# Settler Colonialism K – RKS Signature File – Kevin Lu

## Notes

#### The most policy links have been highlighted – everything will be highlighted by the K lab debates.

#### Settler Colonialism is no doubt a complex argument to understand, so first, we should define a few terms and isolate a couple distinctions.

#### The first thing to understand is the distinction between colonialism and settler colonialism:

Veranci 11 [Lorenzo, “Introducing: Settler Colonial Studies”]

COLONIALISM IS NOT SETTLER COLONIALISM Colonisers and settler colonisers want essentially different things.3 True; in practice, the two stances are often intimately intertwined and there are elements of both demands in most statements uttered by both colonisers and settler colonisers. Moreover, this confusion is necessarily compounded by the fact that in any given colonial setting there often are different groups of colonisers demanding different things of the colonised while entertaining different definitions of what may constitute ‘labour’ (i.e., physical, spiritual, consumption, sexual, reproductive labour, and so on). Similarly, different settler colonisers may disagree on what indigenous people ‘going away’ should actually mean (i.e., being physically eliminated or displaced, having one’s cultural practices erased, being ‘absorbed’, ‘assimilated’ or ’amalgamated’ in the wider population, but the list could go on). In the end, what is being said in the context of a sometime contradictory cacophony is: ‘you, work for me while we wait for you to disappear’, and ‘you, move on so that you can work for me’.

#### The second thing is settler futurity, which is cited a lot in the Dalley card and some other ones in the file:

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13 [Eve and Ruben, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity]

Settler Futurity. The settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what Andrew Baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). When we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. To say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. Futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173).

#### I have included two 1NC shells in this file. The first is a shell to read against policy affs. The second card in this shell (Dalley) is a link to extinction impacts so if they don’t read that you shouldn’t read that card either. The second is a shell to read against race and gender affs. The Glenn evidence is generic and makes both a root cause and a link claim for a variety of different ID affs which is useful. There are more 2NC links that you can read or add to the 1NC shell in the link section.

#### This is a good critique to run against policy affs and blackness affs. Especially against blackness affs, settler colonialism is a body of literature that interacts very well with antiblackness, and in my opinion, usually errs your way. Against policy affs, it’s a standard K of their epistemology – you should try to shift the debate to more the framework portion rather than the substantive impact debate, because you will most likely lose to extinction outweighs if you do.

#### You should be able to answer most of the 2AC arguments with the 1NC cards – more cards will be added to the block section though. I moved some important cards the K lab cut over, but if you think you really need something on the spot, checking the k lab setcol aff wouldn’t be a bad idea.

#### Please email me with questions or concerns,

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### To Do

* Alt solves policy affs (@corinne I need help doing this I can’t find anything that’s very good)
* Specific Links

## Cutting

# 1NC

### 1NC – Policy

#### Educational systems are built upon the fundamental logics of colonialism, a tireless effort to erase cultural heritage and land claims

Matthews et. al 3 [Julie Matthews, Professor of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Sunshine Coast, Anne Hickling-Hudson, Professor of international and inter-cultural education at Queensland University of Technology, Annette Woods, Doctoral Student at the School of Education at the University of Queensland, “DISRUPTING PRECONCEPTIONS: POSTCOLONIALISM AND EDUCATION”, Post Pressed Flaxton, 2003, pg. 7-13, June 22, 2017] KLu

Postcolonialism and Education: Assumptions and Disruptions Postcolonial approaches to analysing education reach into the recesses of societies to identify the pervasive saturation of knowledges, academic practices and education systems with colonial and neocolonial ideologies. Highlighting the ambiguous nature of change and the contradictions within change, it seeks to disrupt the cultural beliefs, logic and theories in which education systems are embedded. This latter point is taken up in the discussion below which explains why important constructions of postcolonial theory are useful to education. Colonial assumptions and contestations pervade educational systems. The colonial empires established Western models of education – although often distorted and impoverished models – all over the globe. Socioeconomic stratification at primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education was built into these models, as were Western conceptions of curriculum, pedagogy, language and religion. In current times, debates continue over issues of what language(s) should be promoted, what content should be taught, and how educational institutions should relate to the design of urban settlements and buildings. Conflicts rage over the educational implications of race, ethnicity, gender and degrees of privilege, and not least, over the love-hate relationship between former colony and former coloniser. From the perspectives of postcolonial theory, these contestations have not yet disrupted the preconceptions of a neocolonial education system. They have not displaced the persistence of unequal and inequitable schooling structures, the curricula influenced by the ideologies of Eurocentrism, and the examination systems which exclude the majority from academic success. Although decolonisation challenged, countered and spawned contradictory impulses towards change, in most societies this process has only modified rather than erased embedded patterns of disadvantage. Despite the expansion of formal education, advances in print and electronic communications, the Internet, the global knowledge economy and information overload, a Western-style curriculum tends to ignore the basic context of today’s reality – ‘that many of the wrongs, if not crimes against humanity are a product of the economic dominance of the north over the south’ (Young, 2001, p. 6). Postcolonial analysis exposes assumptions that blame the victim, and goes on to explore how education has been, and continues to be, culpable in this enterprise (Willinsky, 1998). The bland, narrow and monocultural curricula of most schools and universities often ignore the question of how the divisions of colonialism came to delineate the privileged and the disadvantaged in the global sweep of Western imperial expansion. Many students are unaware of the bloody conflicts and tenuous resolutions that destroyed colonial empires and gave rise to hundreds of post World War 2 nation-states. The fraught and multifarious conditions that both enabled and restricted the mobility of capital, materials, products and people are rarely included in traditional fields of study. Nor do Eurocentric education programmes commonly turn their gaze upon their own philosophical underpinnings, assumptions or practices. A postcolonial style of education would disrupt the narrow gaze of monocultural curricula by engaging with the intercultural contexts of phenomena being studied. Education has a long tradition of engagement with ethical standpoints intended to initiate systems changes, policy outcomes and innovative curricula and pedagogy. Because it is fundamentally a praxis - by which we mean action orientated discipline, it cannot forget its ‘what do I teach on Monday morning’ imperative and this tempers what tendencies postcolonialism may have to lapse into discursive abstraction. Accounts of specific circumstances of injustice, domination and resistance prompt a direct engagement with the historical features, locations and machinations stemming from colonisation. This enables us to see how discourses of power are established and why they need to be undermined. This is a difficult project, constantly struggling against the fact that education is also a longstanding site of colonial intervention and deeply implicated in the project of colonialism itself. Contemporary conditions of neoliberal (or economic rationalist) capitalism have made for a limited conception of educational change and transformation. This book seeks to sustain the ongoing critical conjuncture of postcolonialism and education to generate forms of consciousness and postnational practice necessary to spawn new ways of doing education in postcolonial contexts. The scrutiny of education for traces of the past in the present, and in the future, undertaken in the following chapters highlights the disruptive role of postcolonialism and the way education may become a reconstructive force for change and transformation. Curriculum and Change: Subjugated Knowledges and Representational Practices Chapters in section 1 engage in one way or another with subjugated standpoints and representational practices to explore and illuminate histories of exclusion, oppression and resistance. Martin Nakata investigates the intersection of Knowledge and new information systems with reference to Indigenous Australians and uptake of emerging information technologies. Nakata begins by detailing the commodification of Indigenous Knowledge in recent times through the interests of science, development and aid, conservation, and research. Western interests permeate the valuing of Indigenous Knowledge in ways that make its current significance able to be likened to prior colonial interest in co-opting land, labour and resources from Indigenous peoples. However, by reconceptualising notions of the Cultural Interface as a space where continuity with traditional ways of thinking and experience do not replace the current reality of interacting with new systems of Knowledge - or visa versa - Nakata begins an investigation into the complexity of the academic/Indigenous intersection. The case studies carried out by Anne Hickling -Hudson and Roberta Ahlquist compare rural and urban primary schools serving Indigenous populations in the USA and Australia. Hickling-Hudson and Ahlquist argue that decolonising, antiracist approaches are not meant to elicit guilt about white privilege and racism, but rather to foster insight into patterns of oppression and desire for equality. The two state sector schools they describe in Australia and the USA leave us in no doubt that a particular model of Eurocentric curricula and pedagogy continue to inform current educational practices. These schools stand in stark contrast to the two community controlled schools, also in Australia and the USA, which embody life affirming spirit and an intercultural education which balances Indigenous and non-Indigenous content. Yet these schools continue to suffer from the problems of a neocolonial context. It is argued that this research, far from implying any binary between state and community controlled schools, instead focuses on the finding that there appears to be a continuum of neocolonial, decolonising and postcolonial approaches to education which describes the practices of schooling at the current conjuncture. Postcolonialism for Thomas Bean marks the given condition of cultural diversity and exclusion within which teachers need to know how to teach. Secondary school English literature in the American context rely on a Eurocentric literary canon that prevents minority students in particular from achieving personal, cultural and racial identification with a literary subject matter. Bean argues that the inclusion of multicultural literature and postcolonial narratives invite all students to participate and engage directly with previously excluded or disregarded standpoints in knowledge and experience. Teaching approaches such as body biographies, reading against the grain, discussion questions, polar opposites, dialogue journals are all ways of teaching students to ‘read’ in postcolonial times. Importantly, facilitating student encounters with the stark choices and dilemmas of racism, the fragility of communication and the ethical dilemmas faced by minority groups facilitate points of contact and set the ground for the sorts of open-mindedness and cultural competence that precedes the ethical reflexivity discussed by Crouch, Chan and Kaye below. Christopher Crouch, Dean Chan and Nicola Kaye use postcolonial debates about unequal cultural exchange and cultural incommensurability to inform and transform what was previously a Eurocentric art history curriculum offered at an Australian university. For Crouch et al., postcolonialism moves beyond Marxist critiques of imperialism to expose the production and consumption of visual culture and its power/knowledge dynamics. Ethical reflexivity is promoted to prevent an overreductive identification with cultural difference or its erasure, and to show how meanings are able to function differently in different cultural contexts. On the basis of data presented within the chapter, Crouch et al. argue for a pedagogical stance that moves beyond naming and disrupting cultural preconceptions, toward a framework that allows for a continual questioning of preconceptions as they surface within teaching and learning. Continuing the theme of reflexivity in relation to research rather than teaching, this section closes with an insightful and contemplative essay by Christine Fox. Like other writers in this collection, Fox speaks directly to the need to connect with the ‘rooted context’ of postcolonialism. Fox exposes the dilemmas of representing and hearing minority standpoints and interests in Laos. Focusing on education policies prompted by the World Bank, UNESCO and bilateral aid programmes, she emphasises the waste of funds and untenable decisions made by outside consultants and agents with no prior understanding of the complexity of the local situation. Calling for engagement with the views and experiences of ordinary Laotians, Fox underlines the difference education can and has made in people’s lives as well as the difficulties of communicating and representing their interests when the very act of representation can itself silence, commodify, homogenise or indeed diminish engagement with the multifaceted complexity of everyday peoples. Educational Systems and Structures: Reinscribing Colonialism The second section of this collection brings together chapters that investigate the resilient after-effects of empire. Focusing on the case of sub-Saharan Africa, Leon Tikly charges existing accounts of globalisation and education with overemphasising global economic and political structures, and downplaying the impact of colonial control. To understand the sub-Saharan situation, it is necessary to focus on local, contingent and strategic political struggle in light of the relationship of European colonialism to globalisation. Postcolonialism in this account is both a condition and a shift in how events are described and interpreted. The latter is distinguished by a recognition that colonisation and its legacies are precursors to relationships of contemporary global capitalism. Tikly’s postcolonial framing of globalisation highlights unevenness. Accepted ‘truths’ of globalisation are contested in a situation where education does not directly correspond with the economy to either reproduce inequality or to challenge Western hegemony. Instead, state sponsored education sustains an array of obstacles, vested interests and possibilities. It maintains Western hegemony through elite formation, English language teaching and divisions between rich and poor, but at the same time it is the only available means of funding the mass education necessary for economic, political and cultural development. Pam Christie’s meticulous account of education reform in post-Apartheid South Africa is more sceptical of the ability of postcolonial accounts to facilitate an understanding of the complexities of political and economic decisions made in light of globalisation. While postcolonial approaches highlight the incorporations of precolonial power addressed by Tikly, they also tend to universalise the complexity of colonial histories. Christie’s case in point is education provision and reconstruction in South Africa, intended to redress the massive inequalities of apartheid. Policy decisions were made in light of human rights and cultural diversity/identity agendas. However, in an economy with negative growth, primarily dependent on primary commodity exports in a competitive and unequal global economy, financial redress necessarily took second place to the pragmatic priorities of macroeconomic policies and self imposed curbs to public spending. Education policy under such conditions was therefore less concerned with alternative interventions or foregrounding previously excluded knowledges and identities than pragmatic resolutions intended to fast-track the formation of the skilled, global citizens deemed necessary to launch South Africa into the global economy. The historical and contextual differences that are an effect of colonisation take second place to broader colonialising themes in the work of Helen Tiffin who focuses on British colonial impact on Caribbean literary education, and Aaron Koh who looks at education in Singapore. Helen Tiffin argues that despite differences British colonial education systems have a great deal in common. Tiffin reiterates the point that postcolonialism is an ambiguous and ambivalent term. Although it offers useful tools for analysing disparate oppressions, she stresses that its grounding in situations with immediate historical connections to European empires best suits it to analyse relations of domination and subordination rooted in colonialism and extending into the present neocolonial era. Tiffin argues that the legacy of colonial education is also ambiguous. It did and continues to do violence to local cultures and devalue local education, it represses histories of slavery, and inculcates racist stereotypes and empire loyalty. However, the history of English language instruction and literary education demonstrates that it can be used by those who recognise that English and an Anglo literary education is a means to intellectual and vocational advancement, and as testified by the success of postcolonial literatures, it has also been used to stimulate the literary and artistic imagination. The commonalities and contradictions of British colonial education systems are underlined by Aaron Koh in Singaporean context. For Koh, postcolonialism highlights the discursive and symbolic resonances of the colonial cultural imaginary which gives rise to new and contradictory configurations of power and domination. Koh graphically illuminates how Singapore’s education system constructs itself first through a nostalgic romanticisation of the colonial past and, second, through the promotion of ‘Asian’ values. It clings to British school curricula and examinations, but also strives to ‘Asianise’ the learning experience. In light of ‘Asian values discourse’, the Singaporean curriculum is regarded by Koh as an ideological framing device which maximises difference between ‘Asia’ and the ‘West’ while homogenising differences between ‘Asian’ countries to reinvent national identity. Pedagogical Interface: Fractured Identities and Asymmetrical Power Deftly weaving the theoretical precepts of postcolonial theory with those of queer theory, Vicky Crowley offers a groundbreaking analysis of the pedagogical possibilities of queering postcolonialism, or indeed of undertaking the reverse case, and challenging racialised notions of identity and subjectivity assumed by queer theory. Crowley raises questions about the heteronormative conditions of postcolonialism and the white hegemonic conditions of queer theory. It is instructive to consider her point that the reception of postcolonialism and queer theory in education has tended to be reconfigured into categories of anti-racist and multicultural education or sexual health and homophobia, for it reminds us that dividing practices, frontiers, territories and boundaries delimit our capacity to engage with complexity multiplicity and hybridity. Further, these dividing practices reconfigure ‘actual hybridities’ through the singularly familiar and intransigent categories of race, class, gender and sexuality. Practices of boundary demarcation and incursion are illuminated at the micro level of school practice in Julie Matthews’ and Lucinda Aberdeen’s analysis of racial discourse. They argue that settler societies contain entrenched myths justifying settlement in the face of Indigenous ‘threat’. These myths enable students to both re-establish the racial discourse but at the same time demonstrate its ambiguity and internal inconsistency. The specific context of racial discourse in settler society challenges the idea that it can be undone by pedagogies designed to replace misunderstandings and ignorance with the facts of the matter. They argue that underlining the ways young people ‘undo’ their own racialising logic offers teachers important points of deconstructive pedagogical intervention. The colonial legacy has facilitated unidirectional trade in education from Western nations to former colonies. Parlo Singh examines international education in the Asia Pacific region and Roslyn Appleby looks at English as a Second Language EDUCATION, POSTCOLONIALISM AND DISRUPTIONS 13 teaching in East Timor. Both stress the need to account for historical, economic and political context of recipient nations in understanding the local situation. Focusing on women teachers in three Australian offshore university campuses in Indonesia, Singh explores the impact on pedagogical relations of a number of overlaying factors. She identifies the impact of complex historically and politically constituted power relations between ‘Western’ teacher and ‘Indonesian’ student and the subject positions of ‘Asian learner’. Asian learners are commonly represented as deficient, uncritical, reliant on rote learning and memorisation. White Western women teachers are invariably employed on short-term teaching contracts to deliver standardised curricula, while representing desired Western knowledge and embodying the undesirable attributes of Western femininity. Singh argues that these mediating factors demand boundary crossing strategies and negotiations of power which severely limit teachers’ capacity to undertake curriculum and pedagogical modifications. The professional development of teachers must be addressed in these terms if we are to provide quality education and pedagogical innovation which meet student need. The heterogenous effects of pedagogies and knowledges in cross-cultural contexts is also the focus of Roslyn Appleby’s concluding chapter. Appleby shows that English language teaching in East Timor is at the same time the language of cultural imperialism, cultural homogeneity, academic and vocational success, oppression and resistance. To understand processes of ESL pedagogy we need to comprehend the contradictions of local contexts. Thus in East Timor, language policy is caught up in a frenetic maelstrom of change, which is as much a fall out of successive colonisation and invasion as an effect of political and economic resolutions to independence struggles and decolonisation. Appleby argues that, while English language teaching is by no means culturally and politically neutral in as much as it normalises Western materialism, it is not entirely hegemonic. Appleby uses student writing to show how Western technical, vocational and academic English Language Teaching discourse is resisted by students to construct a parallel syllabus while using English to engage with the political context of their own concerns and experience.

#### Their performative use of extinction impacts are just rhetorical tropes to divert attention away radical decolonization and reinscribes a settler will to innocence.

Dalley 16 [Hamish, Professor of Ethnic Studies at Daemen College, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature”, Settler Colonial Studies, October 4, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160>, July 7, 2017] KLu

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds, which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’. 11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspective is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization thinkable.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist? I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinction narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, biologically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness asequivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the putative de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings.

#### Settlerism is an everyday process constituted through physical and affective control by geopolitics and settler common space over our spaces of political resistance – governmentality is not redeemable because colonization is not an event, but the systemic erasure of indigenous bodies.

Rifkin 13 [Mark, Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Settler Common Sense”, Settler Colonialism Studies, 3:3-4, September 13, 2013, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rset20>, July 7, 2017] KLu

Thoreau’s conception of “Nature” further can be understood as unfolding from the legal narration of Native lands as both a space apart and as lacking distinct political status. Native peoples in New England did not have treaties with the federal government as did peoples elsewhere, and Indian affairs were considered to be state matters. By the 1840 s and 1850s Massachusetts had eight reservations whose boundaries had been determined and regulated under colonial and thenstate law, and the maintenance, usage, and sale of such tribal lands were administered largely by state-appointed guardians or overseers. Written in response to a legislative mandate, the Bird report (1848) repeatedly describes the legal and political situation of Native peoples and their lands in the state as “imperfectly defined”, “anomalous”, and “peculiar”. 31 These terms refer not only to the ambiguity of the relevant statutes as to certain key points, but also to the general fact of having persons and places governed by a set of policies not applicable to the rest of the population and property in the state. It describes these peoples as “among the ‘stricken few’ who remain of the once undisputed sovereigns of the Western World. The blood of Samoset and Massasoit runs in their veins” (5), and in decrying the fact that Indians do not hold citizenship in the state or the nation, the report observes, “The Indian alone, the descendant of monarchs, is a vassal in the land of his fathers” (49). Further, as the 1861 report on Indian affairs in the state, authored by John Milton Earle, notes of the Gay Head Indians, the whole civil polity of the tribe, … a community residing in the State, and nominally of the State, and subject to its laws, is yet a sort of imperium in imperio, not governed by the laws to which it is nominally subject, but have its own independent law, by which all its internal affairs are regulated.32 The reports continually suggest that they should be made citizens even as they repeatedly note that the peoples who continue to hold tribal lands themselves do not wish to see the existing system changed.33 The reports circle around a conceptual impasse: Indian tribes once were “sovereign”, but now they are not; they cannot live as subjects of the state/nation and not be citizens, but they do not desire citizenship. That disjunction, and the threat it poses, is narrated as an oddity they and their lands bear, literalizing them and the space they occupy as anomaly. The sovereignty of the state of Massachusetts here depends on the production of Native peoples and their lands as a kind of alegal limbo within the jurisdiction of the state/nation. Such a description of Indian spatiality resembles almost exactly the contours and function of “Nature” in Walden, suggesting that the latter (especially in its repeated connection to Indianness in the text)34 gestures toward and draws on the prior translation of Native sovereignty as a space of apolitical anomaly. In Thoreau’s observations about the basket-maker, they occupy parallel positions (“I too had woven a kind of basket”) in which he can learn a lesson of independence lost on the unnamed Settler Colonial Studies 335 “Indian”. What would it mean for him to see the act of writing/weaving not as an opportunity to sublate the Indian, but as a chance to understand his relation to this person (and the “us” who are “starv[ing]”) as the condition for an investigation into the contours of settler selfhood? Thoreau notes in the “Conclusion”, “I left the woods for as good a reason as I went there…It is remarkable how easily and insensibly we fall into a particular route, and make a beaten track for ourselves,” adding, “How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and conformity” (215–6). Introducing a similar idea earlier, he observes in “The Village,” if we go beyond our usual course we still carry in our minds the bearing of some neighboring cape … till we are completely lost, or turned round…Not till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite extent of our relations. (115) Getting “lost”, losing one’s bearings and becoming “turned round” within an otherwise wellknown space, opens the potential for a new sense not only of the place but also of one’s position within it – “where we are”. In “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For,” Thoreau insists that we inhabitants of New England live this mean life that we do because our vision does not penetrate the surface of things. We think that is which appears to be. If a man should walk through this town … [and] give us an account of the realities he beheld there, we should not recognize the place in his description. (65) The text suggests the need to alter bodily dispositions in ways that break one out of one’s entrenched experience of place such that it can be made strange, allowing for a resurveying of “relations” to the world around you. As opposed to the sense of withdrawal into a space divorced from contemporary political economy, the text also proposes a reframing of perspective, altering the physical sense of relation to one’s surroundings via a suspension of their givenness. In this vein, Ahmed suggests, “If orientation is about making the strange familiar through the extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails” (11). These moments in the text suggest how the self can become the site for an imaginative break with routine that produces a sensuous reorientation (getting “turned round”). The critical project of the text appears here less as locating a space apart in which to discover the fullness of the self than as the making alien of an already occupied place, such that “we should not recognize” it. The act of turning round, of shifting one’s orientation and redirecting the momentum by which one previously was impelled, offers possibilities for perceiving differently, for seeing and engaging in ways that less take for granted the jurisdictional matrix of the state and in which contemporary Native peoples can be acknowledged as themselves important “inhabitants of New England” whose indigeneity compels a reconceptualization of the terms of occupancy for everyone. Becoming conscious of the everyday enactment of settlement involves relinquishing the notion of an autonomous, extra-political selfhood existing in a place apart, instead opening onto a recognition not only of enduring Native presence within contemporary political economy but of the effaced history of imperial superintendence and displacement that provides the continuing condition of possibility for the sense of settler escape into the wilderness. To be clear, the absence of a declared set of imperial commitments does not suggest non-Natives’ exoneration from continuing histories of violence perpetrated and perpetuated by the settler-state. Returning from a different direction to Nicoll’s critique discussed earlier, there may be an absence of sentiments hostile to Native peoples in non-Natives’ speech or writing, or nonNatives may adopt a particular viewpoint supportive of Indigenous sovereignty on delimited plots of land when considering Native peoples as such. However, that absence of malice or declaration of support does not address the ways quotidian experiences of space (with respect to jurisdiction, occupancy, and ownership) and subjectivity (as modular, self-identical, and extralegal) affectively register and iterate settler sovereignty in ways that shape the generation of, for example, ethics, ideals, and political projects that do not take Native nations, voices, and lands as their direct object. While arguments about the structural quality of settler colonialism – its scale, density, duration, and centrality to US life – remain important, their very insistence on its pervasive and systemic operation can create the impression of an integrated whole. However, as Latour observes, if “the body politic” is taken “to be virtual, total, and always already there”, then “the practical means to compose it are no longer traceable; if it’s total, the practical means to totalize it are no longer visible; if it’s virtual, the practical means to realize, visualize, and collect it have disappeared from view” (162–3). How is the settler body politic composed, collected, and realized in everyday ways through the experiences, perceptions, associations, emplacements, and trajectories of non-Native bodies? How do settler jurisdiction and governmentality shape the material possibilities available to non-Natives in scenes and sites apparently disconnected from Native peoples and Indian policy, and how do non-Natives in their quotidian feelings and interactions (and the cultural productions for which ordinary sensation serves as background) actualize the political and legal geographies of the settler-state? Attending to settler common sense in this way does not so much bracket Indigenous self-determination as draw on it as ethical inspiration to investigate the ways it is deferred through ordinary action whose aim is not such but whose effect is to reiterate the self-evidence of settler geopolitics. Reciprocally, such analysis also seeks to suggest how non-Natives might disorient and reorient themselves, how they might come to understand not only that Indigenous peoples remain part of the social landscape of life in the US but that the very terrain non-Natives inhabit as given has never ceased to be a site of political struggle.

#### The alternative is an ethic of incommensurability

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve, Professor at SUNY New Paltz, K. Wayne, University of California San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017] KLu

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### 1NC – Blackness

#### Indigeneity can’t be theorized through racial identity – settler colonialism transcends their analysis of racial violence – their claims that blackness structures the world reduces spatial violence to bodily identity – that allows for the erasure of land claims and reconstructs the settler system.

Rifkin 9 [Mark, Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the "Peculiar" Status of Native Peoples”, Cultural Critique, Number 73, Fall 2009, pp. 88-124, July 14, 2017] KLu

In using Agamben’s work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholar- ship and cultural criticism, such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples’ position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and adjusting three aspects of Agamben’s thinking: the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of “bare life” as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.5 Such revision allows for a reconsideration of the “zone of indistinction” produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate not only proper kinds of embodiment (“bare life”) but also legitimate modes of collectivity and occupancy—what I will call bare habitance.¶ If the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned as less about control of particular policy domains than of metapolitical authority—the ability to define the content and scope of “law” and “politics.” Such a shift draws attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state’s plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the “overriding” assertion of a right to exert control over Native polities. My argument, then, explores the limits of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state’s employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as of cultural recognition are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence and its authority to determine what issues, processes, and statuses will count as meaningful within the political system. While arguments about Euramerican racism and the disjunctions be- tween Native traditions and imposed structures of governance can be quite powerful in challenging aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty. Drawing on Agamben, I will argue that “sovereignty” functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.6 The state has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation. That fundamentally circular and self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples’ authority to determine or adjudicate for themselves the normative principles by which they will be governed. Through Agamben’s theory of the exception, then, I will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples.

#### Settlerism is an everyday process constituted through physical and affective control by geopolitics and settler common space over our spaces of political resistance

Rifkin 13 [Mark, Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Settler Common Sense”, Settler Colonialism Studies, 3:3-4, September 13, 2013, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rset20>, July 7, 2017] KLu

Thoreau’s conception of “Nature” further can be understood as unfolding from the legal narration of Native lands as both a space apart and as lacking distinct political status. Native peoples in New England did not have treaties with the federal government as did peoples elsewhere, and Indian affairs were considered to be state matters. By the 1840 s and 1850s Massachusetts had eight reservations whose boundaries had been determined and regulated under colonial and thenstate law, and the maintenance, usage, and sale of such tribal lands were administered largely by state-appointed guardians or overseers. Written in response to a legislative mandate, the Bird report (1848) repeatedly describes the legal and political situation of Native peoples and their lands in the state as “imperfectly defined”, “anomalous”, and “peculiar”. 31 These terms refer not only to the ambiguity of the relevant statutes as to certain key points, but also to the general fact of having persons and places governed by a set of policies not applicable to the rest of the population and property in the state. It describes these peoples as “among the ‘stricken few’ who remain of the once undisputed sovereigns of the Western World. The blood of Samoset and Massasoit runs in their veins” (5), and in decrying the fact that Indians do not hold citizenship in the state or the nation, the report observes, “The Indian alone, the descendant of monarchs, is a vassal in the land of his fathers” (49). Further, as the 1861 report on Indian affairs in the state, authored by John Milton Earle, notes of the Gay Head Indians, the whole civil polity of the tribe, … a community residing in the State, and nominally of the State, and subject to its laws, is yet a sort of imperium in imperio, not governed by the laws to which it is nominally subject, but have its own independent law, by which all its internal affairs are regulated.32 The reports continually suggest that they should be made citizens even as they repeatedly note that the peoples who continue to hold tribal lands themselves do not wish to see the existing system changed.33 The reports circle around a conceptual impasse: Indian tribes once were “sovereign”, but now they are not; they cannot live as subjects of the state/nation and not be citizens, but they do not desire citizenship. That disjunction, and the threat it poses, is narrated as an oddity they and their lands bear, literalizing them and the space they occupy as anomaly. The sovereignty of the state of Massachusetts here depends on the production of Native peoples and their lands as a kind of alegal limbo within the jurisdiction of the state/nation. Such a description of Indian spatiality resembles almost exactly the contours and function of “Nature” in Walden, suggesting that the latter (especially in its repeated connection to Indianness in the text)34 gestures toward and draws on the prior translation of Native sovereignty as a space of apolitical anomaly. In Thoreau’s observations about the basket-maker, they occupy parallel positions (“I too had woven a kind of basket”) in which he can learn a lesson of independence lost on the unnamed Settler Colonial Studies 335 “Indian”. What would it mean for him to see the act of writing/weaving not as an opportunity to sublate the Indian, but as a chance to understand his relation to this person (and the “us” who are “starv[ing]”) as the condition for an investigation into the contours of settler selfhood? Thoreau notes in the “Conclusion”, “I left the woods for as good a reason as I went there…It is remarkable how easily and insensibly we fall into a particular route, and make a beaten track for ourselves,” adding, “How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and conformity” (215–6). Introducing a similar idea earlier, he observes in “The Village,” if we go beyond our usual course we still carry in our minds the bearing of some neighboring cape … till we are completely lost, or turned round…Not till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite extent of our relations. 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While arguments about the structural quality of settler colonialism – its scale, density, duration, and centrality to US life – remain important, their very insistence on its pervasive and systemic operation can create the impression of an integrated whole. However, as Latour observes, if “the body politic” is taken “to be virtual, total, and always already there”, then “the practical means to compose it are no longer traceable; if it’s total, the practical means to totalize it are no longer visible; if it’s virtual, the practical means to realize, visualize, and collect it have disappeared from view” (162–3). How is the settler body politic composed, collected, and realized in everyday ways through the experiences, perceptions, associations, emplacements, and trajectories of non-Native bodies? 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Reciprocally, such analysis also seeks to suggest how non-Natives might disorient and reorient themselves, how they might come to understand not only that Indigenous peoples remain part of the social landscape of life in the US but that the very terrain non-Natives inhabit as given has never ceased to be a site of political struggle.

