# RKS Signature File – Psychoanalysis K – Anthony Nguyen

## Notes

### Intro

#### Anthony Nguyen (Westwood HS ’18)

#### nguyenanthony33@gmail.com

#### File mentored by Calum Matheson

#### The following notes are from Calum Matheson’s psychoanalysis lecture:

### Why Psychoanalysis?

#### 1) It’s your thing whether you know it or not – a ton of philosophical arguments you read now, a lot of them have intersections with psychoanalysis.

#### 2) To say you don’t care about it as a blanket theory is wrong - there is no one opinion on psychoanalysis

#### 3) Because it’s integrated everywhere, you get an enormous advantage if you have dug into the stuff when your opponent has not.

### Basic Psychoanalysis Principles

#### What distinguished Lacan from other psychoanalysts – he would say return to Freud and then make something up. His main departure from Freud was to externalize the psyche.

#### Id- drive, the thing that insists/wants.

#### Ego- mechanism to channel the id.

#### Superego- the absorbed sense of morality that limits the ego.

#### Pleasure principle- demands for happiness.

#### When children demand something and parents say no, that’s when the ego demands.

#### Ego is the path for the baby to fulfill its desires.

#### Second no when the baby tries to do something when the parent says that’s wrong.

#### That forms the superego, the child incorporates morals and ethics.

#### Dominant theory in the US- describes individuals and their hidden interiority (what’s inside their heads, when you have desires for stuff you’re socially not allowed, you repress them).

#### Libido- repressed will to get what you want, it’s channeled somewhere else to stand in for something it really wants.

#### Lacan wanted to externalize that – the formation of the subject, desire, repression, are all external in some way. The subject is the product of them, but they are not the product of the subject. Baby has no concept of subjectivity – babies aren’t integrated because they don’t understand themselves as discrete entities, the self/other boundary is very vague. The self forms when it identifies with something it calls the self.

#### Formation of the subject happens through the mirror stage- sees reflective image, now when the baby moves its arms, the thing in the mirror moves its arm, it comes to identify itself with the thing in the mirror. In the description of the mirror stage, the baby sees itself, identifies with it, then the Big Other (parent) says yes, that’s you. The baby identifies itself with its specular image. The reflection is the first part of its identity. There is no hidden babyness of the baby that’s not in the mirror, it forms its identity with the mirror. The reflected identity is the signifier.to address others is to address yourself in a certain way. That image is what you come to identify with. I want you to give that to me – describes how the other interacts with you, id want other to give that to ego. The big O Other- the whole order of language and signification, the way the subject forms to identify with the signifier is the way it can participate in the whole of language overall.

#### Order of exchange in language – you can participate in language and be a member of society, but you have to lose the sense of continuity with everything else. There’s always something missing, when you demand stuff it has to happen through the medium of the signifier, language doesn’t totally capture the world, and as a result, your desire is never entirely fulfilled because concepts/linguistic objects don’t restore that sense of lost harmony with everything else. This is the Lack – the pole in the center of your existence that isn’t fulfilled even when you get the object that you insist on, it’s wanting fulfillment in an impossible way, to eliminate the Lack is to break the universe between self and universe. The desire is impossible to fulfill because it would destroy the subject itself, when you seek the Lack, you seek self-destruction. For a subject, it’s an impossible demand. The thing that’s missing is the Lack, subjects aren’t aware of their own Lack. People imagine their desire to be for specific things, they imagine an object that would fulfill that Lack, but each object that you desire even when you attain it, the minute that you have it, you want something else. There’s an endless chain of objects, petit objet “a”, it could be anything but it is also nothing, no real object in the world fulfills that Lack but you desire specific objects because you attach to them, become affectively invested. The signifier that represents the lack. You have an asymptotic relationship to the object.

#### There’s a drive for stuff, but each thing you attain is a failure in a way, you can never fulfill desire but you keep doing it, you keep trying, this is the drive. Freud’s drives were Eros and Thanatos, Eros is desire for love/union/make whole, Thanatos is desire for destruction/return to inorganic state. Why do people continue to do things that don’t make them happy. Repeating a game that it can’t win gives it control over absence/presence, it wants to control it, no absence or presence, this is the repetition compulsion. For Lacan there’s no separate, there’s only one drive and it’s the death drive, it’s not really about death, but repetition in the face of failure, people attach to things as a result even when they don’t bring them pleasure while it’s self-destructive. Jouissance- enjoyment, has more ambivalence, the sense of enjoying the thing but it also has some element of death, yet people repeatedly do it (affective investment in a thing) but we keep doing stuff even when it hurts us because we keep telling ourselves this is what the subject is so it keeps investing itself. One doesn’t see the Lack invested. The death drive isn’t internal to the subject, described it in biological terms but it’s not something that organism has. Not internal biology but product of the symbolic, the set of signifiers in which you live, desire mediated through signifying elements so as a result it always has a social component. What people want that would fulfill the lack changes over time and place, it’s culturally dependent so there’s no inbuilt desire, the symbolic order is what defines those things for you, you’re aware of signifiers/concepts that you don’t come up with, but you’re still exposed to, you have internal desire. Mimetic desire, you know what you want because other people around you want the same thing. There is no you – the subject is socially construct, there’s a split subject not a unified subject due to the repeated identification with things that aren’t you. Mimetic desire is the process where as a set of identities you built a concept of what you want, they exist in language, they’re all words/signifiers but by necessity they’re available to everybody else. There’s no signifier that’s special for you. You want objects of desire because other people want them, part of the death drive is the kind of competition that results from that. People would rather destroy the object than maintain it if they can’t have it. There’s a foundational antagonism where sometimes desires are in conflict with one another. As a result there’s some irreducible conflict in the social.

#### The death drive is a social force that necessitates that, it can be generalized to the way societal interactions work at a social level. Lacan adapted Hegel to describe social relations of mastery, the four discourses. The master is the signifier of sheer will, the monarch that insists that they have a right to rule just because (s1). Greek slavery matters because slaves were often tutors- produced knowledge, the master is the insistent groundless expression that intervenes into an order of society and demands something. The thing that the master demands and is produced is knowledge, while they know nothing. $ is the lacking subject, the master insists to fulfill the barred subject. Academic discourse changes it. S2 desires knowledge, the master demanding the split subject, the real project of Marxism wasn’t that the law produces knowledge, but what’s going on beneath the surface is the master is defining what the subject should be, the project of enlightenment European philosophy. “What you demand is a new master and you will get one.”

#### Applications to debate- when we imagine a better society, in some ways, the imagination of those improvements is just imagining an object that stands in for something else. Mimetic desire and the death drive-> utopian projects are always failure. The imagination of societies occur in the symbolic, concepts that are related to one another. We mistake reality for the real, for Lacan there were 3 orders of human experience. Symbolic is the set of protocols that link signifiers together- grammar, you can read a nonsense sentence and recognize that it’s grammatically correct even if the meaning of it doesn’t make any sense. Content of signifiers is imaginary- X + Y = Z, symbolic is protocol for solving, but what you get is another scenario, Imaginary is how you attach that variable to meaning, the set of signifiers that are structurally related to one another, collectively/affectively invest into the subject. The Real is not mind independent reality- the Real means it’s when the mind-independent reality suddenly show up and demonstrate the arbitrariness of our world. We tend to take things for granted until something goes wrong or gets disrupted. Some phenomenon happened that isn’t incorporated into our world. When we plan perfect socities they aren’t really perfect because they follow the intersection of the symbolic and the imaginary, when something oges wrong, politically the first response isn’t because of the death drive, but scapegoating. Famines/purges- great example of how the death drive gets out of control, someone had to be blamed, violence escalated without a grand plan behind it. Soviet Union famine kill the kulaks, party bosses shooting kulaks so that it’s competitive.

#### Project of policy based fiat is a similar thing- the object desires the ballot to make the world a better place and there’s a constant competitive drive to accumulate them but that perfect society never materializes them. Used as a framework argument, the question to achieve the perfect world, the ballot stands in for an infinite signifying chain, the ballot stands in for mimetic desire. General link argument, the death drive could be used as an alternate explanation through the example of the ballot.

### Responses to Psychoanalysis

#### It is non-falsifiable, no scientist has ever found the death drive in the wild. Psychoanalysis is like a priesthood that describes a hidden structure of the unconscious, creates all social relations and psychoanalysis is a totalitarian science to claim access to its hidden real and is an oppressive tool as a result. It’s wrong because the theory of the unconscious can’t be proved, there’s no such thing as an active unconscious. Probably true about Freud where he was wrong about the biology of the drive, but for Lacan stuff isn’t biological, not about specific subjects, his innovation was to make the unconscious not something inside your skull, but a society phenomenon. Unconscious is set of relations but we aren’t necessarily directly aware of. Tracing the way words evolve over time. Covering over those things is repression. There is no internal you, so the theory of the active unconscious isn’t real. Repressed things are signifiers in the unconscious, an external phenomenon of language and not an internal phenomenon of the subject. None of the social sciences are actually sciences and no theory in the humanities is actually falsifiable, that standard would destroy almost every statement. Correlating data points doesn’t prove causality, historical theories are not falsifiable, aggregation of a bad data. Human beings make predictions very difficult- complexity mathematics, describe the inevitability that there are increases and decreases in economic activity.

### Things to Read

#### “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric” by Christian Lundberg

#### “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” by Todd McGowan

#### “Lacan and the Political” by Yannis Stavrakakis

## Shells

### 1NC Lundberg

#### The 1AC’s demand to be recognized as a form of political dissent is an investment in the hegemonic order – the power of demand stems from the authority of the system. Their failure to theorize desire turns the 1AC into a moment of jouissance that betrays their radical intentions in order to maintain the possibility of protest. The 1AC is structured by an agential fantasy – This constant repetition of the demand that to change our representations that will never be fulfilled invests desire solely onto the level of demand – creating a constant repetition of the same – The 1NC is a no to the affirmative and disrupts the agential fantasy in favor of reinvesting desire in light of the death drive.

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

In the run up to the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, the Mexican Government composed a list of the sixty most “globalophobic” leaders of antiglobalization groups. The document, subsequently leaked to the Mexican newspaper La Reforma, was met with predictable criticisms regarding the relationship between state security apparatuses, the institutions of global economic governance, and democratic protest. But there were less predictable responses: in addition to criticisms that the list chilled democratic dissent, some antiglobalization groups criticized the list for not being comprehensive enough, demanding its expansion. Activist Josef Schneider wrote: “What do we have to do to get a little credit? . . . In a not-very secret document . . . the Mexican government compiled a list of ‘globalophobic leaders’ who will be singled out for special scrutiny by the Mexican police. Despite the role that Portland activists played in the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, none of us made the list!”24 More than a passing lament, the remainder of the article analyzes the reasons why the Mexican government neglected to include any Portlanders, arguing that the Mexican state’s class bias prompted them to ignore the true threat that ordi- nary citizens posed to the WTO: “They can’t accept that a bunch of ordinary citizens are the ones who are the biggest threat to shut down the WTO. . . . How typical.”25 By this diagnosis, the Mexican response typifies institutional attempts to downplay protest. Here, the lack of recognition does not make the protest ineffective, instead the fact that the Mexican government and the WTO underestimate the danger posed by ordinary citizens animates this critique. Not to be outdone, the Mexico Solidarity Network created an online form letter for self-identified “dangerous antiglobalization groups”: Dear Government Agents Bent on Restricting Civil Liberties, I recently found out about the “watch list” prepared by Mexican authorities, purportedly to quell the voice of civil society at the upcoming WTO Ministerial in Cancun. . . . Please add my name to your “watch list” immediately!! Nothing less is acceptable.26 One might read such demands as parodic critiques of globalization and security, as ironic calls for mobilization, as a strategy of overidentification, or as any combination of these. Even though these demands represent a call for inclusion as a means of democratizing global governance, these demands are not simply for inclusion: they are also demands to be recognized as dangerous and in solidarity with other similarly dangerous global citizens. How is it possible to ground a reading of the rhetorical functions of the demand to be recognized as dangerous? For Laclau, such demands ought be read through their potential to activate relations of solidarity: the individual call to be recognized as dangerous and excluded opens the possibility for equivalential linkages between the subjects who lodge such demands and others who are similarly situated in relation to the hegemonic order. Here, all demands entail a split between the concrete particular conditions of their articulation and the more universal political possibility that they potentially ground. This split implies that demands are caught up in a formal logic of trope: metonymic connections between disparate demands are condensed in metaphors that figure a relation to and make claims on a political order. But in a Lacanian reading another split is at work in and underwrites the split identified by Laclau between the particular content and universal possibilities for affinity implied in the demand. This supplementary split inheres between the subject who enjoys the mere fact of affinity with a group as a mode of (mis)identification and the set of identitarian equivalences inaugurated by investing in the specific content of the demand. Specific political demands contain a universal commitment that authorizes equivalential linkages and are simultaneously sites of enjoyment that create ritually repeated relationships to a hegemonic order. Based on this Lacanian reading, it is not the change that the demand anticipates, nor the political potential of forging equivalential links that is significant, but the role demand plays for the one who utters it and the modes of interpassive political affinity entailed that are of primary analytical importance. Working through the complexity of demands requires reading the demand for recognition as a practice of enjoyment—as an affectively invested call for sanction and love by the governing order. Demands also entail a perverse dialectic of political agency as resistance and simultaneous interpassive political constraint. Demands empower forms of political agency by generating an oppositional relationship to hegemonic structures and by providing the equivalential preconditions for identity. As Žižek might have it, there is always the risk that the demands of protestors are the supplement that authorizes the functioning of capital.27 Enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account, a dynamic that stands out in particularly stark relief in Laclau’s work. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, his theory of demand is not explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a “complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau’s work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance.”28 Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is “to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau’s work to the concept of jouissance.”29 On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance in Copjec’s work, which Laclau summarizes by saying: “There is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical.”30 There is an elegance to Laclau’s point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau’s work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. But with Laclau’s insight on the formal similarities of enjoyment and hegemony come certain ~~blind~~ [blank] spots. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as “achievable” as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This “uselessness” defines the operation of jouissance. When Lacan suggests that “language is not the speaking subject” in the seminar On Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification. Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the gristmill of speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning, and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization, is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental “split” in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Posing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. The demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects and to be given the sanction and love of the Symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure, and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes or points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion: can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud’s tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud’s account of the ego does not characterize the ego as preexistent or automatically given. The ego is not inevitably present in every human subject: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a “subject” whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfills its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. “Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may I have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” In “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function.... [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfillment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by extension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” Understanding the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at Freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the subject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective intentions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of accommodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing demands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As I have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal I. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a nonrelationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to notice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Thus, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “In this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The structural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name ~~his~~ [their] desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . .In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gérard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the “hysteric . . . cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own. . . . [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge. . . . [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition—being put under pressure to answer a question.”44 Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes naming in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation between jouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

### 1NC Policy – Fund Education

#### Their faith in education as a democratic tool to better the conditions of students is misplaced. Instead, education has become a process of the re-subjectification of students in which their identities are erased in the name of academic achievement and performance – this death drive of student self-completion sustains the educational system.

Stillwaggon 17 (James Stillwaggon obtained a Ph.D. in Philosophy and Education at the Teachers College of Columbia University, ““A FANTASY OF UNTOUCHABLE FULLNESS”: MELANCHOLIA AND RESISTANCE TO EDUCATIONAL TRANSFORMATION”, Educational Theory, Volume 1) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

Democratic systems of education cannot help their attraction to the idea of the self-made man, or, less colloquially, the ideal educated subject as constructed entirely through its adventures and experiences in the world. The radically mutable understanding of childhood that can be traced from John Locke, through John Watson and B. F. Skinner, to the patchwork of developmental and cognitive educational psychologies that inform educational policy in our own time grounds the promise that democratic schooling will not only be a matter of sifting out the naturally talented from the rest, but will offer every student an opportunity at becoming something more than the accidental characteristics ~~he or she inherits~~ [they inherit] at birth. Beyond its sorting function, the mission of the democratic school involves transforming the inchoate wilderness of childhood into the finished product of democratic citizenry through participation in multiple, overlapping discourses of democratic life. Yet despite all the scholarly and especially political attention paid to improving our schools’ abilities to transform student lives, the positive language of policy typically fails to recognize the scattered tradition of extraordinary works, often found on the fringes of educational scholarship or outside of it entirely, that articulate the tremendous burden of educational transformation required of students who come to schooling from marginalized backgrounds.2 Students, after all, are the ones expected to accomplish the work of changing themselves in relation to curricular norms, often without any acknowledgment that the changes they undergo not only involve the triumphs of self-overcoming but also the unavoidable experience of loss as they trade their untaught pasts for competent futures. Where these feelings of loss go unrecognized, a potential for resistance manifests itself in the form of an identification with their lost connections rather than with the positive promises of educational transformation. An unintended result of our faith in education as a democratic tool is that our universally high expectations of educational achievement threaten to re-entrench the very differences they seek to erase at a level where they may be less susceptible to students’ desires for self-completion. One of the sites where melancholic identification manifests itself most visibly in educational endeavors is in the realization of democratic educational promise in those whose social identities change radically as a result of their education. Describing the high expectations for working-class British students’ college attendance and degree completion, Diane Reay quotes Pierre Bourdieu’s claim that the ultimate burden of educational reform often rests on the shoulders of its intended beneficiaries: Educational systems across Western society universally impose the same demands without any concern for universally distributing the means for satisfying them, thus helping to legitimate the inequality that one merely records and ratifies, while additionally exercising (first of all in the educational system) the symbolic violence associated with the effects of real inequality within formal equality.3 According to Reay, the upshot of raising educational expectations and broadening educational opportunity as a means toward greater social and economic equality is an imposition of upper-class values on any working-class student willing to sever ties with familial and class identities: “In England, in the minority of cases when the equation of working class plus education equals academic success, education is not about the valorization of working classness but its erasure.”4 Education in these circumstances thus promises a means of escape from the culture into which one is born, but as Reay argues, this notion of escaping one’s own, and especially of contributing to negative understandings of one’s own through a willingness to escape, produces problems of identity for the very student subjects we would rely upon to bring about the kind of changes that democratic educational reforms aim to realize: “among its many promises and possibilities, higher education poses a threat to both authenticity and a coherent sense of selfhood.… Class hybridity does not sit easily with a sense of authenticity. Feelings of being an imposter are never far away.”5 To use Reay’s language, successful working-class students may experience “the threat of losing oneself”6 to a system of interconnected discourses that fail to represent any aspect of their life experiences outside of school, and may forego the widely recognized benefits of higher education for the more familiar identity categories of the home. Alternatively, successful working-class (or otherwise culturally different) students who remain engaged with the target culture in which they have been educated may find themselves at a loss: always feeling the split between their outward, professional identity and their inner feelings of belonging. Students in the latter group may even subject themselves to judgmental critique as they attempt to bring the various and often unspoken commitments that constitute their sense of identity under a single narrative. Reay’s findings validate my sixth graders’ statements of resistance, insofar as they already anticipated the alienation necessary to their academic growth. While it may appear inappropriate to take up the question of students’ suffering and resistance in language more commonly associated with pathology, melancholia has maintained an ambivalent place in Western thought for as long as it has been recognized as a marginal characteristic of the human psyche: as with Antigone, melancholia serves as both an individual pathology and an indicator of social ills. Aristotle seems to have been the first to identify the excess of black bile (melaina chole), from which the term “melancholia” is derived, with an exceptional, generative aspect of human nature “coextensive with man’s anxiety in Being.”7 The ambivalence of the melancholic’s exceptional status carries through German Romanticism, in which the melancholic character, in the form of the Beautiful Soul, is endowed with greater vision of the world and its limitations “on account of a surfeit of humanity” (BS, 7), but is at the same time ~~paralyzed~~ [halted] by the conflict between its infinite spirit and the limitations and disappointments of the world. Following this doubled historical characterization, Sigmund Freud’s early works assign melancholia a strictly pathological status, while later developments explore the significance of the subject’s earliest, unspeakable attachments in describing early moments in the development of the subject’s character. More recently, based on Judith Butler’s work, David Eng has reconceived melancholia’s life beyond its clinical role in pathologizing the experiences of women in patriarchal society by reclaiming its capacity to describe the attachments of minoritized subjects to those aspects of their identity that constitute their difference.8 From within the dominant discourses of flourishing and success that define any particular community, an attachment to objects unrecognized and indescribable in those discourses would certainly seem pathological. Implicit to the working of democratic societies, however, remain two important ties to those beloved objects that recalcitrantly remain unmournable, indescribable, or ineffable. First, aspects of humanity that were at one time unrecognized as human have played an important role in human rights discourses: those anomalies that have demanded a reconsideration of what is human have brought the most enriching changes to our shared understanding of humanity. Second, human communities are often founded on what might be called ineffable principles, followed faithfully by those who have no capacity to rationally justify their soundness. Considering the place of the ineffable in the founding and maintenance of communal ties, we can appreciate the significance of retaining a view of melancholia that describes not so much the pathologized as the marginalized — the “other” who helps us understand who “we” are — as a means of recognizing the role that difference plays within schooling without making that difference insignificant by merely accepting it. To foreground one of the assumptions that makes the use of psychoanalytic thought in educational contexts possible, the notion of education employed here is not a matter of delivering content to an established subject, but a regular re-subjectification of the student in relation to new forms of language and disciplines that claim the student’s identity as educated and may be changed by ~~his or her~~  [their] inclusion in this category. The upshot of this recursively constituting view of education is that the crisis of loss and language that occasions the advent of melancholia in the subject is not limited to a particular developmental stage, and is especially not limited to the pre–school age period during which one’s first language is typically learned. The refusal of language as a replacement for a lost or unspeakable object can be seen as a potential outcome at every stage of the subject’s educational life, and the preference or erotization of suffering that grows from this refusal is at stake in each attempt made by the student to rediscover and reinvent ~~him- or herself~~ [themselves] in the language of the curriculum. While the interpellation of the subject within language is necessary to its education in any particular discourse of human flourishing, in order to remain a distinct self rather than be swallowed whole by the interests of a discourse the subject must engage in some sort of refusal of language in its own formation. That this assertion of something in the self that is more than the sum of its influences — a character or personal style — derives more from the limitations of language to account for its own creations than from an original nature or inborn disposition has important consequences for the way we understand the recalcitrant child, the refusal of curricular goals, and the formation of competent human subjects.

#### The repression of the death drive creates a politics of utopia sustained by the genocide of communities that do not fall into the boundaries of the harmonious world.

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and the Political”, 10/3/99) AqN

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same. The first condition of possibility for its emergence is the dislocation of traditional forms of organising and making sense of society, a dislocation inflicted by the increased hegemony of secularism, liberalism, socialism, industrialisation, etc. Faced with such disorientating developments, people can very easily resort to a promise for the re-establishment of a lost harmony. Within such a context Hitler proved successful in persuading the Germans that he was their only hope. Heartfield’s genius collages exposing the dark kernel of National Socialism didn’t prove very effective against Nazi propaganda. It was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety (especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler’s hegemony, to the hegemony of the Nazi utopian promise. At the very time when German society was turning into one of the great industrial powers of Europe, a land of factories and cities, technology and bureaucracy, many Germans were dreaming of an archaic world of Germanic peasants, organically linked by bonds of blood in a ‘natural’ community. Yet, as Cohn very successfully points out, ‘such a view of the world requires an anti-figure, and this was supplied partly by the liberal West but also, and more effectively, by the Jews’ (Cohn, 1996:188). The emergence of the Jew as a modern antichrist follows directly from this structural necessity for an anti-figure. Rosenberg, Goebbels and other (virtually all) Nazi ideologues used the phantom of the Jewish race as a lynch-pin binding the fears of the past and prospective victims of modernisation, which they articulated, and the ideal volkish society of the future which they proposed to create in order to forestall further advances of modernity. (Bauman, 1989:61) No doubt the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy is a revival, in a secularised form, of certain apocalyptic beliefs. There is clearly a connection between the famous forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the antichrist prophecy (Cohn, 1996:48). The Protocols were first published by Nilus as part of his book The Great in the Small: Antichrist Considered as an Imminent Political Possibility and were published in 1917 with the title He is Near, At the Door…Here comes Antichrist and the Reign of the Devil on Earth. As the famous Nazi propagandist Rosenberg points out ‘One of the advance signs of the coming struggle for the new organisation of the world is this understanding of the very nature of the demon which has caused our present downfall. Then the way will be open for a new age’ (Rosenberg in Cohn, 1996:217). Within this schema the elimination of the antichrist, that is the Jews, is considered as the remedy for all dislocations, the key to a new harmonious world. Jews were seen as deserving death (and resented for that reason) because they stood between this one imperfect and tension-ridden reality and the hoped-for world of tranquil happiness…the disappearance of the Jews was instrumental in bringing about the world of perfection. (Bauman, 1989:76) As Sartre claims, for the anti-Semite the Good itself is reduced to the destruction of Evil. Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite one can only reveal the optimistic belief that harmony will be reconstituted of itself, once Evil is destroyed. When the mission of the anti-Semite as holy destroyer is fulfilled, the lost paradise will be re-established (Sartre, 1995:43–5).8 In Adorno’s words, ‘charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation…. It is the great Panacea…the key to everything’ (Adorno, 1993:311, my emphasis). Simply put, the elimination of the Jew is posited as the only thing that can transform the Nazi dream to reality, the only thing that can realise utopia.9 As it is pointed out by an American Nazi propagandist, ‘our problem is very simple. Get rid of the Jews and we’d be on the way to Utopia tomorrow. The Jews are the root of all our trouble’ (True in Cohn, 1996:264, my emphasis). The same is, of course, true of Stalinism. Zygmunt Bauman brings the two cases together: Hitler’s and Stalin’s victims were not killed in order to capture and colonise the territory they occupied…. They were killed because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing was not the work of destruction but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world—more efficient, more moral, more beautiful—could be established. A Communist world. Or a racially pure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict free, docile in the hands of their rulers, orderly, controlled. (Bauman, 1989:93) In any case, one should not forget that the fact that the anti-figure in Nazi ideology came to be the Jew is not an essential but a contingent development. In principle, it could have been anyone. Any of us can be a substitute for the Jew. And this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In their classical study of the authoritarian personality Theodor Adorno and his colleagues point out that ‘subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks’ (Adorno, 1993:303). Although the need for the structural position of the anti-figure remains constant the identity of the ‘subject’ occupying that position is never given a priori. This does not mean that within a certain historical configuration with a particular social sedimentation and hegemonic structure all the possibilities are open to the same extent; it means though that in principle nobody is excluded from being stigmatised. Of course, the decision on who will eventually be stigmatised depends largely on the availability within a particular social configuration of groups that can perform this role in social fantasy, and this availability is socially constructed out of the existing materials. As Lacan points out in Anxiety, although a lack or a void can be filled in several ways (in principle), experience—and, in fact, analytic experience—shows that it is never actually filled in 99 different ways (seminar of 21 November 1962). What we have here is basically **a** play of incarnation. This play of incarnation is marking both the pole of the utopian fantasies and the pole of the evil powers that stand between us and them. As Cohn concludes, Middle Ages prophecies had a deep effect on the political attitudes of the times. For people in the Middle Ages, the drama of the Last Days was not a distant and hazy but an infallible prophecy which at any given moment was felt to be on the point of fulfilment: In even the most unlikely reigns chroniclers tried to perceive that harmony among Christians, that triumph over misbelievers, that unparalleled plenty and prosperity which were going to be the marks of the new Golden Age. When each time experience brought the inevitable disillusionment people merely imagined the glorious consummation postponed to the next reign. (Cohn, 1993c:35) But this fantasy cannot be separated by the coming of the antichrist which was even more tensely awaited. Generation after generation of medieval people lived in continuous expectation of signs of the antichrist, and since these signs, as presented in the prophecies, included comets, plague, bad rulers, famine, etc. a similar play of incarnation was played out in terms of determining the true face of the antichrist (ibid.).

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud's metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn't have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject's lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject's self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject's activity. According to the theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good - any progress - will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. This occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, an effort to sustain one's disorder in the face of the imminence of the cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic relationships that fail according to a precise pattern. Politically, it means that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat and thereby incessantly undermines itself, there is a backlash written into every progressive program from the outset. The death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked to trauma. This structure renders difficult all attempts to prompt subjects to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. The death drive leads subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that would lead to their good. Common sense tells us that sadism is easier to understand than masochism, that the sadist's lust for power over the object makes sense in a way that the masochist's self-destruction does not. But for psychoanalysis, masochism functions as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. Considering the structure of the death drive, masochism becomes easily explained, and sadism becomes a mystery. Masochism provides the subject the enjoyment of loss, while sadism seems to give this enjoyment to the other. This is exactly the claim of Jacques Lacan's revolutionary interpretation of sadism in his famous article "Kant with Sade." Though most readers focus on the essay's philosophical coupling of Kantian morality with Sadean perversion, the more significant step that Lacan takes here occurs in his explanation of sadism's appeal. Traditionally, most people vilify sadists for transforming their victims into objects for their own satisfaction, but Lacan contends that they actually turn themselves into objects for the other's enjoyment. He notes: "The sadist discharges the pain of existence into the Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an 'eternal object:" Though the other suffers pain, the other also becomes the sole figure of enjoyment. What the sadist enjoys in the sadistic act is the enjoyment attributed to the other, and the sadistic act attempts to bring about this enjoyment. In this sense, sadism is nothing but an inverted form of masochism, which remains the fundamental structure of subjectivity.22 Self-destruction plays such a prominent role in human activities because the death drive is the drive that animates us as subjects. Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman 0. Brown, another celebrated proponent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, attempts to construct a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a powerful category on its own. In Life against Death, Brown conceives of the death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, "The death instinct is the core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant's incapacity to accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time leads to death:'23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically, because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own death, according to Brown's view, we would avoid falling into the death drive and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness. Like Marcuse, Brown's societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs. Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself) than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the repetition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of progress altogether.

### 1NC Policy – Regulate Education

#### Education reform is a project that seeks to create psychic dead zones structured by the death drive. The very language of education constricts the symbolic – this produces a desensitization and psychic numbness that serve to smooth the processes of governmentality.

Taubman 17 (Peter Taubman is a professor of secondary education at the Brooklyn College, “Death by Numbers: A Response to Backer, Sarigianides, and Stillwaggon”, SYMPOSIUM: ON THE UNMOURNED LOSSES OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH. GUEST EDITOR: JAMES STILLWAGGON, Educational Theory, 2/7/17) AqN \*modified for ableist rhetoric\*

Freud's initial claim was that the death drive compels us to return to an inanimate or inert state.11 What if we were to read the death drive not in the literal sense but rather in the figurative sense, as a drive to put an end to memory, and history, and therefore to feelings? What if the death drive kills that which, in fact, makes us human? What if we have within us as individuals or groups a drive that, provoked and shaped by particular constellations of social and historical forces or by particular conditions, impels us to create psychic dead zones, to render ourselves and others less than human? As Michael Eigen said, “When one is dead, one fears being alive.”12 The Death of History If repetition results from not remembering or is a form of remembering without working through, if it is a way, as Adam Phillips suggests, of “making memory impossible,” of “determinedly wishing not to know” or creating “states of mind in which there is nothing left to remember,”13 then can we not read the death drive in terms of a force that destroys history and memory? Might not the compulsion to repeat, in which Freud initially located the death drive, be seen in the repetition compulsion of education, returning again and again to the same purported panaceas as a way to avoid the trauma of its inherent impossibility? “To be locked in the past,” James Baldwin wrote, “means that one has no past, since one can never assess it, or use it, and if one cannot use the past, one has no present.”14 One is, as Baldwin warns, stuck in a perpetual youth, a corrupt innocence. Can we not see such corrupt innocence in education reform's insistence on its newness, its certainty, and its “nowness”? Anyone who opposes ed reform is cast as living in a dead past. Can we not see this ~~blind~~ [blank] innocence in the failure to work through histories and dreams of and dependence on, for example, white supremacy or misogyny? Certainly in the United States, the inability to face the trauma of race and the resistance to looking at the role of white supremacy in the formation of identities, fortunes, and education policies create not only racial melancholia but psychic dead zones and reveal the workings of a death drive. Sarigianides suggests as much in her reading of American Born Chinese.15 As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, the “tenacious dream of white, straight, male exceptionalism that thrives on generalization, limiting questions, and privileging immediate answers” numbs memory and erases history.16 This drive to forget, to not remember, is evident, too, in the contention by education reformers in the United States that the history of education is irrelevant to becoming a teacher and in the denigration of foundation courses in teacher education. If history is offered, it is as what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno referred to as a fixed order of time, not something living but transformed into the “material to be used for the ideology of progress.”17 When education reformers offer medicine, engineering, and architecture as analogies for teaching, or when they base their views of teaching in the learning sciences, they effectively remove teaching from the world of history. The Death of Feelings But if memory and history disappear, what happens to feelings? Let us follow Brian Massumi and take feelings to be both personal and biographical. They are, he writes, body-based sensations, checked against remembered experiences that emerge in language.18 What will happen to feelings if memory and history vanish and the language in which feelings take form diminishes? If the language of education reform increasingly constricts the symbolic — I imagine many of us have had the experience of feeling suffocated or flattened by that language at meetings — and if it makes relationships suspect — I imagine, too, we have all felt interpersonal exchanges rushed, diminished, or mistrusted under the glare of audit — might we not also venture that such language diminishes the world of feelings? Certainly we know that education reform culls its language from the worlds of finance and business, which reduce all behavior to the bottom line; from the learning sciences, which render knowledge and wisdom as information and insist on predictability and replicability; from the military, with its focus on command and control; and from the world of sports, which knows only winners and losers. The language of these worlds evacuates our subjectivity, except insofar as it demands that we endlessly monitor, control, and improve ourselves and others. This demand for constant improvement, a kind of superego of education reform, lacerates us with the harsh and narrow language of failure, substituting imperious judgment for conversation and, as Adam Phillips suggests in Unforbidden Pleasures, submitting our lives to one, often cruel, “correct” interpretation.19 The self-denigration with which Freud distinguished melancholia from mourning appears in the impoverished language of the superego that harbors the drive to turn us into objects. The language of the superego, Phillips further suggests, is filled with petty and cruel demands and vicious charges that we are never enough.20 There is no dialogue, no poetry, no interpretive flexibility. There is only the one right answer, and we are reduced to an object whipped and rendered inert, left with only depression or, turned outward, rage, and a lingering affect provoked by the constrictions of deadened identities and numbed and numbered selves. The superego — that stuck record that endlessly reiterates its scathing criticism in its impoverished vocabulary — first turns us into an object by telling us who we are before it unleashes its scorn on us. As Phillips writes, “[T]he superego treats the ego like an object not a person.”21 Can we not ~~see~~ [recognize] the work of the death drive in the way teachers and students are articulated as bundles of skills, lists of rules and procedures, and scripts written, designed, and packaged somewhere else? It's no wonder that education reformers talk so much of “building” a better teacher. Through various vocabularies and practices of quantification, we are rendered and render ourselves as machines: efficient, predictable, and easily programmed, machines that elicit and process numerical data. The impoverishment of language results not only from the barrage of terms culled from the worlds of business, the learning sciences, the military, and sports, but also from ed reform's fascination with and promotion of technology. Sherry Turkle, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has perhaps written most persuasively about the role of technology in the transformation of our feeling life. She is particularly worried about the decline in empathy among young people and the blurring of boundaries between machines and humans, as robots come to be programmed to give the appearance of feeling.22 If feelings disappear or emerge only in terms of spatial descriptions — I feel high, low, flat, as Fredric Jameson so many years ago claimed was happening in our postmodern state23 — what happens to thought? Deprived of feeling, does not thought itself dry up? Bound by rules of statistical evidence, empirical verifiability, experimental design, and linear sequential logic, rendered always in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of Bloom's taxonomy, thinking hardens. The rigor demanded by education reformers becomes rigor mortis. If repetition compulsion signals the presence of the death drive, then perhaps we can say that such repetition is indeed in the service of an ultimately deadening psychic stasis, of numbing feelings. Even the addict who would seem to be seeking the rush of affect and who is certainly caught in a repetition compulsion is trying hard not to feel. This is why recovery can be so hard — too many feelings. Is it possible, then, that all the various defenses we erect serve to defend against feelings, to achieve psychic numbness? Are they perhaps all really minions of the death drive? Can we read the death drive in Theodor Adorno's manipulative character, who is “distinguished by a rage for organization and a certain lack of emotion and one who is obsessed with doing things as well as becoming a thing,” or in Christopher Bollas's normotic, who “fails to symbolize in language his subjective states of mind” and is “inclined to reflect on the thingness of objects, on their material reality, or on ‘data’ that relates to material phenomena”?24 Perhaps what is really beyond the pleasure principle is in fact this drive for numbness, for forgetting, for psychic deadness. And perhaps this drive both constitutes and inflames a superego inflated by the ineffable losses of melancholia. If the death drive is a drive to psychically numb ourselves and neoliberalism provides conditions under which this drive grows in intensity, and if melancholy, which Freud said diminishes our “interest in the outside world” and “the capacity to love,”25 becomes the dominant structure of feeling, what hope is there? This, Freud felt, was the “fateful question.”26 He offered as a response that hope lay in “the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers,’ eternal Eros.”27 Perhaps our task, then, is to engage in a project of remembering and feeling or at least creating the conditions such that these are possible. In their contributions to this symposium, Backer, Sarigianides, and Stillwaggon suggest particular approaches to classroom discourse, the choice of texts, and teaching writing that might constitute such conditions. I want to focus, however, on Freud's third claim — that Eros is the preserver of life.

#### The affirmative’s form of educational regulation attempts to ameliorate a collective Lack. Their consensual politics of equity props up schools as depoliticized capitalist spaces.

Clarke 13 (Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, “Terror/enjoyment: performativity, resistance and the teacher’s Psyche”, London Review of Education, 2013 Vol. 11, No. 3, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14748460.2013.840983>, 7/4/13) AqN

Another classic instance of consensualism is found in the education revolution agenda to “simultaneously deliver equity and excellence in our schools”, an agenda that “can only be achieved, however, with the concerted and united national effort that focuses on improving the productivity of all Australian schools” (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 35). But aside from the consensualism, evident in the emphasis on all parties singing from the same song sheet, and the instrumentalism, obvious in the characterisation of schools as a locus of improved productivity, this statement is noteworthy as an illustration of the operation of fantasy – in the Lacanian sense – in education policy. Within this theorization, fantasy operates in a dialectical relationship with the fundamental lack that is inscribed in us through our entry into the symbolic realm, within which we are mere placeholders in a socially shared semiotic system that precedes and exceeds us. Fantasy arises as the vehicle of potential explanation and amelioration of this lack, whilst resulting from a continual denial/forgetting of the ontological impossibility of such fantasmatic fulfilment. As Dean puts it “what is crucial…is the way the fantasy keeps open the possibility of enjoyment by telling us why we are not really enjoying” (Dean, 2006, p. 12). What seems to be overlooked in this fantasmatic vision of the simultaneous achievement of equity and excellence is that the means of achieving the latter, through the market-oriented policies of choice and managerialist-oriented performativity, and accountability policies grounded in instrumentalization, competition, and atomization, are fundamentally at odds with notions of equity. As Savage recently noted in the context of Australian neo-liberal education policies, “the social capitalist political-educational imagination of schools as excellent and equitable learning communities is difficult to take seriously when infused into the architecture of a globalising education system (and society) that is deeply stratified and structured to economise and discriminate between individuals in line with performance hierarchies” (2011, pp. 55-56)[[1]](#footnote-1). This sort of neat resolution of the seemingly paradoxical is one indicator of the fantasmatic realm, since “fantasies seek directly to conjure up – or at least presuppose – an impossible union between incompatible elements” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 147). Such fantasies also serve to decontest and hence depoliticise both equity and quality by harmonising all potential discord between them and hence draining them of any sociopolitical tension. We can also see the operation of fantasy-supported consensualism as a mode of depoliticisation in relation to the framing of teachers’ work in the Education Revolution and in particular, in the way teachers are positioned as the lynchpin of educational reform, student success and national competitiveness. Thus, in a passage on “High Quality Teaching in All Schools”, Quality Education asserts, It is well established that teacher quality is the single greatest in-school influence on student engagement and results. In addition evidence indicates the improving the quality of the teaching workforce is fundamental to any overall improvements in schooling. The impact of teaching is cumulative – a poor-quality teacher not only imparts less knowledge for the period they teach the student, but can leave the student worse off when they later attempt higher levels of work. The 2007 McKinsey report, which identified features common to the world’s top-performing school systems, argues that the quality of an education system simply cannot exceed the quality of its teachers and that the only way to improve outcomes is to improve instruction (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 21). Consensus is claimed in the opening assertion of ‘well established’ truth regarding the pivotal position of teachers. But aside from the attempt at bracketing out factors like the socioeconomic status of students by restricting the claim to ‘in-school’ influences – as if the in- and out- of school contexts could be neatly separated (cf Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) – this statement is noteworthy as a classic instance of the ‘discourse of teacher centrality’ (Larsen, 2010). This discourse is underpinned by a fantasmatic element organized around a beatific, salvation narrative, whereby quality teachers and teaching will ensure the future success of all students, while education is positioned as the source of salvation for society, providing indispensible social and economic benefits – an implicit if unintended meaning implied in the very notion of an education revolution. The overall consequence, with the role of wider societal inequality in socioceconomic and educational success rendered invisible and irrelevant, is to add to the broader depoliticisation of education that is the focus of this paper.

#### The repression of the death drive creates a politics of utopia sustained by the genocide of communities that do not fall into the boundaries of the harmonious world.

