# Necroptx

## Generic 1nc shells

### 1nc education

#### educational reform such as race to the top and no child left behind shapes children into the modern day liberal subject (this card is over highlighted but is specific to liberal subject formation within education systems)

Jahng 11

Kyung Eun. Assistant Professor, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea early childhood and care policy, multicultural education, character education, qualitative research methods, Foucault "Thinking inside the box: Interrogating no child left behind and race to the top." KEDI Journal of Educational Policy 8.1 (2011). //gc

Educational reform policies as apparatuses inscribe and embody a certain form of rationality that underlies citizenship education. Despite the claim that NCLB undermines citizenship education due to its exclusive focus on math and reading and less attention to other subjects, this policy officially addresses that it “helps schools to establish safe, disciplined and drug-free educational environments that foster the development of good character and good citizenship” (U.S. Department of Education, 2010c). This indicates that teaching is not so much delivering subject knowledge as cultivating qualities of good citizens in children (Popkewitz, 2008). Namely, education serves as a governing mechanism, fashioning children as modern liberal subjects that possess and exercise free agency that predates any social conditions and enables them to act as they wish, by inculcating children with rational ways of thinking and behaving (Kessl, 2008; Passavant, 2002; Popkewitz, 2008). Here, both the sovereign power of the government and institutionalized disciplinary micro-practices co-function as governmentality over minority children as Foucault (1991) explains the term governmentality as: [t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (p. 102). Although children are expected to exercise agency that qualifies them to become good citizens, their way of reasoning is extensively shaped through schooling. While they are constrained through the processes of differentiation, normalization, and division in the current educational systems, governmentality enables them to freely choose any behavior within a given regime of truth which refers to a set of statements that is considered to be true, thinkable, and acceptable and formulated as the effects of power within a particular discourse (Foucault, 1980). As Popkewitz (2005) asserts, “schooling serves to fabricate the child who participates and acts as a reasonable citizen” (p. 5). Agency, reason, and rationality are thus seen as taken-forgranted capabilities of a modern liberal subject. Early education attempts to cultivate these prerequisites for becoming a reasonable citizen.

#### Education is used as a tool to construct children as liberal subjects

Barouch 14 (Timothy. Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Georgia State University - ‎Georgia State University Liberalism's Children: Studies in Literature and Law. Diss. Northwestern University, 2014.)

Because the child doesn’t possess the requisite capabilities to participate in social and governing institutions or pursue life plans, the liberal tradition recognizes the child as an object of education and discipline in order to cultivate these skills. The child’s speech and preferences are discounted, and her judgment is met with skepticism; all in the name of developing a future citizen adequate to the task of maintaining the health of the state. In its earliest articulations, this meant even excluding children from some of the most basic human rights, even if that exclusion came with the acknowledgment that the child possessed some capability that required cultivation. When John Locke dispensed advice on how to deal with a crying child **in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, he advised adults in the ways of emotional control**, **asking them to beat children “without Passion, soberly and yet effectually too, laying on the Blows and Smart, not furiously and all at once, but slowly,** with Reasoning between.”16 The crying child – uttering unintelligible speech – must be dealt with as both a reasoning being and **a piece of property**, because that method is appropriate to the future of the wider community. This strain of conflict found in these sweeping pronouncements from liberal thinkers have also formed the basis for a host of recent scholarship spanning the disciplines of English, History, Philosophy, Political Theory, and Psychology, the emerging Children’s Studies field, and cultural criticism. These works worry over the These works worry over the development of the child in our current condition because children are becoming transformed into consumers. Studying the social life of the child as a test case for the health of the larger public culture, this body of scholarship romanticizes childhood as something to protect, so that children can grow up uncorrupted by the market’s expansive reach and create a better community. In 1982, three years prior to publishing his best-known book, Amusing Ourselves to Death, Neil Postman wrote The Disappearance of Childhood, which attacked the electronic medium of television for the manner in which it dismantles childhood through the exposure of children to inappropriate images of adult activity.17 Lawrence Grossberg’s 2005 book, Caught in the Crossfire: Kids, Politics, and America’s Future partly builds on Postman’s argument, with explicit reference to the child’s diminished cognitive capabilities when he writes that capitalism “targets kids as soon as they are old enough to watch commercials, even though they may not be old enough to distinguish programming from commercials or to recognize the effects of branding and product placement.”

#### Liberal violence manifests in the classroom through dehumanization violence to disabled bodies that they deem inhuman creating violence and worlds of living death

Jordan 13

Thomas. 2013. “Disability, Able-bodiedness, and the Biopolitical Imagination.” Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal 9 (1). http://rdsjournal.org/index.php/journal/article/view/70

Both Foucault and Arendt characterize modernity in precisely the same way, though they arrive at the conclusion separately: the threshold of modernity is constituted by the politicization of the unqualified body, simple human life. For Arendt (1958), scientific modernity names the process by which labor, the animal laborans, rises to central importance within the sphere of politics. Foucault’s (1990) analysis concurs: “For millennia man [sic] remained what he [sic] was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man [sic] is an animal whose politics calls his [sic] existence as a living being into question” (p. 143). Once the animal laborans (or Agamben’s zoe) is linked to the disabled body, disability becomes stigmatized in the West as a symbol of the strictly biological needs of the human body. The conclusion might follow that if the project of modern biopolitics is invested primarily in the biological processes of its subjects, disability would find a measure of inclusion in this new paradigm of rule. On the surface, this appears to be the case, particularly with the deinstitutionalization movement and legislation like the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) that seeks to guarantee the civil rights of disabled populations. Likewise, Davis (2002) has demonstrated the ways that disability finds inclusion as a market identity within the newly globalized economy. At the same time, there are dangers associated with this line of thought, which corresponds to a type of progress narrative associated with disability liberation. Even as the old walls of the institution begin to crumble, the group home, the nursing home, the special education classroom, and the government-funded facility continue to mark a point of separation between the able-bodied and the disabled. From a global perspective, the inclusion of disabled subjects is also severely limited. In Achilles Mbembe’s (2003) essay “Necropolitics,” he offers the concept of a “death-world” to describe “new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40).6 Given that there are more than a half billion disabled people in the world today and that 80 percent live in developing countries, the intersections between impaired bodies and the creation of death-worlds are multifarious (Davidson, 2008, p. 117). In such spaces, the visibly fragmented body marks a liminal position between life and death. While the social conditions conferred upon Mbembe’s (2003) “living dead” produce disproportionate numbers of disabled people, their disabilities perform the symbolic work of justifying those unequal living conditions.7 The “death-world,” then, relies on a form of circular logic that inverts its temporal manifestation, where acts of violence are justified by the disabilities they produce. Neither Foucault nor Arendt can answer the competing and contradictory claims represented by the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the disabled body that characterizes modernity and the current age of global capital. For Agamben (1995), the primary limitation of Foucault’s (and by extension, Arendt’s) theoretical analysis is their inability to define the precise relationship between the law and specific forms of biopower (p.6). Agamben (1995) asks, “Where is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge?” (p. 6). In other words, at what point do sovereign acts of violence and modern technologies of discipline intersect and inform one another?

#### Liberal ideology engrained in students boils up leading to endless war, this turns the case

Evans 10 Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### The alternative is to be the queer Suicide terrorist – an explosion of self-sacrifice with a bomb, in favor of unsettling the violent definitions of subjectivity.

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage, "'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

### Catastrophic Future k

#### The affirmative’s optimistic reform of education falls back into liberal ideology

Or modern day optimistic education has become a tool to capture affective energy and regulate bodies

Sellar 16

Sam. professorial Research Fellow in the School of Education and Institute for Social Science Research "Leaving the future behind." Research in Education 96.1 (2016): 12-18. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0034523716664602> //gc

Optimism can become a trap for educational thought when it is aligned to normative beliefs about the purposes of education and what is desirable as a good life. Affect is subtly interwoven into the creation and maintenance of our sense of who we are, how we belong with others, and what gives life meaning. Affect can thus powerfully align with social norms to produce a visceral sense of how one should think and act. The story of how our attachment to reproducing the intelligibility of the world nudges affective forces into line with normative realism is also the story of liberal subjectivity’s fantasies of individual and collective sovereignty, the public and private, the past’s relation to the future, and the distribution of sensibilities that discipline the imaginary of what the good life is and how proper people act. (Berlant, 2011: 52–53) The affirmation of the future with which educational thinking begins encourages the alignment of optimistic dispositions and normative beliefs about the role of education in relation to opportunity in democratic, capitalist societies. Optimism is a powerful affective force, coded in the language of positive psychology as motivation, grit or resilience, and is promoted by politicians and policy makers as a motor for ‘getting ahead’ through investment in education. The affective dynamics of educational optimism operate across policy and practice (Moore and Clarke, 2016). Educational opportunity has become the primary lure in the politics of aspiration and self-motivation for educational success has become a prominent governance strategy. Raco (2009) argues that ‘[t]he aspiration to ‘better oneself’ in material and commodified terms is presented as a natural sense of order or something that reflects the innate desires of human beings’ (439). This ‘natural’ tendency is leveraged by what Brown (2003) calls the opportunity bargain: the promise made by governments that more learning will equal more earning. However, as Brown et al. (2010) argue, if everyone pursues the same educational strategies in pursuit of social mobility then nobody wins. The opportunity bargain has not extended individual freedom but has led to an opportunity trap that forces people to spend more time, effort, and money on activities that may have little intrinsic purpose in an attempt fulfill one’s opportunities. The trap is that if everyone adopts the same tactics, such as getting a bachelor’s degree or working longer hours to impress the boss, no one secures an advantage. (12)

#### Liberal violence manifests in the classroom through dehumanization violence to disabled bodies that they deem inhuman creating intense violets and worlds of living death

Jordan 13

Thomas. 2013. “Disability, Able-bodiedness, and the Biopolitical Imagination.” Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal 9 (1). http://rdsjournal.org/index.php/journal/article/view/70

Both Foucault and Arendt characterize modernity in precisely the same way, though they arrive at the conclusion separately: the threshold of modernity is constituted by the politicization of the unqualified body, simple human life. For Arendt (1958), scientific modernity names the process by which labor, the animal laborans, rises to central importance within the sphere of politics. Foucault’s (1990) analysis concurs: “For millennia man [sic] remained what he [sic] was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man [sic] is an animal whose politics calls his [sic] existence as a living being into question” (p. 143). Once the animal laborans (or Agamben’s zoe) is linked to the disabled body, disability becomes stigmatized in the West as a symbol of the strictly biological needs of the human body. The conclusion might follow that if the project of modern biopolitics is invested primarily in the biological processes of its subjects, disability would find a measure of inclusion in this new paradigm of rule. On the surface, this appears to be the case, particularly with the deinstitutionalization movement and legislation like the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) that seeks to guarantee the civil rights of disabled populations. Likewise, Davis (2002) has demonstrated the ways that disability finds inclusion as a market identity within the newly globalized economy. At the same time, there are dangers associated with this line of thought, which corresponds to a type of progress narrative associated with disability liberation. Even as the old walls of the institution begin to crumble, the group home, the nursing home, the special education classroom, and the government-funded facility continue to mark a point of separation between the able-bodied and the disabled. From a global perspective, the inclusion of disabled subjects is also severely limited. In Achilles Mbembe’s (2003) essay “Necropolitics,” he offers the concept of a “death-world” to describe “new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40).6 Given that there are more than a half billion disabled people in the world today and that 80 percent live in developing countries, the intersections between impaired bodies and the creation of death-worlds are multifarious (Davidson, 2008, p. 117). In such spaces, the visibly fragmented body marks a liminal position between life and death. While the social conditions conferred upon Mbembe’s (2003) “living dead” produce disproportionate numbers of disabled people, their disabilities perform the symbolic work of justifying those unequal living conditions.7 The “death-world,” then, relies on a form of circular logic that inverts its temporal manifestation, where acts of violence are justified by the disabilities they produce. Neither Foucault nor Arendt can answer the competing and contradictory claims represented by the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the disabled body that characterizes modernity and the current age of global capital. For Agamben (1995), the primary limitation of Foucault’s (and by extension, Arendt’s) theoretical analysis is their inability to define the precise relationship between the law and specific forms of biopower (p.6). Agamben (1995) asks, “Where is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge?” (p. 6). In other words, at what point do sovereign acts of violence and modern technologies of discipline intersect and inform one another?

#### The aff is caught in a double bind they are either a Cruel optimism, and no reform can take place or their reform is successful and collective actions block their hopes at success

this is the impact the opportunity trap

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The opportunity bargain becomes an opportunity trap when the promise that education will make things better meets reality of education as a positional good that derives its value from scarcity. Education is presented as the best opportunity for social mobility, but pursuing this opportunity undermines possibilities for social mobility. The opportunity trap is a double bind. [O]ptimism is cruel when it takes shape as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the satisfactions they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies have come to represent. (Berlant, 2011: 51) When large numbers of people pursue the promise of opportunity through education their collective initiative can prevent the object of their desires being reached, but this promise has become embedded in the social contract and the collective imaginary as a source of optimism in itself. Even when they sense that a particular promise is unlikely to be kept, people cling to optimism, to hope that study and hard work will lead to something better, because it feels too uncomfortable to let go.

#### their solvency advocate falls into the opportunity trap as well🡪this guts their solvency

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The opportunity trap is also a trap for educational researchers. Many academics in education departments have achieved social mobility through education and their subjectivities are shaped by a commitment to paying this opportunity forward. While the reproductive infrastructure of education has long been recognized by sociologists of education, the role that the optimism of educational researchers play in tightening the double bind of the opportunity trap has been given less consideration. Even when the opportunity trap is acknowledged, education research generally remains attached to the promise of optimism as such. This is the limit created by the image of educational thought. Educational research contributes to the opportunity trap to the extent that it promises, perhaps unavoidably, that education can be an opportunity for everyone. The opportunity trap is now doubled at the level of educational research by the introduction of impact as a measure of research quality. Research assessments in the UK and Australia link judgments of research quality to the demonstration of its benefit. In a field such as education, such measures promise new recognition for applied studies that make a difference in schools and communities. However, the impact of educational research is evaluated in terms of the social contract established by the politics of aspiration. Making a difference has come to mean making things better according to the dominant image of educational thought. And, as Brown (2003) argues, ‘There is a high degree of collusion with the rhetoric of ‘‘learning is earning’’ within the educational establishment, as schools, colleges and universities try to pursue their own positional advantage in the competition for students, resources and reputational capital’ (162)

#### The alternative is to leave the future behind affirming the catastrophe to come, this opens us up to an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion’

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The disaster opens a crack through which the future could be left behind. The future as a psychological category is a construction of a particular time and place: ‘[t]he future is not an obvious concept.... The rise of the myth of the future is rooted in modern capitalism, in the experience of the expansion of the economy’ (Berardi, 2011: 17–18). This myth is faltering with the economies that it has grown, and the promise of a better future, through intensification of investment in education, can be seen as an attempt to keep kicking the can down the road. For many, however, ‘the future no longer appears as a choice or a collective conscious action, but is a kind of unavoidable catastrophe that we cannot oppose in any way’ (Berardi, 2011: 226). But this catastrophe could be a disaster for thought that produces radical change, a change premised on no change rather than ‘making a difference’ for the better. Optimism is the orthodox image of educational thought and it is diagrammed in the opportunity trap, which limits this thought to a future that can be affirmed. The opportunity trap is both a constraint on people’s material lives and a constraint on how education can be thought. There are thus historical and conceptual reasons for wanting to escape from this trap. Singleton (2014: 504) argues that ‘[i]f a trap is to be escaped by anything other than luck... the escapee itself must change: the thing that escapes the trap is not the thing that was caught in it’. One possibility for escaping the opportunity trap is by questioning the dominant image according to a line of thought that ‘subtracts hope from the equation’ (Niedzviecki, 2015: 259). The disaster brings educational thought to its limit, confronting it with a future that cannot be affirmed and the possibility that human history may not continue. But this constraint on educational thought also holds possibilities for a new way of thinking education. The thought of the disaster is a radical disorientation and passivity of thought. The disaster is beyond the alternative between affirming a better future or affirming collapse. But what comes after ‘the future’? Berardi (2011) points to ‘a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the twentieth century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion’ (138). If optimism has led us into the trap, then it may be time to give up in order to get out.

#### **Education is recognized as a way to extend the future of America – challenging this form of educational futurism in a radical negation is critical to break normative boundaries**

GRETEMAN & **WOJCIKIEWICZ 14 – (** Adam J., Steven K, Ph.D in Teacher Education & 2014 ERA Queer SIG Article of the Year Award, Director of Faculty of Education at University of Portland, “The Problems with the Future: Educational Futurism and the Figural Child” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 48, No. 4, PG 559-562, SL)

‘I touch the future’, Christa McAuliffe said, ‘I teach’. This resonates with educators. By passing on skills, knowledge, and ideas that will be used at later times, they reach out to an unseen future and touch it. Teachers tell their students to study and work hard, for the things they are learning will be needed in the future. The lesson of the day may be applied to a test at the end of the week, or it may be the basis for work that will be carried out at the next grade level. It may even help prepare a student for college, or for a job, or for a fulfilling life. Whatever the specifics, the commonality here is that learning now prepares students for a yet unknown then. Teaching and schooling are suffused with concern about, discussion of, and **focus on the future**. This theme of futurity carries on beyond school walls and enters political discourse on education. President John F. Kennedy noted, ‘Children are the world’s most valuable resource and its best hope for the future’, while Malcolm X claimed ‘education is the passport to the future, for tomorrow belongs to those who prepare for it today’. But, education is not merely directed toward the future of the individual, but also toward the future of the nation. A Nation at Risk, the oft-quoted 1983 US Department of Education report on the state of American education, tells us that, People are steadfast in their belief that education is the major foundation for the future strength of this country. They even considered education more important than developing the best industrial system or the strongest military force, perhaps because they understood education as the cornerstone of both . . . Very clearly, the public understands the primary importance of education as the foundation for a satisfying life, **an enlightened and civil society,** a strong economy, and a secure Nation (National Commission on Excellence in Education, The Public’s Commitment section, 1983, para. 2). Close to 20 years after the publication of A Nation at Risk, the most sweeping educational reform effort of our time, No Child Left Behind, returned the focus back to the Child, continuing the focus on the future in education and the necessity of the Child to maintain the competitiveness of the nation. As former president George W. Bush asserted in one of his last speeches in office, NCLB, . . . starts with this concept: Every child can learn. We believe that it is important to have a high quality education if one is going to succeed in the 21st century. It’s no longer acceptable to be cranking people out of the school system and saying, okay, just go—you know, you can make a living just through manual labor alone. That’s going to happen for some, but it’s not the future of America, if we want to be a competitive nation as we head into the 21st century (Bush, 2009, para. 22). And more recently, President Obama, in a speech when he was running for the office, asserted, ‘We are the nation that has always understood that our future is inextricably linked to the education of our children’ (Obama, 2008, para. 10). Along the same lines, the current Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, has stated that, ‘Today, more than ever, better schooling provides a down payment on the nation’s future’ (Duncan, 2009, para. 15). Within these statements, the future cannot be separated from those it relies on—predominately ‘children’. These assumptions made in regards to children, their role in the future, and schools’ roles in creating that future are seemingly ingrained in our society and our politics. The presence of this future focus may seem uncontroversial, its influence benign. Such assumptions may appear to be natural and beyond question, particularly since this Enlightenment, with its progress-oriented philosophical perspectives. Yet, we wish to question these assumptions, to explore how they can set **narrow boundaries** around children in schools. In carrying out this task, we employ the work of Lee Edelman and John Dewey to examine the educational ramifications of the focus on the future, which we call ‘educational futurism’ after Edelman’s (2004) ‘reproductive futurism’. Our argument seeks specifically to explore how educational futurism imposes **limits on educational discourse** and privileges a certain future, thus making it unthinkable to imagine ways **outside** of such a privileged future. We turn to Edelman for his ‘reproductive futurism’, which is embodied in the regulatory figure of ‘the Child’, because it is seems particularly apt to the educational settings, practices and discourses which are our concern. This ‘figural Child’ for Edelman ‘alone embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights “real” citizens are allowed’ (2004, p. 11). The Child exists in discourse and it limits discourse from engaging the unruly lives of children. The Child, for Edelman, is not representative of children. **It is all there is**. And actions taken in the name of the Child ignore, even exclude, the particularities and contexts that make children who they are—alive and unique. Edelman’s challenge then offers up a threat to education’s identification with the Child, a challenge that is not simply nihilistic, but which rather aims to see what is **denied consideration** and action. His project, heavily reliant on Lacan’s death drive, offers a challenge to ‘a future whose beat goes on’ to expose the way ‘the political regime of futurism, unable to escape what it abjects, **negates it as the negation of meaning**, of the Child, and of the future the Child portends’ (pp. 153–154). He insists, as such, on a politics that does not seek accommodation within such logic but an embrace of the negation, **the unintelligible place of queerness**, for it is in such an **embrace that queer ethics can engage the violence against non-normative bodies**. Dewey makes an appearance here because, though he has been narrowly and inaccurately portrayed as the benign father of student-centred, activity-oriented, open, and laissez-faire classroom methods, his positions are far more nuanced, and far more radical, in relation to children and the future (Dewey, 1938; Petrovic, 1998; Popkewitz, 2005; Prawat, 1995; Schleffler, 1974; Wong and Pugh, 2001). He presents a critique of a future focus in education that shows how such a focus means **a loss**, not only of present opportunities, but also of the promised future for children. Dewey, read in relation to Edelman’s engagement with futurism, offers a place within educational discourse to explore the **possibility to engage educational futurism** in ways that challenge the discourse of the Child illustrated in our opening statements. To focus on Dewey’s radical insights then is to challenge the innocent position to which he is often relegated. After all, it is the innocent Dewey, like the innocent Child, that supports and carries forward the status quo. Our focus on the radical insights of Dewey position him against the status quo, and against the Child, bringing a different, though complementary, perspective to our engagement with Edelman. Before moving forward, we would like to note that our approach in this analysis is not entirely new. As a critique of futurism, it questions a general characteristic of modernism, namely, a foundational belief that we will get ‘there’ someday (Lagemann, 2000). This belief asserts that wherever there might be, and in whatever endeavour we are engaged in, the point is that progress is possible and that our actions can be justified in the name of the inevitable and **promising, though distant, end**. This belief, the heart of futurism, has, in this postmodern time, been challenged on many occasions. Our argument, however, seeks specifically to explore how futurism, expressed through the iterative construction of the Child, shapes the ways that we can think about children and education. We will begin our analysis by describing Edelman’s reproductive futurism and its relation to education specifically. In this we will address Edelman’s the notion of the Child, the Child’s relation to children, and the impact of these concepts on education. Following this we will introduce John Dewey’s views of growth, life, and education, and show how these views can be read to engage a similar critique of the role of the future and the workings of normative or regulatory subjects.With our two theorists in place, we will seek to draw out connections and disconnections between them, illustrating the ways in which educational futurism ignores or overlooks the lived experiences of children. We conclude by briefly noting the queerness of children and the impact of such queerness on broadening discussions of the future of children.

### Identity

#### Invocation of this space as a site of resistance to racialized violence traps it within a dialectical parliamentary politics ultimately relying on state models of deliberation as a metric of success – This allows for exponential proliferation of the deaths of those in-between rigid identitarian categories – we need a new mode of politics that rejects the parliament and creates new aesthetic dimensions

Preciado 13 [Interview between Ricky Tucker and Beatriz Preciado, professor of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, “Pharmacopornography: An Interview with Beatriz Preciado,” December 4, 2013, *The Paris Review*] //khirn

We don’t have to be afraid of questioning democracy, but I’m also very interested in disability, nonfunctional bodies, other forms of functionality and cognitive experiences. Democracy and the model of democracy is still too much about able bodies, masculine able bodies that have control over the body and the individual’s choices, and have dialogues and communications in a type of parliament. We have to imagine politics that go beyond the parliament, otherwise how are we going to imagine politics with nonhumans, or the planet? I am interested in the model of the body as subjectivity that is working within democracy, and then goes beyond that. Also, the global situation that we are in requires a revolution. There is no other option. We must manage to actually create some political alliance of minority bodies, to create a revolution together. Otherwise these necropolitical techniques will take the planet over. In this sense, I have a very utopian way of thinking, of rethinking new technologies of government and the body, creating new regimes of knowledge. The domain of politics has to be taken over by artists. Politics and philosophy both are our domains. The problem is that they have been expropriated and taken by other entities for the production of capital or just for the sake of power itself. That’s the definition of revolution, when the political domain becomes art. We desperately need it.

#### This creates a regime of coding bodily flows which freezes subjects into place and leaves them trapped within grids of intelligibility that allow for violence

Puar 7 Jasbir, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 214

Linked to this is what Massumi calls "ontogenetic difference" or "ontogenetic priority," a concept that rescripts temporality exterior to the sheer administrative units that are mobilized to capture the otherwise unruly processes of a body: To say that passage and indeterminancy "come first" or "are primary" is more a statement of ontological priority than the assertion of a time sequence. They have ontological privilege in the sense that they constitute the field of emergence, while positionings are what emerge. The trick is to express that priority in a way that respects the inseparability and contemporaneousness of the disjunct dimensions: their ontogenetic difference. And later: "The field of emergence is not pre-social. It is open-endedly social. ... One of the things that the dimension of change is ontogenetically 'prior to' is thus the very distinction between individual and the collective, as well as any given model of their interaction. That interaction is precisely what takes form."' The given models of interaction would be these bifurcated distinctions between the body and the social (its signification) such that the distinctions disappear. Massumi's move from ontology (being, becoming) to ontogenesis is also relevant to how he discusses affect and cognition and the processes of the body: "Feedback and feed forward, or recursivity, in addition to converting distance into intensity, folds the dimensions of time into each other. The field of emergence of experience has to be thought of as a space-time continuum, as an ontogenetic dimension prior to the separating-out of space and time. Linear time, like position- gridded space, would be emergent qualities of the event of the world's self- relating. " 2 7 This ontogenetic dimension that is "prior" but not "pre" claims its priorness not through temporality but through its ontological status as that which produces fields of emergence; the prior and the emergence are nevertheless "contemporaneous." "Ontological priority" is a temporality and a spatialization that has yet to be imagined, a property more than a bounded- ness by space and time. The ontogenetic dimension that articulates or occupies multiple temporalities of vectors and planes is also that which enables an emergent bifurcation of time and space. Identity is one of affect, a capture that proposes what one is by masking its retrospective ordering and thus its ontogenetic dimension- what one was- through the guise of an illusory futurity: what one is and will continue to be. However, this is anything but a relay between stasis and flux; position is but one derivative of systems in constant motion, lined with erratic trajectories and unruly projectiles. If the ontogenetic dimensions of affect render affect as prior to representation-prior to race, class, gender, sex, nation, even as these categories might be the most pertinent mapping of or reference back to affect itself-how might identity-as-retrospective-ordering amplify rather than inhibit praxes of political organizing? If we transfer our energy, our turbulence, our momentum from the defense of the integrity of identity and submit instead to this affective ideation of identity, what kinds of political strategies, of "politics of the open end,"" might we unabashedly stumble upon? Rather than rehashing the pros and cons of identity politics, can we think instead of affective politics? Displacing queerness as an identity or modality that is visibly, audibly, legibly, or tangibly evident-the seemingly queer body in a "cultural freeze-frame" of sorts-assemblages allow us to attune to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities. Intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information. Further, in the sway from disciplinary societies (where the panoptic "functioned primarily in terms of positions, fixed points, and identities") to control societies, the diagram of control, Michael Hardt writes, is "oriented toward mobility and anonymity. . . . The flexible and mobile performances of contingent identities, and thus its assemblages or institutions are elaborated primarily through repetition and the production of simulacra. "29 Assemblages are thus crucial conceptual tools that allow us to acknowledge and comprehend power beyond disciplinary regulatory models, where "particles, and not parts, recombine, where forces, and not categories, clash. "30 Most important, given the heightened death machine aspect of nationalism in our contemporary political terrain-a heightened sensorial and anatomical domination indispensable to Mbembe's necropolitics-assemblages work against narratives of U.S. exceptionalism that secure empire, challenging the fixity of racial and sexual taxonomies that inform practices of state surveillance and control and befuddling the "us versus them" of the war on terror. (On a more cynical note, the recent work of Eyal Weizman on the use of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Guy Debord by the Israeli Defense Forces demonstrates that we cannot afford to ignore concepts such as war machines and machinic assemblages, as they are already heavily cultivated as instructive tactics in military strategy.) For while intersectionality and its underpinnings- an unrelenting epistemological will to truth- presupposes identity and thus disavows futurity, or, perhaps more accurately, prematurely anticipates and thus fixes a permanence to forever, assemblage, in its debt to ontology and its espousal of what cannot be known, seen, or heard, or has yet to be known, seen, or heard, allows for becoming beyond or without being.32

#### Politics of negation convert the 1AC into a line of death – a nihilistic passion for abolition trapped within dialectical models of subjectivity that must violently define themselves in opposition to the other

Koerner 11 Michelle Koerner, professor of women’s studies at Duke, “Lines of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson,” Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 pg. 164

Writing On the first page of the provocatively titled essay “On the Superiority of Anglo- American Literature,” Jackson’s line is once again deployed, but here it is in reference to the idea that the “highest aim of literature” is to escape (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 26). An interesting convergence occurs here between political and aesthetic practices, suggesting an indiscernibility between the two insofar as both effectuate becomings. Genet had already made a similar point in describing Soledad Brother as a “poem of love and combat,” but deploying Jackson with respect to the question of literature as such, this essay invites us to rethink a more profound relation between blackness and writing. At some distance from traditional Marxist theory, Deleuze and Parnet insist we reject any account of literature as an “imaginary representation” of real conditions (literature as ideology) in order to consider writing as a production at the level of real conditions.10 Writing, which is to say the unleashing of the creative force of becoming in language (a line of flight), is not finally reducible to already existing historical conditions, because such an act involves the production of new conditions. Literature, as they underscore, is driven by a desire to liberate what existing conditions seek to govern, block, capture; as such, it asserts a force in the world that existing conditions would otherwise reduce to nonexistence. Such formulations enable a radical assertion: Soledad Brother, insofar as Jackson’s letters defy the prison system and the arrangement of a social order defined by the criminalization and capture of blackness, escapes what would otherwise be thought of as the historical conditions of its production. Jackson’s writing gains its real force by a total refusal to adjust to existing conditions of capture, enslavement, and incarceration. And it does so concretely by rejecting the subjectivity produced by the structures of what Genet, in his introduction to the letters, called the “enemy’s language” (Jackson [1970] 1994: 336). Jackson (ibid.: 190, 305) himself underscores this dimension of the letters several times, remarking, “I work on words,” and more precisely describing an operation by which the intensities of black resistance come to be expressed in writing: “We can connect the two, feeling and writing, just drop the syntax” (ibid.: 331). The specific feeling invoked here is linked first to Jackson’s total rejection of the terms of captive society—“the feeling of capture . . . this slave can never adjust to it” (ibid.: 40) — but it further affirms a connection to the “uncounted generations” of enslaved black labor: “I feel all they ever felt, but double” (ibid.: 233). In dropping the syntax, Jackson describes a method for rearticulating the relationship between the historical experience of capture (and the multiplicity of feeling carried across the passage) and the feeling of that experience. In his introduction to Soledad Brother, Genet focuses almost entirely on how Jackson’s use of language could be understood as a “weapon” precisely because Jackson’s lines were shot through with such violent hatred of the “words and syntax of his enemy” that he “has only one recourse: to accept this language but to corrupt it so skillfully the whites will be caught in his trap” (ibid.: 336).11 In corrupting the “words and syntax” of domination, one directly attacks the “conditions that destroy life,” because language is here considered a mechanism by which one’s thought, agency, relations, and subjectivity are “caught” by Power. As can be seen, this idea is not one that Genet imports into Soledad Brother. Rather, these are ideas that Jackson himself has already emphasized. Jackson’s “minor use” of a standard, major language thus contributes to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of literature. This is to say that, while commonly associated with Franz Kafka, the very notion of “minor literature” is also linked to the encounter between black radicalism and French philosophy in the early 1970s. The connection forged between writing and feeling in Jackson’s letters sug- gests that the production of resistant subjectivities always involves a dismantling of the dominant order of language. To “drop the syntax” names a strategy for forcibly rearranging existing relations. But such a strategy also implies that one releases something else, specifically the affective force of what resists those relations. Writing here becomes the “active discharge of emotion, the counterattack” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 400). Or put differently, writing becomes a weapon.12 When Deleuze (1997: 143) states that “in the act of writing there’s an attempt to make life something more than personal, of freeing life wherever it’s imprisoned,” he seems to refer to something exceedingly abstract, but Jackson’s letters concretely assert writing as a freeing of life—of blackness—from the terms of racist imprisonment. As we will see, Jackson twists and pulls on the joints of language itself, quite literally seizing on the standard syntax until it breaks. In doing so, what Jackson describes as his “completely informal” style makes language an open field shot-through with fugitive uses (Jackson [1970] 1994: 208). Writing becomes an expression of thought on the run, a way of mapping escape routes and counterattacks that cannot be adequately understood in terms of structure or an understanding of language as an invariable system. But escaping the existing dominant social order on “lines of flight” — given the volatile intensities they assert in the world — carries a real danger. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 229) note the risk of “the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turns to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition.” Here, a restricted concept of abolition, understood simply as the destruction of the existing social order, runs the risk of transforming the “line of flight” into a line of death. For this reason the issue of escape must not stop at negation “pure and simple” but become one of construction and the affirmation of life. And it is for this reason that the effort to connect “lines of flight” and to compose consistencies across these lines becomes a matter of politics: an affirmation of a politics of reconstruction as the immanent condition of abolition. Jackson ([1970] 1994: 328) wrote from prison: “Don’t mistake this as a message from George to Fay. It’s a message from the hunted running blacks to those people of this society who profess to want to change the conditions that destroy life.” A collective imperative determines the reading of these letters—namely, the necessity to put them in connection with other lines. The circulation of these letters in France during the 1970s offers a compelling example of how Jackson’s message insinuated itself into what would seem an unlikely arrangement of French philosophy in the 1970s. Yet it is precisely in understanding that moment in French thought as an effort to “change conditions that destroy life” that we gain a sense of how Jackson’s book arrives at its expressly stated destination. In making the connection between Jackson’s line and the lines of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and his coauthors can be said to have gotten the message.