#### The alternative is a Cartography of Refusal – their focus on antiblackness leaves land relations untheorized, and thus colonized.

Day 15 [Iyko, Professor of Indigenous and Ethnic Studies at Mount Holyoke College, “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Antiblackness, and Settler Colonial Critique”, Minnesota University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.2.0102?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#fndtn-page_scan_tab_contents>, Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 102-121, July 4, 2017] KLu

Wilderson and Sexton extend these arguments about the relationality of black and Indigenous ontologies of non- or half-life respectively to further interrogate the validity of Indigenous sovereignty movements. These arguments are taken from Wilderson’s articles and 2010 monograph Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, which are expanded upon in Sexton’s 2014 article, “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign.” To begin then with Wilderson’s formulation, for him Indigeneity differs from antiblackness because Indigenous sovereignty struggles engage in a politics of state recognition that is categorically unavailable to black subjects. More than this, Wilderson claims that Native sovereignty claims ultimately uphold rather than undermine white supremacy and the coherence of the U.S. nation-state. He writes, “White supremacy has made good use of the Indian subject’s positionality: a positionality which fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea, because treaties are forms of articulation, and discussions brokered between two groups presumed to possess the same kind of historical currency: sovereignty.”36 In their critical alliance, Wilderson and Sexton emphasize how “the dynamics of Negrophobia are animated . . . by a preoccupation with sovereignty.”37 The claim of Negrophobic Indigenous sovereignty is rooted in Wilderson’s somewhat selective reading of Chris Eyre’s 2002 feature film Skins about Native American vigilantism and alcoholism. Here he argues that the Native American protagonist Rudy Yellow Lodge’s preoccupation with spirituality and sovereignty animates his Negrophobia. Wilderson’s rationale for this interpretation is that Rudy has the capacity to be aligned with a politics of genocide rather than sovereignty, the latter of which forecloses a shared antagonism with black existence. Such an emphasis on sovereignty therefore represents a “de-escalation of antagonism to the level of conflict.”38 In particular, Wilderson links Rudy’s investment in sovereignty to his anger at two Native teens for “acting ‘Black’ . . . their grunting voices and aggressive body language [indicating] that they are talking ‘Black.’”39 Because the teens get into a fight with one another, Wilderson registers Rudy’s “sovereign” rejection of the corrosive effects of blackness. The teens’ mimicry of blackness is presented as the cause of their fight: “Rap lyrics, dialect, and Black male body language have pulled these two young men into a pit of absolute dereliction and cultural abandonment,” which leads Wilderson to conclude that “Blackness is at the heart of Native American autogenocide.”40 As a result, as Sexton elaborates, Indigenous sovereignty can only mobilize a politics of “resurgence or recovery [that] is bound to regard the slave as ‘the position of the unthought.’”41 Slavery is incompatible with the presumptions of sovereign recuperation of and governance over land, identity, and cultures, because slavery “is not a loss that the self experiences . . . but rather the loss of any self that could experience such loss.”42 These points form the basic architecture for Sexton’s ultimate claim that sovereignty should be jettisoned in favor of the more radical antagonistic project of abolition. To begin digesting these claims, one finds a certain contradiction in the empirical relation of Indigeneity and blackness that Wilderson and Sexton present. Wilderson’s suggestion that a shared genocidal antagonism would potentially form a correspondence between Indigeneity and antiblackness is somewhat at odds with Sexton’s claim that racial slavery subsumes all other modalities of power. It is only through our realization of the exceptionality of antiblackness, Sexton writes, that “might help not only to break down false dichotomies, and perhaps pose a truer one, but also to reveal the ways that the study of slavery is already and of necessity the study of capitalism, colonialism, and settler colonialism, among other things.”43 Here I interpret Sexton’s rejection of a Native/settler opposition as among the “false dichotomies” that should be dispensed with in order to install a black/ nonblack “truer” dichotomy. However, and this is my point, Wilderson’s and Sexton’s divergent emphases put the empirical status of Indigeneity in flux. On the one hand, Indigenous sovereignty is conceptualized primarily as a screen: an “obscene supplement” of the settler nation-state,44 an antiblack expression of false consciousness, or a lost opportunity to apply the motif of genocide and share in an antagonism that relates to black social death. That is, the claim that sovereignty “de-escalates” a genocidal antagonism to “conflict” suggests that a more authentic truth of Indigeneity is genocide, which means that the unrealized fact of Indigeneity is its empirical analogy to black social death. But on the other hand, Sexton forcefully rejects any claim to an empirically based analogy, claiming that antiblackness trumps Indigeneity just as racial slavery trumps settler colonialism. And so the potential relations that Wilderson sets up through a critique of sovereignty are at best irrelevant or at worse false in Sexton’s absolute claim that slavery stands alone as the “threshold of the political world.”45 I suggest that this wavering relation/nonrelation of antiblackness and Indigeneity exhibited in Wilderson’s and Sexton’s work reveal the problem in any totalizing approach to the heterogeneous constitution of racial difference in settler colonies. Beyond this inconsistency, the liberal multiculturalist agenda that Wilderson and Sexton project into Indigenous sovereignty willfully evacuates any Indigenous refusal of a colonial politics of recognition. Among other broad strokes, Sexton states, “as a rule, Native Studies reproduces the dominant liberal political narrative of emancipation and enfranchisement.”46 This provides a basis for Wilderson’s assertion that Indigenous sovereignty engages in a liberal politics of state legitimation through recognition because “treaties are forms of articulation” that buttress “the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea.”47 But such a depoliticized liberal project is frankly incompatible with Indigenous activism and scholarship that emerges from Native studies in North America. The main argument in Glen Sean Coulthard’s book Red Skin, White Masks is to categorically reject “the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous selfdetermination.”48 This is not a politics of legitimizing Indigenous nations through state recognition but rather one of refusal, a refusal to be recognized and thus interpellated by the settler colonial nation-state. Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard describes the “necessity on the part of the oppressed to ‘turn away’ from their other-oriented master-dependency, and to instead struggle for freedom on their own terms and in accordance with their own values.”49 It is also difficult to reconcile the depoliticized narrative of “resurgence and recovery” that Wilderson and Sexton attribute to Indigenous sovereignty in the face of Idle No More, the anticapitalist Indigenous sovereignty movement in Canada whose national railway and highway blockades have seriously destabilized the expropriation of natural resources for the global market. These are examples that Coulthard describes as “direct action” rather than negotiation—in other words, antagonism, not conflict resolution: They [blockades] are a crucial act of negation insofar as they seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations. These modes of direct action . . . seek to have a negative impact on the economic infrastructure that is core to the colonial accumulation of capital in settler-political economies like Canada’s.50 These tactics are part of what Audra Simpson calls a “cartography of refusal” that “negates the authority of the other’s gaze.”51 It is impossible to frame the blockade movement, which has become the greatest threat to Canada’s resource agenda,52 as a struggle for “enfranchisement.” Idle No More is not in “conflict” with the Canadian nation-state; it is in a struggle against the very premise of settler colonial capitalism that requires the elimination of Indigenous peoples. As Coulthard states unambiguously, “For Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die.”53 But perhaps my own defense of Indigenous decolonization movements for sovereignty begs a larger question about whether sovereignty in itself offers a radical politics that can encompass or mobilize a black radical tradition rooted in the project of abolition. And it is here that I agree with Sexton’s intervention to problematize the idea that antiracist agendas must emerge from the foundational priority of Indigenous sovereignty and restoration of land.54 But against the totalizing frame of Afro-pessimism, I want to stress instead the pitfalls of any antidialectical approach to the political economy of the settler colonial racial state from the position of either Indigenous or antiblack exceptionalism. Settler colonial racial capitalism is not a thing but a social relation. As such, it is not produced out of the causal relationships that Sexton puts forward here: “Slavery, as it were, precedes and prepares the way for colonialism, its forebear or fundament or support. Colonialism, as it were, the issue or heir of slavery, its outgrowth or edifice or monument.”55 The nearly totalizing black existential frame is similarly based on a questionable construction of epistemic privilege: [black existence] does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer.56 According to Sexton, no other oppression is reducible to antiblackness, but the relative totality of antiblackness is the privileged perspective from which to understand racial formation more broadly. But unlike the way feminist and queer critical theory interrogate heteropatriarchy from a subjectless standpoint, Sexton’s entire point seems to rest on the very specificity and singularity—rather than subjectlessness—of black critical theory’s capacity to understand race. The privilege of this embodied viewpoint similarly relies on rigidly binaristic conceptions of land and bodily integrity. He writes, “If the indigenous relation to land precedes and exceeds any regime of property, then the slave’s inhabitation of the earth precedes and exceeds any prior relation to land—landlessness. And selflessness is the correlate. No ground for identity, no ground to stand (on).”57 In other words, the slave’s nonrelation to her body precedes and exceeds any other body’s relation to land.

### 1NC – ID

#### The 1AC’s analysis of race/gender is incomplete without an analysis of settler colonialism – violence occurs not only in relation to the body, but also to geopolitical factors – inability to focus on land relations confines redness solely to the body, allowing for the erasure of land claims.

Glenn 15 [Evelyn Nakano, Professor at the University of California Berkeley, “Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 2015, Vol. 1(1) 52–72, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2332649214560440>, July 7, 2017] KLu

Summary and Conclusions The most widely used sociological frameworks for theorizing race relations in the United States have focused on generating analyses that encompass not just anti-black racism but also anti-Latino and antiAsian American racisms. What these frameworks share is an appreciation that racial hierarchy and inequality are not simply the products of individual beliefs and attitudes but are built into American social structure and that whites have historically benefited from racial inequality. I have found each of the major frameworks, internal colonialism, racial formation, and racialized social systems, useful in my own work in comparative race and gender studies. However, what these theories do not explicitly consider is whether and in what ways U.S. national and regional racial systems may be unique and/or idiosyncratic because they have grown out of distinct material, social, and cultural circumstances, in this case, U.S. settler colonialism. I have offered the concept of “settler colonialism as structure,” as a framework that encourages and facilitates comparativity within and across regions and time. I believe that a settler colonial structural analysis reveals the underlying systems of beliefs, practices, and institutional systems that undergird and link the racialization and management of Native Americans, blacks, Mexicans and other Latinos, and Chinese and other Asian Americans that I have described herein. What are these underlying systems/structures? First, the defining characteristic of settler colonialism is its intention to acquire and occupy land on which to settle permanently, instead of merely to exploit resources. In order to realize this goal, the indigenous people who occupy the land have to be eliminated. Thus, one logic of settler colonial policy has been the ultimate erasure of Native Americans. This goal was pursued through various forms of genocide, ranging from military violence to biological and cultural assimilation. British settler colonialism in what became the United States was particularly effective because it promoted family settlement right from the beginning. Thus, the growth of the settler population and its westward movement was continuous and relentless. Settler ideology justified elimination via the belief that the savage, heathen, uncivilized indigenes were not making productive use of the land or its resources. Thus, they inevitably had to give way to enlightened and civilized Europeans. The difference between indigenes and settlers was simultaneously racialized and gendered. While racializing Native ways of life and Native Americans as “other,” settlers developed their selfidentities as “white,” equating civilization and democracy with whiteness. Indian masculinity was viewed as primitive and violent, while Indian women were viewed as lacking feminine modesty and restraint. With independence from the metropole, the founders imagined the new nation as a white republic governed by and for white men. Second, in order to realize a profitable return from the land, settlers sought to intensively cultivate it for agriculture, extract resources, and build the infrastructure for both cultivation and extraction. For this purpose, especially on large-scale holdings that were available in the New World, extensive labor power was needed. As we have seen, settlers in all regions enslaved Native Americans, and the transnational trade in Native slaves helped to finance the building of Southern plantations. However, in the long run, settlers could not amass a large enough Indigenous slave workforce both because indigenes died in large numbers from European diseases and because they could sometimes escape and then survive in the wilderness. Settlers thus turned to African slave labor. Slave labor power could generate profit for the owner in a variety of ways: by performing field labor, processing raw materials, and producing goods for use or sale and by being leased out to others to earn money for the owner. What linked land taking from indigenes and black chattel slavery was a private property regime that converted people, ideas, and things into property that could be bought, owned, and sold. The purchase, ownership, and sale of property, whether inanimate or human, were regularized by property law or in the case of chattel slaves, by slave law. Generally, ownership entails the right to do whatever one wants with one’s property—to sell, lend, or rent it and to seize the profits extracted from its use. The elimination of Native Americans and the enslavement of blacks form two nodes that have anchored U.S. racial formation. Redness has been made to disappear, such that contemporary Native Americans have become largely invisible in white consciousness. In contrast, blackness has been made hypervisible, and blacks are constantly present as an imagined threat to whites and the settler colonial social order. As pointed out earlier, Indianness is thought to be diluted and then to disappear through miscegenation, while blackness is thought to be continually reproduced even through generations of miscegenation. In this respect as well as others, the racialization of blacks—the irredeemability and dehumanization of blacks—has been incommensurable with the racialization of other groups. Nonetheless, the racialization of certain (in Lorenzo Veracini’s term) exogenous others has been a prominent feature of settler colonial societies. In the United States, some groups have been recruited and/or tracked into hard labor and super-exploited because they can be induced to work by need and kept in place by restricted mobility. For a nation that purports to stand for freedom, opportunity, and equality, the United States has had a long history of imposing coercive labor regimes, social segregation, and restricted mobility on many of its residents. Racializing certain groups as insufficiently human serves to justify subjecting them to oppression, subordination, and super-exploitation. Thus, conditions of compelled labor short of chattel slavery—contract labor, sharecropping, payment in scrip, wages paid only after completion of a long period of work—were legally allowed and commonly imposed on racialized others even after the abolition of slavery. These practices were designed to immobilize and disable workers’ ability to survive by other means and thereby tie down theoretically free workers. These forms of coercion might be labeled de facto slavery because they do not involve ownership of the person and the enforcement of slave law. The experiences of national and local policies toward Mexicans and Chinese were examined herein to help illuminate the linked processes of racialization and super-exploitation in U.S. settler colonialism. Racialization has been integral to resolving the contradiction between settler ideologies of freedom, equality, and progress and the unfreedom, inequality, and denial of mobility and citizenship rights to Mexican Americans in the Southwest and Chinese Americans in the Far West. The various technologies of control and management (segregation, cultural erasure, terrorism, expulsion, and legal exclusion) served the interests of capitalism by enabling landowners, plantation owners, and railroad companies to super-exploit these exogenous others. At the same time, racialization of “others” enabled white workers to reap a psychic reward, the so-called “wages of whiteness” to succor the wounds inflicted by class inferiority. The case studies of Mexican Americans and Chinese Americans further illustrate the importance of paying attention to both the specificities and differences and the connections and commonalities among and between the experiences of various racialized others. Some of the major technologies for control and management of racialized groups were similar, most prominently the use of terrorism. It could be argued that the continuous history of genocide against Native Americans helped to normalize the use of extreme violence against non-white “others.” Extreme violence was rationalized as necessary to ensure settler security. As described, not only blacks, but also Mexicans and Chinese were subjected to extreme and disproportionate violence that might well be characterized as ethnic cleansing. And, as in the case of the denial of the founding violence against Native Americans, white settler culture either denied or forgot its violence toward Mexicans and Chinese by magnifying the threat they posed not only to individual whites but also to the nation. The technology of erasure through cultural assimilation practiced on Native Americans was also employed on Mexican Americans. In both cases, schooling was intended to prepare girls and boys for gender-appropriate domestic and vocational skills. The speaking of children’s natal languages was punished, and mainstream (white/ Anglo) ways of living were valorized. Education was also intended to teach racialized children “their place” in American society, that is, to accept and be satisfied with a limited future. The technologies unique to Mexicans and Chinese were those of mass deportation and legal exclusion. Native Americans could be and were removed to remote reservations in the United States and in a few instances driven across the Southern border into Mexico, but they were not legally deported. Removal of freed blacks and resettling them in Africa was tried after the Civil War, but the number of those removed was only a small proportion of the population. Whites in the South were able to re-impose a white supremacist order that could control and super-exploit black labor. However, once the transcontinental railroad was completed, Chinese labor was not strictly necessary in the West, and moreover, as immigrants, the Chinese could more easily be subjected to expulsion and exclusion. In fact, the Chinese were the first immigrant group subject to exclusion, first through the Page Act of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and then through the Immigration Act of 1924 that extended exclusion to cover other Asian peoples.As described earlier, for nearly a century after the U.S. takeover of the Southwest, Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans were able to cross back and forth across the southern border more or less freely. However, this situation began to change during the 1920s with the establishment of the U.S. Border Patrol. Because of high unemployment during the Great Depression, Mexican Americans became the first group subject to mass deportation. A second large-scale deportation occurred during another period of unemployment in the 1950s under Operation Wetback. The first decades of the twenty-first century saw the creation and establishment of a vast federal machinery for “safeguarding” our borders, ostensibly to battle terrorism. This machinery has been wielded primarily against Mexicans, who are viewed as constituting a different kind of threat, a menace to “mainstream” American (white) culture. Thus, the majority of deportees continues to be immigrants from Mexico. Throughout my historical analyses of settler colonial structures and practices as they developed in relation to Indigenous peoples, blacks, Mexicans, and Chinese, I have tried to apply an intersectional lens that views race and gender as co-formations. The bulk of the discussion has perhaps focused greater attention on race and racialization; however, gender has been present throughout the text. I pointed out that the settler project constructed various racialized gender and gendered racial dualisms. The white race was masculinized in relation to feminized black, red, or yellow races. Settler ideology also defined appropriate gender relations within the settler family and community, variously using Indian, black, and “others” as negative foils. White settler society understood extreme gender differentiation as a mark of civilization and thus attempted to shape white womanhood toward domesticity and dependency. Importantly, white women were viewed as needing to be protected by white men, particularly from the dangers posed by the primitive or perverse male sexuality of Natives, slaves, and exogenous others. Thus, for example, lurid tales of Indian capture of white women and their rescue by white soldiers circulated widely in settler culture. Meanwhile, Indian, black, and exogenous women were viewed variously as shameless, docile, alluring, or unfeminine because they did “men’s work.” Settler colonialism also had different effects on men and women from subjugated groups as shown in several instances discussed in the main text. For example, it was mentioned that Indian women were more likely to be enslaved, while adult Indian men were more likely to be killed. Relatedly, Indian women were also more likely to be brought into settler households to be sex slaves and domestic servants. As for the Chinese, although male laborers were eventually subject to exclusion, women had been legally excluded earlier and more stringently on the assumption that all Chinese women attempting to enter were prostitutes. In contrast, Mexican women were sometimes viewed more favorably than Mexican men and were thought to be appropriate wives for Anglo men. As for enslaved blacks, women were subjected to gender-specific violence such as rape but not exempted from the same kinds of physical punishment and heavy field labor to which slave men were subjected. I will now briefly consider the implications of the present analysis in relation to anti-racist politics. Given that many different groups have been victimized by racial violence, exclusion, and dehumanization, coalitions among racialized minorities are desirable and necessary. I suggest that coalitions are best built by recognizing the specific histories of racialized minorities other than our own. Our understandings ideally should reckon with (a) commonalities, (b) relations and connections, and (c) differences. All of these are highlighted by this settler colonial analysis. Many commonalities have emerged from the case analyses, including experiences of genocide and terrorism that have been inflicted, justified, and “forgotten” or deemphasized by settler society. Also having emerged are relations/connections in the experiences of different groups that complicate their positionality vis-à- vis one another. Thus, for example, the analysis might lead us to ask whether and in what ways racialized minorities might position themselves in relation to the territorial dispossession of Native Americans. Finally, some significant differences have emerged; for example, only blacks were subjected to chattel slavery, which is a condition of social death and subjection by slave law that even those who worked under conditions of extreme coercion did not share. A final thought: in this article I have suggested that a settler colonialism framework for analyzing and understanding race and gender in America will have certain advantages over other frameworks, most specifically in the strength of its historicity and in a fuller incorporation of the role of Native Americans in how racism and gender oppression have developed and continue to operate. A question with which I have not dealt is to what extent can a settler colonial framework relate to and interact with other frameworks such as internal colonialism, racial formation, and racialized social systems. My belief is that there are significant insights and analytical methods offered by each of the frameworks and that the addition of settler colonialism to the mix may help us to work toward a higher level theoretical model that can be widely used by social scientists both in the United States and internationally. I suggest that a fruitful next task will be for us to explore and discuss the connections and relationships among the various frameworks, with a new awareness of the distinct historical, social, and cultural understandings brought to our table by the settler colonialism framework.

#### Settlerism is an everyday process constituted through physical and affective control by geopolitics and settler common space over our spaces of political resistance

Rifkin 13 [Mark, Professor at the University of North Carolina, “Settler Common Sense”, Settler Colonialism Studies, 3:3-4, September 13, 2013, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rset20>, July 7, 2017] KLu

Thoreau’s conception of “Nature” further can be understood as unfolding from the legal narration of Native lands as both a space apart and as lacking distinct political status. Native peoples in New England did not have treaties with the federal government as did peoples elsewhere, and Indian affairs were considered to be state matters. By the 1840 s and 1850s Massachusetts had eight reservations whose boundaries had been determined and regulated under colonial and thenstate law, and the maintenance, usage, and sale of such tribal lands were administered largely by state-appointed guardians or overseers. Written in response to a legislative mandate, the Bird report (1848) repeatedly describes the legal and political situation of Native peoples and their lands in the state as “imperfectly defined”, “anomalous”, and “peculiar”. 31 These terms refer not only to the ambiguity of the relevant statutes as to certain key points, but also to the general fact of having persons and places governed by a set of policies not applicable to the rest of the population and property in the state. It describes these peoples as “among the ‘stricken few’ who remain of the once undisputed sovereigns of the Western World. The blood of Samoset and Massasoit runs in their veins” (5), and in decrying the fact that Indians do not hold citizenship in the state or the nation, the report observes, “The Indian alone, the descendant of monarchs, is a vassal in the land of his fathers” (49). Further, as the 1861 report on Indian affairs in the state, authored by John Milton Earle, notes of the Gay Head Indians, the whole civil polity of the tribe, … a community residing in the State, and nominally of the State, and subject to its laws, is yet a sort of imperium in imperio, not governed by the laws to which it is nominally subject, but have its own independent law, by which all its internal affairs are regulated.32 The reports continually suggest that they should be made citizens even as they repeatedly note that the peoples who continue to hold tribal lands themselves do not wish to see the existing system changed.33 The reports circle around a conceptual impasse: Indian tribes once were “sovereign”, but now they are not; they cannot live as subjects of the state/nation and not be citizens, but they do not desire citizenship. That disjunction, and the threat it poses, is narrated as an oddity they and their lands bear, literalizing them and the space they occupy as anomaly. The sovereignty of the state of Massachusetts here depends on the production of Native peoples and their lands as a kind of alegal limbo within the jurisdiction of the state/nation. Such a description of Indian spatiality resembles almost exactly the contours and function of “Nature” in Walden, suggesting that the latter (especially in its repeated connection to Indianness in the text)34 gestures toward and draws on the prior translation of Native sovereignty as a space of apolitical anomaly. In Thoreau’s observations about the basket-maker, they occupy parallel positions (“I too had woven a kind of basket”) in which he can learn a lesson of independence lost on the unnamed Settler Colonial Studies 335 “Indian”. What would it mean for him to see the act of writing/weaving not as an opportunity to sublate the Indian, but as a chance to understand his relation to this person (and the “us” who are “starv[ing]”) as the condition for an investigation into the contours of settler selfhood? Thoreau notes in the “Conclusion”, “I left the woods for as good a reason as I went there…It is remarkable how easily and insensibly we fall into a particular route, and make a beaten track for ourselves,” adding, “How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and conformity” (215–6). Introducing a similar idea earlier, he observes in “The Village,” if we go beyond our usual course we still carry in our minds the bearing of some neighboring cape … till we are completely lost, or turned round…Not till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite extent of our relations. (115) Getting “lost”, losing one’s bearings and becoming “turned round” within an otherwise wellknown space, opens the potential for a new sense not only of the place but also of one’s position within it – “where we are”. In “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For,” Thoreau insists that we inhabitants of New England live this mean life that we do because our vision does not penetrate the surface of things. We think that is which appears to be. If a man should walk through this town … [and] give us an account of the realities he beheld there, we should not recognize the place in his description. (65) The text suggests the need to alter bodily dispositions in ways that break one out of one’s entrenched experience of place such that it can be made strange, allowing for a resurveying of “relations” to the world around you. As opposed to the sense of withdrawal into a space divorced from contemporary political economy, the text also proposes a reframing of perspective, altering the physical sense of relation to one’s surroundings via a suspension of their givenness. In this vein, Ahmed suggests, “If orientation is about making the strange familiar through the extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails” (11). These moments in the text suggest how the self can become the site for an imaginative break with routine that produces a sensuous reorientation (getting “turned round”). The critical project of the text appears here less as locating a space apart in which to discover the fullness of the self than as the making alien of an already occupied place, such that “we should not recognize” it. The act of turning round, of shifting one’s orientation and redirecting the momentum by which one previously was impelled, offers possibilities for perceiving differently, for seeing and engaging in ways that less take for granted the jurisdictional matrix of the state and in which contemporary Native peoples can be acknowledged as themselves important “inhabitants of New England” whose indigeneity compels a reconceptualization of the terms of occupancy for everyone. Becoming conscious of the everyday enactment of settlement involves relinquishing the notion of an autonomous, extra-political selfhood existing in a place apart, instead opening onto a recognition not only of enduring Native presence within contemporary political economy but of the effaced history of imperial superintendence and displacement that provides the continuing condition of possibility for the sense of settler escape into the wilderness. To be clear, the absence of a declared set of imperial commitments does not suggest non-Natives’ exoneration from continuing histories of violence perpetrated and perpetuated by the settler-state. Returning from a different direction to Nicoll’s critique discussed earlier, there may be an absence of sentiments hostile to Native peoples in non-Natives’ speech or writing, or nonNatives may adopt a particular viewpoint supportive of Indigenous sovereignty on delimited plots of land when considering Native peoples as such. However, that absence of malice or declaration of support does not address the ways quotidian experiences of space (with respect to jurisdiction, occupancy, and ownership) and subjectivity (as modular, self-identical, and extralegal) affectively register and iterate settler sovereignty in ways that shape the generation of, for example, ethics, ideals, and political projects that do not take Native nations, voices, and lands as their direct object. While arguments about the structural quality of settler colonialism – its scale, density, duration, and centrality to US life – remain important, their very insistence on its pervasive and systemic operation can create the impression of an integrated whole. However, as Latour observes, if “the body politic” is taken “to be virtual, total, and always already there”, then “the practical means to compose it are no longer traceable; if it’s total, the practical means to totalize it are no longer visible; if it’s virtual, the practical means to realize, visualize, and collect it have disappeared from view” (162–3). How is the settler body politic composed, collected, and realized in everyday ways through the experiences, perceptions, associations, emplacements, and trajectories of non-Native bodies? How do settler jurisdiction and governmentality shape the material possibilities available to non-Natives in scenes and sites apparently disconnected from Native peoples and Indian policy, and how do non-Natives in their quotidian feelings and interactions (and the cultural productions for which ordinary sensation serves as background) actualize the political and legal geographies of the settler-state? Attending to settler common sense in this way does not so much bracket Indigenous self-determination as draw on it as ethical inspiration to investigate the ways it is deferred through ordinary action whose aim is not such but whose effect is to reiterate the self-evidence of settler geopolitics. Reciprocally, such analysis also seeks to suggest how non-Natives might disorient and reorient themselves, how they might come to understand not only that Indigenous peoples remain part of the social landscape of life in the US but that the very terrain non-Natives inhabit as given has never ceased to be a site of political struggle.

#### The alternative is an ethic of incommensurability

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve, Professor at SUNY New Paltz, K. Wayne, University of California San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017] KLu

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

# 2NC

## F/W

### 2NC – F/W

#### The ROJ is to be a warrior scholar – do not work to reconcile the relationship between settler and settled but rather speak the truth to power – it’s a prerequisite to pragmatic action

Corntassel and Gaudry 14 [Jeff, Associate professor for Indigenous Governance programs at University of Victoria, Adam, Assistant professor in Native Studies at Universty of Saskatchewan, “Insurgent Education and Indigenous-Centered Research: Opening New Pathways to Community Resurgence”, University of Toronto Press, 2014, <https://www.academia.edu/6941157/Insurgent_Education_and_Indigenous-Centred_Research_Opening_New_Pathways_to_Community_Resurgence>, July 19, 2017] KLu

It is in Mohawk scholar'Taiaiake Alfred's (2004) concept of "warrior scholarship" that we find a way of engaging with colonial institutions that is nonetheless grounded in a thoroughly Indigenous world view, focusing on correcting the power imbalance of the colonial relationship and restoring the power of Indigenous peoples. Taiaiake's idea of war-rior scholarship begins with the recognition that "the university is con-tentious ground" (p. 92). He views the university as the intellectual centre of colonialism that "create the attitudes and beliefs that sustain imperial relations," which "enable injustice by providing innovation on intellectual techniques and training" for "imperial servants in the me-chanics of dominion" (p. 96). With an increasing number of Indigenous scholars working in the academy, we face an ever-increasing responsi-bility to challenge the presumptions of colonial domination and au-thority. Taiaiake argues that Indigenous scholars have a responsibility "to counter the ongoing production of imperial attitudes and to defy its pretensions" (p. 97). The role of the Indigenous academic is a most im-portant one: to teach "an empowering and truthful sense of the past and who we are, and as visionaries of a dignified alternative to the in-dignity of our cultural assimilation and political surrender ... The strongest weapon we have against the power of the state to destroy us at the core is the Thal," (p. 95). Continual contestation of oppression, domination, and colonialism is the way of the warrior-scholar, a power-ful voice which reminds us all — Native and non-Native — that "it will be absolutely necessary to redefine and fully reconstruct the govern-mental and economic relationships between the original peoples and the settlers in this country" (p. 94). The power of the warrior-scholar then is to be an intellectual leader who is firmly bound to his or her community — responsible to them, to speak the truth to the outside and support the meaningful work within the community. This is a voice from the community and the ancestors; it seeks not the validation of hegemonic knowledge, nor to find its place in the false unity of the nation-state, but to achieve the freedom and independence so valued by our ancestors. it is the scholarship, research, and teaching of anti-colonial contention, from an Indigenous world view, that makes the warrior-scholar responsible to "the not-so-fortunate and all-too-easily ignored ninety percent of our people who do not get any benefit at all from the new political and economic order" (p. 94). Like Maori scholar Graham Smith's Kaupapa Maori theory, Taiaiake places emphasis on critical pedagogy based on interlocking actions of consciousness rais-ing, resistance, and transformative praxis (Smith, 2003, p. 15). The warrior-scholar, unlike the word warrior, does not attempt to rec-oncile differences so much as to work to fundamentally transform the relationship between the settler society and Indigenous peoples. Overall, these projects have different end goals: one is intellectual unification, and an eradication of philosophical contradictions while leaving the nation-state intact; the other is respectful and peaceful coexistence in which Indigenous knowledges are respected in their own right, remain-ing autonomous and independent from the dominant culture. It is this latter approach to warrior scholarship that we believe holds the most promise for an Indigenous resurgence and the revival of our traditional ways of being. Grounded in a warrior-scholar ethos, insurgent educators question settler occupation of Indigenous places through direct, honest, and ex-periential forms of engagement, ultimately demanding accountability and action to address these truths. Insurgent educators act on their re-sponsibilities to defend Indigenous homelands and communities and act on behalf of those being silenced. Insurgent educators exemplify Indigenous forms of "leadership by example" by making their daily struggles for Indigenous resurgence relatable to broader audiences us-ing innovative ways that inspire activism and reclamation of indigenous histories and homelands and waterways. For Cherokees, leadership usually starts with the individual. An individual has a dream or a vi-sion and then starts living it by incorporating whatever it is that he or she has envisioned into his or her daily life. Then the individual makes it relatable to other people. Only after making these teachings relatable to others can one start organizing people and mobilizing them for change. This is different from a Western kind of model that structures the hierarchical leadership process by organizing everyone at the be-ginning. Insurgent educators understand that Indigenous struggles must be made relatable to others before mobilization towards change can occur. According to Shuswap leader George Manuel (1976), "we will steer our own canoe, but we will invite others to help with the paddling" (p. 12). It follows that if one is invited to help with the paddling, then that person's research priorities must be directly relevant and centred on the needs of local Indigenous communities. The following section offers some examples of insurgent education in action as a way to con-vey the complexities of community-based research.