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and the Political”, 10/3/99) AqN

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same. The first condition of possibility for its emergence is the dislocation of traditional forms of organising and making sense of society, a dislocation inflicted by the increased hegemony of secularism, liberalism, socialism, industrialisation, etc. Faced with such disorientating developments, people can very easily resort to a promise for the re-establishment of a lost harmony. Within such a context Hitler proved successful in persuading the Germans that he was their only hope. Heartfield’s genius collages exposing the dark kernel of National Socialism didn’t prove very effective against Nazi propaganda. It was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety (especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler’s hegemony, to the hegemony of the Nazi utopian promise. At the very time when German society was turning into one of the great industrial powers of Europe, a land of factories and cities, technology and bureaucracy, many Germans were dreaming of an archaic world of Germanic peasants, organically linked by bonds of blood in a ‘natural’ community. Yet, as Cohn very successfully points out, ‘such a view of the world requires an anti-figure, and this was supplied partly by the liberal West but also, and more effectively, by the Jews’ (Cohn, 1996:188). The emergence of the Jew as a modern antichrist follows directly from this structural necessity for an anti-figure. Rosenberg, Goebbels and other (virtually all) Nazi ideologues used the phantom of the Jewish race as a lynch-pin binding the fears of the past and prospective victims of modernisation, which they articulated, and the ideal volkish society of the future which they proposed to create in order to forestall further advances of modernity. (Bauman, 1989:61) No doubt the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy is a revival, in a secularised form, of certain apocalyptic beliefs. There is clearly a connection between the famous forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the antichrist prophecy (Cohn, 1996:48). The Protocols were first published by Nilus as part of his book The Great in the Small: Antichrist Considered as an Imminent Political Possibility and were published in 1917 with the title He is Near, At the Door…Here comes Antichrist and the Reign of the Devil on Earth. As the famous Nazi propagandist Rosenberg points out ‘One of the advance signs of the coming struggle for the new organisation of the world is this understanding of the very nature of the demon which has caused our present downfall. Then the way will be open for a new age’ (Rosenberg in Cohn, 1996:217). Within this schema the elimination of the antichrist, that is the Jews, is considered as the remedy for all dislocations, the key to a new harmonious world. Jews were seen as deserving death (and resented for that reason) because they stood between this one imperfect and tension-ridden reality and the hoped-for world of tranquil happiness…the disappearance of the Jews was instrumental in bringing about the world of perfection. (Bauman, 1989:76) As Sartre claims, for the anti-Semite the Good itself is reduced to the destruction of Evil. Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite one can only reveal the optimistic belief that harmony will be reconstituted of itself, once Evil is destroyed. When the mission of the anti-Semite as holy destroyer is fulfilled, the lost paradise will be re-established (Sartre, 1995:43–5).8 In Adorno’s words, ‘charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation…. It is the great Panacea…the key to everything’ (Adorno, 1993:311, my emphasis). Simply put, the elimination of the Jew is posited as the only thing that can transform the Nazi dream to reality, the only thing that can realise utopia.9 As it is pointed out by an American Nazi propagandist, ‘our problem is very simple. Get rid of the Jews and we’d be on the way to Utopia tomorrow. The Jews are the root of all our trouble’ (True in Cohn, 1996:264, my emphasis). The same is, of course, true of Stalinism. Zygmunt Bauman brings the two cases together: Hitler’s and Stalin’s victims were not killed in order to capture and colonise the territory they occupied…. They were killed because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing was not the work of destruction but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world—more efficient, more moral, more beautiful—could be established. A Communist world. Or a racially pure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict free, docile in the hands of their rulers, orderly, controlled. (Bauman, 1989:93) In any case, one should not forget that the fact that the anti-figure in Nazi ideology came to be the Jew is not an essential but a contingent development. In principle, it could have been anyone. Any of us can be a substitute for the Jew. And this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In their classical study of the authoritarian personality Theodor Adorno and his colleagues point out that ‘subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks’ (Adorno, 1993:303). Although the need for the structural position of the anti-figure remains constant the identity of the ‘subject’ occupying that position is never given a priori. This does not mean that within a certain historical configuration with a particular social sedimentation and hegemonic structure all the possibilities are open to the same extent; it means though that in principle nobody is excluded from being stigmatised. Of course, the decision on who will eventually be stigmatised depends largely on the availability within a particular social configuration of groups that can perform this role in social fantasy, and this availability is socially constructed out of the existing materials. As Lacan points out in Anxiety, although a lack or a void can be filled in several ways (in principle), experience—and, in fact, analytic experience—shows that it is never actually filled in 99 different ways (seminar of 21 November 1962). What we have here is basically **a** play of incarnation. This play of incarnation is marking both the pole of the utopian fantasies and the pole of the evil powers that stand between us and them. As Cohn concludes, Middle Ages prophecies had a deep effect on the political attitudes of the times. For people in the Middle Ages, the drama of the Last Days was not a distant and hazy but an infallible prophecy which at any given moment was felt to be on the point of fulfilment: In even the most unlikely reigns chroniclers tried to perceive that harmony among Christians, that triumph over misbelievers, that unparalleled plenty and prosperity which were going to be the marks of the new Golden Age. When each time experience brought the inevitable disillusionment people merely imagined the glorious consummation postponed to the next reign. (Cohn, 1993c:35) But this fantasy cannot be separated by the coming of the antichrist which was even more tensely awaited. Generation after generation of medieval people lived in continuous expectation of signs of the antichrist, and since these signs, as presented in the prophecies, included comets, plague, bad rulers, famine, etc. a similar play of incarnation was played out in terms of determining the true face of the antichrist (ibid.).

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud's metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn't have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject's lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject's self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject's activity. According to the theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good - any progress - will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. This occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, an effort to sustain one's disorder in the face of the imminence of the cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic relationships that fail according to a precise pattern. Politically, it means that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat and thereby incessantly undermines itself, there is a backlash written into every progressive program from the outset. The death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked to trauma. This structure renders difficult all attempts to prompt subjects to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. The death drive leads subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that would lead to their good. Common sense tells us that sadism is easier to understand than masochism, that the sadist's lust for power over the object makes sense in a way that the masochist's self-destruction does not. But for psychoanalysis, masochism functions as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. Considering the structure of the death drive, masochism becomes easily explained, and sadism becomes a mystery. Masochism provides the subject the enjoyment of loss, while sadism seems to give this enjoyment to the other. This is exactly the claim of Jacques Lacan's revolutionary interpretation of sadism in his famous article "Kant with Sade." Though most readers focus on the essay's philosophical coupling of Kantian morality with Sadean perversion, the more significant step that Lacan takes here occurs in his explanation of sadism's appeal. Traditionally, most people vilify sadists for transforming their victims into objects for their own satisfaction, but Lacan contends that they actually turn themselves into objects for the other's enjoyment. He notes: "The sadist discharges the pain of existence into the Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an 'eternal object:" Though the other suffers pain, the other also becomes the sole figure of enjoyment. What the sadist enjoys in the sadistic act is the enjoyment attributed to the other, and the sadistic act attempts to bring about this enjoyment. In this sense, sadism is nothing but an inverted form of masochism, which remains the fundamental structure of subjectivity.22 Self-destruction plays such a prominent role in human activities because the death drive is the drive that animates us as subjects. Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman 0. Brown, another celebrated proponent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, attempts to construct a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a powerful category on its own. In Life against Death, Brown conceives of the death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, "The death instinct is the core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant's incapacity to accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time leads to death:'23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically, because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own death, according to Brown's view, we would avoid falling into the death drive and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness. Like Marcuse, Brown's societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs. Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself) than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the repetition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of progress altogether.

### 1NC K

**The 1AC’s demand to be recognized as a form of political dissent is an investment in the hegemonic order – the power of demand stems from the authority of the system. Their failure to theorize desire turns the 1AC into a moment of jouissance that betrays their radical intentions in order to maintain the possibility of protest. The 1AC is structured by an agential fantasy – This constant repetition of the demand that to change our representations that will never be fulfilled invests desire solely onto the level of demand – creating a constant repetition of the same – turns case.**

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

In the run up to the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, the Mexican Government composed a list of the sixty most “globalophobic” leaders of antiglobalization groups. The document, subsequently leaked to the Mexican newspaper La Reforma, was met with predictable criticisms regarding the relationship between state security apparatuses, the institutions of global economic governance, and democratic protest. But there were less predictable responses: in addition to criticisms that the list chilled democratic dissent, some antiglobalization groups criticized the list for not being comprehensive enough, demanding its expansion. Activist Josef Schneider wrote: “What do we have to do to get a little credit? . . . In a not-very secret document . . . the Mexican government compiled a list of ‘globalophobic leaders’ who will be singled out for special scrutiny by the Mexican police. Despite the role that Portland activists played in the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, none of us made the list!”24 More than a passing lament, the remainder of the article analyzes the reasons why the Mexican government neglected to include any Portlanders, arguing that the Mexican state’s class bias prompted them to ignore the true threat that ordi- nary citizens posed to the WTO: “They can’t accept that a bunch of ordinary citizens are the ones who are the biggest threat to shut down the WTO. . . . How typical.”25 By this diagnosis, the Mexican response typifies institutional attempts to downplay protest. Here, the lack of recognition does not make the protest ineffective, instead the fact that the Mexican government and the WTO underestimate the danger posed by ordinary citizens animates this critique. Not to be outdone, the Mexico Solidarity Network created an online form letter for self-identified “dangerous antiglobalization groups”: Dear Government Agents Bent on Restricting Civil Liberties, I recently found out about the “watch list” prepared by Mexican authorities, purportedly to quell the voice of civil society at the upcoming WTO Ministerial in Cancun. . . . Please add my name to your “watch list” immediately!! Nothing less is acceptable.26 One might read such demands as parodic critiques of globalization and security, as ironic calls for mobilization, as a strategy of overidentification, or as any combination of these. Even though these demands represent a call for inclusion as a means of democratizing global governance, these demands are not simply for inclusion: they are also demands to be recognized as dangerous and in solidarity with other similarly dangerous global citizens. How is it possible to ground a reading of the rhetorical functions of the demand to be recognized as dangerous? For Laclau, such demands ought be read through their potential to activate relations of solidarity: the individual call to be recognized as dangerous and excluded opens the possibility for equivalential linkages between the subjects who lodge such demands and others who are similarly situated in relation to the hegemonic order. Here, all demands entail a split between the concrete particular conditions of their articulation and the more universal political possibility that they potentially ground. This split implies that demands are caught up in a formal logic of trope: metonymic connections between disparate demands are condensed in metaphors that figure a relation to and make claims on a political order. But in a Lacanian reading another split is at work in and underwrites the split identified by Laclau between the particular content and universal possibilities for affinity implied in the demand. This supplementary split inheres between the subject who enjoys the mere fact of affinity with a group as a mode of (mis)identification and the set of identitarian equivalences inaugurated by investing in the specific content of the demand. Specific political demands contain a universal commitment that authorizes equivalential linkages and are simultaneously sites of enjoyment that create ritually repeated relationships to a hegemonic order. Based on this Lacanian reading, it is not the change that the demand anticipates, nor the political potential of forging equivalential links that is significant, but the role demand plays for the one who utters it and the modes of interpassive political affinity entailed that are of primary analytical importance. Working through the complexity of demands requires reading the demand for recognition as a practice of enjoyment—as an affectively invested call for sanction and love by the governing order. Demands also entail a perverse dialectic of political agency as resistance and simultaneous interpassive political constraint. Demands empower forms of political agency by generating an oppositional relationship to hegemonic structures and by providing the equivalential preconditions for identity. As Žižek might have it, there is always the risk that the demands of protestors are the supplement that authorizes the functioning of capital.27 Enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account, a dynamic that stands out in particularly stark relief in Laclau’s work. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, his theory of demand is not explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a “complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau’s work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance.”28 Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is “to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau’s work to the concept of jouissance.”29 On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance in Copjec’s work, which Laclau summarizes by saying: “There is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical.”30 There is an elegance to Laclau’s point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau’s work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. But with Laclau’s insight on the formal similarities of enjoyment and hegemony come certain ~~blind~~ [blank] spots. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as “achievable” as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This “uselessness” defines the operation of jouissance. When Lacan suggests that “language is not the speaking subject” in the seminar On Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification. Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the gristmill of speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning, and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization, is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental “split” in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Posing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. The demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects and to be given the sanction and love of the Symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure, and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes or points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion: can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud’s tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud’s account of the ego does not characterize the ego as preexistent or automatically given. The ego is not inevitably present in every human subject: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a “subject” whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfills its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. “Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may I have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” In “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function.... [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfillment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by extension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” Understanding the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at Freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the subject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective intentions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of accommodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing demands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As I have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal I. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a nonrelationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to notice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Thus, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “In this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The structural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name ~~his~~ [their] desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . .In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gérard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the “hysteric . . . cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own. . . . [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge. . . . [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition—being put under pressure to answer a question.”44 Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes naming in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation between jouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

#### [INSERT SPECIFIC LINK HERE]

#### Education has become a process of transference where students learn to identify with master signifiers through the teacher due to the desire to construct harmonious imaginary fantasies.

Gunder 4 (Michael Gunder is an Associate Professor in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, “Shaping the Planner’s Ego-Ideal A Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education”, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0739456X03261284>, 3/1/4) AqN \*modified for gendered rhetoric\*

Planning educators help reshape and develop their students’ ego-ideals to become planners. Educators, rightly or wrongly, act as role models for the profession in which the students desire to belong (Baum 1997). The student cannot literally copy the behavior of the professor, as this would be absurd. But the student generally enters into a “mirrored” relationship with the academic that is not confrontational. This occurs when the student identifies with a “specific trait” of the educator—perhaps how ~~she touches her hair or speaks~~ [they touch their hair or speak] —and, especially, when the student adopts the value and norms that the professor is asserting—~~his or her~~ [their] planning (and perhaps other) master signifiers (Van Haute 2002, 96). In this way, “consciously and often unconsciously, students learn to be members of a school culture that has a particular structure of authority and norms” (Baum 1997, 23). For Lacan (1977), this identification with the master signifiers, the “special traits” of their educators, is what constitutes the formation of the professional ego-ideal of the novice planner. Students attempt to get their professors to act in a manner that fulfills their desires and consolidates their egos (Bracher 1999, 133). This is called transference. The “relationship between the teacher and the pupil is always based on transference, that the teacher is ‘the subject supposed to know’ for the pupil” (Salecl 1994, 168). “Symbolic-order transferences are in place when the teacher functions primarily as an authority figure from whom the student seeks recognition, positive reinforcement, or new, more powerful, master signifiers or knowledge” (Bracher 1999, 133). The student’s seeking of gratification from the teacher is crucial to learning. As all educators know, the student’s ego already contains “a whole organisation of certainties, beliefs, of coordinates, of references” that is often wrong but resists correction and change (Lacan 1988a, 23). The professor overcomes the student’s intransigence through transference and interpolates new master signifiers and supporting subcodes—value and knowledge sets—that the student seeks to adopt in identifying with the educator. Yet even when planning’s suturing signifiers and their S2s are integrated into the student’s ego-ideal, “the ego’s defensive posture, the subject’s perceptions of itself, others, and the world around it [continue to be] submitted to a systematic distortion” (Boothby 2001, 144), a misrecognition that now incorporates the S1 of planning and those of its subdiscourses. The ego fails to understand its own subject’s fundamental unconscious bodily desires for ontological security, resulting in a distorted perspective to our perception of reality (Boothby 2001, 144). “When harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent” (Stavrakakis 1999, 63). At a fundamental level, the student (and everyone else, including the educator) overlooks contradictions, missing gaps, inconsistencies, and the undesirable aspects of the knowledge sets and beliefs supporting ~~his or her~~ [their] S1s. We fundamentally desire to make existence harmonious, enjoyable, and just plain bearable, and we construct imaginary fantasies to make it so (Zizek 2002a). These harmonious fantasies constitute what we define and share as a common reality. To illustrate this, let us return to the S1 of sustainability. Most students (and academics, including this author) in developed countries readily buy into the S1 of sustainability and support it in their planning values and practices. At the same time, most knowingly and voluntarily continue to partake of conspicuous consumption that is well outside of the sustainable ecological footprint of their environments. In this example, we want our ideological cake of promoting a sustainable future while overlooking our nonsustainable daily practices. The “ego continually devotes itself to a stereotypical picture of reality” in which “perception by the ego is continually misconception” (Boothby 2001, 144). Fundamentally, at our most basic unconscious level that seeks ontological security, “our assumptions of an identity in language entails powerful desires to promote, protect, defend, and actualize our identity-bearing master signifiers and the other signifiers, including entire systems of knowledge or belief,” even though this requires us to fabricate a shared reality predicated on illusion and fantasy (Bracher 1999, 46). Zizek (1997, 10) is correct when rhetorically asserting that “normalcy” is “ultimately ...a more ‘mediated’ form of madness.”

#### The repression of the death drive creates a politics of utopia sustained by the genocide of communities that do not fall into the boundaries of the harmonious world.

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and the Political”, 10/3/99) AqN

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same. The first condition of possibility for its emergence is the dislocation of traditional forms of organising and making sense of society, a dislocation inflicted by the increased hegemony of secularism, liberalism, socialism, industrialisation, etc. Faced with such disorientating developments, people can very easily resort to a promise for the re-establishment of a lost harmony. Within such a context Hitler proved successful in persuading the Germans that he was their only hope. Heartfield’s genius collages exposing the dark kernel of National Socialism didn’t prove very effective against Nazi propaganda. It was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety (especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler’s hegemony, to the hegemony of the Nazi utopian promise. At the very time when German society was turning into one of the great industrial powers of Europe, a land of factories and cities, technology and bureaucracy, many Germans were dreaming of an archaic world of Germanic peasants, organically linked by bonds of blood in a ‘natural’ community. Yet, as Cohn very successfully points out, ‘such a view of the world requires an anti-figure, and this was supplied partly by the liberal West but also, and more effectively, by the Jews’ (Cohn, 1996:188). The emergence of the Jew as a modern antichrist follows directly from this structural necessity for an anti-figure. Rosenberg, Goebbels and other (virtually all) Nazi ideologues used the phantom of the Jewish race as a lynch-pin binding the fears of the past and prospective victims of modernisation, which they articulated, and the ideal volkish society of the future which they proposed to create in order to forestall further advances of modernity. (Bauman, 1989:61) No doubt the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy is a revival, in a secularised form, of certain apocalyptic beliefs. There is clearly a connection between the famous forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the antichrist prophecy (Cohn, 1996:48). The Protocols were first published by Nilus as part of his book The Great in the Small: Antichrist Considered as an Imminent Political Possibility and were published in 1917 with the title He is Near, At the Door…Here comes Antichrist and the Reign of the Devil on Earth. As the famous Nazi propagandist Rosenberg points out ‘One of the advance signs of the coming struggle for the new organisation of the world is this understanding of the very nature of the demon which has caused our present downfall. Then the way will be open for a new age’ (Rosenberg in Cohn, 1996:217). Within this schema the elimination of the antichrist, that is the Jews, is considered as the remedy for all dislocations, the key to a new harmonious world. Jews were seen as deserving death (and resented for that reason) because they stood between this one imperfect and tension-ridden reality and the hoped-for world of tranquil happiness…the disappearance of the Jews was instrumental in bringing about the world of perfection. (Bauman, 1989:76) As Sartre claims, for the anti-Semite the Good itself is reduced to the destruction of Evil. Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite one can only reveal the optimistic belief that harmony will be reconstituted of itself, once Evil is destroyed. When the mission of the anti-Semite as holy destroyer is fulfilled, the lost paradise will be re-established (Sartre, 1995:43–5).8 In Adorno’s words, ‘charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation…. It is the great Panacea…the key to everything’ (Adorno, 1993:311, my emphasis). Simply put, the elimination of the Jew is posited as the only thing that can transform the Nazi dream to reality, the only thing that can realise utopia.9 As it is pointed out by an American Nazi propagandist, ‘our problem is very simple. Get rid of the Jews and we’d be on the way to Utopia tomorrow. The Jews are the root of all our trouble’ (True in Cohn, 1996:264, my emphasis). The same is, of course, true of Stalinism. Zygmunt Bauman brings the two cases together: Hitler’s and Stalin’s victims were not killed in order to capture and colonise the territory they occupied…. They were killed because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing was not the work of destruction but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world—more efficient, more moral, more beautiful—could be established. A Communist world. Or a racially pure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict free, docile in the hands of their rulers, orderly, controlled. (Bauman, 1989:93) In any case, one should not forget that the fact that the anti-figure in Nazi ideology came to be the Jew is not an essential but a contingent development. In principle, it could have been anyone. Any of us can be a substitute for the Jew. And this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In their classical study of the authoritarian personality Theodor Adorno and his colleagues point out that ‘subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks’ (Adorno, 1993:303). Although the need for the structural position of the anti-figure remains constant the identity of the ‘subject’ occupying that position is never given a priori. This does not mean that within a certain historical configuration with a particular social sedimentation and hegemonic structure all the possibilities are open to the same extent; it means though that in principle nobody is excluded from being stigmatised. Of course, the decision on who will eventually be stigmatised depends largely on the availability within a particular social configuration of groups that can perform this role in social fantasy, and this availability is socially constructed out of the existing materials. As Lacan points out in Anxiety, although a lack or a void can be filled in several ways (in principle), experience—and, in fact, analytic experience—shows that it is never actually filled in 99 different ways (seminar of 21 November 1962). What we have here is basically **a** play of incarnation. This play of incarnation is marking both the pole of the utopian fantasies and the pole of the evil powers that stand between us and them. As Cohn concludes, Middle Ages prophecies had a deep effect on the political attitudes of the times. For people in the Middle Ages, the drama of the Last Days was not a distant and hazy but an infallible prophecy which at any given moment was felt to be on the point of fulfilment: In even the most unlikely reigns chroniclers tried to perceive that harmony among Christians, that triumph over misbelievers, that unparalleled plenty and prosperity which were going to be the marks of the new Golden Age. When each time experience brought the inevitable disillusionment people merely imagined the glorious consummation postponed to the next reign. (Cohn, 1993c:35) But this fantasy cannot be separated by the coming of the antichrist which was even more tensely awaited. Generation after generation of medieval people lived in continuous expectation of signs of the antichrist, and since these signs, as presented in the prophecies, included comets, plague, bad rulers, famine, etc. a similar play of incarnation was played out in terms of determining the true face of the antichrist (ibid.).

#### The alternative is to abandon hope in education. This produces a recognition that there was no beginning of education in the first place – rather, it was only a product of societal fantasy construction. Our alternative opens up a space for possibility within the traumatic Real which brings an end to schooling.

Garcia 12 (Antonio Garcia has taught general humanities and education courses: Aesthetics, philosophy, Society and Culture, Freshmen Writing, multicultural education, pop culture and pedagogy, intro to curriculum theory, and intro to educational research methods, “The Eclipse of Education in the End Times”, <http://www.academia.edu/3596973/The_Eclipse_of_Education_in_the_End_Times>, 12/9/12) AqN

To Abandon Hope is to Abandon the Fantasy: Are we really in the end times of education, and should an end be necessarily contemplated? Speaking of philosophy, though pertaining to our discussion here, Badiou believes that, “It is really modest to declare an ‘end’, a completion, a radical impasse.” Can anything really have an end? And, is this end a point of no return where one would, as Lot’s wife did, turn to salt for reflecting back upon it as if witnessing God destroying Sodom (Genesis 19)? For there to be an end there must be a beginning and the beginning of education is not certain nor uncertain, it rests in the fissures of fantasies. Education has become the Dog of dogmatism, an inverted who is not a master, but a servant (notalways nor necessarily in the master/slave dialectic exemplified in Hegel). We utter education as a signifier with a definite signification; that it is evident and intrinsically prepared with a distinct curriculum, pedagogy, and epistemological economy. Yet, education is taken up – and taken for granted – as something that it may or may not be based on a matter of one’s belief of what signifies education. With fantasy construction we can endlessly participate in “fill in the blank” belief (e.g., I believe\_\_\_\_\_\_; I hope\_\_\_\_\_; and I have faith\_\_\_\_\_). We supply the substance to fill the signification that is ambiguous or empty in the linguistic structure of language: we are bound by that which we can and cannot say, as well as that which is miscommunicated or deferred in communication . This is a fundamental tenet of Lacanian psychoanalysis: “the unconscious is a language.” The Beginning of the End of the Beginning: As you recall, I began this chapter by recounting my first year experience as a teacher and the quote by Dante on the door of the math teacher’s room. We should not shy away or fear Dante’s words here that perhaps conjure a discouraging image. Rather we should embrace "abandon all hope ye who enter" as a welcoming metaphor to abandon the ideological fantasies ( objet petit a ) in order to welcome the traumatic Real (the traumatic hell we must confront). This does not mean that we must become hopeless, though, at first, this may seem the case. On the contrary, we must recognize and understand the linguistic determination placed on hope as a term of limitation and fantasy provocation. In other words, we must not confuse the fantasy element with the emotional and infinite potential (as Applebaum described) that lays within the substance of hope in the Real. Thus, we have to make a certain distinction of what dimension and provocation hope incites. To have hope in the Real is to understand that potential and possibility are considerable. To have hope in the symbolic registry is to conform to the fantasy subjections that relegate one to infinitely hoping without the real possibility of what that hope negotiates outside the symbolic. In the words of Raymond Williams, “To be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than despair convincing.” When we consider education in the end times, we must consider the im/position that we find ourselves that is always-already situated in the symbolic, and more importantly, in capitalist logic. Consider this last thought by Neil Postman: “To put it simply, there is no surer way to bring an end to schooling than for it to have no end.”

## Links

### Academic Achievement

#### Academic achievement is a project of the university discourse where students become objet petit a and the agent that acts on the demand of the master. This produces a tyranny of knowledge as subjects within the schooling system seek an impossible form of jouissance that leads to an infinite pursuit of the knowledge. Academic achievement is used as a tool of the master the guarantee a nullification of political resistance as the students are pitted in an indefinite competition for survival.

Lowther 9 (John Lowther is a Professor in the English department at Georgia State University, “To Keep on Knowing More(?): Seminar XVILL, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis”, <http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=english_theses>, Scholar Works, 7/16/09) AqN

The university discourse is undoubtedly the most discussed in the secondary literature. In part this is because Lacan characterizes the current historical moment as being under the generalized sway of this discourse. It is the discourse both of the state socialism of his time and the burgeoning capitalism of the American empire as was. It is the discourse of the scientific and medical establishments, education and government, military and business, technology and every aid organization from the United Nations to the United Way. A simpler way of saying this perhaps is that it is the discourse that breeds bureaucracy and that establishes and rationalizes the values of any possible knowledge economy. What occupies the place [of the agent] is this S2, which is specified as being, not knowledge of everything [savior de tout]—we’ve not reached that point yet—but all-knowing [tout-savoir]. Understand this is what is affirmed as being nothing other than knowledge, which in ordinary language is called the bureaucracy. (31) In the Lacanian or post-Lacanian literature we find much discussion of the imperative to Enjoy! A critique of the discourse of the university formalizes and underpins those discussions, even as in many instances I think that they stray from Lacan in pursuing their own ends, and ironically where they often stray is into the very discourse they diagnose. But, let it be said, I too am operating firmly within the presumptions of the university discourse here, doing my part to keep on knowing more, even as I am hystericized again and again. Let’s back up to the master’s discourse for a moment. As was discussed above, Lacan maps Hegel’s master and slave onto this and also refers to Plato and Marx. In each case the master/ruler/capitalist commands the slave/proletarian to make things work [S1ÆS2]. As the slave learns to do this, he develops know-how but not abstract knowledge of the principles of his work. Enter the philosopher who, on behalf of the master, questions the slave and derives from his answers the general principles involved. This knowledge [S2], conscious knowledge at this point, has thereby become the master’s knowledge. On a hypothetical factory floor we can imagine the same thing taking place: the workers become better at what they do, and they have to, as they are pitted against one another in competition for their survival. An innovation made by one will soon enough be used by others and eventually mandated by the capitalist at the top. This knowledge born of work, just as wealth in Reaganomics (inverting its rhetoric), “trickles up,” if, that is, it doesn’t simply flood uphill. But something happens over the course of time and Lacan explicitly lays much of the blame for this transformation at the feet of philosophy, whereby the old form of master, the one who doesn’t desire to know how it works only that it work, ceases to be so common and the form of the “modern master” takes hold in the university discourse (31). This is precisely analogous to the historical shift from monarchies to representative governments in that the monarch was master because he just was, but once a constitution and so forth is in place the master is but a placeholder within symbolic space; a master with a term of office. So how does the university discourse work? The agent, knowledge in the sense of that which is consciously knowable and fantasmatically masterable, commands an other [S2Æa] not simply to know, to understand what is commanded, but to enjoy this knowing. Here one might recall the phrase often delivered with a smirk both to children and to students complaining of the work asked of them; “it’s good for you!” This is what Lacan has in mind by referring to students as the “astudied,” uniting object a and “student” in this neologism (105). In doing so the agent of the university discourse, this “new tyranny of knowledge” (32), is driven onward by the demand of the master, now unconscious, inaccessible and dead, to “[k]eep on knowing more” (105). The command to enjoy is identical even as it seems different. The reason for this is that whether the agent of the university discourse commands that an other learn or understand some specific content or engage in some action that “knowledge” has deemed to be good for the other or productive of happiness, what is being demanded is that the other’s jouissance be served up in response. You must do this and you must not only get something out of it, you must get off on it too. But there is a wrinkle here as this jouissance above the bar is neither the jouissance of the lost object regained nor is it the surplus jouissance that is the product of the master’s discourse; instead it is “an imitation” (81). But this is also part of what makes the university discourse effective, subjects desire the neat and tidy, non-threatening jouissance that is mandated whether it be reflected in the smiles of models as they interact with consumer products or the less quantifiable esteem that is believed to result from academic achievement. This lure, Lacan notes, “can catch on. One can do a semblance of surplus jouissance—it draws quite a crowd” (81). With the product we come to the somewhat ambiguous downside of the university discourse. This discourse is driven by S1 in the place of truth; “[t]he myth of the ideal I, of the I that masters, of the I whereby at least something is identical to itself, namely the speaker, is very precisely what the university discourse is unable to eliminate from the place in which its truth is found” (63). But, S2 in the dominant, through the lure of a simulated jouissance, has the “unheard of pretension of having a thinking being, a subject, as its production. As subject […] there is no question of its being able to see itself as the master of knowledge” (174). What exactly is the problem here? As I understand it (and I have doubts about my understanding) the issue is that the other in this discourse is doomed to fail and to suffer as a consequence further alienation. Recall that in the master’s discourse the demand of the master always fails, and though this impotence is not recognized as it would upset the master’s function, neither is it inscribed as failure upon anyone else. But in the university discourse the inability to be the master of a “simulated” knowledge-as-jouissance that is commanded is something at which we all must fail. I fail to find ecstacy in my new iPod and I fail to present myself as master of Lacan’s thought in this paper10 and I fail, always, to enact myself as a perfectly enjoying, that is, knowing being. This discourse allows us to insert jouissance into the old adage that the more I learn (pursue knowledge) the more I realize how little I know and, perhaps to update it as follows, the more I pursue enjoyment the more I realize how little I enjoy. In the university discourse, so far as jouissance is concerned, more is less.

### Academic/University Discourse

#### The interaction between the educator and the educated operates within the framework of the university discourse – students become banal normalized subjects to which master signifiers are imposed.

Gunder 4 (Michael Gunder is an Associate Professor in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, “Shaping the Planner’s Ego-Ideal A Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education”, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0739456X03261284>, 3/1/04) AqN \*modified for gendered rhetoric\*

Lacan’s theory is based on four elements: the master signifier (S1); the network of signifiers that is knowledge (S2); the product that is both excluded and produced by knowledge as loss or surplus of jouissance, represented by the lost object (a); and the split subject (S| ), split between the unconscious and conscious (Bracher 1993, 53). In each of Lacan’s four discourses, these elements—S1→S2→a→ S|—rotate through different placements in the following structural relationship, or model of discourse, illustrated in Figure 1 and explained in the subsequent text. The positions on the left of Figure 1 visualize the active factors of the speaking subject—the agent driven to speak by his or her desire as truth. The positions on the right visualize the active factors of the interpellated, or hailed, subject. The observable elements of the agent and the Other in the speech act are located on the top. The bottom positions are those of “the covert, latent, implicit, or repressed factor”—the internal factors within each actor that drive the speech act or are created by it (Bracher 1993, 54). The position of agency and dominance is located in the top left. It is that of the speaking agent and is the overtly active component of the discourse. The internal element of “truth” driving the dominant agent exists in the concealed place on the bottom left—“the factor that supports, grounds, underwrites, and give rise to the dominate factor, or constitutes the condition of its possibility” (Bracher 1993, 54). The “Other” on the top right is engaged by the factor within the receiver called into acceptance by the interpellation of the communication. It is what makes you turn your head when someone calls out, “Hey you,” and you somehow know that you are the “you” being hailed. Knowledge “passes easily when the subject adopts a passive attitude towards discourse and empties itself of any existing knowledge that might interfere with the new knowledge taken in” (Alcorn 1994, 43). This is facilitated by “positive transference: one learns where one loves” (Verhaeghe 2001, 44). But this has a cost. By permitting ourselves to accept the message, receivers, consciously or not, internally create the product at the bottom right of the figure—a product that generally has little to do with the truth of the agent initiating the discourse (Verhaeghe 2001). This product should then induce the receiver to respond to the agent of the speech act, that is, feed back to the speaker seeking more of the driving force of truth underlying the original message. But this feedback is largely blocked, as is the original communications to a much less extent, because the receiver has existing beliefs that induce misconceptions, and language inherently lacks completeness for perfect communication. For if there were perfect communications, we would never need to repeat ourselves (Lacan 1977)! The educator deploys all four discourses, but fundamentally, each “starts with an agent driven by a truth to speak to another with as a result a product” (Verhaeghe 2001, 41). Yet it is never possible for the academic to transmit a complete message, something is always lacking. The agent’s speech is always driven by desire constituted as truth. Yet this is a truth that “cannot be completely verbalised, with the result that the agent cannot transmit his [sic] desire to the other; hence a perfect communications with words is logically impossible” (Verhaeghe 2001, 23). “Both the impossibility and incapability are the effect of the radical heteronomy of the truth: part of it lies beyond the signifier and belongs to the realm of” jouissance—outside of language and the symbolic (Verhaeghe 2001, 41). The masters demand to be the first discourse, and this is illustrated in Figure 2. The masters are the unquestionable authorities. They seek no justification for this imperative, dogmatic power: it just is. The master is not concerned with knowledge in itself, rather with certainty. “I AM = I AM KNOWLEDGE = I AM THE ONE WHO KNOWS” (Ragland 1996, 134). The masters are satisfied provided everything works, and their authority is believed and maintained. The authoritarian teacher commands that the pupils learn and organize their knowledge (S2) in a way that supports the master’s own beliefs and values (S1s) while repressing and restricting contrary knowledges, desires, and fantasies at odds with the S1s of the educator (Bracher 1994, 121). For this to work, “the other has to sustain the master in his [sic] illusion that he is the one with the knowledge. . . . The pupils make the master” (Verhaeghe 2001, 27). The masters’ weakness is that they are unconscious of their own desire, the actual reason for asserting the master signifier (S1), for the hidden truth of the discourse is that of the divided subject. The master’s discourse directly attempts to mold the receiver’s ego-ideal, as “one reads or hears such a discourse, one is forced, in order to understand the message, to accord full explanatory power and/or moral authority to the proffered master signifiers [S1] and to refer all other signifiers [S2] (objects, concepts, or issues) back to the master signifiers” (Bracher 1993, 64). Globalization, sustainability, and new urbanism (choose one, or any alternative S1) are important “truths” because the educating master says they are, and the educator is the master who always knows! Students in obeying the master forgo jouissance as the loss of enjoyment or frustration, not to mention loss of spontaneity and creativity, produced by their obedience and conformity to the master. Regrettably, as desirous as the ability to assert total authority might be for some academics, the master’s discourse can seldom belong to the enlightened university educator. “The teacher is by no means in the position of the Master: knowledge (S2) and the Master (S1) are mutually exclusive” (Salecl 1994, 168). The planning educator, at least in the Anglo-Saxon university, can rarely command, as the “scientific” academics must provide explanation for their assertions from legitimizing epistemic evidence. The educator is seldom the agent of the master’s discourse; rather, the academic is more often the agent of the university discourse, in which the master’s assertion of “lies” (S1) as the agent’s own truth and the teacher’s interpellations of knowledge (S2) shape the student as an alienated subject within the symbolic order. In Figure 3, the speech act produces the alienated subject (S| ) of the university educational system (Bracher 1993). In attending planning school, students place themselves into a planning knowledge system (S2) that constitutes the professional body of knowledge for the discipline. By doing so, the knowledge-receiving students are eventually transformed into planners. Yet as students gradually acquire the identifications of planners, they are alienated from their own original desires and beliefs and are eventually obligated to reproduce, reinforce, and apply their received planning knowledge and practices on the public. Under this discourse, planning educators seek to produce new planners who are inspired agents of the academics’ own master signifiers and supporting knowledges! The more systematic knowledge is received, the more students are transformed into “normalized” planners, symbolically regulated by these norms, knowledges, and practices, while at the same time they become progressively more alienated from their own unconscious desires and any passionate response, or challenge, to the received “wisdom” (Verhaeghe 2001, 43; Zizek 1998, 107). Fink (1995, 132) observes that there is “a sort of historical movement from the master’s discourse to the university discourse, the university discourse providing a sort of legitimation or rationalization of the master’s will.” Educators can seldom, if ever, compel the student to believe. They can only represent the master signifier’s (S1) truth as its agent by asserting the S1’s subcodes of knowledges, norms, and beliefs (S2). “The teacher is therefore polite in the relationship not to the pupil but to the knowledge of the Other, to which he [sic] is a responsible subject” as “a representative of socially recognised knowledge” that “forms the very frame structuring our perception of reality” (Salecl 1994, 168). Educating agents in this discourse are driven by the truth of their belief in their master signifiers. These are the S1s that guarantee knowledge—the anchoring stopping points under which the knowledge sets reside. Initially, Lacan argued that the university discourse was that of scientific research within the academy, in which “knowledge” in its own right is the master signifier (S1; Fink 1995). Lacan’s later thinking shifted to consider that this discourse uses systemic knowledge to justify any signifier. In this regard, the university discourse is the use of systemic knowledge for rationalization by the agent of the speech act. Here, the receiving subject is interpellated by any knowledge, or assertion, attempting to justify the master signifier (S1) of the dominant agent of the discourse, which might not be only that of the academic but also the agent of the dominant societal perception of social reality itself—the ideologies that construct our reality. This discourse suggests that objectivity, “the classical requirement of science . . . to be a mere illusion” (Verhaeghe 2001, 31). As a consequence, Lacan’s latter “view of genuine scientific activity correspond[s] to the structure of the hysteric’s discourse” (Fink 1998, 34). In the hysteric’s discourse (Figure 4), the dominant position is occupied by the split subject, hailing the master signifier to answer the agent’s dissatisfaction. This agent “goes at the master and demands that ~~he or she~~ [they] show ~~his or her~~ [their] stuff, prove ~~his or her~~ [their] mettle by producing something serious by way of knowledge,” as the “hysteric gets off on knowledge” (Fink 1995, 133). The “hysterical structure is one in force whenever a discourse is dominated by the speaker’s symptoms—that is, his or her conflicting mode of experiencing jouissance (a), a conflict manifested (in experiences such as shame, meaninglessness, anxiety, and desire) as a failure of the subject (S| ) to coincide with, or be satisfied with the jouissance underwritten by, the master signifiers [S1] offered by society and embraced as the subject’s ideals” (Bracher 1993, 66). Driven by jouissance, this discourse is one of disapproval, complaint, and often outright resistance (Fink 1995). Moreover, this is also the discourse of both the questioning academic and the questioning planning student seeking the production and assurance of new knowledge (S2). It corresponds to the question always arising from students in class, “But what about . . . ?” This author suggests that the hysterical discourse is to be valued. It is the discourse from which may arise ethical inquiry, challenge for change, and the potential for creativity. It is a discourse that should be actively encouraged in the student, for it is a necessary discourse to develop the passionate, reflective, adaptable, creative, and ethical—“Is this fair?”—practitioner. Moreover, despite the hysteric’s dissatisfaction with the master signifier, the hysteric “remains in solidarity with it” (Bracher 1994, 122). The hysteric agent (S| ) hails the receiving master to respond with an answer that contains new knowledge (S2). The hysteric specifically seeks knowledge that has “a secure meaning that will overcome anxiety and give a sense of meaningful, and respectable identity” (Bracher 1993, 67). This is one role of the planning educator. Furthermore, this quest for promises of certainty can also instigate academic research that continually attacks scientific contradictions and paradoxes until new insights and answers emerge (Fink 1995, 1998). Yet for the questioning planning student or researcher, the answer supplied is inherently not quite the one sought. This is because the new knowledge produced “is unable to produce a particular answer about the particular driving force of the object a at the place of truth” that drives the hysteric agent (Verhaeghe 2001, 29). For Lacan, the analyst’s discourse (Figure 5) is “the only ultimately effective means for countering the psychological and social tyranny exercised through language” (Bracher 1994, 123). In clinical practice, the external factor of the psychoanalyst’s desirousness is used to draw out the unconscious obstructions and fixations that underlie the analysand’s subjective agency. The analyst continually probes the subject at the split between the conscious and unconscious so that hints and scraps of master signifiers creating dysfunction can slip into speech. The task of the psychoanalyst is to bring master signifiers induced by forgotten trauma and hidden in the unconscious into relation with conscious signifiers and, in so doing, negate them (Fink 1995). As Gunder (2003, 303) argued, “drawing on Bourdieu (2000) and Butler (1997b), just as the unconscious is not knowable by the conscious, the underlying ideological distortions and norms comprising the planning field, or game, are not always visible, or knowable, to those emerged within them in planning practice.” The planning field’s norms and ends produce ideological illusions for the players that can only be exposed by the critical researcher located at a point of observation external to the set of practices under study. Gunder “suggested that this is the role of the critical planning theorist and hence, perhaps, that the analyst’s discourse is the correct home of the post-structuralist ‘academic’ discourse” (p. 303). The analyst’s discourse also provides value to the planning educator. Students (generally) want to please the teacher, but they often do not know what the educator really desires of them. As Bracher (1999) asserts, if educators make their teaching desires clear to the students, they are much more likely to be fulfilled. This goes beyond a mere list of teaching objectives or outcomes to what the educator really wants the students to become as completed subjects. This author desires his students to passionately reflect and question why they think and act as they do. His planning theory courses’ readings and assignments are set out to facilitate this self-critique, but key to the whole process is repeatedly stating this fundamental desired object “a” to the students (see Gunder 2002). The same techniques can also be deployed in encouraging creativity and innovation from the student to offset the repression induced by symbolic regulation of the master’s and university discourses, which inherently produce subjects progressively alienated by increasing knowledge from their own spontaneity, desire, and feelings (Verhaeghe 2001, 43). Lacan’s four discourses illustrate how “transference can be used in a twofold way, either to impose signifiers or to make someone produce them” (Verhaeghe 2001, 47). Planning education is more than just passing facts from the educator to the student. It involves the shaping of the student’s identity through the adoption of new identifications produced by suturing signifiers and the resultant production and loss of desire—jouissance—that this incurs. Teaching is more than just a transmission of knowledge; it also induces alienation and change in the student’s identifications and sense of self. Both contribute to group formation around shared signifiers, that is, beliefs of the planning discipline (Verhaeghe 2001, 47). Furthermore, for the planning educator, this very process of transference via symbolic discourse “results inevitably in a confrontation with the limits of this knowledge, and thus with the part of truth that lies beyond verbalisation” (Verhaeghe 2001, 45). For many of us, this drives our research. It is also why Freud called teaching an impossible profession.

#### University discourse is bad- it produces a divided subject stripped of authenticity

Brown et al 14 (Tony Brown is a professor at the Education and Social Research Institute Manchester Metropolitan University, Harriet Rowley has a PhD in Education at the Manchester Metropolitan University, Kim Smith is a Careers Consultant at The University of Manchester, Rethinking Research in Teacher Education, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2014.955080>, British Journal of Educational Studies, 10/15/14) AqN

Lacan’s schemata of the four discourses are referenced to: systems of knowledge (university); discourses of control or governance (master); the alienated or divided subject split between alternative discursive modes (hysteric); and systematic resistance to oppressive power structures (analytic). For this paper, the schemata is drawn on in conceptualising how teacher educators craft their sense of being with reference to the discursive orders that determine their subjectivities. It provides a helpful model in depicting the ‘schizophrenic’ subject positions that university teacher educators are obliged to confront. For example, the individual will form identifications with political, academic or administrative discourses which shape that individual’s thought and affect enjoyment and the meanings that ~~he or she~~ [they] assign~~s~~ to different situations. It is through this route that the paper will theorise how the changing policy environment variously impacts on individuals and how they understand their mode of professional participation. We shall take these discourses in turn. The university discourse comprises systematic knowledge. For individuals to understand this discourse, they need to be receptive to the idea of pre-constituted knowledge. This requires that the individual empties ‘themselves of any knowledge that might interfere with the knowledge in the discourse becoming an amorphous, non-articulated substance … to be articulated by discourse’ (Bracher, 1994, p. 109). They are produced as a divided subject as a result of this interpellation that captures part of them; for example, a teacher educator is appreciated merely to the degree that their practice complies with inspectorial criteria. It ‘is admissible only insofar as you already participate in a certain structured discourse’ (Lacan, 2007, p. 37) but part of their selves is left out in this encounter, a gap, marking the divide. In turn, others may gauge the degree of this individual’s submission according to particular criteria and judge their performance according to their degree of alignment. For instance, a trainee mathematics teacher may be assessed in their ability to teach fractions in a step-by-step fashion according to a curriculum schema that specifies particular developmental stages of a child’s learning. Other aspects of their teaching, such as their humanist mode of interaction, may not register on this scale. A new entrant to the profession of teacher education, meanwhile, might be able to play one version of university discourse off against another (e.g. practical versus academic expertise) as teacher education boundaries lose definition. One of our interviewees specifically criticised a new policy of staff needing PhDs. She favoured a more school-based expertise in universities: the vast majority of people in schools don’t have a masters never mind a doctorate and so it worries me that we will not get experienced teachers in. … I think there are some great people in the schools that we should headhunt but none of them will meet that criteria. This production of the divided subject, however, is not the whole story, as Lacan portrays systems of knowledge as being in the service of alternative master discourses shaping the situation in question: ‘the master’s discourse can be said to be congruent with, or equivalent to, what comes and functions … in the university discourse’ (2007, p. 102). That is, the subjective production results from participation in a form of knowledge that is motivated by some underlying interest (mode of sponsorship, pedagogical preference, kinship, etc.).