#### The attempt to render the world coherent and legible is a disciplinary technique which paves over modernity’s foundational Conquest – the always-already ongoing war that determines what is and is not coherent, revealing and concealing ways of being in the world through the regime of sense. This is also the sum total of all other wars, all acts of violence which make the material convergence of this debate possible

Halberstam 11 J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 5

Illegibility, then, has been and remains, a reliable source for political autonomy. —James C. Scott, Perceiving Like a State Any book that begins with a quote from SpongeBob SquarePants and is motored by wisdom gleaned from Fantastic Mr. Fox, Chicken Run, and Find- ing Nemo, among other animated guides to life, runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Yet this is my goal. Being taken seriously means missing out on the chance to be frivolous, promiscuous, and irrelevant. The desire to be taken seriously is precisely what compels people to follow the tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours. Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts, for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for [exceptional] insights or flights of fancy. Training of any kind, in fact, is a way of refusing a kind of Benjaminian relation to knowing, a stroll down uncharted streets in the “wrong” direction (Benjamin 1996); it is precisely about staying in well-lit territories and about knowing exactly which way to go before you set out. Like many others before me, I propose that instead the goal is to lose one’s way, and indeed to be prepared to lose more than one’s way. Losing, we may agree with Elizabeth Bishop, is an art, and one “that is not too hard to master / Though it may look like a disaster” (2008: 166–167). In the sciences, particularly physics and mathematics, there are many examples of rogue intellectuals, not all of whom are reclusive Unabomber types (although more than a few are just that), who wander off into uncharted territories and refuse the academy because the publish-or-perish pressure of academic life keeps them tethered to conventional knowledge production and its well-traveled byways. Popular mathematics books, for example, revel in stories about unconventional loners who are self- schooled and who make their own way through the world of numbers. For some kooky minds, disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and ~~blind~~ [unscripted] fumbling might yield better results. In 2008, for example, The New Yorker featured a story about an oddball physicist who, like many ambitious physicists and mathematicians, was in hot pursuit of a grand theory, a “theory of everything.” This thinker, Garrett Lisi, had dropped out of academic physics because string theory dominated the field at that time and he thought the answers lay elsewhere. As an outsider to the discipline, writes Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Lisi “built his theory as an outsider might, relying on a grab bag of component parts: a hand-built mathematical structure, an unconventional way of describing gravity, and a mysterious mathematical entity known as E8.”1 In the end Lisi’s “theory of everything” fell short of expectations, but it nonetheless yielded a whole terrain of new questions and methods. Similarly the computer scientists who pioneered new programs to produce computer-generated imagery (CGI), as many accounts of the rise of Pixar have chronicled, were academic rejects or dropouts who created independent institutes in order to explore their dreams of animated worlds.2 These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside academia rather than within it, the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for alternatives precisely when the university cannot. This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred years ago to respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault de- scribed them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond either to real-world knowledge projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams (as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and conforming to the dictates of the discipline. This book, a stroll out of the confines of conventional knowledge and into the unregulated territories of failure, loss, and unbecoming, must make a long detour around disciplines and ordinary ways of thinking. Let me explain how universities (and by implication high schools) squash rather than promote quirky and original thought. Disciplinarity, as de- fined by Foucault (1995), is a technique of modern power: it depends upon and deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, and it produces experts and administrative forms of governance. The university structure that houses the disciplines and jealously guards their boundaries now stands at a crossroads, not of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, past and future, national and transnational; the crossroads at which the rapidly disintegrating bandwagon of disciplines, subfields, and interdisciplines has arrived offer a choice between the university as corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in thought and politics. A radical take on disciplinarity and the university that presumes both the breakdown of the disciplines and the closing of gaps between fields conventionally presumed to be separated can be found in a manifesto published by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in 2004 in Social Text titled “The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses.” Their essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical intellectual, the professional scholar and the “critical academic professionals.” For Moten and Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become “an ally of professional education.” Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the “subversive intellectuals,” a maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of “rigor,” “excellence,” and “productivity.” They tell us to “steal from the university,” to “steal the enlightenment for others” (112), and to act against “what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law refounds, society” (113). And what does the undercommons of the university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: “Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society” (113). Not the elimination of anything but the founding of a new society. And why not? Why not think in terms of a different kind of society than the one that first created and then abolished slavery? The social worlds we inhabit, after all, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not inevitable; they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to cite Fou- cault again, “disqualified.” A few visionary books, produced alongside disciplinary knowledge, show us the paths not taken. For example, in a book that itself began as a detour, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), James C. Scott details the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and undisciplined forms of knowledge in order to rationalize and simplify social, agricultural, and political practices that have profit as their primary motivation. In the process, says Scott, certain ways of [perceiving] the world are established as normal or natural, as obvious and necessary, even though they are often entirely counterintuitive and socially engineered. [Perceiving] Like a State began as a study of “why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of ‘people who move around,’” but quickly became a study of the demand by the state for legibility through the imposition of methods of standardization and uniformity (1). While Dean Spade (2008) and other queer scholars use Scott’s book to think about how we came to insist upon the documentation of gender identity on all govern- mental documentation, I want to use his monumental study to pick up some of the discarded local knowledges that are [eliminated] in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of other motivations for being and doing.

#### Be the queer suicide terrorist – an explosion of self-sacrifice with a bomb, in favor of unsettling the violent definitions of subjectivity.

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage, "'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

## Education Links

### Generic links

#### Through the liberalization of the university act of teaching becomes an impersonal experience where education is used to further the means of production destroying critical thought.

Giroux, Henry A., ’06, “The Conservative Assault on America.” America on the Edge Henry Giroux on Politics, Culture, and Education, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, pp. 30–31.,

The third antidemocratic dogma is visible in the relentless attempt on the part of the Bush administration to destroy critical education as a foundation for an engaged citizenry and a vibrant democracy. The attack on critical education is evident not only in the attempts to standardize curricula, privatize public schooling, and use the language of business as a model for running schools, but also in the ongoing effort to hand over those larger educational forces in the culture to a small group of corporate interests. Schooling is reduced to training, rote learning, and, with regard to poor minorities in poverty stricken neighborhoods, becomes a form of warehousing. Teachers are now viewed as either technicians, depoliticized professionals, or, if they belong to a teachers’ union, as former Education Secretary Rod Paige believed, members of a “terrorist organization.”

#### Children become productive liberal subjects through educational systems

Baltes 13 (John. (2013). Locke's Inverted Quarantine: Discipline, Panopticism, and the Making of the Liberal Subject. The Review of Politics, 75(2), 173-192. doi:10.1017/S0034670513000028 https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/89EAACE75D03289E41154D43C20111E4/S0034670513000028a.pdf/lockes\_inverted\_quarantine\_discipline\_panopticism\_and\_the\_making\_of\_the\_liberal\_subject.pdf)

Instead of populating society with human calculators bound by the chains of reason or punishment, Locke imagines a subject educated to see defection as immoral and blameworthy. The content of this education is not facts and figures, though these are certainly not ignored in the quest to fashion productive citizens, but rather habits of mind and body that make liberal society possible. Through the strikingly panoptic method analyzed above, Locke co-opts his subjects, engaging their capacity for self-regulation; like Bentham who will further refine these tools for different ends, he employs the control of space, surveillance, and gentle correction to tug the levers of the mind into place. His goal is to construct industrious, pious citizens from the raw material of children**, to cultivate people capable of self-government**. As temptations arise, these disciplined subjects habitually choose the right thing, or—what is more to Locke’s point—they transcend temptation, much as my present readers do not find themselves tempted to steal a car they pass on the street, to keep a wallet they see drop from an unsuspecting person’s pocket, or to skip out on an expensive bar tab. They —you—are not the kinds of people who do these things, and so the question of costs and benefits, coercive interference, and eternal damnation is rarely raised in their day-to-day lives. They keep their contracts, pay their taxes, work their jobs, and live their lives within a system of power, habit, and custom that naturalizes these moral commitments, making the idea of gross misdemeanor nearly impossible (for most people, most of the time). These deep commitments enable liberal systems of power—what might be called the illusion of laissez-faire—by shaping the self-governing behavior of citizens such that constant coercive interference is not necessary.25 Discipline reduces the need for political violence to maintain order, and thus stands at the center of liberal subjectivity and liberal politics. But this is not to suggest that Locke’s subjects are nothing more than creatures of habit, automata denied the capacity or relish to reason.

#### Another card about liberal training of children

Baltes 13

John. (2013). Locke's Inverted Quarantine: Discipline, Panopticism, and the Making of the Liberal Subject. The Review of Politics, 75(2), 173-192. doi:10.1017/S0034670513000028

Of men, Locke calculates, “nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education” (Education, §1).9 Children are bubbling brooks, easily turned this way or that by the hand of an engineer: The little and almost insensible impressions on our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences: and there it is as in the fountains of some rivers, where a gentle application of the hand turns the flexible waters into channels that make them take quite contrary courses, and by this little direction given them at first in the source, they receive different tendencies and arrive at last at very remote and distant places. (Education, §1) Blank slates accept whatever characters are written upon them, and thus it is of no small importance what is inscribed by habit, by whom, and when. What is scribbled early and often dominates the script, and for Locke, the habits of youth are emblazoned in indelible ink. “When he has grown up, it is too late to begin to use him to it; it must be got early, and by degrees” (Education, §9). This echoes his discussion of custom, habit, and power in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. “Custom,” Locke alleges there, “settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining the will” (Essay, 2.33.6). Young minds are clean paper awaiting the strokes of the parental pen, laughing streams whose course is easily shaped by the application of the parent’s hand. “I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this or that way as water itself” (Education, §2). And though they initially require an engineer to shape the channels and plug the leaks, Locke’s ultimate point is to co-opt an initially unruly, undisciplined subject and entangle him in a mechanism of power and discipline of which he becomes the bearer.10 Were habits never to become second nature (and here, one might say first), were his subjects to continually require the constant supervision of an engineer, the liberty that is the hallmark of Lockean politics would be impossible

#### The focus on the child – inside the school environment promote the vision of universal and secular views that exclude other bodies

Pellegrini 8 – (Ann, Ph.D @Harvard in Cultural Studies & Professor of Performance Studies @NYU, ““What Do Children Learn at School?” Necropedagogy and the Future of the Dead Child”, Duke University Press, Vol 26, No. 4, Social Text 97, PG 97-104, SL)

Louis Althusser’s now-classic analysis of “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” opens with a double act of ventriloquism. Casting his voice through Marx, he conjures the figure of the child: “As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year.” What every child knows—and how she comes to know it—turns out to be far more complicated, of course, than this fairy tale invocation of the wise child suggests. Althusser’s opening certitude quickly inverts into the form of a question: “What, then, is the reproduction of the conditions of production?”1 This question returns some twenty pages later in slightly different form: “I can now answer the central question which I have left in suspense for many long pages: how is the reproduction of the relations of production secured?”2 In between, though, another question takes central stage in Althusser’s text: “What do children learn at school?”3 The short answer is: the “know-how” of the subject. The child-who-knows functions, within the terms of Althusser’s argument, as the connecting point between the production of the concrete individual as a concrete subject (famously encapsulated in Althusser’s conception of “interpellation”) and the reproduction of dominative social relations. The main features of Althusser’s arguments are by now well known, so I will not rehearse them at any length here. Instead I want to explore what remains undertheorized in his essay and in the critical reception of it: namely, the centrality of the secularization thesis to his account of the child-who-knows. Arguably, Althusser actually emplots childhood in—as?—the story of secular development. I am less interested in offering a close reading of Althusser than in pushing off from his essay in order to offer a series of jottings—my child’s sketch, if you will—about the coconstitution of “the child” and “the secular.” Twins of modernity, “the child” and “the secular” underwrite moral claims about progress, the universal human, and the ordering of time itself. If the child is the fulcrum for the reproduction of relations of inequality, school is the lever. Althusser tells us that in “mature capitalist social formations,” the educational state apparatus has replaced the church as the dominant ideological state apparatus.4 This ascendancy did not happen peaceably, but was, he says, the result of a long and violent struggle from the “first shocks of the Reformation,” to the French Revolution’s attack on clerical authority and privileges, to the nineteenth-century contest for hegemony between the “landed aristocracy” and the “industrial bourgeoisie.”5 The transformations he charts involve changes in economic ordering (from precapitalist to capitalist) as well as in the moral grounding of authority (from the church to the secular state). In its broad outline, Althusser’s condensed history repeats—albeit with a Marxian and, I’d suggest, a French Catholic twist—key aspects of the dominant secularization narrative. As Janet R. Jakobsen and I argue in the introduction to Secularisms, conventional accounts of secularism focus on Europe and narrate a series of sometimes violent realignments brought about by the upheavals of the Reformation and the sectarian wars unleashed in its wake.6 Progress toward civil peace required the privatization of religion and the establishment of secular reason as the foundation of the modern nation-state. Cue the European Enlightenment and freedom as the destiny of men, or of some men, anyway. There are several things to notice here. First, the dominant story aligns secularism with universalism, reason, progress, freedom, and peace over and against religion, which appears as an irrational, atavistic force in the world. Second, though narrated as a universal project—as, indeed, the project of universalism—secularism, in its dominant (and dominating) form, remains tied to a particular religion, Christianity, and a particular history of origins in Enlightenment Europe. Jakobsen and I have named this dominant formation “Christian secularism” to mark the particular religious, geographic, and political histories imported into and by the “universal” claims of the secularization thesis.7 This marking serves as a springboard for some different questions about the way relations of domination are reproduced as the very heart of universalism and secular freedom. What does it mean to the terms of the secularization thesis, and the correlations put forward by it, if we take seriously the coimplication of the secular and the religious rather than their absolute distinction? How must we then think differently about the ways in which secularism itself can be a vehicle for imposing particular values rather than the universal values it asserts as its gift to humanity? The historical invention of “the religious” and “the secular” roughly coincided with the construction of modern childhood. How does “the child” come to function in the gap between “the religious” and “the secular”? Conceived as a discrete point in time in a developmental march toward maturity, childhood is pivotal to the temporal ordering of modernity. The child’s progress toward mature adulthood lines up with the construction of other peoples and places as “our innocent, but immature and undeveloped, past.”8 Paradoxically, these others are “childish” in proportion to their lack of proper childhood; their children prematurely assume adult roles and knowledge. Thus could Charlotte Perkins Gilman, that feminist champion, intertwine narratives of religious progress and evolutionary overcoming through the figure of the child in her 1900 book Concerning Children: The sweet confidence of a modern child as compared to the alert suspicion of a baby savage, shows what ages of social safe-guarding have done. In the beautiful union of our civilised growth, even so far, we have made possible the Child; and it is for us still further to protect and develope the most exquisite social product,—the greatest social hope and power. . . . Parentally, we care only for our own: socially, we care for all. Parentally, we are animals; socially, we learn to love one another. We have become, approximately, Christians.9 The “approximation” of the child to Christian ideals of bodily life, family form, and temporal ordering haunts contemporary, globalized debates over child labor and the sexual trafficking of women and children. In the United States, it also helps to explain some otherwise surprising alliances between faith-based organizations and secular human rights activists to “free God’s children.”10 But this is not just an American phenomenon. In a 13 February 2008 speech to members of France’s Jewish community, French president Nicolas Sarkozy announced a new educational initiative: beginning in the fall of 2008, each French fifth grader would be assigned the life story of an individual French child-victim of the Holocaust. The one-to-one match was explicitly framed as a project of overcoming difference: “Nothing is more moving, for a child, than the story of a child his own age, who has the same games, the same joys and the same hopes as he, but who, in the dawn of the 1940s, had the bad fortune to be defined as a Jew.”11 Note how Sarkozy’s invocation of “luck” (the “bad fortune to be defined as a Jew”) evacuates the agency of both perpetrators and collaborators. Nevertheless, the “bad fortune” of being defined by one’s identity, which is to say, by one’s difference—but, from what? from Frenchness? from the universal human? from Frenchness as the universal human?—does link up with Sarkozy’s stress throughout on achieving sameness: “the same games, the same joys and the same hopes.” His proposal created a storm of opposition in France and has subsequently been modified. Instead of matching each French fifth grader with an individual child-victim of the Holocaust, each French fifth-grade class will share a dead Jewish child. This adjustment seems to have been made in response to criticisms, such as that voiced by Simone Veil, a French Holocaust survivor, that the weight of an identification with a dead child would be too heavy, too traumatizing, for the schoolchild to bear—hence the move to redistribute this burden of identification among an entire class of students. In either case, however, the lamination of pedagogy and necrophilia is astonishing and requires further accounting. Is this, then, what remains of Auschwitz, to wit, a reliquary for French pedagogy? Somehow, when Giorgio Agamben expresses the hope, in Remnants of Auschwitz, that his study might correct “some of the terms with which we register the decisive lesson of the century,” I don’t think this is what he had in mind.12 And yet, there is a certain logic at work here that takes us—and takes us ever again in the place of a never again—to the place where biopolitics and necropolitics meet. In a recent argument, “When Killers Become Victims: Anti-Semitism and Its Critics,” Gil Anidjar draws on Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive and Elias Canetti’s Crowds and Power and suggestively links two modern figures—and two modern discourses—of futurity: the child and the survivor.13 If we are, as Edelman argues, unable to “conceive of politics without a fantasy of the future,”14 the figure of the child steps in to secure that fantasy for us. This is a fantasy with real-world consequences via the regulation of sexual life and reproduction. Anidjar pushes us to see how the figure of the survivor also involves fantasies of, and imperatives for, reproduction as a response to the interruption of generation that genocide constitutes. In the end, Anidjar concludes, these two figures—the child and the survivor—starkly illuminate the will to survive as the pulsing core of modern politics.15 With Foucault I want to say: as the force of modern “biopolitics.” However, it is not enough to stop here, on either the individual will to survive or on the sovereign will to make live. The bloody history of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries teaches us that the survival of some too often requires the coordinated and wide-scale death of some others. In Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Jasbir K. Puar draws together the work of Michel Foucault on “biopolitics” and Achille Mbembe on “necropolitics” to flesh out those “interstices between life and death” within which some queer subjects are being folded back into the project of the neoliberal state and its reproduction, even as forms of racialized queerness allow for the exclusion even unto death of some other queer bodies. The relay between inclusion and exclusion marks a point of “oscillation,” in Puar’s words, between the individuating disciplines of the subject and the massifying technologies of population.16 Puar’s analysis also supports an expanded investigation into the interpellating call of “the child.” How is the “reproduction of relations of living and dying” (Puar’s words) secured through the fiction of the universal child? Once more, with feeling: “What do children learn at school?” Because Sarkozy’s proposal was animated by religious language—he blamed the genocidal violence of the twentieth century on “an absence of God” and called Nazi racism “radically incompatible with Judeo-Christian monotheism”—much of the criticism of his plan took the form of accusing him of violating cherished French ideals of church-state separation and the privatization of religious difference. Others worried that the focus on victims would focus attention away from Vichy France’s collaboration with genocidal violence against Jews. (Where there is “bad fortune,” there is no need to address French complicity.) Finally, there were worries that the Holocaust curriculum could, in the words of the New York Times, create resentment among France’s “ethnic Arab and North African populations.”17 These worries are all related, of course, even if their overlap was not remarked upon in the U.S. media. The return of the repressed here—well, one of them at any rate—is an earlier French school reform involving the ban on “conspicuous” religious symbols (signes) or dress (tenues) in public schools. Despite the neutral wording of the French law, every French schoolchild, citizen or non-, knows that it was centrally aimed at the Muslim headscarf, though its secondary casualties have included the Jewish kippah and tzitzis and the Sikh turban. The French word “tenues” is actually broader than “dress” alone. It also means a more general sense of how an individual holds herself, and so potentially applies to things like general comportment or behavior. Thus, the reach of this law is theoretically deeper than the body’s surface signs. “Conspicuous” signs of Christian identity do come within the imagined reach of the law, but one wonders just how big the sign of the cross would have to be to occasion censure. Promoted in the cause of French universalism, the 2004 law in practice installs a particular French body as the universal body. Understood and explicitly named as a law for the implementation of French principles of laïcité (laicism), the 2004 school reform is a potent case study of Christian secularism at work. Here, under cover of laïcité, the particular body of French Catholicism at once tucks its religious difference out of sight and projects it as the blank slate of French secularism. Against this background, Sarkozy’s assertion that racial hierarchy is “radically incompatible with Judeo-Christian monotheism” resounds with the Abrahamic monotheism he did not name: Islam.18 This is not an innocent omission.19 It silently insinuates that Islam is all-too compatible with racist violence and transfers the historical burden of French anti-Semitism to sources “outside” French civilization. When French anti-Semitism does come home, it comes home in the person of foreign strains within the French body politic: racialized Muslims, citizen-strangers. It is they who stand accused in the present of threatening French Jews with annihilation. However, the survival of French Jews is ultimately less the point of this Holocaust pedagogy than is the survival and reproduction of a universal French culture. This is where the figure of “the child” becomes a strange sort of hinge. Living French children are called to identify with dead Jewish child-victims. This identification produces a third child—let’s call it the “virtual” child, the child yet-to-be. This virtual child figures a future in which difference has been left behind. There is something disturbingly Hegelian in this overcoming of the dead child on the way to becoming a modern subject of/in history. But there is also something Pauline about a French version of universalism in which there is no Christian and no Jew. And, finally, there is something of the Christ child in this figure who rises from the ashes of so many dead Jews. Those who cannot or will not pass through this schoolroom door risk a different kind of passage from human into nonhuman. Another name, another figure, arises here: der Muselmann, literally “the Muslim.” This term was widely used and widely known among Jews at Auschwitz as a way to refer to those who had given up or been given up for dead; they were “walking corpses,” the “living dead.” In recent years the term has gained critical currency via Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz, but its history remains strangely obscure. Agamben writes that “there is little agreement on the origin of the term Muselmann,” and hypothesizes that its use at Auschwitz derives from “the literal meaning of the Arabic word muslim: the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God.”20 He cites some other, in his view, less plausible explanations, too, such as the possibility that the collapsed bodies of prisoners at the brink of death were taken to resemble the crouched position of Muslims bent in prayer. Ultimately unable to decipher this etymological mystery, Agamben concludes his very brief discussion of the term’s origins, “In any case, it is certain that, with a kind of ferocious irony, the Jews knew that they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews.”21 What are we to make of the simultaneous visibility of der Musel mann—as it circulates in Holocaust literature and in critical theory—and the obscurity asserted for the term’s origins? This “invisible visibility” is one of the things exposed by Gil Anidjar in his 2003 study, The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy. 22 Anidjar offers a critical genealogy of the way “the Jewish Question” and “the Muslim Question” have come to mark internal and external borders for Christian (and Christian secular) Europe. His analysis crucially interrupts heroic narratives of “Judeo-Christian” civilization by interposing the history of another pairing: the “JudeoMuslim.” Anidjar traces a through-line within European philosophical thought (in Kant and Hegel especially) connecting Jew and Muslim and articulating the figure of der Muselmann as the “sick man of Europe” who threatens the vitality of the West. This contemporary French example shows how the survival of the body politic—its ongoing vitality—happens not by keeping death at bay but by soliciting it. As the site of this solicitation, “the child” uneasily straddles past and future, death and life. Lee Edelman may be right that “the child” summons the fantasy of a future. Nevertheless, we must critically supplement his analysis by asking, which child, whose fantasized future? As José Esteban Muñoz bluntly puts it, “The future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity.”23 Or, if they are, perhaps it is only from the other side of life. Of the many sobering lessons to take from Sarkozy’s proposed curriculum, not the least is how even dead children can be repurposed as figures securing a fantasy of “reproductive futurism” for the nation.24 In the context of current French debates over immigration and the boundaries of national identity, the logic of this figuration excludes actually existing Muslim children. A fresh and no-less-ferocious irony, then, appears at the prospect of French Muslim children being asked to identify with dead Jewish ones in order not to become “the Muslims” they are already imagined to be. “Look, a Negro!” Another child and another scene of French necropedagogy assert themselves here: “Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” Frantz Fanon’s account of the white French child’s sideways address to the dark-skinned adult offers an anticipatory illumination and critique of Althusser’s child-who-knows.25 The larger mise-en-scène of this terrifying encounter between the little white boy and the Martiniquan who would never be at home in France is the colonial geography of European Enlightenment narratives. The white child’s wide-eyed fright transfers the agency of terror from imperial racism and the modern state to the colonized themselves. Although Agamben centers the concentration camp in his analysis of the state of exception, with Mbembe—and, also, with Fanon—we can pressure this singular focus on the Holocaust without thereby dismissing its significance or denying its horrors.26 The “decisive lesson of the [twentieth] century” derives from multiple sources and produces multiple, discordant ways of existing in time. The future of any child pivots on racialized and Christian secularized forms of knowing which populations are targeted for death and which are mandated to life everlasting.Education constructs a new liberal subject

Baker 04

Bernadette M. professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the Dept of Curriculum and Instruction Dangerous Coagulations?: The Uses of Foucault in the Study of Education. Vol. 19. New York: Lang, 2004. Print.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the emergence of the self- goveming liberal and autonomous subject in the Swedish educational context. The inscription of this subject was not restricted to the popular school but appeared in other contexts like programs for the making of civil societies and the new welfare practices that were invented at the time. The popular school, like other inventions, served the purpose of making the Nation and the subiect of citizenship in the emerging modern Swedish society. The liberal subject is still with us, but the twentieth century saw a series of transfonnations and mutations both in educational discourse and the discourses that inscribed the subject in other institutional settings. Today, a new-ish liberal subject has emerged in the rhetoric c educational reform. It is reminiscent of previous versions, but it has also acquired attributes and characteristics that distinguish it from the subject of the past. That subject is presupposed in strategies for a decentralize school, and it is inscribed in the national curricula as well as in the school proper but can be found almost everywhere, in the public arena: as well as in the private sector of the economy, and it plays a significant role in the context of today's discussions about citizenship and democracy. It is not even restricted to the Swedish national borders but crosses countries and nations. |t's what I will call a traveling concept.

### Alternative school prograns/ racial biopolitics

#### Alternative school programs are rooted in liberal democratic projects that create new forms of racial biopolitics

Gulson & Webb 15 – (Kalervo N., P. Taylor, Associate Professor & Ph.D., Associate Professor @U of British Columbia, “Not Just Another Alternative School: Policy Problematization, Neoliberalism, and Racial Biopolitics”, Vol 30, PG 158-160)

Policies, such as the alternative schools program, that were historically posited as “progressive” policies, and created previous to the advent of “choice,” are now firmly located within neoliberalism. Foucault (2008) posits the need to understand neoliberalism through the techniques by which states and individuals govern and are governed. The political-economic theory of neoliberal posits that markets are the primary rationalities of contemporary government and governance, with a particular focus on “choice” and “freedom” that indicates not the withdrawal of the state as such but the economization of the state (Brown, 2015; Peck, 2010). Neoliberalism is characterized by “its unevenness, its lack of self-identity, its spatial and temporal variability, and above all, its reconfiguration” (Brown, 2015, p. 21), while this plasticity has the effect of reconfiguring many of what were considered liberal democratic projects, including the project of anti-racism (Goldberg, 2009). For example, being part of the independent and community-driven school lineage, the AAS is located within a policy realm where parental choice is the primary market mechanism that defines and enacts much of what constitutes ideas such as “independent,” “community,” and “educational equity.” As Brown (2015) maintains, As both individual and state become projects of management, rather than rule, as an economic framing and economic ends replace political ones, a range of concerns become subsumed to the project of capital enhancement, recede altogether, or are radically transformed as they are “economized.” These include justice (and its subelements, such as liberty, equality, fairness), individual and popular sovereignty, and the rule of law. (p. 22) We could propose that economics provided conditions (in the form of choice policies) for the development of the AAS, where decades of anti-racist politics did not succeed. However, while significant, the story of the AAS is more complicated than the economization of equity, for it involves the connection of neoliberal policy to biopolitics. Lather (2006) proposes that “[p]olicy is to regulate behavior and render populations productive via a ‘biopolitics’ that entails state intervention in and regulation of the everyday lives of citizens in a ‘liberal’ enough manner to minimize resistance and maximize wealth stabilization” (p. 787). Policy is central to biopolitics, as we can see in the following florid construction, Policy is correction, forcing itself with mechanical violence upon the incorrect, the uncorrected, the ones who do not know to seek their own correction . . . This is the first rule of policy. It fixes others. (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 78) We suggest that this “fixing” can be part of what Ash Amin (2010) contends is the new normality of racial biopolitics. Amin proposes that racial biopolitics involves the ways, [b]odily traits and “ethnic” cultures are becoming the basis upon which peoples are allocated rights, identities, a place in the world . . . at the expense of other modes of marking community and negotiating difference (e.g., doctrinaire principles, ideas of good citizenship, moral and ethical values). (p. 10) Traits and cultures are precisely the objects that Foucault (1990) referred to in his understanding of biopolitics, noting “the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques” (pp. 141-142). School and schooling have long been forms of biopolitical governance (Ball, 2013), with neoliberalism and school choice policies now ushering in new forms of racial biopolitics. Neoliberal policy has provided particular types of openings for the allocation of “rights” as bodily traits and “ethnic” cultures, such that any debates about anti-racism or equity politics occurs within neoliberalized framings. This is part of the shift from a state-supported anti-racist project to one in which there are new forms of race and racialization being produced as both invisible and visible within market forms in a colorblind State, and reconfigured as private and privatized forms of choice and selection (Goldberg, 2009; Gulson, 2011). The state is much less overtly involved in producing and arranging racializations, and has, instead, transferred or downloaded these forms of racial biopolitics onto populations that are “free” and “empowered” to produce and maintain variable raciologies.

### Black Mothering/ black fem

#### **Historical narratives of antiblack violence calcifies into a mathematics of blackness, thus recentering hegemonic narratives of calculation that seek to grid all forms of identity, attempting to render both identity and suffering intelligible, evacuating all life from the body**

McKittrick 15 Katherine McKittrick, Katherine McKittrick researches in the areas of black studies, anti-colonial studies, cultural geographies, and gender studies. Her interdisciplinary research attends to the links between epistemological narratives, practices and texts that focus on liberation, and creative text. McKittrick also researches the writings of Sylvia Wynter, with part of this work being put forth in her edited collection, Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis (Duke University Press, 2014). McKittrick wrote Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle (University of Minnesota Press, 2006) and coedited with the late Clyde Woods Black Geographies and the Politics of Place (Between the Lines Press/South End Press, 2007). Additional publications can be found in Small Axe, Mosaic, Gender, Place and Culture, and the Journal of Social and Cultural Geography. Her forthcoming monograph, Dear Science and Other Stories, will look at the promise of science in black poetry, music, and visual art. Published online: 14 Apr 2015. “The Mathematics of black life”. Pgs. 16 – 19.