#### **Debate is first and foremost a site of subject formation – thus, we must center the centuries long genocidal structure that forms how we think and exist. The kritik’s affective intervention is essential to destabilize the settler psyche that otherwise coheres itself by pushing this violence out of the picture. Anything else is to sustain the ongoing violence of dispossession – land must come first**

Henderson 15 – prof of political science @ University of Victoria (Phil, ‘Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism,’ Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement)

Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, settlers must answer the legitimate charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon the privileges produced by ongoing genocide. The jarring nature of such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge to settlers qua settlers.64 Should these charges become impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode the imago of settler colonialism, which had hitherto operated within the settler psyche in a relatively smooth and benign manner. This explosion is potentiated by the revelation of even a portion of the violence that is required to make settler life possible. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability.66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment', the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown's thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening'.68 This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism's imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler's offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, the attendant desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject's reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized. Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession; as such, settlers often suggest that they aim to create a ‘city on the hill’.70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts'. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire's energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, this obsession at once solidifies the power of the settler state, thereby naturalizing the settler and simultaneously perpetuating the processes of erasing indigenous peoples. Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of arrested development between these defensive positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure.

#### Don’t default to settler “common sense”—challenging the epistemic basis for action is a prereq to ethical policymaking

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If there were any serious concern about liberation we would see thousands of people simply walk away from the vast economic, political, and intellectual machine we call Western civilization and refuse to be enticed to participate in it any longer. Liberation is not a difficult task when one no longer finds value in a set of institutions or beliefs. We are liberated from the burden of Santa Claus and the moral demand to be “good” when, as maturing adolescents, we reject the concept of Santa Claus. Thereafter we have no sense of guilt in late November that we could have not behaved properly during the year, and no fear that a lump of coal rather than a gift will await us Christmas morning. In the same manner, we are freed and liberated once we realize the insanity and fantasy of the present manner interpreting our experiences in the world. Liberation, in its most fundamental sense, requires a rejection of everything we have been taught and its replacement by only those things we have experienced as having values. But this replacement only begins the task of liberation. For the history of Western thinking in the past eight centuries has been one of replacement of ideas within a framework that has remained basically unchanged for nearly two millenia. Challenging this framework of interpretation means a rearrangement of our manner of perceiving the world, and it involves a reexamination of the body of human knowledge and its structural reconstruction into a new format. Such a task appears to be far from the struggles of the present. It seems abstract and meaningless in the face of contemporary suffering. And it suggests that people can be made to change their oppressive activity by intellectual reorientation alone. All these questions arise, however, because of the fundamental orientation of Western peoples toward the world. We assume that we know the structure of reality and must only make certain minor adjustments in the machinery that operates it in order to bring our institutions into line. Immediate suffering is thus placed in juxtaposition with abstract meta-physical conceptions of the world and, because we can see immediate suffering, we feel impelled to change conditions quickly to relieve tensions, never coming to understand how the basic attitude toward life and its derivative attitudes toward minority groups continues to dominate the goals and activities that appear designed to create reforms. Numerous examples can be cited to show that our efforts to bring justice into the world have been short-circuited by the passage of events, and that those efforts are unsuccessful because we have failed to consider the basic framework within which we pose questions, analyze alternatives, and suggest solutions. Consider the examples from our immediate past. In the early sixties college application forms included a blank line on which all prospective students were required to indicate their race. Such information was used to discriminate against those of a minority background, and so reformers demanded that the question be dropped. By the time all colleges had been forced to eliminate questions concerning the race of applicants, the Civil Rights Movement had so sensitized those involved in higher education that scholarships were made available in great numbers to people of minority races. There was no way, however; to allocate such scholarships because college officials could no longer determine the racial background of students on the basis of their applications for admission. Much of the impetus for low-cost housing in the cities was based upon the premise that in the twentieth century people should not have to live in hovels but that adequate housing should be constructed for them. Yet in the course of tearing down slums and building new housing projects, low income housing areas were eliminated. The construction cost of the new projects made it necessary to charge higher rentals. Former residents of the low-income areas could not afford to live in the new housing, so they moved to other parts of the city and created exactly the same conditions that had originally provoked the demand for low-rent housing. Government schools had a very difficult time teaching American Indian children the English language. (One reason was the assumption of teachers that all languages had Latin roots, and their inability to adapt the programs when they discovered that Indian languages were not so derived.) Hence programs in bilingual teaching methods were authorized that would use the native language to teach the children English, an underhanded way of eliminating the native language. Between the time that bilingual programs were conceived and the time that they were finally funded, other programs that concentrated on adequate housing had an unexpected effect on the educational process. Hundreds of new houses were built in agency towns, and Indians moved from remote areas of the different reservations into those towns where they could get good housing. Since they were primarily younger couples with young children, the housing development meant that most Indian children were new growing up in the agency communities and were learning English as a first language. Thus, the bilingual programs, which began as a means of teaching English as a second language, became the method designed to preserve the native vernacular by teaching it as a second language to students who had grown up speaking English. Example after example could be cited, each testifying to the devastating effect of a general attitude toward the world that underlies the Western approach to human knowledge. The basis of this attitude is the assumption that the world operates in certain predetermined ways, that it operates continuously under certain natural laws, and that the nature of every species is homogeneous, with few real deviations. One can trace this attitude back into the Western past. Religious concepts, which have since been transformed into Scientific and political beliefs, remain objects of belief as securely as if they had never been severed from their theological moorings. Let us trace a few examples. Originally the continuity of the world was conceived as a demonstration of the divine plan and God, conceived as a lawgiver in the moral sense, became a law-giver in the scientific sense also. Scientific data was classified in certain ways that in the eyes of Western peoples became a part of the structure of nature. Phenomena that did not fit into the structure that had been created were said to “violate” the laws of nature and hence to be untrue in the religious sense and unimportant in the scientific sense. When evolution replaced the concept of creation in the book of Genesis, it became an inviolable law in the eyes of Western people in much the same way that the literal interpretation of the biblical story had been accepted by Western people in former centuries. The world was originally conceived in terms of the Near East as the center of reality. As awareness extended to other peoples, this world gradually expanded until by the Middle Ages it encompassed those regions that were in commercial contact with Western Europe. The discovery of the Western hemisphere created a certain degree of trauma, for suddenly there was an awareness of lands and peoples of which Western Europeans had no previous knowledge. The only way that these people could be accounted for was by reference to the Scriptures. So it was hypothesized that the aboriginal peoples in North and South America must have been the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel who had crossed into the New World over a land bridge somewhere in northern Asia. The basic assumption of this theory was the creation of the human species as a single act, performed by the Christian God, with its subsequent history one of populating the planet. The rise of social science, and the downgrading of theological answers to what were considered scientific questions concerning the nature and history of human societies, meant that social science had to provide answers to questions formulated within the theological context. With virtually no reconsideration of the basic question of the creation [or origination in scientific terms) of our species as the product of a single act, anthropologists promptly adopted the old theological explanation of the peopling of the Western Hemisphere, developing the Bering Strait theory of migration to account for the phenomenon. Whether secular or sacred, the classification of American natives as a derivative, inferior group of Asian-European peoples, albeit far removed from those roots by the postularion of many millenia of wandering, became a status from which American Indians have been unable to escape. The emphasis on objective knowledge by Western peoples has meant the development of an attitude that sees reality as basically physical, the knowledge thereof basically mental or verbal, and the elimination of any middle ground between extremes. Thus religion has become a matter of the proper exposition of doctrines, and non-Western religions have been judged on their development of a systematic moral and ethical code rather than the manner in which they conducted themselves. When a religion is conceived as a code of verbal importance rather than a way of life, loopholes in the code become more important than the code itself since, by eliminating or escaping the direct violation of the code by a redelinition of the code or a relaxation of its intended effect, one can maintain two types of behavior; easily discerned in a practical way, as if they were identical and consistent with a particular picture of reality. In recent decades Western science had made an important discovery, important at least for Western peoples who had formerly confused themselves with their own belief system. Western science was premised upon the proposition that God had made the world according to certain laws. These laws were capable of discovery by human reason, and the task of science was to discover as many of these laws as possible. So human knowledge was misconceived as the only description of physical reality, a tendency Alfred North Whitehead called the principle of “misplaced concreteness.”' With the articulation of theories of indeterminancy in modern physics, this naive attitude toward human knowledge radically shifted and became an acknowledgement that what we had formerly called nature was simply our knowledge of nature based upon the types of questions we had decided to use to organize the measurements we were making of the physical world. The shift in emphasis meant that all knowledge became a relative knowledge, valid only for the types of questions we were capable of formulating. Depending upon the types of information sought, we could measure and observe certain patterns of phenomena, but these patterns existed in our heads rather than in nature itself. Knowledge thus became a matter of cultural preference rather than an indication of the ultimate structure of reality. Presumably if one culture asked a certain type of question while another asked another type of question, the two different answers could form two valid perspectives on the world. Whether these two perspectives could be reconciled in one theory of knowledge depended upon the broader pattern of interpretation that thinkers brought into play with respect to the data. When this new factor of interpretation is applied specifically to different cultures and traditions, we can see that what have been called primitive superstitions have the potential of being regarded as sophisticated insights into the nature of things, at least on an equal basis with Western knowledge. The traditional manner in which Western peoples think is now only one of the possible ways of describing a natural process. It may not, in fact, even be as accurate, insofar as it can relate specific facts without perverting them, as non-Western ways of correlating knowledge. This uncertainty is liberating in a much more fundamental way than any other development in the history of Western civilization. It means that religious, political, economic, and historical analyses of human activities that have been derived from the Western tradition do not have an absolute claim upon us. We are free to seek a new synthesis that draws information from every culture, and every period of human history has as a boundary only the requirement that it make more sense of more data than any other synthesis. Even the initial premises of such a synthesis can be different from what we have previously used to begin our formulation of a picture of reality. When we apply this new Freedom to some of the examples cited above, we see that the proper question we should have asked with respect to housing did not concern housing at all, but covered the more general question of the nature of a community. We discover that the college applications and the bilingual programs should have been transcended by questions concerning the nature of knowledge, how it is transmitted, and how it can be expanded, rather than how specific pre- determined courses of action can be implemented. Once we reject the absolute nature of Western conceptions of problems, we are able to see different types of questions inherent in our immediate problem areas. The immediacy we feel when observing conditions under which people live should enable us to raise new issues that contain within themselves new ways of conceiving solutions. An old Indian saying captures the radical difference between Indians and Western peoples quite adequately. The white man, the indians maintain, has ideas; Indians have visions. Ideas have a single dimension and require a chain of connected ideas to make sense. The connections that are made between ideas can lead to great insights on the nature of things, or they can lead to the inexorable logic of Catch-22 in which the logic inevitably leads to the polar opposite of the original proposition. The vision, on the other hand, presents a whole picture of experience and has a central meaning that stands on its own feet as an independent revelation. It is said that Albert Einstein could not conceive of his problems in physics in conceptual terms but instead had visions of a whole event. He then spent his time attempting to translate elements of that event that could be separated into mathematical and verbal descriptions that could be communicated to others. It is this difference, the change from inductive and deductive logic to transformation of perceived realities, that becomes the liberating facto; not additional information or continual replacement of data and concepts within the traditional Framework of interpretation. Let us return, then, to our discussion of the manner in which racial minorities have been perceived by the white community, particularly by the liberal establishment, in the past decade and a half, Minority groups, conceived to be different from the white majority, are perceived to be lacking some critical element of humanity that, once received, would bring them to some form of equality with the white majority. The trick has been in identifying that missing element, and each new articulation of goals is immediately attributed to every minority group and appears to answer the question that has been posed by the sincere but unreflective liberal community. Liberation is simply the manner in which this missing element is presently conceived by people interested in reform. It will become another social movement fad and eventually fade away to be replaced with yet another instant analysis of the situation. Until fundamental questions regarding the assumptions that form the basis for Western civilization are raised and new articulations of reality are discovered, the impulse to grab quickly and apparently easy answers will continue. Social conditions will continue to be described in a cause-and-effect logic that has dominated Western thinking for its entire intellectual lifetime. Programs will be designed that fail to account for the change in conditions that occurs continually in human societies. Ideas will continue to dominate our concerns and visions will not come. lf we are then to talk seriously about the necessity of liberation, we are talking about the destruction of the whole complex of Western theories of knowledge and the construction of a new and more comprehensive synthesis of human knowledge and experience. This is no easy task and it cannot be accomplished by people who are encompassed within the traditional Western logic and the resulting analyses such logic provides. If we change the very way that Western peoples think, the way they collect data, which data they gather and how they arrange that information, then we are speaking truly of liberation. For it is the manner in which people conceive reality that motivates them to behave in certain ways, that provides them with a system of values, and that enables them to justify their activities. A new picture of reality, a reality conceived as a vision and not as a series of related or connected ideas, can accomplish over a longer period of time many changes we have been unable to effect while conceiving solutions as short-term remedies. More important for our discussion is the recognition that all parts of human experience are related and the proposed solution to any particular problem overlooks the changes that will occur in related activities because of their relationship. Fundamental changes initiated by a new picture of reality will create a transformation, and will avoid the traditional replacement of words with new words. In summary we now challenge the basic assumptions of Western man. To wit: 1] that time is uniform and continuous; 2) that our species originated from a single source; 3) that our descriptions of nature are absolute knowledge; 4) that the world can be divided into subjective and objective; 5) that our understanding of our species is homogeneous; 6) that ultimate reality, including divinity, is homogeneous; 7) that by projection of present conditions we can understand human history, planetary history, or the universe; 8) that inductive and deductive reasoning are the primary tools for gaining knowledge.

## Links

### 2NC – Link – Apoc Rhetoric

#### Civil Society reifies a temporal narrative that uses doomsday rhetoric to bracket out the indigenous as “relics of the past” that are anathemas to progress—that instills a linear futurism that absolves us of responsibility for settler colonialism

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Nowhere is this contest more evident than in the on-going struggle among some contemporary Native Americans to withstand themanifold pressures of assimilation and preserve a semblance of "traditional" tribal cultures. Their struggle is infused with temporal concerns: thoroughly (and painfully) cognizant of the history of native/Euramerican relations on this continent, activists seek the meaning of this past, construe its relevance to their current condition, find in it their purpose and tactics, and presage the final victory to come. Superficially, Red Power rhetoric is no different from that of other social movements in these respects; all articulate a self-justificatory narrative that interweaves past, present, and future. **Red Power**'s story, however, is unusual, and ought be of particular concern to rhetorical scholars, for two reasons. First, it **struggles against a**n especially well-developed and **powerful Euramerican narrative which**, in telling the lessons of its own history, **renders Native Americans relics of the past**, thus **absent from** (and logically, silent in) **the present and** irrelevant **to the future.** Second, **Red Power** rhetoric **articulates a time grounded in ritual that challenges prevailing Euramerican metaphors of time itself** (expresses, that is, what Eliade [1954; 1959, esp. pp. 68-113; 1963, esp. pp. 75-91] calls "sacred," as differentiated from "profane" time), **and problematizes** the very categories of **"past," "present," and "future."** In short, **the "shared time" of Native American protest rhetoric subverts** not only our own sense of the appropriate time for and timeliness of native activism, but also **the very constructs with which we theorize about the temporal dimensions of (their) rhetoric.** This essay, then, examines certain temporal features of the Euramerican establishment's discourse concerning Native Americans, and then the Red Power movement's responses thereto. In each case, I examine, first, the characterization of Euramerican/native relations; second, the temporal metaphors that infuse these characterizations; and third, the discourse's rhetorical power and limitations. I argue that both groups exploit the resources of metaphors of time in arguments concerning the relative superiority of native and Euramerican cultures, the meaning and relevance of the "past," i.e., historical events in native/Euramerican relations, to the contemporary Native American activist cause, and the inevitability of the triumph of one way of life over the other. However, because movement and establishment invoke different metaphors, the claims made and the shared time created are starkly opposed. Drawing principally upon time's arrow, Euramerican discourse characterizes native cultures as outdated and regressive, native history as uncorrectable (if regrettable), and native activism as a historical anachronism. Activist rhetoric, in contrast, exploits primarily time's circle to characterize native "history" as an on-going tale of injustice, the modern movement as the fulfillment of ancient prophecies, and native cultures as the sort to which all human life will turn to survive.3 Finally, I consider implications of this analysis. The Iron Law of History and the Native Other . . . How should I live? Among my people a small voice? In your world silent? Among my people there is no horizon In your world I have seen the universe contained in glass . . . "[M]ost **commentators** on American culture," contends Arnold Krupat (1989, p. 3), "generally have ~~man~~aged to **proceed** as though there were no relation between the two, white and red, Euramerican and Native American, as if absence rather than avoidance defined the New World**: as if America was** indeed **'virgin land,'** empty, uninhabited, silent, dumb **until the Europeans brought the plow** and the pen to cultivate its wilderness." From the earliest days, however, **settlers seeking to carve out** a "**civilization**" in this land **confronted the** persistent and awkward **fact that the New World was anything but empty and silent**. And so, as Pearce (1953), among others, has documented amply, **this "civilization" came to define itself in opposition to native "savagism."**4 At first, driven by the aggressive spirit of Puritan Protestantism, **"civilization" articulated a rhetoric of "salvationism,"** which Krupat (1989, p. 142) describes as "the discursive equivalent of a glass trained on heaven through which all this world must be seen," and which narrowed the native horizon fundamentally to conversion and extermination. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, this discourse became secularized, and God's will became an evolutionary law of nature (Krupat, 1989, p. 142). Salvationism became assimilationism. As Commissioner of Indian Affairs Morgan (cited in Forbes, 1964, p. 114) put it bluntly in 1889, natives were to "conform to the White ~~man~~'s ways, peaceably if they will, forceably if they must. . ." But whether decreed in heaven or on earth, by divine will or history, **the fate of the natives was** sealed, to be **supplanted by the inevitable march of American civilization**. As "**one who had no right to be heard from**" (Frost, 1949, p. 179), **the savage Other was, finally and irrevocably, to be silenced. The denouement of this narrative is the familiar theme of the** **"vanishing** **[Native]** red ~~man~~.**"** The belief that primitive native societies must and would give way before the advancing tide of Euramerican civilization, either to be absorbed or crushed, has a long history. Count Alexis de Tocqueville (cited in McNickle, 1973, p. 3) remarked in 1831: "The Indians have been ruined by a competition which they had not the means of sustaining." A century ago, a West Point cadet named Custer (cited in Steiner, 1968, p. x) lamented the passing of the race in a term paper for his ethics class: "The red ~~man~~ is alone in his misery. We behold him now on the verge of extinction, standing on his last foothold . . . and soon he will be talked of as a noble race who once existed but have passed away." In 1911, Boas (cited in Steiner, 1968, p. xi) noted that the proportion of people with Indian blood "is so insignificant that it may well be disregarded," for the race had "vanished comparatively rapidly." Three years later, Moorehead (1914, p. 10) lamented that "we have brought about the extinction of tribal and communistic life among the Indians." The theme of inevitable doom was common "in song and story," and exemplified by James E. Fraser's equestrian statue, "The End of the Trail," first shown at the 1915 San Francisco Exposition (McNickle, 1973, p. 3). Doomsaying continued into the middle of this century. In his 1932 chronicle, The Passing American, Linderman (cited in Steiner, 1968, p. xi) observed that even the Indian had forgotten the Indian: "The young Indians know next to nothing about their people . . . and now it is too late to learn." Journalist John Keats (cited in Steiner, 1968, p. xi) echoed this sentiment in 1964, asking: "But, who speaks for the Indian? Amazingly his cause is almost without rebels to support it." The closing line of Paul Radin's The Story of the American Indian (1927/1937, p. 371) stressed the finality of the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee: "The white ~~man~~ had triumphed . . . the Indians were crushed. Their nerve was gone. Broken, disorganized, externally and internally they gave up the fight." In this way, the theme of the vanishing red ~~man~~ voices the evolutionary claim that time, indeed, marches on. Ironically, ~~man~~y of these pronouncements were sounded by observers acutely sympathetic to the plight of Native Americans. To a degree, the theme of the vanishing red ~~man~~, like its cousin the noble savage, romanticizes native people and martyrs them to Euramerican greed and racism. Yet, **the portrayal of** theirinevitable doom almostabsolves whites of culpability**, fixing blame** instead **on the** inexorable **march of abstract forces like "progress."** Unsurprisingly, **this theme** quickly became a self-fulfilling prophecy**, legitimizing even greater incursions upon the lands and liberties of native people** (McNickle, 1973, p. 62). As Native Americans occupied an ever-smaller part of the real world, to the general public they increasingly lived on only in the romantic fictions of literature and Hollywood (Forbes, 1964, p. 13; Friar & Friar, 1972), thereby cementing their consignment to history and, thus, irrelevancy. It is important to appreciate that **this Euramerican narrative relies for its temporal structure on time's arrow**, which itself has come to play a vital part in Euramerican thinking on the subject over the centuries. Nowhere is this better shown than in Toulmin and Goodfield's well-known The Discovery of Time (1965), in which the authors trace the "gradual emergence of a continuing sense of history out of earlier mythological and theological" conceptions of Nature (p. 15), argue that, by the nineteenth century, all natural sciences save physics and chemistry had rejected the a priori categories of Greek thought in favor of an historical consciousness (p. 247); and conclude that even the "laws of nature" may be discovered to be, not immutable, but subject to evolutionary change over time (pp. 263-265). Highly influential in solidifying the position of time's arrow has been Christianity, **in which time**—one product of the Creation—**unfolds unidirectionally the continuous action of God through history, progressing from the past into the future, until the eschatological end of time foretold in Revelation as Christ's second coming** (Puech, 1957/1983, p. 40).5 Further, in a process akin to what Burke (1966, pp. 380-409; 1945/1969, pp. 430-440) calls the "temporizing of essences," time's arrow is frequently normative. The history of the idea of "progress" is not coincident with that of "history" itself, and the former is in some respects at odds with the Christian story of the Fall and subsequent degeneration. Nonetheless, "progress" **is one ethical extension** of the doctrines of **history** and Darwinism, **and**, like them, **denies alternative conceptions such as time's cycle** (Bury, 1932/1960, esp. pp. xi—xxix, 334—349). In linear time, the inexorable march of progress ensures that **all events necessarily and certainly must become merely historical, superceded by the superior future** (Bury, 1932/1960, p. 109). Thus, anteriority comes to signify inferiority while posteriority implies superiority (Brown, 1982, p. 117), as **evidenced by** evolution's infamous sociopolitical cousins, **Social Darwinism and Manifest Destiny** (on the latter, see Bass & Cherwitz, 1978). In sum, the story of civilization's triumph over savagism presupposes a linear time in which each present moment becomes the past (or falls into "history") as life proceeds toward a qualitatively different future. This procession is inevitable and irreversible; history never literally repeats itself. And because the unfolding future typically is conceived not only as different, but also as better, "living **in the past" is anathema to the "progressive spirit."** As one among a host of stories that symbolize human experience in predominately linear terms, the narrative is rooted deeply in Euramerican thought.6 And in consigning Native Americans to the past, it sentenced them to metaphoric and literal death. Pearce's (1953) analysis is telling and merits extended quotation: **Westward American progress** would, in fact, be understood to be **reproduc**ing **this historical progression** [**from a lesser to** a **greater good**, from the simple to the complex, from savagism to civilization]; and **the savage would be understood as one who had not and somehow could not progress into the civilized, who would inevitably be destroyed by the civilized** . . . For the Indian was the remnant of a savage past away from which civilized men had struggled to grow. To study him was to study the past. To civilize him was to triumph over the past. To kill him was to kill the past. History would thus be the key to the moral worth of cultures; the history of American civilization would thus be conceived as threedimensional, progressing from past to present, from east to west, from lower to higher, (p. 49) This narrative is itself timeless, perennially available as a rhetorical resource**. Time's arrow treats past events as irretrievably past, as strictly historical. Argumentatively,** even when the vector from past to future is **"smooth," "**continuous**," or "**unbroken**," the past nonetheless is dissociated from the present** which, while perhaps the product of the former, is a qualitatively different stage in evolutionary advance. Thus, time's arrow furnishes a powerful way to cast vestigial traditional Native American life and efforts to sustain that life as anachronistic. Forms of this strategy recur today in Euramerican reactions to contemporary native activism.

### 1NC – Link – Asian Americans

#### The 1AC is premised upon a fantasy of belonging and the creation of a multicultural nation for Asian Americans – that creates a settler will to innocence and recreates the logic of settlement.

