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#### The 1AC relies on a futural hope of a “not-yet-realized” future in which they can fantasize about contingent solutions that never come. This hope creates a cruel optimism for black folk that forces them to invest in the pursuit of our own death because it crowds out all non-politically recognizable alternatives. This model for politics only re-entrenches the anti-black world and is an independent reason to reject the aff.

**Warren 15** (Calvin L., Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope; Surce: CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Derrida and French Hegelianism (Spring 2015), XMT, pp. 215-248 Published by: Michigan State University Press Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/crnewcentrevi.15.1.0215> . Accessed: 30/03/2015)

The politics of hope, then, constitutes what Lauren Berlant would call “cruel optimism” for blacks (Berlant 2011). It bundles certain promises about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object that always lies beyond reach. The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal. Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude political hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative [End Page 221] from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an unknown future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives. The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.” “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the onto-existential horizon. The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution—every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself. The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,” a future tense unmoored from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence, the politics of hope cleverly shields its “solutions” from critiques of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense. The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” The field of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/ inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an antiblack world.

#### Their unwarranted faith in the equal distribution of the economy misunderstands that blackness doesn’t not fit within the economy but rather makes it possible through exploitation and expropriation. The aff’s faith in localized officials like Congressmen misses that local governments mobilize policing and the prison system to maintain global economic revenue. The very premise of their politics requires anti-black slavery.

Wang 18 [Jackie, writer, poet, musician, and academic whose writing has been published by Lies Journal, HTML Giant, and BOMBlog, PhD African-American Studies @ Harvard, p. 14-22//AK47]