In Saidya Hartman's "Venus in Two Acts," she returns to the deaths of two young African girls who were both violently and brutally killed on the middle passage. Raped, strung up, whipped to death, dying alone: This is the information Hartman pieces together from the ship's ledger and financial accounts, the captain's log book, and the court case that dismissed the charges of murder against Captain John Timber, the man who caused the deaths of the girls. The archive of black diaspora is, as Hartman rightly suggests, "a death sentence, a tomb, a display of a violated body, an inventory of property, a medical treatise ... an asterisk in the grand narrative of history."1 The asterisked archives are filled with bodies that can only come into being vis-a-vis racial/sexual violence; the documents and ledgers and logs that narrate the brutalities of this history give birth to new world blackness as they evacuate life from blackness. Breathless, archival numerical evidence puts pressure on our present system of knowledge by affirming the knowable (black objecthood) and disguising the untold (black human being). The slave's status as object-commodity, or purely economic cargo, reveals that a black archival presence not only enumerates the dead and dying, but also acts as an origin story. This is where we begin, this is where historic blackness comes from: the list, the breathless numbers, the absolutely economic, the mathematics of the unliving. Recall then, aboard the ship Peggy, aboard the ship Prosperous Amelia, aboard the brig Nancy. The ledgers read: Samuel Minton, 60 years, nearly worn out ... Formerly slave to Thomas Minton, Norfolk, Virginia ... Gilbert Lafferts, 21 years, likely lad, Mr. James Henderson's possession, proved to be the property of Mr. James Henderson ... Master & Bill of Sale produced ... Anny Bolton, 42, stout wench, Uames Alexander). Formerly the property of Thomas Bolton, Nansemond, Virginia ... Jenny Frederick, 32 years, or dinary wench ... Certified to be free by Jonah Frederick of Boston, New England ... Betty Rapelje, 21, stout wench, (Peter Brown) ... Says she was born free at Newtown, Long lsland.2 Worn out, bill of sale produced, certified to be free, ordinary wench, proved to be the property of, formerly slave to, formerly the property of, all with parenthetic possessors. New world blackness arrives through the ordinary, proved, former, certified, nearly worn-out archives of ledgers, accounts, price tags, and descriptors of economic worth and financial probability. The list of slaves upon these ships is a list of propertied commodities. The slave is possession, proved to be property. Yet a voice interrupts: says she. It follows that black freedom is embedded within an economy of race and violence and unfolds as an indeterminate impossibility: wench, property of, likely lad, nearly worn out; certified to be free, says she was born free, formerly slave to. Says she was born free. The brutalities of transatlantic slavery, summed up in archival histories that give us a bit of (asterisked-violated) blackness, put meaningful demands on our scholarly and activist questions. While the tenets and the lingering histories of slavery and colonialism produced modernity as and with and through blackness, this sense of timespace is interrupted by a more weighty, and seemingly truthful (truthful and truth-telling because iterated as scientific, proven, certified, objective), underside-where black is naturally malignant and therefore worthy of violation; where black is violated because black is naturally violent; where black is naturally unbelievable and is therefore naturally empty and violated; where black is naturally less-than-human and starving to death and violated; where black is naturally dysselected, unsurviving, swallowed up; where black is same and always and dead and dying; where black is complex and difficult and too much to bear and violated. The tolls of death and violence, housed in the archive, affirm black death. The tolls cast black as impossibly human and provide the conditions through which black history is currently told and studied. The death toll becomes the source. The tolls inevitably uncover, too, analyses of histories and narratives and stories and data that honor and repeat and cherish anti-black violence and black death. If the source of blackness is death and violence, the citation of blackness-the scholarly stories we tell-calls for the repetition of death and violence. The practice of taking away life is followed by the sourcing and citation of racial-sexual death and racial-sexual violence and blackness is (always already and only) cast inside the mathematics of unlivingness (data/scientifically proven/certified violation/asterisk) where black comes to be (a bit).4 Indeed, if blackness originates and emerges in violence and death, black futures are foreclosed by the dead and dying asterisks. And if the dead and dying are the archival and asterisked cosmogonies of blackness, within our present system of knowledge-a system, to paraphrase Frantz Fanon, where the subhuman is invited to become human on terms that require antiblack sentiment-scraps and bits of black Iife and death and narrative are guaranteed to move toward, to progress into, unlivingness and anti-blackness.5 With this in mind we would do well to notice that scholarly and activist questions can, at times, be so tightly tied to bits and pieces of narratives that dwell on anti-black violence and black racial death-seeking out and reprising "terrible utterances" to reclaim and recuperate black loss and somehow make it all the less terrible-that our answerable analytical futures are also condemned to death.6 Put differently, historically present anti-black violence is repaired by reproducing knowledge about the black subjects that renders them less than human. It is a descriptive analytics of violence. The cyclical and death-dealing numeration of the condemned remains in tact, at least in part, through analytical pathways that are beholden to a system of knowledge that descriptively rehearses antiblack violences and in this necessarily refuses decolonial thinking. How then do we think and write and share as decolonial scholars and foster a commitment to acknowledging violence and undoing its persistent frame, rather than simply analytically reprising violence? How do we ethically engage with mathematical and numerical certainties that compile, affirm, and honor bits and pieces of black death? In order to underscore the urgency here, it is worth thinking about the ways in which slave ship and plantation ledgers unfold into a series of crude and subjugating post-slave accounts: The rule in the courts was that a drop of blood made you black; just walking around looking about/This guy looks like he is up to no good or he is on drugs or something; the accusation was beginning to take on a familiar tone ... EmmettTill ... Scottsboro ... Armed with his new political powers Diluilo came to have access to billions of dollars in public funds to launch a program to reform the superpredators by exorcising the evil he saw in them; three-quarters of the persons arrested for such crimes were Negro ... in Detroit, the same proportions held .... Negro males represent 2.1 per cent of all male technicians while Negro females represent roughly 10 percent of all female technicians .... It would appear therefore that there are proportionately 4 times as many Negro females in significant white collar jobs than Negro males; these assholes, they always get away; it would come to be based on degrees of selected genetic merit (or eugenics) versus differ ential degrees of the dysselected lack of this merit: differential degrees of, to use the term made famous by The Bell Curve, "dysgenicity."7 We can think of more accounts, more numbers, more math. In Demonic Grounds, I suggest that the markers of captivity so tightly adhere to the black body that seeing blackness involves our collective willingness to collapse it into a signifier of dispossession.8 While I certainly suggest there, as I do here, that black dispossession reveals the limits of our present geographic order and opens up a way to imagine new modes of black geographic thought, it is challenging to think outside the interlocking data of black erasure, unfreedom, and anti-black violence. Putting pressure on archive numbers that, particularly in the case of the middle passage and plantation life, are the only documents that tell us about the ways in which the practice of slavery set the stage for our present struggles with racism, is difficult. So, what do we do with the archival documentation that displays this unfree and violated body as both naturally dispossessed and as the origin of new world black lives? How do we come to terms with the inventory of numbers and the certain economic brutalities that introduce blackness-the mathematics of the unliving, the certification of unfreedom-and give shape to how we now Iive our lives? And what does it mean that, when confronting these numbers and economic descriptors and stories of murder and commonsense instances of anti-black violence, some of us are pulled into that Fanonian moment, where our neurological synapses and our motor-sensory replies do not result in relieved gasps of nostalgia or knowing gasps of present emancipation (look how far we have come/slavery is over/get over slavery/ post-race/look how far) but instead dwell in the awfulness of seeing ourselves and our communities in those numbers now? This is the future the archives have given me. Yet, the Fanonian moment also disturbs to ask not how we get over the awfulness and brutality, but rather how do we live with it, differently, right now and therefore imagine what Sylvia Wynter describes as "being human as praxis"?10 In what follows, I move with the numbers and begin to work out how the uncomfortable mathematics of black life can inform current and future formations of black studies. I suggest that black studies not only names and posits the violent arithmetics of the archive, but that this citation of violence also can and should no longer ethically repeat this violence. Indeed, while not always honored, the intellectual project of black studies-with its long history of citing and surviving racial violence in numbers-provides a deliberate commentary on the ways in which blackness works against the violence that defines it. Thus, across a range of thinkers-! note Dionne Brand, Sylvia Wynter, Audre Lorde, Frantz Fanon, but there are more and many to add-there is a careful effort to show that if we are to name the violent displacement of black cultures, this must be done by both noticing and undoing the compulsion to inhabit safe and comfortable places within the very system that cannot survive without anti-blackness. Indeed, the research of W. E. B. Du Bois, who turns knowable racial numbers in on themselves to ask how the race is both fixed and unfixed by social conditions, is especially notable here.

### Cap/Neolib affs

#### **Trapped within the dialectics of globalization, the 1AC colludes with the very apparatuses of neoliberal capital they critique. Only dismantling the political project of optimism through the alternatives strategy of nihilist refusal shatters the ideological formations that render economic domination inevitable.**

Dupont 9(Dupont, Monsieur: clown, diarist, essayist, correspondent, *Nihilist Communism*. Ardent Press, 2009, 66-73, pilch)

The optimism of revolutionaries Long ago I felt the utter weariness that religion induced in me. So I abandoned all respect for it. Later in my life I came to the conclusion that ghosts did not ex- ist, that there was no such thing as magic or miracles, and that aliens have never visited planet earth. It took a great weight off my shoulders to come to these conclu- sions. I was reminded of when I had given up allowing for the possibility that a god existed. It is common sense that permits one to come to such decisions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves”. Shakespeare said, “This above all: to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man”. If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. The point of religion, the belief in ghosts or the supernatural, the belief in aliens, all ideology in fact, is to distract people from thinking about, and from, themselves and to make them feel humble and powerless. Instead of basing our world-view on our own experience we are coerced into looking out onto the world through a filter of hope and fear. When I was young, after I had passed through a peri- od of reading that started with tales about King Arthur and ended with the Conan the Barbarian books, I began read- ing serious and great literature. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As a young man I read less; I was in the search for how to actually live my life, which for me meant doing as little work as possible. However, if I had to work I preferred manual labour to anything else. I was a student for a while, to put off inevitabilities. Here I met many Marxist lecturers. In fact, in those days every ac- ademic seemed to be a Marxist of some sort. One of them, a man whose thinning black hair and full, unkempt beard suited his passion for the French Revolution, once said to me that he had given up reading fiction a long time ago. I remember him saying this but do not remember exactly why he said it. Probably it was because I had asked him if he had read some novel or other. Being of an impressiona- ble age and, indeed, nature, I resolved to abandon my silly novel reading. What use was fiction when there were so many factual books around that could tell you more about real life and the forces that shape the world? But I was unsuccessful. I could rarely read factual books; they hung like a dead weight on my hands. (There are a few excep- tions to this rule, I remember, for example, reading with great gusto an academic book I had borrowed from Sydney Library, while lazing by a pool in Fiji, on the Ruhr and its role in the German Revolution.) One of the problems with factual books is that the reader cannot tell if they are telling the truth. For this reason it is no good reading one version of events – you have to read all of them and only then can you attempt to form your own opinion on matters, or give up in despair. This is too tiresome a task for the likes of me, so I tried to find the right interpretations of events by only reading writers I thought were close to my way of thinking. So I read a few obscure political works: anarchist, ultra-left, council communist, Marxist, Situationist, etc. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As I said, I read much less in general than when I was a teenager, but still I was drawn to great novels, and I contin- ued to read them, slowly. The political works I read, the people I was involved with, and the texts I produced myself, although often having some worthy characteristics, were imbued with an optimism and a faith that bore no relation to the real world that I saw around me. I had become a kind of politi- cal animal. However, since I never actually lived for any length of time in any political social scene I was always able to critique it from outside. Macho gestures; lack of serious thought; lack of self-reflection; insularity; condescending and do-good impulses better suited to the rigorously alien- ated world of social work – these were elements I became aware of in the Revolutionary social scene. It seemed to me to be a grave error to see your personal lifestyle, your personal politics, as evidence of genuine revolt. It is also tragically egotistical and, in the end, comic. After a short while all bohemias become restrictive, moralistic, and deadly boring. We cannot escape this society while the fundamental aspects of its continuation are still function- ing, we cannot come up with any real alternatives, beyond half-told dreams, until the economy comes crashing to a halt. It is the way the economy of the world works – not to say that it always works perfectly of course – that makes it possible for the ruling class to exercise its power. And the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class. And in this democratic and mass world the ruling class pro- vides us with many differing and even competing ideas. By providing us with these false opposites (globalisation/ anti-globalisation, imperialism/anti-imperialism, vegan café/McDonalds, etc) the ruling classes can ensure that debates are kept on their terrain, that those with a sense of self-righteousness are kept busy playing the tiresome political games of good versus evil. These political move- ments, naturally, never threaten to destroy the economy (how could they?), they only offer empty threats to refine it or save it. History shows us that it is not movements that lead to genuinely revolutionary events, it is only complete economic failure and mis-management. If this occurs, and it was close to happening at the time of World War One, then it may be that the workers in those industries that are essential for the economy to keep running will be forced to take them over. It is at this point that the material basis of society will have altered, and it is now that humanity has the chance to assert itself, and prevent the re-imposition of economics. Where movements are the dominant force in events one will only see a hasty replacement of effec- tive government, a coup d’etat; one will not see the collapse of all sections of the ruling class as all these sections lose control, however temporarily, of the economy. There is a difference between the toppling of political parties in, for example, Serbia in 2001, and the turmoil in society in Eu- rope at the end of WW1. There is a difference, for example, between the toppling of political parties in recent years in the Philippines and the limited events in France in 1968. Apart from my distance from the revolutionary lifestyle I also had an enlightening experience in a postal workers group. This was not really a rank-and-file group, it was mostly a group of political postal workers who wanted to gain some influence over other postal workers and increase tensions at work. (Attempting to expose all anti-worker tendencies at one’s workplace is the nihilist communist’s daily fare – “Cheer up, folks, in a hundred years we’ll all be dead and forgotten!”) It wasn’t long after I joined it that the group began to fall apart. My experi- ences in this group and at work in the delivery office con- vinced me of certain things. I became aware of how those who are for communist revolution should act and behave in workplaces. I also became aware that most of my politi- cal associates did not work, and would not ever work, in any essential industry. This, I felt, helped sustain the cur- rent and general misunderstanding of where the power of the working class lies. On the other hand, simply working in essential industries does not in any way guarantee clar- ity of observation for so-called revolutionaries. Anyway, I can see now that it was this experience that helped me move away from more liberal, leftist, anarchist convictions and take on more communist positions. It was from this point that much of my political writing became aimed at the whole of the political milieu that I associated with. Over the years my critique of this milieu has deepened, and in- deed my critique of my own actions and texts has also be- come sharper. For example, I used to do a small magazine called Proletarian Gob. While there is much in this magazine that is still useful there is also much that relies on a kind of religious faith. A while ago I thought about re-issuing the whole set, but now I realise that it could only be re-issued with heavy annotation. Better, in fact, that the whole minor work is left in the oblivion (my loft) in which it now lies. The optimism of so-called revolutionaries now pro-duces an utter weariness in me. And I have abandoned all respect for the various self-appointed midwives of com- munism; all those who talk about what sort of movement is needed to destroy capital – they who insist on putting their ideological and restricting cart before the horse of material events. It has been like a weight lifted from my shoulders. Recently my critique of Revolutionary Experts and activists has sharpened to the point that I am now no longer much welcome in revolutionary circles. People don’t like to have their bubbles threatened by little pricks like me. I am now in the group Monsieur Dupont. The two of us in this group are generally despised. The common fault we see across the whole of the communist and anarchist milieu is one of a faith in the concept of consciousness, particularly Working Class Consciousness and the general belief that conscious- ness in The Masses can be raised by revolutionaries. We have come to the conclusion that the useful proletariat only consist of those workers who work in the essential sectors of the economy. Those who produce and/or distribute things without which the economy would crumble. And these proletarians are only useful when they are actually at the point of production, that is, actually at work, whether it be working normally or preventing work through strikes and similar. We have also come to the conclusion that people will only be able to decide on new ways of living when the old ways have been broken materially. The concept of Consciousness is mistaken. There is no way that millions of people across the world will eventually arrive at a communist perspec- tive and then overthrow the economy. It is common sense that permits one to come to such conclusions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves.” If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. One major factor in Revolutionary Politics is this optimism that workers will wake up. But the only way workers will be considered to have woken up is when they have become organised by revolutionary experts, this leadership of experts will then end up killing workers the same way Lenin did. Steve Biko of South Africa was a proponent of consciousness-raising and the ANC was successful in organising workers through this process. They started killing workers routinely even before they got into power. These revolutionaries – who tell us that one day people will change their minds because they will realise the sinfulness of present society – are trying to make us see the world through a filter of hope. They have put common sense aside, they are offering us that same old pie in the sky that the clerics used to sell. There is no hope (but this does not mean I need not be enthusiastic in my life, or a participant in events. My negativity, which is at last written through me like rock, does not make me unhappy). A famous Revolutionary once said, “Nihilists, one more effort if you want to be revolu- tionaries!” This was a slogan of the generally remarkable Situationists. But this is also the optimism of the Christian missionaries, “Be positive about the future of the world; if we work hard enough then the rest of the people will see the truth of what we say and the world will be saved,” not forgetting the stage whisper, the secret goal: “And then we will get a place in government!” Someone once said, “No- body speaks the truth when there is something they must have.” This maxim seems to apply to the majority of the revolutionary milieu across the world, who want to pre- serve their sense of self-importance above all else. We would reverse the slogan and say, “Revolutionar- ies, one more effort to become nihilists!” And we would say that from your critique of everything, from your non-belief, it may be possible for you to connect with your own human- ity. My criticisms of revolutionism have always been based in my attempts to establish a personal perspective and ex- perience. This has not been an easy task, and it is ongoing – it is easy to fall back on holy mantras. It is easier to promote dogma, to let dogma rise to the surface, than it is to engage with the world through one’s own experience. These days I have almost completely abandoned reading factual books because I have discovered that there is more truth in one page of good fiction than there is in a shelf of academic or political works. I am for communism now more than ever. I am against religious faith, intolerance, hidden agendas, and machismo now more than ever.

### Common core

#### Common core shiz

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, Maya L. Secondary English Teacher at Teach For America ""Reimagining Ability, Reimagining America: Teaching Disability in Unite" by Maya L. Steinborn." Site. University of San Francisco, 18 May 2017. Web. 06 July 2017. <http://repository.usfca.edu/capstone/504/>.

In California Common Core State Standards: English Language Arts & Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects (CCCSS, 2013), only two disability keywords surfaced out of the document’s 98 pages. Those two words, illness and disease, appeared in the same sentence on page 49: “Taking care of your body: Germs, diseases, and preventing illness” (CCCSS, 2013). I found zero references to disability, disabled, mental, deaf, blind, polio, handicap, paralysis, amputee, wheelchair, asylum, institutional, equity, equality, justice, or rights. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, another infamous supercrip,19 was mentioned twice in the document in reference to his Four Freedoms speech and 1941 State of the Union Address, but never in reference to his having polio or spearheading the March of Dimes. These nuanced presences and absences support the notion that U.S. history textbooks erase disability from the fabric of the nation, eliminating it not just from the norm but from the national consciousness, and reference terms connected to disability only to promote their avoidance. A less standard and more progressive online resource, History, 2017). While disability keyword searches fruited zero results, equity merited five, equality merited 10, and justice merited a whopping 74 unique results. Disability did sometimes appear as a secondary search term for those three terms, but almost completely in reference to Helen Keller – only twice in reference to a teaching guide with one mention of disability (Rethinking Our Classrooms: Teaching for Equity and Justice and Open Minds to Equality: A Sourcebook of Learning Activities to Affirm Diversity and Promote Equity). In dissecting a hard copy index of Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (2005), none of the aforementioned keywords appeared. Scanning for related topics, I was able to find one reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act on page 629, though the 1990 act was framed as having passed Congress in the 1970s and 1980s. President Roosevelt was mentioned five times, always in relation to World War II, and Helen Keller was mentioned three times, all in reference to suffrage and socialism. Teaching a People’s History – Zinn Education Project, fell into the same pattern (Teaching a People’s

### Debate as a system

#### Even debate is a death that lives a human life – Corrupted by the values of enlightenment humanism, the 1AC cedes itself to a public sphere that relies on the liberal subject as its assumed participant, creation of the self within deliberative institutions traps us within a legal hall of mirrors – The space necessary to discuss western liberal rights is sustained on the basis of mass eastern death

Mbembe 3 Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15(1): pg.13

The aim of this essay is not to debate the singularity of the extermination of the Jews or to hold it up by way of example.6 I start from the idea that modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty—and therefore of the biopolitical. Disregarding this multiplicity, late-modern political criticism has unfortunately privileged normative theories of democracy and has made the concept of reason one of the most important elements of both the project of modernity and of the topos of sovereignty.7 From this perspective, the ultimate expression of sovereignty is the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made up of free and equal men and women. These men and women are posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation. Politics, therefore, is defined as twofold: a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition. This, we are told, is what differentiates it from war.8 In other words, it is on the basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the political, the community, the subject—or, more fundamentally, of what the good life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral agent. Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of the subject and politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere. The exercise of reason is tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for individual autonomy. The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing one’s own limits for oneself). The exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in society’s capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations.9 This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has been the object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here.10 My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death. Significant for such a project is Hegel’s discussion of the relation between death and the “becoming subject.” Hegel’s account of death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human’s effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the “animal” that constitutes the human subject’s natural being is defeated. In other words, the human being truly becomes a subject—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment.11 Politics is therefore death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one’s life

### Democracy spred

#### The use of the justification of “spreading democracy” allows for endless warfare and proliferates neocrocapitalism

Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby.,06, Prof, S. Banerjee is at the Cass business school he has also held positions at University of Wollongong, RMIT University and the University of South Australia and recived his PhD from the university of Massachusetts, "Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism." *Borderlands* 5.1 (2006): n. pag. 2006. Web. 7 July 2017., http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol5no1\_2006/banerjee\_live.htm#top

18. New economic doctrines require new military doctrines as well. 'Spreading democracy and capitalism' the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy also involves Operation Infinite War, a 'new imperial hegemony, commanding a global economy administered by multiple states, requiring war without end' (Wood, 2003: 71). War without end does not necessarily mean endless fighting: the coercive mechanisms of capital require an endless possibility of war. Leaving aside the problem of conflating democracy with capitalism for the moment, one could argue that U.S. foreign policy of 'spreading democracy and capitalism' is a new form of imperialism. While the rhetoric behind U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years is to 'spread democratic values', the reality is that foreign policy decisions promote a brand of American liberal democracy that seeks to create a global system 'based on the needs of private capital including the protection of private property and open access to markets' (Hertz, 2001: 78). 'War without end' has an impressive genealogy in the west. Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1907: Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked...The seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry (cited in Katz, 2006). Thus, Woodrow Wilson's declaration that the 'world must be made safe for democracy' must therefore be seen in light of the kind of market fundamentalism and violence that defines the parameters of democracy. American style liberal democracy where multinational corporations become the carriers of democratic values to Third World regions is perfectly capable of functioning in authoritarian regimes—in fact these regimes are preferred, as long as a market economy is allowed. Democratic notions of private property rights and the rule of law are sacrosanct but other aspects of democracy such as 'mass participation, an active civil society, regular free and fair elections are optional and in fact expendable' (Hertz, 2001: 80). 19. And when inconvenient democracies threaten American style capitalism as was the case with the democratically elected President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, a state of exception can always be created to justify a military backed coup (the extent of U.S. political and military involvement in the military coup to oust Chavez is still not clear as documents remain classified by the State department because of reasons of 'national security') or political assassination as advocated by 'religious broadcaster' Pat Robertson. Appearing on national television, Robertson called for the assassination of Chavez to stop his country from becoming 'a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism' (the charge of 'Muslim extremism' in Venezuela is bizarre to say the least given that less than 0.5% of the country's population is Muslim). In his broadcast Robertson said: We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability. We don't need another $200 billion war to get rid of one strong-arm dictator. It's a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with. It's a whole lot cheaper than starting a war ... and I don't think any oil shipments will stop (USA Today, 2005). 20. While the U.S. government distanced itself from Robertson's remark (U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told newsmedia with a straight face 'We don't do that sort of thing'), Robertson's statement underscores the relationship between oil (Venezuela is the fifth largest exporter of oil in the world and the U.S. buys nearly 60% of its production), and capitalist accumulation by dispossession and death through political assassination and war. And to further clarify the relationship between markets and war, President Bush, in an attempt to address concerns about the dramatic decline in tourism and air travel in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, told airline employees that 'one of the great goals of this war is to tell the traveling public: Get on board' (cited in Gregory, 2004). Thus, for the American tourist to 'get on board' to enjoy a holiday, stimulate the tourism market and save airline jobs it becomes necessary for some people to die, as homo sacer , in a state of exception outside national and international law. 21. If the sword of commerce was most visibly active in the days of empire its activity in the postcolonial era continued the violence in a more covert manner, often with the complicity of the political elites of the former colonies. Ong (2005) develops the notion of 'graduated sovereignty' to describe how some countries in South East Asia, notably the so-called 'Asian tigers' embraced the global market with a combination of governmental political strategies and military repression. Her research on globalization in Indonesia and Malaysia showed that the interaction between states and transnational capital resulted in a differential state treatment of the population already fragmented by race, ethnicity, gender, class and region as well as a reconfiguration of power and authority in the hands of transnational corporations operating in special export processing zones. The neoliberal turn in these regions follows a different trajectory where the interplay of market versus state results in differing levels of sovereignty: some areas of the economy have a very strong state presence and in other areas, markets and foreign capital rule. State sovereignty is dispersed because global markets and capital with the collusion of governments create states of exception where coercion, violence and killings occur. State repression against rebel populations and separatist movements is often influenced by market forces: as Ong (2005) argues territories are cleared of rebels ('outlawed citizens') to make way for logging concessions, petroleum pipelines, mines and dams. Thus, necrocapitalism creates states of exceptions where 'democratic rights are confined to a political sphere' while continuing forms of domination, exploitation and violence in other domains (Wood, 2003: 80).

#### Curricular practices are tied to biopolitics of neoliberalism that denies the possibility of democratic future – promotes a carceral state that marginalizes students in the education system

Bourassa 11 – (Gregory N., Assistant Professor @U Northern Iowa & Ph.d @U Utah, “Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism”, OISEUT, PG 8-10, Published 1/12/11, SL)

In addition to providing significant contributions to the field of curriculum theory, the writings of Henry Giroux (1981a; Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993; Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981; Giroux & Purpel, 1983) have always posed grave challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize the curricular relations between power and knowledge, social contexts, and school practices. As such, a serious examination of Giroux’s (1981b) work leads us to approach curriculum with the recognition that it is inextricably bound to broader social contexts of cultural and political struggle. For Giroux, such contexts are never reduced, abstracted, or divorced from an ever-complex array of school practices that materially impact students on a daily basis. Always charting the domains of public pedagogy, Giroux’s writings offer curriculum theorists extraordinary insights into how contestations of power shape and organize not only official school curricula or hidden curricula, but all aspects of social life (Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993). And now, perhaps more than ever, the writings of Giroux summon the curricular imagination to respond to a unique constellation of challenges that threaten to foreclose the educational experience along with the remaining possibilities for a democratic future. Youth in a Suspect Society marks a continuation of Giroux’s recent interests in the resurgence of authoritarianism, market-based logics of disposability, and a biopolitics of neoliberalism. The convergence of these concepts, for Giroux, is accompanied by a fundamental shift from an imperfect social state to a ruthless market state. This shift, from “state sovereignty” to “market sovereignty” is characterized by a disinvestment in the public sphere. In this configuration, anything pertaining to the public is not only neglected but also met with great disdain. As an economic logic, neoliberalism invades the public sphere, invalidating and enclosing that which cannot be filtered through a market rationality. Here, neoliberalism meets biopolitics in that politics distances itself from social governance—withdrawing from a commitment to protect its citizens—and increasingly resorts to governing populations through the economic reign of the market. In this cruel landscape that Giroux calls the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the social state ceases to exist only to be replaced by a corporate state that is intent **on warding off democratic sensibilities** and enclosing the few spheres of the public that remain. Giroux’s conceptual mapping of a biopolitics of neoliberalism contains yet another important element. Excluded from social and political life, those populations marginalized by class and race are reduced from the status of citizens to waste, or in Agamben’s (1998) terms, from bios (social and political life) to zoe¯ (life without quality). Rendered disposable under a biopolitics of neoliberalism, marginalized populations are vulnerable to Agamben’s formulation of biopolitics as thanatopolitics. Giroux, rightfully taking Agamben’s biopolitics seriously in this instance, draws here from Achille Mbembe (2003), who argues that “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40). In short, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability ushers in forms of social death, rendering populations expendable, without support, protection, or compassion. In Giroux’s account, such a biopolitical order abandons populations under the guise that they represent the refuse of a neoliberal economic regime. This epitomizes, for Giroux, a complete violation of ethical responsibility and obligation to youth and the democratic future to come. With the breaking of the social contract, in the U.S. context, the state is transformed from a “weakened welfare state into an increasingly powerful racialized warfare state” (Giroux, 2009, p. 71). Embedded within this shift, what emerges is a powerful concoction of a racial state, a punishing state, and a carceral state, in which disposable populations constitute **a threat that must be contained**. Hence, prisons become the primary disciplinary apparatuses that regulate and govern disposable populations. According to Giroux (2009), “The institution of the prison is at the ideological center of the biopolitics of the punishing state dutifully inscribing its presence into the political and cultural landscape of everyday life” (p. 83). In this important passage, we can begin to see how the site of schooling comes to function as an appendage for the carceral state. In fact, as Giroux (2009) asserts, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability is able to forcefully “collapse the distinctions between crime and social problems, prison and school, and race and disposability, while constructing spaces that subject minority youth and others rendered redundant to a form of punitive control, if not social death” (p. 80). As a result of this blurring of boundaries, apartheid schools—those schools “in which 99 to 100 percent of students are nonwhite” (Kozol, 2005, p. 18)—come to closely resemble prisons, or at the very least, enclaves of intellectual, social and political containment (De Lissovoy, 2008; Devine 1996; Giroux, 2009). Too often, such sites jettison the educational lives and futures of those students within their purview. It is here where the real insight of Giroux’s text takes shape and productively aggravates the curricular imagination by exposing the broken promises of public schooling. While many have similarly pointed to the eroding investment in the futures of working-class youth of color (Kozol, 2005; Valenzuela, 1999), Giroux is able to outline the contours of a viable theory—a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability—that provides a new analytic for understanding the form and content of teacher education in relation to broader social patterns. There are at least two points of interest here worth noting. First, Foucault (2003) insisted that modern **racism is a “mechanism that allows biopower to work**. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power” (p. 258). Despite this, few theorists focusing on biopolitics endeavor to interrogate how “racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower” (Foucault, 2003, p. 258). Youth in a Suspect Society not only attempts to make explicit the links between biopower and schooling, but it achieves in beginning to demonstrate how the warehousing of Black and Brown children in lockdown schools—along with the production of educational and social death—performs a principle function of biopower. The importance of making these conceptual links between biopower and racial domination, and subsequently Giroux’s connection of this theory to material outcomes cannot be understated. Second, employing the theory of a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability, Giroux highlights the broken promises of public schooling in terms that refocus what is at stake for curriculum inquiry. Beyond the myopic rhetoric of accountability and standards, it is absolute democracy (Dewey, 1927; Hardt & Negri, 2004) and its unfolding futurity that is in jeopardy. Put differently, a biopolitical reading of curriculum insists that the production and reproduction of certain forms of life are at the very center of the educational experience. Thus, no longer can prevailing conceptions of curriculum fail to locate the ideological underpinnings of school practices, allowing the relationship between schooling and economic, political, and cultural imperatives to remain veiled. In other words, curriculum inquiry must strive to locate and disrupt the commensurability between these prevailing imperatives, their broader political projects and the mandates they impose on curriculum. With the aid of Giroux’s biopolitical framework, the curricular imagination must conceive of the educational experience not as a formula to be consumed or constructed for calculable instrumentality, but rather as **a vital resource for galvanizing a robust social imagination** capable of collectively negotiating and perpetually reconstructing democratic life (Dewey, 1927). The writings of Tyson Lewis, which I will now turn to, are especially crucial for this task.

### Disability links

#### Disabled people are denied access to liberal notions of humanity

CARLSON and KITTAY 09

LICIA, and EVA FEDER. "INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUMPTIONS IN LIGHT OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY."Metaphilosophy. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 18 Sept. 2009. Web. 06 July 2017. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01609.x/abstract>.

Of the many indignities suffered by people with disabilities, the denial of their claims to justice (or claims made on their behalf) has been especially serious and particularly acute for people with cognitive disabilities. Through the Americans with Disabilities Act, people with disabilities have demanded and have been granted legal protections against discrimination in civic and political life. But people with severe cognitive disabilities appear unable to participate in the workplace on a competitive basis and may not be able to exhibit the understanding and judgment needed for political participation. With Locke, many philosophers and lay INTRODUCTION 7 people have presumed that while charity is appropriately bestowed on people who cannot function as rational agents in the public domain, these individuals have no claim to just treatment. Were we able to count on each other to be magnanimous to those unlikely to return our favors, worries about justice for the cognitively disabled might be of less concern. But justice entitles us to protections and provisions, and those who have to be at the mercy of another’s charity live precarious lives and are most likely to suffer poverty, neglect, and abuse. This surely has been the history of all whose claims to just treatment have been denied, and people with cognitive disabilities have suffered as much as any, and more than most

<https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/GrzinicIntroWKO3.2.pdf>

#### Teaching must incorporate critical pedagogies in order to solve back for neoliberal systems.

Emiliano Grimaldi (2012), Neoliberalism and the marginalisation of social justice: the making of an education policy to combat social exclusion, International Journal of Inclusive Education, 16:11, 1150-1152,

Hope policy trajectory illustrates how the enactment of a set of neoliberal understandings has reframed the initial egalitarian and inclusive purposes. Discourses of growth, competitiveness and human capital offered the wider framework and defined both the concept of inclusion and the purposes of education in terms of economic rationalism. Such a framing made the solutions proposed by the discourses of school improvement, standardization and performativity as the only ones conceivable. This impeded the adoption of a contextualized, multidimensional and critically informed approach to inequality and exclusion. As the findings of the case study reveal, this strategy did not produce any egalitarian outcome, contributing on the contrary to reinforce discriminatory practices and enhancing the selective function of schooling. In this respect, the evidences emerging from the case study on Hope policy trajectory suggest some critical considerations. The first one concerns the co-option and subjugation of the issues related to social justice by economic rationalism. Dropout is only understood as the product of school inefficacy. Exclusion becomes synonym of educational failure whereas inclusion is thought as inclusion in the labour market. As the case of Hope demonstrates, such a framing inhibits any critical and multidimensional understanding of the problem of exclusion and dropout. The influence exerted by structural inequalities and differences in terms of social and cultural capitals is not taken into account. This results in the impossibility to think social exclusion as part of a complicated and self-reinforcing circle of deprivation and also in the misrecognition that levels of exclusion reflect unequal distributions of power and resources. Moreover, the subjugation of social justice issues by economic rationalism implies the vanishing of any reference to progressive values such as education for citizenship, democratic schooling, active and critical thinking, students well-being and cultural recognition. Such discursive moves clearly hinder any possibility to break the self-reinforcing circle of deprivation and exclusion. They relegate education in a reproductive role, as an appendix of economy and productivity. The development of concrete and effective strategies to pursue social justice would require a different discursive framework where an ethos based on democracy and a notion of education as a ‘social good’ (Mosen-Lowe, Vidovich, and Chapman 2009, 473) are reaffirmed. Education should be thought as the provision of ‘the necessary cultural capital for social participation, inclusion and equality, in addition to the skills necessary for the performance of a job’ (Alexiadou 2002, 82). The second consideration deals with the construction of the problems of dropout and exclusion in terms of students, families, teachers and school’s deficiencies. Furthermore, it concerns the policy solutions imagined. The conflicting development of the policy and its unsatisfying outcomes highlight how such a framing of the problem and the related solutions affect negatively the pursuing of social justice objectives, being them distributional, cultural or associational. This is due to three paradoxes which are inherent in the ‘deficit model’ enacted. The first paradox concerns the role schools and teachers can play in combating social exclusion and pursuing social justice. As Lingard and Mills (2007) have extensively argued, schools can make ‘a difference’ in combating exclusion through the development of more inclusive pedagogies (Apple and Beane 2007). However, the school improvement discourse seems to entirely delegate to educational institutions the burden to cope with social justice issues. Paradoxically, this delegation co-exists with the enactment of a blaming and negative labelling of schools and teachers as ineffective. Those who create the problem are also asked to solve it. In this respect the case of Hope represents a clear example of the outcomes the naive perspective of school improvement is likely to produce and reinforce ineffectiveness in combating exclusion, conflicting dynamics in schools, frustration and mistrust. Instead, it would be crucial to acknowledge the limits of education, which is barely able to compensate for structural inequalities. It would be also necessary to approach existing practices of schooling and teachers’ professional expertise according to a logic of recognition. Trust and participation should be the inspiring principles of a reflexive rethinking of dominant pedagogies in order to make them more inclusive and democratic (Apple and Beane 2007). Moreover, educational policies and practices should work ‘along- side redistributive, democratizing and socially just economic and social policies’ (Raffo and Gunter 2008, 402). As Alexiadou puts it, ‘breaking the circle of social exclusion is thus neither an individual [or school] responsibility, nor a question of raising academic standards. Rather it is a problem of governance of the system, and has to be addressed as such’ (2002, 80). The second paradox can be related to the construction of students’ subjectivities as lacking and inadequate, the simultaneous emphasizing of individualization and the obsessive focus on ‘individual students, their capacities and differing needs deter- mined by differences, for example, in [...] abilities’ (Arnesen, Mietola, and Lahelma 2007, 107). As the case of Hope shows, this results in the paradoxical strategy to address exclusion reinforcing labelling and excluding practices. In such a way ‘a traditional approach to education [...] focused on the individual fitting into the culture of educational systems’ (Mosen-Lowe, Vidovich, and Chapman 2009, 473) is endorsed and reproduced. The findings of the case study presented reinforce the argument that the tyranny of performativity (Ball 2003) and the related adoption of a variety of diagnostic tools and techniques are at odds with any inclusive purpose. They have label- ling and selective consequences, contributing to set the expectations in a reproductive logic. A third related paradox inherent in the ‘deficit model’ regards the governance structures to be enacted in addressing social exclusion and dropout at the local level. In the case of Hope we face the adoption of a decontextualized logic of innovation and the enactment of a hierarchical and asymmetrical pattern of governance. Ineffective schools and teachers need to be taught how to tackle social exclusion and dropout and how to be more effective. The research findings show how this generates resistances and low degrees of commitment among the teachers and the students (i.e. among the leading actors of the process of innovation). Where decontextualized ‘best practices’, effective instruments and techniques are imposed on schools and teachers through asymmetrical power relationships, the policy run the risk to fail. The case of Hope suggests that a policy promoting a real participative planning and aiming at generating bottom-up innovation through a more horizontal pattern of governance would have much more chance to be successful. A final consideration can be done in a critical effort to link the local and the specificities of the Hope policy trajectory to global discourses and general patterns (Rizvi and Lingard 2010). The case of Hope shows how the neoliberal constellation of discourses exerts a pervasive influence on the field of education. They have the strength to co-opt, assimilate or transfigure alternative discourses such as those of the social justice and, as a consequence, to weaken education policies intended to pursue social justice and inclusion. Despite the specificities of the local re-contextualisations, what is at stake here is the spreading across educational systems of apparently neutral and obvious understandings and ‘effective’ recipes to deal with educational problems. Those recipes are increasingly taken for granted and not questioned in their assumptions and underlying values. The dominant position assumed by these practical and ideological patterns has the implicit consequence to drive educational systems towards even more inequitable outcomes and reproductive functions.