#### In the University discourse, all students are exploited by the university to produce a desired divided subject

Lacan 69 (Jacques Lacan was a founder of L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris and the founder of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Cormac Gallagher translated “THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN BOOK XVII in 1969-70, <https://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/THE-SEMINAR-OF-JACQUES-LACAN-XVII_l_envers_de_la_P.pdf>”, Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis) AqN \*modified for gendered rhetoric\*

In the little schemas I put on the board for you this year, my four-footed contraptions, you will find the essential reference points, even though they are not easy to use. In the articulation that I describe as the university discourse, with S2 on the top left and S1 underneath, the o is in the place of what? In the place, let us say, of the one exploited by University discourse, who is easy to recognise – it is the student to whom there is affected the notation o. It is by focussing our reflection on this place of o in the notation that many things can be explained about the singular phenomena that for the moment are taking place around the world. To be sure, we have to distinguish in a radically polarised way between the emergence of ~~his~~ [their] radicality – this is what is produced – and the way the function of the university has become clogged up, blocked, maintained – that can last for a long time. It has, (7) in effect, an extremely precise function, related at every moment to where we have got to with the discourse of the Master – namely, its elucidation. In effect, this discourse has for a long time been a masked discourse. It will become less and less so, simply through its internal necessity. What use has the university been? This can be read according to each epoch. It is by virtue of the fact that the discourse of the master is more and more thoroughly negated, that the discourse of the university shows – you must not believe for all that that it is shaken or finished – that for the moment it is encountering some funny old difficulties. These difficulties are manifest and can be approached in terms of their close relationship to the position of the student as being, in the discourse of the university, in a more or less masked manner, always identified with this o-object, which is charged with producing what? The $ that then comes on the bottom right. That is the difficulty, because it is charged with producing a subject. What kind of subject? In any case, a divided subject. That it is less and less tolerable that this reduction should be limited to producing teachers is quite clearly brought to the light of day in the present epoch, and this requires a study that is all the less improvised for being in the process of actually happening. What is happening, and what is called the crisis of the university, can be inscribed in this formula, because it exists, it is posited, it is grounded at an altogether radical level. It is not possible to restrict oneself to treating it in the way that is being done. It is uniquely on the basis of the revolving, revolutionary, relationship, as I describe it - in a slightly different sense from the usual one - between the university position and the three other discourse positions, that what is happening in the university at the moment can be illuminated.

### Affect

#### Their form of sentimental politics and the call for empathy and identification performs the cognitive labor of liberalism—individuating their feeling and their pain while absolving larger structures that generate violence.

Berlant 2 (Lauren Berlant is a George M. Pullman Distinguished Service Professor in the Department of English at University of Chicago. [“Poor Eliza,” No More Separate Spheres!: A Next Wave American Studies Reader, eds. Cathy N. Davidson & Jessamyn Hatcher, p. 310-313]) VR

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers- that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetitions compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from lames Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom’s Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin’s special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin’s encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amid a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the United States after World War II: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream” They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, truth is the key word for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody’s Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.28 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the sentimentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": It confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoonlike versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

### Afropessimism

**Revolutionary imaginings rely on an attachment to the black and indigenous bodies as fungible objects to be projected upon. They fall into the same trap of cruel optimism as the academic Left – they are fantasmatically invested in the conditions of the status quo. Abandoning these fantasies opens new spaces for political possibilities.**

**Walsh 15** (Shannon Walsh is a faculty member at the School of Creative Media, City University of Hong Kong, “The Philosopher and His Poor: The Poor-Black as Object for Political Desire in South Africa”, 6/17/15, Politikon) AqN

While Rancie`re claims that the poor as object creates possibility for the philosopher, Frank Wilderson goes further. Wilderson (2010) argues that the Human itself is forged through the denial of humanity to the Black.5 Through situating the Black as anti-human, object and voiceless, the Human is thus constituted. In South Africa, the Philosopher’s poor is also, always, Black. For the academic Left, I would argue that there is a cruelly optimistic attachment or relation with a fungible poor-Black. This optimistic relation is bound up with emancipatory, and sometimes pseudo-revolutionary, desires for another possible world. This attachment or relation is not limited to South Africa, but very often it is Black bodies (or the bodies of indigenous people) who are objectified for this kind of fantasy to play out. The fundamental antagonism is one in which the poor-Black is a repository for the projected desires and longings of (white) revolutionary fantasy—a strange nostalgia of some impossible vanquished time that existed in the pure space of non-knowledge. Lauren Berlant reminds us that your desire misrecognizes a given object as that which will restore you to something that you sense effectively as a hole in you. Your object, then, does not express transparently who you ‘are’ but says something about what it takes for you to anchor yourself in space and time. (2011, 110) This is a romance between the Human and the necessarily non-Human, the Other, which is always fantasy. The poor-Black becomes object onto which revolutionary desires can be projected and fantasized. For the revolutionary fantasy to hold, they must remain in their wretchedness, must remain as objects denied the complex existence—the being Human—enjoyed by those who hold the power of representation and fantasy construction. Of course, the horrible irony of such a situation is that while the poor-Black as an object of desire might offer an anchor for such ‘fantasmic investments’ towards a better world for the Left, in so doing it effectively denies that world from ever appearing. For how can such a world erupt from such a depraved and violent denial of being? The fantasy of the fungible poor-Black is a romance full of optimism and aspirations, as well as full of dangerous denials and objectifications. Ultimately it is also a romance like any other: full of false hopes, good intentions and lots of fantasy (Bob 2005; Levenson 2012). The implication of leaving behind revolutionary subjectivities as vestibules for political optimism and hope is difficult, but it must be done. Indeed a critique of the ways social movements, and the poorBlack, have been constructed, and at times desired, in Left academia is crucial, and one that I hope will open spaces for reimagining what solidarity could look like. This is no easy task. As Berlant (2013) reflects, All political movements ... are complicated spaces where the courageous insistence on interrupting the reproduction of toxic normativity is a relief from resignation to life. But every movement that we’ve ever been in reproduces issues of inequality around race, gender, sexuality and education, along with the inevitable personality glitches. That also can be devastating. Berlant encourages a dose of humour to counter the devastation, to laugh at the foibles, missteps and false romances. I sincerely hope that the fantasy can be abandoned, that there can be a way forward that will include a transparent reflection on the nature and exercise of political power within and around social movements in South Africa, reflection that takes seriously race, gender and institutional power.

### Capitalism

#### Capitalism alienates subjects by creating a state of permanent dissatisfaction. In the face of the demand for accumulation, only a form of mediated satisfaction and giving up hope can disrupt the process of capitalist subject formation.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

Capitalist ideology aims at producing subjects who experience their existence as dissatisfied and simultaneously invest themselves completely in the ideal of happiness or complete satisfaction. 15 This idea manifests itself not just in the everyday workings of capitalism but in its most serious theorists - from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. According to Adam Smith, society can attain the satisfaction of true prosperity as long as it unleashes humanity's natural propensity for accumulation. He writes: "The natural effort of every individual to better ~~his~~ [their] own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions." 16 The desire to accumulate enables capitalist subjects to overcome barriers and obtain happiness. For Smith and others, there is no question of an insurmountable barrier and no possibility of enjoying the barrier itself. Capitalism survives on the basis of the same misrecognition that plagues Freud's neurotic: the mistaking of desire for drive, the inability to ~~see~~ [recognize] satisfaction in the act of not getting the object. Without engendering this collective misrecognition, capitalism could not sustain itself as capitalism. Capitalist subjects structurally fail to ~~see~~ [recognize] their own inherent self-satisfaction, and it is this failure that keeps them going as capitalist subjects. Freud's thought reveals this, and it reveals that there is a beyond of the capitalist subject- a beyond that is the death drive. The emancipatory politics of psychoanalysis is thus inherently anticapitalist insofar as the functioning of capitalism depends on the idea of obtaining the object. Capitalism feeds off of desire's perpetual dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction leads to efforts to accumulate more capital, attempts to increase productivity, and the introduction of new commodities into the market - in short, every aspect of capitalist economics. Marketers in capitalist society are bent upon producing desire in subjects and ~~blinding~~ [stunning] them to the drive. In the Grundrisse Marx describes the way capitalism perpetuates desire through the production of needs: "Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material. ... The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art - like every other product - creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object:' I7 Capitalism functions by sustaining- and even increasing- a sense of dissatisfaction commensurate with desire. This explains capitalism's infatuation with the new. Capitalism constantly seeks out and embraces what is new, because the new keeps desire going by helping to create a sense of lack. The new holds the promise of a future enjoyment that will surpass whatever the subject has experienced before. This promise is the engine behind capitalism's creation of ever more needs. The more represents a constant lure, the next more - at least from afar - always seems to be it, the object that would provide the elusive enjoyment. A portrayal of the inherent dissatisfaction that capitalism requires even among the wealthy occurs near the end of Roman Polanski's Chinatown (1974). In the film's penultimate scene, Jake Gittes (Jack Nicholson) reproaches Noah Cross (John Huston) for continuing a pattern of ruthless accumulation despite having already obtained a vast fortune. Their conversation makes clear the insatiable nature of the imperative to accumulate. Jake asks, "How much are you worth?" Cross, sensing the possibility ofbuyingJake oft� says, "I have no idea. How much do you want?" But Jake doesn't want money; he wants to know what keeps Cross going. Jake continues, "No, I just want to know what you're worth. Over ten million?" Cross responds, "Oh my, yes:' Then Jake asks, "Why are you doing it? How much better can you eat? What can you buy that you can't already afford?" Cross gives an answer emblematic of the capitalist subject: "The future, Mr. Getz [sic], the future." Cross's appeal to the "future" indicates that he believes in the promise of capitalism - that the future holds the lost enjoyment that always eludes us today. Despite his millions, his emphasis on the future demonstrates that Cross cannot recognize his own inherent satisfaction. Capitalism leaves individual subjects with a constant sense of their own dissatisfaction, but it also holds out the lure of future enjoyment, which prompts both the capitalist to create a new commodity and the consumer to buy it. Just as the capitalist hopes that every newly created commodity will be it, so does the consumer. However, no new commodity can ever provide the lost enjoyment for either the capitalist or the consumer, no matter how successful the commodity is, because the enjoyment has only an imaginary status. Once the commodity is realized for each (put on the market, in the case of the capitalist, or purchased, in the case of the consumer), it necessarily loses its enjoyment value. In this sense, capitalism depends upon the dynamic of the child at Christmas time. On Christmas Eve all the presents under the tree offer the promise of a future enjoyment, but by afternoon on Christmas Day the child ends up bored and desiring once again, not having found the elusive enjoyment in any of the opened packages. This boredom isn't just the sign of the child's narcissism or that it has been spoiled by overindulgent parents; it is, rather, a structural necessity within the desiring world of capitalism. The cycle of the promise of future enjoyment and then the inevitable dissatisfaction that follows can only perpetuate itself as long as capitalist subjects continue to hope, that is, to believe in the promise that the new commodity holds out. More than anything else, hope keeps capitalism going. Giving up hope - and yet continuing on, enjoying continuing on -moves us from desire to the drive. This type of transformation also entails the end of the capitalist subject: capitalist subjects without hope are no longer capitalist subjects. What holds us back from this possibility is our inability to discover a way of finding satisfaction satisfying. This failure, perhaps even more than its human costs, is what most disturbs Marx about capitalism. The points in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts at which Marx seems to slip into humanism as he recounts the effects of capitalism are the points at which he tries to articulate, though he wouldn't put it this way, the capitalist system's resistance to the death drive: capitalism doesn't allow us to find satisfaction in our satisfaction. Its logic is one that Marx calls "self-renunciation:' As he puts it in perhaps the most famous passage from the Manuscripts, "The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save - the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour- your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life, the more you have, the greater is the store of your estranged being."19 What Marx describes here as "alienated life" is not a life made unnatural by capitalism but a life where satisfaction is not satisfying, a life stuck within the capitalist logic of desire. The alternative is not, as Marx seems to imply, an immediate satisfaction involved with eating, drinking, and buying books; rather, it is the ability to achieve a mediated satisfaction, becoming satisfied with the satisfaction that is already ours. The key, in other words, is not what we do so much as how we do it. It is on the level of this "how;' rather than a "what," that capitalism alienates its subjects from their satisfaction. It fosters this type of alienation through its unrelenting demand for accumulation.

### Climate Change

#### In the Anthropocene, the paradoxical anxieties of control and preservation unconsciously push environmental fixes outside the confines of reality. The affirmative’s technological attempt to address climate change enables the maintenance of ecological fantasies that decenter the effect of the human to continue the acceleration of environmental degradation.

Clarkson 17 (Lindsay Clarkson is a member of the Princeton Center For Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies and received her medical degree from Duke University School of Medicine, “Engaging with Climate Change: Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home”, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0003065117712706>, SAGE journals, 6/23/17) AqN \*modified for ableist rhetoric\*

“The bond of community” between humans and the animal kingdom must create a terrible threat if we must so forcefully obscure this linkage to ourselves. If we extend Freud’s reach to include the human disinclination to recognize our dependence on the web of life, then we become aware of the scotoma so common in our conscious existence. Awareness of the finiteness of the earth’s resources and biodiversity interferes with human wishes to live in an ideal world in which we are in total control and there are no limits, or consequences, to our actions. If we ~~turn a blind eye~~ [are ignorant] to the effect we have on the environment, we do not have to face our own damaging aggression or greedy rapaciousness. Further, we can maintain the fantasy that all harm can be corrected by a technological fix. The reality of environmental degradation forces us to contend with threats to our inner stability; the details of how we manage psychologically is worthy of fresh research. The interplay between the internal world and external world has always been a subject for analytic consideration. In a 1948 paper, “The Theory of Anxiety and Guilt,” Melanie Klein wrote that “if external danger is from the beginning linked with internal danger from the death instinct, no danger-situation arising from external forces could ever be experienced by the young child as a purely external and known danger. But it is not only the infant who cannot make such a clear differentiation: to some extent the interaction between external and internal danger-situations persists throughout life” (p. 39). We are now threatened and made uneasy by changes to the world that we as a species have caused. We could look at the degradation of the environment as a symptom of a disturbance within ourselves that is reflected in our attitude toward the nonhuman earth that is our sustaining home. During analyses conducted during World War II, Klein described analysands who brought anxieties that were due to “objective” threats to life such as aerial bombardment or conflagrations. Klein observed that such anxieties could be settled only if deeper analytic work traced the activation of dangerous worries involving primitive fantasies summoned in response to such external hazards. Through understanding and working through these internal terrors, patients could better tolerate the ongoing perils. Other patients expressed no conscious worries about their actual risk, in fact endangering themselves further by taking no precautions to ensure their safety. Klein postulates that the extent of their unconscious anxiety stirred fierce defenses, resulting in manic denial. The revival of earlier fantastic anxieties was so pressing that the real and present danger had to be denied. In other patients, an internal security prevailed. A more integrated and benign relationship with one’s internal objects affects one’s sense of safety in the realistically hazardous outside world, while allowing preservative action commensurate with the actual scale of threat. While the potential harm of climate change is less available to our immediate senses than a bomb, our acknowledgment (or lack thereof) of its relevance to our existence, and that of future generations, is affected by our internal situations. Searles’s 1972 paper drew attention to the primitive anxieties stirred up by the deteriorating state of the environment, leaving humans unable to face and cope with the problems they have created. His article is a model of a complex and serious psychoanalytic approach to understanding the relationship of humans to the natural world: I postulate that an ecologically healthy relatedness to our nonhuman environment is essential to the development and maintenance of our sense of being human and such a relatedness has become so undermined, disrupted, and distorted, concomitant with the ecological deterioration, that it is inordinately difficult for us to integrate the feeling-experiences, including the losses, inescapable to any full-fledged human life. Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology which is wonderfully powerful, and yet nonetheless dead, inanimate. I suggest that in the process we have come from being subjectively differentiated from, and in meaningful kinship with, the outer world, to finding the technology-dominated world so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience of it, to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it [pp. 236–237]. Searles goes on to discuss the allure of the omnipotence we associate with technology. In his view, we are involved in ongoing conflict between an omnipotent, ~~autistic~~ [introverted] state of mind that protects us from the diminishment we fear suffering if we are aware of being “simply human,” and a more tolerant state of mind in which we recognize our stature and kinship with the earth, its nonhuman processes, and its other inhabitants. In 1949 Aldo Leopold, a renowned conservationist, advocated adoption of “a land ethic” that “changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it” (p. 204). Searles addresses the psychic obstacles to embracing such a perspective. One might not agree with all of his formulations, but he is trying to use psychoanalytic tools to engage with the profound effects our psychic reality has on our ability to settle into a complex place in the natural world, both in kinship and in difference. As the earth is increasingly affected by our presence and use of resources, understanding how we approach the earth’s limited resources becomes increasingly relevant. The news today is full of concern about climate change, and rising temperatures linked to atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide attributable to the burning of fossil fuels are but one manifestation of the vast impact that humans are having on the natural world. In a recent issue of Science, an interdisciplinary team of biologists, geologists, paleontologists, oceanographers, and historians report on the many ways the planet is being modified by humans, at an accelerating rate since 1950 (Walters et al. 2016). Through examination of the earth’s surface accumulations, the report describes our entry into a geologically distinct era, the Anthropocene. The new era is marked by the global effects of human impact in a manner unprecedented in the earth’s history. Recent sediment shows evidence worldwide of vast accumulations of aluminum, concrete, and plastics in a form called “techno-fossils.” There are also deposits from the burning of fossil fuels, sedimentary fluxes attributable to deforestation and roads; there are lead deposits and synthetic pesticide residues. Nitrogen and phosphorus levels in lakes and ice have risen markedly due to heavy fertilizer use. Radionuclide fallout is globally present secondary to weapons testing commencing in the 1950s. Carbon dioxide and methane levels are rising. The report notes a marked rise in species extinction rates, and profound changes occurring in the assemblages of species, primarily due to species movements across the globe into previously alien areas, and intensified farming and fishing. The acceleration of all these changes is linked to rapid increases in the human population, the burgeoning of technological development, and the expansion of human use of the earth’s resources. Although one might think the report’s authors would urge more concerted action to lessen humanity’s impact on the planet, the article’s tone is not one of advocacy. The authors simply state the facts from the perspective of their various disciplines, a stance that seems a good model for a psychoanalytic approach to the relationship of humans and the natural world. As analysts we know that unconscious determinants prevent people from considering the changing environment to be an integral part of their reality. In an interdisciplinary inquiry into the quality of responses to ecological degradation, psychoanalysis has most to contribute in the realm of immaterial facts.

### Cruel Optimism

#### The 1AC sadly clings on to the promise of the good life - a promise of change that will fail miserably and produces an affective investment in a maniacal relationship that bears no fruit - their eyes are bigger than their plate, especially when they have nothing to eat.

Berlant 11 (Lauren Berlant is a George M. Pullman Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, “Cruel Optimism”) AqN \*modified for ableist rhetoric\*

A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project. It might rest on something simpler, too, like a new habit that promises to induce in you an improved way of being. These kinds of optimistic relation are not inherently cruel. They become cruel only when the object that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially. All attachment is optimistic, if we describe optimism as the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene. But optimism might not feel optimistic. Because optimism is ambitious, at any moment it might feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of “the change that’s gonna come.” Or, the change that is not going to come: one of optimism’s ordinary pleasures is to induce conventionality, that place where appetites find a shape in the predictable comforts of the good-life genres that a person or a world has seen fit to formulate. But optimism doesn’t just manifest an aim to become ~~stupid or~~ simple—often the risk of attachment taken in its throes manifests an intelligence beyond rational calculation. Whatever the experience of optimism is in particular, then, the affective structure of an optimistic attachment involves a sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables you to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help you or a world to become different in just the right way. But, again, optimism is cruel when the object/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually makes it impossible to attain the expansive transformation for which a person or a people risks striving; and, doubly, it is cruel insofar as the very pleasures of being inside a relation have become sustaining regardless of the content of the relation, such that a person or a world finds itself bound to a situation of profound threat that is, at the same time, profoundly confirming. This book considers relations of cruel optimism ranging from objects or scenes of romantic love and upward mobility to the desire for the political itself. At the center of the project, though, is that moral- intimate- economic thing called “the good life.” Why do people stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies—say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, political systems, institutions, markets, and at work—when the evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds? Fantasy is the means by which people hoard idealizing theories and tableaux about how they and the world “add up to something.” What happens when those fantasies start to fray— depression, dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, optimism, activism, or an incoherent mash?

### Death Drive

#### Education reform is a project that seeks to create psychic dead zones structured by the death drive. The very language of education constricts the symbolic – this produces a desensitization and psychic numbness that serve to smooth the processes of governmentality.

Taubman 17 (Peter Taubman is a professor of secondary education at the Brooklyn College, “Death by Numbers: A Response to Backer, Sarigianides, and Stillwaggon”, SYMPOSIUM: ON THE UNMOURNED LOSSES OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH. GUEST EDITOR: JAMES STILLWAGGON, Educational Theory, 2/7/17) AqN \*modified for ableist rhetoric\*

Freud's initial claim was that the death drive compels us to return to an inanimate or inert state.11 What if we were to read the death drive not in the literal sense but rather in the figurative sense, as a drive to put an end to memory, and history, and therefore to feelings? What if the death drive kills that which, in fact, makes us human? What if we have within us as individuals or groups a drive that, provoked and shaped by particular constellations of social and historical forces or by particular conditions, impels us to create psychic dead zones, to render ourselves and others less than human? As Michael Eigen said, “When one is dead, one fears being alive.”12 The Death of History If repetition results from not remembering or is a form of remembering without working through, if it is a way, as Adam Phillips suggests, of “making memory impossible,” of “determinedly wishing not to know” or creating “states of mind in which there is nothing left to remember,”13 then can we not read the death drive in terms of a force that destroys history and memory? Might not the compulsion to repeat, in which Freud initially located the death drive, be seen in the repetition compulsion of education, returning again and again to the same purported panaceas as a way to avoid the trauma of its inherent impossibility? “To be locked in the past,” James Baldwin wrote, “means that one has no past, since one can never assess it, or use it, and if one cannot use the past, one has no present.”14 One is, as Baldwin warns, stuck in a perpetual youth, a corrupt innocence. Can we not see such corrupt innocence in education reform's insistence on its newness, its certainty, and its “nowness”? Anyone who opposes ed reform is cast as living in a dead past. Can we not see this ~~blind~~ [blank] innocence in the failure to work through histories and dreams of and dependence on, for example, white supremacy or misogyny? Certainly in the United States, the inability to face the trauma of race and the resistance to looking at the role of white supremacy in the formation of identities, fortunes, and education policies create not only racial melancholia but psychic dead zones and reveal the workings of a death drive. Sarigianides suggests as much in her reading of American Born Chinese.15 As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, the “tenacious dream of white, straight, male exceptionalism that thrives on generalization, limiting questions, and privileging immediate answers” numbs memory and erases history.16 This drive to forget, to not remember, is evident, too, in the contention by education reformers in the United States that the history of education is irrelevant to becoming a teacher and in the denigration of foundation courses in teacher education. If history is offered, it is as what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno referred to as a fixed order of time, not something living but transformed into the “material to be used for the ideology of progress.”17 When education reformers offer medicine, engineering, and architecture as analogies for teaching, or when they base their views of teaching in the learning sciences, they effectively remove teaching from the world of history. The Death of Feelings But if memory and history disappear, what happens to feelings? Let us follow Brian Massumi and take feelings to be both personal and biographical. They are, he writes, body-based sensations, checked against remembered experiences that emerge in language.18 What will happen to feelings if memory and history vanish and the language in which feelings take form diminishes? If the language of education reform increasingly constricts the symbolic — I imagine many of us have had the experience of feeling suffocated or flattened by that language at meetings — and if it makes relationships suspect — I imagine, too, we have all felt interpersonal exchanges rushed, diminished, or mistrusted under the glare of audit — might we not also venture that such language diminishes the world of feelings? Certainly we know that education reform culls its language from the worlds of finance and business, which reduce all behavior to the bottom line; from the learning sciences, which render knowledge and wisdom as information and insist on predictability and replicability; from the military, with its focus on command and control; and from the world of sports, which knows only winners and losers. The language of these worlds evacuates our subjectivity, except insofar as it demands that we endlessly monitor, control, and improve ourselves and others. This demand for constant improvement, a kind of superego of education reform, lacerates us with the harsh and narrow language of failure, substituting imperious judgment for conversation and, as Adam Phillips suggests in Unforbidden Pleasures, submitting our lives to one, often cruel, “correct” interpretation.19 The self-denigration with which Freud distinguished melancholia from mourning appears in the impoverished language of the superego that harbors the drive to turn us into objects. The language of the superego, Phillips further suggests, is filled with petty and cruel demands and vicious charges that we are never enough.20 There is no dialogue, no poetry, no interpretive flexibility. There is only the one right answer, and we are reduced to an object whipped and rendered inert, left with only depression or, turned outward, rage, and a lingering affect provoked by the constrictions of deadened identities and numbed and numbered selves. The superego — that stuck record that endlessly reiterates its scathing criticism in its impoverished vocabulary — first turns us into an object by telling us who we are before it unleashes its scorn on us. As Phillips writes, “[T]he superego treats the ego like an object not a person.”21 Can we not ~~see~~ [recognize] the work of the death drive in the way teachers and students are articulated as bundles of skills, lists of rules and procedures, and scripts written, designed, and packaged somewhere else? It's no wonder that education reformers talk so much of “building” a better teacher. Through various vocabularies and practices of quantification, we are rendered and render ourselves as machines: efficient, predictable, and easily programmed, machines that elicit and process numerical data. The impoverishment of language results not only from the barrage of terms culled from the worlds of business, the learning sciences, the military, and sports, but also from ed reform's fascination with and promotion of technology. Sherry Turkle, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has perhaps written most persuasively about the role of technology in the transformation of our feeling life. She is particularly worried about the decline in empathy among young people and the blurring of boundaries between machines and humans, as robots come to be programmed to give the appearance of feeling.22 If feelings disappear or emerge only in terms of spatial descriptions — I feel high, low, flat, as Fredric Jameson so many years ago claimed was happening in our postmodern state23 — what happens to thought? Deprived of feeling, does not thought itself dry up? Bound by rules of statistical evidence, empirical verifiability, experimental design, and linear sequential logic, rendered always in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of Bloom's taxonomy, thinking hardens. The rigor demanded by education reformers becomes rigor mortis. If repetition compulsion signals the presence of the death drive, then perhaps we can say that such repetition is indeed in the service of an ultimately deadening psychic stasis, of numbing feelings. Even the addict who would seem to be seeking the rush of affect and who is certainly caught in a repetition compulsion is trying hard not to feel. This is why recovery can be so hard — too many feelings. Is it possible, then, that all the various defenses we erect serve to defend against feelings, to achieve psychic numbness? Are they perhaps all really minions of the death drive? Can we read the death drive in Theodor Adorno's manipulative character, who is “distinguished by a rage for organization and a certain lack of emotion and one who is obsessed with doing things as well as becoming a thing,” or in Christopher Bollas's normotic, who “fails to symbolize in language his subjective states of mind” and is “inclined to reflect on the thingness of objects, on their material reality, or on ‘data’ that relates to material phenomena”?24 Perhaps what is really beyond the pleasure principle is in fact this drive for numbness, for forgetting, for psychic deadness. And perhaps this drive both constitutes and inflames a superego inflated by the ineffable losses of melancholia. If the death drive is a drive to psychically numb ourselves and neoliberalism provides conditions under which this drive grows in intensity, and if melancholy, which Freud said diminishes our “interest in the outside world” and “the capacity to love,”25 becomes the dominant structure of feeling, what hope is there? This, Freud felt, was the “fateful question.”26 He offered as a response that hope lay in “the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers,’ eternal Eros.”27 Perhaps our task, then, is to engage in a project of remembering and feeling or at least creating the conditions such that these are possible. In their contributions to this symposium, Backer, Sarigianides, and Stillwaggon suggest particular approaches to classroom discourse, the choice of texts, and teaching writing that might constitute such conditions. I want to focus, however, on Freud's third claim — that Eros is the preserver of life.

### Demand vs K

**The 1AC’s demand to be recognized as a form of political dissent is an investment in the hegemonic order – the power of demand stems from the authority of the system. Their failure to theorize desire turns the 1AC into a moment of jouissance that betrays their radical intentions in order to maintain the possibility of protest. The 1AC is structured by an agential fantasy – This constant repetition of the demand that to change our representations that will never be fulfilled invests desire solely onto the level of demand – creating a constant repetition of the same – turns case.**

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

In the run up to the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, the Mexican Government composed a list of the sixty most “globalophobic” leaders of antiglobalization groups. The document, subsequently leaked to the Mexican newspaper La Reforma, was met with predictable criticisms regarding the relationship between state security apparatuses, the institutions of global economic governance, and democratic protest. But there were less predictable responses: in addition to criticisms that the list chilled democratic dissent, some antiglobalization groups criticized the list for not being comprehensive enough, demanding its expansion. Activist Josef Schneider wrote: “What do we have to do to get a little credit? . . . In a not-very secret document . . . the Mexican government compiled a list of ‘globalophobic leaders’ who will be singled out for special scrutiny by the Mexican police. Despite the role that Portland activists played in the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, none of us made the list!”24 More than a passing lament, the remainder of the article analyzes the reasons why the Mexican government neglected to include any Portlanders, arguing that the Mexican state’s class bias prompted them to ignore the true threat that ordi- nary citizens posed to the WTO: “They can’t accept that a bunch of ordinary citizens are the ones who are the biggest threat to shut down the WTO. . . . How typical.”25 By this diagnosis, the Mexican response typifies institutional attempts to downplay protest. Here, the lack of recognition does not make the protest ineffective, instead the fact that the Mexican government and the WTO underestimate the danger posed by ordinary citizens animates this critique. Not to be outdone, the Mexico Solidarity Network created an online form letter for self-identified “dangerous antiglobalization groups”: Dear Government Agents Bent on Restricting Civil Liberties, I recently found out about the “watch list” prepared by Mexican authorities, purportedly to quell the voice of civil society at the upcoming WTO Ministerial in Cancun. . . . Please add my name to your “watch list” immediately!! Nothing less is acceptable.26 One might read such demands as parodic critiques of globalization and security, as ironic calls for mobilization, as a strategy of overidentification, or as any combination of these. Even though these demands represent a call for inclusion as a means of democratizing global governance, these demands are not simply for inclusion: they are also demands to be recognized as dangerous and in solidarity with other similarly dangerous global citizens. How is it possible to ground a reading of the rhetorical functions of the demand to be recognized as dangerous? For Laclau, such demands ought be read through their potential to activate relations of solidarity: the individual call to be recognized as dangerous and excluded opens the possibility for equivalential linkages between the subjects who lodge such demands and others who are similarly situated in relation to the hegemonic order. Here, all demands entail a split between the concrete particular conditions of their articulation and the more universal political possibility that they potentially ground. This split implies that demands are caught up in a formal logic of trope: metonymic connections between disparate demands are condensed in metaphors that figure a relation to and make claims on a political order. But in a Lacanian reading another split is at work in and underwrites the split identified by Laclau between the particular content and universal possibilities for affinity implied in the demand. This supplementary split inheres between the subject who enjoys the mere fact of affinity with a group as a mode of (mis)identification and the set of identitarian equivalences inaugurated by investing in the specific content of the demand. Specific political demands contain a universal commitment that authorizes equivalential linkages and are simultaneously sites of enjoyment that create ritually repeated relationships to a hegemonic order. Based on this Lacanian reading, it is not the change that the demand anticipates, nor the political potential of forging equivalential links that is significant, but the role demand plays for the one who utters it and the modes of interpassive political affinity entailed that are of primary analytical importance. Working through the complexity of demands requires reading the demand for recognition as a practice of enjoyment—as an affectively invested call for sanction and love by the governing order. Demands also entail a perverse dialectic of political agency as resistance and simultaneous interpassive political constraint. Demands empower forms of political agency by generating an oppositional relationship to hegemonic structures and by providing the equivalential preconditions for identity. As Žižek might have it, there is always the risk that the demands of protestors are the supplement that authorizes the functioning of capital.27 Enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account, a dynamic that stands out in particularly stark relief in Laclau’s work. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, his theory of demand is not explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a “complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau’s work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance.”28 Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is “to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau’s work to the concept of jouissance.”29 On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance in Copjec’s work, which Laclau summarizes by saying: “There is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical.”30 There is an elegance to Laclau’s point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau’s work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. But with Laclau’s insight on the formal similarities of enjoyment and hegemony come certain ~~blind~~ [blank] spots. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as “achievable” as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This “uselessness” defines the operation of jouissance. When Lacan suggests that “language is not the speaking subject” in the seminar On Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification. Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the gristmill of speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning, and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization, is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental “split” in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Posing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. The demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects and to be given the sanction and love of the Symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure, and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes or points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion: can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud’s tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud’s account of the ego does not characterize the ego as preexistent or automatically given. The ego is not inevitably present in every human subject: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a “subject” whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfills its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. “Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may I have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” In “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function.... [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfillment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by extension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” Understanding the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at Freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the subject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective intentions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of accommodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing demands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As I have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal I. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a nonrelationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to notice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Thus, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “In this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The structural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name ~~his~~ [their] desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . .In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gérard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the “hysteric . . . cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own. . . . [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge. . . . [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition—being put under pressure to answer a question.”44 Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes naming in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation between jouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

### Demand vs Policy

#### Debate is structured by an agential fantasy. The plan is an impotent academic offering that is answered and alleviated by judges only to restart the cycle. That’s why the aff and WTO protestors share a common refusal to surpass politics as a demand for politics of direct claim. [The alternative is not a new form of politics but a NO to the affirmative], only this intervention breaks apart the fantasy and allows us to crack open the coordinates of desire that open the aff up to a mode of political subjectivity that can name and claim what it wants instead of calling upon an inaccessible symbolic other.

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

In the run up to the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, the Mexican Government composed a list of the sixty most “globalophobic” leaders of antiglobalization groups. The document, subsequently leaked to the Mexican newspaper La Reforma, was met with predictable criticisms regarding the relationship between state security apparatuses, the institutions of global economic governance, and democratic protest. But there were less predictable responses: in addition to criticisms that the list chilled democratic dissent, some antiglobalization groups criticized the list for not being comprehensive enough, demanding its expansion. Activist Josef Schneider wrote: “What do we have to do to get a little credit? . . . In a not-very secret document . . . the Mexican government compiled a list of ‘globalophobic leaders’ who will be singled out for special scrutiny by the Mexican police. Despite the role that Portland activists played in the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, none of us made the list!”24 More than a passing lament, the remainder of the article analyzes the reasons why the Mexican government neglected to include any Portlanders, arguing that the Mexican state’s class bias prompted them to ignore the true threat that ordi- nary citizens posed to the WTO: “They can’t accept that a bunch of ordinary citizens are the ones who are the biggest threat to shut down the WTO. . . . How typical.”25 By this diagnosis, the Mexican response typifies institutional attempts to downplay protest. Here, the lack of recognition does not make the protest ineffective, instead the fact that the Mexican government and the WTO underestimate the danger posed by ordinary citizens animates this critique. Not to be outdone, the Mexico Solidarity Network created an online form letter for self-identified “dangerous antiglobalization groups”: Dear Government Agents Bent on Restricting Civil Liberties, I recently found out about the “watch list” prepared by Mexican authorities, purportedly to quell the voice of civil society at the upcoming WTO Ministerial in Cancun. . . . Please add my name to your “watch list” immediately!! Nothing less is acceptable.26 One might read such demands as parodic critiques of globalization and security, as ironic calls for mobilization, as a strategy of overidentification, or as any combination of these. Even though these demands represent a call for inclusion as a means of democratizing global governance, these demands are not simply for inclusion: they are also demands to be recognized as dangerous and in solidarity with other similarly dangerous global citizens. How is it possible to ground a reading of the rhetorical functions of the demand to be recognized as dangerous? For Laclau, such demands ought be read through their potential to activate relations of solidarity: the individual call to be recognized as dangerous and excluded opens the possibility for equivalential linkages between the subjects who lodge such demands and others who are similarly situated in relation to the hegemonic order. Here, all demands entail a split between the concrete particular conditions of their articulation and the more universal political possibility that they potentially ground. This split implies that demands are caught up in a formal logic of trope: metonymic connections between disparate demands are condensed in metaphors that figure a relation to and make claims on a political order. But in a Lacanian reading another split is at work in and underwrites the split identified by Laclau between the particular content and universal possibilities for affinity implied in the demand. This supplementary split inheres between the subject who enjoys the mere fact of affinity with a group as a mode of (mis)identification and the set of identitarian equivalences inaugurated by investing in the specific content of the demand. Specific political demands contain a universal commitment that authorizes equivalential linkages and are simultaneously sites of enjoyment that create ritually repeated relationships to a hegemonic order. Based on this Lacanian reading, it is not the change that the demand anticipates, nor the political potential of forging equivalential links that is significant, but the role demand plays for the one who utters it and the modes of interpassive political affinity entailed that are of primary analytical importance. Working through the complexity of demands requires reading the demand for recognition as a practice of enjoyment—as an affectively invested call for sanction and love by the governing order. Demands also entail a perverse dialectic of political agency as resistance and simultaneous interpassive political constraint. Demands empower forms of political agency by generating an oppositional relationship to hegemonic structures and by providing the equivalential preconditions for identity. As Žižek might have it, there is always the risk that the demands of protestors are the supplement that authorizes the functioning of capital.27 Enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account, a dynamic that stands out in particularly stark relief in Laclau’s work. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, his theory of demand is not explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a “complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau’s work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance.”28 Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is “to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau’s work to the concept of jouissance.”29 On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance in Copjec’s work, which Laclau summarizes by saying: “There is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical.”30 There is an elegance to Laclau’s point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau’s work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. But with Laclau’s insight on the formal similarities of enjoyment and hegemony come certain ~~blind~~ [blank] spots. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as “achievable” as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This “uselessness” defines the operation of jouissance. When Lacan suggests that “language is not the speaking subject” in the seminar On Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification. Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the gristmill of speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning, and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization, is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental “split” in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Posing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. 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This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “In this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The structural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name ~~his~~ [their] desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . .In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gérard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the “hysteric . . . cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own. . . . [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge. . . . [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition—being put under pressure to answer a question.”44 Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes naming in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation between jouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

#### The plan is an attempt to feign unicity to compensate for the inevitable failed unicity in social relations. The reading of the 1AC can never adequate to the world so while they recognize the limits of their discourse, they simultaneously operate as if those limits don’t exist. Debate is structured by an agential fantasy. They are an impotent academic offering, merely a trope of the policy supposedly signified, that is answered and alleviated by judges only to restart the cycle that is invested in debate’s contradictions.