Before the Ferguson moment and the Black Lives Matter movement I felt compelled to write "Against Innocence" as a response to what I felt was a discursive and political impasse-that is, liberalism's stranglehold on how we understand both the nature of racism and which tactics are legitimate to counter racism. As someone who has extensively researched and is personally affected by mass incarceration, I know that in the United States, blackness is associated with guilt and criminality. Though this conflation has been around for more than a century-as Khalil Muhammad notes in The Condemnation of Blackness-in the 1960s-'90s criminologists, politicians, and policy makers worked vigorously to consolidate the image of the black criminal in the public imagination. For this reason, it seemed counterproductive to construct an antiracist politics founded on the moral framework of innocence, whereby only "respectable" subjects are considered proper symbols for the contestation of racism. Such a political framework would ensure that forms of structural and state violence against those who are not "proper" victims would remain illegible and fail to register as a scandal. The a priori association of blackness with guile and criminality comforts white America by enabling people to believe that black Americans are deserving of their condition and that the livelihoods of whites are in no way bound up with black immiseration. At the same time, the framework of innocence-which fetishizes passivity-delegitimizes militant forms of revolt that may be more potent in actually challenging racism. Though the liberal antiracist framework has not been completely dismantled, I feel that the new, younger generation of activists are not so easily beguiled by the political establishment and the promise of state recognition-unlike those who just a few years ago quixotically held to the belief that it was possible for revolutionaries and the police to be bedfellows. Not only did the Ferguson Uprising make the public acutely aware of just how constitutively racist the police are, it also attracted enough attention that the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation into the practices of the Ferguson Police Department. The investigation ultimately revealed the existence of a system of municipal plunder involving the city financial manager, John Shaw, and the police department. The DOJ discovered that not only were the police killing and harassing residents, but the city was also using the police and the courts to generate revenue to balance the municipal budget. After reading the report and researching this topic, began to pay closer attention to news stories related to municipal and state finance. I realized that across the country, municipalities and states were increasingly dependent on the use of coercive extractive mechanisms that squeezed the people on the bottom for cash. What the fuck was going on? For me, these methods of extraction mark a turning point in what some have called the neoliberal era. Neoliberalism has been defined as: a set of policies and ideological tenets that include the privatization of public assets; the deregulation or elimination of state services; macroeconomic stabilization and the discouragement of Keynesian policies; trade liberalization and financial deregulation; a discursive emphasis on "neutral," efficient, and technical solutions to social problems; and the use of market language to legitimize new norms and to neutralize opposition. 1 Nearly half a century of economic policies that have eroded the power of labor and enabled a high degree of capital mobility has not only resulted in a fiscal race to the bottom that has gutted the tax base in this country, but has also transformed the nature of governance itself. If-to borrow Wolfgang Streeck's taxonomy-the tax state (i.e., the postwar Keynesian welfare state) has evolved into the debt state (which authorizes austerity), then what we are witnessing now is the emergence of the predatory state, which functions to modulate the dysfunctional aspects of neoliberalism and in particular the realization problem in the financial sector. Modern monetary theorists assert that governments •with fiat currency systems (which the U.S. became when President Richard Nixon took the country off the gold standard in 1971) do not need to raise revenue to cover government spending, as they are the monopoly issuers of their respective currencies. However, this is not true for U.S. states and municipalities, as they are unable to issue the U.S. currency, nor can they function by arbitrarily raising their debt ceilings. States and municipalities must either issue bonds (and continue to make payments on their debts) or find a way to raise revenue. Although states cannot file for bankruptcy, municipalities can file under Chapter 9, Tide 11 of the United Scares Code. Depending on the laws of a given state, some municipalities can use bankruptcy to discharge their pension obligations. During the Detroit bankruptcy, the bankruptcy lawyer Timothy M. Wittebort appeared on television touting the widely held (false) myth that ordinary people own the public debt, and thus investors should be given equal priority to pensioners. In reality, between 1989 and 2013, household holdings of municipal bonds have fallen from 4.6 percent to 2.4 percent, and in 2013 the top 0.5 percent of the wealthiest households owned 42 percent of all municipal bonds. 2 The question of who owns the public debt is a political one that enables the financial sector and the wealthiest Americans to assert their interests by claiming that they are everyone's interests. As the public debt is financialized and the money to cover government expenditures is increasingly supplied by the financial sector, government bodies become more accountable to creditors than to the public. Over time, this has a de-democratizing effect. In short, the outcome of neoliberal policies and federal fiscal retrenchment has been not only privatization and austerity, but predatory and parasitic governance on the state and local levels and indebtedness as a generalized social condition. Increasingly, local governments are engaging in risky forms of borrowing, making high-risk financial bets with public money. When these deals go south-as many of them did in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis-governments have sought to balance the budget on the backs of the poor, the unemployed, and black and brown people. Since tax codes are designed such that corporations and wealthy people can easily evade taxation, when the housing market collapsed in 2008, local governments lost a substantial portion of one of their key revenue screams: property taxes. Recently the city of Miami, Florida, sued the Bank of America for indirect financial harm caused by discriminatory subprime mortgage lending, which targeted black and Latinx borrowers for high-interest loans that were designed so that the borrowers would default. By examining recent political developments, we can uncover the interrelatedness of the economy, policing, and municipal finance: the collapse of the housing market created a global economic crisis, which led to the loss of revenue for municipalities, which catalyzed the creation of municipal fiscal schemes that used the police to plunder residents. But given that local law enforcement officers are bankrolled by municipalities, wouldn't their existence be threatened by this new fiscal situation? Although under neoliberalism the power of labor has been weakened in both the public and private sector, police continue to operate with bloated budgets and collect generous pensions. Indeed, in recent years, police unions (and sometimes firefighter and prison guard unions) are among a meager handful of unions that have actually fared well. When Wisconsin governor Score Walker rewrote state labor laws and dismantled collective bargaining rights, he protected police and firefighter unions and excluded them from state pension cuts. Although financing the security apparatus remains a priority of local governments, revenue shortfalls have still put pressure on local police departments. In The Police Chief magazine, Paul LaCommare-a commander from the West Covina Police Department-opens an article about using the police to generate new revenue streams with the observation that a "downward spiral in California city governments' revenue screams has occurred for the last five years starting with the housing bubble that burst property tax returns by 40 percent." He goes on to note that the "common reaction to a budget crisis is reducing personnel and cutting services. The focus of this article is to provide police agencies with an alternative to personnel and service reductions."' In 2008, "experts in the fields of city government, business, real estate, and entrepreneurship" met to "identify possible new income streams that could be initiated by law enforcement." The ideas include: fees for sex offenders registering in a given jurisdiction, city tow companies, fine increases by 50 percent, pay-per-call policing, vacation house check fees, public hours at police firing range for a fee, police department-run online traffic school for minor traffic infractions, department-based security service including home checks and monitoring of security cameras by police department, a designated business to clean biological crime scenes, state and court fees for all convicted felons returning to the community, allowing agency name to be used for advertisement and branding, triple driving-under-the-influence fines by the court, resident fee similar to a utility tax, tax or fee on all alcohol sold in the city, tax or fee on all ammunition sold in the city, public safety fees on all new development in the city, 9- 1-1 fee per use, police department website with business advertisement for support, selling ridea- longs to the public, and police department-run firearm safety classes. Many of the ideas offered above, which represent a move toward offender-funded policing and punishment, incentivize the hyper-exploitation of residents by the police by directly monetizing policing or by using fees and fines to squeeze money out of people who come into contact with police. Places such as Ramsey County, Minnesota, have recently come under fire for charging a range of fees for arrest, regardless of a guilty conviction. As this article suggests, in the new fiscal environment, police are increasingly taking on the role of directly generating revenue, which ensures that their departments do not suffer extensive budget cutbacks and layoffs when there are municipal revenue shortfalls. In other words, their survival and expansion becomes bound up with their capacity to use the police power and the court system to loot residents. As we have seen with the explosion of prisons in the latter half of the twentieth century (which occurred alongside market liberalization), the supposed scaling back of government does not necessarily lead to the shrinking of police, prisons, and military spending. Prisons and law enforcement may actually grow when the ideology of small government is hegemonic because the maintenance of law and order is considered the proper (morally authorized) domain of government. For Bernard E. Harcourt, neoliberal penality is rooted in "the assumption of government legitimacy and competence in the penal arena and, on the other hand, the presumption that the government should not play a role elsewhere. However, the collapse of the tax state owing to neoliberalizarion has created a situation where the livelihoods of local government bodies are increasingly tied to predatory fiscal structures that foster looting.