### Futurism

#### **Education is recognized as a way to extend the future of America – challenging this form of educational futurism in a radical negation is critical to break normative boundaries**

GRETEMAN & **WOJCIKIEWICZ 14 – (** Adam J., Steven K, Ph.D in Teacher Education & 2014 ERA Queer SIG Article of the Year Award, Director of Faculty of Education at University of Portland, “The Problems with the Future: Educational Futurism and the Figural Child” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 48, No. 4, PG 559-562, SL)

‘I touch the future’, Christa McAuliffe said, ‘I teach’. This resonates with educators. By passing on skills, knowledge, and ideas that will be used at later times, they reach out to an unseen future and touch it. Teachers tell their students to study and work hard, for the things they are learning will be needed in the future. The lesson of the day may be applied to a test at the end of the week, or it may be the basis for work that will be carried out at the next grade level. It may even help prepare a student for college, or for a job, or for a fulfilling life. Whatever the specifics, the commonality here is that learning now prepares students for a yet unknown then. Teaching and schooling are suffused with concern about, discussion of, and **focus on the future**. This theme of futurity carries on beyond school walls and enters political discourse on education. President John F. Kennedy noted, ‘Children are the world’s most valuable resource and its best hope for the future’, while Malcolm X claimed ‘education is the passport to the future, for tomorrow belongs to those who prepare for it today’. But, education is not merely directed toward the future of the individual, but also toward the future of the nation. A Nation at Risk, the oft-quoted 1983 US Department of Education report on the state of American education, tells us that, People are steadfast in their belief that education is the major foundation for the future strength of this country. They even considered education more important than developing the best industrial system or the strongest military force, perhaps because they understood education as the cornerstone of both . . . Very clearly, the public understands the primary importance of education as the foundation for a satisfying life, **an enlightened and civil society,** a strong economy, and a secure Nation (National Commission on Excellence in Education, The Public’s Commitment section, 1983, para. 2). Close to 20 years after the publication of A Nation at Risk, the most sweeping educational reform effort of our time, No Child Left Behind, returned the focus back to the Child, continuing the focus on the future in education and the necessity of the Child to maintain the competitiveness of the nation. As former president George W. Bush asserted in one of his last speeches in office, NCLB, . . . starts with this concept: Every child can learn. We believe that it is important to have a high quality education if one is going to succeed in the 21st century. It’s no longer acceptable to be cranking people out of the school system and saying, okay, just go—you know, you can make a living just through manual labor alone. That’s going to happen for some, but it’s not the future of America, if we want to be a competitive nation as we head into the 21st century (Bush, 2009, para. 22). And more recently, President Obama, in a speech when he was running for the office, asserted, ‘We are the nation that has always understood that our future is inextricably linked to the education of our children’ (Obama, 2008, para. 10). Along the same lines, the current Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, has stated that, ‘Today, more than ever, better schooling provides a down payment on the nation’s future’ (Duncan, 2009, para. 15). Within these statements, the future cannot be separated from those it relies on—predominately ‘children’. These assumptions made in regards to children, their role in the future, and schools’ roles in creating that future are seemingly ingrained in our society and our politics. The presence of this future focus may seem uncontroversial, its influence benign. Such assumptions may appear to be natural and beyond question, particularly since this Enlightenment, with its progress-oriented philosophical perspectives. Yet, we wish to question these assumptions, to explore how they can set **narrow boundaries** around children in schools. In carrying out this task, we employ the work of Lee Edelman and John Dewey to examine the educational ramifications of the focus on the future, which we call ‘educational futurism’ after Edelman’s (2004) ‘reproductive futurism’. Our argument seeks specifically to explore how educational futurism imposes **limits on educational discourse** and privileges a certain future, thus making it unthinkable to imagine ways **outside** of such a privileged future. We turn to Edelman for his ‘reproductive futurism’, which is embodied in the regulatory figure of ‘the Child’, because it is seems particularly apt to the educational settings, practices and discourses which are our concern. This ‘figural Child’ for Edelman ‘alone embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights “real” citizens are allowed’ (2004, p. 11). The Child exists in discourse and it limits discourse from engaging the unruly lives of children. The Child, for Edelman, is not representative of children. **It is all there is**. And actions taken in the name of the Child ignore, even exclude, the particularities and contexts that make children who they are—alive and unique. Edelman’s challenge then offers up a threat to education’s identification with the Child, a challenge that is not simply nihilistic, but which rather aims to see what is **denied consideration** and action. His project, heavily reliant on Lacan’s death drive, offers a challenge to ‘a future whose beat goes on’ to expose the way ‘the political regime of futurism, unable to escape what it abjects, **negates it as the negation of meaning**, of the Child, and of the future the Child portends’ (pp. 153–154). He insists, as such, on a politics that does not seek accommodation within such logic but an embrace of the negation, **the unintelligible place of queerness**, for it is in such an **embrace that queer ethics can engage the violence against non-normative bodies**. Dewey makes an appearance here because, though he has been narrowly and inaccurately portrayed as the benign father of student-centred, activity-oriented, open, and laissez-faire classroom methods, his positions are far more nuanced, and far more radical, in relation to children and the future (Dewey, 1938; Petrovic, 1998; Popkewitz, 2005; Prawat, 1995; Schleffler, 1974; Wong and Pugh, 2001). He presents a critique of a future focus in education that shows how such a focus means **a loss**, not only of present opportunities, but also of the promised future for children. Dewey, read in relation to Edelman’s engagement with futurism, offers a place within educational discourse to explore the **possibility to engage educational futurism** in ways that challenge the discourse of the Child illustrated in our opening statements. To focus on Dewey’s radical insights then is to challenge the innocent position to which he is often relegated. After all, it is the innocent Dewey, like the innocent Child, that supports and carries forward the status quo. Our focus on the radical insights of Dewey position him against the status quo, and against the Child, bringing a different, though complementary, perspective to our engagement with Edelman. Before moving forward, we would like to note that our approach in this analysis is not entirely new. As a critique of futurism, it questions a general characteristic of modernism, namely, a foundational belief that we will get ‘there’ someday (Lagemann, 2000). This belief asserts that wherever there might be, and in whatever endeavour we are engaged in, the point is that progress is possible and that our actions can be justified in the name of the inevitable and **promising, though distant, end**. This belief, the heart of futurism, has, in this postmodern time, been challenged on many occasions. Our argument, however, seeks specifically to explore how futurism, expressed through the iterative construction of the Child, shapes the ways that we can think about children and education. We will begin our analysis by describing Edelman’s reproductive futurism and its relation to education specifically. In this we will address Edelman’s the notion of the Child, the Child’s relation to children, and the impact of these concepts on education. Following this we will introduce John Dewey’s views of growth, life, and education, and show how these views can be read to engage a similar critique of the role of the future and the workings of normative or regulatory subjects.With our two theorists in place, we will seek to draw out connections and disconnections between them, illustrating the ways in which educational futurism ignores or overlooks the lived experiences of children. We conclude by briefly noting the queerness of children and the impact of such queerness on broadening discussions of the future of children.

### Generic (Policy and K)

#### **Their conception of sovereignty upholds a reactionary attachment to necropolitical slaughter – The creation of political community requires the exclusion of those deemed “other” to politics-as-such – even resistant attempts are sublimated into a violent logic of expenditure – Despite their best intentions, their politics are the work of death - This destruction of excess must be confronted with its mirror – Only affirming self-sacrifice allows us to disrupt the narratives of coherence at the heart of liberalism**

Mbembe 5 Achille Mbembe, Professor Achille Mbembe, born in Cameroon, obtained his Ph.D in History at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1989 and a D.E.A. in Political Science at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Paris). He was Assistant Professor of History at Columbia University, New York, from 1988-1991, a Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., from 1991 to 1992, Associate Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania from 1992 to 1996, Executive Director of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Codesria) in Dakar, Senegal, from 1996 to 2000. Achille was also a visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2001, and a visiting Professor at Yale University in 2003. “Sovereign Bodies Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World”. “Sovereignty as a Form of Expenditure”. 2005. Pgs. 149 – 160.

The object of this study is to analyze conceptions of the political that, in present-day Africa, articulate power as a theory and practice of war. As it is employed here, the notion of “war” does not refer purely and simply to those moments of the dramatic enactment of conﬂict that present themselves in terms of the confrontation of forces of men followed by scenes of destruction involving the loss of human life on the ﬁeld of battle. This form of ordeal has already been thoroughly investigated in his own day by Clausewitz. In the case of Africa, too, it has formed, over the past ten years, the subject of a range of increasingly sophisticated historical studies.1 These studies do, however, underestimate the centrality that war has come to assume in the mental representation that contemporary African social actors hold of politics in general, and of sovereignty in particular. In the recent history of several countries, war has become just as much the means whereby one creates a world, as well as the life-world that is itself created. African wars have given rise to at least two different logics of expenditure.2 The first type of expenditure relates to the ability of the human psyche to invest heavily in—and to sublimate—objects, resources, and even indeed human beings—and then to release an extraordinary quantum of energy whose function is to ensure their serial and systematic destruction—a destruction from which there comes to be derived a corresponding satisfaction. This work of destruction—which consists in its essence of a “putting to death”—is a striking manifestation of absolute, sovereign power, whether this is expressed at the level of intention, of action, or of fantasy (cf. Mbembe 2003). Although the impulse to death and the passion for destruction revolves around self-preservation in the first type of expenditure, the second form of expenditure opens the way to the possibility of getting oneself killed in the name of that for which one is prepared to live (sovereignty as self-sacrifice). In the fullest acceptance of this risk, the principle of destruction is on an equal footing with the will to exercise power over the unknown that is represented by death. As Castoriadis (2002) reminds us, what a society, a community, indeed particular individuals are prepared to live and to die for “isn’t in most cases either material or “real.” Very often, the politics of life and death take shape around “imaginary social symbolizations.” These imaginary social symbolizations are made concrete in and implemented by institutions in which force and violence are constituted and organized as struggles “about power, through power and for power” (Foucault 1976, 16–17). In this respect, times of war are not so different from the times of politics, or that war is politics continued by other means, as Clausewitz put it. Inverting this proposition and understanding politics as war continued by other means, Foucault was able to show how the role of political power was to “reinscribe continuously that power relationship in institutions, in economic inequalities, in the language, even in the very bodies of one group and another,” through a whole panoply of technologies and contrivances. If the true purport of power rests, in the ﬁnal analysis, in its capacity to continue the conduct of war by other means, is it possible, then, to interpret democracy and the movement for democratization as straightforward incidents in a war? As the broken-down elements of war? As a radical change of locus of war itself? If war is as much a means to the achievement of sovereignty as a means of exercising the right to kill, what place do the new African forms of politics-as-war accord to life, death, and the body? In order to address these questions, I shall ﬁrst identify certain structuring elements of the material conditions of life in the Africa of the last quarter of the twentieth century. I shall then investigate two structures of the imaginary that describe and deﬁne just as many forms of political struggle and warfare considered in the light of their hold on bodies, on things, and on life. This has given rise to a new form of governmentality. The latter consists of the control of the mobility of people—individuals or even multitudes—by jurisdictions or armed formations of an extra- or quasistatal character. What is more and more at work in the exercise of power is to a large extent the same thing that is at work in war itself: the maintenance of a social identity and the possibility of the production and reproduction of bare life. This new form of governmentality, based on the proliferation of extreme situations and predatory practices, attacks bodies and lives only in order the better to control the ﬂow of resources, objects, and commodities released by the process of economic informalization. Because they rest in very large part on the values of transience as opposed to those of sedentary living, the new dynamics of proﬁt and livelihoods through migration have contributed to a profound change in the forms and the nature of social belonging. How, in fact, can one continue to belong to a community in a context in which one is physically removed from it and in which one can no longer directly take part in the rituals that a sedentary life renders possible? The scattering and dispersion imposed by the necessities of long-distance livelihoods have certainly not abolished the old deﬁnitions of “community.” In many cases, the “community” has remained that place of birth, concrete and geographically situated, that one appropriates to oneself and defends, and that one seeks to isolate from the contact of those who have no part in it; and in the name of which one kills and gets oneself killed at need. Considerable variations have nonetheless appeared in the relation between “what belongs to more than one person, to many people, to everyone” and what, by being in a narrower sense “private,” is susceptible of being enjoyed in an entirely individual manner. A chain of “intermediaries,” brokers and specialists in the negotiation over objects, stories, and identities, have seen a great enhancement in their statuses. The enhancement of these statuses has beneﬁted from the breakdown and shifting of existing frontiers (cf. Mbembe 2000). The result has been not only an increase in the speed of migrations but also a proliferation of networks that have specialized in exploiting faraway resources (Fall 1998). Far from putting an end to the crisis or leading to the “rule of law” and “good governance” expected by international ﬁnancial institutions, the double demand—characteristic of the 1990s—for political and economic liberalization was to accentuate, almost everywhere, the emasculation of the public power. Because the state had lost its ability to manage risk and the unexpected by any means other than those of naked force, it was consequently in a context of societal violence and a general dispersion of power that the attempts to break free of authoritarianism took place. The weakening of the state’s administrative capacities went hand in hand with the privatization of certain of its sovereign functions (Hibou 1999; Mbembe 1999). The primacy accorded to deregulation converted itself, on the ground, into a generalized movement of deinstitutionalization, which itself provided an atmosphere propitious to irregular, or informal, activities. This informality was to be found not merely in the economic domain but at the very heart of the state and the administration, and in all aspects of social and cultural life bearing any kind of relation to the struggle for survival. Conduct seeking to “bend” or infringe regulations with a view to accruing rent and deriving the maximum beneﬁt from the failure of state institutions was to prevail as much among the representatives of the state as among private actors (Niger-Thomas 2000). Still more important is the fact that democratization is occurring at a time when, as a result of the brutal effect of monetary constraint, the process of the fragmentation of society had reached hitherto unsuspected depths. In the context of the struggle for survival that marked the last quarter of the twentieth century in Africa, social fragmentation has taken on widely differing forms. In addition to the extreme atrocities of genocidal wars, forcible uprootings of populations, and massacres, it can also be seen in people’s recourse to a plurality of repertoires of action and a parallel entanglement of conﬂicting codes of legitimation. More than hitherto, practices of informalization are no longer conﬁned to the economic sphere alone and to strategies of physical survival. They have become, little by little, the paramount forms of the social and cultural imagination. The consequences of this new cultural condition for the constitution of social movements and the formation of coalitions and alliances, has been considerable. The short term temporality, marked out by improvisation, immediate, and informal arrangements and the imperatives of the immediate conquest of power, are privileged at the expense of long-term “projects” and the search for alternatives. Alliances are constantly being made and unmade. The provisional and continually renegotiable character of contracts and agreements emphasizes the fundamental reversibility of political processes. The divergences of interest, multiple allegiances, and multiple relations of authority work against cohesion and durable crystallizing of social movements. The result is an unending particularization of conﬂicts, and a fragmentary and ﬁssiparous mosaic of organized struggle. Among the dominant imaginaries of sovereignty in contemporary Africa is that which posits the fear of death and the will to survive as critical to any political practice. The belief is that political power cannot ﬁnd any other reliable foundation for itself than in threatening the security of its subjects as individuals. From this stems the necessity for those subjects to immunize themselves against. But the concern to avoid death at all costs and the instinct for self-preservation have also been productive of new imaginaries of politics in regimes in which the elites have successfully resisted the pressure of the opposition’s forces and have been able, unilaterally, to gradually open up the political system. In being the only ones who determined the scope, the nature, and the content of any such openings, these elites have laid down a set of rules that enabled them to keep their grip on the main levers of the state and the economy and guaranteed their continuance in power. Fundamental disagreements between those in power and the opposition in these countries persist, while at the same time there continues a situation of conﬂict in which periods of latency alternate with periods of violence. Such is notably the case in Cameroon, in it in advance, by measuring, at every stage, the risks that such a challenge would involve for the preservation of life itself. Zimbabwe, in Guinea, in Togo as well as in Chad, and the Central African Republic. In the majority of these cases, the reaction to popular opposition was to contain the thrust of protest, exerting as necessary a repression that was sometimes improvised, brutal, and unrestrained (imprisonments, shootings, suppressions of opposing parties, proclamations of states of emergency, press censorship, etc.). The regimes in power sought to depoliticize social protest, to give an ethnic proﬁle to confrontations, and to attribute to street protests the character of hooliganism. These regimes also extended the role of the army to the tasks of the maintenance of law and order. In certain cases, entire regions or cities, were placed under a dual administration, both civil and military, as it happened in Douala in Cameroon in 2000. Wherever the established regimes felt themselves most under threat, they fostered the emergence of gangs or militias controlled either by party zealots operating in the shadows or by military or political leaders. The role of the so-called war veterans in Zimbabwe is the best known example. In some cases, the militias won themselves greater and greater autonomy, and transformed themselves into veritable armed formations, with their own independent chains of command distinct from those of the regular armies, notably the case in Congo Brazzaville. Three consequences have followed from this breakdown in the monopoly of physical force and the unequal distribution of the means of terror through society: (1) the dynamic of informalization has speeded up; (2) a new form of social division separates those who are protected (because they are armed) from those who are in no way protected; (3) political struggles have developed a tendency to be settled by force as the access to arms regulate dynamics of insecurity, self-preservation, and access to property. Another imaginary of sovereignty is the one that, in its deﬁnition of the political, accords a large role to the possibility that anyone may be killed by anyone else. Furthermore, this possibility is perceived, if not as legitimate, at least as constituting a general rule or even a commonly accepted practice. Although certainly displaying some continuities with the conﬁguration discussed earlier, this one also presents us with characteristics of its own. First, it rests on a pyramid of the destruction of life, whereas the former was concerned with the conditions of its preservation and the price that had to be paid to achieve that end. Second, in establishing a relationship of relative equality in the ability to kill and its corollary, the possibility of being killed—a relative equality that only comes to be suspended by virtue of the difference between being or not being in possession of arms—this conﬁguration lends authority to the idea that politics can effectively be translated, at base, into a “work of death.” Third, in escalating violence into forms that are sometimes paroxysmal, sometimes virtually self-parodic (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia), this cultural conﬁguration accentuates the functional character of terror, dread, and panic and renders possible the destruction of every social bond other than that of enmity. It is this bond of enmity that justiﬁes the active relationship of dissociation of which war constitutes a particularly violent version. It is also this bond of enmity that allows the routinization of the idea that power cannot be acquired or exercised except at the price of someone’s life; and that, ultimately, the death of the Other is the precondition for the constitution of political community. In order to legitimize their actions, contemporary African warriors mobilize the rhetoric of the eradication of corruption, of the protection of the environment, or of the rights of minorities—the common and unifying elements of the international lexicon. In so doing, they assign to current conﬂicts the connotations of a fundamental moral conﬂict. The warriors’ discourse freely mixes the desire for sacriﬁce, the wish to liquidate existing tyrannies, ideologies that aim to dissolve social differences, and considerations linked to race or to the survival of ethnic groups that consider themselves under threat, as in Liberia, the Delta region in Nigeria, and in parts of Uganda. Other discourses draw their central categories from indigenous interpretations of the social world in terms of sickness, misfortune, and cure. War, under these conditions, takes on the appearance of a vast therapeutic liturgy. Others again, rely on nuclei of meanings derived from monotheistic religions or messianic eschatologies of a religious type, when they do not borrow their mental and symbolic structures from autochthonous imaginaries of the occult. Others claim to inscribe themselves within the horizons of a modernity from which they retain above and beyond all other elements the materialist, utilitarian, and hedonist dimension.9 Whatever may be their ideological underpinnings, their translation into politics occurs through the medium of incessant and debilitating warfare, in the course of which thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of victims are massacred, and hundreds of thousands are either made into refugees or conﬁned in camps. The “modes of execution” of mass death in themselves vary little; the sequelae of death little more. In the case of massacres in particular, the corpses despoiled of life are rapidly reduced to skeletons. Their form nowadays inscribes them in a register of undifferentiated generality: mere remnants of an uninterred grief, empty and unmeaning corporealities, strange deposits buried in a cruel stupefaction. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, where a great number of skeletons was able, if not to be exhumed, at least to be preserved in a visible state, it is the tension between the petriﬁcation of the bony remnants with their strange coldness, on the one hand, and, on the other, their obstinacy in wanting at all costs to mean something that is striking. There does not seem to be, in these bits of bone marked by their impassivity, any kind of supramundane serenity: just the illusory refuse of a death that has already overtaken people.

### Identity

#### Our argument: the 1AC operates within grids of intelligibility, affixing the body to a state of gridlocked, identarian stasis that cannot account for the movement of matter and energy

Massumi 2 Brian Massumi, professor of communications at the University of Montreal, *Parables For the Virtual*, pg. 2

"The Body." What is it to The Subject? Not the qualities of its moving experience. But, rather, in keeping with the extrinsic approach, its positioning. Ideological accounts of subject formation emphasize systemic structurings. The focus on the systemic had to be brought back down to earth in order to be able to integrate into the account the local cultural differences and the practices of resistance they may harbor. The concept of "positionality" was widely developed for this purpose. Signifying subject formation according to the dominant structure was often thought of in terms of "coding." Coding in turn came to be thought of in terms of positioning on a grid. The grid was conceived as an oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations: male versus female, black versus white, gay versus straight, and so on. A body corresponded to a "site" on the grid defined by an overlapping of one term from each pair. The body came to be defined by its pinning to the grid. Proponents of this model often cited its ability to link body-sites into a "geography" or culture that tempered the universalizing tendencies or ideology. The sites, it is true, are multiple. But aren't they still combinatorial permutations on an overarching definitional framework? Aren't the possibilities for the entire gamut of cultural emplacements, including the "subversive" ones, precoded into the ideological master structure? Is the body as linked to a particular subject position anything more than a local embodiment of ideology? Where has the potential for change gone? How does a body perform its way out of a definitional framework that is not only responsible for its very "construction," but seems to prescript every possible signifying and countersignifying move as a selection from a repertoire or possible permutations on a limited set of predetermined terms? How can the grid itself change? How can what the system has pinpointedly determined flip over into a determining role capable of acting on the systemic level? The aim of the positionality model was to open a window on local resistance in the name of change. But the problem of change returned with a vengeance. Because every body-subject was so determinately local, it was boxed into its site on the culture map. Gridlock. The idea of positionality begins by subtracting movement from the picture. This catches the body in cultural freeze-frame. The point or explanatory departure is a pinpointing, a zero-point of stasis. When positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement comes a problematic second. After all is signified and sited, there is the nagging problem of how to add movement back into the picture. But adding movement to stasis is about as easy as multiplying a number by zero and getting a positive product. Of course, a body occupying one position on the grid might succeed in making a move to occupy another position. In fact, certain normative progressions, such as that from child to adult, are coded in. But this doesn't change the fact that what defines the body is not the movement itself, only its beginning and endpoints. Movement is entirely subordinated to the positions it connects. These are predefined. Adding movement like this adds nothing at all. You just get two successive states: multiples of zero. The very notion of movement as qualitative transformation is lacking. There is "displacement," but no transformation; it is as if the body simply leaps from one definition to the next. Since the positional model's definitional framework is punctual, it simply can't attribute a reality to the interval, whose crossing is a continuity (or nothing). The space of the crossing, the gaps between positions on the grid, falls into a theoretical no-body's land. Also lacking is the notion that if there is qualitative movement of the body, it as directly concerns sensings as significations. Add to this the fact that matter, bodily or otherwise, never figures into the account as such. Even though many of the approaches in question characterize themselves as materialisms, matter can only enter in indirectly: as mediated. Matter, movement, body, sensation. Multiple mediated miss.

#### The affirmative just spreads the ideology that until minorty students are educated they don’t have access to any form of subjectivity

Jahng 11

Kyung Eun. Assistant Professor, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea early childhood and care policy, multicultural education, character education, qualitative research methods, Foucault "Thinking inside the box: Interrogating no child left behind and race to the top." KEDI Journal of Educational Policy 8.1 (2011). //gc

In this manner, minority children “are made up” (Hacking, 1986) as controllable, manipulatable, and correctible, and produced as self-governing individuals. This fabrication of the subjects further leads to governing them as a targeted population, one homogeneous mass, which is rationalized in the name of the security of society. When it comes to the education of minority children, including English language learners, immigrant children, and racial and ethnic minorities, the NCLB legislation specifies that the objective of its proposed education is to “enable the students to become more productive and informed citizens” (Public Law No. 107-110, 2002, p. 1848) and to close “the achievement gap between minority and nonminority students” (Public Law No. 107-110, 2002, p. 1440). It implies that minority students are left behind and are not productive and competent enough citizens until they are fully educated under the given educational agenda.

#### **Framing their arguments through cultural positionality forecloses on the productive potential of the body, assuming it as a corporeal entity undermines its capacity to vary – What’s necessary is a politics of abstraction, exploding the definitional grid upon which the body is rendered static. Even if there’s some truth to their notion of identity, we can better reformulate the coordinates of being.**

Massumi 2 Brian Massumi, Associate Professor of Communications at the Université de Montréal. “PARABLES FOR THE VIRTUAL Movement, Affect, Sensation”. 2002. Pgs. 4 – 6.

If at any point I thought of this refreshing in terms of regaining a "concreteness" of experience, I was quickly disabused of the notion. Take movement. When a body is in motion, it does not coincide with itself. It coincides with its own transition: its own variation. The range of variations it can be implicated in is not present in any given movement, much less in any position it passes through. In motion, a body is in an immediate, unfolding relation to its own nonpresent potential to vary. That relation, to borrow a phrase from Gilles Deleuze, is real but abstract. The positional grid was abstract, despite the fact that it was meant to bring cultural theory back down to the local level since it involved an overarching definitional grid whose determinations preexisted the bodies they constructed or to which they were applied. The abstract of Deleuze's real-but-abstract is very different from this. lt doesn't preexist and has nothing fundamentally to do with mediation. If ideology must be understood as mediating, then this real-abstract is not ideological. (Chapters 2, 3, and 9 tackle the description of nonideological mechanisms of power.) Here, abstract means: never present in position, only ever in passing. This is an abstractness pertaining to the transitional immediacy of a real relation-that of a body to its own indeterminacy (its openness to an elsewhere and otherwise than it is, in any here and now). The charge of indeterminacy carried by a body is inseparable from it. lt strictly coincides with it, to the extent that the body is in passage or in process (to the extent that it is dynamic and alive). But the charge is not itself corporeal. Far from regaining a concreteness, to think the body in movement thus means accepting the paradox that there is an incorporeal dimension of the body. Of it, but not it. Real, material, but incorporeal. Inseparable, coincident, but disjunct. If this is "concrete," the project originally set out on will take some severe twists. One way of starting to get a grasp on the real-material-but-incorporeal is to say it is to the body, as a positioned thing, as energy is to matter. Energy and matter are mutually convertible modes of the same reality. This would make the incorporeal something like a phase-shift of the body in the usual sense, but not one that comes after it in time. lt would be a conversion or unfolding of the body contemporary to its every move. Always accompanying. Fellow-traveling dimension of the same reality. This self-disjunctive coinciding sinks an ontological difference into the heart of the body. The body's potential to vary belongs to the same reality as the body as variety (positioned thing) but partakes of it in a different mode. Integrating movement slips us directly into what Michel Foucault called incorporeal materialism.1 This movement-slip gives new urgency to questions of ontology, of ontological difference, inextricably linked to concepts of potential and process and, by extension, event-in a way that bumps "being" straight into becoming. Paraphrasing Deleuze again, the problem with the dominant models in cultural and literary theory is not that they are too abstract to grasp the concreteness of the real. The problem is that they are not abstract enough to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete. When it comes to grappling productively with paradoxes of passage and position, the philosophical precursor is Henri Bergson. The slip into an incorporeal materialism follows the logic of Bergson's famous analysis of Zeno's paradoxes of movement. 2 When Zeno shoots his philosophical arrow, he thinks of its flight path in the commonsense way, as a linear trajectory made up of a sequence of points or positions that the arrow occupies one after the other. The problem is that between one point on a line and the next, there is an infinity of intervening points. lf the arrow occupies a first point along its path, it will never reach the next-unless it occupies each of the infinity of points between. Of course, it is the nature of infinity that you can never get to the end of it. The arrow gets swallowed up in the transitional infinity. lts flight path implodes. The arrow is immobilized. Or, if the arrow moved it is because it was never at any point. lt was in passage across them all. The transition from bow to target is not decomposable into constituent points. A path is not composed of positions. lt is nondecomposable: a dynamic unity. That continuity of movement is of an order of reality other than the measurable, divisible space it can be confirmed as having crossed. lt doesn't stop until it stops: when it hits the target. Then, and only then, is the arrow in position. lt is only after the arrow hits it mark that its real trajectory may be plotted. The points or positions really appear retrospectively, working backward from the movement's end. lt is as if, in our thinking, we put targets all along the path. The in-between positions are logical targets: possible endpoints. The flight of the arrow is not immobilized as Zeno would have it. We stop it in thought when we construe its movement to be divisible into positions. Bergson's idea is that space itself is a retrospective construct of this kind. When we think of space as "extensive," as being measurable, divisible, and composed of points plotting possible positions that objects may occupy, we are stopping the world in thought. We are thinking away its dynamic unity, the continuity of its movements. We are looking at only one dimension of reality.

### Intersectionality

#### Queer times require even queerer modalities of analysis — Intersectionality’s focus the varying permutations of the violence of the subject ignores the heart of the problem: the subject itself. By beginning with the terrorist as the subject of analysis the negative is that temporal interruption of the queer – only by problematizing the very basis of liberal humanism can we actually create the self beyond being – the only tenable theory of subjectivity is becoming

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 204

These are queer times indeed, temporal assemblages hooked into an array of enduring modernist paradigms (civilizing teleologies, Orientalisms, xenophobia, militarization, border anxieties) and postmodern eruptions (suicide bombers, biometric surveillance strategies, emergent corporealities, counterterrorism in overdrive). With its emphasis on bodies, desires, pleasures, tactility, rhythms, echoes, textures, deaths, morbidity, torture, pain, sensation, and punishment, our necropolitical present-future deems it imperative to rearticulate what queer theory and studies of sexuality have to say about the metatheories and the realpolitik of empire, often understood, as Joan Scott observes, as “the real business of politics.” Queer times require even queerer modalities of thought, analysis, creativity, and expression in order to elaborate upon nationalist, patriotic, and terrorist formations and their imbricated forms of racialized perverse sexualities and gender dysphorias. Throughout this book I allude to queer praxes of futurity that insistently disentangle the relations between representation and affect, and propose queerness not as an identity nor anti-identity, but an assemblage that is spatially and temporally contingent. The limitations of the intersectional identitarian models emerge progressively—however queer they may be—as I work through the concepts of affect, tactility, and ontology. While dismantling the representational mandates of visibility identity politics that feed narratives of sexual exceptionalism, affective analyses can approach queernesses that are unknown or not cogently knowable, that are in the midst of becoming, that do not immediately and visibly signal themselves as insurgent, oppositional, or transcendent. This shift forces us to ask not only what terrorist corporealities mean or signify, but more insistently, what do they do? In this conclusion, I review these tensions between affect and representation, identity and assemblage, posing the problematics of nationalist and terrorist formations as central challenges to transnational queer cultural and feminist studies. I propose the assemblage as a pertinent political and theoretical frame within societies of control. I rearticulate terrorist bodies, in particular the suicide bomber, as an assemblage that resists queerness-as-sexual-identity (or anti-identity)—in other words, intersectional and identitarian paradigms—in favor of spatial, temporal, and corporeal convergences, implosions, and rearrangements. Queerness as an assemblage moves away from excavation work, deprivileges a binary opposition between queer and not-queer subjects, and, instead of retaining queerness exclusively as dissenting, resistant, and alternative (all of which queerness importantly is and does), it underscores contingency and complicity with dominant formations. This foregrounding of assemblage enables attention to ontology in tandem with epistemology, affect in conjunction with representational economies within which bodies interpenetrate, swirl together, and transmit affects and effects to each other. It also aids in circumventing the fatigued “temporal differencing” of resistant identity paradigms of the Other that Chow problematizes. Invariably, Chow argues, poststructuralist self-referentiality produces alienating temporalities of “non-coincidence.” Mystification exoticizes the Other through a referential inward-turning “temporality as self destruction” that refuses continuity between the self and other, producing difference as a complete disjuncture that cannot exist within the same temporal planes as the Self. Concomitantly, futurization occurs where “temporality as allochronism” produces the Other as the “perpetual promise” that is realizable, but only with a lag time, not in the present. Both Hansen and Chow hint at the ends of identity. Chow suggests that attending to the specificity of others has ironically become a universalizing project, whereas Hansen implies that othering itself is no longer driven by the Hegelian self-other process of interpellation. While the language of “misrecognition” problematically harks to an older Marxian model of false consciousness, Hansen avers that taking up the position of the other only capitulates to state and capitalist modes of domination and surveillance. Affect, Race, and Sex Representational analyses, identity politics, and the focus on rights-bearing subjects are currently being complemented with thinking on affect and on population formation that recognizes those who are living not only through their relation to subjecthood, but are coming under control as part of one or many populations, not individuals, but “dividuals.” Norma Alarcon intimated as much in her brilliant 1990 essay “The Theoretical Subject(s) of *This Bridge Called My Back* and Anglo-American Feminism.” In this essay she asks, “Do we have to make a subject of the whole world?” suggesting that the modern subject is exhausted, or rather that we have exhausted the modern subject. We have multiplied it to accommodate all sorts of differences (i.e., a politics of inclusion), intersected it with every variable of identity imaginable, split it to account for the unknown realms of the subconscious, infused it with great individual rights (the rights-bearing subject). Foucault’s own provocations include the claim that sexuality is an intersection, rather than an interpellative identity, of the body and the population. We an read both of these pronouncements as attempts to highlight what Rey Chow calls “categorical miscegenation”: that race and class are for the most part not only indistinguishable and undifferentiable from each other, but are a series of temporal and spatial contingencies that retain a stubborn aversion to being read. While Foucault’s formation hails the feminist heuristic of “intersectionality,” unlike intersectional theorizing which foregrounds separate analytics of identity that perform the holistic subjects’ inseparableness, the entities that intersect are the body (not the subject, let us remember) and population. My own reliance upon calls to intersectional approaches not withstanding, the limitations of feminist and queer (and queer of color) theories of intersectionality are indebted in one sense to the taken-for-granted presence of the subject and its permutations of content and form, rather than an investigation of the predominance of subjecthood itself. Thus, despite the anti-identitarian critique that queer theory launches (i.e., queerness is an approach, not an identity or wedded to identity), the queer subject, a subject that is against identity, transgressive rather than (gay or lesbian) liberatory, nevertheless surfaces as an object in need of excavation, elaboration or specularization.