Fujikane 12 [Candace, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at the University of Hawaii, “Asian American critique and Moana Nui 2011: securing a future beyond empires, militarized capitalism and APEC”, Routledge Publishing, April 1, 2012, PDF pg 5-6, April 25, 2016] KLu

We can first trace Asian American critiques of US empire to the 1968–1969 Third World Strike at what was then San Francisco State College. The Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) brought together African American, Asian American, Latino/a, and American Indian campus groups demanding an autonomous ethnic studies program and community control over curricula and hiring, and the TWLF drew critical connections between domestic civil rights struggles in the United States and international human rights struggles in imperial wars being fought in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As an historical event linking racism in the United States with US imperialism, the Third World Strike reminds us that ethnic studies was founded on conceptions of shared struggles on a global scale. There is another dimension to the Third World Strike that Asian American critical inquiry must consider. At the same time that the Third World Strike was taking place, American Indians were engaged in the second occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. Asserting American Indian title to the federal facility by right of discovery, American Indian activists at Alcatraz initiated the Alcatraz-Red Power movement (ARPM) which led to 70 property takeovers in the following nine years (Johnson et al. 1997). Similarly, in 1976, Kanaka ‘ Oiwi were engaged in struggles to reclaim Kaho‘olawe, an island that had been used since the Second World War as a site for bombing target practice by the US military. These struggles illustrate that although American Indians and Kanaka ‘ Oiwi were allied with people of color on civil rights issues and against US imperialism, their primary struggle was to reclaim their ancestral lands from the United States. Although Asian Americans, particularly Japanese Americans who were critical of the US political system after their internment during World War II, supported American Indians at Alcatraz and Hawaiians at Kaho‘olawe in important ways, they used a framework of race and class struggle that did not account for the uniqueness of indigenous land dispossession or their own positions in a settler colonial context (Johnson 1996: 118; Gidra 1970; Tanioka and Yamaguchi 1970; Kudaka 1970; Kotani 1985: 168–169).4 As I have argued elsewhere, Asian American studies as a discipline has also historically had a stake in claiming America in ways that are ideologically at odds with indigenous critiques of US settler colonialism(Fujikane 2005). Asian American studies has generally focused on Asian American civil rights and immigrant rights, histories of racial, ethnic, heteropatriarchal and class oppression and literary, cultural and political forms of resistance to those interlocking axes of oppression, interracial and interethnic conflicts and alliances, movements of people to and from the United States in terms of immigration, diaspora, transnational mobility and the international divisions of labor, and multiple forms of imperialisms in Asia. In a multicultural ethnic studies framework, claiming America often inadvertently ends up reproducing the settler colonial claims to Native lands made in white settler historiography. Kanaka ‘ Oiwi leader and scholar Haunani-Kay Trask first identified Asian Americans in Hawai‘i as settlers who benefit from the dispossession of Hawaiians. Trask writes, Our Native people and territories have been overrun by non-Natives, including Asians. Calling themselves ‘local’, the children of Asian settlers greatly outnumber us. They claim Hawai‘i as their own, denying indigenous history, their long collaboration in our continued dispossession, and the benefits therefrom. Part of this denial is the substitution of the term ‘local’ for ‘immigrant’, which is, itself, a particularly celebrated American gloss for ‘settler’. As on the continent, so in our island home. Settlers and their children recast the American tale of nationhood: Hawai‘i, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of the uniqueness of America’s ‘nation of immigrants’. (Trask 2008: 46)5 Kanaka Oiwi are genealogically connected to Hawai‘i, their kulaiwi or ancestral lands, through Papahanaumoku, ‘She who births land’ (ho‘omanawanui 2008: 125; Kamahele 2008: 79; Trask 2008: 45). Under the US occupation of Hawai‘i, Asian Americans are settlers who do not have this genealogical relationship to land in Hawai‘i. As Trask points out, the failure to identify immigrants in settler states as settlers makes possible the teleological fantasy of settler states evolving into ‘multicultural’ nations (Trask 2008: 47). The effects of Asian American settler colonialism become even more visible when we examine indices that register political power in Hawai‘i, such as the ethnic breakdown of the 2009 Hawai‘i State Legislature (see Table 1). According to these figures, Japanese constitute only 21.9% of the population of Hawai‘i, but they are 40% of the Senate and 38% of the House of Representatives (Okinawans are included in statistics for ‘Japanese’, but separately they are about 4% of the population, 12% of the Senate and 6% of the House). Whites constitute 21.1% of the population, 16% of the Senate, and 20% of the House. By contrast, Hawaiians constitute 22.1% of the population compared with 16% of the Senate and 14% of the House. Overall, Asian Americans make up about 44% of the population, 64% of the Senate and 72% of the House. The conditions of Asian American settler colonialism are only made possible by the US settler state and its occupation of Hawai‘i. The United States has acknowledged that its military unlawfully invaded Hawai‘i and backed the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by a white American oligarchy on January 17, 1893. In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed US Public Law 103-150, apologizing for the United States’ role in the military invasion and overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In the Apology Resolution, the United States acknowledges that Kanaka ‘ Oiwi have never relinquished their sovereignty: ‘The indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum’. The document also acknowledges the illegal seizure of Hawaiian national lands: ‘The Republic of Hawaii also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown, government and public lands of the Kingdom of Hawaii without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their sovereign government’. The Apology Resolution has been cited to argue that the sovereign state of Hawai‘i continues to exist, and Kanaka ‘ Oiwi can assert their claim to 1.8 million acres of crown and government lands called the ‘ceded’ lands, half of all land in Hawai‘i seized at the time of the overthrow and now administered by the State of Hawai‘i.6

### 1NC – Link – Blackness

#### Blackness is fundamentally a question of land relations – black fungibility is a result of forced removal.

King 13 [Tiffany Jeannette, Doctor of Philosophy, “IN THE CLEARING: BLACK FEMALE BODIES, SPACE AND SETTLER COLONIAL LANDSCAPES”, PhD Dissertation, 2013, <http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/14525/King_umd_0117E_14499.pdf;jsessionid=7DA8E0EAD56156407235132AB4145B8E?sequence=1>, July 17, 2017] KLu

Redefining Settlement: Settlement within the disciplines of colonial history, US history, Native Studies and the emerging field of settler colonial studies is often defined through the space and time of contact. The first moments of European contact with the lands of the New World and the Native people of the hemisphere give us our spatial and temporal frame for the origins of settlement.10 Dash’s reorganization of the Eliza Lucas Pinckney archive allows us to reorganize the spatial and temporal frames of settlement. For Dash, settlement is reorganized along similar coordinates as Sylvia Wynter’s frame for conquest. In her novel, Dash takes us back to West Africa to give us some context and explains how the cultivation of indigo that would become a part of the process of settling the land in the British colonies is a protracted process that in fact starts before arrival on these shores. In the novel, Dash takes us to West Africa and introduces us to Ayodele (Elizabeth Peazant) when she is a twelve year old girl. Twelfth year come, Ayodele in the indigo fields with mama, learning all she able bout growing indigo and making it into paste to be sent to de market. It was a long an difficult process, but she patient, an after her first successful batch, they call her ‘My Indigo Girl’ as her mother did.11 The expertise that Ayodele gains as a child makes her valuable to Arab and European slave traders.12 Eventually Ayodele is then sold to the “Pinchney”13 family and is forced to tame the soil and plant in order to cultivate indigo in Charleston on the Wappoo plantation. Nobody know how, but some way the mistress found out that Ayodele knew how to grow indigo. Maybe she see this piece of cloth that Ayodele bring with her colored with indigo. So mistress gave her some seedlings an a small piece of land to work. The mistress told the Boss Man that Ayodele was only to work that bit of land. Oooh, he not like that one bit, but her would not hear nothing else. Well, Ayodele did all right, an the mistress very pleased. All the white men, the master, that planter from Jamaica they brought in, the Boss Man, they fit to be tied. They spent a lot of money bringing that man over here, and he sposed to be the expert, an he was white. Ayodele was just a girl and she was black.14 Settling the land by cultivating indigo required Black bodies from Africa. While Native genocide and the theft of Native land is at the core of settlement, the transport of Black bodies and the knowledge that those bodies have is also a part of settlement. The spatial process of settlement includes the theft and use of Black bodies from across the Atlantic. Settlement straddles the Atlantic Ocean and exceeds the White-Settler/Native conflict. This is not an appeal to expand the category of the settler, as I have argued before Black slaves and descendants of slaves are not settlers. However, the processes which make Black bodies fungible flesh, a form of terra nullius, and embed their bodies in the land as settled-slaves needs to be theorized as modalities of settlement. Settlement needs to be retheorized along the contours of the bodies that it renders materially and socially dead. Scholarship from Marxist geographies, cultural landscape studies, anthropology and the emerging field of settler colonial studies is useful for helping us think about space, however, it does not help us think about the ways that the process of settlement also materializes Blackness as an ontological position. Native studies and Black studies enable a discussion of how the production of Settler and Master or Settler-Master subjectivity comes about due to its parasitic relationship to Native death and Black fungibility/accumulation (social death). When we think about the Settler-Master as parasitic we can also begin to think about their process of settlement as one that also requires the making of ontological categories occupied by the dead. The process of settlement allows the Settler-Master to become a human with spatial coordinates because the Native dies and the Black becomes a non-being (a settled-slave).15 Settlement is more than transforming the land. It is more than the teleological process of weary white people making a home and Native people naturally disappearing over time. Settlement is an assemblage of technologies and processes of makings and unmakings. Its processes require the making and unmaking of bodies, subject positions, space, place and claims to various forms of autonomy, self actualization and transcendence. In Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Lorenzo Veracini, a founding scholar of the emerging field of settler colonial studies describes the process of settlement as a process that enables the “unfettered mobility” of the settler.16 While abject others within settler colonial nations are “principally characterized by restrained mobility” the settler experiences the capacity for “unfettered mobility.” This description of the kind of state of existence that settlement allows the settler is instructive. While Veracini’s description moves us closer to a discussion of states of being, I want to reframe Veracini’s description and introduce a few more elements to the equation. Settlement as an intricate, dynamic and contradictory relationship to Native bodies, Black bodies and the land/nature. Settlement structures the Settler’s relationship to the Native, the Black and nature as a relation of negation. Settlement also creates complex ontological positions that are constituted by both states of stasis and flux. What I mean by this is that some bodies (Native and Black) are relegated to a permanent position of flux. Native bodies are always slipping into death, Black bodies are always sliding into states of fungibility and accumulation. The flux and instability of the Black and the Native enable the Settler to experience a self actualizing state of both libratory stability and transcendent autonomy. The ontological positions of the Native (slipping into death) and the Black (sliding into fungibility and accumulation) are positions of fixed-flux. As Wilderson argues these positions do not occupy the universal liberal orienting and humanizing frames of time and space. They are fixed and rooted in a place of elimination and expanding use for the settler’s unending pursuit of self actualization. By settling, or gaining an exclusive claim to time and space, the Settler is able to simultaneously become a stable, coherent and autonomous human subject who occupies space while they also experience hyper mobility, transcendence and self directed transformation. The Settler moves back and forth at will between states of rootedness and mobility, stability and postmodern (self determined) constructedness. The Settlers’ unfettered movement between these contradictory spaces and states is predicated on the “fixed-flux” of Native and Black bodies. Fixed-flux is the underside of the Settler’s unfettered mobility and self actualization. It is always being susceptible to having the world flipped upside down at the whim of another (the Settler). Settlement functions like a violent form of deconstruction. Settlement as a gratuitously violent project that kills the Native and accumulates the Black also reorganizes discourse. The relationship that exists between the signifier and signified for concepts like autochthony and indigeneity and words like clearing under conditions of settlement become shifting ground beneath our feet.17 The prior meanings held by the terms and words autochthonous, indigenous and clearing are destabilized and then completely evacuated due to the material and discursive muscle of settlement. At the site of the clearing, Settlers are able to become autochthonous and indigenous at the same time. Frank Wilderson helps us think about the kind of discursive and material violence that occurs within what he calls the “Settler/Master/Human’s grammatical structure.”18 Within this grammatical structure, Wilderson argues that there is a disavowal of the violence of genocide in the way the settler narrates the formation of the US. On one level, the disavowal occurs through the settler’s preferred part of speech. Clearing is only spoken of as a noun in the Settler/Master/Human’s grammatical structure. Clearing is never used as a verb in the human’s grammatical structure. Wilderson draws our attention to its use: “Clearing, in the Settler/Savage” relation, has two grammatical structures, one a noun and the other as a verb. But the Western only recognizes clearing as a noun. But prior to the clearing’s fragile infancy, that is before its cinematic legacy as a newborn place name, it labored not across the land as a noun but as a verb on the body of the “Savage,” speaking civil society’s essential status as an effect for genocide.”19 This discursive displacement represents an actual displacement. As the Settler/Master/Human renders the clearing a static place, void of settler violence and absent of indigenous bodies and relations to the land, the Settler also indigenizes themselves to this abstract space. The Settler is allowed to merge with the land as they root themselves. They become autochthonous people that “sprang up from the land.”20 Settlers are now the group of humans that establish a right/righteous relationship with the land. Settlers proclaim themselves the new indigenous population. The original indigenous peoples are stripped of their indigeneity and rendered dead. Within the process of settlement, the indigenous people become embedded in or are literally buried as the dead within the land. The Settler then assumes a new autochthonous identity and emerges from the earth anew. Even when the Settler indigenizes or roots themselves into the land; they do not become stuck there like Native peoples. In her book, Black Body: Women, Colonialism and Space, Radhika Mohanram spends time explaining how enlightenment notions of the Indigene and European binary operate.21 The body conceived as incarcerated by nature is partially achieved by the discursive construction of the native as a “person who is born and thus belongs to a certain place,” and is in fact over determined by that place.22 The European on the other hand can be of a place but is not incarcerated by it like the Native. Their settler “indigeneity” offers them “unfettered mobility” as well as unfettered self actualization. Native people do not acquire this through their indigenous status. Upon encountering the settler (who becomes indigenous) the Native experiences their indigeneity as non-existence and death. The clearing also shapes Blackness as it carves out the settlement-plantation. The clearing in its verb form certainly labored across the bodies of Native people. However, the clearing also worked on and transformed the bodies of Blacks. The Black body is turned into the Settled-slave. Nana and Elizabeth Peazant are Settled-slaves whose bodies evince the way that the process of settling “cleared” Blacks of all spatial coordinates that could make them human during this process of making the settlement/plantation. Blacks become mere ‘states of flux,” and the atomic potential for space. At the site of the clearing, both a spatial and ontological production, Black bodies are the raw material and precursor to space. While Black bodies are geographic and necessary to the production of space they are not geographic subjects that humanly inhabit space at the site of the clearing.23 As geographic—dark—matter and material under settlement they make space possible but cannot occupy it. Existing in a continual state of liminality and change Black femaleness is a place making unit but not in place. Place is where humanness resides. According to Tim Cresswell, place and its links to humanness, morality and identity are a part of a humanistic project.24 For the humanist undertaking geography, “ontological priority was given to the human immersion in place rather than the abstractions of geometric space.”25 The humanist concept of place is accompanied by the baggage of morality, identity, authenticity and exclusion.26 Within modern thought systems, there is a tendency to locate people with certain identities in certain places. There is also a tendency within this metaphysical framework to imagine “mobile people in wholly negative ways.”27 Bodies on the move or sentient beings in a state of “fixed-flux” who slip into death like the Native or slide and transform as fungible flesh have no place and are considered suspect within this worldview. McKittrick argues that Black subjects, specifically Black women are geographic subjects. Wilderson on the other hand argues throughout Red, White and Black that Blacks have no spatial coordinates or place for that matter. I however, hold these two thinkers understandings of Black peoples relationship to space in tension. I argue that Blacks are crucial to the production of Settler space, however can not occupy it on the Settler’s terms. Cresswell argues that since antiquity, western philosophy has enshrined space as universal and abstract. People, bodies and the particular aspects of mere place did not belong there. That is until the 1970s when “humanistic geographers” attempted to repeople space and focus on the “geographical nature of being in the world.” 97 Through humanist articulations and re-theorizations of place, the universal and abstract notion of space becomes humanized and exclusionary admitting only a select group of people. Making a place is also about making a home.28 Place (and space) as home was functioning within imperialist endeavors of the enlightenment far before human geographers of the 1970s named it as such. As a geographer, Tuan has focused a great deal of attention on the extent to which people have attempted to “create order and homeliness out of the apparent chaos of raw nature.”29 In fact “the concept of place is central to our understanding of how people turn nature into culture by making it their home.”30 What happens when this humanist endeavor of turning nature/chaos into culture/order/home meets up with the imperialist endeavor? Sylvia Wynter argues that both the Native and the Black are considered states of non-Reason and chaos within Enlightenment humanism. Under imperialism, both the bodies and the lands of Native and Black people were states of chaos that needed to be ordered. While Tuan’s configuration of place and the transformation of raw nature into a home for humankind does not have the violent and exclusionary form of the human in mind, my reconfiguration of the place of settlement does. The landscapes of settlement, when they appear to the eye as a tranquil pasture with a log cabin or people sun bathing on a beach conceal the violent processes hidden in the clearing. One way of revealing what is hidden is through rethinking what a landscape is and how it functions. Richard Schein presents an interpretation of landscape as a process. 98 In fact, Schein argues that landscape is always in the “process of becoming.”31 Another aspect of Schein’s theorization of the landscape that is productive is that he construes the landscapes as having material and epistemological value. The epistemology of the landscape disciplines those who come into contact with it. The disciplinary element of landscape is embedded in the fact that the material aspect of the landscape is seen, and presents itself as linear and objective.32 The landscape is in fact not self evident but duplicitous.33 Likewise settlement as a process and what it achieves even in its materiality (clearing, settlement-plantation) is not self-evident but multivalent and at times counter intuitive. What is hidden is that settlement is not just the making of a physical location for the Settler; rather, what is concealed is the simultaneous process of the Settler rooting in order to launch. Settlement is the subjugation and sinking/fixing of others into a state of flux (death, fungibility) in order for the Settler to transcend into a state of humanness. As the ultimate self actualizing human, the Settler can actually overcome the particularity of place (body, gender, race, abject sexuality) and launch into universal and abstract space (humanness). To be human in Frank Wilderson’s terms is to have “cartographic capacity.”34 “Spatial and temporal capacity is so immanent on the field of Whiteness that the effects and permutations of its ensemble of questions and the kinds of White bodies that can mobilize this universe of combinations are seemingly infinite as well.”35 To be a 99 Savage or to be Black is to exist in the realm of no time and space.36 An apt visual for what happens when the Settler (noun) settles (verb) both people and land is one of a propelling long jumper. A long jumper is a subject who plants in order to launch oneself into space. This process of disciplining bodies, land and the viewers’ eye is hard to always perceive. One of the ways that landscapes come into view and also obscure themselves is through the representational work of archives. Archives often stand as material records, locations, buildings, people, narratives and discourses where we are often told that truth can be found. Schein’s description of a cultural landscape as “discourse materialized” opens up the possibility of reading the archive, specifically Eliza Lucas Pinckney’s archive as a discourse that “touch[es] ground.”37 I would like to unsettle and disrupt the ways that the Eliza Lucas Pinckney archive creates a landscape of settlement that veils the ways that place/non-place and human/non-human ontologies are being created at her Wappoo, Waccamaw and Garden Hill settlement plantations. I also want to expose the way that she is made to function outside of the category of the Settler/Master. Many historians can remark on the rather pristine and harmonious depictions of her as a slave master. Few remark on the fact that she had great stakes in and supported the death of the Cherokee in the Indian Wars. And there are almost no analyses of the ways that both her Master and Settler status constituted one another and required the negation of both the Native and the Black in order to make her a human.

### 1NC – Link – Black Ontology

#### Social Death framing is bad– framing blackness around social death reinscribes the colonial hierarchy of the settler.

Walker 12 [Tracey, Birbeck University Masters in Psychosocial Studies, “The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance”, Graduate Journal of Social Science, 9.2, July, JSTOR, July 17, 2017] KLu

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as vic­tims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transat­lantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed de­stroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson’s (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life ‘were not in fact the living dead’, but ‘the mothers of gasping new societ­ies’ (Brown 2009, 1241). The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in or­der to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These ‘run­aways’ were in fact ‘ferocious fight­ers and master strategists’, building towns and military bases which en­abled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism in­herent within the story of the slave ‘hero’ by the very revelation that their leader, ‘Queen Nanny’ was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a lead­er, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an ‘old hagg’ or ‘obeah’ woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representa­tion of a figure whose gender defy­ing acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imagi­nary and as such ‘the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression’ (Gotlieb 2000, 84). The label of ‘social death’ is re­jected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon’s (1967) assertion that ‘not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man’ (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to un­derstand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the back­drop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the ‘death’ one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into ‘life’, one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject’s right to live or die: this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of sub­ject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fan­tasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65). The point to make here is that al­though the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to de­scribe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of ter­ror. In keeping with Gilroy’s (1993b) argument that the memory of slav­ery must be constructed from the slaves’ point of view, we might in­stead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the hegemonic discourse which ne­gated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communi­cation which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This cre­ative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mu­tual recognition. In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded 8. Young’s argu­ment that ‘one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white peo­ple’s role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression’, appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll re­veals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation ‘immi­grants’ believe that voting ‘doesn’t matter’.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the ‘lived contra­diction’ of being black and English which affects one’s confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European supe­riority (Gilroy 1993a). Without con­sidering the slaves’ capacity for sur­vival and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity. The Maroons story how­ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery’s abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

### 1NC – Link – Decol Metaphors

#### Coloniality is not a metaphor, not a joint struggle for human rights, and not a fight against whiteness – it cannot be incorporated or encapsulted into some new form of scholarship – you cannot decolonize asia by voting affirmative at a highschool debate tournament – there is no way to graft the struggle into this space, and their attempt to do so only decenters decoloniality

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Our goal in this article is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization. Decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. The easy adoption of decolonizing discourse by educational advocacy and scholarship, evidenced by the increasing number of calls to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or, “decolonize student thinking”, turns decolonization into a metaphor. As important as their goals may be, social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches that decenter settler perspectives have objectives that may be incommensurable with decolonization. Because settler colonialism is built upon an entangled triad structure of settler-native-slave, the decolonial desires of white, nonwhite, immigrant, postcolonial, and oppressed people, can similarly be entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler colonialism. The metaphorization of decolonization makes possible a set of evasions, or “settler moves to innocence”, that problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. In this article, we analyze multiple settler moves towards innocence in order to forward “an ethic of incommensurability” that recognizes what is distinct and what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. We also point to unsettling themes within transnational/Third World decolonizations, abolition, and critical spaceplace pedagogies, which challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors, making room for more meaningful potential alliances. Keywords: decolonization, settler colonialism, settler moves to innocence, incommensurability, Indigenous land, decolonizing education 2 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 36 Let us admit it, the settler knows perfectly well that no phraseology can be a substitute for reality. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 45 Introduction For the past several years we have been working, in our writing and teaching, to bring attention to how settler colonialism has shaped schooling and educational research in the United States and other settler colonial nation-states. These are two distinct but overlapping tasks, the first concerned with how the invisibilized dynamics of settler colonialism mark the organization, governance, curricula, and assessment of compulsory learning, the other concerned with how settler perspectives and worldviews get to count as knowledge and research and how these perspectives - repackaged as data and findings - are activated in order to rationalize and maintain unfair social structures. We are doing this work alongside many others who - somewhat relentlessly, in writings, meetings, courses, and activism - don’t allow the real and symbolic violences of settler colonialism to be overlooked. Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym. Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants. There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of moves to innocence (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Here, to explain why decolonization is and requires more than a metaphor, we discuss some of these moves to innocence: 1 As an Indigenous scholar and a settler/trespasser/scholar writing together, we have used forward slashes to reflect our discrepant positionings in our pronouns throughout this essay. 4 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang i. Settler nativism ii. Fantasizing adoption iii. Colonial equivocation iv. Conscientization v. At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples vi. Re-occupation and urban homesteading Such moves ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation. Actually, we argue, attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won’t get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. Thus, we also include a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability.

### 1NC – Link – ESSA

#### ESSA is a settler ploy – a myth to maintain discipline from the colonized.

Juarez and Pierce 17 [Anita, Professor at the University of Utah, Clayton, Professor at Western Washington University, “Educational Enclosure and the Existential Commons: Settler Colonialism, Racial Capitalism, and the Problem of the Human” in the book “Educational Commons in Theory and Practice”, Palgrave MacMillan, February 28, 2017, PDF, pg 145-166, June 29, 2017] KLu

\*errors due to ocr

Homo ECONOMICUS AND THE ESSA: RACIAL CAPITALIST SCHOOLING IN THE NEOLIBERAL PERIOD In this final section we apply Wilderson, Jackson, and Coulthard's analyt-ics of land, labor, and antiblackness to the ESSA. We do this to show how enclosure in the example of school policy involves more than a repro-ductive strategy used by state and corporate actors to bolster neoliberal economic arrangements. Centered on creating policy and practice "inno-vations" as a response to the failed NCLB policies, the ESSA reframes the government's approach to dealing with the ongoing achievement gap between low-income students of color and white students through a neoliberal governance approach. Initially, a major point of contention regarding the ESSA policy is how it allows for teacher preparatory acad-emies backed by corporate philanthropists to be sites of teacher educa-tion and credentialing (Strauss, 2015). What we want to highlight here, however, is how its insistence upon a human capital model of subjectivity, homo economicus, allows neoliberal educational enclosures to proliferate. Yet, we also suggest the need to take up the ways primitive accumula-tion and its systems of enclosure have fostered an ontological condition of humanity based on imperial and antiblack values. In other words, we want to ask how home economicus serves not only to animate the ESSA's economic project of increasing and optimizing the human capital stock of the educational population in the US by deregulating teacher education, but also how critiques of neoliberal polices ignore the way such polices preserve an ontological condition based on antiblackness, land disposses-sion, and settler labor. In this sense, we echo De Lissovoy et al.'s (2014) recent call to revision a new common school movement in the US. For them a new commons movement in education "is an effort to strengthen and reconceptual-ize public schooling for a genuinely democratic society beyond the crisis and failure of neoliberalism." Such a reconstruction of the educational commons would include not "merely need[ing] to defend public school-ing; we need to remake it. We believe that engagement with the theory and practice of the global commons provides a set of creative and ethical referents suitable to this task" (p. vii). Within such a reconstructive edu-cational project we suggest that an abolitionary pedagogy—centered on fungibility, land dispossession in settler societies, and labor as more than a linear-progressive concept—as key analytic points of departure for a new commons movement in education. Let us now look at the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) policy to see what a theory of abolitionary pedagogy linked to a commons movement in education would need to emphasize. As many theorists have pointed out, homo economicus is the operative human subject from which neoliberal rationalities and governing practices are derived (Brockling, 2011; Foucault, 2008; Olssen, 2006; Peters, 2005; Pierce, 2013a). Where there has been very little work, however, is in the area of better understanding how homo economicus reaffirms whiteness and settler identities through a colorblind market rationality. In other words, homo economicus's agency in the world is based on the individual's ability to compete and be held responsible for their entrepreneurial decision mak-ing in market-based society. In this ontological schema, whiteness and the privileges it endows subjects with is erased and masked over with notions of meritocracy, equality through market freedom, and other myths that construct the white imaginary since the founding of the country. What the "achievement gap" discourse allows, when connected to neoliberal govern-ing reform approaches to education like the ESSA, is a way to not only main-tain but also discipline the material and psychic social conditions in schools and society where whiteness is constantly equated to being fully human. For example, in his remarks on the passage of ESSA, former Secretary of Education Arne Duncan situated the piece of legislation as part of the long civil rights struggle to attain equal and high-quality education for working-class students of color. Within the civil rights framework, Duncan suggested that ESSA is "about what kind of opportunity Brandon, Russhaun, Federico Christina and Star have. Throughout our nation's history, the federal government has played an important role in protecting their civil rights" (Duncan, 2015). Duncan's framing of the ESSA within the civil rights legacy is important because it is based in the liberal human-ist tradition where the rights-bearing individual achieves freedom and equality through property possession and competitive advantage, all of which are supported and recognized by the (neo)liberal state. Moreover, it normalizes the assumption that access to state-sponsored resources, like public education, is a sufficient measure to tackle social and economic inequities. It ignores, for instance, the way state-recognized solutions have historically sought to dilute and co-opt racial justice and struggles for autonomy and self-determination (Coulthard, 2014; Melamed, 2011; Schnyder, 2010; Stern & Hussain, 2015). What we want to emphasize about the ESSA again is not the particular ways it advances the neoliberal restructuring of education, though this is also important, but rather how such policies fit within the larger governing logic of the settler colonial and racial capitalist state that predate neoliberal forms of governance. To be clear about what we mean here we provisionally outline what educational enclosures associated with the ESSA look like within the coordinates laid out by Coulthard, Jackson, and Wilderson's work analyzed above. With the analytics of fungibility, land dispossession/rights discourses, and labor as a linear-progressive Western concept in view, we can see not only the underlying liberal political economic assumptions of policies like the ESSA, but also the liberal humanist definition that animates how stu-dents/people are understood and measured as rights possessors and accu-mulatory subjects. From the standpoint of fungibility, the ESSA activates the "achievement gap" as a tool of the racial capitalist/settler state in that it sets up students of color (who the policy frames as the gapped population) for participation in an exchange-value system of education steeped in the co-articulating projects of white supremacy and capitalist accumulation. In other words, the ESSA policy as a human capital development strategy encloses students and communities of color by forcing them to play the rigged game of entrepreneurial market decision making in the new educa-tional "flat world" while also holding them accountable to the amount of human capital investments made over their educational lifetime. Here the benefits of whiteness are not accounted for; instead, they are built into the performative logics of an educational landscape based on the ontological subjugation of students of color and in particular the historical pattern of antiblackness schooling the US has always upheld and reconstructed in a variety of ways (Dumas, 2014). The achievement gap population is neces-sary, in other words, to support the white accumulation of "better" forms of education—fungibility here allows educational actors to choose from market menus that reinscribe social and political conditions of social death for students and communities of color and Indigenous populations while creating the conditions of full humanity that can only be achieved through accumulation connected to the fungibility of "gap" populations. The use value of gap populations generated in racial capitalist-settler colonial schooling contexts, in other words, is defined by how these groups exist as exchange value in the racial capitalist economy of schooling in the US. When we apply Coulthard's analytic of primitive accumulation attuned to rights-based political discourses and land dispossession, we can see how the ESSA preserves white-settler identity by affirming education as funda-mentally an accumulatory project supported and recognized by the state. In this sense, as a human capital accumulation model, the ESSA affirms and teaches settler rights to property (both in the form of educational property such as elite charter school access and connected neighborhood gentrification projects) by enclosing educational value into commodifi-able and exchangeable forms. For example, while the ESSA may seem only to focus and promqte educational reforms in the US around solving the persistent problem of the "achievement gap," it is also a normalizing governing tool that teaches white subjects and people of color to under-stand themselves as homo economicus—rights bearers and accumulators of human capital investments and resources. Coulthard's work thus highlights the way enclosure happens at the level of subject production, connecting to work in educational theory that cri-tiques neoliberal subjectivities (De Lissovoy et al., 2014; Slater, 2014). Individuals, through settler colonial processes and systems of the state like educational institutions, are taught to understand themselves through rights based and generated from the accumulatory property (both in terms of land and whiteness as property) system of settler colonial states. Here, we would argue that part of the solution of closing the gap offered by ESSA is in effect enforcing forms of recognition (how the state and its institu-tions view and govern its citizens) based on colonial power relations. As Coulthard argues, building off Indigenous scholar/activist Taiaiake Alfred's work, "colonial recognition politics serves the imperatives of capitalist accu-mulation by appearing to address its colonial history through symbolic acts of redress while in actuality 'further entrenching in law and practice the bases of its control'" (p. 155). So, in this sense, the ESSA enforces a type of subjectivity where only through acquiring forms of human capital can individuals seemingly become a marketable educational subject—ongoing primitive accumulation takes place through the subject's internal recogni-tion of property acquisition in terms of valuable human capital dispensa-ries (i.e. elite charter schools, segregated districts, etc.)—which connects to another important type of possession through accumulation. Finally, Shona Jackson's work offers another important insight in terms of how we might think of educational enclosure today, and similarly, what a commoning movement in education should entail. Specifically, we argue that Jackson's work of rethinking the Marxist notion of labor as an inher-ently emancipatory concept is invaluable because it offers a productive critique to Marxist-influenced education literatures, such as critical peda-gogy. For example, in looking at the question of human capital accumula-tion as the predominant model of education in the US today, a Marxist approach would highlight the ways neoliberal education based on skill acquisition and entrepreneurial behavior is ultimately a dehumanizing and alienating theory and practice in which to organize education in society. While we would fundamentally agree with this analysis, we would also argue that it is also limited by starting with the question of how human creative, imaginative, and productive powers are distorted, disfigured, and usurped for the needs of the capitalist production process and the endless hunt for surplus labor value. Jackson's work illustrates for us that while labor was the key categorical target to focus on in industrial capitalist set-tings in Europe (and the colonial world) for Marx, it doesn't adequately account for the ways labor also plays a crucial role in maintaining settler colonial relations even in political contexts oriented toward liberation and anti-colonial political movements. Precisely because, as an emancipatory concept, labor in the Marxist tradition is still rooted in a progressive-linear model of state development that constructs humanity within the limits of how it is alienated or exploited in capitalist organized societies. Jackson's study of creole indigeneity, on the other hand, shows how labor even in Marxist revolutionary settings is built on the erasure of Indigenous peoples (it is their land being labored on to develop into a modern nation state and a corollary notion of citizenship). It also shows how enclosure vis-à-vis Black (creole people of Guyana in the case of Jackson's example) communities work through their participation in settler colonial practices of nation building that require land to meet the productive needs of mod-ern states, socialist, capitalist, or communist. So, in taking Jackson's critique of labor and applying it to the problem of human capital educational models, we argue it offers a more penetrat-ing explanation to the question of educational labor within the neoliberal educational context. Namely, while homo economicus is a deeply alien-ated human subject because his (homo economicus is also a patriarchal subject) productive capacities are locked within the accumulatory limits of skill and behavior acquisition most valuable within neoliberal society, a revolutionary Marxist subject whose labor has been emancipated from the model of homo economicus does not necessarily overcome the underly-ing developmental model of modern society where production and land (nature) are still required to realize full humanity. In other words, even if the problem of alienated labor is addressed by emancipating human labor power from the clutches of the capitalist mode of production in its neolib-eral phase, how does the question of land and racial domination get dealt with by placing productive powers in the hands of the 99%?