#### Their focus on techno-fixes to climate change maintain ongoing destruction of the environment by obscuring the social organizations that cause them – ensures that ongoing ecological crisis is inevitable.

Crist in 7 <Eileen. Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech. “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 (Winter 2007): 29–55. CS>

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that **there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner** deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it **encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem;** and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. **Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered** the proliferation of **technical proposals** that address the specific challenge. **The race is on for figuring out what technologies**, or portfolio thereof, **will solve “the problem.”** Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that **dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament.** Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, **if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth.** Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 **But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis**—among numerous other catastrophes—**climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points**.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system.

#### THE FRAMING FOR THE IMPACT CALCULATION ON EVERY FLOW IS THAT IT IS UNETHICAL TO BE FREE IN A WORLD OF SLAVES. THEIR IMPACTS CENTRALIZE THE GRAMMAR OF SUFFERING OF THE MASTER, WHICH IS A CONTINGENT RELATION TO VIOLATION THAT CROWDS OUT ANY CONSIDERATION FOR GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE. THEIR IMMUNITY FROM STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE IS BORN FROM THE SUFFERING OF THE BLACK WHO ARE POSITIONED BY VIOLENCE IN EVERY INTERACTION WITH THE WORLD, INCLUDING DEBATE.

**WILDERSON IN 10** [Frank B., Associate Professor of African American Studies and Drama at the University of California & former member of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, p. 10, C.A.]

**Again, if accumulation and fungibility are the modalities through which Blackness is positioned as incapacity, then genocide is that modality through which embodied Redness is positioned as incapacity. Ontological incapacity,** I have inferred and here state forthright, **is *the* constituent element of ethics.** Put another way, **one cannot embody capacity and be, simultaneously, ethical. *Where there are Slaves it is unethical to be free.*** The Settler/Master’s capacity, I have argued, is a function of exploitation and alienation, and the Slave’s incapacity is elaborated by accumulation and fungibility. But the “Savage” is positioned, structurally, by subjective capacity and objective incapacity, by sovereignty and genocide, respectively. The Indian’s liminal status in political economy, how her and his position shuttles between the incapacity of a genocided object and the capacity of a sovereign subject, coupled with the fact that Redness does not overdetermine the thanatology of libidinal economy (this liminal capacity within political economy and complete freedom from incapacity within libidinal economy) raises serious doubts about the status of “Savage” ethicality vis-à-vis the triangulated structure (Red, White, and Black) of antagonisms. Clearly, **the coherence of Whiteness as a structural position in modernity depends on the capacity to be free from genocide, perhaps not as a historical experience, but at least as a positioning modality.** This embodied capacity (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here, the Indian comes into being and is positioned by an a priori violence of genocide. Whiteness can also experience this kind of violence but only *a fortiori*: genocide may be one of a thousand contingent experiences of Whiteness but it is not a constituent element, it does not make Whites white (or Humans human). **Whiteness can grasp its own capacity, be present to itself, coherent, by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Red genocide, as well as by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Black accumulation and fungibility. If it experiences accumulation and fungibility, or genocide, those experiences must be named,** qualified, that is, “White slavery,” or the Armenian massacre, the Jewish Holocaust, Bosnian interment, **so that such contingent experience is not confused with ontological necessity.** In such a position one can always say, “Im not a ‘Savage’” or “I’m being treated like a nigger.” One can assert one’s Humanity by refusing the ruse of analogy. Regardless of Whites’ historical, and brief, encounters with the modalities of the “Savage” and the Slave, these modalities do not break in on the position of Whiteness with such a force as to replace exploitation and alienation as the Settler/Master’s constituent elements. **We might think of exploitation and alienation as modalities of suffering which inoculate Whiteness from death. If this is indeed the case, then perhaps Whiteness has no constituent elements other than the immanent status of immunity. Still, this immunity is no small matter, for it is the sine qua non of Human capacity.**