### **K affs**

#### The affirmative’s attempt at momentary insurrection not only utterly fails at changing anything, but locks in structures of resilient social control that maintain contemporary neoliberalism

Luke 15[T.W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, “On Insurrectionality: Theses on Contemporary Revolts and Resilience,” October 29, 2015, published on *Globalizations*]

These theses on insurrection are only a provisional assessment. They attempt to assay certain logics of change and containment apparently at work in new radical appeals for direct action, like those made in The Coming Insurrection (2009), The Democracy Project (2013), or Two Cheers for Anarchism (2012). While these calls for upheaval are provocative, this analysis suggests one should ask to what extent the politics touted by such programmatic manifestos now are becoming, and already have been for some good while, interwoven into the existing order of power in the subtle dialectics of resilience? For months, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) activists organized public protests and teach-ins against economic and political inequality all across the USA during 2011 and 2012. Thousands joined this peaceable uprising against corporate power. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security kept it under continuous watch for terrorist intentions at its peak of popularity, but then classified it as a ‘peaceful movement' when its appeal waned. OWS popularized, and in many ways glamorized, popular resistance, but its inchoate critiques of embedded corporate and state power seem to have only made the top 1% much more resilient as the decisive social force at work in business and government. This outcome leads one to suggest that insurrectionists now are an intrinsic part of a robustly resilient social order that justifies itself, and legitimizes its own expansive controls, in part, by tolerating the possibility of constant revolts while continuously containing their impact? Also in 2011, thousands of Egyptians rose up against President Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square, toppling his government with the assistance of the nation's armed forces in less than two weeks. A new elected regime of Islamist partisans from the Muslim Brotherhood led by President Mohamed Morsi quickly was elected as well as a new constitution installed to appease the insurrection. Yet, this regime also met its own quick demise at the hands of new uprisings centered in Tahrir Square. That renewed insurrection in the streets then turned to the Egyptian military and General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to take control of the state. This complicated cycle of embedded regime collapse, and then reconstruction, could be characterized as a useful case study in ‘insurrectionality’. Like other parallel ideologies of good works, like ‘accountability’, ‘diversity’, or ‘sustainability’, the logics of insurrectionality appear to be another facet of flexible control in a new regime of resilient power. This emergent system of maintaining social order seems to mobilize disorder to generate its power and knowledge. It is affected, in part, by achieving a loose containment of insurrectionists as well as by accepting, to a degree, the legitimacy of insurrectionism as a general civil/political/social freedom, if not, a new type of right. For a world in which 85 elite rich individuals own as much wealth as one half of the entire Earth's population, and where the number of billionaires has doubled since 2008 (even as most of the 99% of world's population is floundering economically), insurrection is attractive. For too many people everywhere, their nearly insignificant existential meaning and financial net worth are at best stagnant. This lack of purpose and wealth amidst tremendous affluence is associated with their growing sense of anomie, disempowerment, and impoverishment. Insurrectionality, then, can flare up here in all of the conflicted complementarities crackling between their frustrated aspirations and growing hopelessness (Baudrillard, 1996). The widespread outbreaks of insurrectionist political movements in open defiance of today's dominant economic and social order perhaps are a defining quality at this juncture in history. From the ‘Arab Spring' uprisings, to the ‘color revolutions' in Eastern Europe, to the worldwide ‘Occupy' movements, to numerous attacks of pre-mediated violent **terrorist action**, this new politics of insurrection has been unfolding rapidly during the twenty-first century (Graeber, 2013). In some instances, these movements often appear to be quite radical, but also not necessarily progressive. They seem very popular, but not always seeking emancipation for all people. They have political complaints, but also have not usually pursued conventional governmental means of redress within the workings of modern state structures as they stand (Dussel, 1985). Most distinctively, despite the open, and quite often aggressive, defiance of these insurrectional movements there is little transformation coming from their activities. Such discontinuities raise questions: do insurrections pose significant challenges to the existing social order, have they taken different epistemic or ethical positions that put them in complete opposition to prevailing systemic authority, and do their insurrections challenge conventional humanist conventions of secular, statal, and social identity (Elden, 2007)? Working to advance some provisional responses here to these fascinating developments could cast new light on how contemporary insurrections, and systemic transformations that they profess to pursue, are either closely connected or completely contradictory historical changes that appear to have very low probabilities of success no matter how intensely their supporters push for them. Insurrection is an old word, and one whose meaning resonates across time and space from its Latin origins in the notion ‘insurgere' to ascend, rise up or rebel. Close to the idea of insurgency, insurrection also implies being mutinous, rebellious, or revolutionary in open acts of rebellion against civil authority, ruling elites, or government power. To be insurrectional, or incite insurrection, and rise up, as an insurrectionist does not imply, however, that those who rise in rebellion necessarily will continue to stay up or succeed in their would-be ascension to power (Bartelson, 1995; Giddens, 1985). Consequently, insurrection can be seen as some latent potentiality, a quality of being at readiness for, an instance of launching into, or a need for rising up, which allows one to discuss simultaneously the intermittent emergence and persistent embeddedness of insurrectionality as a crucial characteristic in the governance of contemporary life (Luke, 2012). As Miller and Rose (2008, p. 149) claim. the emergence of professionals in the conduct of conduct, professionals whose expertise lies in the shaping of this self-steering mechanism of others in relation to certain norms grounded in positive knowledge, may be seen as a decisive event in the exercise of authority. Therefore, one must pay heed to the management of insurrectionality by expert professionals. It follows fresh scripts in which less rigid and resilient forms of authority become exercised via the machinic unconsciousness imprinted in the assemblages of everyday life (Guattari, 2011). One wonders how protests against debt, unemployment, and dispossession in America's contemporary capitalist economy are, in fact, a strategic mediation of ‘a government of “each and all”, evincing a concern for every individual and the population as a whole’, which essentially ‘involves the health, welfare, prosperity, and happiness of the population' such that ‘to govern properly, to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the population, it is necessary to govern through a particular register, that of the economy' (Dean, 1999, p. 19). Accepting economic and political crisis, therefore, becomes an effective strategy to communicate, control, and command the containment of popular uprisings via unwritten constitutional provisos for such insurrectionality. By accepting mediagenic street demonstrations and colorful site occupations, if only for a short stretch of time, as liminal movements in which direct actions by ‘the people' to engage in the popular review, legitimation, or alteration of the existing regime, does the exercise of sovereign authority and disciplinary practice provisionally reinvent ‘the regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within that territory' (Dean, 1999, p. 20) by turning to such unorthodox means of governance via insurrectionality? 2. Risk to Sustain and Develop Resilient Rule This brief analysis, therefore, plays off contradictions, conflicts, and contagions in the contemporary events around the world to find the patterns in these variations of power. From Paris in 2005, Athens in 2008, Tunis in 2011, Kiev in 2012, Bangkok in 2014, or innumerable other instances of organized violence, popular turmoil, civic unrest, or social mayhem in smaller cities and towns going back years, if not decades, all over the world, many have foretold of the coming of grand insurrections from all of these seemingly disparate events (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Nonetheless, crisis management by corporations and states has been refining its practices as a mode of governance since the 1960s to the extent that it essentially risks revolt to sustain and develop resilience as a logic of rule (Luke, 1978, pp. 56–72). Plainly, for 50 years, fresh waves of insurrectional activity have erupted, only to be disrupted, and then crushed, contained, or captured to dissipate or redirect their activism (Scott, 2012). These are distinctive trends in today's ‘risk society' (Beck, 1992). Its incumbent authorities at many levels of administration often accept and manage the risk of insurrection, like any sets of collective social risk. The coevolutionary coexistence of established power and emergent insurrection iterate this logic of insurrectionality. In keeping the media looking for unrest, citizens ready to engage in mayhem, and flexible state power mobilized to defend with considerable force the existing order against unruly street mobs, strategic elite decision-makers nurture resilience through revolts. That is, they continue draining off, or cultivating, more limited aspects of the credible, helpful, or useful normative policy agendas borne by the programs of insurrectionists when and where they appear in orderly demonstrations as spectacles of free assembly, conscience, and speech. Insurrection, then, never truly disappears with the development of modernizing urban industrial societies (Luke, 1990). On the contrary, it must persist. The enduring promise of revolt perpetuates its never fully fulfilled promise with precepts and possibilities that portend their advocates can never be manageable, disreputable, or contained ‘the next time’. These recurring tendencies must be explored, because one rightly can ask if there are new strategic practices at work within these manifestations of insurrectionality, which have been integral to the survival and strength of the existing order (Dean, 2008). Is it possible that the culture of resilience, now so cherished by the existing order, cannot be implemented, and then continuously refined, without conflicts, contention, or crises to degrade everyday economic, political, and social processes to the point that their crisis-ridden eventuation's must, and can, ‘bounce back' resiliently to keep new cycles of neoliberal economic growth and social reform expanding?

#### The impact is the absorption and harnessing of the aff’s insurgent energy into the biopolitical apparatuses of capture that sustain global oppression

Luke 15[T.W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, “On Insurrectionality: Theses on Contemporary Revolts and Resilience,” October 29, 2015, published on *Globalizations*]

Many of these revolutionary movements’ key ‘representational spaces' do generate insurrectionist spatiality, like Tahrir Square, the Maidan, or Zuccotti Park, that feed into the mythos of new world order grounded in vigilant resilience, but those shifts become more feasible only with microelectronic information and communication technologies. Diversely imagined communities of incumbent and insurgent forces interact through ‘space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and the space of “inhabitants” and users … this is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate' (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39). Both sets of contending imaginative forces will change and appropriate the acts and artifacts of insurrection in many small ways that affirm the resistance of insurrections as well as actualize the resilience of the authorities they challenge. These calculated and intelligible workings of power are neither so formulaic nor inspired that they appear unprecedented. Rather they are continuously emergent, and deeply embedded, aspects of post-Cold War relations of power, which ‘are both intentional and non-subjective’, making them as Foucault would argue, ‘imbued, through and through, with calculation: There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives' (Foucault, 1978, pp. 94–95). Resilience certainly has objective aims as a mode of governmentalizing rule. Nevertheless, it seemingly accepts some aspects of sustainability, insurrectionality, complexity, or reflexivity as harnessed oppositional energies. These elective affinities cannot be tracked back to ‘the choice or decision of an individual subject’, even though it is readily apparent that each one's operational ‘logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable' (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). Insurrectionality unfolds, like sustainability, as another layer in the contemporary codes of global performativity. Resilient authority structures at work in the deep state collaborate continuously through never-ending police operations to contain, shape, or manage insurrectionable development. In so doing, they refine appear to refine their ‘systems of neutralization and equivalence' to select those motifs, styles or traits of insurgency that become ‘comparable within the capitalistic economy of flows’, even though it often will be ‘necessary to hide them, cut them off, make them over, or better yet transform them from the inside' (Guattari, 2011, p. 79). Organizing new anti-capitalist insurrections through tweets, posts, and blogs is not that dissimilar from enforcing their pacification through commercial counter-tweets, anti-posts, and reactive blogs. Systemic stability arguably presumes episodes of failure, interruption, and turbulence. Otherwise, it is less effective at maintaining operational resilience in all ‘the functions of opening and reclosing signifying assemblages' for the distributed and resilient power grids maintaining today's precarious social peace (Guattari, 2011, p. 79). Insurrectionality might well improve these networks of order by bringing new social demands to light, but so too does it strengthen the resilience of those authorities who may concede or crush these demands. 4. Resilience is Insurrectionable Development The rapid urbanization of planet Earth transmutates cityscapes and countrysides into a profusion of man-made conurbanations (Virilio, 2000). Still the metropolis is not just this urban pile-up, the final collusion of city and country. It is also a flow of beings and things, a current that runs through fiber-optic networks, through high-speed train lines, satellites, and video surveillance cameras, making sure that this world keeps running straight to its ruin. (Invisible Committee, 2009, pp. 58–59) Maintaining cohesion and coherence against any and all insurrectionists under these circumstances basically is improbable, if not impossible. Hence, an ethos of accepting risk and accommodating it resiliently unfolds to rejoin shattered pieces and reintegrate suddenly incoherent practices as viable and enhanced forms of life (Miller & Rose, 2008). Rather than pretending to be invulnerable and steady, resilient state power may well concede its tendencies to fail even as it labors to stay up and running. It is precisely due to this architecture of flows that the metropolis is one of the most vulnerable human arrangements that has ever existed. Supple, subtle, but vulnerable … the world would not be moving so fast if it didn't have to constantly outrun its own collapse. (Invisible Committee, 2009, 60) Frequently, the resilience thinking behind current-day governmentality accedes that the Earth's environment as such is becoming a continuous catastrophe. Instead of struggling to guard pristine ecologies against all probable threats, the ethos of endangerment at the core of resilience affirms that all environments must persist through punctuated incidents of toxic catastrophe. The relation of state power to the masses in resilience regimes recognizes ‘the environment is nothing more than the relationship to the world that is proper to the metropolis and that projects itself onto everything that would escape it' (Invisible Committee, 2009, p. 75). Indeed, the modalities of insurrectionable development concede that the metropolis is a terrain of constant low-intensity conflict, in which the taking of Basra, Mogadishu, or Nablus mark politics of culmination … no longer undertaken in view of victory or peace, or even the re-establishment of order, such ‘interventions' continue a security operation that is always already in progress. War is no longer a distinct event in time, but instead diffracts into ‘a series of micro-operations, by both military and police, to ensure security’. (Invisible Committee, 2009, pp. 56–57) These institutional developments arguably are also part of the effects following from the advent of walled states and waning sovereignty. This couplet of order and disorder is taking hold across many societies around the world, but especially in those regimes that rest upon building physical barriers between the starkly divided classes of technologically competent, obsolescent, and superfluous workers proliferating in divisive cultures and exploited societies trapped in a globalized world economy. Wendy Brown focuses her attention on the border walls between the USA and Mexico running from California to Texas and Israel's security walls on the West Bank in the Sinai, and near Gaza (2010, pp. 28–42) to spotlight these contradictions. Such ‘security fences' seem often fail as impermeable barriers, and therefore create little security (Nevins, 2002; Weizman, 2007). Yet, they never were intended to be impermeable secure barriers. Rather they are the most massive markers of how far more tangible divides already are always being erected between businesses and communities, the rich and poor, racial majorities and minorities, or the top and bottom of society over the last 50 years. Through the practices of urban redevelopment, freeway construction, public housing, gated communities, secure skyscrapers, guarded campuses, and other ‘defensible spaces' around the world, the walled state has morphed into the sine qua non of civil society. As Brown suggests, ‘walls respond to and externalize the causes of different kinds of perceived violence to the nation, and the walls themselves exercise different kinds of violence toward the families, communities, lands, and political possibilities they traverse and shape' (2010, p. 38). While she regards them as ineffective security mechanisms per se, one wonders how insurrections are the material effects of when and where ‘walls inadvertently subvert the distinction between inside and outside that they are intended to mark' as well as ‘what contingent effects they have in contouring nationalisms, citizen subjectivities, and the identities of political entities on both of their sides' (Brown, 2010, p. 41). To solidify the logics of resilience, then, walls prove to be important mechanisms to effectuating the insecurities that resilient rule requires. In too many ways, the growing inequalities and social divisions in post-Fordist neoliberal economies are barriers very rarely experienced everyday in mass behavior. The fabrication of walls, fences, checkpoints, and other dividers simultaneously imply insurrections can be both fueled, and actively contained, by the structural violence of neoliberal dispossession (Lazzarato, 2012). In stimulating and then sparking insurrection, then, how normalized is insurrectionality becoming in these decades-old patterns? And, after multiple cycles of insurrection-and-suppression, to what extent have resilient responses become, in fact, an emergent regimen of governance rather than entrenched embattlement? Inequality is growing, insurrectionality persists, and injustice is rife. Yet, the prevailing powers concede openly these realities by reimagining themselves always improving how they will respond to injustice-fueled mayhem, insurrectional destruction, and inegalitarian turmoil. Events like Watts, California; Detroit, Michigan; Liberty City, Florida; South Los Angeles, California; and Ferguson, Missouri from the 1960s through the 2010s in the USA unfold different manifold variations of insurrectionality, but the growing resilience of civil municipal authority and police powers in facing these events matters also evolves. They are being tested, refined, and readied for the next insurrectionable developments waiting to be triggered by a traffic stop, a street fight or an ID check involving a cop and citizen. Inside and outside now coincide in the logics of resilience-as-rule. 5. Insurrectionality: Governance through Resilience With the militarization of municipal, regional and national police forces in the USA and other OECD countries (one here can think about the overly aggressive display of military-grade weaponry in response at Ferguson, Missouri or Keene, New Hampshire to civil rights protest or student mayhem that was not wholly unlike that of Egyptian military and police forces in Tahrir Square), new global trends of social control and organization, rooted in resilient styles of governance, are gelling in the turbulence of insurrectionality. Add to these rapid response forces, the securitized surveillance system of closed-circuit television, cybertracking, biometric scanning, and addressable individual tracking devices; and, the withering away of many other streams of popular ideological resistance as corrective feedback loops, the powers that be, have been, and will be seem, if they are truly sophisticated, to be adding insurrection to their risk society calculi. Indeed, these new integers for innovation justify building and enforcing a potent mix of resilience tactics, which are tested as ideology and practice for continued elite empowerment. Rising up in the streets against authority in the fury of intense insurrection is acceptable, but standing up slowly to truly assume power has become much less likely. Still, the collapse of economic growth, the decay of middle and working class job opportunities, civic infrastructure decay, loss of public goods, and degradation of private markets are all generating and maintaining a high level of insurrectional energy (Luke, 2012). Now the elite discourses embedded in the reproduction of existing power structures knowingly accedes to insurrection, and even can concede conceptually, its justifiable bases, which endorses its existence as ‘insurrectionable development'. Instead of a ‘clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996), these arrangements for a resilient adaptation to recurrent anarchy are the nuts and bolts needed for ‘governing the present' (Miller & Rose, 2008). Governance games on this scale harness legitimate corrective impulses from the outsiders, underclasses, and superfluous populace to make improvements in some state and non-state services, which usually enhance systemic resilience, regime stability, and the sustainability of ruling alliance/elite/bloc/class power (Guattari & Negri, 2010). Are insurrections—both peaceful and violent instances of direct action—crucial opportunities for policy innovations? They seem to appear as fluid zones of indeterminate determination where layers of opposition and acceptance arguably are ‘at once economic, political, and cultural—and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the forms of life … creating new public spaces and new forms of community' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 56). Likewise, do insurrections reconfigure ‘the organization of the social worker and immaterial labor' in which ‘bodies are on the front lines of this battle, bodies that consolidate in an irreversible way the results of past struggles and incorporate a power that has been gained ontologically' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 410) stand ready to OWS, but are they also truly unable to ever manage Wall Street? Along these lines, insurrection becomes yet one more reflexive dimension of modernity's disciplinary modulations of individual and collective human life. State authority rationally maps, and then manages the degrees of freedom allowed in the life of its subjects or citizens through the dispositifs at work in many embedded institutions woven into the territorial fabric of states. The command and control containments of these degrees of unruly freedom, which are clearly allowed to human life by state power, unevenly meld sovereignty, territoriality, and population as new resistant-and-resilient coproductions of governmentality (Foucault, 1978). Hence, resilience-ready rulers often use popular direct action effectively to ensnare the population in ‘apparatuses of security', like those created by various police forces, homeland security units, public health measures, etc., in a manner such that these events also address ‘health, education and social welfare systems and the mechanisms of the management of the national economy' (Dean, 1999, p. 20). In turn, can these governmentalizations of insurrectionable developments settle into ‘the juridical and administrative apparatuses of the state in all of the ways that optimize the health, welfare and life of populations' as biopolitical formations (Dean, 1999, p. 20)? Quite clearly, this complex style of resilient response must be studied, since the emergent regimentations of governance practices have ‘a technical or technological dimension' with new adaptive strategies that display ‘characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects' (Dean, 1999, p. 21). Seeing insurrectionality as a tactical move for the defense of fluid, global and unstable public order follows from Foucault's vision of the apparatuses of government. The problematization of insurrectionable developments as constructive moments of collective purpose seconds his sense of the world today, namely,  … not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1997, p. 256) The division of social forces into ‘insurrectionists' that are continuously tracked by ‘anti-insurrectionist' security assessment experts, working as ‘threat assessment teams' to assay ‘teeming assessable threats' confirms this consciousness of everything merely being dangerous, and thereby producing a fluid new social order out of constant flexible imperatives that assure all they will have ‘something to do'. Strangely, ‘endangerment' becomes a new operational baseline assumption for making the advances of ‘development'. Are these strategies leading to more secure order, or only securitizing everyday life to accustom citizens to living on the minimal basis they appear to accept? They are unruly wards protected by quasi-police state power, who permit the public to protest the conditions of their confinement in advocacy networks within and across borders, but always remain at the mercy of the same resilient power practitioners (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Ironically, insurrectionality serves multiple purposes; but, most importantly, its practices sustain resilient state networks for ruling elites, and this link cultivates the expected outcomes—a barely passable life for the masses trapped in shells of passivity, dependency, and inaction that remarkably are regarded by far too many citizens, clients or consumers as the freedoms of insurrectional agency.

#### The aff is a power move.

Massumi 15 (Brian, Prof of Communications @ U of Montreal, *The Politics of Affect*, ebook)

It goes both ways. Although there is no original state of freedom to which we can return, if structures of power are defined by what escapes them, then resistance is as much a part of the collective field as the tendency for capture by techniques of domination. This was Foucault's basic point: power and resistance are two sides of the same coin. Tendencies towards free action, towards escape from crystallized power structures, are as primary as the tendency towards capture I was just talking about. A powered structure is not all-encompassing. It rises from a field of emergence that includes it. It is plugged into a broader field of activity on which it feeds. That field is astir with tendencies pointing to the potential for different modes of structuration. They may not amplify past the point of incipiency, they may be captured, or simply fail to take and subside back into the field of bare activity from which they came, but still their difference cannot not have been felt at some level, in some way. So even if there is no unsullied state of freedom to return to, there is always a degree of freedom offering the potential for other emergences. There are always counter-tendencies that can be joined, and moved with, proposing themselves for amplification. There is always a margin of manoeuvre. What a body can do is tweak the field — improvise modulations of the field of activity in a way that takes up the offer of these different-order affective tendencies. What a body can do is trigger counter-amplifications and counter- crystallizations that defy capture by existing structures, streaming them into a continuing collective movement of escape. If the movement effects an intensification of the collective field through the mutual inclusion in it of reciprocally heightened capacities in contrastive attunement, then the degree of freedom has been increased across the board. Powers of existence have been collectively augmented. This can only occur from within, in situation, ﬂush with the event, in an immediacy of enaction. In this enactive immediacy, resistance is of the nature of a gesture. Resistance cannot be communicated or inculcated. It can only be gestured. The gesture is a call to attunement. It is an invitation to mutual inclusion in a collective movement. The only power it has is exemplary. It cannot impose itself. It can only catch on. Its power is to throw out the lure of its own amplification. Its power is of contagion. The gesture of resistance is a micro-gesture of offered contagion, oriented otherwise than towards the structures into which the gestures of microfascism occurring on the same level, in the same field, have the tendency to channel. All of this is very consistent with Gabriel Tarde's micro-sociology of ‘imitation’. But it also reinforces the notion that there is an aesthetic dimension — of allure, of style of gesture — that is not an added dimension but is absolutely integral to the very operation of resistance, one with its politicality. There is only one a priori: participation, participatory immersion in bare activity. Resistance comes of immanence. It cannot be led. If it is, it is already coagulating into an apparatus of capture poised to rise up and bear down, as if from above and outside. Resistance is immanent critique: a ‘critique’ that is one with its enaction. It occurs at the level on which bodies think more actively and feel more thinkingly, towards acting differently together. In this kind of resistance, there is no avant-garde. There are seeds. Seeds of free action blowing in the winds of bare activity, looking for a fertile field of attunement for their ﬂowering. The analogy is inexact. Such a field does not exist. In its role as exemplary gesture, resistance creates its own field. It gestures it into existence, by its own power of contagion. Resistance is performative of itself. It triggers its own self- organizing. Its field is always to come, ﬂush with its own self-amplifying event. Immanent critique, as its name implies, cannot purport to apply already-established criteria of correctness or necessity to the field of collective action. It cannot operate in the imperative, based on a prior political programme or already structured set of moral precepts. It cannot justify itself by appealing to established principles. It immanently enacts its own principle, which is one with its exemplary movement. There is no ought to resistance. On what basis can we say that it is better to desire one's freedom than one's servitude? That one ‘ought’ to resist? An ‘ought’ is nothing but an already assumed servitude to a higher order of imperative. To say ‘ought’ is to enact our servitude to abstract principle, and to justify our imposing it on others, as from outside and above. It's a power move. As such, it carries seeds of domination — perhaps a new order of domination, but domination nonetheless. Freedom, like oppression, is desired, or it is nothing at all. It cannot be ‘oughted’ and imposed. It cannot be inculcated. It is desired, or it is nothing. Resistance is the counter-desire for the collective augmentation of powers of existence, in dynamic mutual inclusion in an intensive field of contrasts. There is no basis on which we can say it is ‘better’ in principle. But there are ways to perform its desirability — to make it more desired, more strongly tended towards, more amplificatory and exemplary. There are indeed techniques of resistance. They are techniques of relation aimed at immanent field- modulation. They are gestures already in relation, in participatory immersion, stirring towards self- augmenting relational movement. This is closer to the anarchist notion of ‘propaganda by the deed’ than it is to traditional Marxist notions of ideology critique and vanguard action. Over the last two years, we have seen this kind of exemplary politics percolating up in many places around the world. The Occupy movement's refusal to advance a particular set of demands is a case in point. This refusal to set forth a programme was not a deficiency, it was an enablement. It was a way of saying that what was important was the gathering together of bodies and capacities in self-improvising collective movement for the production of surplus-value of life, and that democracy is that far-from-equilibrium movement — not its pre-programmed end in a prefigured stable structure. This is the ‘direct’, relational democracy of enactive resistance.

#### The appeal to deliberative forums is the most pernicious lie of liberalism. Intellectuals naively collude with power via the agential fantasy of the ballot – This is a politics of magical voluntarism, the perverse pleasure of simulated political responses at the cost of genuine resistant strategies

Cloud and Gunn 10 Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20(2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification *. . .* of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant *zeitgeist*—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling *magical voluntarism* fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classicalMarxism), we aremutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in *Run Lola Run*,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (*phronesis*) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

#### **Their critical praxis is mobilized violently in the postcolony – bids for inclusion within this space is only made possible through the targeted elimination of the colonial subject**

Thobani 14 SUNERA THOBANI, Dr. Sunera Thobani is Associate Professor at the Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice at the University of British Columbia,. Her research focuses on critical race, postcolonial and feminist theory, globalization, citizenship, migration, Muslim women, the War on Terror, and media. “Queer Necropolitics”. 2014. Pgs. Xv – xvi.

The Empire of Terror offers a stark choice to its objects of power: incorporation or extermination. Its forms of sovereignty intend the taking of no survivors: loyalty or death. Violence and whiteness constitute the intractable foundation of colonial sovereignty and its processes of subjection, argued Fanon (1961) in his radical anticolonial praxis. Drawing on Fanon’s insights, Mbembe (2001) points out that in the ‘terror formation’ that is the colony, power takes the form of commandment as it incorporates colonizing subjects into its murderous projects of conquest. Embedded in the depths of such stubbornly brutal terrain, power in the postcolony assumes the form of necropolitics as ‘it makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective’ (Mbembe 2003: 12). In the 21st-century post/colonial formation that is the ‘war on terror’, the simultaneous constitution of the West and its many rests relies no less on occupation, invasion and genocide, albeit in changing configurations and with emergent practices enacted by differentially positioned subjects. For, as Mbembe has astutely noted, ‘modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty’ (2003: 13). In other words, while liberal democracy celebrates its citizen-subjects, the mark of extermination that infuses its racial logic of power gives rise to the ‘Indian’ reserve, the slave plantation, the native quarter, the Bantustan, the Nazi camp, as well as the slums, prisons and refugee camps proliferating around the world (Thobani 2012). Western militarized states, their nationals and private mercenaries now form willing coalitions as readily as they organize death squads; Western feminists recalibrate their alignments with their states as they set out to rescue Muslim women or to protect themselves from their narcissistically construed forms of precariousnesses; and Muslim women and men supplicants to the West speak in the name of feminism and liberal democracy to indict Islam, along with their families and communities, providing vital alibis for torture and collective punishment. All the while, Muslim men around the world are demonized as misogynist homophobes even as they are incarcerated, deported, raped, tortured and targeted for assassination; Muslim women and queers are raped, killed, bombed and compelled to surrender unconditionally to Western gender regimes if they are to survive. As for the Muslims killed in the hundreds of thousands by bombs, drones and militias, they do not even appear as human in the register of the war, featuring only as collateral damage - if at all. Islamophobia has thus become the lingua franca that enables trans/national allegiances to be remade, international accords to be signed, aid negotiations to be consolidated, intelligence, security and border control agreements to be implemented, and assassination squads to be deployed across the planet. Such is the moment that marks the (re)birth of the West as the singular model for futurity after the age of independence. What avenues, then, for contestation? How to strengthen the forces committed to ending the violence that characterizes the contemporary geopolitical moment? What possibilities for the politics of radical transformation? For justice? Queer Necropolitics makes a particularly timely and critically engaged intervention. Mapping out how deployments of sexuality, gender, race and desire inform the self-constituting practices of unlikely imperialist subjects — queer, feminist, left, and yes, even critical theorists and philosophers - as they simultaneously advance the reach of the Western empire, the authors of this book highlight how these practices also mark out entire ‘queerly racialized populations’ for occupation, subjugation or elimination (Puar 2007). Examining the particularities of the instances where ‘queer vitalities become cannibalistic on the disposing and abandonment of others**’**, the authors help to disrupt a critical axis on which pivot the imperial heteronormative, homonormative and transnormative politics of violence and pleasure (Introduction: p. 2). What comes into view when homonationalism is named homoracism? When feminism is defined as imperialist? When human rights arc conceived of as recolonization? When queer and trans politics are identified as parasitic? The power of whiteness comes into sharp focus, the everydayness of the institution of white supremacy is exposed in all its stark (in)visibilities. The authors of Queer Necropolitics provide the conceptual and analytical tools vital to the politics of resistance against the deathly trajectories of power that mark these times.

#### **Politics of recognition relegate the other to an object – inclusivity forms a violent relationship toward the outside -**

Posocco 14 Silvia Posocco, Programme Director MA Psychosocial Studies. Convenor, 'Theories and Sites of the Psychosocial: Power and Subjectivity'. I also contribute to the teaching on the MA/MSc Gender and Sexuality and the MSc Social Research. Department of Psychosocial Studies Research Ethics Officer. Member of the Birkbeck Gender and Sexuality (BiGS) Steering Committee. “Queer Necropolitics”. 2014. Pgs. 73 – 74.