### 1NC – Link – High Stakes Testing

#### High stakes testing is rooted in settler colonial logic – an attempt to erase certain types of knowledge while propping up others.

Tuck and Gorlewski 16 [Eve, Professor at SUNY, Julie, Department Chair and Associate Professor of Education at Virgina Commonwealth University, “Racist Ordering, Settler Colonialism, and edTPA: A Participatory Policy Analysis”, Sage Publications, 2016 Vol. 30(1) 197–217, June 22, 2017] KLu

Education Policy: Instantiating Racist Ordering Education policy in the United States today is perceived, developed, and enacted in ways that put Whiteness in the most powerful position of every racist ordering. White, primarily middle-class norms of language and culture, are consistently privileged in institutions of public education, regardless of the presence of teachers and students of color. In recent decades, neoliberal reforms have reinforced narratives that focus on outcomes and buttress perspectives supporting an “achievement gap,” related to academic promise and education policies, rather than an “opportunity gap,” related to “job, wage, housing, tax, and transportation policies that maintain poverty” (Anyon, 2005, p. 66). The language of a “gap” at all, of course, is a reifying of the racist ordering so typical of U.S. education policy. As measures of learning become increasingly standardized, what it means to be an educated person contracts. That policies are created and implemented through racist ordering means that many of the learners whose experiences of school are most negative are Black and Brown (Gillborn, 2005; Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux, 2001). Keisch and Scott (2015) note that “while there is indeed a growing state level and national movement against corporate education reform, it is essential that this struggle be centered in the fight for racial justice throughout society” (n.p., emphasis added). They identify three mechanisms of White supremacy through education policy: “the notion of ‘choice’ and charters, high-stakes testing, and discipline and criminalizationn” (Keisch & Scott, 2015, n.p.). Although these interrelate, our project focused on highstakes testing, as edTPA provided an immediate example of this mechanism. Standardized examinations have a long, well-documented history of justifying and reproducing discrimination (Au, 2009). Although cloaked in the guise of objectivity and swathed in the myth of meritocracy, high-stakes assessments are forms of racist ordering. As P. L. Thomas (2015) asserts, The accountability era over the past thirty years—based significantly on standards and high-stakes testing—has not confronted and eroded race and class inequity, but in fact, and notably because of the central roles of standardized testing, race and class inequity has become even more entrenched in our schools and society . . . The essential flaw with continuing to cling to high-stakes standardized testing is two-fold: (1) the tests are race, class, and gender biased, and (2) the demand that (educators) raise test scores keeps all the attention on outcomes (and not the policies and practices that create the inequity). (n.p.) Thomas (2015) continues, “As such, the demand remains that black, brown, and poor children (and adults) are themselves flawed and must be ‘fixed’” (n.p.). As we explain below, edTPA is consistent with many of the corporate education reforms which do little to reduce poverty yet focus on outcomes with funding consequences for low performance. The edTPA, on the surface, appears to be race neutral, as well as neutral with regard to class and first language. However, in practice, especially as it has been implemented in New York State, it disincentivizes teacher candidates from seeking student teacher placements in high-needs schools. Even worse, it may communicate to teacher candidates that they cannot get certification if they work in classrooms with students of color, English language learners, and/or students living in poverty. This impression, accurate or not, will surely have consequences for how newly certified teachers in New York State perceive these schools and classrooms. The edTPA in New York State Prior to 2013-2014, Schools of Education and other teacher certification programs in New York State had the primary role in determining readiness for the classroom. In recent decades, teacher candidates in New York State have been required to complete an accredited program and be recommended by the program for licensure. In addition, they had to pass two examinations—one of which focused on pedagogical knowledge and the other related to specific content area knowledge relevant for their respective certification. Claiming that the passing rate of these examinations was too low for such an important profession, and arguing that the related lack of teacher quality was a primary reason for failing public schools and the racially defined “achievement gap,” New York State officials kept the content test and implemented two additional assessments: the Educating All Students (EAS) test and the Academic Literacy Skills Test (ALST). Consistent with their role of standardized tests as mechanisms of exclusion (Au, 2009), examinations such as the content specialty test, EAS test, and the ALST have already proven to produce results that privilege White over non-White test takers. To fulfill the conditions of New York State’s application for the federal Race to the Top grant program, which required evidence of tougher teacher certification examinations, New York State also implemented a fourth standardized assessment—a performance assessment called edTPA. Based on the Performance Assessment for California Teachers (PACT) used for teacher certification in California, edTPA (previously titled TPA) was developed by the Stanford faculty in cooperation with staff at the Stanford Center for Assessment, Learning, and Equity (SCALE). To facilitate administration and scoring of the assessment, SCALE partnered with Pearson, Inc. After a brief, partial (some certification areas were not part of the pilot program) pilot period, New York State mandated edTPA for candidates who complete requirements for initial certification after May 1, 2014. Candidates must submit to Pearson a series of two to five lessons, corresponding commentaries, and one to two videoclips reflecting 15 to 20 min of uninterrupted instruction. Tasks align with three areas: planning, instruction, and assessment. Submissions, which are commonly 30+ pages of text and supporting materials composed by candidates in response to prompts, are scored in association with 15 rubrics. Wrapped in the rhetoric of professionalism and quality, edTPA represents the normalization of teaching as a technical and apolitical act, of examinations as meaningful measures of complex acts and useful instruments for surveillance and discipline, and of relationships and local contexts as subordinate to distant, objective expertise. All these consequences are subsumed in discourses of equity, achievement, and teacher quality, with Black and Brown students in poor schools often described as the beneficiaries of examinations that will raise standards for teachers. Such consequences are rooted in policies that see teaching, learning, and knowledge as value-free and apolitical (Apple, 2000; Au, 2009; Ball, 1993). Neither knowledge nor the act of teaching is neutral or apolitical. What counts as knowledge, and how privileged knowledge is fostered and assessed, is largely promoted as natural, normal, and “common sense.” In practice, however, curriculum is contested and all teaching is political; gaps represent deficits in socially constructed norms, not the students to whom the disparities are assigned. Curriculum, like policy, is socially constructed, and unless interrupted, schooling works to reinforce existing power relations. A performance assessment meant to be implemented during the student teaching experience, edTPA requires candidates to submit a portfolio that demonstrates effective teaching as defined by a series of prompts and evaluated by a set of rubrics. As teacher educators, we immediately recognized the likely consequences of this assessment, and our concerns were quickly borne out. As a result of this policy initiative, our institution allocated significant resources—including a full-time coordinator—to prepare faculty and students to earn passing scores on edTPA. Composing and organizing files to submit as part of the portfolio dominated the student teaching experiences, infiltrating interactions among candidates, mentor teachers, faculty supervisors, and college faculty. Precious time, energy, and resources were devoted to anticipating how scorers (who were hired, trained, and assigned by Pearson) might evaluate portfolios. In a very real sense, edTPA intruded on our teacher education program, defining teaching in ways that constrained and reduced it to a series of technical, predictable, and visible acts. It encroached on faculty time, distracting teacher educators from scholarship and program planning. Moreover, the videoclip requirement raised additional concerns about which students in which classes would illustrate the kind of classroom that would result in a high score. Teacher candidates wondered aloud how student behavior that did not conform to White, middle-class, academic norms might influence scorers’ evaluations, especially as scorers would be unfamiliar with local contexts. Thus, faculty members were justifiably worried that edTPA would have a chilling effect on candidates’ requests for student teacher placements.

### 1NC – Link – Language Education

#### Land relations are inevitable tied the language of the indigenous. The affs language learning is a multicultural ploy with the purpose of cultural assimilation of indigenous peoples, who’s language is papered over by the multitude of settler tongues.

Iyengar 14 [Malathi Michelle, Professor at UC San Diego, “Not mere abstractions: Language policies and language ideologies in U.S. settler colonialism”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, pp. 33-59, July 19, 2017] KLu

We can instructively juxtapose such arguments with the justifications given by the promoters of public schooling for whites. In order to carry out a comparative cost-benefit analysis of “educating” Indians versus killing them, one has to have considered both possibilities. The promoters of the white common school used a range of arguments to advance their cause, but they never argued that investing in education for white children would avert the greater financial expense of killing them. While the strategy for drawing Euro/American settlers into the common schools consisted of implementing curricula to their liking – i.e., in their mothertongues – the strategy for ensuring that the Natives sent their children to (settler-controlled) schools was brute coercion. Oral histories and official archives are replete with stories of Native children forcibly removed from their homes and placed in boarding schools. Yes, some Native parents sent their children to boarding schools voluntarily, and some children even enrolled themselves. Note, however, that while some Native families were able to exercise a choice about whether or not to send their children to the schools, they were not given any choice about what these schools should do for (or to) their children. Euro/American settlers could say, “I’ll send my children to the common school, if and only if that school provides education in our mothertongue.” Native parents could say, “I’ll send my children to the off-reservation Indian boarding school,” but did not have the option of adding, “only if you agree not to beat our language out of them while they’re there.” In contrast to the biopolitical project of state-funded education for settler children, the schools for Indigenous children constituted an explicitly necropolitical endeavor. As Commissioner of Indian Affairs Henry Price proclaimed, “Savage and civilized life cannot live and prosper on the same ground. One of the two must die” (qtd. in Adams, 1995, p. 15). I have already noted the line of thinking that said it was less costly to educate the Indians than to kill them but, in fact, boarding schools sought to do both. As Lieutenant Richard Henry Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, explained, the aim was to “Kill the Indian and save the man.” The statement is well-known, but the question here is: How did such a statement translate into practice, and why was language so important to that practice? To address this question, we first recall Wolfe’s (2006) critique of the term “cultural genocide.” As Wolfe notes, this expression can all too easily be misconstrued as suggesting that genocide is either biological (i.e. “real” genocide) or “cultural” (i.e. directed only at “culture” and not at human bodies, therefore not real genocide). “In practice,” Wolfe points out, “it should go without saying that the imposition on a people of the procedures and techniques that are generally glossed as ‘cultural genocide’ is certainly going to have a direct impact on that people’s capacity to stay alive” (pp. 398-399). Wolfe’s point here bears multiple layers of relevance to the question of language policy. Remember that “a language”, a “mothertongue,” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was commonly viewed as constitutive of the spiritual and biological essence of “a people,” as well as a “natural” feature of a landscape. From a twenty-first century perspective, a language is in fact a biological (though not inherent or inherited) trait, to the extent that a language resides in the neural pathways of the brain of a speaker (as well as in the inter-mental space between speakers). Either way, if we were to speak of “cultural” and “biological” genocides, linguicide would constitute both of the above. Wolfe’s point, of course, is that terms such as “cultural genocide” might misleadingly suggest an absence of “biological” destruction. In fact, the issue of linguicide epitomizes two arguments made by Wolfe: one, that the relationship of the “cultural” to the “biological” is not an “either/or,” but a “both/and”; two, that the policies “generally glossed as ‘cultural genocide’” will obviously have an adverse impact upon people’s literal “ability to stay alive.” Moving away from the vocabulary of “cultural genocide,” Wolfe uses the more integrated term “structural genocide” – a phrase that reflects the fact that, under settler colonialism, genocide is a structure rather than an event. The attack on Indigenous languages is a central component of structural genocide. In referring to the impact of linguicidal policies upon people’s basic ability to stay alive, I refer not to the idea of “cultural genocide,” but to the relationship – once again – between language and life. Language resides in the body. It is not an object – like a garment – that can simply be removed from the body and replaced with something else. Of all the things boarding schools sought to do in order to “kill the Indian,” none required so much action upon the body as the killing of language. Language cannot be simply separated from the body, or snipped off in one fell swoop. Language resides in the body. What this means is that the only way to decisively kill the language is to physically punish the body each time a bit of the undesired language emerges from it. And language often emerges involuntarily, because it is in-grained in the body, it is part of the very “grain” of the brain and therefore of the body. Many boarding school survivors recall being physically abused for speaking their languages. Settler children in many nineteenth century schools were also physically punished for misbehavior. The difference (apart from severity) was that for Indian students, unlike for most settler students, simply speaking in their languages constituted a form of “misbehavior.” Hence, for Indian students, their very being was defined as “misbehavior.” This point becomes particularly salient when we recall the connection, in nineteenth century European thought, between language and Being. Language was considered an inherent constituent of identity. As Humboldt had influentially proclaimed, “The language is as it were the external appearance of a people’s spirit; its language is its spirit and its spirit is its language; the two cannot be thought identically enough” (qtd. in Bush, 2009, p. 11). Language, as Humboldt put it, was the “spiritual exhalation” of the nation. The use of a bodily metaphor – “exhalation” – is telling. To kill the Indian (nation), this exhalation had to be prevented, suffocated. But that act of suffocation of language could not actually take place upon the “nation,” as a “nation” is an abstract concept and as such cannot be literally “suffocated.” That act of suffocation of language/nation had to be enacted upon the bodies of individual children. The word “nation” calls attention to another facet of why linguicide was a central component of the boarding school project. What made a “nation,” in much nineteenth-century European thought, was the organic linkage of “blood,” “soil,” and “language.” A group of people, linked (at least in theory) by common ancestry (“blood”), living on their native “soil,” and speaking a common “language”: this was a Nation. And language was the most important defining point in this blood-soil-language triad. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, considered one of the fathers of German nationalism, asserted in 1808: “It is incontestably true that, wherever a particular language is found, a separate nation exists which is entitled independently to take charge of its own affairs and govern itself” (qtd. in Crowley, 1996, p. 125). Humboldt wrote in 1823 that, “our historiography nowhere justifies the assumption that a nation ever existed prior to its language”; in 1830 he declared that “the concept of a nation must be based especially upon language… Language by its own force proclaims the national character” (qtd. in Coulmas, 1988, p. 9). The ever-poetic Herder rhetorically demanded, “Has a nation anything more precious than the language of its fathers? In it dwell its entire world of tradition, principles of existence, its whole heart and soul” (qtd. in Oakes, 2001, p. 22). In short, as Oakes (2001) notes, So strong was this tendency to link language and nation in the nineteenth century that Europe witnessed the advent of the Sprachnation (language nation), that is, a nation which uses language to justify its right to an independent state. Norwegian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Finnish and Turkish were all used as grounds for the formation of new nation-states in what has been termed the ‘second ecolinguistic revolution’ in Europe. (p. 23) The separation of Angloamerica from England, of course, had no recourse to any linguistic justification. Benedict Anderson (2006) notes this difference between settler nationalisms and the ethnolinguistic nationalisms of Europe: “…whether we think of Brazil, the USA, or the former colonies of Spain, language was not an element that differentiated them from their respective imperial metropoles.” These settler states were initiated by “people who shared a common language and common descent with those against whom they fought” (p. 47). Angloamerica, as a settler state, had no originating claim to a distinct language, but this lack posed no problem since settler states did not originate in the same way as ethnolinguistic nations. Hence it was no problem that the founding documents of the United States were written in English, nor was the U.S. state threatened by European settlers maintaining their heritage languages in America. Because the U.S. was a settler state, there was no need for a blood-soillanguage link. But the threat arose because there were groups of people who did appear to have a blood-soil-language link in/to various regions of the “United States.” Those people were the Indigenous nations. If ethnolinguistic nationalism presaged state-formation, and if a nation could be thought of in terms of the triad blood-soil-language, with language being the most important, then the Indigenous peoples, by European standards, clearly were nations. Seen this way, Indigenous languages linked People to Land. This connection between Native people and land had to be disarticulated. Disarticulation required the destruction of language. While the erasure of Indigenous languages prior to “wardship” had taken place through denial (the languages were less “developed” and therefore didn’t count), after wardship this erasure was enacted upon the bodies of children. The deaths of Native children in boarding schools were the result of malnutrition, exposure to disease, lack of medical care, and a range of other causes. Some deaths also resulted from severe physical abuse that was directly language related. Of course, since one of the major purposes of removing children from their families and sending them to off-reservation boarding schools in the first place was to eliminate Native languages, we might as well note that all boarding school deaths were language-related. In this sense, boarding schools were engaged in what John Mugane (2005) calls, “murdering the corporeal in order to destroy the linguistic” (p. 165). The policy of “murdering the corporeal in order to destroy the linguistic” is common in colonial and settler-colonial societies. Mugane discusses apartheid South Africa: In 1974, hundreds of students were shot by police during demonstrations against a decree making Afrikaans a compulsory medium of instruction in Black schools. “In a very real sense,” writes Mugane (2005), “languages were being shot at” in the streets of Soweto (p. 165). Mugane also writes of “linguistic Orientalism” and “linguistic incarceration.” Linguistic Orientalism involves the application of the practices and attitudes that Said famously termed “Orientalism” to the study of the languages of the colonized. Referring to “Afrolinguistic Orientalism,” Mugane notes that “What has been said about African languages… has been an important part of the arsenal that has been used to repress, stymie, and eventually destroy these languages” (2006, p. 12). Further, “Experts were important contributors to linguistic racism….Though colonialism was cast in [terms of ‘race’ and ‘culture’], an important part of its execution was the demonizing of native languages… a clear case of linguistic racism” (Mugane, 2005, p. 163). The reference to “experts” immediately recalls the American philologists. The phrase “linguistic incarceration” also bears a compelling relevance to the U.S. settler-colonial context. As Mugane notes, the “confinement of languages in people’s minds is the initial step in erasing them” (2005, p. 161).

### 1NC – Link – Military Bases

#### The aff’s preservation of US military bases sustains the global project of imperialism and exports US logics of settler colonialism to other parts of the world

JALAN 8 [Journal of Asian Liberation, “On the origins of anti-Asian racism and how we have fought back”, JALAN, September 21, 2008. <http://jalanjournal.org/2008/09/asians-against-white-supremacy/>, August 25, 2016] KLu

The fact that these stereotypes are so contradictory show their ludicrousness. Racists project their own fears, anxieties, desires, and aspirations onto us in order to suppress our self-government and make us into who they want us to be, even if what they want us to be makes no sense. But racist fears, anxieties, desires and aspirations are not simply the product of individual ill will â€“ they are shaped by powerful institutions. For example the U.S. military reproduces stereotypes of Asians as an aggressive, brainwashed Mongolian horde in order to raise support for their base expansion projects aimed at containing Chinese military power. Without U.S. military interests in Asia, this stereotype could have died out but instead it is growing. That’s why liberal strategies of “anti-racism” will not liberate us. Liberals encourage white people to question their stereotypes as part of confronting their “privilege.” They do not attempt to abolish the institutions like military bases that produce and reproduce these stereotypes to keep us subordinated. This editorial will examine the historic political, economic, and social origins of anti-Asian racism. Our goal is not to enlighten anyone’s consciousness but rather to expose the institutions that oppress us so we know who our enemies are and what we need to smash. The big picture: Facing the double-barreled shotgun of colonialism and empire In general, we can say that our enemies are the forces of white supremacy â€“ any institutions and practices that have the effect of elevating white people over people of color (including Asians) by subordinating and suppressing our attempts to be self-governing. In particular, there are two interlocking systems of white supremacy that shape the terrain of Asian American life and struggle. The first consists of the social relations formed by the colonial settlement of North America and the founding of the United States out of colonial settler states. It is the result of land stolen from American Indians and Chicano/as, the enslavement of Blacks, and the extreme exploitation of “free” Black, Indigenous, European, and Asian migrant labor. As a shorthand, we will call all of this “settlerism”.[1] Settlerism has created a legacy of terror, violence, and racial hierarchy which Asian Americans have had to navigate. From the moment we arrived as workers in the Wild Wild West we found ourselves facing down the barrels of guns originally pointed at Blacks and American Indians. Later, we found ourselves victims of a Jim-Crow-style legal system. It is only more recently that we have been championed as the “model minority”, a supposed solution to the “problem” of militant Black resistance to 500 years of settler terror. The racist rationale that created such an identification for Asian Americans is further explored below, as well as in other articles. The second system of white supremacy is related to settlerism but is more global. It consists of the social relations formed through the expansion of U.S. imperialism in Asia through military conquest (the colonization of the Philippines, the partition of Korea, the Vietnam War, etc.) and the domination of American multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank over Asian economies. U.S. Empire built off of earlier forms of European imperialism in Asia even as it modified them. Like them, it enforced the fiction of a white Western civilization reforming Asian barbarism. The experience of Asian Americans has been shaped by the fact that those who rule over us here in the U.S. also subjugated the countries we or our families came from. The architects of U.S. Empire in Asia created a whole string of lies about Asians being backwards, ignorant, weak, and undemocratic in order to justify this subjugation. These lies have been applied to us as well, preventing us from assimilating and becoming white like the formerly non-white immigrant groups from Europe did. In response many Asian Americans have chosen to be consistent and principled internationalists – we have known that our situation here will not improve unless people of color abroad defeat U.S. Empire. Others have bought into U.S. empire, claiming they are the “good” Asians, unlike those “bad” Asians over there who are prone to terrorism, fanaticism, Communism, or Islam. And of course US Empire has exported aspects of North American settlerist ideology to Asia, which is why so many of our aunties and uncles over there are scared of Black Americans even though they have never met any. In order to understand Asian American struggles we need to keep both of these systems of white supremacy in our headlights. We can’t adopt the all-too-common view that race in America is a simple binary of white over Black. Social relations in the U.S. are deeply shaped by U.S. imperialism in Asia, our peoples’ resistance to it, and our own struggles here in North America. But at the same time, we can’t pretend we’re in a national liberation struggle somewhere in Asia where we are the majority â€“ we are in the Western Hemisphere where our lives are forged in the Black-indigenous-white crucible and we need to seek our allies and define our enemies within this context.

### 1NC – Link – Narratives of Suffering

#### The aff’s pain-centered research is not catalyst for change, but merely retrenches the abdication of those they purport to help

Tuck and Yang 14

(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>) language edits marked by |||

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: **No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew**. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk**.** (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343). The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon|||their||| her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).

### 1NC – Link – School to Prison Pipeline

#### Settler Colonialism has structured the school to prison pipeline

Juarez and Pierce 17 [Anita, Professor at the University of Utah, Clayton, Professor at Western Washington University, “Educational Enclosure and the Existential Commons: Settler Colonialism, Racial Capitalism, and the Problem of the Human” in the book “Educational Commons in Theory and Practice”, Palgrave MacMillan, February 28, 2017, PDF, pg 145-166, June 29, 2017] KLu

\*errors due to ocr

COMMONALMES IN THE COMMONS LITERATURE Many contemporary scholars have now observed that primitive accumu-lation is an ongoing feature of capitalist societies rather than a distinct historical phase (Coulthard, 2014; De Angelis, 2001; De Lissovoy, 2008; Harvey, 2006; Perelman, 2000). The capitalist enclosure of communal spaces and basic necessities of life (i.e. land, education, housing, forms of work, food production and access, etc.) creates and coerces into exis-tence numerous levels of dependency across the globe in our age of neo-liberal ascendency and dominance. Primitive accumulation continues to appropriate epistemological, ecological, cultural, economic, and spiritual systems from across the globe (De Lissovoy et al., 2014). Through vari-ous "biopiracy" enterprises masquerading as development and natural conservation projects, for example, state/corporate neocolonial projects continue to viciously extract value from land, species, and Indigenous knowledge systems. Important to note is that besides producing plan-etary lethal effects, neoliberal forms of enclosure create unique levels of violence. Vandana Shiva (1988, 1999, 2005) and Silvia Federici's (2004, 2012) respective work, for instance, have brought attention to the rela-tionship between land dispossession, patriarchy, and reproductive work—and in particular how this connection has led to the transformation of the body and the elimination of women's power (Federici, 2004). Their work illustrates a highly important gendered dimension to the ways enclosures work within the contemporary processes of primitive accumulation, thus emphasizing how patriarchy and capitalism are an important power cou-pling of enclosure in Western modern history. Framing primitive accumulation as a necessary and ongoing set of pro-cedures, as opposed to confining it to a single historical moment, not only allows a consideration of the intrinsic role of violence and warfare in capitalist developments (Federici, 2002), but also encourages a sustained interrogation of the state as a key agent of enclosure (Harvey, 2007). Yet, within the uneven development projects driven by neoliberal state/corpo-rate interests where distinct geographic spaces of enclosure look different, De Angelis (2001) reminds us that because peoples from all across the world are facing similar neoliberal strategies of accumulation "it allows us to identify the broad essential question that any discussion on alternatives within the growing global anti-capitalist movement must pose: the issue of direct access to the means of existence, production and communication, the issue of the commons" (pp. 19-20). Crucially, institutions of education have been one of the most con-tested sites where enclosure and commons have been interrogated. This is in large part because creating economic and political dependency requires teaching people that they are incapable of learning outside the purview of expert control and that education is little more than a commodified prod-uct detached from autonomous social and cultural concerns (Mich, 1971). In the field of educational theory, several scholars have argued for the need to move away from forms of subjective enclosure caused by neolib-eral, educational policy and curriculum, and toward collective movements and spaces that can help facilitate subjectivities attuned to a politics of the common (De Lissovoy, 2011; De Lissovoy et al., 2014; Lewis, 2012; Means, 2013; Schnyder, 2010; Slater, 2014). In jumping to a politics of direct access around these different means of the commons, as the autonomist Marxist Massimo De Angelis sug-gests, we want to ask for a collective pause that considers whether the move to direct access to the means of production adequately deals with foundational assumptions about who can be fully human in the future commons. It is our contention that we must deeply reflect on how anti-blackness and settler colonialism complicate the idea of remaking our social existences through "direct access to the means of existence, pro-duction and communication." Here we would be in agreement with De Lissovoy et al. (2014) that "a new common school movement will need to challenge the whiteness of education," and abolish schools in neoliberal society that are part of a "racist containment of black and brown students in preparation for semipermanent marginalization within the flux of an uncertain service economy and prison state" (pp. 92-93). We would, however, suggest that one important place to start a radical educational movement based in a commons that "confront[s] the violent ontology that determines these students as mere objects or disposable instances of 'bare life'" is to begin to articulate what an abolitionary pedagogy might entail within the neoliberal education context (p. 93). Extending previous calls in educational theory for developing an abolitionary peda-gogy, we argue that it is important to link a theory and practice of abo-litionary pedagogy to the commons movement in education—reason being that the white world remains invested in an ontological basis of humanity that is measured by the accumulatory white subjects' ability to extract material and psychic wealth from the less than human "dark world" (Allen, 2004; Gillborn, 2005; Leonardo, 2002, 2009; Pierce, 2013b; Watkins, 2005). In fact, the white world's education has sup-ported and normalized this dehumanizing ethic. As part of a commons movement in education, an abolitionary ped-agogy would thus entail dismantling what Du Bois (1998) called the "wages of whiteness": the privileges white groups have accrued over the centuries in the US that advantages the "white world" with better social, economic, and psychic life conditions. In this sense, an abolition. ary pedagogy would need to draw on Du Bois's material and psychic concept of the "wages of whiteness" to confront how the white work-ing class learned to be antiblack because their ontological and material conditions are predicated on the dehumanized condition of the Black worker. A commons movement in education connected to an abolition-ary pedagogy would also need to articulate in practical terms how the original and sustained theft of land from Indigenous peoples are tied to the white accumulatory subject supported by the wages of white-ness and the ontological condition of antiblackness. Such a project, as the authors we turn to below suggest, would need to address how even Marxist revolutionary politics can harbor settler colonial values and fail to adequately see the ontological consequences of focusing on exploita-tion and alienation over fungibility. Here we might consider if calling for a politics of the commons based on a move to retake the means of production (especially how communities chow to educate them-selves) includes returning Indigenous lands and other forms of wealth to tribes across the Americas—both at a material, psychological (i.e. wages of whiteness), and organizational level. To begin to broaden Marxist oriented theorizations of the commons we now turn to work in the edu-cational literature that has advanced the analytic of primitive accumula-tion in some important ways. In particular, we point to work that deals with how primitive accumulation and the co-articulating projects of race and class operate in and through the racial capitalist and settler colonial project of schooling in the US. The persistent commodification and privatization of public education by neoliberal regimes has led to a series of new critiques and proposed alternatives for rethinking the politics of education from the standpoint of the commons. Take, for example, Damien Schnyder, whose work explores how schools function within a "prison regime" that intentionally attempts to enclose Black autonomous spaces of being by subjugating the human-ity and culture of Black youth. Schnyder (2010) has introduced the idea of white capital's urgency to remove and erase the vernacular cultures of Black and brown populations—particularly since they serve as potential sites for creating, imagining, and practicing autonomous ways of exis-tence. Along similar lines, Noah De Lissovoy theorizes educational enclo-sure through the ways accumulation and carceral forms of power work within the neoliberal schooling context. De Lissovoy (2012) argues that "schools increasingly exclude and marginalize students of color in prepa-ration not for regular work but rather for an existence on the periphery of the economy or within the walls of the prison system" (p. 750). Both Schnyder and De Lissovoy point to an important feature of how primitive accumulation and enclosure work within the neoliberal context of schooling today: Black and brown bodies are made productive and capitalized upon by locking their life chances within ontological spaces that deny humanity outside of the white settler patriarchal framework. In other words, schools play an important role in maintaining the pro-cesses of primitive accumulation and enclosure because they enforce epistemological and ontological allegiance with forms of dispossession, eliminating students of color from the workforce through carceral "vio-lations" that hinge on making disposable life profitable (such as in the prison industrial complex). Here, as De Lissovoy points out, schools in the neoliberal context are not solely concerned with human capital workforce production but on managing bodies and populations for "useful" forms of labor such as prison, military, or service types. In this sense, as Schnyder (2010) points out, the school in the school-to-prison pipeline is not sim-ply a carceral staging area: it is a site of cultural violence and epistemic punishment in itself. In the above review of the Marxist and neo-Marxist literature on the commons/enclosure there are two themes we want to highlight before we move into our analysis. On the one hand, the analysis of theorists work-ing more closely within the Marxist tradition focus on the problem of the commons and enclosure through the processes of proletarianization and removal of people from their means of subsistence (De Angelis, 2001;

### 2NC – Link – Race

#### Settler colonialism transcends the racialized body onto the land – their analysis of race fails

Glenn 15 [Evelyn Nakano, Professor at the University of California Berkeley, “Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 2015, Vol. 1(1) 52–72, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2332649214560440>, July 7, 2017] KLu