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN

Lacan figures trope as a process of signifying connection, disconnection, and investment that underwrites both the subject and its discourses. His understanding of trope is deceptively elegant: for Lacan, “trope” marks the idea that no connection in the life of the subject or its discourses is given in advance. Rather, such connections are the result of habituated accidental connections between signs, representations, and the world. Such connections have formal properties, but for Lacan, the formal properties of tropes are a function of the ways that ritually repeated connections elicit the investment of the subjects who employ them. Reading discourse as both a formal and affective economy, Lacan’s psychoanalysis affords rhetoric a means for analyzing the cumulative effects of discursive labor in producing durable social formations. Thus, Lacan’s turn to rhetoric hazards a response to the questions of structure, contingency, agency, and the allied constellation of terms occupying our contemporary theoretical context in the wake of poststructuralism. In reading signification and representation rhetorically—as products of both failed and feigned unicity—Lacan’s rhetoric provides an account of the speaking subject’s relationship to structure without determination; to contingency while still maintaining an account of the durability of the basic elements of social life; and to the problem of agency without asserting either that the human subject is a cog in a machine of discourse or that it is endowed with virtually deific agential capacities. If rhetoric is understood to be both failed and feigned unicity, then a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides a helpful critique of two alternatives for understanding discourse represented by the communicatively oriented tradition of rhetoric in composition and communication studies and by the structuralist Lacanian tradition in comparative literature, critical theory, and allied disciplines. Both traditions elide the dual and mutually dependent character of rhetoric as failed and feigned unicity demonstrated in Lacan’s work. The American rhetorical tradition largely ignores the economically derived formal rhetorical functions of trope, which work to feign unicity, and the structuralist traditions largely ignore the rhetorical accent that Lacan places on the concept of trope as a compensatory function in the context of failed unicity. An implied tension between these two claims abates if one begins with a theory of rhetoric as both failed and feigned unicity. Rhetoric relies on a transcontextual logic of trope and signification that figures the means of its effectivity for the subject in specific contexts. But this transcontextual logic is the result of an encounter with the empirical world; it is neither an automatic nor a contextually agnostic iteration of structure because structuring functions are dependent on the affective labor and contingent situatedness of the subjects that inhabit them. Lacan’s theory of rhetoric confronts the rhetorical traditions in communication and composition studies with the necessity of attending to the economy of tropes as the transcontextual condition of possibility for rhetorical action. That this logic is transcontextual does not mean that it is a structure. Rather, it means that because there is no automatic relationship of correspondence between signifiers and the world, there are a limited number of ways that a speaking subject can both employ a signifier as a referent to the external world and differentiate it from other signifiers. This condition is so all encompassing that it figures the contents, modes of address, and social forms that underwrite rhetorical exchange. A theory of trope ought to gain primacy in rhetorical theory, because trope is always immanent within and constitutes the specific contexts where persuasion, identification, propriety, or any of the other readily available rhetorical means for understanding the function of discourse are operative. Lacan’s conception of trope offers rhetoric the possibility of framing the ontological and discursive operations underwriting the varied contexts within which critics attend to rhetorical effect. Put more directly, Lacan’s work identifies the overarching context of the specific contexts that the rhetorical traditions engage by providing a means of reading the general economy of discourse as the ground of specific, contextually bound discursive practices.9 Paradoxically, Lacan’s commitment to a rhetorical conception of tropology also argues against identifying him with a strongly articulated structuralism. If rhetoric is inseparable from a condition of failed unicity, Lacan’s conception of rhetoric critiques structuralist tendencies to reconstitute unicity in the form of a self-generating structure. Although the structuralist project rejected certain forms of unicity—the self-possessed subject, the idea of individual agency, and so on—a structure that automatically and unfailingly scripts reality reinstates unicity at the level of the structure itself. This tendency is manifest in the ideas that structure is defined by a set of transcontextual binary oppositions (as in the case of Levi-Strauss); that a discursive formation can exist independently of the contexts within which it is embodied; that structure can efficiently and unfailingly program or script social reality; or that reality is structure all the way down. Failing and feigned unicity imply that one must not only cast out the last vestiges of unicity in the idea of structure itself but one also must pay attention to the impossibility of separating the formal logic of signification from the empirical contexts within which discourse emerges. Although undoubtedly influenced by the structuralist tradition, and even identified by some as the high-water mark of this tradition, Lacan turns to rhetoric to understand the genesis and performance of the subject without reaffirming the automatic structuring function of language.10 Instead, Lacan replaces “structure” with the metaphor of economy in a radical embrace of his maxim that “language is not the speaking being.”11 More to the point, one does not only find an account of structure in Lacan’s work, one also finds a commitment to the materiality of speech, attention to the specificity of affects, an account of address, and, perhaps most significantly, a theory of the failures of structure in ordering the Real that works against a reduction of his thought to an unproblematic structuralism. Lacan’s ruminations on rhetoric have not gone unnoticed by his readers, although the extent of his reliance on rhetoric is often overlooked. For example, Bruce Fink, who is deservedly regarded as one of Lacan’s best readers, cites the rhetorically focused “Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious,” which argues that “figures of speech are not ‘mere manners of speaking,’” but “are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse that the analysand actually utters . . . to the analyst, nothing is ever just a ‘figure of speech.’”12 Fink claims that while “the analysand spontaneously employs well-known rhetorical figures to keep from saying certain things and to keep certain ideas from surfacing . . . [i]n his typical fashion, Lacan does not elaborate on this, neither here nor anywhere else, to the best of my knowledge.”13 As I hope to show, Lacan’s oeuvre contains a rich account of the regulatory function of trope in organizing speech. This realization has begun to take hold in the fields of composition and communication studies. Work on Lacan in communication studies extends as far back as 1977, when Lloyd Pettegrew introduced Lacan’s work on transference to figure the place of metaphor in a theory of discourse.14 Similarly, Michael Hyde took up Lacan’s theory of the sign in 1980, arguing for a reading Lacan’s structuralism in the context of the phenomenological and hermeneutic elements of his work.15 These interventions sought to expand rhetorical studies’s vocabulary for addressing “speech and language” by situating Lacan’s account of signification against a number of experiential registers (transferential, phenomenological, and “hermeneutic”).16 Work on Lacan in communication studies saw a fairly rapid expansion in the years after 1999, which marked the publication of Henry Krips’s Fetish: An Erotics of Culture.17 Krips’s purpose in Fetish was to provide a theory of the fetish and the gaze informed by Marx’s and Lacan’s reading of Freud, detailing the ways that these concepts bridge the gap between the psyche and culture by attending to their production around specific objects, texts, and practices. For Krips, the central questions are both “how can a subjective psychoanalytic conception, like the gaze, account for the public, objective effects of images” and “how is it possible to bridge the gap between individual psychic responses and the communal effects of cultural artifacts?”18 Asking similar questions of public politics, James P. McDaniel took up a reading of Lacan and Žižek to understand the roles of public address in American politics, specifically by attending to the role of fantasy and figure in democratic life.19 Though neither Krips nor McDaniel focus on Lacan’s account of the ontology and functions of rhetoric, both employ a rhetorically inflected understanding of psychoanalysis to engage political and cultural production. Although also interested in sites of political production, Barbara Biesecker and Joshua Gunn have taken up the relationship between rhetoric and psychoanalysis in more direct terms. Gunn has argued for closer critical attention to Lacan’s work in understanding the function of rhetoric in contemporary public culture. Gunn has done groundbreaking work in rehabilitating a conception of fantasy in rhetorical studies, with close attention to the understanding of the intersubjective bond in public life, in understanding the function of “voice,” and the relationship between rhetoric and love by critiquing rhetorics of identification.20 Biesecker’s “Rhetorical Studies and the ‘New’ Psychoanalysis” begins with the “modest claim” that “rhetorical theorists and critics will be considerably enriched” by engaging Lacanian psychoanalysis in the process of “ideological critique.”21 Biesecker is “tempted” to make the stronger claim that “Jacques Lacan will have already been the great theorist of rhetoric for the twenty-first century” because his work “makes visible the limits of a number of contemporary theories of rhetoric that foreclose, disavow, or devalue the speaking beings’ affective attachments . . . and gestures toward strategies for overcoming them.”22 Biesecker has taken up this task with deftness in both detailing the rhetorical production of the melancholic citizen-subject in the war on terror and in her treatments of national commemoration.23 More recently, Biesecker has taken up the task of delineating an “evental rhetoric” defined by four qualities: “one, evental rhetoric is more than performative in Derrida’s sense since it is full speech in the Lacanian sense; two, evental rhetoric takes the form of the exorbitant demand; three, evental rhetoric works by and through the logic of sublimation and not by and through the logic of representation or articulation; four, evental rhetoric does not abide the binary logics of the timely and untimely, the appropriate and inappropriate or the possible and impossible; it forces their displacement that, with Freud and Lacan, I would call the uncanny.”24 Biesecker’s charge to think evental rhetoric has strong resonance with the reading of rhetoric that I will offer here, which is also premised on privileging the tropological charge in speech (which is the hallmark of Lacan’s full speech), figuring speech as a demand, thinking beyond articula- tion and propriety. The question that occupies this book is whether evental rhetoric is an exceptional case in speech, or whether the event is always immanent in and the condition of possibility for speech. Increasingly, composition studies have also taken up Lacan’s work for theorizing rhetoric. Victor Vitanza has identified Lacan as one important contributor to a “critical sub/version” of rhetoric.25 David Metzger’s The Lost Cause of Rhetoric: The Relation of Rhetoric and Geometry in Aristotle and Lacan draws on a provocative homology between rhetoric and geometry as formal modes of knowing in the work of Aristotle and Lacan.26 Susan Wells’s Sweet Reason: Rhetoric and the Discourses of Modernity contains a rhetorically tinctured presentation of the role of language in Lacan’s accounts of subject formation and agency.27 James V. Catano’s Ragged Dicks: Masculinity, Steel, and the Rhetoric of the Self-Made Man theorizes the relationship between Lacan’s Symbolic order and the oedipal function. Thomas Rickert’s Acts of Enjoyment: Rhetoric, Žižek, and the Return of the Subject takes up the processes and politics of writing pedagogy to situate a new pedagogy of writing as a mode of engaging ideology and enjoyment. Finally, Diane Davis has done insightful work that inspires the Lacanian thematics that I treat here, including critiques of understanding rhetoric simply in relation to persuasion and identification and of reducing rhetoric to the hermeneutic traditions of meaning making.28 There are at least four major places where there has been sustained reflection on the place of rhetoric in Lacan’s work beyond rhetorical studies. The first I address is the “structuralist poetic” approach, a school of thought primarily rooted in comparative literature.29 Second, I treat Ernesto Laclau’s work, which embodies a comparatively structuralist approach to articulation theory, highlighting the place of trope in Lacan’s work as a means of engaging democratic politics. Third, I address Slavoj Žižek’s critique of the reduction of Lacan’s thought to a theory of discourse, which dissents from structuralism on the grounds of a commitment to materiality. Finally, I address Lacan’s readers who argue that he ultimately replaced a focus on rhetoric with a focus on math (specifically on topology and set theory). Taking up these four diverse schools of thought, my overarching goal is to characterize the implications of locating Lacan’s work within the tradition of structuralist poetics, arguing that many of the most incisive criticisms of the place of rhetoric in his work figure Lacan through structuralist poetics. Conversely, framing Lacan’s work as a rhetorical theory of trope (as opposed to a structuralist poetics) redeems it from the debilitating implications of a too strongly articulated structuralism. The reading of Lacan’s work as a structuralist poetics is common: much of the debate surrounding rhetoric in Lacan has ultimately been about presenting Lacan as a pure structuralist and subsequently engaging him on the idiosyncratic use of metonymy and metaphor—treating him as a footnote to Roman Jakobson’s formalist poetics.30 Reading rhetoric as a foil to the structuralist impulse in Lacan’s work upsets this account. The basis of this critique, grounded in Lacan’s commitment to rhetoric, becomes clear in taking up the constituent terms of structuralist poetics. Structuralism argues that any phenomenon can be meaningfully engaged as a product of the structurally determined relations that precede and produce it. Conversely, as a practice of signifying in a condition of failed unicity, rhetoric names the fact that structures fail in efficiently structuring the world. While Lacan’s work undoubtedly assimilates the structuralist insight that actors in the social world are figured by discourses that exceed and produce them, his work on the concepts of enjoyment and the labor of signification reveal a commitment to figuring the failure of structure in constituting the world without remainder. Next, poetics: those who read Lacan through structuralist poetics are primarily concerned with the effect of trope independent from speech as the medium that carries the trope. One of the strongest indicators of Lacan’s commitment to rhetoric is that his work rarely engages the formal properties of discourse without noting the modes of relation and practices of investment that underwrite them. Consider this commitment from the perspective of the Aristotelian distinction between rhetoric and poetics: unlike rhetoric, poetics is primarily concerned with the question of mimesis—with the various ways that human discourse relies on imitation as the “method or process” of making actions or representations “imitate nature.”31 Poetics takes up the question of style to understand the ways that mimetic processes embody certain formal qualities, often in the form of language that draws attention to its character as tropologically inflected. As a result, a poetic account presumes a constitutive disconnection between the act of imitation and the imitated, driving Aristotle toward a treatment of poetics as an “art in itself.”32 Though focused on modes of discursive production, poetics takes the formal properties of mimesis as a primary site of concern. If poetics aims at the trope in itself, rhetoric aims at an understanding of tropes that refers them outward to the whole economy of discourse. Rhetoric’s movement outward frames the formal properties of language as both a means of articulating the subject and relations between subjects with the world external to language. Substituting a rhetorical conception of trope for a poetic one frames the trope as the site of language’s essential failure to seamlessly articulate the economy of discourse with the world of things, subsequently requiring an account of feigned unicity.33 In the register of rhetoric the formal properties of the trope are productive, but the trope is also inextricably linked with the larger economy of socially situated practices of feigned unicity and, therefore, with the failures of discourse to inscribe the word onto the thing.

### Education Bad

#### Educational regulation attempts to ameliorate a collective Lack. Their consensual politics of equity props up schools as depoliticized capitalist spaces.

Clarke 13 (Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, “Terror/enjoyment: performativity, resistance and the teacher’s Psyche”, London Review of Education, 2013 Vol. 11, No. 3, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14748460.2013.840983>, 7/4/13) AqN

Another classic instance of consensualism is found in the education revolution agenda to “simultaneously deliver equity and excellence in our schools”, an agenda that “can only be achieved, however, with the concerted and united national effort that focuses on improving the productivity of all Australian schools” (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 35). But aside from the consensualism, evident in the emphasis on all parties singing from the same song sheet, and the instrumentalism, obvious in the characterisation of schools as a locus of improved productivity, this statement is noteworthy as an illustration of the operation of fantasy – in the Lacanian sense – in education policy. Within this theorization, fantasy operates in a dialectical relationship with the fundamental lack that is inscribed in us through our entry into the symbolic realm, within which we are mere placeholders in a socially shared semiotic system that precedes and exceeds us. Fantasy arises as the vehicle of potential explanation and amelioration of this lack, whilst resulting from a continual denial/forgetting of the ontological impossibility of such fantasmatic fulfilment. As Dean puts it “what is crucial…is the way the fantasy keeps open the possibility of enjoyment by telling us why we are not really enjoying” (Dean, 2006, p. 12). What seems to be overlooked in this fantasmatic vision of the simultaneous achievement of equity and excellence is that the means of achieving the latter, through the market-oriented policies of choice and managerialist-oriented performativity, and accountability policies grounded in instrumentalization, competition, and atomization, are fundamentally at odds with notions of equity. As Savage recently noted in the context of Australian neo-liberal education policies, “the social capitalist political-educational imagination of schools as excellent and equitable learning communities is difficult to take seriously when infused into the architecture of a globalising education system (and society) that is deeply stratified and structured to economise and discriminate between individuals in line with performance hierarchies” (2011, pp. 55-56)[[2]](#footnote-2). This sort of neat resolution of the seemingly paradoxical is one indicator of the fantasmatic realm, since “fantasies seek directly to conjure up – or at least presuppose – an impossible union between incompatible elements” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 147). Such fantasies also serve to decontest and hence depoliticise both equity and quality by harmonising all potential discord between them and hence draining them of any sociopolitical tension. We can also see the operation of fantasy-supported consensualism as a mode of depoliticisation in relation to the framing of teachers’ work in the Education Revolution and in particular, in the way teachers are positioned as the lynchpin of educational reform, student success and national competitiveness. Thus, in a passage on “High Quality Teaching in All Schools”, Quality Education asserts, It is well established that teacher quality is the single greatest in-school influence on student engagement and results. In addition evidence indicates the improving the quality of the teaching workforce is fundamental to any overall improvements in schooling. The impact of teaching is cumulative – a poor-quality teacher not only imparts less knowledge for the period they teach the student, but can leave the student worse off when they later attempt higher levels of work. The 2007 McKinsey report, which identified features common to the world’s top-performing school systems, argues that the quality of an education system simply cannot exceed the quality of its teachers and that the only way to improve outcomes is to improve instruction (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 21). Consensus is claimed in the opening assertion of ‘well established’ truth regarding the pivotal position of teachers. But aside from the attempt at bracketing out factors like the socioeconomic status of students by restricting the claim to ‘in-school’ influences – as if the in- and out- of school contexts could be neatly separated (cf Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) – this statement is noteworthy as a classic instance of the ‘discourse of teacher centrality’ (Larsen, 2010). This discourse is underpinned by a fantasmatic element organized around a beatific, salvation narrative, whereby quality teachers and teaching will ensure the future success of all students, while education is positioned as the source of salvation for society, providing indispensible social and economic benefits – an implicit if unintended meaning implied in the very notion of an education revolution. The overall consequence, with the role of wider societal inequality in socioceconomic and educational success rendered invisible and irrelevant, is to add to the broader depoliticisation of education that is the focus of this paper.

### Education Good

#### Their faith in education as a democratic tool to better the conditions of students is misplaced. Instead, education has become a process of the re-subjectification of students in which their identities are erased in the name of academic achievement and performance.

Stillwaggon 17 (James Stillwaggon obtained a Ph.D. in Philosophy and Education at the Teachers College of Columbia University, ““A FANTASY OF UNTOUCHABLE FULLNESS”: MELANCHOLIA AND RESISTANCE TO EDUCATIONAL TRANSFORMATION”, Educational Theory, Volume 1) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

Democratic systems of education cannot help their attraction to the idea of the self-made man, or, less colloquially, the ideal educated subject as constructed entirely through its adventures and experiences in the world. The radically mutable understanding of childhood that can be traced from John Locke, through John Watson and B. F. Skinner, to the patchwork of developmental and cognitive educational psychologies that inform educational policy in our own time grounds the promise that democratic schooling will not only be a matter of sifting out the naturally talented from the rest, but will offer every student an opportunity at becoming something more than the accidental characteristics ~~he or she inherits~~ [they inherit] at birth. Beyond its sorting function, the mission of the democratic school involves transforming the inchoate wilderness of childhood into the finished product of democratic citizenry through participation in multiple, overlapping discourses of democratic life. Yet despite all the scholarly and especially political attention paid to improving our schools’ abilities to transform student lives, the positive language of policy typically fails to recognize the scattered tradition of extraordinary works, often found on the fringes of educational scholarship or outside of it entirely, that articulate the tremendous burden of educational transformation required of students who come to schooling from marginalized backgrounds.2 Students, after all, are the ones expected to accomplish the work of changing themselves in relation to curricular norms, often without any acknowledgment that the changes they undergo not only involve the triumphs of self-overcoming but also the unavoidable experience of loss as they trade their untaught pasts for competent futures. Where these feelings of loss go unrecognized, a potential for resistance manifests itself in the form of an identification with their lost connections rather than with the positive promises of educational transformation. An unintended result of our faith in education as a democratic tool is that our universally high expectations of educational achievement threaten to re-entrench the very differences they seek to erase at a level where they may be less susceptible to students’ desires for self-completion. One of the sites where melancholic identification manifests itself most visibly in educational endeavors is in the realization of democratic educational promise in those whose social identities change radically as a result of their education. Describing the high expectations for working-class British students’ college attendance and degree completion, Diane Reay quotes Pierre Bourdieu’s claim that the ultimate burden of educational reform often rests on the shoulders of its intended beneficiaries: Educational systems across Western society universally impose the same demands without any concern for universally distributing the means for satisfying them, thus helping to legitimate the inequality that one merely records and ratifies, while additionally exercising (first of all in the educational system) the symbolic violence associated with the effects of real inequality within formal equality.3 According to Reay, the upshot of raising educational expectations and broadening educational opportunity as a means toward greater social and economic equality is an imposition of upper-class values on any working-class student willing to sever ties with familial and class identities: “In England, in the minority of cases when the equation of working class plus education equals academic success, education is not about the valorization of working classness but its erasure.”4 Education in these circumstances thus promises a means of escape from the culture into which one is born, but as Reay argues, this notion of escaping one’s own, and especially of contributing to negative understandings of one’s own through a willingness to escape, produces problems of identity for the very student subjects we would rely upon to bring about the kind of changes that democratic educational reforms aim to realize: “among its many promises and possibilities, higher education poses a threat to both authenticity and a coherent sense of selfhood.… Class hybridity does not sit easily with a sense of authenticity. Feelings of being an imposter are never far away.”5 To use Reay’s language, successful working-class students may experience “the threat of losing oneself”6 to a system of interconnected discourses that fail to represent any aspect of their life experiences outside of school, and may forego the widely recognized benefits of higher education for the more familiar identity categories of the home. Alternatively, successful working-class (or otherwise culturally different) students who remain engaged with the target culture in which they have been educated may find themselves at a loss: always feeling the split between their outward, professional identity and their inner feelings of belonging. Students in the latter group may even subject themselves to judgmental critique as they attempt to bring the various and often unspoken commitments that constitute their sense of identity under a single narrative. Reay’s findings validate my sixth graders’ statements of resistance, insofar as they already anticipated the alienation necessary to their academic growth. While it may appear inappropriate to take up the question of students’ suffering and resistance in language more commonly associated with pathology, melancholia has maintained an ambivalent place in Western thought for as long as it has been recognized as a marginal characteristic of the human psyche: as with Antigone, melancholia serves as both an individual pathology and an indicator of social ills. Aristotle seems to have been the first to identify the excess of black bile (melaina chole), from which the term “melancholia” is derived, with an exceptional, generative aspect of human nature “coextensive with man’s anxiety in Being.”7 The ambivalence of the melancholic’s exceptional status carries through German Romanticism, in which the melancholic character, in the form of the Beautiful Soul, is endowed with greater vision of the world and its limitations “on account of a surfeit of humanity” (BS, 7), but is at the same time ~~paralyzed~~ [halted] by the conflict between its infinite spirit and the limitations and disappointments of the world. Following this doubled historical characterization, Sigmund Freud’s early works assign melancholia a strictly pathological status, while later developments explore the significance of the subject’s earliest, unspeakable attachments in describing early moments in the development of the subject’s character. More recently, based on Judith Butler’s work, David Eng has reconceived melancholia’s life beyond its clinical role in pathologizing the experiences of women in patriarchal society by reclaiming its capacity to describe the attachments of minoritized subjects to those aspects of their identity that constitute their difference.8 From within the dominant discourses of flourishing and success that define any particular community, an attachment to objects unrecognized and indescribable in those discourses would certainly seem pathological. Implicit to the working of democratic societies, however, remain two important ties to those beloved objects that recalcitrantly remain unmournable, indescribable, or ineffable. First, aspects of humanity that were at one time unrecognized as human have played an important role in human rights discourses: those anomalies that have demanded a reconsideration of what is human have brought the most enriching changes to our shared understanding of humanity. Second, human communities are often founded on what might be called ineffable principles, followed faithfully by those who have no capacity to rationally justify their soundness. Considering the place of the ineffable in the founding and maintenance of communal ties, we can appreciate the significance of retaining a view of melancholia that describes not so much the pathologized as the marginalized — the “other” who helps us understand who “we” are — as a means of recognizing the role that difference plays within schooling without making that difference insignificant by merely accepting it. To foreground one of the assumptions that makes the use of psychoanalytic thought in educational contexts possible, the notion of education employed here is not a matter of delivering content to an established subject, but a regular re-subjectification of the student in relation to new forms of language and disciplines that claim the student’s identity as educated and may be changed by ~~his or her~~  [their] inclusion in this category. The upshot of this recursively constituting view of education is that the crisis of loss and language that occasions the advent of melancholia in the subject is not limited to a particular developmental stage, and is especially not limited to the pre–school age period during which one’s first language is typically learned. The refusal of language as a replacement for a lost or unspeakable object can be seen as a potential outcome at every stage of the subject’s educational life, and the preference or erotization of suffering that grows from this refusal is at stake in each attempt made by the student to rediscover and reinvent ~~him- or herself~~ [themselves] in the language of the curriculum. While the interpellation of the subject within language is necessary to its education in any particular discourse of human flourishing, in order to remain a distinct self rather than be swallowed whole by the interests of a discourse the subject must engage in some sort of refusal of language in its own formation. That this assertion of something in the self that is more than the sum of its influences — a character or personal style — derives more from the limitations of language to account for its own creations than from an original nature or inborn disposition has important consequences for the way we understand the recalcitrant child, the refusal of curricular goals, and the formation of competent human subjects.

### Foreign Languages

#### The ability to establish absolute knowledge over a foreign language is impossible, they seek to create an instrument of power that mobilizes an excess of signs carried by language.

Felman 82 (Shoshana Felman is a Woodruff Professor of Comparative Literature and French at Emory University, “Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable”, Yale French Studies, No. 63, The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre) AqN \*modified for gendered language\*

Western pedagogy can be said to culminate in Hegel's philosophical didacticism: the Hegelian concept of "absolute knowledgen-which for Hegel defines at once the potential aim and the actual end of dialectics, of philosophy-is in effect what pedagogy has always aimed at as its ideal: the exhaustion-through methodical investigation-of all there is to know; the absolute completion termination-of apprenticeship. Complete and totally appropriated knowledge will become-in all senses of the word-a mastery. "In the Hegelian perspective," writes Lacan, "the completed discourse" is "an instrument of power, the scepter and the property of those who know" (S-11, 91). "What is at stake in absolute knowledge is the fact that discourse closes back upon itself, that it is entirely in agreement with itself." (S-11, 91). But the unconscious, in Lacan's conception, is precisely the discovery that human discourse can by definition never be entirely in agreement with itself, entirely identical to its knowledge of itself, since, as the vehicle of unconscious knowledge, it is constitutively the material locus of a signifying difference from itself. What, indeed, is the unconscious, if not a kind of unmeant knowledge which escapes intentionality and meaning, a knowledge which is spoken by the language of the subject (spoken, for instance, by ~~his~~ [their] "slips" or by ~~his~~ [their] dreams), but which the subject cannot recognize, assume as ~~his~~ [their], appropriate; a speaking knowledge which is nonetheless denied to the speaker's knowledge? In Lacan's own terms, the unconscious is "knowledge which can't tolerate one's knowing that one knows" (Seminar, Feb. 19, 1974; unpublished). "Analysis appears on the scene to announce that there is knowledge which does not know itself, knowledge which is supported by the signifier as such" (S-XX, 88). "It is from a place which differs from any capture by a subject that a knowledge is surrendered, since that knowledge offers itself only to the subject's slips-to his misprision" (Scilicet I, 38)14."The discovery of the unconscious . . . is that the implications of meaning infinitely exceed the signs manipulated by the individual" (S-11, 150). "As far as signs are concerned, ~~man~~ [humanity] is always mobilizing many more of them than ~~he knows~~ [they know]" (S-11, 150). If this is so, there can constitutively be no such thing as absolute knowledge: absolute knowledge is knowledge that has exhausted its own articulation; but articulated knowledge is by definition what cannot exhaust its own self-knowledge. For knowledge to be spoken, linguistically articulated,.it would constitutively have to be supported by the ignorance carried by language, the ignorance of the excess of signs that of necessity its language-its articulation-"mobilizes". Thus, human knowledge is, by definition, that which is untotalizable, that which rules out any possibility of totalizing what it knows or of eradicating its own ignorance.

### Hegemony

#### The affirmative’s attempt to construct an American-dominated global system through hegemony is invested in the construct of a “whole” America that sustains itself off Weapon States. In an impossible world of complete hegemony, destruction of subjecthood occurs through the fulfillment of all desire.

Solomon 15 (Ty Solomon is a Lecturer in International Relations (Politics) at the School of Social & Political Sciences, Adam Smith Building, Bute Gardens, University of Glasgow, “The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.5031921>, University of Michigan Press) AqN

The fantasy of Krauthammer’s discourse differs notably from fantasies offered by neoconservatives at other times. In one sense, this is to be expected. Different times and issues call for different arguments. Yet many observers note that since the beginning of the movement during the 1970s, one fairly consistent quality of neoconservatism is the ever-present sense of doom just around the corner and national choices that are always starkly dichotomous. As Bacevich (2005: 77) wryly observes, “On the one hand—if the nation disregards the neoconservative call to action—there is the abyss. On the other hand—if the nation heeds that call—the possibility of salvation exists.” Krauthammer’s text displays many of the usual neoconservative precepts, such as the primacy of military power and the idea that American global hegemony is benevolent and beneficial for non-Americans. The key tension in Krauthammer’s text, though, is that the notion of “chaos” lurking close-by conflicts with the major thrust of the message of unipolarity. We can understand the role of desire in the discourse through this tension. Rather than constructing a subject of lack, Krauthammer’s discourse largely constructs a subject much closer to fullness. This, in turn, does not evoke desire for identification but instead kills desire for identification. Desire (as understood here) is coextensive with lack (Fink 1995: 54). To exist as a subject, one must desire. Lack evokes desire, desire drives identification, and only through identification with the social resources of the Symbolic can subjects gain the recognition they need to achieve a sense of stability and security. Krauthammer’s discourse presumably does not spark much desire because the subject it produces is, strictly speaking, not lacking all that much. As the unipolar power—or, as the subject “America” is constructed through the fantasy of being a unipolar power—Krauthammer’s discourse includes little desire for something else that might make the subject feel more secure or more stable. As the unipolar power, the subject “America” already seems quite close to the wholeness of enjoyment in terms of a world of American-imposed rules. Now that the Cold War is over, and now that the only other superpower that remotely had the capability to impose its own global rules is no more, the obstacles to the subject’s enjoyment have largely been removed. Yet the effect of this subject formation on a receiving audience—in terms of an audience “being positioned (or having existing positionings reinforced) as complex subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 135)—depends on the workings of desire. Once the subject approaches the object it believes it desires, desire for that specific object paradoxically begins to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The ultimate contingency of our desire and identifications would set in, and one would cease to be a desiring subject. As Lacan (1998: 111) argues, “‘That’s not it’ is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance expected” when one approaches the perceived missing object. Desire is sustained by not reaching the missing object: “The satisfaction of desire essentially consists of the preservation of its own unsatisfaction, since a subject remains a subject only insofar as . . . he is a desiring lack-of-being that wants-to-be” (Chiesa 2007: 155; see also Fink 1995: 103). That is, the closer the subject gets to enjoyment, the more desire fades and the more anxiety sets in, since only through desire do we have subjectivity, and therefore the more desiring the subject becomes.5 Indeed, fantasy’s purpose is to ward off anxiety and contingency: This way enjoyment is kept at a “healthy” distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility—something that would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger. (Stavrakakis 2007: 198) Although Krauthammer’s message of unipolarity constructs a discursive subject not lacking all that much, thus evoking less desire for identification with it than might otherwise be the case, the fantasy of the “unipolar moment” was not completely without lack. This is expressed a few ways in the discourse. First, we can understand the place of object a in this fantasy as the lack of an American-dominated world, toward which Krauthammer—and the subject his discourse constructs—is oriented throughout the text. While the international system is, in Krauthammer’s view, undoubtedly unipolar, it is not unipolar to the extent that every other state or actor willingly submits to an American-imposed order. “Weapon States” are some of the few states mentioned at all in the text, presumably because they are the outlaws that do not conform to post–Cold War order as defined by the United States. North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa all pose blockages to American/global order through their possession (at the time) of weapons of mass destruction, even though some of these states were more threatening than others. The obstacle that these few states pose to a truly unipolar world—where “we” no longer must “hope for safety” but can seemingly achieve complete safety—evokes desire to remove them as obstacles to the fantasy of enjoyment. Desire is constructed as pushing toward that elusive object believed to bring the enjoyment of being a complete subject— here, understood as an American-centered world with American-imposed global rules. Although this object is unattainable (since it is but a Symbolic manifestation of a void), the subject’s fantasy allows it to believe that this object is attainable. An absolutely American-dominated global system—a full subject—is indeed presupposed to exist were it not for these few states that pose an obstacle. Krauthammer’s entire discourse guides the audience to believe that a truly American-centered world is entirely plausible and desirable, yet this object of desire that promises enjoyment does not exist. Not merely the social construction of threat, Krauthammer’s production of “Weapon States” hinges on the movements of desire and enjoyment that make possible Self-Other relations. The construction of these threats is in one sense, as many international relations (IR) identity theories would contend, the production of a hierarchy of “identities” in which America is differentiated from those states that are not America or the new American unipolar world (see Weldes 1999). “Weapon States” here constitute the opposing side of a binary between those states that are members of and are perceived to openly welcome the new American world, and those states that are not “us.” Yet in contrast to such approaches, more than just the presence of these Others poses an obvious threat to “us.” Consequently, it is not enough merely to make explicit the binary construction of identities. As Slavoj Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “It is not sufficient to point out how the . . . Other presents a threat to our identity. We should rather inverse this proposition: the fascinating image of the Other gives a body to our own innermost split, to what is ‘in us more than ourselves’ and thus prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves.” In other words, the construction of the subject through reference to an Other—the construction of “America” through reference to “Weapon States”—is premised on a frustration of the “American” subject of the discourse. The fully enjoying subject is an impossible project, and “America” and a completely American-dominated global system are likewise impossible projects, since no social entity can fully construct itself. The discursive production of “Weapon States” “gives a body,” in Žižek’s words, to the ultimate frustration and incompleteness of the subject in Krauthammer’s discourse. These movements of frustration and desire for a full subject give rise to the construction of fantasies of Self and Other in Krauthammer’s discourse. This process involves the notion that fantasies often presume that Others “steal our enjoyment” (Žižek 1997). This subtly appears several times in Krauthammer’s discourse. Although “we” are without a doubt the only superpower, Krauthammer (1990–91: 29) asserts that “there will constantly be new threats disturbing our peace.” Global stability is “our” stability, since American domination is (again) good, necessary, and vital if “chaos” is to be avoided. “Weapon States” that “brandish” their weapons must be policed to alleviate the threat they pose, and the rise of “intolerant aggressive nationalisms in a disintegrating communist bloc” can be read as moments of fantasy blockages in which the Other is doing something “we” should be doing. One gets the sense that as the lone superpower, America alone should have the right to “brandish” its weapons of mass destruction—for example, in “unabashedly laying down the rules of world order.” One also gets the sense that the potential rise of “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” poses a blockage to the desiring American subject because America itself should have the sole right to engage in the behaviors engendered by such forces. Krauthammer’s entire discourse is constructed around the idea that America should aggressively promote its own ideas for how the world should be organized and policed and that no other entity has the ability or license to do so. America alone should dominate the world, and for Krauthammer, America should be intolerant of anyone else attempting to preempt this new opportunity, for this is the road to “chaos.” America possesses the “strength and will” that the rest of the world does not, and thus America rightfully should exercise those qualities to the benefit of all. Others’ “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” are threatening and not to be tolerated, but American aggressive and nationalistic expansion are to be welcomed. American nationalist-driven internationalism is beneficial for the world, while other nationalisms are threatening. This illustrates the notion that constructions of Self and Other are underpinned by desire and enjoyment—or, rather, the perceived theft of enjoyment by others. “What we gain,” Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “by trans- posing the perception of inherent social antagonisms into the fascination with the Other . . . is the fantasy-organization of desire.” Through Krauthammer’s production of threats, one sees the fascination exhibited by what others are doing, the enjoyment that they are displaying, and how “they” are in a sense stealing the enjoyment that “we” should be having and are lacking. The “fullness” that they seem to attain in their enjoyment is perceived as precisely the Thing that “we” seem to be missing. “America” is lacking in some sense, and the Thing it lacks is the very Thing that “Weapon States” brandish openly. Moreover, there is the worry that isolationism keeps “America” from being fully itself. Indeed, if this revival spreads, an American “collapse to second-rank status will not be for foreign but for domestic reasons,” such as the country’s “insatiable desire for yet higher standards of living without paying any of the cost” (Krauthammer 1990–91: 26–27). Krauthammer’s fears of isolationism relate to the “strength and will” of which he speaks in closing his essay. Yet the manner in which isolationists, in Krauthammer’s view, define the national interest goes against America’s true national interests, which extend beyond the narrow confines of the nation’s borders. America should “unashamedly” lay down its own rules for global order, since the world’s interests coincide with American interests (33). Although isolationism may indeed be an old theme of American foreign policy, it is simply out of place in a unipolar world, which by definition must be dominated by the unipolar power. “Isolationism” in this sense weakens precisely the part of the American subject that must be utilized in imposing and enforcing world order. Krauthammer’s emphasis on the necessity of “American strength and will” for world security points to qualities that the subject “America” needs to have, in some sense has, but in another sense does not have. In other words, “strength and will” are a part of the subject that is missing but that is needed so that the subject can fully become its own image of itself. These characteristics are foremost uniquely American. The rest of the world cannot act without America leading the way, since “where the United States does not tread, the alliance will not follow” (24). The rest of the world lacks the “strength and will” needed to define and carry out global order. In a sense, however, so does the United States. As the unipolar power, America without a doubt has a great deal more “strength and will” than any other power. Yet given a resurgent domestic “isolationism” and other potential “domestic” problems, the United States does not yet have the “strength and will” necessary to fully embrace its global role. The subject is lacking some- thing that is posited as having faithfully served it in the past but that it has lost exactly when it needs it the most. What precisely Krauthammer means by “strength and will” is left undefined, yet their meaning could be filled in any number of ways. This lack of definition—indeed, the impossibility of fully defining what they mean—enables them to function as signifiers covering the subject’s lack in the fantasy. “Strength and will” function as the Symbolic stand-ins for what the subject “America” currently lacks the full force of, yet in some sense they remain a part of the subject. They may have been temporarily or partly lost during the current isolationist revival, but they are still a missing part of the subject that must be rediscovered if “America” is going to more fully step into its proper role as global leader. The partial enjoyment implied in both of these aspects—in the just-out-of-reach image of an American dominated global system and the “strength and will” that is both present in and absent from the subject—sparks the desire for their pursuit. In the fantasy of the “unipolar moment,” the subject “America” seeks the perceived to-be-missing parts of itself that it believes will bring it the enjoyment it seeks, yet the fantasy posits obstacles to explain why enjoyment is not forthcoming and why desire remains frustrated. Although figures such as “Weapon States” are posited as blocking the culmination and stabilization of the subject, these figures merely Symbolically cover over the ambiguity, divisions, and frustrations that are inherent to subject formation itself. Even though the signifier “isolationism” is offered for why our “strength and will” have not been delivered, this of course does not mean that “strength and will” would automatically be forthcoming if “isolationism” were to subside. “Strength and will” do not represent anything but the lack of what the subject is constructed as needing to pursue the image of fullness (an Americandominated world), itself an illusory object projected by the fantasy to pursue enjoyment. However, the desires evoked by the fantasy are very much in tension with the overall tenor of Krauthammer’s discourse. Again, as the subject “America” constructed as the sole superpower, there is not much to desire in Krauthammer’s text for another object that might alleviate the ambiguities of subjectivity. As the sole unipolar power, the collective subject is already close to enjoyment in terms of a world shaped by American-imposed rules. However, when the subject approaches the object it desires, desire itself starts to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The desires evoked by the fantasy ob- stacles posed and the evaporation of desire the closer it approaches the enjoyment seemingly promised are in tension in Krauthammer’s discourse. In other words, there is not much distance between the subject and the missing object, yet this distance is necessary to maintain desire. The subject in Krauthammer’s discourse (and implicitly projected to an audience) in fact helps to dissolve desire rather than evoking the desire for identification. In closing in on a truly American-centered world, the desire for identification with the subject of this discourse (“America,” the “United States”) induces a kind of dissatisfaction because it comes too close to the object(s) of desire. Without desire, there is no subject, and here the subject is close to fulfilling its desire. In terms of its efficacy or resonance, then, it presumably it fails to spark desires for identification. If the United States now sits astride the globe with relatively little to fear from other great powers, what is left to desire?

### Identity Politics

#### Their identity politics collapses under capitalism – their focus on individuality fails to transcend universality – this depoliticizes their project and gives coherence to the existing order.

Garcia 12 (Antonio Garcia has taught general humanities and education courses: Aesthetics, philosophy, Society and Culture, Freshmen Writing, multicultural education, pop culture and pedagogy, intro to curriculum theory, and intro to educational research methods, “The Eclipse of Education in the End Times”, <http://www.academia.edu/3596973/The_Eclipse_of_Education_in_the_End_Times>, 12/9/12) AqN

For Zizek, at least in regards to politics, we are in a post-political era in which identity and cultural politics are depoliticized; that is, they are no longer political in taking up a revolutionary struggle predicated on a universal ideal. We are no longer engaged in the political struggles that seek to instigate radical reform and "egaliberté."42 The reason is that, "Postmodern identity politics involves the logic of ressentiment, of proclaiming oneself a victim and expecting the dominant social Other to pay for the damage, while egaliberté breaks out of this vicious cycle." One should, therefore, ask: Are we as engaged in a revolutionary struggle (universalized under oppression proper) or are we content with being pissed off so that we are not pissed on? Incorporated within this critical matter is how we currently frame multiculturalism in a wider context across the sociological and political spectrum that is becoming entrenched in the privatization of education (i.e., neoliberal market ideology), focused on meritocratic ideals, and operated under the pretense that educational inequality is more of a matter of poor teaching than socio-cultural considerations. In other words, have we become complacent through institutional forbearance in which we remain agitated without agency and action? In considering the current state of multiculturalism, we must contemplate what must be done to ensure, if not reinvigorate, a really existing [revolutionary] struggle like that of the Civil Rights era. As it stands, multiculturalism remains an abstraction in the post-political era, or at least a distraction, from really existing political struggle. How do we begin to engage in critical pedagogical practices in the classroom, examine the superficial nature of multicultural education policies and curriculum (beyond heroes, holidays, and a pedagogy of niceness), and approach the larger socio-political questions of a truly multicultural society? How does one exist as a singular organ (i.e., humanity) among the multiplicity of particularities? Zizek asks, ' 'When we are dealing with a series of particular struggles, is there not always one struggle which, although it appears to function as one in the series, effectively provides the horizon of the series as such?" 4 The one that is primal for Zizek is "class struggle," which he believes selves as the heart of all oppression (manifested through capital) where all other struggles converge arterially. The issue of class struggle is not new and has been taken up by others, 4 but one should entertain that "class struggle" cannot be the rigid determinate of struggle. Hardt and Negri believe that "class is a political concept in that a class is and can only be a collectivity that struggles in common. "42 The problem, as Hardt and Negri see it, is that orthodox Marxists like Zizek believe that the industrial proletariat is the only active collective that can effectively dismantle or counteract capitalism. One should, rather, conceptualize class struggle in "an infinite number of ways that humans can be grouped into classes hair color, blood type, and so forth — but the classes that matter are those defined by the lines of collective struggle. Race is just as much a political concept as economic class in this regard. Marxist thought that is overly determined by a totalizing, singular conception of class (i.e., the industrial proletariat) poses some problems of myopic dogmatism. Emesto Laclau believes that the problem with the rigid emphasis on class struggle is that ' 'it tends to anchor the moment of struggle and antagonisms in the sectorial identity of a group, while any meaningful struggle transcends any sectorial identity and becomes a complexly articulated 'collective will'. ' The problem with Zizek, according to Laclau, is "his discourse around entities — class, class struggle, capitalism... are largely fetishes disposed of any precise meaning. Zizek has attempted to defend criticisms about his political thought. 43 He has consistently advocated the need for a universality that instigates a clear demarcation of "us" and "them"; that is, it is only by instituting an ideological dialectic (inclusion/exclusion) that one engages in making a struggle political. Universalization instigates politicalization by, [T]he fact that one, precisely, is not merely that specific individual exposed to a set of specific injustices — consists in its apparent opposite, in the thoroughly irrational, excessive outburst of violence... In the equation of universalism with the militant, divisive position of engagement in a struggle. True universalists are not those who preach global tolerance of differences and all-encompassing unity but those who engage in a passionate fight for the assertion of the truth that engages them. Universality is ultimately tied into two dimensions of post-politics. The first dimension is politicization (one could think of it also as publicization).433 Post-politics allows for "recognition without revolution" in that one acknowledges that an event has occurred in which an individual or group has been disenfranchised or oppressed (e.g., the arrest of Dr. Henry Louis Gates) without actually engaging it as a political event (i.e., one is content with being pissed off as long as one is acknowledged). Such postmodern post- politics relegates the struggle to a spectacle (concealing the structural implications that still resonate through covert practices embedded in ideology), as well as one that relies on a "divide and conquer" schema under capitalist logic. The second dimension is politicalization. Politicalization instigates revolutionary struggle in which acknowledgement is not enough; therefore, one is willing to fight for their right, not just talk it out (i.e., one is not just going to be pissed off, they are willing to fight and get pissed on in order to bring about really existing change). In order to engage really existing social transformation, one must actively engage (militantly or through active democratic protest 434) and unhinge the structural ideology that promulgates the existing torrent of inequality. In other words, one should not accept post-political "appeasements" (e.g., affirmative action) that force one (i.e., the dominant, hegemonic Other) to be tolerant without openly assuming proprietorship of one's act in the structuring and maintenance of symbolic ideology. Let me provide a clarifying example of how to understand the post-political dimensions of politicization and politicalization. One may remember the highly publicized arrest of Dr. Henry Louis Gates for "disorderly conduct" after being questioned by a police officer that was alerted about a possible break-in in the area. Dr. Gates questioned his arrest, "Why, because I'm a black man in America?" 36 After a couple of weeks of media publicizing, what was the outcome of the situation between Dr. Gates and the arresting officer? The two were invited to the White House by President Obama to share a beer and discuss the incident in what was deemed "the beer summit." Although Obama invited Crowley (the arresting officer) and Gates as part of what he called a 'teachable moment,' something significant was missed. The coverage allowed the public to get the ' 'we've come together" photos and video footage that the White House wanted while keeping the discussion private among the men. The event was individualized, made particular, being the isolated experience of one Black man and one White police officer. It is exactly this singularity of an event that reduces its possibility in becoming universalized in implicating a larger problem embedded in global capitalism. This is precisely what global capitalism desires, a depoliticization of struggles reducing them to a singular core. Events like the one involving Henry Louis Gates are "politicized" as a "race card" event. Thus, it is precisely in it being an isolated event that it loses its ability to be political and truly acknowledge the larger social and cultural struggle that still undergirds US society (i.e., institutionalized racism . In the post-political era of identity politics, one no longer has to worry about being beaten or hosed down openly in the streets. Acts of violence, even hate crimes, are singularities; that is, they are acts committed by individuals without implication of transcending the universal. Without transcendence towards universality, ' 'Postmodern racism emerges as the ultimate consequence of the post-political suspension of the political, of the reduction of the State to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually „438 established) needs of market forces and multiculturalist, tolerant humanitarianism. Multiculturalism polices and publicizes but does little to transcend the existing order.

#### The content of their identity politics is also a demand for recognition that cements themselves in the hegemonic hierarchy of inequality. Understanding the fantasies of inclusivity is a precondition for liberatory politics.