In popular discourse as in academic analysis, ‘transnational adoption’ is often figured in reference to ideas of new forms of relatedness, kinning and sociality, while simultaneously conjuring up the spectre of illegitimate appropriation, unscrupulous commerce and degrading commodification of underprivileged bodies and persons moving across transnational circuits through uneven, unequal and non-reciprocal relations of exchange. As Briggs argues, it may initially appear counterintuitive to study the ‘hard politics’ of neoliberal globalization - and postconflict adjustment - through ‘soft subjects’ like the family, reproduction and by analytical extension and abstraction, gender and sexuality (Briggs 2009, 2010: 49). ‘Transnational adoption’, as an assemblage of situated cultural forms, political and legal technologies of governing, social relations and subjectivities, directly connects to processes of economic, political and legal restructuring that have taken place periodically since the debt crisis of the 1980s through policies associated with the Washington Consensus/ Thus, transnational adoption, as a peculiar form of intimate labour through which the act of bearing children on others’ behalf is commodified, marketized and, crucially, made the object of inequitable and nonrescindable relations of ownership and exchange — is a particularly poignant point of entry for an inquiry into how transnational processes and dynamics associated with neoliberalism play out in contradictory and complex ways (Briggs 2009, 2010, 2012; Marre and Briggs 2009; Posocco 2011) and connect to life/death problematics. Neoliberalism, as a political rationality with variegated and malleable modes of governing subjects and populations, very explicitly connects to the exponential growth in transnational adoptions globally and the mass relocation of adoptees from the Global South to the Global North. Povinelli reframes the political rationality at stake in these processes as ‘late liberalism’, arguing that this can be understood in specific relation to the set of dispositifs introduced in liberal governmentality in the aftermath of multiple eruptions of dissent, including those of the anti-colonial movements and new social movements in the 20th century, and the new Islamic movements in the early 21st century (Povinelli 2007, 2011: 25). In these terms, both neoliberalism and late liberalism delineate not so much a temporality or epochal shift, but rather, they stand for ‘uneven terrains of social maneuver’ (Povinelli 2011: 28) articulated in relation to myriad modes of governance and ‘microphysics of power’ (Foucault 1977, 2000). The analytics of late liberalism refocus these dynamics in relation to a notion of antagonism, but carefully avoid any collapsing or reconciling of struggle and difference, given that, in the governmentality of late liberalism, ‘recognition’ is neither benign nor transparently affirmative, but, rather, normative and disciplinary. Questions of justice, within this horizon, are always aporetic, that is, both paradoxical and in a state of being at a loss, insofar as they relate to a sense of recurrent crisis, risk, expropriation and seemingly ever deepening vulnerability and (in)security. Late liberalism’s temporalities of justice are always/already fundamentally overdetermined, as they reference the space of difference and incommensurability between the socially situated law and the always deferred and yet to come realm of ethics (Derrida 1997, 2001). Transnational adoption thus foregrounds questions and problems concerning the proximity and complex interrelatedness of social realities of deprivation, desertion and exclusion, on one hand, and value extraction, accumulation and privilege, on the other. It marks, in ways that are perceptible and embodied, those often occluded points of articulation of late liberal dispositifs of governance that are productive of shifting and uneven distributions of life and death. Within this terrain, ‘race’ and ‘sexuality’ cease to refer exclusively, or indeed primarily, to the domain of' identity. Rather, they compellingly designate a nexus of articulation, or an apparatus, in the Foucaldian sense, as the coming together of discourses, institutions, spatial forms, regulatory frames, legal and administrative practices as well as modes of conduct, affect and desire. Further, as dispositifs, they precipitate questions regarding how modalities of relatedness grounded in social practices of expropriation and acquisition — that is, forms of sociality where a specific type of convergence occurs between models of property and value, and models of the person -- may have sedimented in cultural forms and social relations in the postcolonial present. The confluence of ‘race’ and ‘sexuality’, as domains of regulation, and processes of production of subjectivities and affective states, on one hand, and the emphasis on the genealogical character of these dynamics of sedimentation, on the other, reframe ‘the contemporary’ - the ‘here and now’ — as a textured terrain in which bodies, subjects and their relations materialize and bring into view histories of conquest and domination. This is a condition of ‘multitemporal heterogeneity’, of daily strategies ‘in and out of modernity’ (Garcia Canclini 1995: 47), and a ‘combination of several temporalities’ (Mbembe 2001: 15) that bring together an ‘interlocking’ of duration and emergence. In this sense, ‘transnational adoption’ designates a range of ‘material anchors’ for social worlds which are at once incommensurate and connected, both grounded and yet in-the making, as are ‘the racial and sexual discourses that apprehend them’ (Povinelli 2007: 2). A number of important analytical moves are at stake here, not least one that requires relinquishing attachment to the seemingly self-evident status of identitarian designations - including those born out of situated struggles for recognition - and the reorientation of attention towards the political rationalities and genealogical dynamics in play in processes of articulation of sociality, relatedness and belonging, as well as disposability, confinement and death. This critical perspective also stresses incommensurability and deferment in relation to the domains of ethics and justice, insofar as it refers to the analysis of interlocking experiences of sociality and displacement, relatedness and disintegration, affirmation and exemption, life and death.

### **K affs w/ a plan**

#### Remaining inside legal claims for inclusive personhood and statist anti-discrimination ensures there is a necessary outside

Weheliye 14 Alexander G. Weheliye, professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, Habeas Viscus, Pg. 82

We are in dire need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what re­mains outside the law, what the law cannot capture, what it cannot magi­cally transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity- based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on inclusion, recognition, and equality based on a narrow legal framework (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only hinders the eradication of violence against trans people and other vulnerable populations but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”22 If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a delimited notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differ­ences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist, civil rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the still and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abo­lition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird anti- prison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law.24 Relatedly, Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,” which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service pro­viders, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the ex­istence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the in­compatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered.

#### **Political representation breeds homonationalism – the inclusion of certain bodies and the slaughter of those deemed too deviant**

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK. “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times”. Pgs. 9 -11.

Reﬂecting upon contemporary debates about the United States as empire, Amy Kaplan notes, ‘‘The idea of empire has always paradoxically entailed a sense of spatial and temporal limits, a narrative of rising and falling, which U.S. exceptionalism has long kept at bay.’’ Later, she states, ‘‘The denial and disavowal of empire has long served as the ideological cornerstone of U.S. imperialism and a key component of American exceptionalism.’’∞∫ Thus, for Kaplan the distancing of exceptionalism from empire achieves somewhat contradictory twofold results: the superior United States is not subject to empire’s shortcomings, as the apparatus of empire is unstable and ultimately empires fall; and the United States creates the impression that empire is beyond the pale of its own morally upright behavior, such that all violence’s of the state are seen, in some moral, cultural, or political fashion as anything but the violence of empire. U.S. exceptionalism hangs on a narrative of transcendence, which places the United States above empire in these two respects, a project that is aided by what Domenico Losurdo names as ‘‘the fundamental tendency to transform the Judeo-Christian tradition into a sort of national religion that consecrates the exceptionalism of American people and the sacred mission with which they are entrusted (‘Manifest Destiny’).’’∞Ω Kaplan, claiming that current narratives of empire ‘‘take American exceptionalism to new heights,’’ argues that a concurrent ‘‘paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality’’ are coterminous in that ‘‘they share a teleological narrative of inevitability’’ that posits America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such universalizing mandates.≤≠ Whether one agrees that American exceptionalism has attained ‘‘new heights,’’ Kaplan’s analysis perfectly illustrates the intractability of state of exception discourses from those of exceptionalism. Laying claim to uniqueness (exception = singularity) and universality (exceptional = bequeathing teleological narrative) is not quite as paradoxical as Kaplan insists, for the state of exception is deemed necessary in order to restore, protect, and maintain the status quo, the normative ordering that then allows the United States to hail its purported universality. The indispensability of the United States is thus sutured through the naturalized conjunction of singularity and telos, the paradox withered away. State of exception discourses rationalize egregious violence in the name of the preservation of a way of life and those privileged to live it. Giorgio Agamben, noting that biopolitics continually seeks to redeﬁne the boundaries between life and death, writes, ‘‘The state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of deﬁning it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.’’≤≤ The temporality of exception is one that seeks to conceal itself; the frenzied mode of emergency is an alibi for the quiet certitude of a slowly normativized working paradigm of liberal democratic government, an alibi necessary to disavow its linkages to totalitarian governments. The state of exception thus works to hide or even deny itself in order to further its expanse, its presence and efficacy, surfacing only momentarily and with enough gumption to further legitimize the occupation of more terrain. Agamben likens the externally internal space of the state of exception to a Möbius strip: at the moment it is cast outside it becomes the inside.≤≥ In the state of exception, the exception insidiously becomes the rule, and the exceptional is normalized as a regulatory ideal or frame; the exceptional is the excellence that exceeds the parameters of proper subjecthood and, by doing so, redeﬁnes these parameters to then normativize and render invisible (yet transparent) its own excellence or singularity. Sexual exceptionalism also works by glossing over its own policing of the boundaries of acceptable gender, racial, and class formations. That is, homosexual sexual exceptionalism does not necessarily contradict or undermine heterosexual sexual exceptionalism; in actuality it may support forms of heteronormativity and the class, racial, and citizenship privileges they require. The historical and contemporaneous production of an emergent normativity, homonormativity, ties the recognition of homosexual subjects, both legally and representationally, to the national and transnational political agendas of U.S. imperialism. Homonormativity can be read as a formation complicit with and invited into the biopolitical valorization of life in its inhabitation and reproduction of heteronormative norms. One prime mechanism of sexual exceptionalism is mobilized by discourses of sexual repression—a contemporary version of Foucault’s repressive hypothesis—that are generative of a bio- and geopolitical global mapping of sexual cultural norms. Unraveling discourses of U.S. sexual exceptionalism is vital to critiques of U.S. practices of empire (most of which only intermittently take up questions of gender and rarely sexuality) and to the expansion of queerness beyond narrowly conceptualized frames that foreground sexual identity and sexual acts. Given that our contemporary political climate of U.S. nationalism relies so heavily on homophobic demonization of sexual others, the argument that homosexuality is included within and contributes positively to the optimization of life is perhaps a seemingly counterintuitive stance. Nonetheless, it is imperative that we continue to read the racial, gender, class, and national dimensions of these vilifying mechanisms. So I proceed with two caveats. First, to aver that some or certain homosexual bodies signify homonormative nationalism—homonationalism—is in no way intended to deny, diminish, or disavow the daily violences of discrimination, physical and sexual assault, familial ostracism, economic disadvantage, and lack of social and legal legitimacy that sexual others must regularly endure; in short, most queers, whether as subjects or populations, still hover amid regimes of deferred or outright death. What I am working through in this text are the manifold trajectories of racialization and un-nationalization of sexual others that foster the conditions of possibility for such violent relegation to death. The spectral resistances to gay marriage, gay adoptive and parental rights, ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policies, and the privatization of sexuality entail that the protection of life granted through national belonging is a precarious invitation at best. Second, there is no organic unity or cohesion among homonationalisms; these are partial, fragmentary, uneven formations, implicated in the pendular momentum of inclusion and exclusion, some dissipating as quickly as they appear. Thus, the cost of being folded into life might be quite steep, both for the subjects who are interpellated by or aspire to the tight inclusiveness of homonormativity offered in this moment, and for those who decline or are declined entry due to the undesirability of their race, ethnicity, religion, class, national origin, age, or bodily ability. It also may be the case, as Barry D. Adams argues, that the United States is exceptional only to the degree to which, globally speaking, it is unexceptional, another angle that stresses the contingency of any welcome of queer life. In terms of legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships, Adams notes ironically that to some extent the United States lags behind most European countries, as well as Canada, Brazil, Colombia, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa—a ‘‘backwardness’’ that the United States often ascribes to others in comparison to itself.≤∂ We can also say that the United States has investments in being exceptionally heteronormative even as it claims to be exceptionally tolerant of (homosexual) difference. But Adams’s reliance on lag reinscribes a troubling teleology of modernity that, despite situating exceptionalism as a narrative that masks or fuzzes over regional differences, impels like-minded countries in a unilateral itinerary rather than multidirectional ﬂows. Some efforts to determine whether the United States is indeed exceptional, efforts that have dominated various debates in history, American studies, and political science, among other ﬁelds, have focused on comparative empirical studies that do little to challenge or even question this telos. With the range of discussion on American exceptionalism in mind, my intent is not to determine whether the United States is indeed exceptional—exceptionally good or ahead, or exceptionally behind or different— but to illustrate the modes through which such claims to exceptionalism are loaded with unexamined discourses about race, sexuality, gender, and class. Furthermore, exceptionalisms rely on the erasure of these very modalities in order to function; these elisions are, in effect, the ammunition with which the exception, necessary to guard the properties of life, becomes the norm, and the exceptional, the subjects upon whom this task is bestowed, becomes the normal.

### Legal education

#### Training students “legal precision” teaches mediocrity and complacency – instead educators should strive to disrupt normal patterns of thought and frustrate standards of reasonableness. Endorsing models of mediocrity to the next generation of legal bureaucrats guarantees extremely violent decision-making

**Schlag 9** [Pierre, Byron R. White Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean for Research, University of Colorado Law School, “ESSAY AND RESPONSE: Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art),” March, 2009, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 803]

In terms of social organization then, there may be something to be said for creating a professional corps (lawyers) whose modes of communication are widely shared and relatively standardized. Notice that if this is the objective, then the only place where that sort of standardized communication can be widely shared is somewhere close to the middle of the bell curve. Both intellectual sloth and intellectual excellence are, by definition, aberrant and thus detract from our efforts at standardization. Thus, training for mediocrity does serve a social function (within limits, of course). Mediocrity is not the only aim here. One would like this mediocrity to be the best it can be. We would like legal professionals to share a language and a mode of thought and, at the same time, for that language and mode of thought to be as perspicuous and intelligent as possible. Given the omnipresence of the bell curve, these desiderata are obviously in tension. The economists would likely talk about achieving "the optimal degree" of intelligence and mediocrity at the margin, but my sense is this will only get us so far. For law professors, the tension is bound to be somewhat frustrating. What many law professors would like--because many of them are intellectually inclined--is to bring intelligence to bear within legal discourse. This is bound to be a somewhat frustrating venture. Legal discourse is not designed to produce intelligence and, frankly, the materials and the discourse can only bear so much. Good judgment, groundedness, reasonableness--any of these virtues is often enough to snuff out real thinking. Indeed, whatever appeal good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness may have for a judge or a lawyer (and I am prepared to say the appeal is considerable), such virtues are not particularly helpful to intellectual achievement. On the contrary, intellectual achievement requires the abandonment of received understandings. In fact, I would go so far as to say that intellectual vitality (at least in the context of a discipline like law) [\*829] requires some degree of defamiliarization, some reach for the exotic. The thing is, those sorts of efforts are not going to get very far if they constantly have to answer to good judgment, groundedness, reasonableness, and the like. And at this point, I would like to flip the argument made earlier in the paper. Here, I would like us to think of appeals to good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness in legal thought as appeals to mediocrity. Making people see things involves things far different from good judgment, groundedness, or reasonableness. It involves a kind of artistry--a reorientation of the gaze, a disruption of complacency, a sabotage of habitual forms of thought, a derailing of cognitive defaults. This is part of what a really good education is about. Constant obeisance to good judgment or groundedness or reasonableness, by contrast, will systematically frustrate such efforts. n57 This is all rather vexing. Legal academics--with aspirations to intellectual excellence--are thus destined to play out the myth of Sisyphus. The main difference, of course, is that Sisyphus had a real rock to push up a real hill. The law professors' rock and hill, by contrast are symbolic--imaginative constructions of their own making. Arguably, pushing a symbolic rock up a symbolic hill is substantially easier than doing it for real. At the very least, it is easier to fake it and to claim success. At the same time, though, the symbolic nature of the exercise perhaps makes it more transparently pointless. As between these two points, there is a certain dissonance. On the one hand, we are dealing with pushing rocks up hills--and that is surely hard work. On the other hand, the rocks and hills are of our own imagination--so it should be easy. This is very confusing. n58 My best guess (and I offer this only as a preliminary hypothesis) is that the dissonance here might yield a certain degree of neurosis. n59 Still the question pops up again: "So what?" So what--so you have maybe seven thousand-something law professors in the nation and you know, maybe ninety-six percent are engaged in a kind of vaguely neurotic scholarship. So what? Maybe it's borderline tragic. Maybe, these people could have done so much better. None of this, by the way, is clearly established. But let's just assume, it's true. Who cares? Seven thousand people--that's not a lot of people. Plus, it's hard to feel for them. I know that nearly all of them would be us (but still). It's an extraordinarily privileged life. So why care about this? Here's why. The thing about legal scholarship is that it plays--through the mediation of the professorial mind--an important role in shaping the ways, the [\*830] forms, in which law students think with and about law. n60 If they are taught to think in essentially mediocre ways, they will reproduce those ways of thinking as they practice law and politics. If they are incurious, if they are lacking in political and legal imagination, if they are simply repeating the standard moves (even if with impressive virtuosity) they will, as a group, be wielding power in essentially mediocre ways. And the thing is: when mediocrity is endowed with power, it yields violence. And when mediocrity is endowed with great power, it yields massive violence. n61 All of which is to say that in making the negotiation between the imprinting of standard forms of legal thought and the imparting of an imaginative intelligence, we err too much on the side of the former. (Purely my subjective call here--but so is everybody else's.) Another way to put it is that while there is something to be said for the standardization point made earlier, generally, standardization is overdone. n62

### Link to education (in the context of neolib)

#### Education is commodified by neoliberalism

Professor Bronwyn Davies & Peter Bansel (2007) Neoliberalism and education, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 20:3,

These terms and the policies and practices that follow from them have particular implications for education. Since the shift to neoliberal governance refigured relations between government, private enterprise and society, with the economic imperatives of the private sector situated as central to government economic and social policies, public institutions, such as schools and hospitals, previously supported as essential to collective well-being, were reconstituted under neoliberalism as part of the market. Within this view ‘there is nothing distinctive or special about education or health; they are services and products like any other, to be traded in the marketplace’ (Peters, 1999, p. 2). The public service and schools were early targets of this neoliberal ideol- ogy. The neoliberal management technologies that were installed included increased exposure to competition, increased accountability measures and the implementation of performance goals in the contracts of management. When the Keynesian economic system of the 1960s and ’70s had been seen to be working well, Western governments had invested in social institutions that would contribute to the improvement of ‘human capital’, such as education and health. Informing this link between quality of workers and productivity was a belief that much of the economic growth of recent times had come from improvements in the quality of capital and labour. Education was one of the central means by which the ‘quality of capital and labour’ was to be improved. The generous funding of education institutions in this period had been made on the basis of the belief that knowledge and education were valuable to the state and society for the purposes of defense and for ensuring that all members of the society were able to participate and to contribute. Neoliberalism, however, unlike liberalism, withdraws value from the social good. Economic productivity is seen to come not from government investment in educa- tion, but from transforming education into a product that can be bought and sold like anything else.

#### Current educational systems have been co-opted by neoliberalism causing schools to proliferate the idea of the ideal liberal subject embedded in current pedagogical practices

Professor Bronwyn Davies & Peter Bansel (2007) Neoliberalism and education, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 20:3,

The next two papers focus on the ways that teachers make (non)sense of neoliberal modes of governmentality in the practices of schooling. The paper by Megan Watkins holds an unexpected twist. While the history of neoliberalism suggests that the dominance of neoliberal policies in education in Australia can simply be read as a reaction against the progressivism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s throughout the Western world, it can also be read as acting in concert with it. Neoliberalism’s agenda of making democratic citizens more governable followed the student and worker rebellions that culminated in the confrontations of May 1968 in Paris. Those rebellions heralded major educational reforms throughout the Western world, giving students a much greater say in their education. The authority of teachers and their knowledges was brought into question through these reforms. Learning became more responsive to local knowledges, to student knowledges and students’ desires. Rather than oppose these changes, however, neoliberalism has appropriated them to its own agenda in developing the individualized neoliberal subject. Watkins dates the demise of progressive pedagogy in the mid-1990s, with neoliberal educational agendas having begun to assert themselves in Australia in the early 1990s. Neoliberalism strongly reinforced the undermining of the teachers’ authority that had been established with progressivism, shifting authority away from both students and teachers to state curriculum and surveillance authorities. In establishing the conditions in which neoliberal subjects might develop, it added competitiveness and individual responsibilization to student ‘freedom’, thus both appropriating and undermining the progressive movement. Watkins’s interviews with teachers in primary school classrooms reveal the complex meshing of progressive and neoliberal discourses. The desire to teach, and to teach students to desire learning, she argues, is already undermined by the group-based teaching of progressivism and then further undermined by surveillance and linear, end-product-driven teaching espoused in neoliberal policy. What this paper again reveals is the difficulty of teasing out neoliberal discourse from those discourses that it cannibalizes to its own ends. Watkins’s methodology involves a discursive analysis of interviews with teachers and with school principals in primary and elementary schools. The stories produced in these inter- views are not treated as descriptive, realist tales that would produce a generalizable set of variables in teachers’ practices. It focuses instead on ‘grasping cultural process’. She uses teachers’ and principals’ accounts of what they think and what they do as data to be mined and worked through, to be analysed within a theoretical domain in which the problems of desire, of affect and of neoliberalism, and its relations to progressivism, can enable us to look differently at the cultural production of education. The paper by Judith Duncan is set in the early childhood context in New Zealand. This paper also has a surprising twist, since it shows that, despite the concerted implementation of neoliberal governmentalities in education in New Zealand since the late 1970s, teachers in early childhood settings still experience a great deal of tension between the early childhood discourses that have been dominant in New Zealand for the last one hundred years and the neoliberal, market driven discourses, ascendant in New Zealand over the last two and more decades. As we pointed out earlier, neoliberalism has been inserted in a piecemeal, functionalist fashion, which works to make the discourse itself invisible. The latest extension of neoliberal policy in the early childhood sector seems to have taken teachers by surprise. The current transition from free child care services for all to a user pays philosophy is not experienced by the teachers as an inevitable and comprehensible extension of the policies of the last two or more decades. They remain committed to the ideals of early childhood education: it should be available to everyone, and the child–teacher ratio should be kept as low as it is, or even lower. They express an unshaken and primary desire to maximize the benefits of education to each child, and, to the extent this is accomplished, they experience professional satisfaction. The latest neoliberal policies and practices, in contrast, focus on reducing the cost of early childhood education to government, increasing the number of children in each group, and increasing parent financial contributions. Trying to manage these two incompatible sets of discursive practices generates considerable distress for the teachers who read the latest iteration of neoliberal discourse as a travesty of their early childhood ideals. Duncan’s methodology involves an examination of the changing demographic and policy framework in New Zealand, and an examination of life-history interviews with teachers to see how that changing discursive structuring of the early childhood sector is made to make sense (or nonsense) of what they want to do in their work. To this extent, the market discourses of neoliberalism have remained external to these teachers rather than becoming integral to subjectivity, desire and the taken-for-granted world. The final two papers analyse events in two Australian private schools where things go horribly wrong, and the logic of the market prevents them from being put right. Students are subjected to serious harm as the schools struggle to keep their market advantage by refusing to accept responsibility for the events in question and for the damage that is done to the students. Sue Saltmarsh’s paper provides an analysis of sexual violence in an Australian private boys’ school. She considers the ways in which the neoliberal market discourses, which have become central to the establishment and maintenance of market advantage for elite private schools, are implicated in the production of social violence. Using critical discourse analysis, and focusing in particular on official school texts and media reports, Saltmarsh theorizes regarding the production of cultural violence and the ways in which neoliberalism is violently caught up in the establishment and maintenance of privilege. Using school- and media-generated texts as well as interviews with ex-students and parents of the school, Saltmarsh considers how violence and heteronormativity are naturalized and normalized in the process of maintaining the market ascendancy of elite schools. Finally, Susanne Gannon, drawing on media reports of a rape that occurred on an Australian private girls’ school excursion, and responding to the paper by Sue Saltmarsh, analyses the tension between the rhetoric of special care for individual students that is a major selling point of elite schools and the demands of the market that prevent acknowledgement of trouble when it occurs. Through critical analysis of media reports of a court case, Gannon examines how, once again, a school that has a market advantage is able to negate the claims of individuals who do not manage to maintain and serve their market image. What these collected papers show is that neoliberalism both competes with other discourses and also cannibalizes them in such a way that neoliberalism itself appears more desirable, or more innocent than it is. They show the ways neoliberalism is nevertheless widely taken up as natural and inevitable. Its moral ascendancy is not generally challenged except where it is overriding and negating deeply held values of professional practice. The flourishing, newly empowered individualized democratic subject that theorists like Beck anticipate is not so much evident in these papers. Becoming an appropriate(d) neoliberal subject who floats free of the social and takes up responsibility for its own survival in a competitive world, where only the fittest survive, is no easy task.

### Neoliberalism

#### Through the neoliberalization of the university act of teaching becomes an impersonal experience where education is used to further the means of production destroying critical thought.

Giroux, Henry A., ’06, “The Conservative Assault on America.” America on the Edge Henry Giroux on Politics, Culture, and Education, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, pp. 30–31.,

The third antidemocratic dogma is visible in the relentless attempt on the part of the Bush administration to destroy critical education as a foundation for an engaged citizenry and a vibrant democracy. The attack on critical education is evident not only in the attempts to standardize curricula, privatize public schooling, and use the language of business as a model for running schools, but also in the ongoing effort to hand over those larger educational forces in the culture to a small group of corporate interests. Schooling is reduced to training, rote learning, and, with regard to poor minorities in poverty stricken neighborhoods, becomes a form of warehousing. Teachers are now viewed as either technicians, depoliticized professionals, or, if they belong to a teachers’ union, as former Education Secretary Rod Paige believed, members of a “terrorist organization.”

#### The use of the justification of “spreading democracy” allows for endless warfare and proliferates neoliberalism

Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby.,06, Prof, S. Banerjee is at the Cass business school he has also held positions at University of Wollongong, RMIT University and the University of South Australia and recived his PhD from the university of Massachusetts, "Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism." *Borderlands* 5.1 (2006): n. pag. 2006. Web. 7 July 2017., http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol5no1\_2006/banerjee\_live.htm#top

18. New economic doctrines require new military doctrines as well. 'Spreading democracy and capitalism' the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy also involves Operation Infinite War, a 'new imperial hegemony, commanding a global economy administered by multiple states, requiring war without end' (Wood, 2003: 71). War without end does not necessarily mean endless fighting: the coercive mechanisms of capital require an endless possibility of war. Leaving aside the problem of conflating democracy with capitalism for the moment, one could argue that U.S. foreign policy of 'spreading democracy and capitalism' is a new form of imperialism. While the rhetoric behind U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years is to 'spread democratic values', the reality is that foreign policy decisions promote a brand of American liberal democracy that seeks to create a global system 'based on the needs of private capital including the protection of private property and open access to markets' (Hertz, 2001: 78). 'War without end' has an impressive genealogy in the west. Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1907: Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked...The seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry (cited in Katz, 2006). Thus, Woodrow Wilson's declaration that the 'world must be made safe for democracy' must therefore be seen in light of the kind of market fundamentalism and violence that defines the parameters of democracy. American style liberal democracy where multinational corporations become the carriers of democratic values to Third World regions is perfectly capable of functioning in authoritarian regimes—in fact these regimes are preferred, as long as a market economy is allowed. Democratic notions of private property rights and the rule of law are sacrosanct but other aspects of democracy such as 'mass participation, an active civil society, regular free and fair elections are optional and in fact expendable' (Hertz, 2001: 80). 19. And when inconvenient democracies threaten American style capitalism as was the case with the democratically elected President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, a state of exception can always be created to justify a military backed coup (the extent of U.S. political and military involvement in the military coup to oust Chavez is still not clear as documents remain classified by the State department because of reasons of 'national security') or political assassination as advocated by 'religious broadcaster' Pat Robertson. Appearing on national television, Robertson called for the assassination of Chavez to stop his country from becoming 'a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism' (the charge of 'Muslim extremism' in Venezuela is bizarre to say the least given that less than 0.5% of the country's population is Muslim). In his broadcast Robertson said: We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability. We don't need another $200 billion war to get rid of one strong-arm dictator. It's a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with. It's a whole lot cheaper than starting a war ... and I don't think any oil shipments will stop (USA Today, 2005). 20. While the U.S. government distanced itself from Robertson's remark (U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told newsmedia with a straight face 'We don't do that sort of thing'), Robertson's statement underscores the relationship between oil (Venezuela is the fifth largest exporter of oil in the world and the U.S. buys nearly 60% of its production), and capitalist accumulation by dispossession and death through political assassination and war. And to further clarify the relationship between markets and war, President Bush, in an attempt to address concerns about the dramatic decline in tourism and air travel in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, told airline employees that 'one of the great goals of this war is to tell the traveling public: Get on board' (cited in Gregory, 2004). Thus, for the American tourist to 'get on board' to enjoy a holiday, stimulate the tourism market and save airline jobs it becomes necessary for some people to die, as homo sacer , in a state of exception outside national and international law. 21. If the sword of commerce was most visibly active in the days of empire its activity in the postcolonial era continued the violence in a more covert manner, often with the complicity of the political elites of the former colonies. Ong (2005) develops the notion of 'graduated sovereignty' to describe how some countries in South East Asia, notably the so-called 'Asian tigers' embraced the global market with a combination of governmental political strategies and military repression. Her research on globalization in Indonesia and Malaysia showed that the interaction between states and transnational capital resulted in a differential state treatment of the population already fragmented by race, ethnicity, gender, class and region as well as a reconfiguration of power and authority in the hands of transnational corporations operating in special export processing zones. The neoliberal turn in these regions follows a different trajectory where the interplay of market versus state results in differing levels of sovereignty: some areas of the economy have a very strong state presence and in other areas, markets and foreign capital rule. State sovereignty is dispersed because global markets and capital with the collusion of governments create states of exception where coercion, violence and killings occur. State repression against rebel populations and separatist movements is often influenced by market forces: as Ong (2005) argues territories are cleared of rebels ('outlawed citizens') to make way for logging concessions, petroleum pipelines, mines and dams. Thus, necrocapitalism creates states of exceptions where 'democratic rights are confined to a political sphere' while continuing forms of domination, exploitation and violence in other domains (Wood, 2003: 80).

#### The humanist version of the liberal subject allows the proletariat to be schooled to accept their responsibility for their lack of capital. This is uniquely true in the context of disabled people who are excluded from full access to the system of capital.

Nirmala **Erevelles, 2k**, Nirmala Erevelles is a Professor in the Social Foundations of Education and Instructional Department of Education Leadership, Policy, and Technology Studies at the University of Alabama and got her Ph.D. in 1998 from Syracuse University in the "Cultural Foundations of Education", Winter 2000, " Educating Unruly Bodies: Critical Pedagogy, Disability Studies, and the Politics of Schooling," Educational Theory, accessed June 26, 2017, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2000.00025.x/full>, BFMN

Rejecting traditional educational discourses that upheld the liberal humanist version of the rational, unified, stable, and unique subject, critical theorists of education began to propose alternative theories pertaining to the social construction of subjectivity. For example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis in Schooling in CapitalistAmerica argued that the history of public education in capitalist America was a reflection of the history of the successes, failures, and contradictions of capitalism itself.I2In other words, they conceptualized schools as “ideological state apparatuses,” that, rather than attempting to meet the needs of citizens, instead devised administrative, curricular, and pedagogical practices that reproduced subject positions that sustained exploitative class hierarchies. For example, they argued that one way educational institutions legitimated the distribution of wealth, privilege, and status in capitalist societies is through the administration of tests that claim to measure intelligence - a presumably genetic attribute - which supported the ideology that the poor are poor because they are stupid. Consequently, schools socialized the working-class poor to accept individual responsibility for the conditions of poverty and discrimination that continue to prevent them from adequately meeting even their basic needs. In this way, schools legitimate the existence of an unequal social division of labor that locates the source of economic failure, not in the social and economic structures of capitalism, but, in the individuals themselves. Though liberal education reformers have criticized the biological determinism inherent in this argument, they have continued to support the notion of innate intelligence by assuming that if only equal educational opportunity were provided to all populations through compensatory programs like Head Start, then the possibilities of increasing individual IQ scores and consequently economic advancement would be an attainable goal for all citizens. Critical of this liberal position, Bowles and Gintis, on the other hand, demonstrated through statistical analyses that IQ was not an important determinant of economic success because even genetically inherited difference in intelligence did not adequately explain the historical patterns of economic and educational inequalities apparent in capitalist societies. Thus, Bowles and Gintis concluded that “inequality under capitalism is rooted not in individual deficiencies, but in the structure of production and property relation^."'^ This materialist analysis, by placing the locus of economic success and failure in the economic structures of capitalist society, poses interesting challenges to critical theory when applied to the social category of disability. Disabled people, especially those with more severe disabilities, have seldom been included in the market economy because their “real” physiological and cognitive differences are thought to affect the productivity of their labor and as a result impede the efficient and rapid accumulation of surplus. It is for similar reasons that disabled people have historically received a separate and unequal education in segregated settings in public schools on the grounds that their ” individual deficiencies” prevent them from realizing the educational gains that a regular education typically provides to “normal” students. Depending on the severity of their disability, the skills learned in these segregated special education classes have allowed a few disabled people to be employed in jobs located at the lowest rungs of the social division of labor, while many more swell the ranks of the permanently unemployed, dependent on the welfare state for their daily survival. ’

Ellen Therese Reilly, 14, Doctor of Education from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, October 28, 2014, " Ableism in Education: A Case Study of a Student with Multiple Disabilities,” Dissertation of the author published by Virginia Tech, pages 10, accessed June 26, 2017, https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/51177/Reilly\_ET\_T\_2015\_support\_3.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Notwithstanding these persistent oversights, I would argue here that Bowles and Gintis’s critique of capitalist education could prove useful in extending as well as (re)writing the theoretical terrain of critical pedagogy if addressed from the standpoint of disability. In fact, I find the most persuasive aspect of their analyses to be their materialist interpretation of the concepts of intelligence or ability. If we accept intelligence or ability to be historically constituted within the structures of production and property relations, then it would be possible to offer a similar materialist analysis for the category of (dis)ability and explore the implications of this analysis for the organization of social difference in U.S. public schools. For example, if we accept Bowles and Gintis’s argument that educational institutions have used the concept of intelligence/ability to legitimate racial, gendered, and class inequalities in both schools as well as society at large, then this could imply that there is a relation between the category of disability and other categories of social difference such as race, class, gender, and sexuality. How then would a critical theory of education adapt its analyses to acknowledge this relation and what benefits could be derived from such analyses? Further, given Bowles and Gintis’s suggestion that we need to re-theorize the current alienating and exploitative relationship of the working classes and labor, what would this re-theorization look like from the standpoint of disability? More specifically, what arrangement of social and economic conditions would be supportive of an alternative theorization of labor such that the self-worth, needs, and desires of disabled people will not be dismissed, denigrated, or completely ignored? However, even though Bowles and Gintis’s argument appears to hold emancipatory possibilities, other critical theorists of education have sought to distance themselves from the economic determinism perceived in this argument, especially the subordination of cultural issues to class analyses. Arguing that Bowles and Gintis, along with other reproduction theorists such as Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu, have portrayed the concept of “school culture” as monolithic and static, with both teachers and students regarded as passive participants in the reproduction process, critical theorists of education have recently (re)understood culture as a discursive space that involves asymmetrical relations of power where both dominant and subordinate groups are engaged in struggles over “the production, legitimation, and circulation of particular forms of meaning and experience.” Thus, for example, critical theorists such as Paul Willis, Henry Giroux, Angela McRobbie, and R.W. Connell among others began to explore how the everyday actions and cultural practices of students that constituted several subcultures within schools served as cultural sites that existed in opposition to the hegemonic dictates of capitalist education. At the present time, influenced by the impact of poststructural theory on cultural studies, the “new” critical theorists of education now describe a world in which “the production of meaning has become as important as the production of labor in shaping the boundaries of human existence.” lBAs a result, critical theorists of education now argue that the political economy of the sign has become ”the primary category for understanding how identities are forged within particular relations of privilege, oppression, and struggle.”