In this article I argue for the necessity of a settler colonialism framework for an historically grounded and inclusive analysis of U.S. race and gender formation. A settler colonialism framework can encompass the specificities of racisms and sexisms affecting different racialized groups—especially Native Americans, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans—while also highlighting structural and cultural factors that undergird and link these racisms and sexisms. I offer here a first rough sketch of a settler colonialism–framed analysis of racial formation in certain critical periods and places in the United States. I engage with recent theoretical work that views settler colonialism as a distinct transnational formation whose political and economic projects have shaped and continue to shape race relations in first world nations that were established through settler colonialism. My aim is to avoid lumping all racisms together, even for the benign purpose of promoting cross-race alliances to fight racial injustice. Equally, I wish to avoid seeing racisms affecting various groups as completely separate and unrelated. Rather, I endeavor to uncover some of the articulations among different racisms that would suggest more effective bases for cross-group alliances. In the latter regard, one implication of taking settler colonialism seriously is to advance decolonization as a necessary goal in the quest to achieve race and gender justice. Indeed, the elaboration of the settler colonialism framework has been closely paralleled by the development of decolonial critiques of racial justice projects that aim to achieve liberal inclusion, rather than liberation, of subordinated groups. Theorists of decolonialism, such as Walter Mignolo (2007) and Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2011), argue that the case for liberal inclusion can only be made by working within the narratives, logics, and epistemologies of modernism. Yet, these are the very narratives, logics, and epistemologies that undergird settler colonial projects. Thus, strategies and solutions that adhere to modernist concepts of progress, individuality, property, worth, and so on are fated to reproduce the inequalities that colonialism has created. Mignolo and Maldonado-Torres argue for the necessity of challenging and rejecting modernist concepts. They propose that the border thinking and philosophy of women of color feminists offer counter-hegemonic narratives, logics, and epistemologies that enable the imagining of liberation for men and women of color. What I draw on from decolonial theory is an intersectional perspective, one that recognizes gender, sexuality, and race as co-constituted by settler colonial projects. Before further elaborating the settler colonial framework, I will contextualize my project by briefly reviewing previous efforts to develop conceptual models to analyze and compare racisms affecting varied racialized groups in the United States. Beyond the Black-White Binary? American sociologists developed the concept of “ethnicity” to refer to relations among groups marked by cultural and language difference, while “race” referred to groups marked by supposed somatically visible difference. These scholars recognized that racial groups were also characterized by cultural distinctions, but in practice, the study of ethnic relations generally focused on intraracial relations, especially among whites from different national origins, while the study of race focused in interracial group relations and inequality between and among groups marked as white and black. Indeed, the vast majority of sociological studies of racism and racial inequality have focused on whiteblack conflict and disparities. This attention was warranted given the long history of black subjugation and the unique structural position blacks occupied as property under the regime of chattel slavery. Jared Sexton (2010:46) noted, “Because Blackness serves as the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and legal culture, it permanently destabilizes the position of any nominally free Black population.” Indeed, after Emancipation and the end of Reconstruction, white supremacy was reinstated in the former slave states by measures that subjected nominally free blacks to legal, political, and economic conditions as close to slavery as possible. Blacks were systematically disfranchised, super-exploited, confined, and terrorized in multiple ways. Denied any freedom wages in the form of land, freed people were ensnared in debt bondage under the sharecropping system, arbitrarily imprisoned and put to forced labor under the convict labor system, and kept in check by legal and vigilante terrorism. Finally, a century after formal emancipation, with the gains won by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the growing ethnic, racial, and religious diversity of the U.S. population, especially as non-Hispanic whites have approached becoming a numerical minority, race scholars have shifted more attention to racism affecting other groups, particularly Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans. One strategy has been to cluster racialized groups together under an umbrella term, such as “non-Whites,” “people of color,” or “third world minorities.” By identifying commonalities in their experiences of subordination, exploitation, and exclusion, theorists hoped to promote coalitional organizing to fight racism. The internal colonialism model, originally devised by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) to account for the condition of African Americans, was elaborated by Robert Blauner (1972) in his influential volume Racial Oppression in America to encompass African Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. According to Blauner (1972:53), these racialized minorities (Colonized Minorities) “share a common situation of oppression” that differed from the situation of European immigrants (Immigrant Minorities), namely, “forced entry into the larger society” (as opposed to voluntary entry by European immigrants), subjection to various forms of coerced labor (as opposed to participation in free labor), and colonizer cultural policy that “constrains, transforms, or destroys original values, orientations, and ways of life.” Racial Oppression became a foundational text for students and scholars of Chicano-Latino, Native American, and Asian American Studies during the 1970s and 1980s. A second approach has been to focus on the common processes by which groups are formed (and reformed) as racial groups—that is, are identified by social and political institutions and selfidentify as distinct races. This approach bypasses the problem of mapping racialized groups in aconceptual space or in a hierarchy of groups. Michael Omi and Howard Winant took this approach in their seminal work, Racial Formation in America, originally published in 1989 and reissued in revised versions in 1994 and 2014. Omi and Winant argued that in the United States, “Race is a fundamental axis of social organization.” At the same time, they recognized race not as fixed but as “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle” (Omi and Winant 1994:13). Indeed, the last decades of the twentieth century saw racially defined groups engaging in political struggle to challenge the structural and cultural violence of colonialism, apartheid, and racial-ethnic cleansing. One result of these struggles is that “we have now reached the point of fairly general agreement that race is not a biologically given but rather a socially constructed way of differentiating human beings” (Omi and Winant 1994:55). Omi and Winant (1994:63) caution, however, that “the transcendence of biological conceptions of race does not provide any reprieve from the dilemmas of racial injustice and conflict nor from the controversies over the significance of race in the present.” A third approach to the imperative for a more comprehensive understanding of race has been to retain the white-black poles as the anchors of a hierarchical U.S. racial system but to expand the hierarchy to include other racialized groups between the poles. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) developed what he called a “racialized social system” approach to analyzing how a society’s economic, political, social, and political stratification is structured by the placement of actors into racial categories. In other writings (e.g., Bonilla-Silva 2009) he argues that U.S. racial stratification is undergoing transformation into a tri-partite Latin American style system consisting of blacks, whites, and an intermediate category of honorary whites. Bonilla-Silva examines the ranking of various Asian and Latino groups on an array of measures, including income, schooling, educational attainment, occupational status, self-identity, attitudes toward blacks, rates of intermarriage, and residential segregation. These rankings provide support for his hypothesis that some Asian groups (e.g., Chinese and Koreans) and some (generally lighter skinned) Latino groups (e.g., Chileans and Argentines) are being assimilated “upward” to become accepted as whites or else are being absorbed into an intermediate stratum of “honorary whites.” Concurrently, other Asian groups (e.g., Hmong and Cambodians) and darker skinned Latinos (e.g., many Puerto Ricans) are being assimilated “downward” to become part of an expanded category that he calls the “collective Black.” Still another approach has been taken by nonU.S. origin scholars who pioneered postcolonial studies (e.g., Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 1995; Hall 2003) and by U.S. Latino/a thinkers who pioneered border studies and feminist decolonial studies (e.g., Anzaldua 2012; Lugones 2010; Sandoval 2000). These scholars have stressed the indeterminacy of racial categories and the fluidity and hybridity of racial identities. Such conceptions make eminent sense of a world where large swathes of populations emigrate and move across borders, where borders are constantly contested and changed, and where individuals and cultures mix and merge. Moreover, some ethnic groups in the United States have long embraced a hybrid identity, most prominently Mexican Americans, many of whom celebrate their mixed Indigenous/Spanish heritage (mestizaje), and Filipinos. Regarding fluidity, recent empirical work by Aliya Saperstein and Andrew Penner (2010, 2012) analyzes national longitudinal data over two decades and finds that individuals’ racial self-identification and others’ classification of them shift over time. Generally, becoming successful and of high status leads to shifts in self-identification and social assignment toward “white,” while becoming unsuccessful and low status (including being incarcerated) leads to reassignment to “black.” A concurrent development has been the destabilization of sex and gender designations and identities by feminist thinkers such as Judith Butler (2006) and empirically studied by researchers such as Lisa Diamond (2009), which unfortunately I do not have space to elaborate on here. Yet, despite the increased recognition of the instability and ambiguity of race and gender categorizations, they remain persistent and resilient principles for organizing hierarchical relations within and between societies. How are we to account for this seeming contradiction?

### 1NC – Link – Reparations

#### Reparations are a mode of accumulating land and naturalizing the erasure of the indigenous

King 13 [Tiffany Jeannette, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the Georgia State University, “IN THE CLEARING: BLACK FEMALE BODIES, SPACE AND SETTLER COLONIAL LANDSCAPES”, University of Maryland, 2013, <http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/14525/King_umd_0117E_14499.pdf;sequence=1>, July 21, 2017] KLu

Ambivalent and Impossible Settlers Julie Dash depicts Black life on the land in the Sea Islands in an indelible way. One can often feel sea wind, salt and sand on the skin when encountering her work. A lush grove of oaks canopy the imagination as we travel with her characters on the low country’s dirt roads. Both in her film and novel she creates an imaginative realm where Black bodies have fraught and tempestuous relationships to land. The land is both breathtaking and welcoming yet holds a history that prevents its full embrace. Dash’s characters strive for an autochthonous link to the land and an indigenous relationship to place; however, the history of slavery prevents these kinds of bonds. We become vividly aware of this barrier to land possession and claims to settlement in the novel. The impossibility of settlement for members of the Peazant family, or Black people, can be read through Lucy Peazant’s struggle with cultivating a piece of land for herself, her fiancé and their unborn children. Lucy is a young woman who represents the future of the Peazant family and their frustrated attempts to settle and become Settlers on the land. There is no denying that the desire to settle a place was strong in Lucy. She longed to cultivate a plot of land for her family. Lucy imagines owning the plot of land as the fulfillment of a promise made to Blacks during Reconstruction. Owning land, cultivating or settling it becomes a dream of hers; it becomes the possibility of taking hold of a white settler tradition of place-making in the United States. Owning land becomes a way to finally belong. Lucy tells her cousin Amelia about the land that she has acquired from a Black family, the Wilkersons. The Union Army gave the Wilkerson family the land after the Civil War. No, dey got deir forty acres. Trinity Wilkerson was de cook for de Sykes Family. Dey won de plantation. When de war come, dey run, an Trinity stay an cook for de Yankees. Come de end of de War, dey give her forty acres, an her get de best land she fin. Her get de piece where de road run. Her got easy water, creek go cross de back. Her know de land. Her born right here.” Lucy spoke with admiration. “Dat meadow, it rich land. Grass grow so thick and green. I know I can get two, three of de yield I get from Daddy’s land.65 Receivership through reparations has often been viewed as a just way of accumulating land by Blacks. The Freedman’s Bureau considered “forty acres and a mule” ample restitution for the injury of enslavement. Property is circulated back into forms of freedom. As Saidiya Hartman argues, unfreedom is resuscitated through notions of freedom post emancipation.66 Reparations in the form of property in the context of a settler colonial nation where Native people are meant to disappear and Black people are made fungible by Settler-Masters makes Lucy’s acquisition problematic. For a moment, Lucy is able to embrace this sense of self actualization through ownership. I would even argue that she tries to assume the speculative gaze of a surveying settler. “Lucy knelt and grabbed a fist full of soil, inspecting it. ‘Dis here de bit we buyin. I burnt this back last summer fore you got here. Clear out all dem weeds, crazy grass, an young trees. It come long real good.’ She shook de dirt from her hand and stepped back to straighten the harness on the mule.”67 Lucy even succumbs to the protestant work ethic that informs the settler colonial ideal that the land must be altered or cultivated as a form of property in order to possess it. Running her hand along the spine of her mule Homer, Lucy proclaims, “You aint getting nuttin till you put in a day work!”68

Radical imaging bad

### 1NC – Link – Transcendence/High Theory

#### The AFF’s embrace of identity and bodies permeated by their environment obliterates the static, land-based subjectivities of the indigenous, justifying assimilation into the American whitestream

Grande 2k [Sandy, Associate Professor of Education at UConnecticut, “American Indian geographies of identity and power: At the crossroads of indigena and mestizaje”, Harvard Education Review, Winter 2000, <https://www.academia.edu/2360040/American_Indian_geographies_of_identity_and_power_At_the_crossroads_of_indigena_and_mestizaje>, Pg. 467] KLu

Discussion The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essen-tialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have in-voked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for disman-tling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices. history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now em-ployed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centu-ries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle &Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democ-racy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacedness that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje runs contrary to American Indian sensi-bilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for exam-ple, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter Mc-Laren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, of what lives in the in-between zone of undecidedability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemp-tion.... A sense of atopy has always been with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling of living in germinal formlessness.... I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Georgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, pp. 18-14) McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possi-bility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybrid-ities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this di-mension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form of our lives.... Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and prac-tices because they represent the presence of the sacred in our lives. They prop-erly inform us that we arc not larger than nature and that we have responsibili-ties to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281) Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian sub-jectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I be-lieve there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access CO public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separa-tion between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical pro-ject of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U.S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjec-tivity — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights-based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place. and space free of the compul-sions of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a "liberated" self. American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sov-ereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and trans-gression are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred with the d6struction of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant state of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive mestizaje func-tions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "demo-cratic" Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the in-tegration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992), the myth of mestiza-je has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American gov-ernmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation-state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") ele-ments into the mainstream. Thus, what Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cul-tural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American lndianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical mes-tizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the post-modern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ "essentialist" tactics also increases. Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sover-eignty, Native resources, and Native lands. The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encour-ages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997), who admon-ish educators to develop a concept of unity and difference as political mobili-zation rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authen-ticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples.

## Impacts

### 1NC – Logic of Elimination

#### Settler colonialism sustains itself upon a logic of elimination, through a violent triad between settlers, indigenous bodies, and chattel slaves – this perpetuates antiblack and antired violence

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13 [Eve, Professor at SUNY, Ruben, Professor at the University of Toronto, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity”, Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Volume 29, Number 1, 2013, PDF, pg. 73-75, October 24, 2016] KLu

Settler Colonialism and Curriculum Studies Settler colonialism is the specific formation of colonialism in which the colonizer comes to stay, making himself the sovereign, and the arbiter of citizenship, civility, and knowing. Patrick Wolfe (2006) argues that settler colonialism “destroys to replace,” (p. 338) operating with a logic of elimination. “Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say,” Wolfe observes, “the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory” (ibid., parentheses original). The logic of elimination is embedded into every aspect of the settler colonial structures and its disciplines—it is in their DNA, in a manner of speaking. Indeed invasion is a structure, not an event (p. 402). The violence of invasion is not contained to first contact or the unfortunate birthpangs of a new nation, but is reasserted each day of occupation. Thus, when we write about settler colonialism in this article, we are writing about it as both an historical and contemporary matrix of relations and conditions that define life in the settler colonial nation-state, such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, South Africa, Chinese Tibet, and others. In North America, settler colonialism operates through a triad of relationships, between the (white [but not always]) settlers, the Indigenous inhabitants, and chattel slaves who are removed from their homelands to work stolen land. At the crux of these relationships is land, highly valued and disputed. For settlers to live on and profit from land, they must eliminate Indigenous peoples, and extinguish their historical, epistemological, philosophical, moral and political claims to land. Land, in being settled, becomes property. Settlers must also import chattel slaves, who must be kept landless, and who also become property, to be used, abused, and managed. Several belief systems need to be in place to justify the destruction of Indigenous life and the enslavement of life from other lands, in particular the continent of Africa. These belief systems are constituted through “what Michel Foucault identifies as the ‘invention of Man’: that is, by the Renaissance humanists’ epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, ‘sinful by nature’ conception/‘descriptive statement’ of the human” (Wynter, 2003, p. 263). These include what was termed in the 19th century “manifest destiny”–or the expansion of the settler state as afforded by God; heteropaternalism–the assumption that heteropatriarchal nuclear domestic arrangements are the building block of the state and institutions; and most of all, white supremacy. Settler colonialism requires the construction of non-white peoples as less than or not-quite civilized, an earlier expression of human civilization, and makes whiteness and white subjectivity both superior and normal (Wynter, 2003). In doing so, whiteness and settler status are made invisible, only seen when threatened (see also Tuck & Yang, 2012). Settler colonialism is typified by its practiced epistemological refusal to recognize the latent relations of the settler colonial triad; the covering of its tracks. One of the ways the settlercolonial state manages this covering is through the circulation of its creation story. These stories involve signs-turned mythologies that conceal the teleology of violence and domination that characterize settlement (Donald, 2012a, 2012b). For example, Dwayne Donald examines the centrality of the “Fort on Frontier” as a signifier for the myth of civilization and modernity in the creation story of the Canadian nation-state. The image of the fort works as “a mythic sign that initiates, substantiates and, through its density, hides the teleological story of the development of the nation” (2012a, p. 43): Fort pedagogy works according to an insistence that everyone must be brought inside and become like the insiders, or they will be eliminated. The fort teaches us that outsiders must be either incorporated, or excluded, in order for development to occur in the desired ways. (2012a, p. 44) The fort is not simply about the process of colonization–of the exogenous conquering of land and people, but more importantly, about a process of colonial settlement—of imposing a hegemonic logic from the inside, “premised on the domination of a majority that has become indigenous” (Veracini, 2010, p. 5, emphasis added). As Donald (2012b) explains, “transplanting a four-cornered version of European development into the heart of the wilderness” (p. 95), the fort stands as a signifier “of the process by which wild and underutilized lands were civilized through European exploration, takeover, and settlement” (p. 99). Scholars like John Willinsky (1998) have offered ample evidence of the ways in which schooling has served the purpose of promoting an imperialist view of the world that justifies colonization premised on European epistemological supremacy. While he provides a powerful critique of the colonizing force of the North American curriculum, such analyses stop short of examining how the project of curriculum is implied in the ongoing project of colonial settlement, assuming that settler colonies are a thing of the past. Recognizing that colonization is an ongoing process, there have been many postcolonial conceptualizations of curriculum and curriculum history (e.g. Asher, 2005; Coloma; 2009; McCarthy, 1998). Yet such conceptualizations typically ignore important differences in the various kinds of colonial processes occurring in the contemporary world. Because it is different from other forms of colonialism in ways that matter, settler colonialism requires more than a postcolonial theory of decolonization. Indeed, “decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 7). In this light, the specific contours of settler colonialism in curriculum studies are as yet undertheorized, particularly its continued role in ensuring what we describe later in this article as settler futurity. This essay takes part in this conversation by theorizing what we call the curriculum project of replacement.

### 1NC – All War

#### The expansion of settler colonial sovereignty is based in an ontological securing of life as infinite futurist progression of desire against the shifting signifier of backwards deathly savages to be eliminated. The result is endless violence.

Schotten 16 [C. Heike, Associate Professor of Political Science at UMass, “Queering Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire”, Spatializing Sovereignty organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial Theory, and Everyday Life Conference Presentation at Carnegie Hall, 8:05-20:00, July 19, 2017] KLu

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation and I’m arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and content of life itself. For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature, in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time — like if it is an era or an epoch — it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern childhood. Savagery is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war, life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into its very structure. Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment — possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point — we're almost done — is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation, undertaking a perpetual reference to an unknown future. Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an underlying logic of desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes' understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive warfare, the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order, as well as the obviously imperial investments of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism, however, helps explicate just how and why this anxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling impulse is definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words – and these are his words — "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies, as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moment of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. Settler societies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failing, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. Yet this anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. The native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler. And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

## Alt

### 1NC – Indigenous Critical Pedagogy

#### The alternative is indigenous critical pedagogy

Reyes 13 [Nicole Alia Salis, Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at UT San Antonio, “‘Ike Kü‘oko‘a: Indigenous Critical Pedagogy and the Connections between Education and Sovereignty for ka Lähui Hawai‘I”, Journal: Hülili: Multidisciplinary Research on Hawaiian Well-Being Vol.9 (2013), PDF, pg. 209-214, June 26, 2017] KLu

What Is Indigenous Critical Pedagogy? As it calls us to pay heed to the seemingly invisible power relationships at work within educational systems, critical pedagogy can provide a useful lens through which Indigenous peoples may consider education as a site for power negotiation and potential liberation. However, in and of itself, it is not appropriately equipped to conceptualize and to serve the purposes of Indigenous communities. For Indigenous communities to be able to use critical pedagogy, critical pedagogy must first be indigenized. Before attempting to flesh out the central points of Indigenous critical pedagogy, I believe it is imperative to consider first who Indigenous peoples are and what their experiences with education have been. According to L. T. Smith (1999), the term indigenous peoples “internationalizes the experiences, the issues and the struggles of some of the world’s colonized peoples” (p. 7). It is a term that allows peoples, across cultural differences and geographical distances, to identify with one another through common histories and lived experiences of colonialism. This being the case, colonialism, which allowed for the global expansion of the European economy through the subjugation of Native communities and civilizations (L. T. Smith, 1999), can be seen as the tie that binds Indigenous peoples. Grande (2008) provides further insight into this concept as she explains that “the colonialist 210 project was never simply about the desire to ‘civilize’ or even deculturalize indigenous peoples. Rather, it was deliberately designed to colonize Indian minds as a means of gaining access to indigenous resources” (p. 235). Thus, the colonial subjugation of Indigenous peoples for European purposes has involved not only physical but also cognitive and spiritual violence (Grande, 2008; Meyer, 2008). Unfortunately, within the context of colonialism, education has played a commanding role in the harming of Indigenous minds and subjectivities. The case of colonialism within the United States alone is fraught with examples. During the 1800s, reservation day schools and off-reservation boarding schools were developed by European American educators in efforts to teach Native American children basic academic subjects and, perhaps most importantly, to instill within them European values and customs (Adams, 1995; Child, 1998). Through this form of education, these children could then serve as the conduits of European civility for the rest of their families and communities in perpetuity (Adams, 1995; Child, 1998). Alaska Natives, who had been perceived as standing in the way of the progress of the Russian fur trade and later the expansion of the United States, were also subjected to enrollment in boarding schools for similar reasons (Jennings, 2004). Though Native Hawaiians may not have been forcefully enrolled in boarding schools, they too were bombarded with messages of Western superiority and Native inferiority through the illegal overthrow of the sovereign Kingdom of Hawai‘i in 1893 and the banning of the Hawaiian language in all public and private schools in 1896 (Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992; Silva, 2004). Sadly, Indigenous peoples across the globe have endured similar experiences and continue to do so. Benham (2004) explains that For many native and indigenous peoples, the place of school is contested terrain; it is a place of conflict, struggle, and negotiation over content, values, instructional strategies, measures of accountability, and so on. Over time, the powerful influence of a dominant culture that values domination, hierarchical structures, competition, materialism and capital accumulation, and the individual over the community—values that have been reproduced in our school organization—has led to complex tensions that have served historically to marginalize native and indigenous communities. (p. 36) 211 In the present day, Indigenous peoples’ relationships with and roles within such a “contested terrain” continue to be uncertain and tenuous. Though, on one hand, education has allowed for the hegemonic reproduction of Western knowledge and devaluation of Indigenous ways of being, on the other hand, education may also serve as a site for Indigenous resistance (Fitzsimons & Smith, 2000). Through education, Indigenous peoples may be able to develop the skills needed both to reject Western hegemony on its own terms and validate and perpetuate Indigenous knowledge, language, and culture (Fitzsimons & Smith, 2000; Grande, 2008). Despite its attentiveness to the resistant potentiality of educational space, critical pedagogy cannot be applied seamlessly to Indigenous needs or contexts due to the Eurocentric assumptions, definitions, and values that lie at its core (Grande, 2008). In fact, since critical pedagogy is opposed to positivist claims of the universality of knowledge, it would be contradictory to assume that critical pedagogy itself could be applied universally to all contexts and situations (Henry & Pene, 2001). Grande (2008), in her development of Red pedagogy, a unique form of pedagogy that is rooted in Indigenous knowledge and driven toward decolonization and Indigenous critical praxis, calls attention to the discontinuities that exist between the assumptions of critical pedagogy and the concerns of Indigenous peoples. Whereas, from a Western frame, critical pedagogy emphasizes a pursuit of democratization, citizenship, and social justice that is brought about through the liberation of individual selves, Indigenous peoples are more likely to envision a form of social justice that is predicated upon the existence of Indigenous sovereignty, which involves the liberation of entire communities and nations (Grande, 2008). This sovereignty involves the rights and privileges of Indigenous peoples not in an abstract, theoretical sense but in one that is inextricably linked to and grounded by land, nature, and place (Grande, 2008; Meyer, 2008). Furthermore, whereas critical pedagogy might emphasize knowledge that is culled through individual reflexivity, Indigenous peoples also place value in knowledge that is tied to Indigenous cultural tradition (Grande, 2008). Finally, whereas critical pedagogy sometimes takes on an idealistic, speculative character through its emphasis on abstract ideals such as hope, democracy, and utopia (Cho, 2010), Indigenous peoples often emphasize the utility of knowledge if it is to be of value (Meyer, 2001a, 2001b). Indigenous critical pedagogy, pedagogy that allows for the resistance and empowerment of Indigenous peoples specifically, may be developed through the infusion of critical pedagogy with Indigenous epistemological, ontological, and axiological concepts. In this way, it can be made to reflect Indigenous knowledge, to assert Indigenous power, and to serve Indigenous needs for community survival (Brayboy, 2005). 212 The decolonization and indigenization of education, which may be strategized and implemented through Indigenous critical pedagogy, requires several steps. Despite the linear appearance of their presentation here, these steps should be thought of as occurring fluidly and recursively. First, we must come to an understanding that Western notions of knowledge, education, and research, especially those that come from a positivist paradigm, are in no way absolute. Meyer (2008), for example, discusses the limitations of Eurocentric empiricism and scientific objectivity in the construction of knowledge. As she theorizes a Hawaiian conception of meaning-making which involves three parts, the body, mind, and spirit, she notes that The body idea in the triangulation of meaning is what science has cornered. It is expressed through sensation via objective measurement and evaluation. It is a valuable and rigorous part in the triangulation of meaning and the center of most research processes…The problem was that we assumed all the world could be described this way. (p. 226) In other words, although there is some value in what we can know empirically, there is also value in the knowledge we can encounter through other means. And, whereas we have been taught through positivism that we can only know what can be detected through the use of our five senses, this is not the only way to know ourselves, to know others, or to know the world. Furthermore, if there are different ways of knowing than those presented to us via Western empiricism, then there are also different ways of constructing new knowledge through research. Though the scientific method teaches researchers to utilize objectivity and distance in their work, such concepts can be liabilities when conducting research within Indigenous contexts (Mataira, Matsuoka, & Morelli, 2005; Meyer, 2008). From an Indigenous perspective, research that originates from within Indigenous communities and involves trust, communication, and collaboration within these communities leads to the production of knowledge that is both authentic and useful (Henry & Pene, 2001; Kawakami, Aton, Cram, Lai, & Porina, 2007; Mataira et al., 2005). In Meyer’s (2008) words, “objectivity is its own limitation” (p. 227). Second, we must utilize education as a space through which we may develop better understandings about our selves, our histories, our traditions and, subsequently, secure foundations for our futures. L. T. Smith (1999) suggests that relearning 213 and reconceptualizing the past is a vital step to the decolonization process for Indigenous people since Westerners have told only one-sided accounts of our histories for so long. In transforming the knowledge of our histories through critical reexamination, we can also be better prepared to transform our contemporary identities. Grande (2008) asserts that Indigenous peoples should collectively examine their own communities and decide for themselves what beliefs and behaviors are acceptable and essential to their community identities. This might include critically examining the ways in which even some of what we consider to be cultural traditions have come to reflect colonial values and norms through time (Denetdale, 2006). Through engaging in such a mindful, spiritual process of reinvention and self-definition, Indigenous peoples exercise their rights as revolutionary agents (Grande, 2008). They empower themselves to push back against Eurocentric mainstream ideologies and create culturally responsive educational spaces, placing their own values, knowledge, worldviews, and concerns at its center (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Trinidad, 2011). Within these educational spaces, Indigenous peoples can arm themselves with what Mataira and associates (2005) call “empirical ammunition” for validating their realities and preserving their traditions for future generations (Grande, 2008). Thus, whereas critical pedagogy might encourage individuals to imagine a utopian future unlike anything before seen, Indigenous critical pedagogy might encourage Indigenous communities to envision a hopeful future “that lives in contingency with the past—one that trusts the beliefs and understandings of our ancestors, the power of traditional knowledge, and the possibilities of new understandings” (Grande, 2008, p. 250). Finally, through it all, we must not pretend to be apolitical. By simply exercising our rights to participate in the act of knowledge production and preservation, we are taking a political stance (Freire, 2003). However, we must not forget the gravity of what that means in relation to our experiences with colonization. Just as hegemony can only maintain its control through reinforcement (Hudson, 1999), we must make constant and consistent efforts to assert our collective agency if we hope to maintain control of our own knowledge and our own educations. We must aim to counter hegemonic forces and to transform the institutional structures that have colonized us over the course of generations (Grande, 2008). Thus, as we work to develop knowledge and educational practices with our own subjectivities at the center through Indigenous critical pedagogy, we must make sure to consider these efforts as they relate to our rights to self-determination and to sovereignty as Indigenous peoples. In the process of striving toward the achievement and maintenance of self-determination and sovereignty, we may begin to heal from the traumas of colonization (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Grande, 2008). 214 In summary, Indigenous critical pedagogy calls for Indigenous peoples to reclaim education as a space for resistance against colonization and Eurocentric hegemony. This entails not only recognizing the limitations of Eurocentric ideas and ideals but also valuing and prioritizing Indigenous values, knowledge, worldviews, and concerns, and in the process asserting Indigenous rights to self-determination and sovereignty. Indigenous critical pedagogy suggests the existence of strong connections between education and sovereignty for Indigenous peoples. As Indigenous peoples assume their roles in the production and maintenance of precious knowledge, they simultaneously situate themselves as the rightful centers of power within their own communities.