Garcia 12 (Antonio Garcia has taught general humanities and education courses: Aesthetics, philosophy, Society and Culture, Freshmen Writing, multicultural education, pop culture and pedagogy, intro to curriculum theory, and intro to educational research methods, “The Eclipse of Education in the End Times”, <http://www.academia.edu/3596973/The_Eclipse_of_Education_in_the_End_Times>, 12/9/12) AqN

Identity politics plagues the postmodern world in that groups and individuals thrust their “identities” upon the political landscape to seek acknowledgment and power. “National identity,” Jusdanis describes, “has emerged at this time as a necessary medium to maintain and to possess political authority.” He continues, “Only in the past two centuries have groups turned to culture in their fight for liberation, in part because culture had already been targeted by their colonizers.” If nationalism is provoked or “reactionary,” as Jusdanis suggests, then those whose identities are marginalized seek to evoke a unifying identity, a rootedness that may provide them access to the political power of the hegemonic nationalism. This quest for acknowledgement has been framed in terms of “recognition” rather than identity (although these terms are often used interchangeably). Taylor explains, with the move from honor to dignity has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements. What is to be avoided at all costs is the existence of “first-class” and “second-class” citizens. We can interpret first class and second class (and possibly sequential classes, i.e., third, fourth, and so on in an hierarchical schema) in the language of Us and Them as well as Us and the Other . This dialectical positioning allows us to begin thinking about how Žižek frames jouissance and the Other within the scope of nationalism. Within the notion of recognition , groups assert their marginalization, but, more importantly, they attempt to make known their depravation of power in the hegemonic hierarchy. Fraser explains, [Those who use the identity model ] contend that to belong to a group that is devalued by the dominant culture is to be misrecognized, to suffer a distortion in one’s relation to one’s self. As a result of repeated encounters with the stigmatizing gaze of a culturally dominant other, the members of disesteemed groups internalize negative self-images and are prevented from developing a healthy cultural identity of their own. In other words, first-class citizens are prescribed superiority due to capital (cultural and financial) as well as historical superiority generated through sex (male), sexuality(heterosexual), religion (Christian), race (White), and other characteristics that create a hierarchy of inequality with the social sphere. Christine Bennett writes, “Members of ethnic minority groups are free to retain many of their cultural ways as long as they conform to these practices deemed necessary for harmonious coexistence within the society as a whole.” In this view, contrary to the assimilationist discourse, ethnic groups are expected and even encouraged to stick to their ethnic heritage and cultural traditions as part of comprising the American ideal. Here, the underlying notion of being “American” has nothing to do with loyalty or citizenship. Multiculturalists argue, however, that the premise of assimilation is to become more like that nation’s dominant ideology, cultural values, and language. Education and curriculum have been key to assimilation to ensure the dominant ideology and to negate Others. Žižek points out that the US is a unique space to examine this discontent of identities and their political implications: The United States plays the unique role of an exception: the key element to standard ‘American ideology’ consists in the endeavour to transubstantiate the very fidelity to one’s particular ethnic roots in an expression of ‘being America’: in order to be ‘a good American’, one does not have to renounce one’s ethnic roots – Italians, Germans, Africans, Jews, Greeks, Koreans, they are ‘all Americans’, that is, the very particularity of their ethnic identity, the way they ‘stick to it’, makes them Americans. Since there is no monolithic identity that implores an authentic or pure nation in the US, Žižek asserts that it is the very rejection of a national identity that in itself becomes our national identity. In other words, and contrary to Roosevelt’s statement earlier, the US is a nation of no-one-nation . However, the fantasy is still enforced that we can be a unifying nation. But to imply this is also to venture into the same realm as cultural studies in which there are numerous subcultures that operate under the general term “culture” (e.g., punk culture, fan culture, consumer culture, etc.). Nationalism suffers from the same logical positivist attempt to narrowly define nation under a singular core of truth, which is impossible to do when dealing with people and sentimentality . Identity politics operates under the auspices of subjugation in which groups are pushed to the margins and often occupy a place of no place . Thus groups who are in limbo under the hegemonic hierarchy have no choice but to fantasize and imagine their own nation, their own institutional and cultural power, as well as their place amongst the other hegemonic states. Is this not what Marcus Garvey implies here: “The Negro needs a Nation and a country of his own, where he can best show evidence of his own ability in the art of human progress. Scattered as an unmixed and unrecognized part of alien nations and civilizations is but to demonstrate his imbecility . . . It is unfortunate that we should so drift apart, as a race, as not to see that we are but perpetuating our own sorrow and disgrace in failing to appreciate the first great requisite of all peoples—organization . . . Organization is a great power in directing the affairs of a race or nation toward a given goal . . . . The Negro will have to build his own government, industry, art, science, literature and culture, before the world will stop to consider him. Until then we are but wards of a superior race and civilization, and the outcasts of a standard social system.” Does not Garvey implicate the need to escape this place of no place in order to have a place, whether it is a physical space or a psychical one in the minds of its constituents? Thus, we must understand how fantasy operates as a sublime object of ideology when such calls for nationalism are instigated.

### Model Minority

#### The shared tropes of what it means to be the Model Minority at the center of the affirmative’s project of resistance reifies the color line. Their Asian spaces of resistance sustain their coherence off this homogenization which creates the model Model Minority through processes of coercive mimeticism.

Gaztambide 14 (Daniel Gaztambide is a professor at the Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology at Rutgers University, “I’m not black, I’m not white, what am I? The illusion of the color line”, Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society) AqN

I also think of Amy, a South Asian social work student. During her participation in a cultural consciousness workshop, the ethnic minorities in the room were asked by the group leader to sit in the center of the circle and discuss their experiences of discrimination and mistreatment. This was intended as an exercise in which white students could learn from the experiences of their peers of color. Over the course of the training, Amy noted that she felt conflicted. On the one hand she could readily bring to awareness her own experiences with prejudice due to being a Brown woman. Yet she also had an awareness of herself as economically privileged due to her family’s class background. She verbalized this ambivalence to the group. The group leader responded that it was not their job to help Amy feel comfortable. Amy clarified that this was not her intent – she was not looking for comfort – but to expand the conversation in terms of different identities and levels of privilege. Other Black group members commented on the conversation. Some believed that as a Brown woman, a South-Asian woman, she wasn’t really a minority. Others said that Asians and Southeast Asians were “model minorities” and basically White by association, and hence didn’t need any legal protection from discrimination. Her presence in the group was in question. It almost seemed that so long as her narrative was one of being a discriminated-against, underprivileged minority, she was an ethnic minority. When she added complexity by noting how she was both underprivileged and privileged, depending on whether one focused on her racial identity or her class status, she was color-checked and judged to be White. These examples can be conceptualized in terms of in-group and out-group dynamics, and there is certainly no lack of writing on this topic in the psychoanalytic and social psychology literature. Important as these are, the perspective I am elucidating points us toward a different angle of vision. Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice.

### Multicultural Discourse

#### The affirmative’s multicultural telos legitimizes moral authority. The desire to acknowledge cultural difference is one that attempts to reduce the Otherness of the Other to depoliticize their distinctions – this sanitizes violence through the repression of the symbolic order and the hierarchical investment of the aff.

Huang 7 (Han-yu Huang is a professor of geosciences at the National Taiwan University, “Horror and Evil in the Name of Enjoyment: A Psychoanalytic Critique of Ideology”) AqN \*modified for gendered language\*

Bringing together McLuhan, Harvey and Tomlinson, we may associate globalization with multiculturalism in terms of the principles of proximity, compression, connectivity and mobility (in both spatio-temporal, physical and conceptual sense). Nevertheless, most discourses of global multiculturalism tend to subsume all the undecidability, unpredictability and contradiction within an optimistically, and one-sidedly as well, liberal-democratic framework and, thus, unconsciously repress or escape from a truly ethical encounter with the Other. For example, Hans Kung claims that “[t]oday it is necessary to achieve solidarity among the people of different cultures and religions as well as cooperation on both the local […] and on global level – under the banners of global communications, global economy, global ecology, and global politics” (212, my emphasis). Similarly, Tomlinson, on the one hand, associates the globalized prevalence of information technology with the liberation from national, local and insular ideological viewpoints and, on the other hand, calls for “a new global civic ethic” (or “ethical glocalism”) that sets up as its core value institutionalized global belongingness, involvement, rights, and responsibilities, all based on “a willingness to engage with the Other” (185). And Parikh explicitly puts forth the common ethical principle of the multi-ethnic society: “[a] commitment to live together, to share a common future, to resolve differences […] and to help preserve a collective culture and mutual concern” (“Racial Justice” 287). Do all these not bring us back to the Kierkegaardean problematic of “love your neighbor”: we build up an ethics of love for the neighbor only on condition that we have dispensed with ~~his~~ [their] distinctions, preferences, ambivalence and Otherness? In the multiculturalist ethical injunction “love your neighbor” as exemplified above, does the (ethnic, racial, cultural, religious, political) Other not acquire its ethical significance and deserve our love only when it fits into the parameters of global multiculturalism? Obviously, a drive to normalize or reduce, if not subjugate or annihilate, the Otherness of the Other is at work in the multiculturalist discourse as exemplified above: hence, we hear the ethical calls that we should accept cultural differences as a normal part of life, that our religious and ethnic others are just like everyone of us, they deserve to be judged with the universal moral parameters like us…We cannot help noticing – for example, in Parekh – that multiculturalism, in its ambivalent inclusion of the Other and reduction of its Otherness, is always walking on the tightrope between essentialism and relativism (as well as naturalism and culturalism), but diverts from the contradiction in between, and betrays its own anxiety towards the politicization of cultural differences (*Rethinking Multiculturalism* 124, 199). Likewise, a globalist-multiculturalist may simultaneously appeal to the marketplace as a center of dialogue equalizing conflicting interests and generating pressures for democracy and, revealingly, call for *non-rival competition* (Goeudevert 46, 51). Within the contemporary multicultural ethos, it seems politically incorrect, if not dangerous, to oppose universal or cross-cultural dialogue. But we still cannot help wondering: what may become of multiculturalist democracy when “a cross-cultural global consensus” is legitimized as the source of moral authority (Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism 128)? And what may become of the dialogue as such when the Otherness of the Other is not truly recognized but reduced and subsumed (within the framework of globalization), and differences, competitions and conflicts are all depoliticized, if not a ceaseless flow of empty signifiers, empty talk to the neighbor devoid of all human distinctions? Or, will the politicization of cultural differences haunt the contemporary global multiculturalism as depicted above and disrupt its underlying fantasy of fully transparent, symmetrical society and communication in the form of “the return of the repressed”? All the above queries circle around one danger in multiculturalism: behind the ethical injunction “respect for the Other / love your neighbor” may lurk a violence done to the Other, the symbolic violence of reducing, depriving its Otherness. In fact, multiculturalism does not lack its self-critical voices from inside. For example, Peter McLaren in his contribution to *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader* (1994) criticizes that left-liberal multiculturalism tends to “exoticize otherness in a nativistic retreat” that locates racial, class, gender and sexual differences all “in a primeval past of cultural authenticity” (“White Terror” 51). Therefore, he calls for a “critical and resistance multiculturalism” that emphasizes the representations of race, class and gender as the result of struggles over signs and meanings (53). Similarly, Robert Stam and Ella Shohat have in mind a “radical multiculturalism” that brings forth “a profound restructuring and reconceptualization of the power relations between cultural communities” (299), while Henry A. Giroux anticipates an “insurgent multiculturalism” that can open up a radical democracy providing open, fluid sites of struggle and expanding the heterogeneity of public spaces (“Insurgent Multiculturalism” 326). However, although these critical voices deserve our recognition, they remain, intentionally or unintentionally, disengaged with the larger context of social, cultural, political and ideological contradictions and struggles within which both multiculturalism and the Other it recognizes (or “misrecognizes”?) – namely, the identity mania that results from the (over-)politicization of (cultural, ethnic, racial and religious) differences (Meyer 10, 14) – take their roots and flourish. This identity mania can be illustrated in Edward Said’s depiction of the contemporary cultural milieu as “an era of a search for roots, of people trying to discover in the collective memory of their race, religion, community, and family a past that is entirely their own, secure from the ravages of history and a turbulent time” (258). Are the assertions of autonomy and demands for recognition, respect and equality not an essential agenda of multiculturalism in general? Or put in a more fundamental way, does “difference” not always already entail politico-ideological reactions and, hence, contradictions and struggles (between “us” and “them/the Other”)? But the problem of identity mania or, more specifically, fundamentalism is that it “projects itself as a political ideology” which attempts to “reverse the modern process of openness and uncertainty” (Meyer 20) and a collective morality that refuses to respect cultural differences, human rights, pluralism and treats culture in an instrumental way to dominate, marginalize others’ beliefs, ethics, lifestyles and forms of social organization (Meyer 18, 20). Thus, we cannot help noticing an uncanny connection between multiculturalism and fundamentalism: both wield violence to the Other, to deprive the Other of its Otherness, to live together with the neighbor as a dead neighbor, though the former more through symbolic gestures than the extremism, or even terrorism often associated with the latter. Is it not justified to assert that fundamentalist intolerance and violence do not reactively irrupt from the outside but from the inside of multiculturalism, which, as I have made clear above, tends to disavow social, political and ideological antagonisms through all those nominalistic ethical injunctions like recognition, tolerance, respect…? Have we not already learnt from Lacan that “what is refused in the symbolic order re-emerges in the real” (*S III* 13)? And where can we locate this real dimension in multiculturalism, if not from its gesture of depoliticizing cultural, ethnic difference? We are tempted to suspect that multiculturalism, as entangled with global capitalism, is consuming the Other through its depoliticizing cultural differences and, hence, reducing the Otherness of the Other: it is only when its Otherness is deprived that the Other deserves a multiculturalist’s respect and functions as a desirable object or commodity to be consumed either in the consumer society or academies. In fact, it is no exaggeration to characterize the contemporary postmodern culture of mass consumption as an artificially-generated world inhabited by schizo-subjects and cybernomads (McLaren, “White Terror” 45), which turn out to be nothing but the contingent assemblage of differences (Kahn 104), as is best exemplified in the contemporary urban subculture or culture of the Internet. And it is in this same cultural milieu that academic multiculturalist discourses play their subservient roles for the dominant global capitalist political economy. In their typically postmodern rejection of metanarratives and fixed centers, multiculturalist academic discourses appropriate identity and difference to the extent of “the nominalism of occasionally empty and sometimes politically naïve theoretical sloganeering” (Goldberg 14). In so doing, they are disengaged from real sources of exploitation and suffering and “free-floating in textual spaces without weight of body and face” (Matustik 102), and, therefore, foreclose real political contestations or, worse, function as the ideal form of the ideology of global capitalism (Yegenoglu para. 10; Zizek, “A Leftist Plea” 988-89). Understood this way, multiculturalism is conveniently co-opted within a peaceful social system to disguise the oppressive and exploitative relations between dominant and subordinate groups; through an inversion like the Hegelian cunning of reason, multiculturalism is subsumed into effective power mechanisms that keep generating new multiplicity of cultural identities as products for consumption and aim to manage difference through assimilatory, disciplinary and exclusionary strategies (Darder and Torres 19; Smith 177-78).

### Multicultural Education

#### Their multicultural pragmatism is sustained off the dialectical opposition between the civilized and the barbaric Other which maintains the silent coding of “cultural deficiency”. Their act of inclusion only serves to further the disempowerment of the Other.

Garcia 12 (Antonio Garcia has taught general humanities and education courses: Aesthetics, philosophy, Society and Culture, Freshmen Writing, multicultural education, pop culture and pedagogy, intro to curriculum theory, and intro to educational research methods, “The Eclipse of Education in the End Times”, <http://www.academia.edu/3596973/The_Eclipse_of_Education_in_the_End_Times>, 12/9/12) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

Multicultural education is not a monolithic field; however, those who work in multicultural education share similar ideals about human dignity, equality, and historical ideologies that have served to subjugate certain groups. Christine Sleeter and Carl Grant outline the central goals of multicultural education as (1) Promoting the strength and value of cultural diversity, (2) Promoting human rights and respect for those who are different from one's self, (3) Promoting alternative life choices for people, (4) Promoting social justice and equal opportunity for all people, and (5) Promoting equity in the distribution of power. Despite having guiding tenets, multicultural education lacks a guiding philosophy, which is understandable due to the multiple disciplines invested in multiculturalism. Much like curriculum studies, multicultural education is a broad umbrella term that includes various disciplines that contribute to conversations concerning democracy and citizenship ; the sociology of inequality in race, gender, sexuality, socioeconomic status, etc. ; and pedagogical approaches that bridge cultural divides. Each scholar in multicultural education works with a particular emphasis (e.g., race and identity, gender, sexuality, socioeconomic status, critical pedagogy, etc.). James Banks explains, there is general agreement among most scholars and researchers in multicultural education that, for it to be implemented successfully, institutional changes must be made, including changes in the curriculum; the teaching materials; teaching and learning styles; the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of teachers and administrators; and in the goals, norms, and culture of the school. Banks’ ideas of multicultural education require a complete shift in thought, practice, and socialization. This is not to say that it is impossible, but I do not think it is realistic to engage in passive revolution and expect the changes needed in this case. The popular conceptual understanding of multiculturalism is narrowed by the historical legacy of race relations in the US, as well as the large body of scholarship focused on non-White students. In other words, “multiculturalism” has become a code word for race. Anne Phillips explains, Culture is now widely employed in North America and Europe as the acceptable way of referring to race, such that people describe a society as multicultural when previously they would have said multiracial or talk about there being many cultural minorities when really they mean many people who are black. This reduction of multiculturalism to race instigates the silent coding of such utterances like “that’s just their culture.” This latter sentiment is a polite way of pointing out “cultural deficiency” and inferior groups, an assertion of one’s superior status to the Other. For Freud, the distinction between civilization and barbarism is a matter of culture. That is, “‘Civilization’ describes the whole sum of the achievements and regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors.” Terry Eagleton points out, though the words ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ go on being used interchangeably, not least by anthropologists, culture is now also almost the opposite of civility. It is tribal rather than cosmopolitan, a reality lived on pulses at a level far deeper than the mind, and thus closed to rational criticism. The very term “culture” creates problems in our discourse of understanding what we mean by multiculturalism. Raymond Williams reminds us, “Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language.” Žižek proclaims that “[T]he ultimate source of barbarism is culture itself, one’s direct identification with a particular culture, which renders one intolerant toward other cultures.” Walter Benjamin wrote, “There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.” What Žižek, Benjamin, Freud, and Eagleton describe is a dialectic that exists when one talks about culture. That is, we are always talking about an “Other” because we centralize ourselves, our truths, our perspectives, and desires of the world while situating the opposite, inverted, and perverted cultural ideologies in the margins, on the periphery. Thus, we are always confronted with being the other of an Other. What is the natural order of the world? Was the world not born of conquest and will die from conquest? How are we to ~~see~~ [recognize] any revelation in the multicultural rhetoric if history has already predicted our future? In a sort of prescience, we can use futuristic movies and literature (e.g., Wall-E, Star Trek , Star Wars , The Time Machine , etc.) to glimpse into the future, one in which Earth’s ecological integrity is in shambles and conquest and “empire” has transcended the global for the universal. The conservative perspective on multicultural education from a sociopolitical standpoint is to protect the individual (the “state” included as a individual entity) from economic disrepair and to will as much power as possible for “safety and security”; this is the policed state of marketized totality (though not to the degree of physical totalitarian violence).Opponents of multiculturalism attack it because it is perceived as being that ideological force that threatens the hegemonic dogma of Western society. Oppositional scholars and mainstream intellectuals, those who are not vested specifically in education, have argued against multiculturalism and counter-assimilationist cultural practices. Oppositional arguments have criticized multicultural education for being anti-US and anti-Western. Other arguments charge that multiculturalism threatens the unity of a national culture and history. One of the primary reasons for the disdain of multiculturalism is that it “highlights differences and obscures similarities, and it gives each group the idea that it has a special knowledge about itself that no one else can share.” Žižek agrees that multiculturalism privileges both the Other and the multiculturalist: [M]ulticulturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ – it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which ~~he~~ [they], the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by ~~his~~ [their] privileged universal position . . . the multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority. Beverly Shaw reiterates Žižek’s point here: The paradox is that multiculturalism is a thoroughly Westernized outlook that condemns its own viewpoint as ethnocentric…The more the multiculturalist educator attempts to develop understanding and tolerant acceptance of other cultures in the young, the sharper becomes the difference between ~~him~~ [they] and those members that are of these cultures. From this point of view, the multiculturalist is a pious hypocrite who spouts “inclusion” except that universality necessitates a position of exclusion. Žižek explains, “Every notion of universality is coloured by our particular values and thus implies secret exclusions.” For example, the idea of love is supported by the dialectical imposition of “I know I love you because there are those that I don’t love.” In other words, every act of inclusion is a simultaneous act of exclusion . In order to understand the proponents and opponents of multiculturalism, we should maintain that every act of progress, justice, and empowerment for an individual or group is a simultaneous act of regression, injustice, and disempowerment for another . Therefore, the multiculturalist disavows the necessary obligation of universality to identify the aberrant other – the one who will lose as ~~he wins~~ [they win].

### Nuclear War

#### The aff sustains the ‘nuclear priesthood’ of debate – in an attempt to control the absolute contingency of the Real, we repetitively invest in a practice of control over nuclear weapons. The 1AC’s enjoyment of nuclear weapons becomes a form of violent repetition compulsion that turns the case.

Matheson 15 (Calum Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive,” 6/23/15)

The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened. The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7 The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration. But it is only on part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes. Instead, the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction. Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, ~~blindnesses,~~ success, and fate...everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us... First, the tuché, which we have borrowed...from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton...it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly attempts to reach the chaos of contingency. They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real. In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition. When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules. Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

#### Their nuclear politics are structured by a manic disavowal that nullifies reality through a creation of a constant state of crisis. Especially under the age of Trump, their political psychosis creates the catastrophe that it fears.

Nixon 17 (Mignon Nixon is a Professor of Modern and Contemporary Art History at University College London, “Crazy”, MIT Press, 3/6/17) AqN

The baby king (a usually masculine despot) licenses a departure from reality and, in particular, a denial of our own badness. To put this another way, the mania of a mad president relieves us of the responsibility to mourn. For Segal, the failure to mourn the effects of our own destructiveness is a defining feature of modern American politics. In her writings on “nuclear mentality culture,” Segal observes that all groups resist assuming collective responsibility for war, but the history of the United States from Hiroshima to the Cold War to Vietnam to the First Gulf War to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is one of manic disavowal.13 The psychic legacy of the denial of guilt is, in psychoanalytic parlance, a pathological mourning. It is not only that we do not face up to the death and destruction we have caused, but also that our energies are consumed in denying their significance by manically declaring our own omnipotence.14 Every time we begin to mourn the destruction we have authored, it is morning, or infancy, in America again.15 And the broader implication of this perpetual recourse to historical amnesia of our own destructiveness in war is a negation of reality itself. In the spring before the election of the mad president, his predecessor performed a symbolic act, assuming a measure of collective responsibility for past destruction. In May 2016, after visiting Vietnam, Barack Obama became the first sitting US president to make an official visit to Hiroshima. After touring the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, he laid a wreath at the cenotaph in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, met survivors of the atomic bomb US forces dropped on the city in 1945, and made a speech in which he called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This simple, long-deferred action, taking place over seventy years after the event but still during the lifetime of some survivors, marked a shift from an enduring triumphalist rationalization of the atomic bombings of Japan (mania) to a more hopeful stance (mourning). The annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might still, the president observed, occasion “a moral awakening.”16 Here was a different vision of mo(u)rning in America, one in which we might finally be able to acknowledge and grieve for the losses we have caused as well as for those we have endured. Following his election in November 2016, months after Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, the president-elect moved swiftly to stock his cabinet with former generals. Days before Christmas, he would announce, with his trademark studied casualness, that he was toying with the idea of restarting the nuclear arms race. The nonfake news over the festive period was filled with speculation about the possibility that nuclear testing would be resumed under the watchful eye of a secretary of energy who had, as a presidential candidate, called for the elimination of the Department of Energy. There was still some uncertainty about the target of this new nuclear buildup, given the president-elect’s personal regard for the leader of the historical archenemy, but there was a certain logic to his tweet that the nuclear show must go on. For if, as Segal had argued, nuclear politics is a form of mass psychosis in which the prospect of annihilation arouses mania—makes us crazy—then the enemy might truly be a secondary concern. What is crazy about the nuclear attitude, the psychoanalyst explained, is that it actively creates the conditions for what it most fears, the end of the world, while also—and this is crucial—denying the catastrophic reality it risks. To the extent that the president-elect himself represents a kind of political nuclear option, which the group has now exercised, the corollary of a reinvigorated nuclear arms race is a logical extension of that radical act. Writing in the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War and the American war in Vietnam, about the psychical implications of the nuclear threat, the Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari framed the problem as “a collective delusion of negation of reality.”17 The reality Fornari had in mind was the “pantoclastic prospect” of nuclear annihilation, a catastrophic possibility so overwhelming as to arouse our most primitive manic defense, a denial of reality. In this situation, the psychoanalyst observed, we urgently require some “instrument of verifying reality.”18 That instrument, he speculated, might be another, contrasting form of madness, namely, melancholia. The possibility exists, Fornari observed, that the melancholic, “while insane,” is still “closer to the catastrophic reality of our times” than “the unsuspecting victims of a collective delusion of negation of reality.”19 In a climate of reality negation, the melancholic vision of doom has the potential to enlighten. Perhaps this is our opening. Afflicted as we are by a manic negation of reality—the realities of climate change, nuclear armaments, the pain of others—we also, and not coincidentally, live in a time of mass melancholia.20 Under the headings of an epidemic of opiate addiction and economically induced despair, mass melancholia was a significant, if unheralded, theme of the 2016 campaign. The selection of the maddest member of the group as our leader might be seen as a radical response to this morbid state, or as the psychical equivalent of the nuclear option that risks self-annihilation in a frenzy of energizing paranoid-schizoid destructiveness. “Love trumps hate,” Clinton’s swan song to the 2016 campaign, attempted to salve the anxiety of the group but also risked a negation of psychic reality to rival the negation of objective reality promoted by her nemesis. For the individual, love has in some circumstances the power to overcome hatred, but love between groups, as Fornari observed, is far rarer. A principal psychic function of the group, he argued, is to pool our terror and hatred and to export those emotions elsewhere—as onto our enemies in war. Today, our group is split, and this divide can seem to replicate the psychical conditions of war. Yet, even this intensifying war at home cannot discharge the destructive reserves of nuclear mentality culture, a destructiveness that, as Fornari warned, has precipitated us into a prolonged state of crisis. By resorting immediately and reflexively to the rhetoric of nuclear escalation, the mad president has laid bare the underlying and persistent predicament of our group: that our failure or refusal to mourn demands an unending and unexpendable accumulation of destructiveness to ward off melancholia. This might be crazy, but it reveals a psychical reality we may be forced to confront for our own survival.

### Race

#### The desire of Whiteness becomes cyclical as racial difference becomes defined in dialectical opposition to it. Their investment in race upholds whiteness as the transcendental master signifier which maintains notions of sameness.

Seshadri-Crooks 2 (Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks is a professor of English at Boston College, “Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race”, 11/1/02) AqN

In locating the emergence of Aryanism in an intra-European rivalry for hegemony over Europe, I suggest that there are at least two consequences for our understanding of the structure of race: First, contrary to the popular notion in critical race theory and postcolonial studies, racial thinking does not emerge in the simple binary opposition between White and Black, or Occidental and Oriental. Rather, what we see is the autochthonous emergence of a notion of “the original people” grounded in a linguistic theory, which begins by making subtle distinctions among the Teutons, which properly inaugurates the hierarchical thinking about “races” within Europe.21 Whiteness, as the transcendental signifier, or standard of a system of differences, makes every term within the chain refer back to it, and it is in the race to approximate and appropriate Whiteness that racial practice is born. The discourse of Whiteness is above all, to use Guillaumin’s terms, “autoreferential” rather than “altero-referential.” Guillaumin writes: The auto-referential system, centered on the Self, was historically the first to be put in place; it coincided with the pre-eminence of the aristocracy, to whom its race symbolism was specific…. Their eyes remain fixed on their own existence which, both in their own minds and in reality, regulates the course and symbolism of social activity. It is perhaps legitimate to see in this system a form of ethnocentrism…. However, “aristocratism” is not yet racism because unlike racism, it is not founded on a belief in its own “naturalness”. Altero-referential racism is centered on the Other, and seems to arise only in egalitarian societies. A fundamental trait of such a system is the occultation of the Self, of which people have no spontaneous awareness; there is no sense of belonging to a specific group. (Guillaumin 1995:50) Guillaumin’s terms are useful not so much in distinguishing between premodern and contemporary notions of race, as she suggests, but rather in discerning the emergence of race through the self-splitting referred to earlier. Guillaumin’s failure to discern the notion of Whiteness as the organizing principle of Eurocentrism (as distinguished from “banal ethnocentrisms”) enables her to exonerate both ethnocentrism and aristocratism as not “true racism.” But proper attention to the crucial element of class at play in Whiteness reveals that it is not about aristocratism, but about “the people”- the volk, with precisely the sense of its “own naturalness” that Guillaumin disavows as an element in auto-referential systems. I would also suggest that the altero-referential system does not so much displace but is founded on the auto-referential notion of Whiteness. Thus the discourse of race as we understand it today is an effect of that internal splitting that we identified earlier as the cause of race. The structure of race is totalizing, and attempts to master and overcome all difference within its boundaries. The dichotomy of self and other is within Whiteness in the competition over who properly possesses Whiteness, or sovereign humanness. H.F.K.Gunther’s (1927) classification along physiognomic lines is a part of the logical nucleus of racial visibility grounded in “the narcissism of small differences” that grounds racial visibility. Thus in Gunther’s classification, “other” European races such as the Mediterranean can carry the “Negro strain,” or the Tartar may carry the “Asiatic.” The signifier Whiteness is about gaining a monopoly on the notion of humanness, and is not simply the displaceable or reversible pinnacle of the great chain of being.22 However, one must not forget that as the unconscious principle or the master signifier of the symbolic ordering of race, Whiteness also makes possible difference and racial inter-subjectivity. It orders, classifies, categorizes, demarcates and separates human beings on the basis of what is considered to be a natural and neutral epistemology. This knowledge is also the agency that produces and maintains differences through a series of socially instituted and legally enforced laws under the name of equality, multiculturalism, antidiscrimination, etc. Anti-racist legislations and practices, in other words, work ultimately in the service of race, which is inherently, unambiguously, structurally supremacist. The structure of race is deeply fissured, and that is discernible in the constitutive tension, or contradiction between its need to establish absolute differences, and its illegal desire to assert sameness. In fact, race establishes and preserves difference for the ultimate goal of sameness, in order to reproduce the desire for Whiteness. As Foucault might have put it, race separates in order to master. However, unlike the technologies of power that Foucault so painstakingly detailed, the analysis of race cannot be exhausted through its historicization. Race produces unconscious effects, and as a hybrid structure located somewhere between essence and construct, it determines the destiny of human bodies. It is our ethical and political task to figure out how destiny comes to be inscribed as anatomy, when that anatomy does not exist as such.

### Refusal

**Their politics of refusal is a demand for something to be refused – this justifies the continued rhetorical existence of the oppressive structures they hope to resist.**

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN \*modified for ableist language\*

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a ~~paralyzing~~ [transfixing] disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”46 One outcome of framing demand as an affective and symbolic process tied to a set of determinate rhetorical functions enjoins against the simple celebration of demands as either exclusively liberatory, as unproblematic modes of resistance, as exhausting the political, or as nodes for the production of political identity along the lines of equivalence. Alternatively, a politics of desire requires that the place of the demand in a political toolbox ought to be relativized: demands are useful as a precursor to articulating desire; they are important when moored to a broader political strategy; but they are dangerous if seen as the summum bonum of political life. A politics of desire thus functions simply as a negative constraint on the efficacy of a politics of demand, and as a practice a politics of desire asks that political subjects constantly test their demands against the measure of desire or against an explicitly owned set of political investments that envision an alternative world. It is the presence of this alternative, explicitly owned as a desired end state of the political, that might become the prerequisite for desire-based solidarities instead of demand-driven affinities, and as such, a politics of desire recognizes the inevitability and productivity of frustrated demand as part and parcel of antagonistic democratic struggle.

### Settler Colonialism

#### The affirmative’s subversive project relies on a relationship of dialectical opposition between the settler and indigenous peoples, this works to sustain the settler subject as the very subject becomes an object of desire that necessitates destabilization. Their psychic investment into a reconceptualization of the settler curricular project only naturalizes new forms of settler desires, and therefore the violence of indigenization.

Veracini 8 (Lorenzo Veracini is an Associate Professor in History at Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia, “Settler collective, founding violence and disavowal: The settler colonial situation”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07256860802372246>, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 9/16/08) AqN

Settler Colonialism as a Project of Desire Desire (noun): a strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen; [mass noun] strong sexual feeling or appetite; something desired. Desire (verb) [with object]: to strongly wish for or want (something); to want (someone) sexually; (archaic) to express a wish to. Much of the scholarship on race, racialization, and settler colonialism has framed the relationship between racialized subjects and settler colonialism in legal or political terms.20 This move makes sense, considering that settler colonialism is, at base, a political project concerned with governance. For example, when Patrick Wolfe critically asserts that settler-colonial invasion is not an event, but a structure, he argues that the “event” of invasion is made permanent through technologies of governance, such as settler laws, policies, and institutions.21 Similarly, Lorenzo Veracini, when distinguishing settlerhood from migration, makes this distinction by suggesting that “settlers are founders of political orders, and carry their sovereignty with them.”22 Like Wolfe, Veracini identifies sovereignty and political governance as the feature that distinguishes settler invasion from migration. Still underexamined in the literature on settler colonialism are the kinds of emotive investments that settler subjects may have in settler coloniality. To be clear, I am not denying that settler colonialism is a political project. However, I do wish to emphasize the significance of desire, which I would argue enables settler-colonial governance and vice versa. This notion that settler colonialism is as much a project of desire as it is a purely political or legal project is certainly clear within the emergent literature on Queer Indigenous studies, which has shown how alternative models of kinship, through figures such as the berdache or two-spirit person, become objects of desire for Queer subjects searching for true or authentic selves and communities.23 For example, in his research on Queer settler subjectivities, Scott Morgensen discusses how Queer Indigenous identities are appropriated by White LGBTQ activists to serve their own goals of building Queer movements without simultaneously challenging the logics of settler colonialism.24 Similarly, in When Did Indians Become Straight? Mark Rifkin underlines how the fetishization of Native social structures by Queer settlers, or liberals more generally, is as complicit with the settler-colonial project as is the repudiation of these social structures by US imperialist politics.25 In each case, argues Rifkin, Native social practices are framed strictly through the lens of cultural difference rather than as integral to processes of governance, and Native sovereignty is undermined.26 The work of both Morgensen and Rifkin points to the ways that relations of desire sustain and reassert colonial power in settler states. For the Queer settlers discussed by Morgensen and Rifkin, it is indigeneity (or a commodified form of indigeneity) which is the object of desire.27 However, I would argue that settlerhood is also an object of desire, and settler-desires also do the work of sustaining colonial power. This is especially true in the case of the racialized subject seeking belonging in settler society or seeking access to the benefits and privileges of the settler society. Moreover, settlerhood is not only an object of desire in and of itself, but desires that are construed as natural or innate—such as “settling down” and starting a family—do the work of constituting settlerhood as natural and happenstance. It is this naturalization in particular which makes settler colonialism so tenacious. More specifically, the political relationship between “Natives” and “settlers” is sustained through the cultivation of settler subjectivities invested not only in asserting settler identity (for example, American, Canadian or Australian), but with seemingly abstract or “universal” aims, objectives, and ideals, such as settling down, heterosexual (heteronormative) love, property ownership, the nuclear family, the separation of public/private spheres, and so on. Incidentally, these are values that dovetail with other political projects. As indicated by Oxford English Dictionary definitions of the word, desire is generally associated with sexual desire, and it is almost always presumed to operate at the level of the individual rather than the collective. As suggested by the literature on critical psychoanalysis, however, the spaces of the psychic and social/cultural/structural are intimately intertwined. The desire I speak of in this paper is a settler/colonial desire, which manifests itself at the collective level even as it expresses itself at the individual level. When settler desire installs itself as individual desire, it makes invisible its structural dimensions. For example, the desire to “settle down” appears to be a neutral, arbitrary, personal desire, delinked from history or politics. In some ways, settler desire is analogous to the construction of race difference that Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks describes in Desiring Whiteness.28 Though she is engaged in a different conceptual task than I am in this paper, there are nonetheless some useful insights to be gleaned from Desiring Whiteness. In it, Seshadri-Crooks draws upon Lacan’s theory of subject constitution to develop a framework for understanding the logic through which race difference is organized. 29 She argues that while the origins of race difference can be historically situated, its effects exceed language.30 However, racial difference assumes the appearance of naturalness and ahistoricity. To do this, racial difference relies upon the order of sexual difference, where sexual difference (via Lacan) is that which cannot be fully articulated by language.31 Racial difference acquires its tenacity and pervasiveness by assuming naturalness and ahistoricity. One could ask a similar question about settler/colonial desire: How do settler desires become naturalized to the point that their violence is erased, their history disappeared? Even as there is recognition that settler colonialism (or its euphemism, “discovery”) has a clear history, and even as there is recognition of First Peoples, the process of settlement itself continues to be construed as benign. Like race, settler coloniality becomes naturalized or made “normal” by relying upon the order of sexual difference, such that the calls to own property or start a (nuclear) family become delinked from their historical contexts and reconfigured as natural, innate, ahistorical desires. At the same time, it should be noted that while settler desires are constructed as innate, settlerhood itself is not marked on the body in the same way as race or sex difference. Rather, the settler/Native distinction is imprinted on the body through race. That is, there is no inherent recognition of settler-ness except through some sense of racial difference, which is often ambiguous. Outside of this, claims to settler status are recognized only through political and legal technologies, such as birth certificates, passports, status cards, and so on. It is perhaps due to this lack of embodied recognition that settler desire is so significant to sustaining colonial power. Indeed, settler/colonial desire is integral to the construction of settler subjectivities, to settler narratives, and to the project of erasure underlying the indigenizing efforts of settler projects. Settler colonialism is able to sustain itself because settler subjects are invested in its project. Because they are framed as belonging to the space of the psychic settler, desires are able to do the work of naturalizing settler imperatives. In other words, they are able to do this work because they are framed as universal human desires. As Scott Morgensen notes in relation to gender difference, “Any naturalisation of Western heteropatriarchy or binary sex/gender also naturalises settler colonialism. . . . Settler colonisation performs the West’s potential universality, by transporting and indigenising Western governance upon territories far from Europe: in settler states that then may appear not to be perpetual colonisers, but rather to be natural sites of Western law.”32 As a key aspect of this naturalization process, desire links settlerhood to the category of the human—with the implication that the binary counterpart to the settler, the “Native,” belongs to the category of the nonhuman. Such was the dilemma that Frantz Fanon described in Black Skin, White Masks. 33 The process of colonization, argued Fanon, institutes the binary of the colonizer/colonized, which seizes the subjectivity of the colonized, denying the ability of the colonized ever to be recognized except through the logic of racial difference.34 For Fanon, only anticolonial struggle held the promise of recapturing the humanity stolen by colonization. Yet, as Denise Ferreira da Silva has argued, the category of the human is always already embedded in the politics of racialization, emerging from historical-material contexts, even as it has the appearance of being natural.35 Claims to humanity rely on the figure of the “Other,” without which humanness cannot be recognized. Da Silva’s analysis thus problematizes the modernist quest for humanity itself. The evocation of humanity, signaled through naturalized desire, is also what facilitates a project of indigenization—wherein it appears natural and inconsequential that settlers belong to, and are legitimate occupants of, land that was acquired through deceptive treaty processes and through policies of genocide and assimilation.36 For example, in Indian Cowboy, love, marriage, and “settling down” are central themes. The film evokes the “American Dream”—the fantasy of marriage, nuclear family, property ownership, and success within a capitalist economy—while simultaneously making invisible the Indigenous histories and claims to land which make the American Dream possible. Because these erasures are enacted through desire—desire constructed as that which is natural, benign, and essentially human—the erasures are neutralized; the effects of their violence are rendered void.

#### Absent a questioning of the fantasies behind the settler colonial project, the affirmative’s form of resistance justifies more righteous violence as they bolster the psychic drives of the colonizer through opposition.

Hixson 13 (Walter Hixson is a professor of history at the University of Akron, “American Settler Colonialism: A History”, 12/5/13) AqN \*modified for gendered language\*

Fantasy played an important role in the evolution of settler societies and the genocidal violence that accompanied them. For the Americans, the fantasies of "American exceptionalism" and "Manifest Destiny" were driving forces replete with psychic contradictions and traumatic repercussions. In Australia the "national fantasy" of "mateship" obscured the destruction of Aboriginal societies, with attendant psychic consequences. The same phenomenon played out in South Africa, where the trekboers viewed themselves as destined, and in modern Israel under the settlement compulsions of Zionism. In attempting to carry out their fantasies, to realize their dreams, settler colonials perceived their actions as the performance of good works. Settlement required the courage to cross the sea, enter into the unknown, build cabins, hew out farms, overcome obstacles, raise families, forge communities, worship God, and build the imagined community of the nation. Settlers could take pride in their good works and identify with those perceived as being of the same race and religion who shared their pride and experiences. Those of different (inferior) races and cultures who posed an obstacle to the settlement project manifestly were engaged in wrongdoing. By intruding into settler fantasies and disrupting their good works, the indigenous people were responsible for the consequences that followed—removal, destruction of their societies, death. In these ways fantasy, rationalization, narcissism, projection, and guilt permeated the conscious and unconscious mind of the colonizer, enabling genocidal violence as well as historical. The psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan illuminate these points. "The domain of the good is the birth of power," Lacan explained. "To exercise control over one's goods is to have the right to deprive others of them." Jennifer Rutherford elaborates, "This paradox, identified by Freud and articulated by Lacan, is the manifestation of aggression at the very moment we set out to do good." As the Americans set out to build their farms and communities or the Australians to tame the outback, "an aggressive jouissance—a will to destruction"—set in at the expense of those who impeded these projects, namely the indigenous and borderland peoples.92 The persistent violence of the colonial encounter, as narrated throughout this volume, stemmed from the repeated disruption of the settler colonial fantasies and projects on the part of the indigenous populations. Not merely the ambivalence and resistance of the indigenous people but ultimately their very presence ruptured the settler colonial fantasy. As indigenous peoples appeared to impede the path of the new chosen peoples they menaced the good that inhered in the rational, civilized, progressive, and providentially destined settler project. "Within the frameworks of psychoanalytic discourse, anti-colonial resistance is coded as mad- ness, dependency or infantile regression," Ania Loomba points out. "The inferior being always serves as a scapegoat," the French psychoanalytic theorist Octave Mannoni pointed out, "our own evil intentions can be projected onto him [them]." 93 As the indigene becomes the force of evil pitted against the good of the colonizing project, the psychic drives within the colonizer rationalize violent repression. Despite all ambivalent efforts to work with ~~him~~ [them], to share culture, religion, and the benefits of civilization, by putting up resistance the indigene shows that in the end ~~he is~~ [they are] a savage who understands only the exercise of power. Righteous violence, however lamentable, is therefore justified. "A true Stalinist politician loves mankind, yet carries out horrible purges and executions—his heart is breaking while he does it, but he cannot help it, it is his Duty towards the Progress of Humanity," the Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Zizek explains. "It is not my responsibility, it is not me who is really doing it. I am merely an instrument of the higher Historical Necessity. The obscene enjoyment of this situation is generated by the fact that I conceive of myself as exculpated for what I am doing: I am able to inflict pain on others with the full awareness that I am not responsible for it." 94 Settler communities are both "civilized" and "savage" and therefore must walk a fine psychic line in forging a collective identity and institutions. In the case of the United States, "There was, quite simply, no way to make a complete identity without Indians," Phlip Deloria explains. "At the same time, there was no way to make a complete identity while they remained."95 Considerable psychic gymnastics arise from the contradictions involved in cleansing the land of the indigenes while appropriating their desirable characteristics within the maw of the dominant culture, all the while eliding the genocidal past. The colonizer's claims of indigeneity and authenticity require long-term effort but also entail "a cognitive dissonance, a gap between knowledge and belief," a repression of knowledge. Thus the unresolved "historical legacy of violence and appropriation is carried into the present as traumatic memory, inherited institutional structures, and often unexamined assumptions."