#### Neolib breeds productivity

Professor Bronwyn Davies & Peter Bansel (2007) Neoliberalism and education, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 20:3,

The emergence of neoliberal states has been characterized by the transformation of the administrative state, one previously responsible for human well-being, as well as for the economy, into a state that gives power to global corporations and installs apparatuses and knowledges through which people are reconfigured as productive economic entrepreneurs of their own lives. We suggest it is primarily this reconfigu- ration of subjects as economic entrepreneurs, and of institutions capable of producing them, which is central to understanding the structuring of possible fields of action that has been taking place with the installation of neoliberal modes of governance. The context of education is clearly a highly relevant site for such structuring to take place. Schools and universities have arguably been reconfigured to produce the highly individualized, responsibilized subjects who have become ‘entrepreneurial actors across all dimensions of their lives’ (Brown, 2003, p. 38). Because of this diffuse and largely invisible installation of neoliberal technologies and practices it has taken a great deal of analytic and observational work to make the constitutive force of neoliberalism open to analysis. Work such as that of Rose (1999) has been crucial in this process of beginning to theorize neoliberalism and show how it functions at the level of the subject, producing docile subjects who are tightly governed and who, at the same time, define themselves as free. Individuals, we suggest, have been seduced by their own perceived powers of freedom and have, at the same time, let go of significant collective powers, through, for example, allowing the erosion of union power. Individual subjects have thus welcomed the increasing individualism as a sign of their freedom and, at the same time, institutions have increased competition, responsibilization and the transfer of risk from the state to individuals at a heavy cost to many individuals, and indeed to many nations (Saul, 2005).

### No child left behindish stuff

#### Another chunk of the last card goes right before

Jahng 11

Kyung Eun. Assistant Professor, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea early childhood and care policy, multicultural education, character education, qualitative research methods, Foucault "Thinking inside the box: Interrogating no child left behind and race to the top." KEDI Journal of Educational Policy 8.1 (2011). //gc

In this manner, minority children “are made up” (Hacking, 1986) as controllable, manipulatable, and correctible, and produced as self-governing individuals. This fabrication of the subjects further leads to governing them as a targeted population, one homogeneous mass, which is rationalized in the name of the security of society. When it comes to the education of minority children, including English language learners, immigrant children, and racial and ethnic minorities, the NCLB legislation specifies that the objective of its proposed education is to “enable the students to become more productive and informed citizens” (Public Law No. 107-110, 2002, p. 1848) and to close “the achievement gap between minority and nonminority students” (Public Law No. 107-110, 2002, p. 1440). It implies that minority students are left behind and are not productive and competent enough citizens until they are fully educated under the given educational agenda.

### **Prison**

#### **This particularly true in their understandings of the prison – the 1AC papers over a larger matrix of normalization that ensures the violence of the prison merely expands into the everyday**

Gossett 14 Che Gossett, a Black genderqueer independent scholar and activist who works to excavate queer of color AIDS activist and trans archives. They hold an MA in history from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA in education from Brown. “Queer Necropolitics” Pgs. 33 – 34.

The prison industrial complex is at once a manifestation of a disciplinary and of a control society. The prison is one of the central and proliferating oppressive technologies through which bio- and necropolitical violence and the apparatuses of surveillance that reinforce it are naturalized. The insidious morphology of the carceral is such that even as it is dismantled via lobbying for decriminalization and decarceration, on the one hand, it proliferates via extended modes of surveillance and control — ankle bracelets, probation and parole — on the other. Carceral violence is maintained in various penal registers and forms. In the post- 911 age of the Patriot Act, which expanded surveillance and police militarization (implemented during the continuing war on drugs), we are witnessing the violence of what I propose to describe as penal securitocracy. The call for the abolition of the prison industrial complex requires the complete dismantling of spaces of confinement and detention - what Foucault termed the ‘carceral continuum’ (Foucault 1977: 297, 303) - ranging from the torturous sensory deprivation of solitary confinement that is the signature of the supermax prison, to the coercive containment that characterizes psychiatric institutionalization. The criminalization of HIV is one site in which anti-blackness, AIDS phobia, queer phobia and carceral violence converge. While recent research, particularly in public health, has begun to address the impact of mass incarceration on AIDS treatment and prevention, inside/outside AIDS activism and the struggle for HIV decriminalization in relation to queer and/or trans prison abolition politics have so far been neglected. As I will illustrate next, we have much to learn from this and I will turn to the insightful history of this struggle in the following section.

### Settler reparations

#### Settler reparations fail – are a technology of racial governance that justifies biopolitical and necropolitical domination

Murdocca 13 – (Carmela, Associate Professor of Sociology @York University, Persistence and Memorialisation: Self Harm and Sucide in Reparation Politics in Canada”, Australian Feminist Law Journal, Issue 1, Volume 38, 95-97, SL)

In the settler state, Indigenous suicide, and youth suicide in particular, is a fetish object — a site of memorialised biopolitical and necropolitical governance. Currently, federal and provincial governments, as well as Indigenous groups, are engaged in the development of a range of reparative justice practices which seek to address the root causes of suicide among Indigenous people (and Indigenous youth) in order to develop state and community responses. Provincial and national responses have included state sponsored research, community consultations, and coroner’s inquiries. Together, these legal and quasi-legal colonial inquiries contribute to the already significant archival edifice for reparative juridics in Canada linking time, space and colonial violence.18 Biopolitics, the governance of ‘life itself,’19 and necropolitics,20 the governance of death, are useful descriptions of the form and content of reports and inquires that attempt to capture the problem of suicide and self-harm among some Indigenous groups and youths in Canada. Foucault has defined the process of biopolitics in the following manner: `By [biopolitics] I meant the endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race … It seems to be that these problems could not be dissociated from the political rationality within which they appeared.'21 Furthermore, as Achille Mbembe explains: ‘that race (or for that matter racism) figures so prominently in the calculus of biopower is justifiable’ since ‘race is the ever present shadow of Western political thought’ and racism ‘regulate(s) the distribution of death.’22 Practices of reparative justice, like an inquiry into the social problem of self-harm in one remote Indigenous community, as I explore, are a technology of **racial governance;** such reports work as biopolitical tools, fusing distinct racial ontologies and subjectivities to processes of reparation. Bearing witness to and translating practices of living and dying in settler colonialism is both biopolitical and necropolitical. Biopolitical forms of reparative justice attempt to assess and manage well being and the risks associated with self-harm and suicide. Reports on suicide and self-harm reveal the precarity of ‘life itself’ for some Indigenous people. In so doing, the governance of death, or necropolitics, extends the biopolitical to account for annihilation regimes within settler colonialism. Mbembe describes necropolitics as the ‘instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations.’23 An over-arching concern of biopolitical and necropolitical forms of reparative governance in liberal democracies is to offer an account of the connections between historical forms of injustice and contemporary instances of structural and corporeal violence. In the case of inquiries and reports into self-harm and suicide, the racial body serves an interface linking past, present and future and becomes the site for the reparative juridics of the state. In governmental, community, non-governmental and visual documentary accounts of the effects of self-harm for Indigenous people and communities, the necro/biopolitics of reparative justice offer a scaffold for a range of instances of corporeal violence: self-harm, accidental death, quasi-death, and suicide.

### Separate rooms justify oppression

#### Separate rooms are used by systems of liberalism to justify oppression and rejection of subjectivity

Knight 16

Hunter. Graduate Department of Social Justice Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto "The Making of the ‘Problem Child’: Egerton Ryerson and the Liberal Project of Ontario Public Education." Thesis. University of Toronto, 2016. Print. //gc

The development of Ryerson’s proposals of separate schools required a conception of some categories of people as requiring specific forms of management and containment in the form of schooling. This was not universal or ahistorical and can be read as reflecting “normative categories for governance” (Lowe, 2015, p. 7) in that each category was constructed by its relationship to the state. Despite variations in the circumstances that led to the production of each proposal, Ryerson makes similar strategic moves in the rationales behind his proposals. In each proposal, Ryerson paints images of inherent, bodily difference in order to establish an illusion of defined boundaries around a constructed category: boundaries that then support a justification for school segregation. This emphasis on bodily difference in particular is key, because, as Therí A. Pickens (2013) writes, “to have a body is to be a subject – the very epitome of the Western liberal subject – and to be a body is to be an object” (p. 22). Emphasizing bodily difference is an act of defining categories of difference by their pure inhabitance in their bodies, their inability to control their bodies, and thus their ‘need’ to be governed. In this section, I examine each individual proposal in turn in order to show how the acts of proposing separate schools always center on this initial, violent act of definition.

## Impact

### Coding

#### The human as a biological entity is defined in opposition to its incoherent outside – these racializing tactics continue an ever-present regime of categorization – this objectifies non-human bodies

**Weheliye 14** Alexander G. Weheliye, professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University where he teaches black literature and culture, critical theory, social technologies, and popular culture. “RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES, BIOPOLITICS, AND BLACK FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE HUMAN”.

Consequently, racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line—instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks—that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding anti-pathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality. Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity, their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter's day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly.” Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization. For Wynter, the promise of black studies—and the numerous other ruptures precipitated by the 1960s—lies in its liminality, which contains potential exit strategies from the world of Man. However, we must first devise new objects of knowledge that facilitate “the calling in question of our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore of what it is like to be, human.” We must do so because we cannot fully understand the present incarnation of the human from within the “biocentric and bourgeois” epistemic order that authorizes the biological selectedness of Man and, conversely, the creation of “dysgenic humans” (those who are evolutionarily dysselected), “a category comprised in the US of blacks, Latinos, Indians as well as the transracial group of the poor, the jobless, the homeless, the incarcerated,” the disabled, and the transgendered.— Within our current episteme, these groups are constituted as aberrations from the ethnoclass of Man by being subjected to racializing assemblages that establish “natural” differences between the selected and dysselected. In other words, black, Latino, poor, incarcerated, indigenous, and so forth populations become real objects via the conduit of evolutionarily justified discourses and institutions, which, as a consequence, authorizes Man to view himself as naturally ordained to inhabit the space of full humanity. Thus, even though racializing assemblages commonly rely on phenotypical differences, their primary function is to create and maintain distinctions between different members of the Homo sapiens species that lend a suprahuman explanatory ground (religious or biological, for example) to these hierarchies. As Wynter explains, “all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources.—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle.”44 Wynter's oeuvre facilitates the analysis of the relay between different forms of subjugation, because in it the human operates as a relational ontological totality. Therefore, the Man versus Human battle does not dialectically sublate the specificity of the other struggles but articulates them in this open totality so as to abolish Man and liberate all of humanity rather than specific groups.

### Disability

#### Specifically about how boundaries are drawn to justify segregation and oppression

Knight 16

Hunter. Graduate Department of Social Justice Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto "The Making of the ‘Problem Child’: Egerton Ryerson and the Liberal Project of Ontario Public Education." Thesis. University of Toronto, 2016. Print. //gc

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#### Ableism acts in a covert ways to commodify or destroy disability.

Campbell, Fiona A. Kumari., ’08, She is a current Senior Lecturer of Disability Studies at Griffith University, Australia and is an Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies with the Faculty of Medicine, at the University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka and received her PhD in Sociology, Humanities, and Law from Queensland University of Technology, "Exploring Internalized Ableism Using Critical Race Theory." Disability & Society 23.2 (2008): 151-62. Web. 8 July 2017. <https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/21024>.

I HATE [it] when people tell me how well I’ve overcome my disability. To me, it’s suggesting that I am separate from my body. But my body is me and I am my body. This includes my disability. It is part of who I am and a part of what makes my body beautiful and a part of what makes me a beautiful person. My disability CANNOT be separated from who I am. I cannot overcome my own body (Shain, 2002). The ruminations of CRT (cf. Delgado & Stefancic, 2000) transposed to an analysis of ableism point to its embeddedness. The very existence of ableism and its effects, like racism, are covert but more often profoundly veiled. Ableism as an epistemology and ontological modality frames an individual’s subjectivity and thus becomes the power “…that animates ones emergence”, complicity and resistance (Butler, 1997b, p.198). At the end of this paper two strong images of living with impairment emerge. The first is of disabled people as survivors. People with disabilities labour under the pain and burden of violence - violence that is epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical. This labouring has resulted in lives of ontological vulnerability. For scholars there is an ethical imperative to interrogate the violence of ableism and speak of its injuries. By exposing the practices of ableism and unravelling the psychic life of internalised ableism, unearthing various states of injury, (apologies to Wendy Brown), when reiterating these violences and injuries I am mindful of the necessity not to re-perform them. An example here could be the continual usage of photographic images of people exhibited as freaks when alive, and re-exhibited in a form of fetishist graphics on the internet. To do so would be to fall victim to a theorizing that reinstitutes the notion of an overwhelming vision of catastrophe, where disabled people are forever sucked into the vortex of being perpetual victims. This paper invites the reader to sign up to the field of critical ableism studies and argues the critical need to investigate internalised ableism and its effects on the psychic life of our community. Further research could explore the process of counter-story telling about liberalism’s so-called ‘disability success stories’, and the way these stories differ when the individual ‘succeeds’ in spite of impairment and those stories which embrace impairment and frame success in terms ‘because disability’. The second image is of disabled people engaged in guerrilla activity – rejecting the promises of liberalism and looking elsewhere, daring to speak otherwise about impairment. For too long critical theorist’s have figured places of marginality and liminality as places of exile – where the emarginated are to be ‘brought in from the cold’ and integrated so that they too can sit beside the ‘warm fires’ of liberalism (and all will be well). However, as Bell Hooks reminds us, the margin can be “… more than a site of deprivation … it is also the site of radical possibility, a space of resistance” (hooks, 1990, p.149).

#### The illusions that normalcy are founded upon the construction of the disabled Other, through the creation of new pedagogies we can use the university as a space of resistance.

Nirmala **Erevelles, 2k**, Nirmala Erevelles is a Professor in the Social Foundations of Education and Instructional Department of Education Leadership, Policy, and Technology Studies at the University of Alabama and got her Ph.D. in 1998 from Syracuse University in the "Cultural Foundations of Education", Winter 2000, " Educating Unruly Bodies: Critical Pedagogy, Disability Studies, and the Politics of Schooling," Educational Theory, accessed June 26, 2017, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2000.00025.x/full>, BFMN

The poststructural turn in critical theories of education that defines the purpose of radical pedagogy as constructing transgressive embodied knowledges and the classroom as a space of seduction, desire, authority, and resistance can actually hold emancipatory possibilities for the disabled student. After all, the disabled student embodies the “unruly” subject whose physiological excesses are seen as disrupting the disciplined control of schooling. In fact, the actual existence of special education programs that serve children with a variety of labels (learning disabled, emotional and behavioral disorders, mild, moderate ,and multiply handicapped) is predicated on the inability of regular schooling to control effectively the disruptive interruptions of these bodies that appear impervious to the rigid demands for conformity and rationality in schools. Described in these terms, the (dis)abledbody can therefore be perceived as epitomizing the transgressive body of poststructural discourses.

Yet, despite the transgressive element associated with disabled bodies, poststructural discourses have been silent about the issue of disability. I read this as ironic, especially since these same theoretical discourses, while claiming to challenge hegemonic constructions of subjectivity, have remained silent in the face of oppressive practices that forcibly regulate, discipline, and categorize bodies that deviate from the norm. It is for this reason that I will argue here that the disabled subject’s experience of invisibility can be seen to parallel the invisibility experienced by the racialized protagonist of Ralph Ellison’s novel, *Invisible Man* when he explains,

I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads, you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination. Indeed, everything and anything except me?”

Ellison’s depiction of invisibility as an African-American in a white supremacist society supports a logic similar to the Lacanian conceptualization of the Mirror Stage and can therefore be used to explain the continued invisibility of the disabled subject. For example, reading the above quote as a metaphor for the Mirror Stage, Robert Young has argued that in a racist society it is necessary for the African-American subject (blackness)to be rendered invisible in order to enable the Euro-American subject (whiteness)to preserve the illusion of autonomy, rationality, and control.3l Applying this analysis to disability, a similar argument could be made where the nondisabled subject upon encountering its Other (the disabled subject), finds it necessary to suppress the memory of this ”deviant” image in order to support the illusion of “normalcy” and “wholeness.” That these assumptions of “normalcy” or “wholeness” are themselves illusions becomes vividly apparent when one examines how constructions of the normative self are in fact predicated on the existence of the disabled Other. This is because, as Rosemary Garland Thomson points out, “without the monstrous body to demarcate the borders of the generic, without the female body to distinguish the shape of the male, and without the pathological to give form to the normal, the taxonomies of value that underlie political, social, and economic arrangements would collapse.”3z

Now, while Young’s theory of racist constructions of difference is predicated on the subject‘s fear of the Other, Kelly uses a similar argument to explain that in the current historical context, where consumer ideologies abound, this fear of the Other is now disguised as the desire not only to consume but also to become the Other - a situation that holds both oppressive as well as emancipatory possibilities. In its oppressive form, the subject espouses a liberal multiculturalism that supports a “tourist model of knowledge and longing” for the Other33- a practice that constitutes the Other as a commodity for consumption and through this objectification serves to obscure the exploitative relations that have constructed the Other, in the first place. In its transgressive form, the desire for the Other results in the hybridization of identity (for example, the “all white” hip-hop band disclaiming whiteness to construct a new hybrid identity), such that the humanist conception of the coherent, authentic, and unique subject is disrupted by the “contingent subject- in the present” who resisting the tyranny of limits supports the formation of new oppositional as well as transgressive hybrid subjectivities.

### Microaggression

#### **These acts of violence aren’t external to us – sovereign violence manifests itself in our daily encounters – prior impact**

Mbembe 1 Achille Mbembe, Senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand. “On the postcolony”. 2001. Pgs. 26 – 28.

On the other hand, colonial sovereignty rested on three sorts of violence. The ﬁrst was the founding violence. This is what underpinned not only the right of conquest but all the prerogatives ﬂowing from that right. Thus it played an instituting role, in at least two ways. First, it helped to create the space over which it was exercised; one might say that it presupposed its own existence. Second, it regarded itself as the sole power to judge its laws—whence its one-sidedness, especially as, to adopt Hegel’s formulation, its supreme right was (by its capacity to assume the act of destroying) simultaneously the supreme denial of right. A second sort of violence was produced before and after, or as part and parcel of, the conquest, and had to do with legitimation. Its function was, as Derrida speaks of a somewhat different issue to provide self-interpreting language and models for the colonial order, to give this order meaning, to justify its necessity and universalizing mission—in short, to help produce an imaginary capacity converting the founding violence into authorizing authority. The third form of violence was designed to ensure this authority’s maintenance, spread, and permanence. Falling well short of what is properly called “war,” it recurred again and again in the most banal and ordinary situations. It then crystallized, through a gradual accumulation of numerous acts and rituals—in short, played so important a role in everyday life that it ended up constituting the central cultural imaginary that the state shared with society,2 and thus had an authenticating and reiterating function. Colonial sovereignty only existed in areas where these three forms of violence were deployed, forming a seamless web. This violence was of a very particular sort, immediately tangible, and it gave the natives a clear notion of themselves in proportion to the power that they had lost. Its distinctive feature was to act as both authority and morality; it could do so for two reasons. First, it eliminated all distinction between ends and means; depending on circumstances, this sovereign violence was its own end and came with its own “instructions for use.” Second, it introduced virtually inﬁnite permutations between what was just and what unjust, between right and not-right. Thus, in regard to colonial sovereignty, right was on one side. And it was seized in the very act of occurring. In face of it, there could only be “wrong” and infraction. Anything that did not recognize this violence as authority, that contested its protocols, was savage and outlaw. The combination of this indiscriminate force and this power of disqualiﬁcation meant that commandement scarcely raised questions of its ends; it was the very instance that justiﬁed them. This is why the colonial state, in putting projects into effect, did not rule out either the exercise of naked force against the native or the destruction of the forms of social organization that existed prior to its arrival—even their “recycling” for ends other than those for which they had once been instituted. The lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that may be said to have been the distinctive feature of colonial sovereignty. Postcolonial state forms have inherited this unconditionality and the regime of impunity that was its corollary. Such unconditionality and impunity can be explained by what long constituted the credo of power in the colony. This requires distinguishing two traditions, each according a central place to an image of the colonized that made of the native the prototype of the animal. Under colonization, the object and the subject of commandement combined in a single speciﬁc category, the native. Strictly speaking, the “native” is one born in the country under discussion. As such, the term is close to another, indigene—that is, a “son or daughter of the soil,” not someone who has settled as a result of immigration or conquest. In colonial political vocabulary, this description was applied to colonial subjects in general, all natives making up no more than what Albert Sarraut spoke of as that “unformed clay of primitive multitudes” from which colonization’s task was to shape “the face of a new humanity.” The regime known as the indigénat was itself a particular administrative system applied to natives of French pre-1945 colonies but not to the colonizers.5 The indigénat was a caricatural form of the inscription of colonial sovereignty in the structures of the everyday life of the colonized. This regime included a range of punishments covering a vast number of offenses. Punishments were administered by a decentralized state apparatus—to be precise, by its agents—through specialized institutions, some of recent origin, some indigenous but reshaped for this purpose. But whatever the forms and quality of the penal rituals, they shared the feature of doing something to the body of the colonized. As a productive agent, he/she was in effect marked, broken in, compelled to provide forced labor, obliged to attend ceremonies, the aim being not only to tame and bring him/her to heel but also to extract from him/her the maximum possible use. The colonial relation, in its relation to subjection, was thus inseparable from the speciﬁc forms of punishment and a simultaneous quest for productivity. On this last point, it differs qualitatively from the postcolonial relation. One characteristic of commandement in the colonies was the confusion between the public and the private; the agents of the commandement could, at any moment, usurp the law and, in the name of the state, exercise it for purely private ends. But what marked violence in the colony was, as it were, its miniaturization; it occurred in what might be called the details. It tended to erupt at any time, on whatever pretext and anywhere. It was deployed in segmentary fashion, in the form of micro-actions which, becoming ever smaller, were the source of a host of petty fears.

### Necrocapital

#### Neoliberalism requires the death of the periphery in order to maximize profit – necrocapital invisibilizes violence under the guise of progress and benevolence

Banerjee 6 Subhabrata Bobby, University of South Australia. “Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism”. Borderlands, Volume 5 No. 1. 2006. <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol5no1_2006/banerjee_live.htm>.

Agamben shows how sovereign power operates in the production of bare life in a variety of contexts: concentration camps, 'human guinea pigs' used by Nazi doctors, current debates on euthanasia, debates on human rights and refugee rights. A sovereign decision to apply a state of exception invokes a power to decide the value of life, which would allow a life to be killed without the charge of homicide. The killings of mentally and physically handicapped people during the Nazi regime was justified as ending a 'life devoid of value', a life 'unworthy to be lived'. Sovereignty thus becomes a decision on the value of life, 'a power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant' (Agamben, 1998: 142). Life is no more sovereign as enshrined in the declaration of 'human' rights but becomes instead a political decision, an exercise of biopower (Foucault, 1980). In the context of the 'war on terror' operating in a neoliberal economy, the exercise of biopower results in the creation of a type of sovereignty that has profound implications for those whose livelihoods depend on the war on terror as well as those whose lives become constituted as 'bare life' in the economy of the war on terror. 11. However, it is not enough to situate sovereignty and biopower in the context of a neoliberal economy especially in the case of the war on terror. In a neoliberal economy, the colony represents a greater potential for profit especially as it is this space that, as Mbembe (2003: 14) suggests, represents a permanent state of exception where sovereignty is the exercise of power outside the law, where 'peace was more likely to take on the face of a war without end' and where violence could operate in the name of civilization. But these forms of necropolitical power, as Mbembe reads it in the context of the occupation of Palestine, literally create 'death worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of theliving dead ' (Mbembe, 2003: 40). The state of endless war is precisely the space where profits accrue whether it is through the extraction of resources or the use of privatized militias or through contracts for reconstruction. Sovereignty over death worlds results in the application of necropower either literally as the right to kill or the right to 'civilize', a supposedly 'benevolent' form of power that requires the destruction of a culture in order to 'save the people from themselves' (Mbembe, 2003:22). This attempt to save the people from themselves has, of course, been the rhetoric used by the U.S. government in the war on terror and the war in Iraq. 12. Situating necropolitics in the context of economy, Montag (2005: 11) argues that if necropolitics is interested in the production of death or subjugating life to the power of death then it is possible to speak of a necroeconomics - a space of 'letting die or exposing to death'. Montag explores the relation of the market to life and death in his reading of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Montag's reading of Smith, it is 'the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness...which while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society' (cited in Montag, 2005: 12). If social life was driven solely by unrestrained self-interest then the fear of punishment or death through juridical systems kept the pursuit of excessive self-interest in check, otherwise people would simply rob, injure and kill for material wealth. Thus, for Smith the universality of life is contingent on the particularity of death, the production of life on the production of death where the intersection of the political and the economic makes it necessary to exercise the right to kill. The market then, as a 'concrete form of the universal' becomes the 'very form of universality as life' and requires at certain moments to 'let die'. Or as Montag theorizes it, Death establishes the conditions of life; death as by an invisible hand restores the market to what it must be to support life. The allowing of death of the particular is necessary to the production of life of the universal. The market reduces and rations life; it not only allows death, it demands death be allowed by the sovereign power, as well as by those who suffer it. In other words, it demands and required the latter allow themselves to die. Thus alongside the figure of homo sacer, the one who may be killed with impunity, is another figure, one whose death is no doubt less spectacular than the first and is the object of no memorial or commemoration: he who with impunity may be allowed to die, slowly or quickly, in the name of the rationality and equilibrium of the market (Montag, 2005: 15). Montag, therefore, theorizes a necroeconomics where the state becomes the legitimate purveyor of violence: in this scenario, the state can compel by force by 'those who refuse to allow themselves to die' (Montag, 2005: 15). However, Montag's concept of necroeconomics appears to universalize conditions of poverty through the logic of the market. My concern however, is the creation of death worlds in colonial contexts through the collusion between states and corporations. 13. If states and corporations work in tandem with each other in colonial contexts, creating states of exception and exercising necropower to profit from the death worlds that they establish, then necroeconomics fails to consider the specificities of colonial capitalist practices. In this sense, I would argue that necrocapitalism emerges from the intersection of necropolitics and necroeconomics, as practices of accumulation in colonial contexts by specific economic actors - multinational corporations for example - that involve dispossession, death, torture, suicide, slavery, destruction of livelihoods and the general management of violence. It is a new form of imperialism, an imperialism that has learned to 'manage things better'. Colonial sovereignty can be established even in metropolitan sites where necrocapitalism may operate in states of exception: refugee detention centres in Australia are examples of these states of exception (Perera, 2002). However, in the colonies (either 'post' or 'neo'), entire regions in the Middle East or Africa may be designated as states of exception.

### Opportunity trap

#### The aff is caught in a double bind they are either a Cruel optimism, and no reform can take place or their reform is successful and collective actions block their hopes at success

this is the impact the opportunity trap

Sellar 16

Sam. professorial Research Fellow in the School of Education and Institute for Social Science Research "Leaving the future behind." Research in Education 96.1 (2016): 12-18. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0034523716664602> //gc

The opportunity bargain becomes an opportunity trap when the promise that education will make things better meets reality of education as a positional good that derives its value from scarcity. Education is presented as the best opportunity for social mobility, but pursuing this opportunity undermines possibilities for social mobility. The opportunity trap is a double bind. [O]ptimism is cruel when it takes shape as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the satisfactions they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies have come to represent. (Berlant, 2011: 51) When large numbers of people pursue the promise of opportunity through education their collective initiative can prevent the object of their desires being reached, but this promise has become embedded in the social contract and the collective imaginary as a source of optimism in itself. Even when they sense that a particular promise is unlikely to be kept, people cling to optimism, to hope that study and hard work will lead to something better, because it feels too uncomfortable to let go.

#### their solvency advocate falls into the opportunity trap as well🡪this guts their solvency

Sellar 16

Sam. professorial Research Fellow in the School of Education and Institute for Social Science Research "Leaving the future behind." Research in Education 96.1 (2016): 12-18. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0034523716664602> //gc

The opportunity trap is also a trap for educational researchers. Many academics in education departments have achieved social mobility through education and their subjectivities are shaped by a commitment to paying this opportunity forward. While the reproductive infrastructure of education has long been recognized by sociologists of education, the role that the optimism of educational researchers play in tightening the double bind of the opportunity trap has been given less consideration. Even when the opportunity trap is acknowledged, education research generally remains attached to the promise of optimism as such. This is the limit created by the image of educational thought. Educational research contributes to the opportunity trap to the extent that it promises, perhaps unavoidably, that education can be an opportunity for everyone. The opportunity trap is now doubled at the level of educational research by the introduction of impact as a measure of research quality. Research assessments in the UK and Australia link judgments of research quality to the demonstration of its benefit. In a field such as education, such measures promise new recognition for applied studies that make a difference in schools and communities. However, the impact of educational research is evaluated in terms of the social contract established by the politics of aspiration. Making a difference has come to mean making things better according to the dominant image of educational thought. And, as Brown (2003) argues, ‘There is a high degree of collusion with the rhetoric of ‘‘learning is earning’’ within the educational establishment, as schools, colleges and universities try to pursue their own positional advantage in the competition for students, resources and reputational capital’ (162)

### Queer NecroPTX

#### Investments in the state create the desire for its violent protection – certain populations become eligible for slaughter to create spaces for inclusion

Lamble 14 Sarah Lamble, “Queer Investments in Punishment” in *Queer Necropolitics*, pg. 163

Examining these queer investments in punishment and necropolitics, we can identify several recurring patterns. First, these trends suggest the emergence and expansion of a specifically queer penality. Although punishment is widely endorsed and socially sustained, it appears that LGBT organizations increasingly engage in citizenship claims that are explicitly bound up with punitive norms and values. The popularity of LGBT campaigns for the passage and enforcement of hate crime legislation, with the specific aim of increasing carceraI penalties for those convicted, sutures claims of queer safety and freedom to state practices of caging. Second, these trends reconfigure the neoliberal carceral state as the guardian of sexual citizenship rather than the perpetrator of violence. As Haritaworn argues: The redefinition of crime, security, and integration as sexual problems lends an intimate touch to the hard arm of the state. The move of LGBT activism into the penal state enables the police to reinvent themselves as protector, patron, and sponsor of minorities at the very moment that their targeting of racialized populations and areas is reaching new levels. (Haritaworn 2010: 83) In an era of neoliberalism, where faith in the welfare state has been almost abandoned, it is striking how much faith is placed in the carceral state’s capacity to dole out justice, particularly when the state itself has begun to acknowledge the limits of this capacity (Garland 2001). In this context, queer investments in punishment become mechanisms through which the state enlists LGBT subjects as responsibilized partners in the ‘co-production of security’ (Garland 2001: 124) and acquires consent and support for one of its most systemically violent institutions. Whereas law and order politics once belonged more firmly in a right- wing conservative agenda, policing and punishment in these contexts have been transformed into ‘symbols of social inclusion and care for sexual diversity’ (Haritaworn 2010). Third, these processes go hand in hand with the perpetual (re)invention of a dangerous Other, who is easily recognized through older tropes of criminality: the ‘homophobic Muslim’, the ‘working-class job’ or the ‘backwards immigrant’ (Haritaworn 2010). State recognition of the respectable, enlightened and worthy sexual citizen is thus produced through the reproduction of a dangerous Other who offers a scapegoat for the insecurities and vulnerabilities produced by the contemporary political economic order. The production of these dual figures works to entrench the dividing line between those who are marked for life and vitality and those who are marked for abandonment and death. In this way, LGBT investments in punishment can be seen to occur at multiple levels, through (a) discursive investments in the myths of the neoliberal carceral state (by endorsing rhetoric which equates community safety and violence prevention with state punishment and securitization politics); (b) affective investments in the racialized and classed politics of fear and danger (by invoking discourses of ‘dangerous others’ who threaten LGBT claims to citizenship and security); (c) labour investments in the neoliberal carceral state (by literally taking on the work of the carceral state through partnerships that provide training, develop criminal justice policy and undertake state-based criminal justice work) and; (d) financial investments in the expanding carceral state (by channelling community resources into practices of state punishment and by supporting policies that increase state spending on prisons and policing). These punitive trends arc not restricted to LGBT organizations, but are occurring more broadly within leftist and ‘progressive’ politics (Aharonson 2010). Feminists who advocate for the criminalization of sex work and trafficking, for example, have increasingly become engaged in what Elizabeth Bernstein (2010) describes as ‘carceral feminism'. Similarly, feminist anti-violence goals increasingly operate in tandem with ‘law-and-order’ politics and are used to justify increased imprisonment, policing and immigration controls (Bumiller 2008; Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2006). The issue is not simply that activist agendas have been co-opted by pro-criminalization agendas, but rather that social movements are redefining their politics in ways that actively infuse traditional recognition claims with punitive logics. These trends raise larger questions about why ‘progressive’ movements have turned to policing and incarceration as means for achieving movement goals, and why ‘law-and-order’ agendas that were previously associated with repressive politics have been reconfigured as signs of sexual justice. Do these trends stem from broader moves away from a politics of ‘liberation’ towards more rights- and recognition-focused strategies or have these movements always contained the seeds of punitive politics (Hanhardt 2008; Kunzel 2008; Spade 2009)? Are these trends symptomatic of broader changes in governance which reflect ‘cultures of control’ (Garland 2001) and ‘governing through crime’ (Simon 2007) or are they specific to particular elements of LGBT and feminist organizing? In what ways do these changes reflect movement desires to organize around achievable goals, combined with the state’s willingness to work more cooperatively with particular ‘minority’ constituencies (Moran 2007)? Exploring the specific reasons for these changes is beyond the scope of this chapter and warrants further empirical investigation; however, it seems clear that simple explanations of co-optation, false consciousness or social conservatism are insufficient to fully account for the complex and contradictory terrain of punitive sexual politics.

### Ressentiment

#### Ressentiment impact to liberal subjectivity (this card also takes out identity ptx with out liberalism as the root cause

Brown 95

Wendy. Professor in the Political Science department at University of California Berkeley, "States of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity." (1995).

"Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment. . . . But in its attempt to displace its suffering. identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will. not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury. now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by recssentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberalism establishes" (60-70).

### Violence against the other

#### In the construction of the liberal subject education is one of the key tools used for exclusion

Grayson 13

Kyle. senior lecturer in international politics at Newcastle University, "How to Read Paddington Bear: Liberalism and the Foreign Subject InA Bear Called Paddington." The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.3 (2013): 378-93. Itish Journal of Politics and International Relations. Web. 7 July 2017. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00506.x>.