### 1NC – Indigenous Knowledge Systems

#### The alternative is Indigenous Knowledge Systems

Hammersmith 7 [Jerome Alvin, Doctor of Education from the University of South Africa, “CONVERGING INDIGENOUS AND WESTERN KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TERTIARY EDUCATION”, University of South Africa, 2007, <http://iportal.usask.ca/docs/Hammersmith/Hammersmith.pdf>, June 26, 2017] KLu

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM Formal Indigenous education for First Nations and Metis (1) in Saskatchewan reaches from On-Reserve, Band-administered schools, Metis community-administered schools through First Nations and Metis Tertiary Institutions, to universities and technical institutes far away from First Nations and Metis communities, Elders, parents and cultural centres. This educational journey spans distinct value systems and worldviews. At their meeting is the opportunity for cultures to both teach and learn from each other. In Saskatchewan, five distinct First Nations Indigenous cultural/linguistic groupings [Cree, Assiniboine (Lakota), Sioux (Dakota), Saulteaux (Ojibway) and Chipewyan (Dene)] distributed in 72 First Nations Reserve communities, inclusive of the urban segments of those communities, continue to not only survive but also to grow. Also in Saskatchewan, the same number and type of distinct Metis Nation groupings exists in 130 Metis urban, rural and remote northern Metis communities organized as Metis Locals. All these communities have a rich linguistic and cultural history that still influences much of their everyday life. Recurring negative feedback in the relationships with the external, Western education systems brought to bear on Indigenous First Nations and Metis peoples indicates that these relationships have not always effectively addressed many Indigenous special needs, languages, learning styles and cultures. One impact has been the marginalization of First Nations and Metis knowledge systems, contributing to the marginalization of First Nations and Metis Indigenous cultures. 1Metis – people of mixed First Nations and European ancestry who identify themselves, and are identified by the Canadian Constitution as an Aboriginal people, distinct from First Nations, Inuit and non-Aboriginal peoples. 2 After examining issues facing Indigenous First Nations and Metis students as they progress through the schools, colleges, and into professions, this study describes some of the positive and negative results. These results are viewed from a perspective that attempts to be at once philosophical, practical, and visionary. The study contributes to a discussion on the unique experiences of First Nations and Metis, offering options for community leaders, administrators, educators and students involved with Indigenous tertiary education. It concludes with important characteristics of an Indigenous community-based model and support system for delivery of a converged Indigenous/Western approach to Indigenous tertiary education. 1.2 INDIGENOUS WAYS OF KNOWING Indigenous ways of knowing are based on locally, ecologically, and seasonally contextualized truths. In contrast to the aspirations of some Western scientific traditions for universal truths, Indigenous epistemologies are narratively anchored in natural communities. Those natural communities are characterised by complex kinship systems of relationships among people, animals, the earth, the cosmos, etc. from which knowing originates (Ermine, 1995: 101-112). In chapters two (from Battiste and Barman (1995) through Dei et al (2000) and three (from Barnhardt (1986) and Alaska Native Knowledge Network (1998) through Tierney (1992) and Tuhiwai Smith(1999) many who describe traditional Indigenous knowledge systems globally and in North America generally agree that an understanding of traditional Indigenous knowledge systems, and how they differ from non-Indigenous knowledge systems, (enabling the creation of what Ermine (2004: 3) calls ‘ethical space’) is an important basis for determining how they may be implemented. Knowing what a particular Indigenous knowledge system consists of and how it is acquired is fundamental to being able to make use of the knowledge whereby encouraging all parties to be aware of the added value its use will bring. A former Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Federico Mayor, in defining traditional knowledge, points out that the world’s Indigenous people 3 possess an immense knowledge of their environments, based on centuries of living close to nature. He points out in an Opening Address (Mayor 1994: 1-6) to a 1994 UNESCO Lifelong Learning Conference in Rome, that living in and from complex ecosystems, these people have an understanding of the properties of plants and animals, the functioning of ecosystems and the techniques for using and managing them that is particular and often detailed. His address continues that in rural communities in developing countries, locally occurring species are relied on for, sometimes all, foods, medicines, fuel, building materials and other products. In addition, he says that peoples’ knowledge and perceptions of the environment, and their relationships with it, are often important elements of their cultural identity. Most Indigenous people make use of traditional songs, stories, legends, dreams, methods and practises as a means of transmitting specific human elements of traditional knowledge. Sometimes they are preserved in artifacts handed from one generation to the next. In the context of Indigenous knowledge systems, there is usually no real separation between secular and sacred knowledge and practise. They are one and the same. In virtually all of these systems, knowledge is transmitted directly from individual to individual. 1.3 DESCRIPTION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE R. Barnhardt and O. Kawagley (1999), M. Battiste and J. Barman (1995), G. Cajete (1986), A. Emery and Associates (1997), W. Ermine (1995), C. Odora-Hoppers (2002), L. Tuhiwai Smith (1999) and others agree that Indigenous communities generally describe Indigenous knowledge as: o practical common sense based on the teachings and experiences passed on from generation to generation. o knowing its home country. Indigenous knowledge covers knowledge of the environment - snow, ice, weather, resources - and the relationships among things. o holistic; it cannot be compartmentalised and cannot be separated from the people. It is rooted in the spiritual health, culture and language of the people. It is a way of life. 4 o a traditional authority system; setting out the rules governing the use of resources - respect, an obligation to share. It is dynamic, cumulative and stable. It is truth. o a way of life - wisdom is using traditional knowledge in ‘good’ ways. It means using the heart and the head together. It survives because it comes from the spirit. o giving credibility to people. o serving community needs and interests first. o having the potential to realise that the real contributions of local and traditional knowledge incorporate knowledge of the ecosystem. o relationships and a code of ethics, govern the appropriate use of the environment. o recognising that this code of ethics includes rules and conventions promoting desirable ecosystem relations, human-animal interactions and even social relationships. o enabling traditional knowledge to articulate with non-traditional knowledge to form a rich and distinctive understanding of life and the world. 1.4 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IS DISTINCT Nakashima, Prott and Bridgewater (2000: 1), in their Introduction, point out that: human societies all across the globe have developed rich sets of experiences and explanations relating to the environments they live in. These ‘other’ knowledge systems are often referred to as traditional ecological knowledge, Indigenous or local knowledge. They encompass the sophisticated arrays of information, understanding and interpretations that guide interactions with the natural milieu: in agriculture and animal husbandry, hunting, fishing and gathering; struggles against disease and injury; the naming and explanation of natural phenomena; and strategies to cope with fluctuating environments. Many Indigenous people view the extraction of their traditional knowledge from its broader cultural context as a form of theft and, understandably, have been reluctant to share the depth and breadth of what they know with outside interests. They fear that, for example, because many wildlife managers and decision-makers do not understand their culture, customs or values, their traditional knowledge will be used against them (e.g., setting quotas and other resource harvesting regulations). At best, piecemeal extraction 5 of traditional knowledge from its larger cultural context invites misrepresentation and misinterpretation. At worst, it represents a form of misappropriation and cultural exploitation (Cajete 1986: 172-199). In this study Indigenous knowledge is treated as an integral aspect of the ontological theory held by Indigenous people. Knowing is relational and participatory. Through participation, Indigenous students come to understand knowledge as a means of strengthening ecological balance. Indigenous knowledge is gained from a way of living and being in the world; learning is understood as participation, and it is in this forum that human beings influence the manifestation of the physical reality. Indigenous epistemology is explored through engaging and participating in a process that is a reflection of Indigenous ways of building knowledge (Ermine 1995: 104-106). Recurring negative feedback in the relationships with the external knowledge systems brought to bear on Indigenous Nations and peoples, (relationships which have not always effectively addressed many of their special needs, languages, learning styles and cultures), have resulted in extensive marginalization of their knowledge systems. This has, in turn, contributed to the marginalization of cultural integrity. Some examples of this marginalization are identified in chapter three. 1.5 COMPLIMENTARY DIVERSITY AND CREATIVE INTERCONNECTIVITY The study, using the Cree as an example, as in M. Battiste and J. Barman (1995: vii-xx), R. Barnhardt and O. Kawagley (1999: 1-13), W. Ermine (2004: 1-5), C. Odora-Hoppers (2002: iii-285), H.K. Trask (1999: 1-255), L. Tuhiwai Smith (1999: 1-208) and others argues that there is a need for enhancing efforts at identifying and fostering a functional complimentarity leading to creative interconnectivity - between the Indigenous knowledge systems rooted in the Indigenous First Nations and Metis cultures that inhabit Saskatchewan – and the modern versions of formal Western knowledge systems originally intended to serve the educational needs of all Saskatchewan communities. While these complex knowledge systems are functionally interdependent, they are currently often largely disconnected. In considering the cross-cultural knowledge systems in Saskatchewan, this study reviews observations made by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSI), the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), R. Devrome (1991: 1- 165), C. Odora-Hoppers (2002: iii-285), M. Battiste & J. Barman (1995: v-328), W. Ermine (2004: 1-5) and others. It points out that attempts at ‘bridging’ between cultures often suffered, and continues to suffer, from a colonial ‘one-way bridge’ perception that assumes that change is required only in respect of Indigenous people. In Chapter two, the study refers to G. Esteva and M. Suri Prakash (1998: v-147) who describe multicultural education as an oxymoron. Often when attempting to include Indigenous content within Western knowledge systems curricula in Canada, educators have ignored the fact that such content is only meaningful within an Indigenous context and process (V. Deloria and D.R. Wildcat 2001: 79-84). The fact that in Saskatchewan and in the rest of Canada the natural and social sciences, the humanities and fine arts have all been presented and evaluated primarily from Western perspectives, content, context and process is identified in this study as a shortcoming. It limits the education provided to First Nations and Métis in Saskatchewan by restricting its holistic quality. This has been true from elementary through tertiary levels in Saskatchewan and Canadian educational institutions. Despite differences in degree and intensity, it remains true whether Federal, Provincial, First Nations' or Metis’ governance exercise educational jurisdiction. Similar to the observations made by OdoraHoppers (2002: vii-22) with respect to Indigenous education in Africa, education for all Indigenous Nations and people has not been attained. In fact, education for all has collapsed into ‘schooling for all’ – ‘the blind leading the blind for several decades!’ (Odora-Hoppers 2002: vii-22). As Odora-Hoppers observes with reference to Africa, this study, in referring to Saskatchewan and Canada, asserts that Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) represent a national heritage and a national resource. Odora-Hoppers also states (2002: 2-4) that its subjugation and its continuing marginalization challenge us both individually and collectively at moral, ethical, pragmatical and philosophical levels. She continues (2002: 4-8) that at institutional levels, practises, philosophies and methodologies are still non-inclusive and embarrassingly Western-focused and Eurocentric. She argues (2002: 8-20) that these impact on the definition of what constitutes appropriate knowledge and especially what constitutes science. This study agrees with Odora-Hoppers, that in Saskatchewan and Canada, as in Africa and other Indigenous settings globally, IKS impels within us the need to undertake systematic reviews and the transformation of curricula in a manner that can bring to bear fulfillment of the core values embedded in the Canadian Constitution. The study also argues that adding Indigenous content to the Western contexts and processes, while continuing to ignore the need for Indigenous context and processes, cannot constitute innovative improvement. Consistent with the observations of Odora-Hoppers in Africa, IKS carries with it an indictment and a call to action to confront attitudes, choices, preferences and nomenclature in everything that Indigenous persons do as they strive to maintain indigeneity in a world in which there should be room around the banquet table for all (Odora-Hoppers 2002: 11-12). In his paper, ‘Ethical Space – Transforming Relations,’ Ermine (2004: 3-4) observes that the ‘ethical space’ or the place of convergence of two societies with two worldviews can represent a location from which a meaningful dialogue can take place. This dialogue between communities can move them towards the negotiation of a new research order. Such an order can ethically engage different knowledge systems. (Ermine 2004: 2). Socio-economic indicators identifying serious shortcomings in Indigenous educational results constitute a credible cry for forging an enhanced, innovative process for Indigenous tertiary education in Saskatchewan. 1.6 TIME FOR INNOVATIVE ENHANCEMENT Have the Indigenous people in Saskatchewan, as Kawagley and Barnhardt (1999: 1-2) observe about Indigenous people throughout the world, sustained their unique worldviews and associated knowledge systems? That is, have Saskatchewan Indigenous people, like their global brethren, in the face of major social upheavals brought on by imperial and internal settler colonialism, maintained many of the core values, beliefs and practises associated with those worldviews? Are the Saskatchewan Indigenous people also beginning to be recognised as having an adaptive integrity that is as valid for today's generation as it was for generations past? Is the depth of Indigenous Cree knowledge rooted in the long inhabitation of Big Island Lake Cree Nation, able to offer lessons that can benefit everyone, from educator to scientist, as we search for a more satisfying and sustainable way to live on this planet (Kawagley and Barnhardt 1999: 4-6)? Furthermore, the study asks, where better to begin forging an enhanced process of Indigenous tertiary education than Saskatchewan, already acknowledged by Indigenous, Provincial and Federal Governments, to be a national leader in Indigenous tertiary education? In Saskatchewan, multi-jurisdictional approaches have contributed to the creation of very real and well documented cultural and psychological conflicts for many students raised in First Nations' and Métis cultures. These conflicts and the resulting marginalization have contributed to this researcher’s basic impetus for this study. It is expected that this, together with other indicators, will contribute to the identification of whether there is an opportunity and a need to forge new, complementary efforts that can help address Saskatchewan and Canadian Indigenous tertiary educational issues. Including adaptations from G. Burford, O.N. Ngila and Y. Rafiki (2003: 1-6), this study considers the interface between Indigenous knowledge and globalization. It proposes one means for re-focusing emergent Indigenous tertiary education in Saskatchewan based primarily on Indigenous context, process and content realities. It proposes the development of a Canadian Indigenous Multiversity model for the systemic convergence of Indigenous and Western knowledge contexts, contents and processes and in tertiary education. It was expected that if there is indeed such an opportunity, the study would be able, in chapter five, ‘Data Analysis’ and chapter six, ‘Summaries, conclusions and recommendations,’ to describe how the findings answer the main questions relating to: [1] the convergence of Indigenous and Western Knowledge Systems; and [2] A community-based delivery model, based on ‘ethical space’, complementary diversity and creative interconnectivity for Indigenous tertiary education in Saskatchewan. It was also expected that in chapter six, if a model is called for, the study would be able to identify and recommend: [1] Benefits of the model; [2] Implementation Possibilities [3] Areas for further research and development and [4] Possible adaptations/modifications of the model.

### 1NC – Insurgent Education

#### Insurgent education is key education for indigenous educators to confront settler innocence and start a resurgence of activism and reclamation of indigenous histories and homelands

**Corntassel 2011**, Jeff, citizen of the Cherokee Nation and Acting Director of Indigenous Governance, Faculty of Human and Social Development, University of Victoria, “Indigenizing the academy: Insurgent education and the roles of Indigenous intellectuals”, *Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences*, http://www.ideas-idees.ca/blog/indigenizing-academy-insurgent-education-and-roles-indigenous-intellectuals

Some scholars – like Paulette Regan in Unsettling the Settler Within and Megan Boler and Michalinos Zembylas in Discomforting Truths: The Emotional Terrain of Understanding Difference – have discussed this approach as a “pedagogy of discomfort.” I take it further as a demand for insurgent education. If an insurgency is a state of rebellion or act of rising in revolt against established authority, then insurgent education is an important part of an anti-colonial struggle and of pedagogies of decolonization. According to Mohawk Taiaiake Alfred, “…to be a real Indigenous intellectual, one must be a warrior of the truth.” If the “university is contentious ground”, what are some of the roles and responsibilities of an Indigenous intellectual? The late Standing Rock Sioux scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. challenged Indigenous educators and students to be more like “scouts” by using their powers of observation to provide useful information to their Indigenous communities in order to guide future decisions. Others, such as Anishinaabe philosopher, Dale Turner, discuss the need for “word warriors” who must mediate and reconcile indigenous and European worldviews. Being a warrior of the truth is not, however, about mediating between worldviews as much as challenging the dominant colonial discourse. It is about raising awareness of Indigenous histories and place-based existences as part of a continuing struggle against shape-shifting colonial powers. Insurgent education entails creating decolonizing and discomforting moments of Indigenous truth-telling that challenge the colonial status quo. It does this by questioning settler occupation of Indigenous places through direct, honest, and experiential forms of engagement and demands for accountability. Insurgent educators exemplify Indigenous forms of leadership by relating their daily struggles for Indigenous resurgence to broader audiences using innovative ways that inspire activism and reclamation of Indigenous histories and homelands. The truth is that Indigenous peoples are land-based and water-based cultures and need new ways to educate settlers who have become much too comfortable and complacent about living on stolen Indigenous homelands. If colonization is about disconnecting peoples from their lands and territories and depriving them of their cultural practices, then acts of decolonization – including decolonizing knowledge – are, in part, about reconnection and community resurgence. As part of a larger decolonizing strategy, insurgent education does at least four things: First, it localizes Indigenous struggles and avoids the pitfalls of what I call “Free Tibet Syndrome,” which is a settler tendency to cast their decolonizing gaze to faraway places and provide token support (e.g. tax deductible donations, affixing a bumper sticker to their car in a show of “solidarity” etc.) for distant self-determination movements rather than focus on local Indigenous struggles; Second, it counters the politics of distraction by centering Indigenous peoples and their relationships to homelands in the discussion; Third, it occurs both in formal and, more often, informal settings; and Fourth, it compels accountability and action to counter contemporary colonialism and to make amends to Indigenous peoples. What does insurgent education look like in practice? One example comes from O’ahu, Hawai’i, which is visited by over 4.5 million people each year. Most of these tourists congregate at the hotels and beaches in Waikīkī, which was once known for its taro fields and natural springs. In 1998, Gaye Chan and Andrea Feeser launched a public art project that challenged tourists to recognize that they are on Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian) homelands. Appealing to the consumerism of Waikīkī tourists, Chan and Feeser’s souvenirs are touted as an “authentic piece of Waikīkī’s past.” In reality they are selling small chunks of concrete wrapped in plastic accompanied by a historic timeline of colonial encroachment and destruction of Waikīkī. Additionally, tourists are invited to take an online tour of historic Waikīkī and enter the website as either Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian), Kama’aina (Native-born) or Haole (White settler). This anti-colonial reality tour raises awareness of contemporary Kanaka Maoli struggles as well as promotes the idea that “Another Waikīkī is possible.” It is an effective insurgent education project for “unsettling the settler within.” Another instructive example is the 1677 Treaty of Middle Plantation between Mattaponi, Pamunkey, and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Pamunkey and Mattaponi have been upholding the terms of that treaty for the past 300 years. Every year they go to the Governor’s mansion and bring a tribute (usually deer or geese) right to the foot of the stairs. These Indigenous peoples are demonstrating that the terms of the treaty continue to be upheld in their homelands by their communities. Continuing these practices are important to inspire and remind people that the agreements we make as Indigenous peoples are sacred and we uphold them. Actions like these could also spark a resurgence of treaty-making agreements between Indigenous nations to deepen alliances, protect Indigenous peoples crossing borders and regenerate old trade networks. Insurgent education takes several forms, such as the Dakota Commemorative Marches, uses of Haudenosaunee passports and diplomacies, and the Anishinabek Nation outlawing the use of the term “aboriginal.” The thought of Indigenous peoples mobilizing to reclaim their histories and their homelands makes settlers very uncomfortable. Yet, it is through this discomfort that meaningful cross-cultural education, awareness and action can take place. An insurgent educator calls for new solidarity movements with local Indigenous nations and finds innovative ways to assist in their resurgence efforts. According to Shuswap leader George Manuel, “We will steer our own canoe, but we will invite others to help with the paddling.” By helping with the paddling, insurgent education is about making one’s research priorities directly relevant and centered on the needs of local Indigenous communities. This is a challenge to Indigenous intellectuals and others who want to act in solidarity to become ‘warriors of the truth,’ both inside and outside the classroom. When we renew our responsibilities to defending and regenerating Indigenous land-based and water-based cultural practices, we can move from insurgent to resurgent Indigenous people

## ATs

### 2NC – AT: Perm – Policy Affs

#### The perm fails – it’s settler cooption through the guise of reconciliation

Edmonds 16 [Penelope, Historian and is an ARC Future Fellow at the University of Tasmania, “Settler Colonialism and (Re)conciliation: Frontier Violence, Affective Performances, and Imaginative Refoundings, Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, 2016, PDF, 183-186, June 26, 2017] KLu

Across settler societies, conciliation and violence perpetually haunt our nominally postcolonial present. In these troubled nations, reconciliation has emerged as a utopian politics promising a new and deeply affective social covenant and national refounding. But it is often a feigned deal. Too often state-based reconciliation efforts and their attendant public performances are choreographed around the problematic effect of ‘toleration’, and parallel belonging where Indigenous identity is recognized insofar as it does not disturb settler hegemony. The problem at the heart of reconciliation, as a politics of recognition, is that Indigenous people can petition for justice on the condition of submission to the legal, institutional and cultural framework of the settler-state, yet this is itself founded upon the negation of Indigenous sovereignty. This impossible politics of recognition so evident in contemporary state-based reconciliation celebrations within settler nations is embedded, as I have shown throughout this book, in a long genealogy of historical peace deals with Indigenous peoples that have been negotiated through and ratified by the state apparatus. The repeated and national histories elaborated of hands extended in false friendship to smooth the way for imperial expansion, of a desperate need on the part of colonizers for honourable colonization, of terrible frontier violence, reprisals and punishments, and of Indigenous strategies of engagement, evasion, resistance and protest serve as the historical location for reconciliation in contemporary postcolonial settings. In former colonies based on extraction, a progressive, transformational and national narrative of colonization–decolonization–postcolonialism has been promulgated, though not without controversy.1 By contrast, settler societies have not been transformed by the dramatic rupture of decolonization and the move to a postcolonial state. Therefore, in these societies, reconciliation between Indigenous and non- Indigenous peoples is offered as a peace paradigm, a virtuous exchange, forming part of a hopeful, progressive, transformational politics possessing a linear, social schema of colonization–reconciliation– postcolonialism, and which persists in the political imagination. As I have shown in this book, reconciliation in settler colonial societies therefore has a distinctive politics that must be recognized, and possesses a temporal syntax and a lexicon with its attendant performative repertoire and expressive, public regimes of affect. The temporal sequencing of settler colonial reconciliation too often asks us to move on and move forward, and can be characterized by a history-less-ness, obscuring foundational violence and settler colonialism’s historical continuity. It is easy to see why Indigenous theorists and activists would reject state-orchestrated reconciliation days, ceremonies, celebrations and activities, and acts of apology that fail to address the violent past and offer material reparations. Yet there are many instances of vibrant and creative local grassroots activist events that express a strong desire for reconciliation, apology and recognition in performances that simultaneously call the state to account (as in the Two Row Wampum celebrations in North America) or memorialize episodes of colonial violence to assert Indigenous sovereignty through survival (as in the Myall Creek massacre commemorations in Australia, or the Lakota Future Generations Ride which Lakota have opened to non-Native peoples). These are Indigenous-led cross-cultural performances that are reparative and full of risk, but are based on Indigenous experience and protocols, and always maintain their critical and liberatory politics. The need for national acknowledgement of violent dispossession through remembrance is especially urgent in Australia, where the singularly important principle that defines the nation and upon which it was founded – terra nullius – is continually played out in debates that erase and obscure the historical processes of colonization that sustain white settler privilege. Here too, treaty is always held out as a mythic national covenant, as the impossible performance, always-yet-to-occur. How, then, are we to read local activist performances that display a strong desire for renewed and changed relationships, or that envision different futures – in short, a desire for reconciliation – within a nominally postcolonial context in which we are all bound together by history? In this book, I sought to resist the temptation to read such performances through the lens of false consciousness. Awareness of the perpetual ambivalence of conciliation – as both utopic and coercive – is crucial. This study, a form of comparative transnationalism sought to consider deep local histories in the broader context of transnational flows and political ideas of reconciliation and redress that are currently enacted globally across settler societies. I wanted to foreground powerful, local examples of the radical and fertile politics of Indigenous rejection, refutation and anger around the heavy politics of consensus that characterizes too many state-based performances of reconciliation. At the same time, I sought to critically explore the possibility that the unifying, and eudaimonic feelings in performances of solidarity may be as valid and politically useful as anger and the radical rejection of expressions of unity. What makes the performances of unity so enticing – and indeed powerful – is their affective sense of connection and their hopefulness. These collective cross-cultural acts in the name of positive resistance and peace-building for social transformation should not be underestimated. Above all, these potent performances remind us of the great social need for a foundational conciliation narrative and an imaginative refounding, for the desire to forge a virtuous compact, a mythic exchange, with its attendant obligations. However utopic, this is critical and important political work for many peoples, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike, who seek an accord for the future. consider deep local histories in the broader context of transnational flows and political ideas of reconciliation and redress that are currently enacted globally across settler societies. 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### 2NC – AT: Perm – K Affs

#### The affirmative’s move to bridge the gap from their political project to the ‘indigenous problem’ homogenizes the conditions of colonialism—this seemingly innocent move propagates a vague ontological account that mystifies the structure of Settlerism

Tuck and Yang 12 [Eve, Professor at SUNY New Paltz, K. Wayne, University of California San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017] KLu

Performing suffering is also critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. Hawkeye takes on the (imagined) demeanor of the vanishing Native - brooding, vengeful, protecting a dying way of life, and unsuccessful in finding a mate and producing offspring. Thus sympathy and suffering are the tokens used to absorb the Native Other’s difference, coded as pain, the ‘not- I’ into the ‘I’. The settler’s personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality. The 2011 film, The Descendants, is a modern remake of the adoption fantasy (blended with a healthy dose of settler nativism). George Clooney’s character, “King” is a haole hypo-descendant of the last surviving princess of Hawai’i and reluctant inheritor of a massive expanse of land, the last wilderness on the Island of Kauai. In contrast to his obnoxious settler cousins, he earns his privilege as an overworked lawyer rather than relying on his unearned inheritance. Furthermore, Clooney’s character suffers - he is a dysfunctional father, heading a dysfunctional family, watching his wife wither away in a coma, learning that she cheated on him - and so he is somehow Hawaiian at heart. Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an innocent non-oppressor. By the film’s end, King goes against the wishes of his profiteering settler cousins and chooses to “keep” the land, reluctantly accepting that his is the steward of the land, a responsibility bequeathed upon him as an accident of birth. This is the denouement of reconciliation between the settler-I and the interiorized native-not-I within the settler. Sympathy and suffering are profoundly satisfying for settler cinema: The Descendants was nominated for 5 Academy Awards and won for Best Adapted Screenplay in 2012. The beauty of this settler fantasy is that it adopts decolonization and aborts it in one gesture. Hawkeye adopts Uncas, who then conveniently dies. King adopts Hawai’i and negates the necessity for ea, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty. Decolonization is stillborn - rendered irrelevant because decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now ‘we’ are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. ‘Our’ only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with ‘our’ settler future. In the unwritten decolonial version of Cooper’s story, Hawkeye would lose his land back to the Mohawk - the real people upon whose land Cooperstown was built and whose rivers, lakes, and forests Cooper mined for his frontier romances. Hawkeye would shoot his last arrow, or his last long-rifle shot, return his eagle feather, and would be renamed Natty Bumppo, settler on Native land. The story would end with the moment of this recognition. Unresolved are the questions: Would a conversation follow after that between Native and the last settler? Would the settler leave or just vanish? Would he ask to stay, and if he did, who would say yes? These are questions that will be addressed at decolonization, and not a priori in order to appease anxieties for a settler future. Moves to innocence III: Colonial equivocation A more nuanced move to innocence is the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization. Calling different groups ‘colonized’ without describing their relationship to settler colonialism is an equivocation, “the fallacy of using a word in different senses at different stages of the reasoning" (Etymonline, 2001). In particular, describing all struggles against imperialism as ‘decolonizing’ creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work, especially among people of color, queer people, and other groups minoritized by the settler nation-state. ‘We are all colonized,’ may be a true statement but is deceptively embracive and vague, its inference: ‘None of us are settlers.’ Equivocation, or calling everything by the same name, is a move towards innocence that is especially vogue in coalition politics among people of color.

### 2NC – AT: Essentialism

#### Anti-essentialist critiques are just modes of naturalizing the system

Coulthard 14 [Glen Sean, assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition”, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, PDF pg 79-80, July 21, 2017] KLu

I n this chapter I explore in detail the second cluster of concerns often associated with the politics of recognition briefly identified in my introductory chapter. These criticisms have tended to focus on the empirically problematic and normatively suspect character of recognition claims based on “essentialist” articulations of collective identity. According to social constructivist proponents of this line of critique, when claims for cultural accommodation are grounded on essentialist expressions of group identity they can too easily be deployed to justify repressive and authoritarian demands for group compliance on the one hand, or sanction unjust practices of exclusion and marginalization on the other. Without certain guaranteed rights and state institutional mechanisms in place to ensure that problematic cultural norms and practices remain open to democratic deliberation and group contestation, it has been argued that the self-determining status of subaltern individuals within minority groups—especially women and children—will remain at risk. Recognizing that social constructivist critiques of the politics of culture and identity encompass a vast range of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives, in this chapter I will focus more narrowly on the work of political theorist Seyla Benhabib, whose contribution represents what I see as an important yet problematic attempt to bridge the gap between the insights afforded by social constructivist theory and what she views as the deliberative norms and processes that ought to guide and frame democratic practice. 1 In doing so, I argue that Benhabib’s anti-essentialist critique works in concert with a statist feature of her deliberative democratic theory, which functions to inadvertently sanction colonial hierarchies. This argument can be broken into the following two claims. First, I contend that when examined through the lens of Indigenous peoples’ struggles, Benhabib’s social constructivist critique of the politics of recognition tends to not only overestimate the emancipatory potential of anti-essentialist criticism, but more importantly it also fails to address the full breadth of power relations that often serve to proliferate exclusionary and authoritarian community practices and articulations of identity to begin with. In this regard, I align my work with the growing number of scholars who have begun to critically interrogate anti-essentialist criticism when uniformly applied to a range of conceptually distinct and power-laden contexts.2 My second claim is directed more squarely at the statist character of Benhabib’s deliberative democratic critique of the politics of recognition. Here I contend that when anti-essentialist theories of cultural identity are projected as a universal feature of social life and then employed as a justificatory measure for evaluating the legitimacy of claims for recognition within and against the uncontested authority of the colonial state, they can inadvertently sanction the very types of domination and inequality that both social constructivist and deliberative democratic projects ought to mitigate. This is especially the case with respect to Indigenous claims for recognition, which often throw into question, either implicitly or explicitly, the legitimacy of the state’s assumed role as arbiter in contestations over recognition. This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section provides a brief sketch of the constructivist critique of the politics of recognition Benhabib offers in The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. As with my previous engagement with Charles Taylor in chapter 1, although I focus largely on Benhabib’s work here, many of the conclusions reached in this section are by no means limited to her contribution alone. In the second section, I provide a history of Indigenous women’s struggle against sexist provisions of the Indian Act and an examination of the ways in which this history of struggle informed an Indigenous feminist critique of the gendered dynamics underwriting the decade-long (1982–92) effort of mainstream Aboriginal organizations to secure a constitutional right to the self-government in Canada. In the next section, I argue that, although Benhabib is correct to highlight the ways in which preservationist claims to cultural recognition can and have been used by male segments of colonized societies to justify oppressive gender practices, her critique fails to adequately address the colonial context within which these practices have come to flourish. And finally, in the last section, I argue that insofar as Benhabib’s theory uncritically positions the colonial state as a legitimate adjudicator of Indigenous recognition claims, her argument is itself ironically premised on the racist/essentialist assumption that Indigenous peoples were so uncivilized at the time of European contact that they did not constitute self-determining subjects in relation to the states that eventually asserted sovereignty over them

#### Their claims of essentializing claims is bad because it assumes that culture is negotiable, which is the logic that allows for the destruction of indigenous culture.