### Suffering Reps

#### The aff situates their politics in the marketplace of trauma. Their politics of mourning turns the imprisoned other into a dead object through which we can construct a sentimental economy of pleasure and pacification. Their fantasy of change through cruel investment shields power and violence

Berlant 99 (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54)

Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit? In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action.3 Yet even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are? In other words, mounting can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject I citizens from feeling their culture} and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9

### STEM

#### Education is the primary instance of the University discourse – their form of protest produces alienated subjects constituted by master signifiers while giving coherence to The System. Scientific knowledge becomes inauthentic as it becomes a coherent and unquestionable legitimizing the Master’s discourse.

Bracher 94 (Mark Bracher is a Professor of English and Director of the Center for Literature and Psychoanalysis at Kent State University, “Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and Society”, <http://www.felsemiotica.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Bracher-Mark-et-al.-Eds.-Lacanian-Theory-of-Discourse.-Subject-Structure-and-Society.pdf>, New York University Press) AqN

Our first role in discourse is thus as the a. Before we learn to speak and even before we are born-we occupy the position of the other or receiver of speech, and we do so in the form of the a, as the as yet unassimilated piece of the real that is the object of the desires of those around us, particularly our parents: s, s Subjected, in this position, to a dominating totalized system of knowledge/belief (52 ), we are made to produce ourselves as (alienated) subjects, $, of this system. This means, in the first instance, that our preverbal experience of ourselves and the world, mediated as it is by the actions and demeanor of our primary caretakers, is partially determined by the system of knowledge/belief, or language, inhabited by them, and by the position they attribute to us within that system-when they speak and think of us, for example, as son or daughter, delicate or hearty, future beauty queen or athlete, etc. In the second instance, it means that when we begin to understand language and to speak it, we must fashion our sense of ourselves (our identity) out of the subject positions made available by the signifiers (i.e., categories) of the system, 52 . This discursive structure and hence the totalizing and tyrannical effect of the S2 are not limited, however, to our infancy. They are also present in several other realms-most notably in education and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is perhaps the purest form of the discourse of the University; it is nothing but knowledge (34)-that is, pure impersonal system: The System, and nothing else. No provision is made for individual subjects and their desires and idiosyncracies. Individuals are to act, think, and desire only in ways that function to enact, reproduce, or extend The System. Bureaucracy thus functions to educate, in the root sense of that term: it forms particular types of subjects. Education is of course the primary instance of the discourse of the University. Lacan emphasizes to his audience, many of whom are Students, that it is through the structure of University discourse and their position within it that "many things can be explained regarding the singular phenomena that are occurring at the present time [May 13, 1970J throughout the world" (172). In the first place, the discursive position of students can explain why they were driven to protest and rebel. The student is in the position of the exploited (172), and what torments students, Lacan says, is not that the knowledge they are given isn't structured and solid, but that there is only one thing they can do: namely, weave themselves in with their teachers and thus serve as both the means of production and the surplus value (235) of The System. The surplus value that students are charged with producing is "culture," an elaboration or extension of The System. Insofar as they produce culture-by means of their theses, for example (220)-they simply nourish The System, because the function of a thesis is to add to society's knowledge-that is, to reinforce precisely the factor, 52, by which the students are exploited and alienated. Science is a particularly obvious example. Given the totalizing, tyrannical power of the discourse of the University, The System, it is important to know how one might oppose it. The answer, according to Lacan, does not lie in traditional revolutionary strategies, such as an alliance of workers and peasants, for as Lacan points out, this sort of alliance in the Soviet Union produced the reign of the discourse of the University (237)-that is, a society in which a totalizing, totalitarian system (52) was dominant. As long as students continue to speak, they remain within the (discourse of the) University (237), and they search for a new discourse of the Master. The only place that revolutionary desire can lead, Lacan says, is to a discourse of the Master (239), of which the discourse of the University is a perversion (212). "What you aspire to as revolutionaries," Lacan tells the students, "is a Master. You will have one!" (239). One factor that makes the discourse of the University so powerful and tyrannical is the force of its master signifiers, which operate, for the most part, surreptitiously. In the field of science, for example, the major master signifier is knowledge itself. It is impossible, Lacan observes, not to obey the commandment-that is, the master signifier or ultimate value-that is a( the place of truth in the discourse of science: "Continue always to know more" (120). All questioning about the value of this master signifier is simply crushed (120): that knowledge is valuable especially scientific knowledge-goes without saying in this scientific age. Lacan, however, interrogates the ground of this master signifier and On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language 1 17 finds that it consists in an even more fundamental master signifier-that of an "I" that is identical to itself and transcendental. Thus the final, root operation that establishes the discourse of the University is the assumption of such an "I": "The myth of the ideal 'I,' of the 'I' that masters, of the 'I' by which at least something is identical to itself-i.e., the enunciator-is very precisely what the discourse of the university cannot eliminate from the place where its truth is found" (70-71). Anyone who enunciates scientific knowledge automatically assumes the position of subject of this coherent, totalized knowledge, a subject that most Itself be stable, consistent, self-identical. And this assumption is neither more nor less than the assumption of the self-identical "I" as its master signifier, its ultimate value and truth (70-71). . Since the master signifier in this way dominates (surreptitiously) the discourse of the University, this discourse is in a way subservient to the discourse of the Master. The university, Lacan says, "has an extremely precise function which has a relation at each instant with the stage that one is at with the discourse of the master .... It is precisely because of the more and more extreme uncovering of the discourse of the master that the discourse of the university finds itself manifested" (172-73). These comments indicate that the university, insofar as master discourse of overt law and governance is suppressed, functions as an avatar of the Master discourse, promulgating master signifiers hidden beneath systematic knowledge. And this suggests that one step toward opposing the tyranny of University discourse would be to expose the master signifiers that underlie it and constitute its truth. Doing so makes overt the discourse of the Master that has been covert.

### Teacher

#### Starting at the level of the teacher is bad- it breeds ressentiment in students as they reach the limit of their desire

Stillwaggon 17 (James Stillwaggon obtained a Ph.D. in Philosophy and Education at the Teachers College of Columbia University, ““A FANTASY OF UNTOUCHABLE FULLNESS”: MELANCHOLIA AND RESISTANCE TO EDUCATIONAL TRANSFORMATION”, Educational Theory, Volume 1) AqN

Formal education takes advantage of a mechanism of human life already at play by the time the child reaches school age, namely, the child’s desire as a subject of language that feels the limitations of its own ability to manipulate language to achieve what it wants and that deliberately patterns itself after those who, it presumes, know something about human completeness: “[d]emand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs.”11 Ideas, skills, and habits modeled by the teacher are taken up by the student subject as means to master language and — through language mastery — master the self, making the subject efficient at attaining the things it wants and overcoming its status as divided from itself by coming to understand the bewildering habits of life in which it participates. The student subject grows into its environment in a series of repetitions enabled by the recursive function of language through which the subject loses itself in desire and recoups those losses, always partially, through language. New objects in an environment give rise to new desires, new desires bring about the acquisition of new language, and new words to describe the world broaden the student’s horizon to include new objects just out of reach. The paradox inherent in education — that the subject seeks to come to itself through progressively wider circles of self-othering adventures of language in the world — is only visible from the perspective of one who has already been disappointed by desire in some respect. Desire reaches its limit in the subject’s understanding of its dependence on the otherness of language or the immateriality of symbols. The subject’s realization of its total investment in sources external to itself — the fact that after all this progress in language, it still lacks anything to call its own — may breed disillusionment, depression, distrust in language itself: an intensified awareness of the “limits of the nameable” (BS, 258). “Even the soundest among us know just the same that a firm identity remains a fiction” (BS, 257), and yet the maintenance of that fiction occupies a significant part of our adult lives. The clash between the subject’s ability to account for itself entirely according to external influences and its experience of itself as something of its own, over and above its constructed second nature in language, leads to a host of explanations of the human self that suggest its ineffability, its resistance to discourse: original nature, divine imprint, the prelinguistic charm of infancy itself all draw on a refusal to let the totalizing function of language swallow the subject’s presumption that it is original and authentically unique.

### Transference

#### Education has become a process of transference where students learn to identify with master signifiers through the teacher due to the desire to construct harmonious imaginary fantasies.

Gunder 4 (Michael Gunder is an Associate Professor in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, “Shaping the Planner’s Ego-Ideal A Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education”, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0739456X03261284>, 3/1/04) AqN \*modified for gendered rhetoric\*

Planning educators help reshape and develop their students’ ego-ideals to become planners. Educators, rightly or wrongly, act as role models for the profession in which the students desire to belong (Baum 1997). The student cannot literally copy the behavior of the professor, as this would be absurd. But the student generally enters into a “mirrored” relationship with the academic that is not confrontational. This occurs when the student identifies with a “specific trait” of the educator—perhaps how ~~she touches her hair or speaks~~ [they touch their hair or speak] —and, especially, when the student adopts the value and norms that the professor is asserting—~~his or her~~ [their] planning (and perhaps other) master signifiers (Van Haute 2002, 96). In this way, “consciously and often unconsciously, students learn to be members of a school culture that has a particular structure of authority and norms” (Baum 1997, 23). For Lacan (1977), this identification with the master signifiers, the “special traits” of their educators, is what constitutes the formation of the professional ego-ideal of the novice planner. Students attempt to get their professors to act in a manner that fulfills their desires and consolidates their egos (Bracher 1999, 133). This is called transference. The “relationship between the teacher and the pupil is always based on transference, that the teacher is ‘the subject supposed to know’ for the pupil” (Salecl 1994, 168). “Symbolic-order transferences are in place when the teacher functions primarily as an authority figure from whom the student seeks recognition, positive reinforcement, or new, more powerful, master signifiers or knowledge” (Bracher 1999, 133). The student’s seeking of gratification from the teacher is crucial to learning. As all educators know, the student’s ego already contains “a whole organisation of certainties, beliefs, of coordinates, of references” that is often wrong but resists correction and change (Lacan 1988a, 23). The professor overcomes the student’s intransigence through transference and interpolates new master signifiers and supporting subcodes—value and knowledge sets—that the student seeks to adopt in identifying with the educator. Yet even when planning’s suturing signifiers and their S2s are integrated into the student’s ego-ideal, “the ego’s defensive posture, the subject’s perceptions of itself, others, and the world around it [continue to be] submitted to a systematic distortion” (Boothby 2001, 144), a misrecognition that now incorporates the S1 of planning and those of its subdiscourses. The ego fails to understand its own subject’s fundamental unconscious bodily desires for ontological security, resulting in a distorted perspective to our perception of reality (Boothby 2001, 144). “When harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent” (Stavrakakis 1999, 63). At a fundamental level, the student (and everyone else, including the educator) overlooks contradictions, missing gaps, inconsistencies, and the undesirable aspects of the knowledge sets and beliefs supporting ~~his or her~~ [their] S1s. We fundamentally desire to make existence harmonious, enjoyable, and just plain bearable, and we construct imaginary fantasies to make it so (Zizek 2002a). These harmonious fantasies constitute what we define and share as a common reality. To illustrate this, let us return to the S1 of sustainability. Most students (and academics, including this author) in developed countries readily buy into the S1 of sustainability and support it in their planning values and practices. At the same time, most knowingly and voluntarily continue to partake of conspicuous consumption that is well outside of the sustainable ecological footprint of their environments. In this example, we want our ideological cake of promoting a sustainable future while overlooking our nonsustainable daily practices. The “ego continually devotes itself to a stereotypical picture of reality” in which “perception by the ego is continually misconception” (Boothby 2001, 144). Fundamentally, at our most basic unconscious level that seeks ontological security, “our assumptions of an identity in language entails powerful desires to promote, protect, defend, and actualize our identity-bearing master signifiers and the other signifiers, including entire systems of knowledge or belief,” even though this requires us to fabricate a shared reality predicated on illusion and fantasy (Bracher 1999, 46). Zizek (1997, 10) is correct when rhetorically asserting that “normalcy” is “ultimately ...a more ‘mediated’ form of madness.”

### Vampiricism

#### The aff imagines that bringing the suffering body into the debate space becomes a prophylactic for violence. Othered bodies are vampirically drained of life, turns case

Berlant 98 (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are trans- historical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence**.** Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

### Violent Revolution

#### Their deliberative acts of violence to construct a certain reality to claim objet petit a is an indulgence of the death drive – this leads to unending cycles of violence to erase tension at the level of signification.

Rogers 15 (Juliet Brough Rogers is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, and Adjunct Professor at Griffith Law School, Queensland, “A STRANGER POLITICS: Toward a theory of resistance in psychoanalytic thought and practice”) AqN

The desire for an answer as resistance is likely to be more aggressively problematized in psychoanalysis when the subject employs violence – to either the self or another – to secure the answer. Violence pretends to a be definitive access to the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’, as an access to the jouissance of the Other, the substance Lacan (2007: 14) describes definitively in this seminar as ‘knowledge’. Knowledge is one form of the objet petit a – the very substance that causes desire – but in all forms this objet is imagined as what Lacan (2006) describes as non-specular,15 in reference to the ‘mirror stage’. In its status as non-specular the objet petit a cannot be represented and this is precisely what renders it definitive, as knowledge per se. When it does not appear in the mirror – non-specular – then it cannot be represented, and therefore cannot be contested in this representation. The objet defies the contestations that haunt all forms of representation – what we can understand as a haunting by what Lacan calls the Real.16 A foreclosure on the spectre of the Real is precisely what emerges in any claims to knowledge as truth, brokering no pretenders to that status. Lacan suggests that the very promise of the existence of such a status as objet is what drives desire itself, but the desire to acquire such an object always employs the definitive inclinations of the death drive – and here is its connection to acts of violence. The claiming of the objet petit a is precisely, in Lacan’s terms, an indulgence of the death drive. As Lacan interprets Freud on the death drive, it is the drive to attain the point at which ‘tension is maintained at its lowest level’ (Lacan 2007: 16).18 The penultimate point of minimal tension is, of course, death.19 Death is the answer par excellence. That is, when death occurs there is no more question of the reality of the subject, or, at least, there is no more question as to the reality of the subject who is dead. Knowledge, or at least imagining one has the knowledge, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is the achievement of an answer in the same way that death is an achievement of an answer. Both require the enlistment of the dynamics of property – as an imagination of possession, as a having of the object – to enable the fantasy of a possession of knowledge or indeed of an answer.20 Knowledge, as the object possessed by the Master, is, as we say, ‘the final word’, where no question or doubt – or indeed tension – can exist. And this state of non-tension is the end point of all life that might intervene in perfect signification. It is the end of others, that is, it is death. We can say that in deliberate acts of violence the effort to assert a particular reality – the perpetrator’s reality, whether this be linked to a cause, a war, or an interpersonal desire – as a reality for all is an effort to assert ‘the final word’ for the self and for others. As one of Allen Feldman’s interviewees in Northern Ireland says of the infliction of violence during The Troubles – it is done because ‘people forget’ (Feldman 2003: 60). But forget what? For this man the memory he wishes to inflict is populated by his own significance (recruited from the rationales of his political affiliates) of what both the victim and the polis should know. It is an infliction of a reality as the reality, in an effort to inscribe the reality of the past and proscribe the reality of the future. Violence – and perhaps particularly violence to the body of oneself or others – recruits the death drive to the point of inserting knowledge as truth into a reality that cannot be contested. Violence produces an effect that cannot be reversed and demands uncontestable signification. Simply put, in its presentation in the flesh – of oneself or another – it cannot be erased. Thus violence is the aggressive effort to access an answer to the question, and, while violence may not be a necessary practice of all resistance – as Gandhi has proved in at least one context – violence to the self is certainly a likely effect of any form of resistance.

## Impacts

### Extinction

#### Their attempt to obtain maximum enjoyment [and academic productivity] results in extinction

Themi 8 (Tim Themi is a professor in Philosophy & Psychoanalysis from the School of Humanities & Social Sciences at Deakin University, “HOW LACAN’S ETHICS MIGHT IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF PLATONISM: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILSM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008), <http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/96/192>) AqN

Darwin could eventually be forgiven his Thing; by science at least if not by Christendom. But less so for Freud it seems still today, as the Thing he uncovers ‘lies’ closer to home. Certain aspects of this Thing would still only cause too much pain to consider; let alone experience. And for Freud, this very much explains the perpetual resistances towards the truths of psychoanalysis: as well as the perennial temptations of subsequent scholars to ‘refute’ its claims nigh by any means at the intellect’s disposal[46]. But more specifically for Lacan, this Thing also explains the role of the pleasure-principle: a principle whose aim is not as we might at first think simply to satisfy as many of our instinctual-drives as directly as possible; but rather, to keep our tension to a minimum level, by keeping us constant from a painful self-admission of our Thing. To “maintain the distance”(LE:58) as Lacan puts it, as we seek instead our pleasures cast a drift, from signifier to signifier, which never lead us directly to the Thing, even though unconsciously at least, one searches if not for it, than at least because of it. But as Lacan says, “one never finds it, only its pleasurable associations”(LE:52)––through objects which can signify some associative connection, but which are still chosen, more or less, because in accordance with the prevailing etiquettes of a ‘reality-principle’ which tells us that certain things we want will not give us pleasure, because they might risk us punishment, as still most forbidden. However, it is here we can ourselves re-find again the temptation then to interpret ‘reality’ in accordance with our pleasure principle; i.e., to deselect the parts we do not ‘like’. And truth is many times the casualty here, the truth of what is actual and real, as Nietzsche argues of the whole phenomena of Platonism, Freud of the resistances to psychoanalysis, and both of the inability of too many still to relinquish the opiate phantasies of religion. Our pleasure and reality principles might collude thus together, so that what we define as ‘reality’ is not necessarily our best approximation at the truth, but also a means to veil over it, especially the Thing like aspects within. But painful fearing of this Thing within leads us to cover over some of the real’s external aspects as well, insofar as this external covering might feign give us comfort, and help us to achieve this inner denial. For example, as belief in the Devil might help us disavow such sexual instincts and have them come from some place else; or like belief in an external Heaven and Hell could help motivate us in this inner sex-negating task––or like belief in a clock-work, incorruptibly end-directed universe, guided by and heading towards a Sovereign good, might help us believe that we can and should be a little more clock-work and incorruptibly end-directed ourselves. “Well then”, as Lacan likes to say, what we have here in the end is rather “the notion of a deep subjectivisation of the outside world”: one stemming from a fundamental comportment within us that “sifts” and “sieves” reality in such a way that it is often only perceived by us “as radically selected”. A human hence only ever “deals with select bits of reality”, Lacan concludes, when admission of any Other would yield the loss of pleasure [47]. But that the pleasure and ‘reality’ principles thus can work together in this subterfuge way, i.e., that they don’t simply oppose each other, that “each one is really the correlative of the other”(LE:74), is one of the key points that Lacan in his Ethics seeks to make; though not without making the additional qualification that this concerns “not so much the sphere of psychology as that of ethics”(LE:35). For to circle in too close to the Thing which is ethically forbidden by our reality principles––yet too the real truth of much desire––does hardly give us pleasure at all but anguish of the heaviest kind. Even if done so only as a thought experiment; as a free-association. So go there we generally don’t, and our ‘realities’ reflect as much. But henceforth when desire builds up, damns and flares return of the Thing: this is how Lacan specifically characterises the move we might make that goes beyond the pleasure principle, whose other name for Freud is ‘death-drive’. There where there is no, not pleasure yet jouissance in the transgression that the Thing would bring, a jouissance of transgression which Lacan suggests is the most direct satisfaction of a drive humanly possible[48]. But it’s also one perhaps unconsciously masochistic, that which Freud writes up as being only preliminarily sadistic, in eventually expressing itself as an “unconscious need for punishment”[49]. And if indeed we are feeling guilty, then we may yet still seek to pay the price. Why? For unknowingly possessing and inadvertently re-accessing this Thing in our real, beyond the pleasure-reality principle, our moral transgressions casting shadow long into the unconscious we know next to nothing about, and refuse even to acknowledge. Could it not be thusly then that our time is behind now a sadomasochistic, wilfully ignorant drive towards death for nigh the entire species? Such punishment would too overly suffice, to be sure, for even a two-millennium length in repression… But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age. CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE. This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems. Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age-old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating. Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems. The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic-neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within… But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake-head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self-amusement.[54] But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss. The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’ By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition until it accidentally finishes us!

### Genocide/Scapegoating

#### The repression of the death drive creates a politics of utopia sustained by the genocide of communities that do not fall into the boundaries of their harmonious world.

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and the Political”, 10/3/99) AqN

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same. The first condition of possibility for its emergence is the dislocation of traditional forms of organising and making sense of society, a dislocation inflicted by the increased hegemony of secularism, liberalism, socialism, industrialisation, etc. Faced with such disorientating developments, people can very easily resort to a promise for the re-establishment of a lost harmony. Within such a context Hitler proved successful in persuading the Germans that he was their only hope. Heartfield’s genius collages exposing the dark kernel of National Socialism didn’t prove very effective against Nazi propaganda. It was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety (especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler’s hegemony, to the hegemony of the Nazi utopian promise. At the very time when German society was turning into one of the great industrial powers of Europe, a land of factories and cities, technology and bureaucracy, many Germans were dreaming of an archaic world of Germanic peasants, organically linked by bonds of blood in a ‘natural’ community. Yet, as Cohn very successfully points out, ‘such a view of the world requires an anti-figure, and this was supplied partly by the liberal West but also, and more effectively, by the Jews’ (Cohn, 1996:188). The emergence of the Jew as a modern antichrist follows directly from this structural necessity for an anti-figure. Rosenberg, Goebbels and other (virtually all) Nazi ideologues used the phantom of the Jewish race as a lynch-pin binding the fears of the past and prospective victims of modernisation, which they articulated, and the ideal volkish society of the future which they proposed to create in order to forestall further advances of modernity. (Bauman, 1989:61) No doubt the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy is a revival, in a secularised form, of certain apocalyptic beliefs. There is clearly a connection between the famous forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the antichrist prophecy (Cohn, 1996:48). The Protocols were first published by Nilus as part of his book The Great in the Small: Antichrist Considered as an Imminent Political Possibility and were published in 1917 with the title He is Near, At the Door…Here comes Antichrist and the Reign of the Devil on Earth. As the famous Nazi propagandist Rosenberg points out ‘One of the advance signs of the coming struggle for the new organisation of the world is this understanding of the very nature of the demon which has caused our present downfall. Then the way will be open for a new age’ (Rosenberg in Cohn, 1996:217). Within this schema the elimination of the antichrist, that is the Jews, is considered as the remedy for all dislocations, the key to a new harmonious world. Jews were seen as deserving death (and resented for that reason) because they stood between this one imperfect and tension-ridden reality and the hoped-for world of tranquil happiness…the disappearance of the Jews was instrumental in bringing about the world of perfection. (Bauman, 1989:76) As Sartre claims, for the anti-Semite the Good itself is reduced to the destruction of Evil. Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite one can only reveal the optimistic belief that harmony will be reconstituted of itself, once Evil is destroyed. When the mission of the anti-Semite as holy destroyer is fulfilled, the lost paradise will be re-established (Sartre, 1995:43–5).8 In Adorno’s words, ‘charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation…. It is the great Panacea…the key to everything’ (Adorno, 1993:311, my emphasis). Simply put, the elimination of the Jew is posited as the only thing that can transform the Nazi dream to reality, the only thing that can realise utopia.9 As it is pointed out by an American Nazi propagandist, ‘our problem is very simple. Get rid of the Jews and we’d be on the way to Utopia tomorrow. The Jews are the root of all our trouble’ (True in Cohn, 1996:264, my emphasis). The same is, of course, true of Stalinism. Zygmunt Bauman brings the two cases together: Hitler’s and Stalin’s victims were not killed in order to capture and colonise the territory they occupied…. They were killed because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing was not the work of destruction but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world—more efficient, more moral, more beautiful—could be established. A Communist world. Or a racially pure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict free, docile in the hands of their rulers, orderly, controlled. (Bauman, 1989:93) In any case, one should not forget that the fact that the anti-figure in Nazi ideology came to be the Jew is not an essential but a contingent development. In principle, it could have been anyone. Any of us can be a substitute for the Jew. And this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In their classical study of the authoritarian personality Theodor Adorno and his colleagues point out that ‘subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks’ (Adorno, 1993:303). Although the need for the structural position of the anti-figure remains constant the identity of the ‘subject’ occupying that position is never given a priori. This does not mean that within a certain historical configuration with a particular social sedimentation and hegemonic structure all the possibilities are open to the same extent; it means though that in principle nobody is excluded from being stigmatised. Of course, the decision on who will eventually be stigmatised depends largely on the availability within a particular social configuration of groups that can perform this role in social fantasy, and this availability is socially constructed out of the existing materials. As Lacan points out in Anxiety, although a lack or a void can be filled in several ways (in principle), experience—and, in fact, analytic experience—shows that it is never actually filled in 99 different ways (seminar of 21 November 1962). What we have here is basically **a** play of incarnation. This play of incarnation is marking both the pole of the utopian fantasies and the pole of the evil powers that stand between us and them. As Cohn concludes, Middle Ages prophecies had a deep effect on the political attitudes of the times. For people in the Middle Ages, the drama of the Last Days was not a distant and hazy but an infallible prophecy which at any given moment was felt to be on the point of fulfilment: In even the most unlikely reigns chroniclers tried to perceive that harmony among Christians, that triumph over misbelievers, that unparalleled plenty and prosperity which were going to be the marks of the new Golden Age. When each time experience brought the inevitable disillusionment people merely imagined the glorious consummation postponed to the next reign. (Cohn, 1993c:35) But this fantasy cannot be separated by the coming of the antichrist which was even more tensely awaited. Generation after generation of medieval people lived in continuous expectation of signs of the antichrist, and since these signs, as presented in the prophecies, included comets, plague, bad rulers, famine, etc. a similar play of incarnation was played out in terms of determining the true face of the antichrist (ibid.).

## Alternatives

### 1NC

#### The alternative is to embrace the inevitable failures of the death drive. Our political reconceptualization enables a recognition that subjects only derive enjoyment from loss, a relocation of enjoyment would nullify violent human potentialities.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud's metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn't have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject's lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject's self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject's activity. According to the theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good - any progress - will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. This occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, an effort to sustain one's disorder in the face of the imminence of the cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic relationships that fail according to a precise pattern. Politically, it means that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat and thereby incessantly undermines itself, there is a backlash written into every progressive program from the outset. The death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked to trauma. This structure renders difficult all attempts to prompt subjects to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. The death drive leads subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that would lead to their good. Common sense tells us that sadism is easier to understand than masochism, that the sadist's lust for power over the object makes sense in a way that the masochist's self-destruction does not. But for psychoanalysis, masochism functions as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. Considering the structure of the death drive, masochism becomes easily explained, and sadism becomes a mystery. Masochism provides the subject the enjoyment of loss, while sadism seems to give this enjoyment to the other. This is exactly the claim of Jacques Lacan's revolutionary interpretation of sadism in his famous article "Kant with Sade." Though most readers focus on the essay's philosophical coupling of Kantian morality with Sadean perversion, the more significant step that Lacan takes here occurs in his explanation of sadism's appeal. Traditionally, most people vilify sadists for transforming their victims into objects for their own satisfaction, but Lacan contends that they actually turn themselves into objects for the other's enjoyment. He notes: "The sadist discharges the pain of existence into the Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an 'eternal object:" Though the other suffers pain, the other also becomes the sole figure of enjoyment. What the sadist enjoys in the sadistic act is the enjoyment attributed to the other, and the sadistic act attempts to bring about this enjoyment. In this sense, sadism is nothing but an inverted form of masochism, which remains the fundamental structure of subjectivity.22 Self-destruction plays such a prominent role in human activities because the death drive is the drive that animates us as subjects. Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman 0. Brown, another celebrated proponent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, attempts to construct a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a powerful category on its own. In Life against Death, Brown conceives of the death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, "The death instinct is the core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant's incapacity to accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time leads to death:'23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically, because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own death, according to Brown's view, we would avoid falling into the death drive and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness. Like Marcuse, Brown's societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs. Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself) than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the repetition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of progress altogether.

#### The alternative is the enjoyment of absence. This disrupts the belief of complete satisfaction and the cycles of accumulation that capitalism necessitates by ridding objects of value. Our remapping of enjoyment is the ultimate disinvestment from capitalism.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN

Pleasure supplements the death drive by providing a lure for consciousness. The subject actively takes up the path of the death drive - a drive that uses the subject and produces enjoyment at the cost of the subject's well-being or self-interest- because moments of pleasure render it bearable and even attractive. But this pleasure can only be imaginary: it is more the image of a future pleasure to be obtained than an actual pleasure experienced. This is the fundamental problem with the logic of accumulation and the would-be pleasure that derives from enrichment. Every capitalist subject has experienced the dissatisfaction that inevitably results from actually obtaining the desired commodity. As an absent object, the object of desire appears to embody incredible pleasure, but when this object becomes present, it devolves into an ordinary object. In the act of obtaining the object of desire, we deprive this object of its very desirability. The pleasure embodied in the object exists only insofar as it remains out of reach for the subject. Because we desire the object as absent, actually obtaining the object provokes disappointment rather than pleasure. No matter how pleasurable the presence of the object is, this presence never offers us what we desired in the object. The great lie of capitalist ideology is its insistence that one can enjoy the act of accumulation itself. This act inevitably produces disappointment in the subject who buys into it, and this disappointment is never more acute than just after what promised to be the most satisfying acquisition. For capitalist subjects, the disappointment that follows acquisition of a treasured commodity is not a reason to abandon the process of accumulation. In fact, it suggests to such subjects that they simply haven't taken accumulation far enough, that they need more. In this way, capitalist ideology feeds off the disappointment that it produces. If it actually produced the ultimate enjoyment for subjects that it promised them, they would no longer feel compelled to enter into the process of accumulation. After a little accumulation, subjects would become satisfied and thereby cease to be capitalist subjects, properly speaking. Capitalism needs dissatisfied subjects, but it also needs subjects who believe that the ultimate satisfaction is possible. This is accomplished by locating the ultimate satisfaction in the act of accumulation. Subjects invest themselves in capitalist ideology because they accept its map of enjoyment. The key to combating this ideology lies not in undermining the fantasies that it proffers but in revealing where our enjoyment is located, in proffering a different map. Rather than enjoying the process of accumulation, we enjoy the experience of loss - the loss of the privileged object. Accumulation allows us to have objects, but it doesn't allow us to have the object in its absence. This is why accumulation always leads not to satisfaction with what one has but to the desire to accumulate more and more. Loss, in contrast, permits us to experience the object as such. Through the act of losing the privileged object, we in effect cause this privileged object to emerge. There is no privileged object prior to its loss. Understood in this way, loss becomes a creative act. The loss of the object is the foundation of our enjoyment because this act elevates an object above the rest of the world and embodies that object with the power to satisfy us. Through the loss of the object, we are able to enjoy the object in its absence, which is the only form in which the object can motivate our desire. When we enjoy in this way, we enjoy nothing rather than something. This seems to offer, at first glance, an inferior mode of enjoyment. Why would anyone settle for the enjoyment of an absent object rather than a present one? Because this type of enjoyment - the enjoyment of absence - is the only type of enjoyment available to us as desiring beings. When we actually have the object, it loses the quality that renders it enjoyable. We can enjoy the object, but we can enjoy it only through its absence. The subject who recognizes this link between the absence of the object and enjoyment - at the moment of this recognition - ceases to be a subject invested in capitalist ideology. This ideology has a hold over us only insofar as we believe in its image of the ultimate enjoyment that it attaches to accumulation. This is not to say that subjects who recognize that enjoyment is dependent on loss will become completely ascetic beings, enjoying the iPods, widescreen televisions, and luxury cars that they don't have. Instead, they will take up a different relationship to their objects of desire, which will be enjoyable for the loss and sacrifice that they embody. One cannot accumulate such objects because they have no positive value attributed to them. They arrive without the promise of the ultimate future enjoyment attached to them, and in this sense, they do not function as commodities. The commodity depends on the invisibility of the labor that produces it, and the subject who recognizes loss in the object renders labor, which is the loss that gives the object its value, visible. Those who are able to locate their enjoyment in loss ipso facto value the sacrifice made by society's producers and align themselves politically with this group. This transformation results not so much from a change of activity as from a change of perspective.

#### The alternative is to abandon hope in education. This produces a recognition that there was no beginning of education in the first place – rather, it was only a product of societal fantasy construction. Our alternative opens up a space for possibility within the traumatic Real which brings an end to schooling.

Garcia 12 (Antonio Garcia has taught general humanities and education courses: Aesthetics, philosophy, Society and Culture, Freshmen Writing, multicultural education, pop culture and pedagogy, intro to curriculum theory, and intro to educational research methods, “The Eclipse of Education in the End Times”, <http://www.academia.edu/3596973/The_Eclipse_of_Education_in_the_End_Times>, 12/9/12) AqN

To Abandon Hope is to Abandon the Fantasy: Are we really in the end times of education, and should an end be necessarily contemplated? Speaking of philosophy, though pertaining to our discussion here, Badiou believes that, “It is really modest to declare an ‘end’, a completion, a radical impasse.” Can anything really have an end? And, is this end a point of no return where one would, as Lot’s wife did, turn to salt for reflecting back upon it as if witnessing God destroying Sodom (Genesis 19)? For there to be an end there must be a beginning and the beginning of education is not certain nor uncertain, it rests in the fissures of fantasies. Education has become the Dog of dogmatism, an inverted who is not a master, but a servant (notalways nor necessarily in the master/slave dialectic exemplified in Hegel). We utter education as a signifier with a definite signification; that it is evident and intrinsically prepared with a distinct curriculum, pedagogy, and epistemological economy. Yet, education is taken up – and taken for granted – as something that it may or may not be based on a matter of one’s belief of what signifies education. With fantasy construction we can endlessly participate in “fill in the blank” belief (e.g., I believe\_\_\_\_\_\_; I hope\_\_\_\_\_; and I have faith\_\_\_\_\_). We supply the substance to fill the signification that is ambiguous or empty in the linguistic structure of language: we are bound by that which we can and cannot say, as well as that which is miscommunicated or deferred in communication . This is a fundamental tenet of Lacanian psychoanalysis: “the unconscious is a language.” The Beginning of the End of the Beginning: As you recall, I began this chapter by recounting my first year experience as a teacher and the quote by Dante on the door of the math teacher’s room. We should not shy away or fear Dante’s words here that perhaps conjure a discouraging image. Rather we should embrace "abandon all hope ye who enter" as a welcoming metaphor to abandon the ideological fantasies ( objet petit a ) in order to welcome the traumatic Real (the traumatic hell we must confront). This does not mean that we must become hopeless, though, at first, this may seem the case. On the contrary, we must recognize and understand the linguistic determination placed on hope as a term of limitation and fantasy provocation. In other words, we must not confuse the fantasy element with the emotional and infinite potential (as Applebaum described) that lays within the substance of hope in the Real. Thus, we have to make a certain distinction of what dimension and provocation hope incites. To have hope in the Real is to understand that potential and possibility are considerable. To have hope in the symbolic registry is to conform to the fantasy subjections that relegate one to infinitely hoping without the real possibility of what that hope negotiates outside the symbolic. In the words of Raymond Williams, “To be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than despair convincing.” When we consider education in the end times, we must consider the im/position that we find ourselves that is always-already situated in the symbolic, and more importantly, in capitalist logic. Consider this last thought by Neil Postman: “To put it simply, there is no surer way to bring an end to schooling than for it to have no end.”

### 2NC

#### The alt solves – especially in the context of education.

Farley 15 (Lisa Farley is an associate professor at York University, she obtained her PhD in Education at the University of Toronto, “The “Human Problem” in educational research: Notes from the psychoanalytic archive”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03626784.2015.1095621>, 12/14/15) AqN

Drawing from the above discussion, two kinds of fantasy organize my analysis of Milner’s study. First, there is fantasy’s operation at the level of social discourse and history. These are the “cultural myths” that construct and sustain borders of identity and belonging, and that lay the groundwork for the ways in which we imagine the future. Informing my discussion above, Kent den Heyer and Laurence Abbott (2011) describe this mythic quality of fantasy as orienting us in relation to each other and the world through “proper nouns” that presumably “consolidate a shared identity” (p. 616). From this perspective, fantasy organizes dominant conceptions of what it means to be a “girl” or a “woman” or a “Canadian” on the basis of an imaginary origin that inhabitants of these categories are thought to share. The problem is that mythic fantasies presume a rather simple “formula based on the broad categories of race, income or family structure” that cannot tolerate contradictions or conflict (Lawrence-Lightfoot, 2003, p. 150). As noted above, Milner’s research narrative is very much rooted in “cultural myths” that tether the meaning of girl-ness to “feminine ideals” of good wives and mothers in-themaking (Grumet 1988, p. 48). The problem with such fantasied myths, den Heyer and Abbott remind us, “is that they are cracked” (p. 616). Mythic fantasies name subject positions of identity that we inherit but never fully live out. However this “cracked” notion of fantasy is also good news, for it refers to that echo feature of fantasy that exceeds the social categories endowed to us (den Heyer & Abbott, 2011, p. 616). Fantasy can be thought of here as the very first “psychical representative” of affect that introduces an unconscious element to historical inheritance (Isaacs, 1952, p. 83). Under the condition of the unconscious, fantasy, in the words of Julia Kristeva (2002), “does not wish to be familiar with the real world” (p. 40). And here is where the metaphor of the “echo” matters, for it refers to the creative revision of an original source. “Echoes are repetitions but not exact replications” (den Heyer & Abbott, 2011, p. 616). In this view, fantasy refers to the earliest capacity of the mind to author the inherited world before it can be understood. Developmentally, this level of fantasy is “necessary,” because “the infant is having to manage emotional experiences which he does not yet have the capacity psychically to digest by himself” (Waddell, 2000, p. 7). Unconscious and necessary, Susan Isaacs (1952) surveys the history of psychoanalytic thought to describe the incredible content of unconscious fantasy. For instance, from the experience of hunger, the infant makes a fantasy of omnipotence. The fantasy, “I want to eat her all up” is also ambivalent, on the one hand tender in character, “I want to keep her inside me” and on the other hand, aggressive, “I want to tear her to bits” (p. 84). From the vantage of unconscious fantasy, then, the baby is neither innocent nor blank, but full of fantasies born of feelings of both desire and destruction. The irrational quality of unconscious fantasy suggests, too, that meaning is subject to breakdown and reversal. For example, the fantasy, “I want to throw her out of me,” can just as quickly transform into a fantasy of persecution that defends against the anxiety of causing harm “I myself shall be cut or bitten up by the mother” (Isaacs, 1952, p. 84). From these early fantasies of anxiety and aggression also emerge fantasies of guilt and reparation “I want to bring her back” or “I want to make her better” (p. 84). Psychoanalytically, this incredible set of internal events constitutes the very first mental organization of the human mind. And, where we eventually learn to “distinguish between the wish and the deed” and between “external facts and our feelings about them” (Isaacs, 1952, p. 85), these very basic fantasy patterns never entirely go away. Applied to the scene of research, glimmers of early fantasies can be found in the omnipotent reach for mastery over uncertainty through knowledge, in the anxiety that can creep up when new knowledge frustrates existing ideas and aims, or in the helping impulse to rescue others from their perceived position of unknowingness. Thus, while external realities of history, whether economic depression, class division, or educational reform, shape how lives are lived, psychoanalysis shines a light on the way internal influences, called here fantasy, impact social reality, even while they remain “closed off from the world” (Gay, 1985, p. 121). Closed off does not mean irrelevant; quite the contrary, it means that fantasy animates reality through the displacement of feeling and time. The psychoanalytic insight here, also the key point of my paper, is that narratives of educational research will be touched by traces of unconscious conflict that simmer below the surface of their discursive location. At stake in the very effort to narrate significance is the return of repressed conflicts grounded in irrational first experiences of trying to cope with the unknown world through unconscious fantasy. The “human problem” of educational research is this: unconscious fantasies echo within conscious efforts to narrate teaching and learning in the name of knowledge production. Precisely because of the multiplicity of the echo’s return, there is at stake a quality of knowledge that resists cohesiveness and that presents research as a problem of how to build meaning in the awareness that the ground of reality is uneven. For Simon, Rosenberg and Eppert, this is a quality of knowledge that “humbles any design to master” the subject of inquiry once and for all (2000, p. 7). The challenge for the researcher is how to account for a multiplicity of influences that emerge from the ruins of expert knowledge and its presumed certainty. The archived story of Milner’s school study represents two aspects of fantasy at work in the production of knowledge. The first operates at the level of cultural myth and the second, at the unconscious level of phantasy. Through an analysis of her work, I identify how cultural myths of progress and objectivity are tied to fantasies of mastery and the wish not to be influenced by our helpless beginnings. But also, Milner’s study tells a story of the way meaning can breakdown and regress, and, if all goes well, multiply and humble the claims we can make in the name of research, provided they can be symbolized.

## Framework

### 2NC Jouissance

#### The desire for knowledge is structured by jouissance.

Gunder 4 (Michael Gunder is an Associate Professor in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, “Shaping the Planner’s Ego-Ideal A Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education”, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0739456X03261284>, 3/1/04) AqN \*modified for gendered rhetoric\*

For Lacan (1977), all individuals in society are barred subjects (S| ), alienated from knowing their unconscious “being” and desires. This is a direct consequence of each subject’s acquisition of the language necessary for entry into the symbolic network that constitutes society. Each barred subject adopts a position in relationship to the Other’s equally unknowable desire—originally that of the infant to the (m)other—insofar as that desire aroused the subject’s own desire (Lacan 1988b, 1998). Lacan called this thing,11 which initially peeks and then drives our desire in reaction to the hidden desire of the Other, “object petit a.” The individual adopts a position in relationship to the traumatic encounter with object a derived from a primal memory of pleasure/pain—initially ourselves as scared infants crying for the unfulfilled desire of nonstopped completeness provided by Mum in her milk and security. The Lacanian “subject comes into being as a form of attraction toward and defence against this primordial, overwhelming experience of what the French call jouissance ...a pleasure that is excessive, leading to a sense of being overwhelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously providing a source of fascination” (Fink 1995, xii). Lacan (1991) uses the symbol “a” to stand for this loss of wholeness with the Other. Lacan (1998) suggests that we acquire knowledge to fill this void created by this lack of completeness, a failure of pleasure—a deficiency of jouissance (Fink 2002, 34). Inadequate jouissance is the motive force behind our quest for knowledge, including that of planning education. Yet, at the same time, language and socialization, gaining knowledge and retaining a place in the symbolic network, have a cost for its participants. This is the cost of having to block and negate our own jouissance, and even the desire for jouissance, because jouissance is “fundamentally indifferent—and often inimical—to the well-being both of oneself and of the other person” (Bracher 1993, 20). Jouissance is inherently antisocial, yet it fundamentally drives our actions. While our conscious egos seek to present our external identities, perhaps as planners, in a manner conforming to the norms of society, or our profession, our unconscious does its own thing without regard to our interests as human beings adapting to society. “Desire is borne along by signifiers that knead and shape our existence—even against our interests as living beings” (Van Haute 2002, 125). At odds with our egos, jouissance drives us; it supplies the psychic spark that induces us to act, even beyond acceptable behavior, that is, against societal norms and law (Boothby 2001). Jouissance is not pleasurable “but an unconscious clinging to that in being which does not wish one’s own good, an unconscious masochism that is not utilitarian” (Ragland-Sullivan 1991, 64). Jouissance answers to “a ‘logic’ that takes precisely no account of what the subject can experience as ‘pleasant’” (Van Haute 2002, 225). Jouissance resides outside of language in the unconscious. At best, jouissance expresses itself in the symptoms that it induces when we transcend societal norms and laws construed by our constructed social reality. It is why we sometimes dig in our heals over a planning issue, or other issue, that we cannot possibly win (Hillier and Gunder 2003). We are always in a contradiction. We have to either accept the norms and acceptable behaviors of our symbolic identifications and forgo the jouissance fulfilled in acting out our desires or transcend accepted behaviors and face the social sanctions incurred. The ego is always unsure how to act because of this unyielding contradictory position. May I? Can I? Should I or not? Absolute knowledge is always lacking from which to decide. Knowledge itself always stays within the realm of the signifier, truth starts within this realm but evokes a dimension beyond it, that is the main reason we invented poetry. The ultimate dimension of desire and jouissance is the driving part of it. . . . This dimension beyond the signifier is the . . . lost object a that is forever lacking for the speaking subject, causing ~~his/her~~ [their] ever shifting desire. (Verhaeghe 2001, 39) There is always this lack in knowledge, separating it from the certainty of truth. We are continually seeking to complete our ideological fantasy of security and completeness through the attainment of further suturing signifiers and their supporting subcodes. The merit of gaining knowledge “is renewed every time it is exercised, the power it yields always being directed towards” our jouissance (Lacan 1998, 96-97).