#### The alternative to abolish the future. Possibility begins from the starting point that all of this must end. Social and political life is parasitic on anti-black and queer death. Ours is a call for abolition – abolition of the political order of the state and nation that makes executive violence possible.

Dillon 13 [Stephen, Prof. Queer Studies @ Hampshire College, “‘It’s here, it’s that time:’ Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in *Born in Flames*,” *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* vol. 23 no. 1,pp. 45-7//ak]

In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end. In her writing from captivity, Angela Davis articulates this logic in relationship to the prison. In the 1971 essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis argues that the sole purpose of the police was to “intimidate blacks” and “to persuade us with their violence that we are powerless to alter the conditions of our lives” (39). Davis theorizes the violence of police and prisons as pervasive and unrelenting. Throughout the essay, Davis names the complicity between an anti-blackness as old as liberal freedom and new forms of penal and policing technologies that emerged in the 1970s in response to political upheaval and insurrection. Davis calls for the abolition of what she terms the “law-enforcement-judicial-penal network” in addition to arguing for the construction of a mass movement that could contest the “victory of fascism” (50). Yet, in line with the political imaginaries at the time – an imaginary articulated by Born In Flames – Davis wanted more than an end to the prison and the violence of the police. Like other early black feminist writing, Davis did not just call for the overthrow of one form of state power so that a new one may take its place. Instead, Davis implied that the social order itself must be undone. For Davis, the prison was not the primary problem. The prison was made possible by the libidinal, symbolic, and discursive regimes that actualized the uneven institutionalized distribution of value and disposability along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality. Davis called for the total epistemological and ontological undoing of the forms of knowledge and subjectivity that were produced by the racial state. In short, hope, for Davis, meant that the prison could not have a future, and more so, that a world that could have the prison would need to end as well. Critically, Jackson did not understand the end of the future of the social order as particularly different from his present because “I’ve lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief” (1972, 7). Jackson’s understanding of the future arose from his critique of reform. Derived from his correspondence with Davis, Jackson argued that the essence of fascism was reform or more specifically “economic reform” (118).11 Every reform that modified or improved the operations of global capitalism and white supremacy only extended the life of the social order. And the life of the social order, according to Jackson and Fanon, is parasitic on the control, exploitation, incarceration, and premature death of black people. The creation of a new world could not rely on “long term politics” because patience, reform, and change meant nothing to “the person who expects to die tomorrow” (10). For Jackson, the future is a time those without a future cannot risk. The future was not coming and so the present could not wait.

## Case

#### Climate change is not anthropocentric and isn’t just the extinction of humanity—climate change is a product of white culture and means the extinction of minorities—their neutral representations of climate make warming inevitable

Wynter, ‘07 [2007, Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf]

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

#### Racial capitalism leads to technological stagnation – no incentive for basic research

Smith 15 (Tony, Tony Smith is a professor of philosophy at Iowa State University and the author of Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production., “Red Innovation”, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/socialism-innovation-capitalism-smith)