Coulthard 14 [Glen Sean, assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition”, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, PDF pg 96-99, July 21, 2017] KLu

Benhabib’s intervention, however, focuses solely on the exclusionary features of essentialist identity formations, and this understanding is subsequently reflected in her deliberative approach. The potential problem here, of course, is that by theoretically and institutionally privileging recognition claims that adhere to an infinitely negotiable conception of culture, it is unclear what Indigenous claims Benhabib’s deliberative model would be willing and able to accommodate. For one, almost every Indigenous demand for recognition that I can think of is couched, at least in part, in the vernacular of “cultural survival” and “autonomy”—and rightfully so, given the history of genocidal state assimilation policies that Indigenous people and communities have been forced to endure. Thus, as Arif Dirlik and Roxann Prazniak caution, even when the emancipatory potential of seemingly essentialist Indigenous claims are not readily apparent, it is crucial to “distinguish between claims to identity of the powerful and the powerless, because the powerless may face such threats, including on occasion the threat of extinction, that is intellectually, politically, and morally irresponsible to encompass within one notion of ‘essentialism.’”62 In the concluding chapter of The Claims of Culture Benhabib recognizes the challenge that Indigenous claims to self-determination present her position. “These peoples,” she writes, “are seeking not to preserve their language, customs, and culture alone but to attain the integrity of ways of life greatly at odds with modernity.”63 She continues: While being greatly skeptical about the chances for survival of these cultural groups, I think that from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, we need to create institutions through which members of these communities can negotiate and debate the future of their own conditions of existence. . . . As I have suggested . . . the self-determination rights of many of these groups clash with gender equality norms of the majority culture. [However, if] self-determination is viewed not simply as the right to be left alone in governing one’s affairs, but is also understood as the right to participate in the larger community, then the negotiation of these ways of life to accommodate more egalitarian gender norms becomes possible.64 Although Benhabib recognizes the limits of her approach in colonial contexts, in the end she is still unrelenting in her commitment to a conception of democratic governance that views justice for Indigenous communities in terms of their greater inclusion into the institutional matrix of the larger settler state and society. Indeed, her whole approach suggests that this inclusion is necessary so that Indigenous peoples’ nonliberal, nonmodern cultural norms and practices remain open to contestation and group deliberation. Indigenous peoples, in other words, require access to the deliberative mechanisms and democratic institutions of the enlightened colonial society for the well-being of their own citizens. The assumption here being that the colonial imposition of patriarchal governance structures in First Nations communities has so damaged customary gender roles that the colonial state apparatus is now required to intervene in the political life of First Nations communities to ensure that Indigenous women’s rights are honored and upheld. Here, the legitimacy of a substantive right to Indigenous autonomy and self-determination is perversely undercut by the very success of the colonial project itself. The adverse effects of colonization demand more colonial intervention. Second, although these proposals may avoid some of the effects associated with essentialist group practices, they nonetheless leave unscathed the presumption that the colonial state constitutes a legitimate authority to determine which demands for Indigenous recognition ought to be accommodated and which ought to be denied. Ironically, however, the state’s assumed position in these struggles is itself what is contested by many Indigenous claims for cultural recognition. What is also ironic is the fact that that the state’s assumed authority in these matters is premised on the profoundly essentialist, indeed racist, understanding that Indigenous peoples were too uncivilized to constitute equal and self-determining nations when European powers unilaterally asserted their sovereignty over Native North America.

# AFF ANSWERS

### 2AC – Perm

#### Imagining a repurpose of geopolitical power is good – only the permutation solves

Veemaa 14 [Jaanus, PhD Student in the Department of Geography at the University of Tartu, “Reconsidering geography and power: policy ensembles, spatial knowledge, and the quest for consistent imagination”, University of Tartu Press, 2014, <http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/44335/veemaa_jaanus.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>, July 10, 2017] KLu

In this section, we are going to discuss, on the basis of study results, why this thesis matters. So far, this introductory chapter has sought to illustrate, among other things, that the relationships between power and geography are both constitutive and practical. The recognition of the ontological bond between geography and power means that there cannot be such a thing as geography-free policy-making. Since all policies are set up by human subjects, they reproduce spatially constituted social reality, even if it is unintended (Lefebvre 1991; Thrift 1983; Zieleniec 2007). However, the ontological link between power and geography does not speak much about the efficiency of reproduction that this thesis studies (study I–IV). The efficiency normally requires more or less rationalised intervention. This means that geographical knowledge is systematised, reasoned, and conceptualised considering certain (political) purposes. In this thesis this process is defined as spatial imagination (study I). The practices through which imagined geography [spatial imaginations] can enhance the efficiency of targeted actions such as policies include not only (re- )organising of a geographical knowledge according to some rational grounds and/or ideological perspectives, but also planning and coordination as well as considering the interdependence between policies. In all of this, the challenge that policy makers face regarding the use of geography is definitely complex, and this is where the collaboration with geographers could be welcomed both in forms of policy-relevant research and the participation of well-trained specialists (Harvey 1974; Massey 2001). David Harvey (1984, 7) has once declared that ʻGeography is too important to be left to geographers. But it is far too important to be left to generals, politicians, and corporate chiefs̕. Still, it is often lamented by academic geographers that expected collaboration between geographers and policy makers has been woefully limited (Murphy 2006; Peck 1999; Ward 2007). In particular, it has been claimed that geographers tend to provide policy studies that ʻgenerate knowledge about the policy process but are of limited relevance in terms of contributing knowledge to the policy processʼ (Rydin 2005, 74–75). It seems that the spatial analyses regarding policy processes often tend to be rejected by power centres as types of stories that could have some value as interesting intellectual exercises but lack the coherence with prearranged models of policy performance. There are different reasons why policy makers tend to look at spatial knowledge as other than needful for feeding technologies of spatial governance with persistent suspicion. Firstly, spatial analyses offer knowledge and expertise that often push for radical change in the ways in which policies should reproduce a social reality. These claims are not necessary ideological or structural, as is the case with, for example, the works of radical Marxist geography, but rather categorical. The mantra that space matters in policy-making can be true but it cannot be absolute. Geographical research regarding policy processes is just one possible way to reveal shortcomings in policy-making, but there are always others, and more commonplace ways also in the market. The second problem is related to poor communication. Some scholars have complained that spatial analyses of policy processes have a tendency to be theoretically saturated and ambiguous with regard to methods and conceptual apparatus (Martin 2001). The lack of theoretical transparency and misunderstandings regarding basic concepts can make it difficult to convince an audience that considering the spatial knowledge could add some extra quality for policy formation. As a result, spatial factors are often seen by policy makers as secondary compared to, for example, economic or ethnocultural ones, if enhancing of the efficiency of policy-making is at stake (Peck 1999). The third and no less important problem is translation. The majority of geographical analyses which have the ambition to provide practical knowledge for policy processes tend to be highly context-sensitive. This is so because spatial factors are never universal in the sense that they ʻ(re-)actʼ differently in different places. As such, the knowledge that the studies provide is not always easily adaptable and applicable for other political formations, even if the policy performance takes place on a comparable scale of governance (cf. Banks & MacKian 2000; Martin 2001). In addition to the specific character of geographical knowledge and occasionally confusing approaches used for policy analyses, the deficit of policy-relevant geographical research is due to academic standards, which makes it unattractive for geographers to politicise their research and establish an open dialogue with policy makers (Dorling & Shaw 2002; Murphy 2006; cf. Beaumont et al. 2005). Contrary to the prevalent attitude, however, some authors have suggested that the proper way to enhance the attractiveness of geography studies regarding policy formation is to integrate them with policyrelevant agendas. For example, Jakob & Marques (2014, 28) have emphasised that ʻresearch without a political project (why) and applicable ideas (how) will continue to trail behind in its practical relevanceʼ. This plea is partly based on the view that social scientists, including human geographers, cannot just distance themselves from policy cycles and policy formation by avoiding ideologically sensitive themes and ignoring the dialogue with society (Woods & Gardner 2011). Hanging on the belief that academic immunity guarantees the reliability of social research is illusory because social research, even if it is conducted at a very abstract level, can never be politically neutral. In the end, whether the knowledge can be declared politically innocent depends on the contexts in which it is used – for whom, when and what the produced knowledge applies. Furthermore, the changing power relationships between academic and governance spheres occurring during the last decades in many Western countries undermine the myth of academic neutrality even more clearly. As a result, scholars are witnessing academic and social pressure to do contract works for governance institutions and participate in shaping policy through various expert groups and consulting. It is also worth mentioning that we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that much of academic studies is still directly financed from governmental funds and, as such, is monitored and evaluated by politically responsible officials and experts. Considering this, some authors have suggested that geographers could take more responsibility and control over their research outcomes. This means, for example, that geographical studies about policy processes could be politically positioned and targeted by framing them with ʻdiscussion of the political and practical goals that the researchers are trying to achieveʼ (Jakob & Marques 2014, 26).

### 2AC – Genealogy Fails

#### **Genealogy as a theory cannot be tied to recommendations for actions – means their aff falls prey to the circulation of endless discourse in academia**

Flyvberg & Richardon 2 – dept of development @ Aalborg University

(Bent, Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning & Tim, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf.) JPG

3. Towards Foucault Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. Foucault’s norms are not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993, 316) and in this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, 46). Foucault here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. For Foucault praxis and freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. Whereas Habermas emphasises procedural macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality - having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination. It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison...are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and he directly distances himself from the kinds of universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are themselves part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out only in order to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth--a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power. And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding ]over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus.

### 2AC – Util

#### Preventing extinction is the most ethical outcome

Bostrom 13 (Nick, Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Director, Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology University of Oxford, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority”, Global Policy Volume 4, Issue 1, February 2013 // AKONG)

Some other ethical perspectives We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplify- ing assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of human- ity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially end- less quests for scientific knowledge and philo- sophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchil- dren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavor- able to the carrying out of this complex of pro- jects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. ... Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commit- ment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any iso- lated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a popula- tion-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it (Adams, 1989, pp. 472–473). Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drasti- cally curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, sug- gesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasising that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stake- holders would favour existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favour such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future peo- ple are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.23 We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civili- sation that humankind has been working on for thou- sands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activi- ties: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).24 We might also consider the issue from a less theoreti- cal standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have defi- nite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.25 And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to pre- vent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.

### 2AC – Too Totalizing

#### Settler Colonialism is too broad of a theory – prefer specificity of each scenario

Greenstein 16 [Ran, associate professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Settler Colonialism: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?”, Jadaliyya, June 6, 2016, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24603/settler-colonialism_a-useful-category-of-historica>, July 10, 2017] KLu

Increasingly in the last decade, settler colonialism has gained currency as a new field of study. As a descriptive and political term, its utility seems obvious. It identifies a cluster of countries in which colonial rule was combined historically with the large-scale immigration of European settlers. It allows us to focus on particularly resilient forms of domination that serve the interests and concerns of settler populations that made a new home for themselves in overseas territories. Almost invariably facing resistance from indigenous people, settler colonial societies were shaped by ongoing political conflict. This provided them with common features and a sense of shared destiny, understandable given the similar challenges they face. Solidarity among those at the losing end – indigenous people, the enslaved, and others marginalized through this model of colonial rule – is the counter-part of the process. At the same time, the extent to which the term serves a useful purpose in historical and theoretical analysis is less obvious. I argue here that its utility in these respects is limited and it may be misleading at times. For this reason, we might be better off with other, more precise, concepts and models. I draw on examples from Israel/Palestine and South Africa to illustrate the point. What is the problem with settler colonialism as a historical concept? In a sense, its strongest point is also its weakest: it is applicable to many cases that exhibit a great diversity of conditions. It has been applied to countries that saw settlers overwhelm the indigenous population to such a degree that it became demographically and economically marginal. For example, indigenous people are no more than three percent of the population in the USA, Canada and Australia. In other countries, such as Kenya, Rhodesia, Algeria, Mozambique and South Africa, indigenous people remained the bulk of the population, as well as the main source of labor. Slavery featured prominently in some cases (USA, early colonial South Africa) but not in others. Settlers of European origins retained strong legal and political links to the mother country in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Portuguese African colonies. They became independent in the USA, South Africa and other British offshoots, at times as a result of a violent intra-colonial conflict. In some places most settlers left the territory after independence from colonial rule – as in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia. Large numbers stayed put in other countries, such as Namibia and South Africa. And, of course, where they became numerically dominant, settlers used their political independence to consolidate their rule, marginalizing “natives” further. But they also incorporated them into the new polity when the demographic ratio was sufficiently favorable so as not to pose a threat to settler domination. This contrasts with the maintenance of legal-racial divisions in places where indigenous people remained a majority of the population. Indigenous strategies have differed as well. They have consisted of attempts to integrate as individuals on an equal basis in some countries. In others, indigenous people sought to maintain pre-colonial identities and modes of organization. Still others have formed nationalist movements on the new ground created by colonial settlement, or focused on race as a basis for resistance. Most of these strategies acknowledge, to varying degrees, settlers as legitimate members of the envisaged future liberated society. It is not only the broad contours of history that vary greatly in settler colonial societies but also patterns of social change over time. Constant geographical expansion while driving out indigenous people has occurred in the USA and Australia. Elsewhere there has been constant expansion while incorporating indigenous people as labor power, in South Africa most notably. In other cases there has been an initial takeover of the entire territory with more-or-less fixed relations of subordination throughout the period – for example in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Namibia. There have been different degrees of incorporation of “urban natives” in a relatively privileged position compared to rural populations, and different combinations of direct and indirect despotism, to use Mahmood Mamdani’s notions of colonial rule in late colonial Africa. In other words, the category of settler colonialism is compatible with different demographic ratios and different trajectories of indigenous-settler relations. It can go along with different relations between settlers and metropolitan centers and different destinies of settlers in the post-colonial period. It is compatible with different social structures, relying variously on free white labor, and indentured immigrant labor, from Europe, India or other places. Or it can rely on African slavery, indigenous labor subordination, and combinations of the above. In all these respects, settler colonial societies do not share a single historical dynamic nor do they exhibit a tendency to move in similar directions. They may end up with the consolidation of settler rule or its demise through indigenous resistance and victory. None of the possible outcomes serves to mark the historical trajectory of settler colonialism apart from other types of colonial societies. In the absence of a unique trajectory, does settler colonialism display perhaps specific conceptual features? That is to say, does it work as a theoretical model? A model offers a relationship between a limited number of concepts or variables. It aims to make sense of large number of observations. It reduces the infinite variety of empirical reality into discrete units with distinct dynamics or laws of motion. Do models of colonial societies (settler, exploitation, plantation, and so on), show us how some cases differ from others in theoretical terms? Do they outline distinct ways in which concepts such as class, race, ethnicity, identity, state, gender, power, sexuality, ideology, space, time, and discourse, manifest themselves concretely or intersect with one another? If we pose the question in this way, the conclusion seems unavoidable. Settler colonialism as a category of historical analysis does not establish any specific social-theoretical dynamics unique to it. We cannot use its historical features to distinguish it analytically – not just descriptively – from other types of societies, be they colonial or not. If settler colonialism has no specific historical or theoretical dynamics then, how do we deal analytically with societies that fall within its definition? As an alternative method of investigation, I suggest a strategy of addressing the multiplicity of colonial and post-colonial societies with a three-track approach: · Studying them in their full historical specificity without imposing artificial boundaries between classes of cases; · Deploying general analytical concepts instead of developing idiosyncratic models. Such models abound: “colonialism of a special type,” “ethnic democracy combined with protracted military occupation,” “exclusionary colonialism,” or “regimes of separation.” They may serve as useful political labels but are theoretically without predictive value. · Engaging in selected comparisons in order to highlight general and unique features by examining them against each other. This should allow us to enhance the complexity of good empirical description as well as the generality of social theory. But it would not compromise either one of these imperatives. To illustrate this approach, I apply it to two settler-colonial societies, Israel/Palestine and South Africa. In what ways does such a study offer a better prospect for historical analysis? Is the concept of apartheid, originating in one of them and increasingly applied to the other, a useful analytical substitute? In brief, these two have in common an ongoing conflict between indigenous people and settlers. It has stretched over centuries and involved conquest of territory, massive land dispossession, and a constant quest for innovative modes of political domination well beyond the period of global colonial expansion and subsequent decolonization. This continued all the way to the last decade of the twentieth century, in South Africa, and into the twenty-first in Israel/Palestine. At the same time, there are important differences between them. They include the centrality of indigenous labor in enhancing settler prosperity, the religious symbolism of the land, the prevailing mode of collective organization (nationalism as opposed to race), and the degree of international legitimacy. These differences shape both power and resistance, the nature of the state and society, as well as the possibilities of indigenous social and political mobilization. Neither settler colonialism nor apartheid as analytical concepts can help us predict the trajectories of these societies. For that, we have to study them in concrete historical detail and outline the precise configurations of forces at work in each case. The approach proposed here though, directs our attention to key historical processes seen from a comparative angle. For example, it can point out the impact of indigenous modes of political organization on conquest and resistance. It can also highlight the greater capacity of pre-1948 Palestinians to shape the terms of the evolving conflict. And, it can point out the more fragile modes of social organization of indigenous people in South Africa. These, in turn, facilitated their conquest and incorporation into settler-dominated economic structures. It raises questions about the ways in which parties to the conflict in Israel/Palestine made use of their links to global Arab, Islamic and Jewish identities and resources. In contrast, actors in South Africa were reliant for long periods – before the nineteenth century and for much of the twentieth century – on local affiliations and resources. In a contemporary vein, this approach leads us to examine strategies of resistance by focusing on the centrality of the labor movement in South African struggles as compared to its marginal role in Israel/Palestine. This can be linked to patterns of settlement and conquest as well as to affiliations with extra-territorial populations – creating jobs for Jewish immigrants as a crucial imperative, for example. The implications of this difference for mobilization and change are important as well – indigenous race/class synergy in South Africa compared to a split between these factors in Israel/Palestine. Additionally, we could look at culture and discourse. We could discuss the prevalence of demographic considerations in the one case, and its relative absence in the other. The concern of Jewish settlers with becoming a majority had to do with the prior historical consolidation of ethno-national identities in Israel/Palestine. It was also linked to the absence of the technological advantage that was central to relations of domination between settlers and indigenous people in South Africa, making a settler majority less of an imperative there. This, in turn, affected political strategies of demographic exclusion, leading to ethnic cleansing in Israel/Palestine. It contrasts with the incorporation/exploitation of indigenous people as providers of labor power and, later on, as citizens, in South Africa.

### 2AC – Essentialism

#### The K creates a false dichotomy between the indigenous and colonizer – that’s the worst form of essentialism

Andersen 9 [Chris, Associate Professor of Native Studies at Alberta, “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density”, Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 15 No 2 2009, pg. 80-100] KLu

Champagne’s abstraction, imprecision and internal contradictions make it difficult to produce definitive conclusions about his work. However, Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid the essentialism which grounds it. My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘continued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to overshadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’. His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant, whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily struggles. For example, Champagne proposes that ‘[i]mproving existing theories or categorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and colonial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘most current theories do not provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’.44 One of many questions which arise from such statements, of course, is the extent to which Indigenous studies—which must necessarily place itself within the same academic relations of power that shape ‘Western’ disciplines—can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque Champagne is writing on its behalf (more on this in part three). Of more immediate concern: given that Native studies must operate within the forms of power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines, what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne, it is our valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western concepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, precisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of Western disciplines: race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control … the focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclusion into US society as a primary goal. Such goals of social equality are taken up by some American Indians, but race and critical race theories do not conceptualize or center collective American Indian goals such as preservation of land, self-government, and reclaiming culture’;45 class: ‘while helpful, class theory provides little conceptual or explanatory power for understanding American Indian emphases on reclaiming culture and collective tribal forms of economic organization’;46 ethnicity: ‘Theories of ethnicity focus on group organization and culture but do not include issues such as collective land retention and institutions of self-government’;47 nation: ‘ “Nation” is a term often used in Indian country today partly because the expression makes sense in English and in American culture for a political grouping, but its meaning may have powerful cultural meanings for many American Indian communities that are not implied in the English expression’;48 post-modernism/post-colonialism: ‘are imbued with the deep social epistemologies of Western society. There is much emphasis on marginalization, generally in materialistic forms, and on emancipation and liberation from oppression. Such arguments make sense given the economic and colonial conditions under which indigenous peoples often live, but the goals of the theories should not be imputed to be the goals and values of many indigenous peoples and communities’.49 Given the apparent inadequacy of these concepts in Champagne’s argument and his stated focus on Indigenous communities and nations, what is he left with in his pursuit of an academic basis for Indigenous studies? His looming but largely unacknowledged essentialism leaves him—as essentialism usually does—with an emphasis on Indigenous difference. Champagne repeatedly stresses elements which supposedly render Indigenous communities and cultures different from settler society and its communities: for example, our collective forms of governance, collective land retention and institutions of self government, the centrality of non-human powers and the importance of balance between human and nonhuman powers, all sit outside the ability of Western disciplines to analyse.50 Thus, the epistemological (and, one assumes, ontological) commitment of concepts of race, class, ethnicity, nation and culture to Western society—to assimilation or renationalisation—precludes the ‘deep cultural or institutional perspective of American Indians or center American Indian history or individual, group, or cultural experiences’.51 They fail, for example, to ‘emphasize ways of life that seek spiritual or moral balance with the human and nonhuman forces of the world’.52 Perhaps equally importantly, (Champagne’s) American Indian communities are, he tells us, likely to find such concepts troubling insofar as they rely on ‘epistemological assumptions usually alien to those made in American Indian communities and traditions’.53 Few Native studies practitioners would quarrel with Champagne’s argument that Indigenous communities differ in fundamental ways from dominant, whitestream society. This acknowledgement, however, is accompanied by two rubs. First, in the specific context of the academy, in his failure to explain specifically why Indigenous studies as a discipline should hold a privileged place in the academy to render pronouncements regarding the authenticity of this difference. Second and relatedly, Champagne unproblematically conflates community Indigeneity with its academic manifestation and in doing so reproduces the very same epistemological power of whiteness (at the heart of all academic disciplines) he critiques in his original formulation. What epistemological distances exist between academic and community knowledge? Where can we place Native studies in this continuum? Champagne doesn’t answer these questions because for him, the latter question is, in an ideal world, a solution to the former: Native studies is Indigenous knowledge in the academy. Champagne’s failure to account for the constitutive character of power which shapes ‘academic Indigeneity’ pushes his argument unnecessarily and uncomfortably close to an ‘Aboriginalist’ logic which locates Indigeneity by precisely what, apparently, it is not: white/ capitalist/secular/modern. Certainly, his intentions differ from those of colonial administrators who sought to destroy our distinctiveness, disregard our complexity and produce representations which apparently reaffirm(ed) their superiority over us. Nonetheless, his essentialism effectively marginalises ‘dynamic, kinetic, and unfolding [Indigenous] voice[s]’54 at a time when many (including Champagne himself) have laboured so intensively to interrogate and denaturalise such static representations. Perhaps equally importantly, his analytical lens remains focused solely in the direction of Indigenous communities and in so doing handcuffs our ability to undertake an immanent deconstruction of Indigenous representations produced in and by white society. Champagne’s argument is clearly dedicated to clearing intellectual space for an Indigenous studies willing to do the heavy lifting involved in exploring and analysing what ‘the Western gaze rarely acknowledges’ (see below) by using distinctive theoretical and methodological tools apparently unavailable to Western disciplines. We might, then, merely (if generously) read Champagne’s argument as advocating that a proper study of contemporary Indigeneity requires both Indigenous and Western epistemologies. This strand of his argument, though abruptly anti-essentialist and almost wholly at odds with his earlier discussion, appears reasonably to suggest that Indigenous communities are not so different after all, and certainly allows him to avoid his articles’ more essentialist moments. However, this move paints Champagne into another, equally tricky corner. If Indigenous communities are not essentially different, on what epistemological basis can Indigenous studies stake a theoretical or methodological claim separate from those of other disciplines? With all due respect to Champagne, we can no longer base such a claim around an ability to ask questions about Indigeneity in ways Western disciplines cannot, since that ship sailed when he cracked open his positioning of Indigeneity to all epistemological comers. Likewise, he has a larger problem which, perhaps ironically, stems from this same stated centring of Indigenous communities. Though in placing our communities front and centre he rightfully positions us as knowledgeable, agentic subjects, his argument narrows this knowledge to what we know about ourselves and presents no sustained analysis of our equally important knowledge about whiteness. This latter task requires expertise in the very ‘Western’ disciplinary concepts he dismisses. In doing so, Champagne places us outside of the regimes of power which accord these concepts their currency. In a phrase, Champagne has valorised our difference at the expense of our density. The third and final part of the paper will address these issues.

### 2AC – Futurity Good (AT: Dalley)

#### Futurity is key to challenge oppressive structures – focus on reproductive futurism allows us to be reflexive of the past and present

Unger 7 (Robert Mangabeira, Professor of Law Harvard, “The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound,” <http://www.law.harvard.edu/unger/english/docs/pragmatism.doc>)

The third theme is Futurity. Whether or not time is for real in the vast world of nature, of which our knowledge always remains at once remote and contradictory, is a subject that will always continue to arouse controversy. That time is for real in human existence is not, however, a speculative thesis; it is a pressure we face with mounting force, so long as we remain conscious and not deluded, in our passage from birth to death. The temporal character of our existence is the consequence of our embodiment, the stigma of our finitude, and the condition that gives transcendence its point. We are not exhausted by the social and cultural worlds we inhabit and build. They are finite. We, in comparison to them, are not. We can see, think, feel, build, and connect in more ways than they can allow. That is why we are required to rebel against them: to advance our interests and ideals as we now understand them, but also to become ourselves, affirming the polarity that constitutes the law-breaking law of our being.       To seek what goes beyond the established structure and represents, for that very reason, the possible beginning of another structure, even of a structure that organizes its own remaking, is to live for the future. Living for the future is a way of living in the present as a being not wholly determined by the present conditions of its existence. We never completely surrender. We go about our business of passive submission, of voiceless despair, as if we knew that the established order were not for keeps, and had no final claim to our allegiance. Orientation to the future -- futurity -- is a defining condition of personality.       So fundamental is this feature of our existence that it also shapes the experience of thinking, even when our thoughts are directed away from ourselves to nature. Ceaselessly reorganizing our experience of particulars under general headings, constantly breaking up and remaking the headings to master the experience, intuiting in one set of known relations the existence of another, next to it or hidden under it, finding out one thing when we had set out to find out another, and discovering indeed what our assumptions and methods may have ruled out as paradoxical, contradictory, or impossible, we come to see the next steps of thought -- its possibilities, its future -- as the point of the whole past of thought.       Futurity should cease to be a predicament and should become a program: we should radicalize it to empower ourselves. That is the reason to take an interest in ways of organizing thought and society that diminish the influence of what happened before on what can happen next. Such intellectual and institutional innovations make change in thought less dependent on the pressure of unmastered anomalies and change in society less dependent on the blows of unexpected trauma. In any given historical situation, the effort to live for the future has consequences for how we order our ideas and for how we order our societies. There is a structure to the organized revision of structures. Its constituents, however, are not timeless. We paste them together with the time-soaked materials at hand.

### 2AC – Scenario Analysis Good (AT: Dalley)

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

**Barma et al. 16** – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

\*\*FYI if anyone is skeptical of Barma’s affiliation with the Naval Postgraduate School, it’s worth looking at her publication history, which is deeply opposed to US hegemony and the existing liberal world order:

1. co-authored an article entitled “How Globalization Went Bad” that has this byline: “From terrorism to global warming, the evils of globalization are more dangerous than ever before. What went wrong? The world became dependent on a single superpower. Only by correcting this imbalance can the world become a safer place.” (http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/how\_globalization\_went\_bad)
2. most recent published scenario is entitled “World Without the West,” supports the a Non-Western reinvention of the liberal order, and concludes that “This argument made a lot of people uncomfortable, mostly because of an endemic and gross overestimation of the reach, depth and attractiveness of the existing liberal order” (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-the-world-without-the-west-11651)

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

### 2AC – Prag

#### Pragmatism is good – theoretical purity is impossible

Williams and Chrisman 94 [Patrick, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Literature and Languages at Nottingham Trent University, Laura, Lecturer in English in the School of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex, “Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader”, Columbia University Press, <https://books.google.com/books/about/Colonial_Discourse_and_Post_colonial_The.html?id=AtbXMKMzLrkC>, July 11, 2017] KLu

There remains, Of course, the question Of whether any knowledge Of theory is pure, whether Young's deconstructive moves are in the end any less appropriative Of their objects of knowledge (Marxism, colonial discourse analysis) than the theories he criticises. Part of the problem lies in the assumption that theoretical 'purity' is possible; part of the problem lies in the assumption that 'purity', even if possible, is politically desirable. For Adorno and Horkheimer, for instance, these assumptions would be a major shortcoming in the operations of post-structuralism and some post-colonial theory. Such operations repeat the very way in which traditional philosophy (Enlightenment 'or otherwise) cuts itself off from a self-reflective consideration of its relationship to material and political power, deluding itself as to its pure and autonomous status, and thereby becomes all the more readily an instrument and mirror Of social domination. As Adorno States elsewhere, [ellipses in orig] …the idea of the mastery of pure reason as a being-in-itself, separate from practice, subjects even the subject and turns it into an instrument toward purposes. A form of self-reflection of reason really of help would make Its transition to praxis: this self-reflection would see through itself to its practical moment; instead Of mistaking itself for the absolute, it would know that it is a kind of conduct. The anti-mythological aspect of progress cannot be thought without the practical act which seizes the delusion of the autarchy of spirit by the reins. Thus, progress is also not ascertainable through disinterested consideration. 16 Adorno's comments arise from a complex meditation on the nature and theory of (social, historical and intellectual) 'progress' , a concept which occupies an embattled position within and across a range Of post-colonial and development theories. He argues (among other things) that progress means humanity emerges from its spellbound state no longer under the spell of progress as well, itself nature, by becoming aware of its own indigenousness to nature and by halting the mastery over nature through which nature continues its mastery. In this respect it could be said that progress only comes about at the point when it come to an end. 17 In this conclusion, a notion of progress proves to be as indispensable as it is dangerous to human emancipation. The complex turns of Adorno's dialectic, in which Enlightenment traditions of identity-thinking are subjected to an immanent critique, suggest ways in which dialectical thinking can be a tool in challenging, not upholding, philosophical trends towards a totalising absolutism, founded on a notion of the fundamentally unstable, contradictory, interdependent, and mutually transformative relations between 'subject' and \*object', 'self and 'other'. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's critique of theoretical spur.ty' overlaps in many ways with that of Adorno. Spivak would suggest that even those who do not go in for strategic essentiallism do not thereby remain pure: You pick up the universal that will give you the power to fight against the other side, and What you are throwing away is your theoretical purity. Whereas the great custodians of the anti-universal are obliged therefore simply to act in the interest of a great narrative, the narrative Of exploitation, While they keep themselves Clean by not committing themselves to anything. In fact they are actually run by a great narrative even as they are busy protecting their theoretical purity by repudiating