### 2NC Policy

#### Educational policy is inherently lacking, fantasies of effectiveness lead to serial policy failure and the continuation of exploitation through corporate control. Only our analysis can expose the imaginary longings of the political psyche – this is a pre-requisite to any effective form of policymaking.

Fotaki 10 (Marianna Fotaki is a Professor of Business Ethics at Warwick Business School and a visiting professor at The University of Manchester, “Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction”, Organization) AqN

The origins of the ‘choice for all’ fantasy, and every other fantasy, are to be found in the need of the subject to be ‘recognized’ in the symbolic Other in order to exist. Let us not forget that the motivation and impetus for the Lacanian subject is always the desire to retrieve the illusory unity that has been sacrificed upon entry into the symbolic order via language. Language operates by signifying the object in its absence and this is why desire always contains loss within it. Without this loss of the sense of a unified identity and the fantasy it gives rise to, there would be no signification and no symbolic life. In other words, social reality is structured by our imaginary misperceptions, as well as our unsymbolizable unconscious longings, which have been given up (repressed) into the unconscious in the socialization process. Such is, for example, the fantasy of effective policy, of purposeful organization and of harmonious society—all stemming from an impossible desire for unity. The Lacanian perspective unveils the imaginary nature of such strivings which underpins various social and political projects, including idealistic and idealized public policies and dismisses them as vain attempts to counteract our ontological and temporal finitude as human beings. It also reveals why these unacknowledged imaginary and symbolic functions are indispensable for bringing policies to life, even if they cannot be achieved. Such is the example of pursuing ‘Choice for All’ (see Milburn, 2003; Reid, 2003) in a public health system with finite resources and tangible opportunity costs. It offers a stark testimony of the impossibility of realizing the policy objectives it proclaims, despite or perhaps because of its universalistic (and omnipotent) aspirations. Satisfaction of all individual wants will not be possible without limiting someone else’s access to resources and therefore options. This contravenes the founding collectivist principles of the NHS of offering equal access to all according to need. The attempt to attain the fantasy of the impossible can also explain policy recycling and repetition of the same ideas, despite many documented failures. However, the desire to attain the lost part of the self, which is the Lacanian objet petit á, and which in the case of (freedom of) patient choice stands in for freedom from the bounds of the human predicament, instigates the articulation of such and other improbable policies, only if and when the opportune moment arrives. Political expediency, a shift in dominant societal discourses and other massive social changes can all prompt such a move. Once policy makers are implicitly entrusted with formulating aspirational rather than realizable policies, their unworkable aspects are then further reinforced by psychological processes such as organizational defences in health settings. These involve separating off and denying unwanted reality (Heginbotham, 1999; Obholzer and Zagier-Roberts, 1994; Vince and Broussine, 1996). The illusory nature of many public health policies is evidenced whenever they are being formulated in denial of their contextual reality. An idealistic policy such as Choice for All must not be tested against reality and must therefore remain exterior to the organizations that will implement it. Socially sanctioned defensive reactions such as splitting between the idealized policy and its imperfect implementation, and the projection of blame onto various organizational members, are hence employed to protect against discarding this illusion. Object relations theorists came up with various elaborate theories on how social institutions enact psychodynamic mechanisms to defend individuals and groups from existential anxieties (see De Board, 1978; Obholzer, 1994).6 I have also suggested, that health policy must be idealistic to fulfil the impossible goal of the health care system, namely to defend us against the anxiety about disease and dying, a defence it can never fully accomplish (Fotaki, 2006). Although such defences might be necessary to keep destructive fears of annihilation at bay, at the same time they act as a dysfunctional barrier against attaining awareness of our own constructs and ultimately against our attempts to acknowledge fantasy and to survive its failure. To sum up, Kleinian analysis suggests how splits between policy design and organizational reality operate to ‘protect’ us from coming to terms with unrealistic policies, but the Lacanian conception of subjectivity explains why policies are designed in such way and why the splits are there in the first place. In a Lacanian perspective, while the policy tool can be seen to act as a defence against societal anxieties, these anxieties are not simply generated by the health risks themselves, but are sites in which the already existing (subjective) anxiety is expressed collectively. Put differently, we are all anxious anyway as, for Lacan, anxiety is the fear ‘of the lack of lack’ and this is why these symbolic manifestations of extant general anxiety float from one public issue to another, as was helpfully put by one reviewer.7 This leads me now to the central claim I make in this article, namely, that the imaginary construction of policy-making, if unacknowledged, leads to multiple splits and ultimately underscores its failure. The example of patient choice is so evidently suffused with unrealizable promises, as is chosen to highlight the undesirable effects of unrecognized fantasies in the policy-making process and the difficulty of translating value driven statements into organizational realities. The use of abstract economic models simplifying human decisions and devoiding them of real life messiness, and the Labour government’s belated enchantment with the market and competition (Le Grand, 2006; Le Grand and Dixon, 2006) to solve the insoluble efficiency/equity dilemma, ensures that policy formulation is distanced from organizational reality. When such realization of an intrinsic conflict between fantasy and reality and the potential for failure is absent from policy making, defensive mechanisms (projection and splitting) cascade down into health care organizations. These are necessary in order to maintain the splits between a good policy and the flawed implementation should the policy fail, as it must, and for apportioning the blame towards those who must be held responsible for policy failure. Politicians blame health professionals for not meeting their impossible ideals, insisting that more managers are required in order to police their choices. Various groups of health professionals are pitted against each other (doctors versus managers or doctors versus nurses for example) as they are simultaneously idealized and denigrated, offering protection against the inevitability of failure of the unworkable policies while better policies are awaited in the future. Clearly, the process of articulating impossible policies and the difficulties involved in implementing them are all underscored by the idealization and defences around working in health care, as the seminal work of Menzies (1960) has illustrated. The alleged beneficiaries of policies are subject to idealization too: patient choice is after all introduced in the name of empowering the deserving users of services against the dominance of all-powerful professionals who do not always have their patents’ best interest in mind.8 Yet those who do not accept responsibilities for their health related choices are exempted from the category of deserving users as they are stigmatized and refused treatment (see the example of obese patients and smokers turned down by some health authorities in England—BBC, 2005). Inherent in New Labour’s project of modernization is the assumption that the modern citizen should be both managerial and entrepreneurial (Scourfield, 2007). The price of greater autonomy and involvement is that users must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out and for their outcomes. This new form of ‘responsibilization’ corresponds to the new ways in which the governed are encouraged to act freely and rationally while conducting themselves in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action (Burchell, 1993: 276, cited in Scourfield, 2007). Their subordinated citizenship then becomes doubly underlined by their ‘choice’ to have services arranged for them, while they are required to acquire the flexibility of ‘the person’ (Scourfield, 2007). Choice and independence are powerful concepts but dependency and interdependency are part of all our lives, for some of us more than others. It is clear that such policies invariably ignore the reality of non-uniform patients, who are themselves fragmented and divided subjects; more so in times of dislocation and stress Scourfield (2007) reminds us. But the Lacanian analysis of policy making does not simply suggest that the glorification of choice would not have been possible in the absence of an underlying fantasy. It gives us conceptual tools to explore how the inherent idealization involved in articulating aspirational policy objectives such as Choice for All, for example, might enable policy capture by powerful political groups and/ or organized interests for their own ideological and political ends. This is because various (conscious and less conscious) forms of political exploitation are more likely to occur when policy content coheres with the imaginary longings of the psyche. The desire for unity in the subject may be more easily written into political projects, especially when it is being translated into the language of the alleged wants of the disembodied and idealized patient and/or user of health care desiring the abstract notion of ‘choice’. Because choice for all could mean anything and appeal to everybody, it can be easily used as a vehicle to articulate the concerns of a particular segment of society (mostly the vocal and educated middle-classes). In reality, however, patient choice more often than not implies the co-option of calls for greater user empowerment into the neoliberal discourse of greater responsibility. This serves as an excuse for policies that are aimed at the retrenchment of the welfare state and the transfer of public responsibilities to the individual. Similarly, the discourse of inefficiency and irresponsiveness in public services is employed to legitimize managerialism as the sole remedy for these ills. However, this reframes the value of professional ethos and expertise by relegating them to the category of secondary attributes in order to establish neo-Taylorist methods of work as an uncontested norm for every professional group in the NHS (Newman et al., 2008).

## Answers

### AT: Apolitical

#### The alternative can reshape political subjectivity.

Glynos and Stavrakakis 8 (Jason Glynos is a professor at the department of government at the University of Essex and Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and Political Subjectivity: Fantasy and Enjoyment in Psychoanalysis and Political Theory”, 4/1/08) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered rhetoric\*

Thinking along the social-political axis in this way enables us to examine the question of critique from a normative perspective because what is at stake are the concrete norms informing a practice. In abiding by these norms the social subject engages in the practice in a way which exhibits a certain logic, which we can characterize as a social logic. Consider Walkerdine’s discussion of individuals’ workplace fantasies, discussed earlier. It is clear that this investigation was partly motivated by a normative worry about an increasingly hegemonic psychologizing social logic (see also Salecl 2003 on a similar theme). With the term social logic we designate those discursive patterns that, in the self-interpretations of actors, tend to account for the success and failure of work-related activities in terms of psychology or personality, rather than in terms of wider socio-economic features linked to (missed) collective decision-making opportunities. Or consider Dean’s discussion of what can be called patriarchal social logics. Such logics would denote a tendency in the discursive patterns (of institutions and actors) to shrink the options available to women to enhance their personal and collective autonomy. An appeal to political subjectivity, then, introduces doubts about the norms embodied in dominant social logics prospectively and retrospectively. Prospectively, it contests such norms in the name of an alternative norm, a democratic ideal or the value of autonomy for example. Retrospectively, it asks how a dominant social logic was instituted in the first place: what political logics led to its introduction and sedimentation? What battles, alliances, and identifications made possible the successful institution of a particular norm or social logic? Earlier, we noted how the category of fantasy can be usefully deployed as a way of better appreciating the political significance associated with processes of identification and the study of subjectivity. We are now in a better position to ~~see~~ [recognize] how this might be so, because fantasy can serve as a way of trying to give content to the obstacles to and/or direction of political contestation and mobilization. An appeal to fantasy, therefore, introduces another axis along which we can pluralize subjectivity. For what is at stake here is not so much the content of norms embodied in a social logic (or a ‘counter logic’), so much as the mode of the subject’s engagement with these norms. And fantasy can be understood as a way of mediating the subject’s relation to the norms and ideals governing a social or political practice. The question of mediation is important here, and can be approached from the point of view of enjoyment. One mode of enjoyment, for example, might be understood in terms of a subject’s overinvestment in an ideal or norm, which we can link to Lacan’s concept of phallic enjoyment. Here, the subject is in the thrall of ~~his or her~~ [their] fantasy, and thus insensitive to the contingency of social reality. This may explain the frequently encountered response of subjects to their leaders noted in our account of Gabriel’s studies: either total rejection or total embrace. But it also raises questions about what sorts of practice may correspond to a non-phallic form of enjoyment, what Lacan calls jouissance feminine (or Other jouissance). Here, the subject is taken to acknowledge and affirm the contingency of social relations. Thus, insofar as the subject’s relation to social norms is mediated in a phallic mode, we can understand this subject as an ideological subject; and insofar as the subject engages by means of a non-phallic enjoyment, we can qualify it as an ethical subject. This matrix of doubly paired subjectivities (social-political and ideological-ethical) enables us to provide a more complex picture of social and political practices.7 It allows us to give specific sense, for example, to Walkerdine’s warning against treating reasons for exploitation as simply or straightforwardly a matter of ideology or false-consciousness (Walkerdine 2005: 60). The logic of fantasy thus enables us to add an extra layer of complexity to our account of ideology. It suggests to those of us interested in better understanding the conditions of political transformation that obstacles to change are not just social (inclusive of cultural, economic, and so on), but also ideological – where the power of ideology here derives its force and content from the logic of fantasy and the way this structures our subjective relation to enjoyment.

### AT: Colonialist

#### Even if psychoanalysis has colonialist origins, the development of psychoanalysis enables it to expose the colonial unconscious of western society.

Frosh 13 (Stephen Frosh is a professor in the Psychosocial Studies Department at the University of London in Birkbeck, “Psychoanalysis, Colonialism, Racism”, <http://www.academia.edu/6710953/Psychoanalysis_Colonialism_Racism>, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2013, Vol. 33, No. 3, 141–154) AqN

The argument so far is that psychoanalysis has some of its roots in colonialist assumptions that continue to resonate in contemporary theory and clinical practice. Even though this is counterposed with a more complicated investment in a “seditious” mode of critique, the extent to which psychoanalysis is implicated in a colonialist frame makes it a problematic candidate for postcolonial and antiracist adoption. Nevertheless, it is the case that psychoanalysis also inﬂuences contemporary postcolonial theory. This is mainly for two related reasons, one shared with many other disciplines (including psychology) and the other perhaps speciﬁc to psychoanalysis. First, the tortured history of psychoanalysis reveals how colonialism infect seven disciplines that also have subversive possibilities. Psychoanalysis is a key instance of an attempt to speak “from the margins” about Western culture, and indeed to reveal explicitly how the claim of the west to progress and rationality is underpinned by violence and irrationality. In his theory of culture, Freud proposed that the murder of the primal father was the basis for all civilization, including (in his 1939text, Moses and Monotheism) monotheistic religion. In relation to individual psychology, the notion of the dynamic unconscious is such that it places the supposedly primitive at the core of even the most civilized subject. The unconscious is universal, no one is exempt from it; even the most reﬁned person has lust and aggression within. Psychoanalysis reveals this and is consequently a radical opponent of the primitive/civilized distinction. Yet, psychoanalysis carries within it a history of racism and antisemitism that is still visible, not only in the fascination with the “primitive” mentioned above, but even in quite recent outbursts of antisemitism (Frosh, 2012). Psychoanalysis is thus an exemplary incidence of a disciplinary practice that both draws on colonialism and disrupts its categories at the same time, and exploring how this happens can teach us a great deal about the tentacles of colonialism and racism in intellectual life. Second, perhaps because it does speak from the heart of colonialism, psychoanalysis offers a route toward explicating the workings of the colonial mind and its legacy in the postcolonial world. Ranging from Fanon’s (1952) seminal application of existentially inﬂected psychoanalytic ideas to the identity construction of the colonized mind (as well as to the explanation of racism), to more recent uses of Freudian theory in explorations of the “melancholic” aspects of the postcolonial state (Khanna, 2004), psycho-analysis has offered a vocabulary and set of conceptual tools for articulating the subtle manner in which sociocultural processes construct, and are in turn supported by, psychic conﬁgurations. Edward Said (2003) provided one summary of this in his presentation of Freud’s late work, speciﬁcally Moses and Monotheism (1939), as a critique of personal and national identity. This is constituted in “Freud”s pro-found exempliﬁcation of the insight that even for the most deﬁnable, the most identiﬁable, the most stubborn communal identity—for him, this was the Jewish identity—there are inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one, Identity” (Said,2003, p. 53). Freud’s proposition that Moses was an Egyptian emphasizes how a nation is never homogeneous, either “genetically” (i.e.,“racially”) or culturally. The most important founding ﬁgure of Jewish culture is, according to Freud, an outsider, which is a speciﬁc in-stance of a general rule that can be applied everywhere—that identities are always heterogeneous and fractured. This emphasis on the “outsider” at the heart of the nation also under-mines claims for the ﬁxedness and superiority of European colonial culture, pointing to the reality that at its source is a hidden otherness. There is no single identity, it is always open to the other, and claims for its univocality depend on drowning out the voices of the others that have given it shape. The European is thus infected from the start with the disruptive presence of the colonized, and psychoanalysis shows how this occurs.

### AT: Death Drive False

#### Freud’s biological interpretations of the death drive were only a building block for our current understanding. Their focus at the biological level doesn’t take into account the way the death drive has been metaphorically deployed.

Armengou 8 (Frank Garcia-Castrillon Armengou is a Researcher and Professor at the University Pablo de Olavide and CIEE (Council on International Educational Exchange), “The death drive: Conceptual analysis and relevance in the Spanish psychoanalytic community”, <http://www.psicoterapiarelacional.es/Portals/0/Documentacion/FGCastrillon/IJP_Dr%20Frank%20Castrillon.pdf>, 10/23/8) AqN

Segal (1993) rightly recalls the clinical facts leading to Freud’s suggestion of the existence of a death drive, providing clinical vignettes that seem to justify the concept.5 Nonetheless, Paniagua (1982) highlights some false isomorphisms in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Among these are the analogies between fish and bird migration and repetition compulsion, and between the undifferentiated vesicle of excitable substance, with its receptive membrane, and the organization of the human psyche. Freud described this vesicle as surrounded by a differentiated and hardened surface that filtered external stimuli, thus protecting the internal protoplasm. He interpreted these metaphors of psychic functioning literally, transforming them into isomorphic analogies. We are thus no longer dealing with a linguistic tool to understand mental functioning. The metaphorical comparison between the functioning of the vesicle and the conscious system has become inductive reasoning. What happens to the vesicle, therefore, also happens to the conscious system. It is obvious that Freud wanted to use isomorphic comparisons that encompassed all inorganic life. These analogies, however, violate the laws of inference. Metaphorical analogy has usually been considered unsuitable for scientific language. Metonymic continuity, by contrast, fulfils one of science’s basic aspirations, namely, finding universal causes and principles that may be applied to different dimensions of reality. Laplanche (1970b) points to the ambiguity between metonymy and metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The model of the protoplasmic cell is at times viewed as a metaphor, and at times as metonymic continuity. As Laplanche puts it: ‘‘To make sense of the death drive, we cannot consider that the biological myth developed by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is scientifically valid’’ (1970b, p. 42). In this sense, Meltzer (1984) explains that Freud debated between an anatomical–physiological model and one that addressed specifically mental phenomena. Freud believed that mind and brain were identical from a phenomenological viewpoint. He thus created a model that enabled him to structure a metaphor that was confused with a theory. Nonetheless, we can find passages in Freud (1915) where he questions the likelihood of reducing the psychic to the cerebral: Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain […] But every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored-up in nervecells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely […] There is a hiatus here […] Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy. (Freud, 1915, pp. 174–5) Consequently, to be considered plausible the death drive must be interpreted in a figurative way, as Rechardt pointed out (see Folch and Eskelinen, 1984). From this perspective, it represents the active and ‘obstinate’ struggle to retrieve a state of peace, or the effort to rid oneself of disturbing experiences. Death would be but a particular guise of this peaceful state; destruction, the means to that end. We are not dealing here with a provable biological principle but with a basic psychic aspiration. This author contends that Freud’s writings have been interpreted as a failed attempt to find biological evidence to confirm his point of view, rather than as an attempt to find a suitable thinking model. His biological speculations may be compared with scaffoldings that served to build a theoretical model of the psyche. These should have been dismantled once the building was completed. Conceiving of the death drive as the restoration (through the shortest or most destructive route) of a state of absolute stability that eliminates the tensions inherent in human life constitutes a mistaken simplification of the life flow.6 The life drive also tends to create a state of stability – not in the sense of the Freudian principle of inertia or of Fechnerian stability, but in that of homeostasis as described by Breuer (Breuer and Freud, 1893–1895) in Studies on Hysteria. This drive also seeks a state of balance and appeasement that facilitates rather than counteracts life itself. We are talking about a tendency to a decrease in tension comparable to the Epicurean notion of pleasure. Epicureans do not view pleasure as sensory gratification but as happiness, which is equated with a state of calm, of serenity (Hottois, 1997). This idea recalls Meltzer’s (1997) move to separate pleasure from sensuality so as to tie the former to Bion’s ‘K’ factor: ‘‘The tremendous pleasure of understanding’’.

### AT: Not Falsifiable

#### The repetitive nature of the economy of tropes and enjoyment prove that psychoanalysis is falsifiable – specifically in the context of rhetoric

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” 11/26/12) AqN

One of the most hallowed maxims of rhetorical studies is that rhetoric is an art—a techne for engaging discourse in the properly Aristotelian sense of the term. Techne implies a systematic mode of experiential knowledge, but often in declaring that rhetoric is an art, the accent of this declaration falls on the intuitive and the experiential facets of techne at the expense of the more systematic charge inherent in it. While for much of the rhetorical tradition, techne has primarily taken the valence of a prudential guide for intuitive judgment, Lacan turns to rhetoric to confer on psychoanalysis a scientific status. Lacan’s claims to the “science” of rhetoric respond to a number of critics who had framed psychoanalysis as an alchemical mix of unfounded theories, intuitions and inherited practices. Borrowing from Karl Popper’s philosophy of science, such critiques of psychoanalysis argued that analytic practice was non-falsifiable, resting on the idea that no empirical evidence could be mustered to refute it. Any claim to evidence to the contrary of Freudian theories could always be elided by generating another explanation with dubious empirical grounding to account for potential exceptions. In drawing on rhetoric as a systematic mode for theorizing the nature of the sign, representation, and the logic and social functions of discourse, Lacan rescues Freudian categories from non-falsifiability. Rhetoric, which is so squarely rooted in “art,” became one of Lacan’s most powerful allies in articulating psychoanalysis as a science, providing a vocabulary for attending to the repeatable elements of signification that might be held up to empirical verification. Lacan vacillated at different points in his career on psychoanalysis’s status as a science, arguing at points that it was clearly a science, at others that it was not, and at others that it was a special kind of science.61 Generally, Lacan’s early career embodied the strongest claim for the scientific status of psychoanalysis, while in his later career he became less invested in the idea, arguing that it need not attempt to assume scientific status to validate itself.62 What is most interesting about the ambivalence toward science in Lacan’s thought is that at each instance where the relationship between psychoanalysis and science is at stake, the question of rhetoric is never far from the conversation. For example, in The Psychoses and The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that psychoanalysis is a science on the basis of its attention to a set of repeatable logical forms, specifically to trope as a way of specifying the possible connections underwriting discursive and representational practices. Other accounts read Lacan as eventually giving up on the idea that psychoanalysis is a science, but do so, once again, with explicit reference to rhetoric. For example, Stuart Schneiderman argues that by 1977 Lacan had given up the quest to prove psychoanalysis as a science, that “after having posed the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis for so many years, he had come to the conclusion that it was not a science. The reason was one offered by Karl Popper, namely that psychoanalysis was ‘irrefutable.’ Lacan said that analysis was closest to rhetoric. . . . Thus analysis seeks to persuade but not convince, to persuade the analysand to recognize things that he knows already and to act on his desire.”63 Of course, one might take issue with the account of rhetoric that is implicit in this claim, particularly on the grounds that the framing of rhetoric in Schneiderman’s account affirms an understanding of rhetoric exclusively through reference to persuasion, contingency, and probability—a conception that is, as I have been arguing, at odds with Lacan’s understanding of the work of rhetoric. More accurately, rhetoric affords Lacanian psychoanalysis a status as a special kind of science by providing it with a set of techniques for paying attention to the mathematical qualities of discourse. Regardless of how one understands the moniker “science,” rhetoric drives psychoanalysis toward a systematic account of the possible modes of connection that animate actually existing discourses, and toward an observation of the concrete functions of trope in the social life of the subject. Lacan derives this understanding of psychoanalysis as the systematic science of attending to discourse from Freud. For example, in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud argues for a practice of reading dreams that revised received methods for interpreting dreams. Prior to Freud’s intervention there was a long-standing tradition that held that an image in a dream correlated with an unconscious meaning in much the same way that a word in a dictionary correlates with a definition. In order to found his mode of dream interpretation, Freud dissents from a definitional understanding of dreams by distinguishing between manifest “dream content” and the underlying logic of a dream, or the “dream-thought.”64 Although the manifest content of a dream may seem utterly random, it is driven by the dream-thought expressed in it, investing the specific contents of the dream with a meaning dependent on the thought that articulates it. For Freud there is no universal protocol for the expression and interpretation of dream contents, but rather a set of associations unique to an individual which, although not uniform in content, are bound by a more universal logic of expression. It is tempting to see in Freud’s presentation of the interpretation of dreams a cognitive semiotics that verges on a proto-presentation of Saussure’s conception of differential signification, albeit sixteen years prior to the publication of the Course in General Linguistics. Each element in a dream means something not because it has an intrinsic referent, but rather because it is defined by a relationship of difference to other elements in the dream content, and cumulatively the structure of differentially related signs allows for an interpretation of the underlying dream-thought. Naturally, this is the reading of Lacan’s employment of Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams by those who see Lacanian psychoanalysis as an integration of Freud’s unconscious and the insights of Saussure.65 The difficulty arises when one tries to determine what exactly Lacan is attempting to do by reading the regularities of structure that animate dreams and, by extension, discourse. On one account, this reading produces a logic of dreams and discourse that emphasizes structure at the expense of the empirical. But a second account replaces the structuralist poetic account with a rhetorical conception of trope, inventing a science of rhetoric that forces attention to the interchange between form and its empirical manifestations. To instantiate a rhetorical relation between the logics and manifestation of dream contents, Lacan turns to a science of oratory that drives analytic labor toward the empirical life of discourses.66 “What specifies a science,” writes Lacan,” “is having an object.”67 To say that a science must have an object elicits an objection that specifying an “object” presumes a science engages something given in advance as opposed to contingently made. But approaching an object requires equal parts analytic rigor and prudence: “we must be very prudent, because this object changes . . . as the science develops. . . . [W]e cannot say that the object of modern physics is the same now as at its birth.”68 Attention to a changing object implies a relationship of mutual determination between the mode of inquiry and the objects that such a mode takes up. A science is not a general theory to be mapped onto reality because sciences are parasitic on the specific. As Lacan argues, science always begins with the particular: “To be sure, analysis as a science is always a science of the particular. The coming to fruition of an analysis is always a unique case, even if the unique cases lend themselves ... to some generality. . . . [A]nalysis is an experience of the particular.”69 But what is the particular object around which a science of oratory might emerge? The answer is the economy of trope and enjoyment. Claiming that Freud drew attention to a “fundamental” opposition between metaphor and metonymy in “mechanisms of dreams,” Lacan argues that “what Freud calls condensation is what in rhetoric one calls metaphor, what one calls displacement is metonymy.”70 That this reference to a rhetoric of trope frames Lacan’s application of the vocabulary of structural linguistics is clear from the concluding sentence of this paragraph: “It’s for this reason that in focusing attention back onto the signifier we are doing nothing other than returning to the starting point of the Freudian discovery.”71 In “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan argues that the core insight of The Interpretation of Dreams might be fruitfully applied to more than just unpacking dreams. The logic that inheres in dream work is the same logic that underwrites the function of speech generally. If, following Lacan’s reading of Interpretation of Dreams, one is inclined to agree that speech serves as a synecdoche for rhetorical processes generally; by extension one might conclude that speech offers privileged insight into the functioning of everyday discourses. Thus it is no surprise that Lacan recommends instruction in rhetoric as an indispensable component of analytic practice. According to Lacan, this realization should compel attention to the function of “rhetoric . . . ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repetition, apposition—these are the syntactical displacements; metaphor, catachresis, antonomasis, allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche— these are the semantic condensations in which Freud teaches us to read the intentions . . . out of which the subject modulates his oneiric discourse.”72 This extension of Freud’s dream work to speech by means of a globalization of trope founds the possibility of psychoanalysis as a science, via recourse to the scientific properties of oratory: At the bottom of the Freudian mechanism one rediscovers these old figures of rhetoric which over time have come to lose their sense for us but which for centuries elicited a prodigious degree of interest. Rhetoric, or the art of oration, was a science and not just an art. We now wonder, as if at an enigma, why these exercises could have captivated whole groups of men for such a long time. If this is an anomaly it’s analogous to the existence of psychoanalysis, and it’s perhaps the same anomaly that’s involved in man’s relationships to language, returning over the course of history, recurrently, with different ramifications and now presenting itself to us from a scientific angle in Freud’s discovery.73 Why wonder at the “enigma” of a science of oratory and the “exercises” that constituted it? The “exercises” that Lacan is most likely referring to were the progymnasmata—the graduated sequence of somewhat formulaic pedagogical practices that introduced the student of oratory to the inventional moves one might make in composing and/or delivering a speech. This attention to form, embodied in both a theory of arrangement and delivery, attuned the budding orator to the regularities in speech that render inventional moves not only intelligible, but potentially eloquent. Oratorical practice had foreseen and, long in advance of contemporary linguistics, “discovered” the formal properties animating discursive practice. There are two senses of the word “formal” for Lacan: one that relies on quantification and another that relies, if not on math as we typically understand it, then on the mathematizable, or that which can be symbolically rendered as a repeatable relation.74 A science is defined by mathematization, as opposed to quantification: “what is distinctive about positive science, modern science, isn’t quantification but mathematization and specifically combinatory, that is to say linguistic, mathematization which includes series and iteration.”75 The oratorical tradition discovered that rhetorical invention was scientific: in discovering the progymnasmata, the tradition articulated a conception of inventio (invention) as the discovery of repeatable symbolic forms. Lacan prefers the first sense of “formal” because it comports with oratorical pedagogy’s insight that language is mathematizable (amenable to a description of its repeatable formal properties), which is the condition of possibility for a science of oratory. The science of oratory discovers a mode of knowing that would eventually make “linguistics the most advanced of the human sciences” by specifying that which is formally repeatable in the life of the subject and its discourses.76 This understanding of rhetoric moves it from a prudential “art” of the intuitive intersubjective judgments to the symbolic science of forms. For Lacan, an art premised on the disciplining of critical intuition does not move beyond the Imaginary because “everything intuitive is far closer to the Imaginary than the Symbolic.”77 In place of the art of intersubjectively grounded intuition, Lacan calls for attention to the trans-subjective apparatus of the Symbolic: “the important thing here is to realize that the chain of possible combinations of the encounter can be studied as such, as an order which subsists in rigor, independently of all subjectivity. . . . [T]he symbol is embodied in an apparatus—with which it is not to be confused, the apparatus being just its support. And it is embodied in a literally trans-subjective way.”78 This understanding of rhetoric as science does not abandon the subject; rather, it decenters the subject as a taken-for-granted interpretive maxim, replacing attention to what goes on between subjects with the formal movement of tropes, a movement that is mathematizable, and therefore amenable to a formal scientific account of its effects: In as much as ~~he is~~ [they are] committed to a play of [the Symbolic], to a symbolic world . . . ~~man~~ [human] is a decentered subject. Well, it is with this same play, this same world, that the machine is built. The most complicated machines are made only with words. Speech is first and foremost that object of exchange whereby we are reorganized. . . . That is how the circulation of speech begins, and it swells to the point of the symbol which makes algebraic calculations possible. The machine is the structure detached from the activity of the subject. The symbolic world is the world of the machine.79 The world of the symbolic is machinic in a very specific way: only insofar as it relies on the set of regularized, logically possible connections between words and other words. In other words, the Symbolic is machinic because it is tropologically constituted. But because the Symbolic is tropologically constituted, its machinic nature is premised on the various failures in unicity that invite the trope as a compensatory function. Thus, if the Symbolic is a machine, it is a machine that fails. In the next chapter, I take up the paradox of the failing machine by suggesting the metaphor of economy as a way of parsing the relationship between the machinic (or automatic) and its failure in the life of the Symbolic.

### AT: Not Falsifiable/Scientific

#### There’s no impact to psychoanalysis not being scientific because ‘science’ forecloses the natural state of the subject. Psychoanalytic frameworks subsume those of science.

Nobus 17 (Dany Nobus is a Professor of Psychology and Psychoanalysis at the University of Brusel in London and Head of the School of Social Sciences, “When Peter Caws met Jacques Lacan: Some notes on the scientific status of psychoanalysis”, Brunel University Research Archive (BURA)) AqN

In ‘Science and Truth’, Lacan is by no means averse to seeing psychoanalysis being recognized as a science, yet he is quite clear that it cannot possibly associate itself with any form of established, natural or human scientific practice. The reason is that what has come to be known as science can only operate on the basis of a radical rejection—and Lacan explicitly employs the term ‘foreclosure’, which he had singled out as the causal mechanism of psychosis (Lacan, 2006c, p. 742; 2006b, p. 481)—of the split subject, which generates the belief, or even conviction that knowledge can coincide with truth. The term ‘subject’, here, should of course not be conflated with ‘human being’, ‘individual’, ‘personality’, etc. Apart from the fact that it would be difficult to argue that the latter have been rejected by science, especially since the advent of the human sciences, the Lacanian ‘subject’ is exactly the opposite of what the notions of ‘human being’, ‘individual’ and ‘personality’ stand for: division rather than unity; absence instead of presence; dis-being rather than being; real instead of symbolic and imaginary. From a Lacanian point of view, what Caws designates as ‘the individual subject’ is thus a contradiction in terms, unless we are to use ‘individual’ merely as a synonym for singular or particular. Lacan is adamant, however, that what is called ‘science’ can only proceed on the basis of an exclusion, rejection, foreclosure of this subject. In the advancement of science, scientists assume that knowledge and understanding can be created in a radically de-subjectified fashion, either by extracting themselves completely from the process of knowledge-production, or by only including themselves as unified individuals who are at all times in conscious control of their actions and intentions, and by regarding participants as human entities, should the scientific process involve the study of human agents. In ‘Science and Truth’, Lacan argued that this is precisely why psychoanalysis can never adhere to the principles of science. The psychoanalyst, Lacan explained in the opening lines of his text, “detects it [the subject in its state of splitting] on a more or less daily basis. He accepts it as a given, since the mere recognition of the unconscious suffices to ground it . . .” (Lacan, 2006c, p. 726). As a philosopher of science who is knowledgeable about and sympathetic to the practice of psychoanalysis, I don’t think Caws would disagree with Lacan that the psychoanalytic conception of the mind encompasses a view on subjectivity that is radically different from mainstream psychological constructions of the human being, the individual, the person etc. Nor do I think he would disagree that the correlate of this ‘split’ and ‘divided’ psychoanalytic subject can only be a partial or partialised and lost, rather than a total, or totalised and present object. In his 2003 paper, Caws even captures this distinctive subject-object relationship in psychoanalysis quite accurately, although with reference to Freud and the philosopher Franz Brentano, rather than Lacan: “The spool that the child drops out of sight over the edge of his crib, crying ‘Fort!,’ no longer presents itself to his perception: It is perceptually absent, and yet intentionally present. Brentano’s original term for the status of his paradigmatic intentional object—the golden mountain, the round square—was intentional inexistence: Such objects do not stand forth (the root meaning of exist) into our worlds perceptually, but they are objects over against our subjectivity nonetheless, entries in the inventory of our lifeworlds alongside the perceptual ones” (Caws, 2003, p. 630).[[3]](#footnote-3) If this is indeed the nature or, perhaps better, the structure of the subject-object relationship as recognized by and examined in psychoanalysis—and Caws seems to be in agreement with Lacan here—then the knowledge that emerges from this relationship can only ever be incomplete and fractured, that is to say in a constant state of intrinsic inchoate ‘becoming’, without ever arriving at a point of established ‘being’. In proposing that psychoanalysis, as an endless series of local theories, is an idiosyncratic science of the subject, Caws still appears to believe in the possibility for psychoanalysis to accomplish what every scientist, whether human or natural, aspires to, notably the creation of truthful knowledge, with the caveat that in the psychoanalytic domain its realm of applicability would not extend beyond the boundaries of what he calls the ‘individual subject’. However, the very acknowledgement of the aforementioned subject-object relationship excludes the production of this type of ‘absolute knowledge’, generally as well as locally. In conclusion, it seems to me that Caws’ alignment of psychoanalysis with the human sciences, and the associated pre-supposition of the existence of the human being, is indicative of his own ‘arrangement of knowledge’ as a philosopher of science, despite its being not in accordance with the specific psychoanalytic subject-object relationship that he himself recognizes. Over the years, Lacan toyed with numerous images to capture the particularity of the psychoanalytic position, from the Zen-master to the Socratic obstetrician, to the abject saint, yet for all I know he never considered the possibility of the psychoanalyst being a philosopher of science, because unlike the philosopher of science the psychoanalyst would never be expected to criticize, investigate, or indeed falsify (scientific) knowledge from a meta-epistemological platform. The psychoanalyst is there to identify and expose the fundamental fractures that permeate any type of knowledge, insofar as it is produced not by human beings but by divided subjects. As to the relationship between psychoanalysis and science, the issue, then, is not to think about how psychoanalysis can be scientific, but to think about how science can be psychoanalytic, much like Baltimore in the early morning.

### AT: Perm

#### Sequencing DA: the alternative is a pre-requisite to their politics.

McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis”, University of Nebraska Press) AqN \*modified for ableist rhetoric\*

If we recognize the proper location of enjoyment in the fantasmatic experience of the loss of the privileged object, this allows us to reconceive the basis for political action. We do not have to base our political action on the idea of a future reward but can base it on the enjoyment that the subject experiences in breaking from its symbolic and ideological constraints. Ironically, the turn to fantasy by psychoanalysis opens up the possibility of a politics not beholden to an imaginary enjoyment that the future promises. The key lies in recognizing where we find our enjoyment. This enjoyment resides in the moment of the loss of the privileged object, not in the image of its return. The return of the object is pleasing but not enjoyable. Fantasy is ultimately deceptive only in the sense that it induces us to equate enjoyment with the image of the return of the privileged object. But if we pay careful attention to the structure of fantasy - as psychoanalysis does - we can recognize the location of enjoyment at the moment of this object's loss/inception. This points us toward a politics with an appeal structured around our enjoyment rather than reality (as with philosophy) or an image of the future (as with Marxism). Le Guin's novel The Dispossessed shows us what this idea of politics might look like. It is a novel of political activity. The novel's hero, Shevek, comes from a peaceful world of anarchists (on a moon named Anarres) that retains its way oflife through isolation from other worlds. Shevek's political activity consists in reaching out to the rest of the universe and specifically to the moon's mother planet (Urras) with a revolutionary egalitarian philosophy. What is distinctive about Shevek is the motivation for his political activity. He doesn't act out of a desire to eliminate loss by constructing a better world in the future; instead, he acts out of an embrace of loss. Unlike most revolutionary political figures, Shevek adopts a completely pessimistic view of existence. He is convinced of the utter hopelessness of the human condition. This sense of the necessity of loss animates Shevek as a political being. Shevek thus advances a political program that does not hold out the image of a future complete enjoyment. But if Shevek begins with the acceptance of loss and suffering, this doesn't lead him to deny the possibility of enjoyment altogether. In fact, Shevek aims to convince others that the secret of enjoyment lies in the embrace of loss, not in the promise of overcoming it. According to Shevek (and psychoanalysis), loss doesn't represent the end of enjoyment but the beginning. Throughout The Dispossessed, Shevek works toward a more egalitarian society both on his home world of Anarres and on the mother planet, Urras, that he travels to. But he recognizes that they cannot achieve an egalitarian society through the idea of overcoming loss and achieving wholeness. This image of a complete enjoyment that we might attain in the future (in, say, a future socialist society) is necessarily illusory because it depends on some kind of exclusion in order to sustain it. The only way to break out of this exclusionary logic is through abandoning the image of a future completeness. Instead of holding out this image, Shevek offers the ideal of a shared embrace of loss. Through the fantasy that Le Guin constructs in The Dispossessed, we can see the link between enjoyment and the loss of the privileged object, and through recognizing this link, we can rethink politics. Fantasy has the ability to foster a distinctive kind of politics, and psychoanalysis provides the key through which we can unlock fantasy's emancipatory potential. Psychoanalysis allows us to understand both sides of fantasy and its relation to politics. On the one hand, fantasy does hide our subjection to the signifier, but on the other, because of the way it hides our subjection, it allows us to militate against our very subjected status itself in ways unthinkable outside of fantasy. Through its revaluation of the status of fantasy, psychoanalysis enables us to ~~see~~ [recognize] fantasy's fundamental political value in a way that neither philosophy nor Marxism can. Both the philosopher and the Marxist, because of their shared attitude toward fantasy, tend to remain stuck in attacks on the proliferation of false consciousness. Psychoanalysis allows us to rethink the way in which we conceive political activity: not as the triumph of the proper consciousness over the experience of enjoyment but as the embrace of the trauma inherent in real enjoyment. The political task as it might be envisioned by psychoanalytic thought entails not attempting to eliminate fantasy but transforming our relationship to it. Fantasy functions in an ideological way when it works to cover over the structural necessity of absence within the social order, but fantasy appeals to us because it also conveys an experience of loss or absence that we can access nowhere else. One could say that we are never more inauthentic than when we fantasize but never more authentic at the same time. In order to provide the pleasure that comes from overcoming absence, fantasy must introduce and narrate loss. As it does so, it allows the fantasizing subject to experience the impossible loss that founds subjectivity itself. In every fantasy, this loss is enacted, whether implicitly or explicitly. The political task involves fostering the recognition that we enjoy our fantasies for their depiction of loss rather than for the illusion of return. Accomplishing this task demands orienting ourselves and our societies around the enjoyment that fantasy provides. Rather than remaining a marginalized activity indulged in during sleep or while surfing for lewd Internet sites, fantasy must become central, the avowed basis of our social organization. We must count fantasy as worth more than our social reality because we already do. Though it always has a social and psychic centrality, we fail to recognize it, and the political project of psychoanalysis demands the recognition of fantasy's primacy and a consequent devotion to fantasy. Without this, we cannot grasp the possibilities for enjoyment that inhere in the trauma of the lost object.

## Aff Answers

### Alt fails – Reform/Institutions Key

#### Psychoanalysis relies on individualized change that fails to alter systematic political conditions - engaging institutions is a prior question for the efficacy of psychoanalytic practices, justifies the permutation.