The technological dynamism of capitalism has always been a powerful argument in its defense. But one of its secrets is that at the heart of this change we find neither bold entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, nor established firms. Investments pushing the frontiers of scientific knowledge are just too risky. The advances sought may not be forthcoming. Those that do occur may not ever be commercially viable. Any potentially profitable results that do arise may take decades to make any money. And when they finally do, there are no guarantees initial investors will appropriate most of the resulting windfall. There is, accordingly, a powerful tendency for private capital to systematically underinvest in long-term research and development. Despite popular perceptions that private entrepreneurs drive technological innovation, the leading regions of the global economy do not leave the most important stages of technological change to private investors. These costs are socialized. In the quarter-century after World War II, the high profits garnered by American corporations due to their exceptional place in the world market allowed corporate labs to engage in “blue-skies research” projects. But even then, public funding accounted for roughly two-thirds of all research and development expenditures in the United States, creating the foundations for the high-tech sectors of today. With the rise of competition from Japanese and European capital in the 1970s, private-sector funding of research and development increased. However, long-term projects were almost entirely abandoned in favor of product development and applied-research projects promising commercial advantages in the short-to-medium term. Basic research continued to be funded by the government, like the work in molecular biology that supported the move of agribusiness companies into biotechnology. The same was true for projects of special interest to the Pentagon — the developments associated with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, for instance, which paved the way for modern global positioning systems — and other government agencies. But medium-to-long-term R&D in general was in great danger of falling into a “valley of death” between basic research and immediate development, with neither the government nor private capital providing significant funding for it. For all their rhetoric touting the “magic of the marketplace,” those in the Reagan administration recognized market failure when they saw it. They began to offer federal and publicly funded university laboratories various carrots and sticks to undertake long-term R&D for US capital. New programs were created to provide start-ups with resources to develop innovations prior to the “proof of concept” required by venture capitalists. Under Reagan, the Small Business Innovation Development Act even mandated that federal agencies set aside a percentage of their R&D budget to fund research by small firms. These and other forms of public-private partnership have granted US capital enormous competitive advantages in the world market. It’s no surprise that Apple’s tremendously successful line of products — iPads, iPhones, and iPods — incorporate twelve key innovations. All twelve (central processing units, dynamic random-access memory, hard-drive disks, liquid-crystal displays, batteries, digital single processing, the Internet, the HTTP and HTML languages, cellular networks, GPS system, and voice-user AI programs) were developed by publicly funded research and development projects. It hasn’t been the dynamics of the market so much as active state intervention that has fueled technological change. The Promised Golden Age Technology is more than just a weapon for inter-capitalist competition; it is a weapon in struggles between capital and labor. Technological changes that create unemployment, de-skill the workforce, and enable one sector of the workforce to be played against another shift the balance of power in capital’s favor. Given this asymmetry, advances in productivity that could reduce work time while expanding real wages lead instead to forced layoffs, increasing stress for those still employed and eroding real wages. Two ongoing technological developments further strengthen the power of capital. Advances in transportation and communication now enable production and distribution chains to be extended across the globe, allowing capital to implement “divide and conquer” strategies against labor to an unprecedented extent. Astounding new labor-saving machines are also becoming more and more inexpensive. A recent exhaustive study of over seven hundred occupations concluded that no less than 47 percent of employment in the United States is at high risk of being automated within two decades. Anything approaching this level of labor displacement will yield more misery, not progress, for ordinary workers. But the lower cost and higher capacities of machines have also led to change of a better sort. As the prices of computer hardware, software, and Internet connections have declined, many people can now create new “knowledge products” without working for big capitalists. Multitudes across the globe now freely choose to contribute to collective innovation projects of interest to them, outside the relationship of capital and wage labor. The resulting products can now be distributed as unlimited free goods to anyone who wishes to use them, rather than being scarce commodities sold for profit. It is beyond dispute that this new form of social labor has generated innovations superior in quality and scale to the output of capitalist firms. These innovations also tend to be qualitatively different. While technological developments in capitalism primarily address the wants and needs of those with disposable income, open-source projects can mobilize creative energies to address areas capital systematically neglects, such as developing seeds for poor farmers or medicines for those without the money to buy existing medications. The potential of this new form of collective social labor to address pressing social needs across the globe is historically unprecedented. In order to flourish, however, open-source innovation requires free access to existing knowledge goods. Leading capital firms, hoping to extend their ability to privately profit from publicly supported research, have used their immense political power to extend the intellectual property rights regime in scope and enforcement, severely restricting the access open-source projects require. Copyright, after all, was extended for twenty years at the turn of the century, just as Internet access was starting to balloon. Despite these barriers, the success of open-source projects shows that intellectual-property rights are not required for innovation. Further evidence is provided by the fact that most scientific and technological workers engaged in innovation are forced to sign away intellectual property rights as a condition of employment. These rights actually hamper advancement by raising the cost of engaging in the production of new knowledge, and by diverting funds to unproductive legal costs. The World