Rosen-Carole 10 (Adam Rosen-Carole is an adjunct instructor at the Philosophy department of the Rochester Institute of Technology, “Menu cards in time of famine: on psychoanalysis and politics”, http://www.academia.edu/1850815/Menu\_cards\_in\_time\_of\_famine\_on\_psychoanalysis\_and\_politics, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2010 Volume LXXIX, Number 1) AqN \*modified for ableist and gendered language\*

On the other hand, though in these ways and many others, psychoanalysis seems to promote the sorts of subjective dispositions and habits requisite for a thriving democracy, and though in a variety of ways psychoanalysis contributes to personal emancipation—say, by releasing individuals from self-defeating, dam-aging, or petrified forms action and reaction, object attachment, and the like—in light of the very uniqueness of what it has to offer, one cannot but wonder: to what extent, if at all, can the habits and dispositions—broadly, the forms of life—cultivated by psychoanalytic practice survive, let alone flourish, under modern social and political conditions? If the emancipatory inclinations and democratic virtues that psychoanalytic practice promotes are systematically crushed or at least regularly unsupported by the world in which they would be realized, then isn’t psycho-analysis implicitly making promises it cannot redeem? Might not massive social and political transformations be the condition for the efficacious practice of psychoanalysis? And so, under cur-rent conditions, can we avoid experiencing the forms of life nascently cultivated by psychoanalytic practice as something of a tease, or even a source of deep frustration?( 2 ) Concerning psychoanalysis as a politically inclined theoretical enterprise, the worry is whether political diagnoses and proposals that proceed on the basis of psychoanalytic insights and forms of attention partake of a fantasy of interpretive efficacy (all the world’s a couch, you might say), wherein our profound alienation from the conditions for robust political agency are registered and repudiated? Consider, for example, Freud and Bullitt’s ( 1967 ) assessment of the psychosexual determinants of Woodrow Wilson’s political aspirations and impediments, or Reich’s ( 1972 ) suggestion that Marxism should appeal to psychoanalysis in order to illuminate and redress neurotic phenomena that generate disturbances in working capacity, especially as this concerns religion and bourgeois sexual ideology. Also relevant are Freud’s, Žižek’s ( 1993 , 2004 ), Derrida’s ( 2002 ) and others’ insistence that we draw the juridical and political consequences of the hypothesis of an irreducible death drive, as well as Marcuse’s ( 1970 ) proposal that we attend to the weakening of Eros and the growth of aggression that results from the coercive enforcement of the reality principle upon the sociopolitically weakened ego, and especially to the channeling of this aggression into hatred of enemies. Reich ( 1972 ) and Fromm ( 1932 ) suggest that psychoanalysis be employed to explore the motivations to political irrationality, especially that singular irrationality of joining the national-socialist movement, while Irigaray ( 1985 ) diagnoses the desire for the Same, the One, the Phallus as a desire for a sociosymbolic order that assures masculine dominance. Žižek ( 2004 ) contends that only a psychoanalytic exposition of the disavowed beliefs and suppositions of the United States political elite can get at the fundamental determinants of the Iraq War. Rose ( 1993 ) argues that it was the paranoiac paradox of sensing both that there is every reason to be frightened and that everything is under control that allowed Thatcher “to make this paradox the basis of political identity so that subjects could take pleasure in violence as force and legitimacy while always locating ‘real’ violence somewhere else—illegitimate violence and illicit-ness increasingly made subject to the law” (p. 64 ). Stavrakakis ( 1999 )advocates that we recognize and traverse the residues of utopian fantasy in our contemporary political imagination. 1 Might not the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful figures(Bush, Bin Laden, or whomever), collective subjects (nations, ethnic groups, and so forth), or urgent “political” situations register an anxiety regarding political impotence or “castration” that is pacified and modified by the fantasmatic frame wherein the psychoanalytically inclined political theorist situates ~~him- or herself~~ [themselves] as diagnosing or interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures, collective political subjects, or complex political situations with the idealized efficacy of a successful clinical intervention? If so, then the question is: are the contributions of psychoanalytically inclined political theory anything more than tantalizing menu cards for meals it cannot deliver? As I said, the worry is twofold. These are two folds of a related problem, which is this: might the very seductiveness of psychoanalytic theory and practice—specifically, the seductiveness of its political promise—register the lasting eclipse of the political and the objectivity of the social, respectively? In other words, might not everything that makes psychoanalytic theory and practice so politically attractive indicate precisely the necessity of wide-ranging social/institutional transformations that far exceed the powers of psychoanalysis? And so, might not the politically salient transformations of subjectivity to which psychoanalysis can contribute overburden subjectivity as the site of political transformation, ~~blinding~~ [desensitizing] us to the necessity of large-scale institutional reforms? Indeed, might not massive institutional trans-formations be necessary conditions for the efficacy of psychoanalytic practice, both personally and politically? Further, might not the so-called interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political theory similarly sidestep the question of the institutional transformations necessary for their realization, and so conspire with our ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] to the enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future? The idea, then, is to use the limits of psychoanalytic practice and psychoanalytically inclined political theory as a form of social diagnosis. I want to read the limits of psychoanalytically inclined political theory for what they can tell us about the lasting eclipse of the political, and so, inversely, for what they can tell us about what a viable political culture requires, just as I want to read the limits of the political efficacy of psychoanalytic practice for what they can tell us about what would be required for their successful realization.

### Can’t Explain IR

#### Psychoanalysis can’t explain international relations - the move from the clinic to the macro-sphere is too great - not everyone shares the exact same fantasies and there’s no mechanism to actualize change

Boucher 2010 (Geoff, literary and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University, “Zizek and Politics: A Critical Introduction”, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=\_hmrBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%C5%BDi%C5%BEek+and+Politics:+An+Introduction&ots=3uqgdGUwxC&sig=MNP7oMG7JXgWMj49yz2DHRTs6BI#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remark- able that, for all the criticisms of Zizek's political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra-extremism of Zizek's political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate - which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan's notion of travers- ing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people's sub- jective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands' volun- tary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a support- ing moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully-fledged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option ((7), Zizek's option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose 'traversal of the fantasy' is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio-political system or Other. I-Ience, according to Zizek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psy- choanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Zi2ek's resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objec- tive) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject-object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Zizek's decisive political-theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject-object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equat- ing politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embrac- ing dictatorial govermnent, as Zizek now frankly avows (IDLC 412-19). We have seen that the ultra-political form of Zizek's criti- cism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him - even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Zizek's model of politics proper is modelled on a pre-critical analogy with the total transformation of a subiect's entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Zizek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime's 'inherent transgressions': at once subjects' habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime's myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete 'traversal' - in Hegel's terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation - of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the first Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (IDLC 153; OB 144–8). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

### Drive Theory False

#### Drive theory is false – especially the death drive. It’s a form of sham biology.

Callard and Papoulias 12 (Felicity Callard is a Professor in Social Science for Medical Humanities at Durham University, Constantina Papoulias is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Patient and Public Involvement, “The rehabilitation of the drive in neuropsych oanalysis: from sexuality to self-preservation”, <http://dro.dur.ac.uk/9672/1/9672.pdf>, Durham University) AqN

Our choice of focus on the drive as it is discussed in neuropsychoanalytic writings is motivated in at least three ways. First, and centrally, the drive is not only a central concept in Freud’s work but one that articulates the passage between the somatic and the psychic. Freud claims that the concept of the drive is located »on the frontier between the mental and the somatic«,10 and in this sense the concept itself embodies the question of the relation between what are posited as two distinct domains. As such, ›drive‹ invokes a problematic that is also central within neuropsychoanalysis. Secondly, Freud’s drive theory is characterised by a remarkable volatility. On the one hand, Freud was centrally preoccupied with conceptualizing the fundamental forces or impulses that drive the human subject across the span of his work.11 At the same time, however, the precise number and dynamics of such forces and their relation to the body’s biological needs underwent considerable recastings in Freud’s writings. Freud, in his first elaboration of the drive (Trieb)12 in 1905, set up a distinction between a sexual force (libido) and biological needs (for example, the need for nourishment); he later recast this distinction as an antagonism between sexual drives and selfpreservative or ego-drives (around 1910); finally, he installed the more ›mythic‹ opposition between the life and death drives, supplemented by their composites, in 1920.13 Thirdly, in so far as the drive marks the space of a quasi-biological foundation of the psyche, it has become something of a scandalous concept within contemporary psychoanalysis. As Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, in their 2002 monograph The Brain and the Inner World, note in an amusing understatement, the drive »seems to be unfashionable in psychoanalysis nowadays,« even though »[i]t is unclear why this happened«.14 Before moving any further, we shall briefl y consider this fall from grace of the drive, since the terms of this psychoanalytic rejection may illuminate the terms of what we have called the drive’s rehabilitation in neuropsychoanalysis. Indeed, many contemporary psychoanalytic traditions have established their domain through an abandonment of the drive as a crude or unnecessary concept. Generally, drive theory has been read as the clearest expression of Freud’s adherence to Helmholtz’s physiological research, that is, to what is commonly regarded as an outdated mechanistic model of the psychic apparatus as a thermodynamic system.15 Additionally, the drive has been denounced as a representative of a speculative wilderness encroaching on Freud’s writings and therefore turning them away from observable, clinical facts. 16 (While this assessment most frequently arises in relation to the death drive, it is signifi cantly buoyed by Freud’s own claim that drive theory is »our mythology«.)17 Finally, the rejection of the drive has corresponded with many contemporary psychoanalysts’ rethinking of psychic space through object relations and intersubjective engagements, and their seeking to minimise the determinism of endogenous forces in the production of that space. 18 There is, however, an additional dimension to this post-Freudian rejection of the drive, which demands our attention insofar as this dimension becomes central to neuropsychoanalytic discussions of the drive. A substantial impetus for psychoanalysts’ rejection of Freudian drive theory is drawn from the wide acceptance of John Bowlby’s claims regarding the importance of att achment between infant and carer in the production of psychic space. 19 Here, what is being rejected is not the biological as such, but rather Freud’s insistence on the foundational place of libido in his drive theory. Bowlby, in his work with deprived children, had come to emphasise the importance of att achment for child development,20 and vociferously to reject Freud’s insistence that such development should be understood primarily through the vicissitudes of infantile sexuality. Notably, Bowlby framed his rejection of the primacy of libidinal drive as a rejection of the drive tout court, in so far as he defined att achment as a behavioural system, a concept borrowed from ethology. A behavioural system is »a species-universal neural program that organizes an individual’s behavior in ways that increase the likelihood of survival«.21 Bowlby and att achment theorists, in replacing drive with behavioural systems, thereby construct a new foundation for psychic space, in which this space emerges under the auspices of self-preservation, fitted towards survival. In sum, we see the drive being rejected as too biologistic and not scientifi c enough, charged with introducing a sham biology, a biolog-ism within the psyche. At the same time, and under the gravitational pull of att achment theory, this rejection of ›sham biology‹ is also a rejection of Freud’s emphasis on the libidinal foundations of the psyche. Here, drive theory, in its various recastings across Freud’s own writings, becomes a placeholder not only for what Freud referred to as ›the biological‹ but also for the primacy of the sexual in the psychic apparatus. Seen in this way, we would suggest that the rejection of the drive in contemporary psychoanalysis is not so much a refusal of the biological within the psychic but rather a refusal of what we might term Freud’s ›con-fi guration‹ of the biological as the sexual in particular. It is our contention in this chapter that while much of contemporary psychoanalysis refuses this con-fi guration and ejects drive theory altogether, neuropsychoanalysis strives to gather and to streamline both Freud’s ›biologism‹ and his emphasis on the primacy of the sexual under the aegis of self-preservation, as the evolutionarily driven function of the psyche. In what follows, we consider some of the referential strategies through which such streamlining or normalization has been attempted to date.

### Ivory Tower

#### Psychoanalysis is academic ivory tower sustained by the same authoritative psychoanalysts. It’s also bankrupt science as all of Freud’s concepts were based off manufactured results.

Defresne and Tsakiris 14 (Todd Dufresne is a Professor of Philosophy at Lakehead University, Alex Tsakiris is the head of Skeptiko, “235. Dr. Todd Dufresne on Freud’s Looming Shadow of Deception”, <http://skeptiko.com/235-todd-dufresne-freud-deception/>, 1/7/14) AqN

Alex Tsakiris: Before we talk past that too much, give people a sense for this criticism. There are layers of criticism and the way you’re saying it I think people might get the impression that there’s a little tussle over how this should be interpreted or that should be interpreted when in fact the real historical touch-points that we have paint just a horrible picture of Freud—of someone who’s really a complete fraud. Who manufactures evidence in order to support his theories, that copies without attribution other people’s work or at least he promotes himself as being this original great genius when he’s really stood on the shoulders of all these other people. I mean, the history of it beyond just critiquing theory is just stunning for people who haven’t fully encountered it. The other side of that that I really want you to get into to support that is how we know this information was really held under lock and key and protected under the tightest controls for so long. Then it’s gradually pried loose. So give people a sense for that. Dr. Todd Dufresne: There’s so much to say I hardly know where to begin. In some ways, from my perspective, what really happened was Ernest Jones came out with this three-volume biography in 1953, 1955, 1957, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work. Then he died. Basically you have everything after the Jones biography, which is an official biography of psychoanalysis, as kind of a response to this official biography. What happens is that people start becoming more and more critical of psychoanalysis. For me, Rosen is one of the first figures in this regard and it’s around 1967 when he publishes a book called, Brother Animal, in which he reveals that one of Freud’s earlier followers committed suicide. I guess the radical side of this is that Freud was very unmoved by this follower’s plight. He was a sycophant like half the people surrounding Freud, and Freud rebuffed him in various ways and the guy committed suicide. Okay, that’s horrible but not entirely surprising in some ways. But deeper and more radical than that, Rosen exposed that during two periods in the 1920s Freud analyzed his own daughter, Anna, and that’s what really got him into trouble. That’s kind of the beginning of this movement to reassess the fundamental myths of psychoanalysis or the things we didn’t know were myths but certainly we now know are myths. I call it really the beginning of critical Freud studies. I take it to be a post-Jones movement, roughly from the mid-‘60s through to the late 1990s and maybe going on today, as well. I see it as like the whole purpose of scholarship and Freud studies is to move to critical Freud studies. Now how did it happen? It’s really amazing. One of the untold stories of psychoanalytic studies or Freud studies, as it’s usually called, is that one of the reasons there’s so much misinformation is that the vast majority of books published and that appear under the library heading of BF173 to BF175 roughly—go to any library and you’ll find all the Freud books there. Most of this work is vanity publishing. So much of the field is run by psychoanalysts who have positions of authority. They start their own book publishers. They start their own journals. Pretty soon they have an authority in the marketplace of ideas so it’s very, very hard to actually find in the thousands of books published on Freud anything that actually tells the truth. It’s a hard thing for somebody to free themselves from many, many misconceptions about Freud. You mentioned a couple of them. Freud manufactured evidence. One of the things that’s not well-appreciated is how Freud went out of his way to manipulate the reception of his own work, right? He wrote his own histories, first of all. Many times he revised his own histories and sometimes there are discrepancies with his own histories. He was always trying to spin his history in advance because Freud always perceived himself as an historically important person, so he proceeded accordingly. He destroyed some of his correspondence. He would destroy some of his process notes that he used to create his famous case studies, of which there really is only four that he wrote, all of which are failures, by the way. He destroyed the notes and these were important cases. You’d think you’d keep them but he destroyed them. He tried to get his famous letters with Wilhelm Fliess destroyed but Marie Bonaparte preserved them against his wishes. So Freud was always interested in manipulating the reception of his work and he was largely successful in many ways. People have generally believed what he said. Alex Tsakiris: Can we stop right there? One of the things I always like to do when we get into these discussions with people and I have just a very superficial understanding of this stuff—you could get into it in much greater detail. I always stop at this point and say, “What would that look like in modern academic standards?” Just what we already know there. What would that look like if any intellectual, academic figure of our time was known to have done those things? I can’t imagine but that they would be completely ostracized as just the beginning of it. They’d be a complete joke. Dr. Todd Dufresne: The problem is, Alex, that’s there’s hardly any modern equivalent to Freud. What Freud got away with for so long, which is essentially passing off incomplete results or fraudulent results as the truth—I can give you some examples as we get into it later. He did all of the things you said he did. He manufactured evidence and even the evidence that he had, he may have felt legitimately and honestly is so shot-through with epistemological problems because there’s the contamination of results by the expectations he had on the patients. We know this is called “suggestion,” right? And undue influence. One of the things that’s interesting about Freud is that he was a scientist and as a scientist he had followers. These followers routinely referred to his major works like The Interpretation of Dreams as their “bibles.” So we’re already in Freud’s life in the presence of a kind of cult or church or something that’s not scientific. This guy was a trained neurologist, right? He asked some legitimate questions. He explored these questions but at some point ambition took over and he fudged the results in many ways like you’re saying. What should happen with Freud is the minute people see that he fudged the results in a number of ways that are absolutely clear—there’s no question—well, anybody that has any fair-mindedness would say that everything that follows from these results is therefore questionable. But that’s not what happens with Freud, and that’s because we’re in the presence of a belief system, like a religion, so people don’t want to question it. Anything like this today, you’d lose tenure. You’d lose your job. You’d be fired. When this happens people fall into disgrace. But Freud has never really seriously fallen into disgrace. One of the things that’s happened which is amazing to me because I’m somebody who works in the humanities is that part of the blame belongs to people in the humanities and social sciences that don’t really care about science, or in some ways truth, not to be too general about it. They don’t care that maybe he fudged the results; they’re just interested in this as a hermeneutic system, a way of interpreting the world. So this is the place we get, where people are really non-skeptical about Freud and they don’t want to hear it, you know? They do not want to hear it. And that’s my colleagues, I’m afraid.

### Neoliberalism/Sexism/Racism

#### Their psychoanalytic framework is inaccessible to the public sphere- this perpetuates unconscious racism and sexism in our neoliberal era. Political agendas must incorporate an analysis of sociopolitical formations – justifies the permutation.

Layton 16 (Lynne Layton is an Assistant Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychiatry, “What to teach? Social psychoanalysis in the clinic and the classroom”, Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society, Volume 21, Issue 4, 12/21/16) AqN

I want briefly to mention something about the undergrad courses I taught. Like most of us, I, too, am the unconscious product and producer of my times, and I was teaching Harvard undergraduates at a time when identity politics and the critique thereof (anti-essentialism) dominated the humanities. The work I did and taught on conscious and unconscious constructions of race/racism, gender/ sexism, sexuality/homophobia and their intersections was important work. But by the early 2000s, it had become clear to me and, apparently to many others as well, that class had fallen off the intersectionality research and teaching agenda. How that happened has become an area of great interest to me. It feels like a fault line very much connected to neoliberalism: to changes in the nature of work, politics, and capitalism in the past 35 years. These changes contributed to creating excitement around difference while mystifying the effects of class. A few words on the course I constructed for and have now taught to students of liberation psychology: when I began reading about liberation psychology, I found myself for a while regretting that I had spent my life doing individual clinical work. My pedagogical project has been to engage clinicians in recognizing unconscious effects of power and how we reproduce them in the clinic, and I have had the opportunity to elaborate that work with a wonderful group of clinicians from the relational, Kohutian, Lacanian and Kleinian/Bionian traditions. But, when I began to think about what liberation psychologists might want to know about social psychoanalysis, I realized that my own education had completely omitted all the amazing and important psychoanalytic work that has focused on groups and unconscious group process: the group analytic tradition, the Bionian Tavistock tradition, the social defenses tradition, and the Frankfurt School, especially Fromm’s work on social character and social unconscious. And I began to wonder why we do not teach this work to clinicians and began to feel that not teaching it is another way we collude with individualism and neoliberalism. It seems to me that psychoanalytic education has to change if psychoanalysts are going to contribute anything to social transformation. And any radical form of social psychoanalysis has to become accessible enough to enter the public sphere. The time is perhaps right for that, as even mainstream journalists talk about the effects of unconscious racism (see, for example, Blow, 2015). But unconscious racism, like unconscious sexism, takes particular forms in this neoliberal era of extreme income inequality. Thus, any research and teaching agenda today, no matter whom we are teaching, ought to center on the relation between each country’s specific neoliberal sociopolitical formations and their effects on subject formation.

### Not Falsifiable

#### Psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable – their politics fail

Robinson 4 (Andrew Robinson is a political theorist at The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, “The Politics of Lack”, BJPIR: 2004 VOL 6) AqN \*modified for ableist language\*

For Lacanians, the return of the Real is always a disruptive, almost revolutionary event which shatters the entire social totality constructed around its exclusion. Every social order, therefore, has a single touchy ‘nodal point’ which it must maintain, or else it will collapse. Since the exclusion of a Real element is supposed to be necessary, Lacanians urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these. The acceptance of lack takes the form of an Act or Event, in which the myth of subjective completeness is rejected and the incompleteness of the self is embraced. The primary ethical imperative in Lacanian politics is to ‘accept’ the primacy of antagonism, i.e. the central ontological claim of the Lacanian edifice itself. Mouffe, for instance, demands that one accept ‘an element of hostility among human beings’ as something akin to a fact of human nature (2000, 130–132). She attacks deconstructive and dialogical approaches to ethics for being ‘unable to come to terms with “the political” in its antagonistic dimension’. Such approaches lack ‘a proper reflection on the moment of “decision” which characterises the field of politics’ and which necessarily ‘entail[s] an element of force and violence’ (ibid., 129–130). Mouffe’s alternative involves a politics which ‘acknowledges the real nature of [the] frontiers [of the social] and the forms of exclusion that they entail instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality’ (ibid., 105). She celebrates democracy, but her version of democracy depends on ‘the possibility of drawing a frontier between “us” and “them”’ and ‘always entails relations of inclusion–exclusion’ (ibid., 43). The derivation of such views is unclear from the text, but seems to be that, since everyone needs a master-signifier as an element in their psyche, and since such a signifier arises through the machinations of ‘the political’, therefore the exclusionary and violent operations of coercive state apparatuses must be accepted as an absolute necessity for any kind of social life. This is Hobbesian statism updated for a post-modern era. As should by now be clear, the central claims of Lacanian theory are ontological rather than political. Indeed, since Lacan’s work deals with politics only very occasionally, the entire project of using Lacan politically is fraught with hazards. With rare exceptions, Lacanian theorists put ontology in the driving seat, allowing it to guide their political theorising. Political discourse and events are subsumed into a prior theoretical framework in a manner more reminiscent of an attempt to confirm already-accepted assumptions than of an attempt to assess the theory itself. Among the authors discussed here, Zizek takes this the furthest: the stuff of theory is ‘notions’, which have a reality above and beyond any referent, so that, if reality does not conform to the notions, it is ‘so much the worse for reality’ (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 244). The selection and interpretation of examples, whether in concrete analysis of political discourse or in theoretical exegesis, is often selective in a way which appears to confirm the general theory only because inconvenient counterexamples are ignored. The entire edifice often appears wholly a priori and non-falsifiable, and the case for its acceptance is extremely vague. Most often, the imperative to adopt a Lacanian as opposed to (say) a Rawlsian or an orthodox Marxist approach is couched in terms of dogmatically-posited demands that one accept the idea of constitutive lack. A failure to do so is simply denounced as ‘shirking’, ‘~~blindness’~~ [stunning], ‘inability to accept’ and so on. In this way, Lacanian theory renders itself almost immune to analytical critique on terms it would find acceptable. Furthermore, a slippage frequently emerges between the external ‘acceptance’ of antagonism and its subjective encouragement. For instance, Ernesto Laclau calls for a ‘symbolisation of impossibility as such as a positive value’ (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 1999, original emphasis). The differences between the texts under review mainly arise around the issue of how to articulate Lacanian themes into a concrete political discourse. This becomes especially clear in the Butler, Laclau and Zizek volume from which the above quotation is taken. Laclau and Zizek share a theoretical vocabulary and agree on a number of issues of basic ontology. However, they both—and each in an equally dogmatic way—insist on a particular decontestation of this vocabulary in their analysis of contemporary events. For Laclau, Lacanian analysis dovetails with ‘radical democracy’, whereas for Zizek, it entails a radical refusal of the status quo from a standpoint cross-fertilised with insights from Hegel, Kant and the Marxist tradition. This disagreement represents a broader split of Lacanian theorists into two camps: ‘radical democrats’ who follow Laclau’s line that liberal democracy is a realisation of the Lacanian model through the acceptance of antagonism and its conversion into symbolically accepted electoral and interest-group competition, and more-or-less nihilistic Lacanians such as Zizek and Badiou who maintain that a Lacanian politics requires a radical break with the present political system. Butler, for her part, is not sufficiently committed to an ontology of lack to accept the other protagonists’ inability to provide substantial argumentation for their positions. She calls Lacanian theory a ‘theoretical fetish’, because the ‘theory is applied to its examples’, as if ‘already true, prior to its exemplification’. Articulated on its own self-sufficiency, it shifts its basis to concrete matters only for pedagogical purposes (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 26–27). She suggests, quite accurately, that the Lacanian project is in a certain sense ‘a theological project’, and that its heavy reliance on a priori assumptions impedes its ability to engage with practical political issues, using simplification and a priori reasoning to ‘avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement’ involved in studying specific political cases (ibid., 155–156). She could perhaps have added that, in practice, the switch between ontology and politics is usually accomplished by the transmutation of single instances into universal facts by means of a liberal deployment of words such as ‘always’, ‘all’, ‘never’ and ‘necessity’; it is by this specific discursive move that the short-circuit between ‘theology’ and politics is achieved. Butler questions the political motivations involved in such practices. ‘Are we using the categories to understand the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories “in the name of the father” [i.e. the master-signifier]?’ (ibid., 152). The problems raised by Butler are serious, and reflect a deeper malaise. Aside from the absence of any significant support for their basic ontological claims, the two Lacanian camps both face enormous problems once they attempt to specify their political agendas. For the Laclauians, the greatest difficulty is that of maintaining a ‘critical’ position even while endorsing assumptions remarkably close to those of the analytical-liberal mainstream. The claim that liberal democracy is necessary to take the bite out of intractable conflicts arising from human nature, and the resultant condemnation of ‘utopian’ theories such as Marxism for ungrounded optimism and resultant totalitarian dangers, is hardly original. To take one example, it arises in Rawls’ discussion of ‘reasonable pluralism’ and the ‘burdens of difference’ in Political Liberalism (1996, Lecture 2 and passim). Since much of the appeal of Lacanian theory depends on its claims to be offering a new, radical approach to politics, such similarities must be downplayed.

### Perm – Analytical Eclecticism

#### Permutation do both – the permutation is a form of analytical eclecticism where competing theories are combined to generate new conceptual frameworks of engaging intuitions at the macro and micro level. This is not a form of synthesis, which proves our competition and resolves their totalizing claims of the world. Using the two theories to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each is the best method for resolving individual shortcomings.

Katzenstein and Sil 10 (Peter Katzenstein Jr. is a Professor of International Studies at Cornell, Rudra Sil is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions”, Cambridge University Press, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/B078D54DEFB199ADA653B7B35004EACF/S1537592710001179a.pdf>) AqN

At the same time, analytic eclecticism should not be confused with unified synthesis. Although some do use the term “synthesis” to refer to what we call eclecticism,26 we view synthesis as a more ambitious project. It requires something extraordinary and unprecedented: a marked departure on the part of most scholarly communities from their original epistemic commitments, followed by a voluntary convergence upon a new, uniform set of foundational assumptions and analytic principles to guide research. In the absence of such a convergence, attempts at synthesis are likely to devolve into hegemonic projects in which a single metatheoretical framework generates substantive theories concerning diverse social phenomena, while marginalizing or subsuming the insights offered by preexisting traditions about many of these same phenomena.27 Analytic eclecticism is more modest and pragmatic. It is intended to generate diverse and flexible frameworks, each organized around a concrete problem, with the understanding that it is the problem that drives the construction of the framework. Moreover, the value added by eclectic scholarship depends to a large extent on the continued success of existing research traditions. Neither aspiring to uncover universal laws, nor content with statistical associations or interpretations of specific phenomena, analytic eclecticism is best thought of as operating at the level of what Robert Merton called “the middle range.” Midrange theories are designed to be portable within a bounded set of comparable contexts where certain cause-effect links recur. The task for a mid-range theorist is to recognize the conditions under which some of these links become more causally significant while others do not.28 Such an effort is quite different from the construction of a grand theory or general law that is intended to be portable not only across spatio-temporal contexts but also across a wide range of substantive problems. Analytic eclecticism may utilize but is not synonymous with methodological triangulation or multi-method research.29 Any attempt to investigate the interaction between general macro- and micro-level processes and specific contextual factors would benefit from attention to different kinds of approaches employing different techniques of empirical analysis. Yet, it is important to note that analytic eclecticism does not require the acquisition or use of multiple methodological skills; it simply requires a broad understanding of the relative strengths and tradeoffs of different methods and an openness to considering causal stories presented in different forms by scholars employing different methods. The combinatorial logic of analytic eclecticism depends not on the multiplicity of methods but on the multiplicity of connections between the different mechanisms and social processes analyzed in isolation in separate research traditions. In principle, such a project can be advanced by the flexible application of a single method—be it formal modeling, multiple regression, historical case studies, or ethnography—so long as the problem and the explanandum feature efforts to connect theoretical constructs drawn from separate research traditions. This combinatorial logic of analytic eclecticism is evident in, among other fields, the study of institutional change. The first point to note is that the path towards more eclectic styles of analysis typically begins with the relaxation of metatheoretical postulates and the broadening of analytic boundaries among discrete research traditions. Generally treated as competing alternatives, economic, historical, and sociological variants of the “new institutionalism” have all sought to explain a wider range of phenomena employing a wider range of analytic constructs.30 Historical institutionalists have moved away from the emphasis they initially placed on institutional persistence linked to path dependence. They now seek to trace more incremental or gradual processes of change that can either generate novel institutional forms over long time horizons or produce unexpected breakdowns at critical thresholds.31 Economic institutionalists have gone beyond the treatment of institutions as emergent self-enforcing equilibria produced by individual-level preferences. They now seek to make sense of institutional change by considering the implications of shifting parameters and iterated games, and by exploring how social norms affect the supply of information and the expectations of actors engaged in bargaining.32 In addition, sociological institutionalists have generated more complex understandings of how shared worldviews, cognitive scripts, and normative templates may interact with discursive or symbolic practices to influence institutions and institutional actors in given contexts.33These shifts do not themselves constitute a full-blown embrace of eclecticism. However, by stretching the analytic boundaries initially established by each of the new institutionalisms, they open the door for more self-consciously eclectic approaches to the study of institutional change.

### Perm – Antiblackness/Desegregation

#### Permutation do both – an analysis of the antiblack fantasies and the material effects of racist education policies is necessary to understand modern schooling systems. This critical synthesis explains how racist ideology and language constitute subjecthood.

Wun 14 (Connie Wun has a Ph.D. in Education from UC Berkeley, “The Anti-Black Order of No Child Left Behind: Using Lacanian psychoanalysis and critical race theory to examine NCLB”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00131857.2012.732011>, 10/29/14) AqN

Critical race theory emphasizes the social, political and historical implications and contexts of race and racism in the USA, centralizing the perspectives of people of color (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). This approach has made useful interventions into public discourses, originally appropriated from the field of legal research. Since 1995, this theoretical framework has provided much needed insight into the lived experience of race and racism through the use of ‘counter-narratives’. These first hand accounts of racialized experiences subvert mainstream knowledge because the latter has rarely acknowledged institutional investments in race and racism. Counter-narratives by racial minorities not only help subjects to ‘name one’s own reality’ but they provide alternative, sometimes contradictory perspectives to Eurocentric or White American views. In addition to centralizing marginalized accounts of the effects of race and racism, critical race theorists recognize the larger social and historical landscape that informs these experiences. Social policies, however, have increasingly incorporated these narratives about disenfranchisement and inequality to further educational reform agendas that extend, rather than challenge, the logic of racism in the US educational system. For instance, data on racial disparities in schools have been used to support NCLB, which researchers have argued does not rectify but, instead, exacerbates inequalities. Although stressing the importance of counter-narratives from marginalized students is a critical challenge to the history of racial subjugation in education, the fact that these narratives can be incorporated institutionally, or worse co-opted, may be a red herring, necessitating critical discussions.3 Perhaps in lieu of narrating from the position of the racialized subject to demonstrate the effects of racism, an approach that centers on the formative role of the state and its policy mandates in shaping these racial identities may be more helpful.4 More directly, I advocate for an analysis of the constitutive relationship between racial fantasies, state policies and racial formations. Fantasies, Verhaeghe (1999) explains, are the means by which reality——including our perceptions and relationships——is constructed. That is, they do not merely operate as escape mechanisms from difficult worlds. On the contrary, they shape worlds. In this sense, it is important for policy pundits and scholars not only to evaluate the effects of policy on racial groups per se, but also to critically analyze the racializing effects and racial motivations behind educational policy. Scholars should analyze not only the material effects of racism and race, but also the effects of racial ideology. Leonardo (2005) writes about the pervasive role that ‘racial ideology’ plays in shaping subjectivities and social relationships (p. 406). Every subject is informed and constituted through the inescapable ideology of racism. Emphasizing the role of racial ideologies challenges race-conscious scholars to examine race as part and parcel of racial ideology, beyond reason, unconsciously adopted and performed. This type of emphasis does not discount the empirical data on racial inequalities in education, but explores how race is not only a social or historical construct, but one inscribed by language and projections. Traditional discourses on race and schooling draw from concepts of race that are often based upon fossilized conceptions of race, what David Marriott (2007) calls, ‘racial imagos’ (p. 208). When one looks at the ideological machinations of critical race theory in education, racial subjects are presumed to pre-date racist acts. However, Marriott’s attention to ‘racial imagos’ challenges this approach to move beyond materiality and to analyze the centrality of racial fantasies, particularly the anti-Black fantasies which he argues are inextricably haunted by the history of slavery. Adding Lacanian psychoanalysis to theories of race and educational policy may help to elucidate how racial fantasies and legal mandates inform one another and their effects.

### Racial Activism Good

**Our inability to meet their fantasy of a scholar that is on the ground working in activism is explained by our desire to use institutional racism as a strategic tool in debate—this fantasy wastes the strategic utility of dialogue over scholarship and turns it into a jockeying over how “authentic” our resistance is, ultimately just resulting in cynicism**

**Welsh 12** [2012, Scott Welsh, “Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 1]

**Giroux’s concluding words**, **in which scholars reclaim the promises of a truly global democratic future**, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, **McKerrow’s academic emancipation of the oppressed**, **McGee’s social surgery**, **Hartnett’s social justice scholar**, **and Fuller’s agent of justice**. **Each aims to unify the competing elements within the scholarly subject position**—**scholarly reflection and political agency**—**by reducing the former to the latter**. Žižek’s advice is to consider how **such attempts are always doomed to frustration**, not because ideals are hard to live up to but **because of the impossibility of resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position**. The titles “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension. “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension, **these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar is**, in one moment, **wholly public and wholly intellectual**, **wholly critical and wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen**—**an impossible unity**, characteristic of the sublime, **in which the antagonism vanishes** (2005, 147). Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. **The frustration producing gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology**. This is born out in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention to the gap, noting how, **twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.”** **His hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political agency may be possible outside of academia** (2010, 95). Fuller approaches this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006, 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, **the gap is not only recognized on the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well**; **the public** (in the vernacular sense of the word) **does not yield to the desire of the social justice scholar**. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling still, **Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or located outside of academia** (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett implicitly concedes, it may well be that **it really is only outside the academy that there can be immediate, material, political consequences**. In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised, however, by the conclusion that **broadly effective activism is only possible outside of academia**. **The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified.** Instead, **effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view**—and not simply as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives. Rather, **the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position**, **reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences**, **must be constantly present**, **each vying for our attention.** And, **insofar as the two elements are not kept in tension** with each other, **the scholarly subject position becomes increasingly unbearable**, leading to the production of what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations for the gap. **For Fuller, the gap between lived experience and the wished-for embodiment of the scholar** as agent of justice **is explained not by the basic impossibility of resolving the antagonism** within the realm of the symbolic itself **but by the treacherous acts of colleagues of low moral character.** Deploying a Puritan rhetoric (Roberts-Miller 1999), Fuller blames the selfishness of individual scholars pursuing personal gain and “convenience” for the failure of activist scholarship to emerge (2006, 150). Other scholars who fail to be agents of justice are “feckless” (2006, 149). Those resistant to such a scholarly identity “simply follow the path of least intellectual resistance,” preferring “easily funded research” because it offers “greater professional recognition” (2006, 110, 111). **Hartnett follows Fuller in explaining how “theory wolves” have “learned to play the tenure game for their own benefit**.” Current “ graduate students and assistant professors” are cynical, self-obsessed, and content to explore “the intricacies of representation, often with psychoanalytic overtones that explicitly focus on the self or psyche rather than the community or the political” (2006, 72–73). Yet, **fantasy**, according to Žižek, **is not simple delusion**. In fact, **how much scholarly research is unrelated to the exorcism of personal demons? Who among us has not shaded an argument one way or another in order to please a particular audience**? Who has not fecklessly decided against even sending a letter to the local newspaper? Rather, a key characteristic of **fantasy**, in Žižek’s use of Lacan, is that it **accounts for a persistent failure in a prevailing ideology without making reference to basic, structuring antagonisms inherent to every use of symbols**. In this case, **the gap—the existence of academic work that appears not to serve** (or in reality does not serve) **a** sublime **vision of an organic unity between scholarship and citizenship**—**is accounted for by the existence of cynical, crafty scholars of low academic rank who just want to get ahead.** This fantastic pathway to the palliation of the identity-jeopardizing symptom suggests that without these cowardly, selfish, yet strangely powerful neophytes, scholarly reflection and political agency would finally consummate their symbolic union. In this new context of frustration, **what is now most “real” is the spiritual principle of the oneness of scholarly reflection and political agency**, while **the experienced fact of failed transcendence is reduced to a mere empirical obstacle (feckless or selfish individuals) to be displaced**. What is Žižek’s psychoanalytic advice? **Identify with the symptom** (1989, 128). **Identification with the symptom means noting how the symptom is quite likely a byproduct of the ideology itself**, or a consequence of one’s own symbolic identity, **and not a simple empirical fact to be negated**. In this case, **the antagonism between the symbolic practices of scholarly reflection and political action yields academic products that cannot be reduced to disinterested science or political engagement**. **To be an academic is to be** (**unsettlingly**) **in the political world but not of the political world.** **It is to resist the belief that one could finally fulfill the drive to transcendence structuring the academic subject position**. Žižek’s “**coming to terms” with antagonism means, in Burke’s language, learning to leave the two impulses constituting this dialectical pair in “jangling relation” to each other** (Žižek 1989, 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43; Burke 1969, 187) **or to fold the existence of the jangling relation into a less anxiety-producing vocabulary going forward**. To identify with the symptom is to begin the process of inventing an identity that allows one to accept and even enjoy the tension as the constitutive feature of the identity (Michael 2000, 12). Nevertheless, **the desire to “make a difference” needs to remain in full force**. However, **when an individual scholar wants to make a difference as the thing in and of itself versus making a distinctly scholarly difference**, **the antagonism is again repressed**. **In seeking to make a difference as the thing in itself, scholars**, in Žižek’s language, “overtake” their “desire” and **become an object of disgust** (1991, 110). In fact, Hartnett, McKerrow, Condit, and Giroux are each sensitive to this. Hartnett puts it most explicitly when he warns that the “haggard activist, angry and inflamed, accusing others of their transgressions while embodying anxiety, achieves little, alienates many, and often succumbs to despair” (Hartnett 2010, 70–71; Condit 1990, 345; Giroux 2004, 73). In his eighth and final principle of critical rhetoric (“criticism is performance”), **McKerrow qualifies his call to political engagement by distancing himself from Phillip Wander, whom he characterizes as wanting scholars to “take to the streets as practicing revolutionaries.”** In other words, after seventeen pages of calling for scholars to perform critical rhetoric in order to liberate the oppressed from institutional and cultural domination, McKerrow devotes three blushing sentences to hedging his bet, explaining that he really just means that scholars should be “specific intellectuals” working within the confines of the university (1989, 108).

### Racist

#### Psychoanalysis fails to change sociopolitical and material factors that perpetuate racism – this reifies the silence of minority groups.

Young 5 (Robert Young obtained his PhD on the history of ideas of mind and brain at the University of Cambridge and is a Kleinian psychotherapist, “PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RACISM: A LOUD SILENCE”, <http://human-nature.com/rmyoung/papers/loud.html>, 5/28/5) AqN

I will close with two thoughts. First, no amount of 'race awareness training' will cathart away something that is so deeply set in the foundations of cultures. This makes the erection and enforcement of laws and conventions of good behaviour all the more important, because what is bad and underneath will not easily go away. We must be liberal in the public sphere and radical in our knowledge of the deeper issue. Second, I want to return to the dialectic - the deep, mutually constitutive interrelations between the racist and the oppressed. What binds them together is not only the worst aspects of human nature - aspects that may well be ineradicable. What makes these destructive aspects take the specific form of racism is historically contingent, and at the root of that contingency is the social and economic organisation of the world that gives order to consent along the lines of economic and nationalistic relationships which are specific to our own age. These are not set in unchippable stone. They are solid but mutable. When we seek to address racism psychoanalytically, we will get nowhere (nor will we with respect to any other matter) unless we grasp and seek to redirect the social, cultural, economic and geopolitical forces which lead our nastiness to take this particularly horrid form. Then, perhaps, we can replace the loud silence with the sounds of scraping and chipping away at our own ways of shaping the thantic side of human nature. All of this takes me back to Freud's pessimism. He pointed out - and Kleinians have been even more sombre about this - that the psychotic and rapacious parts of human nature are kept at bay only by constant effort and that they are omnipresent in phantasy and ever-ready to erupt if sublimation and guilt fail in their work. Racism, then, is not something alien, a throwback. It is the omnipresence of primitive processes, let out of their cage by thanatic social, cultural, political, ideological and related forces in nominally civilised communities. I grew up in a highly-cultured, dropsically wealthy, suburb (the very one where the 'Dallas' television soap opera was set), but it was racist throughout, with a black and Mexican servant class, and people with whom I worked at a nearby Ford assembly plant were at thast time active members of the Ku Klux Clan. The emotions and actions we find in racism are part of our own mental worlds, relatively unaltered by the history of the civil rights movement. What has altered, however, is the frequency of violently acting out such feelings, and the means of legal redress have also grown. Even so, as I write, the Sunday paper reports a race riot in Brooklyn between blacks and orthodox, Lubavitcher Jews. 'The Reverend Al Sharpton, a veteran of these occasions, demanded the arrest of the driver of the car', a Hasidic Jew who had struck and killed a black child, 'and the appointment of a special prosecutor. The rotund preacher denounced the Hasidic Jews as "diamond merchants" and held several of his trademark "Day of Outrage" demonstrations. 'For once, though, Sharpton - who was immortalised as The Rev. Bacon in Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities - found himself outflanked by more radical voices. Sonny Carson, a self-styled urban guerrilla, who leads a group called X-clan [after Malcolm X], demanded more action on the streets... 'At the funeral of the black child last week, Carson talked of a white plot to destroy black America. "The conspiracy is widespread. I've just come back from Milwaukee. In Milwaukee, they are eating us," he declared in an apparent reference to white serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer, most of whose victims were black' (Sunday Times 1 Sept. 1991). We have here an accident, involving an innocent child, interpreted by two opposing forms of highly-articulated sectarian, separatist groups, one calling it deliberate, a fat charismatic leader, a self-styled guerrilla, imputed diamond-based wealth, allegations of a genocidal conspiracy and the cannibalism of blacks by a self-confessed white serial killer. Projective identification of split-off and utterly primitive parts are here run riot but based on oppressive inequalities in the heat of summer. I do not have any wish to claim that life is better for the racially oppressed in economic and social terms. I do say, however, that it is that veneer of civilization we must attend to and not pretend that we can wish or liberalise the feelings away. They are part of what dwells in our inner worlds, inhabitants of our mental space - part of everyday human nature, just below the surface, awaiting the appropriate social and economic conditions to erupt again, with undimmed destructive virulence. That is the lesson of the riot and of recent international relations. Eternal vigilance is the price of civilization. If you take the army away, you'd better have some civil forces at the ready, or humanity will revert to its primitive projective and scapegoating mechanisms. A pity, but it's best to know what we are up against. De-repression is utterly dangerous unless civil society is strong.

1. Social capitalist is the label adopted by the Australian Federal (Labor) government to describe its ‘third way’ policy agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Social capitalist is the label adopted by the Australian Federal (Labor) government to describe its ‘third way’ policy agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. **At the risk of stating the obvious, the ‘Fort!’ refers to Freud’s account, in the second chapter of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, of a little boy’s game with a wooden reel. See Freud (1955, pp. 14-16).** [↑](#footnote-ref-3)