is Flat? Capitalism also hampers the ability of much of the world to contribute to technological advancement. Whole regions of the global economy lack the wealth to support meaningful innovation. Today, only four countries spend over 3 percent of their GDP on research and development; a mere six others devote 2 percent or more. Capital in these advantaged regions has the opportunity to establish a virtuous circle, free-riding on the extensive public investment discussed above. Privileged access to advanced R&D enables capitalists to appropriate high returns on successful innovations; these returns allow those companies to make effective use of technological advances in the next cycle, setting the stage for future profits. At the same time, enterprises in poorer regions, lacking access to high-level R&D, find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle. Their present inability to make significant innovations that would enable them to compete successfully in world markets undercuts their future prospects. Only a handful of countries — such as South Korea and Taiwan — have ever been able to move forward from this starting disadvantage. Global disparities in technological change alone do not explain why 1 percent of people in the world now own 48 percent of global wealth. But they are a major part of the story; technological change is a weapon that enables the privileged to maintain and extend their global advantages over time. The destructive effects examined above are not necessary features of technological change; they are necessary features of technological change in capitalism. Overcoming them requires overcoming capitalism, even if we only have a provisional sense of what that might mean. The pernicious tendencies associated with technological change in capitalist workplaces are rooted in a structure where managers are agents of the owners of the firm’s assets, with a fiduciary duty to further their private interests. But a society’s means of production are not goods for personal consumption, like a toothbrush. The material reproduction of society is an inherently public matter, as the technological development of capitalism itself, resting on public funds, confirms. Capital markets, where private claims to productive resources are bought and sold, treat public power as if it were just another item for personal use. They can, and should, be totally done away with. Large-scale productive enterprises should instead be acknowledged as a distinct type of public property, and exercises of authority within these workplaces as acts of public authority. The principle of democracy must then come into play: all exercises of this authority must be subject to the consent of those impacted by it. Though additional regulations would be needed if managers were elected and subject to recall by the workforce as a whole, technological advances in productivity would not typically result in the involuntary unemployment of some and the overwork of others, but rather in reduced work for all. We know this because workers say they want more time to spend with their families and friends, or on projects of their own choosing. With democracy in the workplace, the drive to introduce de-skilling technologies would be replaced with a search for ways to make work more interesting and creative. Suppose that decisions regarding the general level of new investment were also a matter for public debate, eventually decided by a democratic body. If there were pressing social needs, the overall rate of new investment could be increased; if this were not the case, it could be stabilized. These bodies could then set aside a portion of new investment funds to provide public goods free of charge, putting more useful goods and services outside the market’s reach. The public goods of scientific and technological knowledge resulting from basic research and long-term R&D would be decommodified, too, as would the fruits of open-source innovation. The latter could be unleashed by abolishing intellectual property rights and by providing an adequate basic income to all — enabling anyone who wished to participate in open-source projects to do so. If special incentives were required, generous prizes could be awarded to the first to solve important challenges. Remaining funds could then be distributed to other elected bodies at various geographical levels, each of which would determine what share would go to public goods in a region. The remainder would be distributed to local community banks charged with allocating them to worker enterprises. Various qualitative and quantitative measures could be employed to measure the extent to which those enterprises used technologies to meet social wants and needs effectively, with the results determining the income beyond the basic level received by their members (and the members of the community banks that allocated investment funds to them). Abolishing intellectual property rights would have the added benefit of ensuring that wealthy regions could not use technological knowledge as a weapon to create and reproduce inequality in the global economy. This danger would be all but eliminated if every region were granted a fundamental right to its per capita share of new investment funds. Finally, if workplaces used productivity advances to free up time for their workers rather than to increase the output of commodities, resources would be depleted and waste generated at a much lower rate. Abolishing capital markets and replacing them with democratic control over levels of new investment would free humanity from the “grow or die” imperative and the environmental consequences that follow from it. If enterprises were acknowledged as inherently matters of public concern, it would eliminate the obscene absurdity of having the fate of humanity rest on whether profit-driven oil companies have the political and cultural power to extract and sell an estimated $20 trillion of fossil-fuel reserves, as they clearly plan to do. If open-source innovation flourished, the creative energies of collective social labor across the planet could be mobilized to address environmental challenges. If poor regions with fragile ecologies were guaranteed their fair share of new investment funds, the pressure to sacrifice long-term sustainability for the sake of short-term growth would be overcome. Of course, all of these proposals are vague and provisional. Nonetheless, they show that the social consequences of technological change could be far different than they are today. We do not need private ownership of productive assets, or markets devoted to financial assets, to have a technologically dynamic society. With the necessary political shifts, technological change would no longer be associated with overaccumulation, financial crises, the stifling of open-source innovation, severe global inequality, or the increasingly palpable threat of environmental catastrophe. We need to unleash the full potential of human ingenuity. The way technology advances is already socialized in important, if restricted and inadequate ways. We can finish the job and make sure that its fruits are put to the benefit of ordinary people.