A Bear Called Paddington provides a vernacular expression of bordering practices, their effects and their limits. It is both complicit in and critical of contemporary understandings of foreignness, liberalism and migrants, with Paddington being an exemplary foreigner under Honig’s (2001) schema. He functions through ambivalence, providing solutions to problems encountered by the liberal mise en scène while generating others that it has difficulty addressing. In some instances, he is negatively portrayed in ways that foreground hygiene, poverty and education as key aspects of his migrant subjectivity. These representations resonate in bordering practices that represent and treat the foreigner/immigrant as a socioeconomic threat, a harbinger of Malthusian demise, an eraser of cultural identity and a resource drain. These representations also help to shore up the perceived borders of the domestic and those said properly to inhabit its spaces by allowing for the articulation of an idealised self and community that is jeopardised and endangered. Threats provide citizens with ontological security, that is, security about their own identity, their rightful position in the world and who (or what) poses a danger to them. Less aggressively, foreignness can be used as a means of shoring up liberal institutions and values such as tolerance by making possible the extension of particular gestures that are understood as magnanimous and generous. In turn, these gestures also contribute to feelings of ontological security by reinforcing apositive view of liberalism—and the universal liberal subject. That these gestures are predicated on the recipient sublimating other forms of identity while accepting the limits of a moral economy that constricts the exercise of agency and autonomy of suspect subjects is also evident in the narrative of A Bear Called Paddington. Paddington can thus draw attention to the myriad insecurities underpinning liberal bordering practices of inclusion

#### Normalcy is a socially defined construct perpetuated by capitalism to create an Other

Anthony J. Nocella II, ‘08, Anthony J. Nocella II, Ph.D., and professor is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Criminology, Gender and Women’s Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, and Environmental Studies at [Fort Lewis College](https://www.fortlewis.edu/facultyexperts/FullStory/ArtMID/23965/ArticleID/1147570/Nocella.aspx), December 2008, " Emergence of Disability Pedagogy," Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.jceps.com/archives/583, BFMN

Much of the theoretical work on disability studies is centered around terminology because of the massive diverse array of imagery related to people with disabilities. There are two major tasks being initiated by the disability rights movement, the first of which is that they are not disabled, meaning they are not deformed, lame, broken, or have something wrong with them, they are perfect the way they are. This point has two subconcerns. First, that what is wrong is societies‘ exclusion of difference and the reinforcement of the social construction of normalcy (Fulcher 1999) which allows capitalism to expand and further exclude people with disabilities from all parts of life that deal with economics, which means everything, and second, until all are accepted in society, there is truly an identifiable group that needs assistance and that are challenged in the current exclusionary society we live in. The second main point is the theoretical understanding of all disability activists, which is the proactive revolutionary position that people with disabilities are not disabled, but that all people are different and have unique needs. This point is critical of society and its role in how people are identified: recognizing that “normal,” “average,” or “able” are all socially constructed terms that can and must be changed. Capitalism must also be critiqued because it contributes to this marginalization by developing the image of a consumer and producer. Capitalism, especially in its post-war consumer form, tries to reduce our humanity and citizenship functions to these two roles, both of which support capitalism; consumption supports the engines of production because people have to work to buy and ideologically capitalism captures their desires and support (Gramsci 1989; Marcuse 1969). Similarly, the concept of a productive employee, student, daughter/son, and parent must be critiqued. There is no measurement for an individual except within the context of himself/herself. Nothing is objective and able to be measured in a detached state. The disabled are not ill, sick, or diseased. They are different. A disease or illness is not part of ones characteristic or being. Let us take a moment to analyze some of the standard definitions of the names given to those identified as disabled. Let us first look at illness defined as, “Poor health resulting from disease of body or mind; sickness.”1 Now let us look at how diseased is defined, “A pathological condition of a part, organ, or system of an organism resulting from various causes, such as infection, genetic defect, or environmental stress, and characterized by an identifiable group of signs or symptoms.”2 It is also defined as, “A condition or tendency, as of society, regarded as abnormal and harmful.”3 Disability has traditionally been associated with illness and disease. Yet, this socially constructed meaning cannot be understood without examining the notion of normalcy. The “normal” is defined as “Relating to or characterized by average intelligence or development.”4 A standard dictionary type definition states that normalcy is “Free[dom] from mental illness; sane. Conforming with, adhering to, or constituting a norm, standard, pattern, level, or type; typical.”5 Fulcher (1999) writes, “disability is primarily a political construct rather than a medical phenomenon” (p. 25).

#### The systemic violence perpetuated by ableism causes impacts for everyone oppressed in this system, the only way to solve is through extra legal means.

Ellen Therese Reilly, 14, Doctor of Education from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, October 28, 2014, " Ableism in Education: A Case Study of a Student with Multiple Disabilities,” Dissertation of the author published by Virginia Tech, pages 19-23, accessed June 26, 2017, https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/51177/Reilly\_ET\_T\_2015\_support\_3.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y, BFMN

Perspectives of disability grounded in the social model add to the ableists’ position suggesting viewpoints of stereotyping “do more than discriminate; they oppress” (Gabel, 2009, p. 4). When people see disability as located inside the individual, they assume a dominant attitude over disabled people (Siebers, 2008). In other words, the abled person feels superior to the person with disability. Often, stereotyping occurs at great cost. As Siebers (2008) suggests, “people perceive when someone is different from them but rarely acknowledge the violence of their perception” (p. 55). The abled person’s perception of the disabled person has damaged and hurt the worth of the disabled person’s being, further isolating the person with the disability. Beliefs about people with disabilities have deep roots in the human psyche. As Freud suggests, violence is perpetrated because of the belief that people who suffer are narcissistic and incapable of loving anything other than themselves (Seibers, 2011). Hence, by Freud’s reasoning, when someone who is able ﬁrst meets someone who is disabled, s/he is inclined to believe that person is self-centered and unloving (Seibers, 2011). This diminishes, stigmatizes, and devalues the person with disabilities, justifying the position of the abled and their inclination to “lessen and label this person as a cripple, bastard, [and] moron” (Goﬂinan, 1963, p. 5). Goﬁ‘man (1963) summarizes this phenomenon as taking “. . .one piece of the person we ﬁnd imdesirable” and creating “more undesirable characteristics” (p. 5). In more modern times: the devaluation of disability results in societal attitudes that uncritically assert that it is better for a child to walk than roll, speak than sign, read print than read Braille, spell independently than use spell check, and hang out with nondisabled kids as opposed to other disabled kids. (Hehir, 2002, p. 3) Here, it becomes easy to see how Goffman’s phenomenon contributes to a climate of diminished expectations for people with disabilities. Disability theorists want everyone to understand that ableism “actually involves practices and attitudes that induce other forms of impairment and injury” (Campbell, 2009, p. 17). Due to this ableist belief/mentality, Hehir (2002) contends that ableist assumptions are pervasive in the education of children with disabilities. The ableist assumption “not only reinforces prevailing prejudices against disability but may very well contribute to the low levels of educational attainment and employment” (Heir, 2002, p. 4). This is evidenced in the fact that 17.2% of disabled adults who are in the working-age range are employed and 12.8% are tmemployed (U .S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). An unemployed person is one who is actively seeking work but at the time is not employed. The labor force participation rate is the ratio of the labor force and the national population of the same age range (U .S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). To provide a concrete example, in 2012 there was 1,353,800 people with disabilities out of 12,562,000 people with disabilities between the ages of 21 to 64 who were not institutionalized who were actively seeking employment. In the year 2012, a person with disabilities average median earning was $36,400 while a person without a disability averaged $42,400 (Disability Statistics, 2014). Table 2 shows that the unemployment rate for people with disabilities is double the rate of people without disabilities. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the year 2012 “persons with higher levels of education were more likely to be hired than those with less education” (U .S. Department of Labor, 2013). However, a person without a disability is more likely to be hired than a person with a disability, no matter their level of education. Diminished expectations for people with disabilities are relevant when it comes to US. schools. While there here have been positive steps towards an equal education for all students, the “ableist assumptions of performance can limit access to needed support and meaningful engagement with academic content ” (Ashby, 2010, p. 346). The goal of legislation since the 1970s has been “to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufﬁciency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society” (p. 395 Id. at § 702(b)(1)). However, without a right to an education, a person’s chances of leading an independent life, earning a livelihood, supporting a family, or contributing positively to society can prove to be complicated (National Council on Disability, 2005). Policy and legislative mandates allowed people with disabilities to enter mainstream society and the school system (National Coimcil on Disability, 2010). But, in many ways, these acts fell short of meeting the needs of people with disabilities because policy did not change public perceptions (Longmore, 2009; Scotch, 2009). Laws alone cannot change the attitudes of people who devalue and diminish the expectations of other people who are not like them (Campbell, 2009; Scotch, 2009). The review of disability-related legislation in the sections ahead explains how the gap between legislative intent and practical enactment has evolved in the ﬁeld of disabilities, particularly when it comes to education.

## Alts

### **Arrigo**

#### The alternative is a strategy of desistance, a deterritorialization of the flows of desire that overdetermine the status quo, an affirmation of the limitless potential inherent to every becoming. This refuses the static forms of politics and subjectivity that sustain the regimes of intelligibility which make the surveillance state possible.

Arrigo and Milovanovic 8[“Revolution in Penology Rethinking the Society of Captives,” Rowman & Littlefield: New York, Bruce A. Arrigo is professor of crime, law, and society in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, Dragan Milovanovic is professor in the Justice Studies Department at Northeastern Illinois University, 2008]

We have not attempted to provide a blueprint or to offer concrete proposals for a socius yet to come. As Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999, 190) proposes, the danger is that any preconceived socius may result in authoritarian outcomes. In other words, deviation from the conceptualization may be resisted and be regarded as counterrevolutionary. Hence, consistent with Deleuze and Guattari, we have suggested how certain lines of flight might emerge that undermine (deterritorialize) closure and capture so that a more liberating socius1 could develop (reterritorialize). To remain true to our position, we must accept the potentials that inhere within each of us and, as such, cannot in advance limit these becomings. Indeed, following Dyer-Witheford (1999, 191), "the aim should be to create a space where a diversity of social, cultural, and economic ways of being can coexist/'2 However, we still need to think through possible alternatives, weighing with appropriate ethical consideration the competing options to which we are drawn and for which the struggle, the revolution, in penology is sustained (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 191). In this direction, we are particularly mindful of some key suggestions, some "battlefield maps," offered bv Dyer-Witheford (1999, 192-218). We have seen that the war machine must engage various molar levels. At the more "micro" level, personal strategies for daily survival and challenge are needed. At the more "meso" level, alternative networks and organizations are desirable. At the more "macro" level, either a reformist remedial or radical reformist strategy is recommended (see Henry and Milovanovic 1996). We return to the constitutive elements of COREL sets/assemblages for guidance at these various "levels." We recall that each comprises (1) a material component ("machinic processes" that produce cuts and breaks or flows of matter/energy providing the raw material on which expressive forms work),3 (2) an expressive component (the manifest forms—discursive and nondiscursive), (3) terri totalization (tendency toward molar structurations and capture in the form of axioms), and (4) deterritotalization (tendency to differentiate, dissipate, break apart). We also recall that iteration and nonlinearitv prevail in terms of linkages and effects. Let us briefly provide some possible directions in producing change that may privilege active molecular forces and becoming. Suggestive at the more "micro" level is Massumi (1992, 103-106), who offers five recommendations. We provide some additional thoughts that augment and amplify his observations. 1. 'Stop the world/' Whereas being concerns stasis, repetition of the same, reactive forms of desire, becoming is about interruption, dis-connections, the creation of spaces within which new relations are (and can be) actively constructed. Thus, Mary's world, although attaining homeostasis and cyclical repetitions, must be interrupted, It is within the interruptions ("zones of indeterminacy") that epiphanies arise.4 Lacan's (1991) combined discourse of the analyst/hysteric., integrated with Paulo Freire's (1973) work on diaiogical pedagogy, indicates that interventionists, cultural revolutionaries, may be catalysts in accessing, mobilizing, and retrieving the subaltern's desire for more genuine expression. The suggestion here is not that these interventionists function as revolutionary vanguards armed with the "appropriate" understandings (master discourse) of struggle, alienation, exploitation, victimization, and the like; rather, they nomadically participate in engaged, ongoing dialogical encounters. 2. “Cherish derelict spaces" Within a socius and its molar forms, spaces always already exist that do not find themselves pacified—regimented, linearized, striated, axiomatized, These are "zones of indeterminacy" (Bergson 1998) where far-from-equilibrium conditions prevail, where with some perturbation dissipative forms will appear as emergents, These are "autonomous zones" that can be the basis of an alternative becoming. The autonomia movement in Italy during the 1960s and 1970s attempted to exploit this movement's revolutionary potential (see Negri 1984, 1999). Similarly, Foucault's5 later works addressed "limit experiences," He argued that the only genuine direction to recapture subjectivity was in transgressing the various boundaries/limits imposed (inscribed) on the body (see Miller 2000; Lyng 2005, 39^7). These transgressive moments, crossing boundaries, "involved experiments in self-creation . . , forms of resistance . , , acts of liberation" (Lyng 2005, 45^47). Moreover, critical race theorists have called for the creation of such alternative spaces within classroom settings where assumptions of the other can be challenged in supportive ways (Matsuda 1998). Attending to the subaltern, as with the case of Mary, is by definition about boundary crossing; still, this activity is continuously subject to the regimented molar expressive forms. However, within the edifice of repetition and larval reactive flows, cracks always exist within which alternatives may arise (Goffman 1961). In other words, these cracks can be the basis for replacement material ("machinic cuts") and expressive forms. Drucilia Cornell (1998) and bell hooks (1994) have also offered the idea of protections for an "imaginary domain." As Cornell (1998, 8, 111) notes, it "is the space of the 'as if in which we imagine who we might be if we made ourselves our own ends and claimed ourselves as our own persons." [t is the "location of recovery" (hooks 1994, 238), It is where we may imagine an otherwise, a becoming, a person yet to come.6 3. "Study camouflage/'' "Seeming to be what you are" allows the inhabitant of preconstructed identities (discursive subject-positions) to provide the illusion that she or he is in fact what is dictated, yet at the same time provides the person critical understanding of her or his molar restrictions. This is in accord with Richard Rorty's (1989) "liberal ironist," whereby molar categories are used in everyday practice but understood as the reifying entities that they are. How-ever, these molecular responses are easily transformed into their molar forms: one becomes that from which one previously remained distant. For the subaltern, then, the difficult task is to establish some distance from the identities forced upon the self: one is more than a category in all its expressive forms (consider Mary's categories as a poor, black woman); one's identity is not rooted in being but has potential in becoming. Desistance theory is evocative here as well. One's postcarceral adaptation will follow a nonlinear pathway but will provide numerous junctures for breaking out of the crime-prison-crime cycle that represents the pains of imprisonment. These singularities are the occasion for symmetry breaking and alternative lines of flight. Hence, camouflaging allows both outward-appearing acquiescence to regimes that would produce the docile body, while simultaneously making possible instances for a reexploration of the self, fleeting oc-currences of luciditv, turning points, coupling moments, and novel molecular flow.s 4. "Side and straddle/' "When in doubt, sidestep," says Massumi (1992, 106). In other wTords, given compelling daily moments to challenge repressive structures, and given the molar forces that police their form, failure often awaits those who on every occasion fight to dis-mantle the molar forms. However, waiting on the sidelines for the right battle may, over time, produce acquiescence and molar identifications. One's sword becomes rusted in the scabbard, and the occasion for its drawing may find diminished skills in its use. "Charging straight ahead may be necessary and effective at times, but as a general principle it is as self-defeating as uncritical [in its] acceptance of reform" (Massumi 1992, 106). In other words, stepping sideways may be more beneficial in the long run than constant daily challenges. This notion of "tranversality" is found in Guattari (1984, 2001) and in Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987). As Massumi (1992, 73) tells us, "An effectively revolutionary movement establishes many other circuits: reform-confrontation, molarity-minority, being- becoming, camouflage-showing oneself, rationality-imagination, and many permutations of these." In other words, for the subaltern and for the activist, developing the ability to transgress various boundaries while providing the appearance of a subject committed to her or his discursive subject-position is encouraged.7 5. "Come out." Massumi (1992, 106) advocates, "Throw off your camouflage as soon as you can still survive. What one comes out of is identity. What one comes into is greater transformational potential" In other words, molar identities must be discarded at opportunities for the development of molecular identities. It is here where machinic cuts and expressive forms find alternative development. For the subaltern, it may very well be that the daily violent imposition of static identities by social-control agencies regularly preclude "coming out." But moments exist in which a nonstatic identity may find expression, and these should be the basis of cultivation. To Maussumi's five suggestions, we offer several others^: 6. Seek and form alliances. Hardt and Negri's (2004, xiv) treatise on the "multitude" indicates that the global society witnesses increasing differences that cannot be reduced to a singular unity; "the multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences" (xiv). Accordingly, while commonalities can only be momentary, they are the basis of concerted and focused struggle. Postmodernity both produces ever more refined technologies for growth and control and the possibilities of reappropriating these resources for struggles. Thus, "network struggles" replace class struggles: the former represents a "polycentric" form of opposition^ it produces both "new subjectivities and new forms of life" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 83). The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas is a clear example. The new struggles, according to Dyer-Withe ford (1999, 187), "would involve constructing a system of 'multivalent engagement' between movements." And, following Guattari and Negri (1990, 123), "each of [these] shows itself to be capable of unleashing irreversible molecular revolutions and of linking itself to either limited or unlimited molar struggles" (see also Dyer- Witheford 1999, 187).Jt1 The key, then, becomes coming up with creative ways of developing linkages via the technological apparatus (i.e., Internet) that is transforming our lives. 7. Be a jazz player. Everywhere that formal rationality takes hold, we find the need to become members of harmonious orchestras. In response, some advocate instead that we become jazz players (Holland 1999), Improvisation in jazz does not necessitate a leader; rather, members vary their play within an overall developing motif (Holland 1999).EJ This conforms with nomadism and the rhizome as described by Deleuze and Guattari, This is not a repetition of the same (stasis) but a perpetual becoming, a continuous transformation of self, society, and other. It is a continuous investment in difference. In this direction, Braidotti (2002, 2006) has developed a postmodern ethics she terms the "ethics of sustainability." This version of moral contemplation and action argues against modernity's linear and unitary conception of the subject; instead, it advances a nonunitary notion ("nomadic subjectivity") as more productive than its counterpart, This nomadic subjectity as the embodiment of an ethic of sustainability regresses into neither relativism nor nihilism but is interconnected with alterity, community, contingencies, and experimentation. Only in this way can continuous transformations (molecular revolution, continuous becoming) be omnipresent and ubiquitous. Additionally, Braidotti (2002, 2006) indicates that it is an "ethic of accountability" that affirms active forces and positive passions conducive to becoming. Consequently, actions that sustain continuous molecular transformations are identified as those that should be advocated for and practiced. Conversely, those that arrest these expressions are deemed "unhealthy," 8. Invest in social judo. In response to harms of repression and reduction, rather than responding with further investments in hierarchical power to overcome, which adds to the overall harm, we advocate a social judo (see Henry and Milovanovic 1996).J- This is the power of domination turned against itself. Consider, for example, Foucault's (1977a) classic study of panopticism in which asymmetrical power relations have been born. More specifically, consider the panopticon designed by Bentham, a circular configuration with cells on the outside and a central tower in the middle for observation. Foucault showed how this was a new form of siuveiilance that was asymmetrical (the seen do not see the seers). Foucault overlooked, however, the inherent power of social judo within this scenario. An inmate, after being officially counted ("on the count": he is asked to step outside of his cell for an official body count), is told to return to his cell, and the cell doors then close. But what if he stands outside, be it alone, in an act of resistance?J3 In this instance, all—prisoners, guards, other staff, any civilians working, and so forth—will be witness to anything that follows. In other words, a symmetrical form of power has been reestablished, albeit only temporary. Social judo is a strategy that can reduce harms of reduction and repression by the act of challenging the asymmetrical forms of power without necessarily increasing the overall amount of harm inflicted. 9, Become-other. At the core of a socius is a point attractor, becoming- the-same, a continuously reinforced molar outcome. Becoming- other, becoming-minoritarian is a voyage toward otherness. It is re-leasing the body from stasis and opening it up to what it can do. It is a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It concerns "challenging conventional body boundaries, taking the risk of becoming indiscernible as a social subject and unsettling a coherent sense of personal self" (Lorraine 1999, 183; see also Grosz 1994), It is to place oneself in the molecular domain and among the active forces. It is to disrupt repetition and to embrace differences. It is to open oneself up to alternative lines of flight and new outcome basins as a result of symmetry-breaking bifurcations along the way. It is a death in the past and a rebirth to the future. 10. Be active; be joyful Not to be confused with the much popularized lyric "Don't worry, be happy," Deleuze's study of "what the body can do," focusing most especially on Spinoza and Nietzsche, identifies the joyful passion and the active as an ethical practice (see Hardt 1993). The body has both powers to affect and powers to be affected. Active affections are those that are connected with our powers to act (Hardt 1993, 92); passive affections are linked to the lack of that power. Active affections allow the body to move toward what it can do; passive affections mobilize the body to suffering and despair. Joyful encounters are those that add to the power to act (Hardt 1993, 94), Joyful passions arise from relations to others. Accordingly, we may draw from Nietzsche's ethic—become active—and from Spinoza's— become joyful (Hardt 1993, 96). Thus, for Deleuze's ethic: "Become joyful; become active" (Hardt 1993, 119). Admittedly, we might pre-maturely want to dismiss this ethic given the harms of repression and reduction that abound in the socius; however, moments exist in which this active joyful ethic can be cultivated and, with other culti-vations, can produce more empowerment, more elation—more lines of flight that are transformative. 11. Cultivate an ethic of care. A feminist ethic of care has been developed by Carol Gilligan (1982), Grace Clement (1998), and Nel Noddings (2003).14 It is a form of substantive justice that centers on context, uniqueness, attachments, human connectedness, the maintenance of relationships, mutuality, and the concrete other. These values stand in contrast to formal, abstract rationality and its concerns for formal equality or inequality. This care ethic signifies a duty to the other as recognized in the work of Emmanuel Levinas,1^ Jacques Derrida, and Francois Lyotard.16 Law and justice reflect different assumptions; law is more connected to economic calculation; justice is more connected to a gift. Justice is something we owe to the other and, hence, is never calculable.17 It is a duty bestowed without payment. This suggests that we cultivate a sense of otherness, even as a capitalist socius demands a rational calculating individual with only instrumental concerns for the other. This dialectical play is omnipresent; however, we advocate the development of a personal reorientation to the other, even while recognizing the formal rational forms of justice that abound. We need to think beyond the latter basin of attraction and intuit methods and forms by which the former predominate. We need greater experimentation in becoming- other.

### Biopolitical pedagogy

#### Radical biopolitical imagination of school spaces allows to incorporate students that disrupt the corporate time of schooling

Bourassa 11 – (Gregory N., Assistant Professor @U Northern Iowa & Ph.D. @U Utah, “Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism”, OISEUT, PG 8-10, Published 1/12/11, SL)

In what might initially strike some as a dizzying array of scholarship—ranging from aesthetics to utopian theories of education—the vast intellectual production of Tyson Lewis, I argue, is indispensable for any project of rethinking the educational experience. Lewis is, in my mind, the central figure writing about biopolitics and schooling today. His gallant efforts to piece together the biopolitical writings of Foucault, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri have led him to rethink the strengths and inadequacies of educational thinkers such as John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich. More importantly, Lewis’s writings exemplify a commitment to reimagining the space of the school in a biopolitical context. For example, whereas Giroux’s (2009) text serves predominately as a diagnostic tool for curriculum inquiry, the writings of Lewis (2007) propel the curricular imagination by not only confronting the logics of modern schooling, but by imaginatively mapping an **alternative theory of biopolitical education**. I will confine my analysis to three of Lewis’s recent essays, all of which explore biopolitics and schooling, and as I shall suggest, bear a particular importance for curriculum inquiry. The first essay, “Defining the Political Ontology of the Classroom: Toward a Multitudinous Education” (Lewis, 2008), critiques Hardt and Negri’s (2004) theorizing of the multitude—an internally different and insurgent global force that opposes the sovereignty of the new global form of rule, Empire. Lewis rightfully points out that Hardt and Negri not only utterly lack a theory of education, but they completely fail to acknowledge **youth as agents of the multitude**. The major shortcomings of this model offer, for Lewis, an opening to imagine a theory of education that retains the spirit of the multitude and its oppositional dimensions. Highlighting the various aims of modern schooling in its corrupt capacity as a people-building project, Lewis (2008) endeavors to reconceptualize **schools as spaces of biopolitical production** in which subjectivities oriented toward “**democracy in its ontological form**” are cultivated (pp. 255–256). Rather than administering populations, such schools would be sites of democratic engagement and struggle. Such a view of schooling is, for the most part, quite compatible with Pinar’s (2004) take on the educational experience. Both of their formulations are articulated against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s enclosure of the form and content of schooling. To this, Lewis (2008) calls for a mode of schooling for the multitude that “ceases to be predetermined by standards (no matter how flexible) and becomes a flexible, open-ended tool responsive to the needs and immediate interests of the multitude to increase the general intellect and the power to act” (p. 256). This way of thinking about biopolitics and curriculum as a temporal and spatial act of unfolding **shifts the focus of schools** in such a way that the “experiences of children are not to be alienated from the curriculum but rather integrated into the classroom through **shared, biopolitical group work** that involves the **reconstitution of the common**” (p. 257). While the project of reinventing common spaces in schools is essential, such a task also encounters major obstacles in a neoliberal context. The problem arises in that the economic and political imperatives of neoliberalism reduce spaces of cooperation and collectivity to the “colonial category of wastelands,” given that such spaces do not promote capitalism (Shiva, 2005, p. 25). In this sense, such spaces are simultaneously rendered discardable and threatening. There is a wild, overflowing, and inexhaustible power in the common (Hardt & Negri, 2009), and capital’s preoccupation with enclosing “wastelands” is a testament to this power. Clearly, curriculum inquiry must struggle with the biopolitical task of reinventing and nurturing the common, which in turn produces democratic subjectivities. Equally as clear for Lewis (2008), the common cannot be cultivated through a scripted market curriculum which—in deference to ritual testing—reduces complex relationships to cold, mechanical relations of instrumentality. In “Biopower, Play, and Experience in Education,” Lewis (2009a) suggests that social and educational life is balanced in the blurring of the boundaries between ritual and play. Lewis draws here from Agamben (2007), who defines ritual as that which “fixes and structures the calendar,” as juxtaposed with play, which “changes and destroys it” (p. 77). Of concern here for Lewis is the prevailing ritual of standardization which has inundated schools—especially those serving working-class students of color (Lipman, 2003; McNeil, 2000)—and depleted the spontaneous and imaginative possibilities of play. Even structured play, such as time devoted to recess, has been deprived from students in apartheid schools (Kozol, 2005). This is devastating as the significance of play resides in its transformative capacity to redefine the educational experience and activate new theories of value. More specifically, Lewis (2009a) argues that play produces a utopian-value “which cannot stabilize into the synchronic rituals of use or exchange but rather gestures toward an inherent potentiality within the present that is also in excess of the present” (p. 47). Here, play attains a subversive character in the terrain of neoliberalism. Not only does play violate the educational activity of testing, but it also opens up **the possibilities of enunciating** values that are antithetical to the logics of the market. In this context play inherits the status of a tactic “which must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). Thought of in these terms, play, as Lewis points out, is not something that should simply be promoted or incorporated within set parameters as a management strategy. On the contrary, play is messy and risky. It is a spontaneous “activity of self-expression and imaginative creation” that is both subversive to, and endangered by the totalizing ritual of standardization (Lewis, 2009a, p. 54). The task for curriculum theory and classroom educators is to imagine possibilities allowing for the reverberation between play and ritual to unfold. While Lewis importantly points to Agamben and Herbert Marcuse in his essay, I would contend that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2004) analysis of play is perhaps equally relevant here for the biopolitical classroom. Gadamer’s concept of play is profoundly relational and as such complements Hardt and Negri’s (2009) concept of the common. To be clear, it is the to-and-fro relational movement of Gadamer’s concept of play that most resembles Hardt and Negri’s common, and is therefore likely to cultivate biopolitical production, or the democratic subjectivities of the multitude. As de Certeau (1984) would suggest, play is always present, always emerging. Yet play, like the common, because it does not easily lend to exchange-value, is seen as wasteful through the lens of neoliberalism. Curriculum inquiry must struggle to validate and create spaces for play that are recognized as having educational value: not simply recess, or isolated time that is perceived as external to educational activity. For instance, collective play might entail spontaneous storytelling, artistic expressions, critiques of curriculum, and other reappropriations and co-constructions of common space and time. Ideally, such play would unleash a subversive social imaginary that connects and multiplies the energies and everyday understandings of dispersed, yet congealed, social existences. Such activities would rupture, or at the very least, temper, the “corporate time” of schooling (Giroux, 2009, p. 47), **transforming classrooms into venues for the struggle to reconstruct democratic life**.

### **Derrida**

#### **The 1AC is the attempted injection of life into a decaying political system – The aporetic violence at the heart of the law ensures its’ demise – The continued invocation of the law within deliberative forums makes possible the smooth functionings of legal positivism, at the expense of those deemed “other” – Vote neg to experiment with the unruly spaces outside the law**

Zacharias 7 ROBERT ZACHARIAS, Ph.D. student in the School of English and Theatre Studies at the University of Guelph, and a Fellow of the TransCanada Institute. “‘And yet’: Derrida on Benjamin’s Divine Violence”. Mosaic 40/2 (June 2007). Pgs. 104 – 116.

In order to properly understand the surprising structure of Derrida’s “Force of Law,” perhaps a quick overview of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” is in order. At first glance, what stands out in the essay is its orthodoxy: unlike so much of Benjamin’s work, “Critique of Violence” includes no enigmatic titles, no staccato theses, no prolonged digressions. Indeed, there is even a plodding and methodical argument, beginning with the essay’s central move, in which Benjamin steps back from considering the legitimacy of violence in specific cases to the question of whether violence itself can ever be considered just. For such a project, he argues that neither natural law (which suggests that the justness of ends guarantees the justness of means) nor positive law (which suggests that just means will always produce just ends) is sufficient; such arguments, he reasons, are part of a tautological logic of means and ends used by the political state to justify its monopoly on violence. Since “the most elementary relationship within any legal system is that of ends to means,” he looks for a space outside the structure of both positive legal philosophy and natural law, wherein he might consider acts of violence “within the sphere of means themselves, without regard for the ends in which they serve”(277). In his search for a place “outside,” Benjamin notes that the legal authority of the state hinges on a distinction that exists between “founding violence” and “preserving violence”; the authority of the state is established by an originary act of great violence that is considered separate and distinct from all the state’s other acts of violence, and which is meant to preserve its authority. Such a distinction cannot hold, he argues, for any moment of “founding violence” always, by definition, seeks to dominate, authorize, and preside over the moments to come, and, as such, always anticipates its preservation, just as it is always echoed and reiterated in the every act of “preserving violence.” Benjamin argues that this co-contamination of authorizing violences means the state exists in a condition of decay, always allowing for the very forms of violence that will, in time, rise up against it, found a new law, and begin the cycle anew. Describing a historical dialectic without Hegel’s teleological optimism, Benjamin writes that “the law governing their oscillation rests on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence represented by it. [. . .] This lasts until either new forces or those earlier suppressed triumph over the hitherto lawmaking violence and thus found a new law, destined in its turn to decay” (300). So far, so good: Derrida’s essay will follow Benjamin approvingly throughout this movement, right down to a shared analysis of how the death penalty and the spectral presence of the police affirm the decadence of the law; the bulk of “First Name of Benjamin” is spent elaborating on the various implications of this argument. A closer examination of the status of justice in the two writers’ essays offers some insight into the tension between Derrida’s essay and his post-scriptum. Benjamin argues that law-founding violence—the force that is used to establish a new law—cannot properly be considered violent because violence, specifically speaking, belongs to the symbolic order of law.As violence is the illegal or unsanctioned use of force, it depends, by definition, upon a structure of law by which it may be defined. For this reason, he argues that an act like a proletariat general strike is neither properly violent nor nonviolent, neither illegal nor legal, because, inasmuch as it attacks the very structure that distinguishes between such terms, it is prior to such distinctions. According to Benjamin, such acts have the potential to escape or even end the cycle of historical violence, for the truly revolutionary act would not seek to found or preserve any new (and necessarily violent) authority. That is, truly revolutionary moments—which Benjamin extends, strangely, to “the educative power” (“Critique” 297)—do not confront but disregard, and thus refuse to replicate, the dialectical gesture of traditional violence. “When not in the hands of the law,” Benjamin writes, an act of violence “threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law” (281). Provocatively interpreting Georges Sorel’s metaphorical call for an “apocalyptic myth” of a general proletariat strike as a literal intervention of the divine (see Sorel’s Reflections of Violence),Benjamin argues that since the proletariat strike is neither lawfounding nor law-preserving, it stands beyond the cycle of means and ends, constituting an act of “pure means.” If early in his essay Benjamin wrote that “the realm of ends, and therefore also the question of a criterion of justice, is excluded for the time being”(279),he has returned to justice with the arrival of the divine. As Peter Fenves notes, for Benjamin, the purity of divine means constitutes the enactment of justice that opposes the injustice of the legal system: “the politics of pure means enacts a destructive but nondivisive, hence divine, violence,” he writes. “Purified of all ends, the strike for which Sorel serves as a prophet makes way for the sole end that purifies itself of all means: justice” (46). Justice, then, for Benjamin, arrives by disregarding what is to-come. In “Force of Law,” Derrida follows Benjamin in tracing the receding authority of law back to the founding moment in which the violent origin institutes the law. Arriving at the same aporia as Benjamin, Derrida writes that “this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law.[...] [T]he moment in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss”(270). These revolutionary moments are frightening, Derrida suggests, because, having suspended all the categories of judgment and legality, we are left with no means to process, understand, or condemn them. As it is only the law-to-come that will justify the violation of the present law, the attempt at founding violence, a moment of lawlessness, is a moment of great vulnerability for the prevailing order—but also a moment of great opportunity for meaningful social change. Whereas Benjamin rushes to fill this void of uncertainty with the assurance of divine violence, Derrida lingers over this period of suspense, suggesting that, without this terrifying uncertainty, decisions we call “just” would merely be thoughtless applications of a pre-determined law (252). For Derrida, the uncertainty at the aporetic origin of law is the very possibility of justice. If Derrida’s indeterminate and strange reading of Benjamin’s essay can be said to position him near to the logic of the very things one must try to avoid, however, I would argue that this, too, is a key part of Derrida’s legacy, both critically and politically. “I do not know whether from this nameless thing that one calls the ‘final solution’ one can draw something that still deserves the name of a lesson,” writes Derrida. “But if there were a lesson to be drawn [...] the lesson that we could draw today—and if we can do so then we must—is that we must think, know, represent for ourselves, formalize, judge the possible complicity among all these discourses and the worst”(“Force”298). In both the form of its various presentations and the content of this essay, Derrida demonstrates that, in order to work honestly within the arena of ethics and politics, one is required to give up the safety of a predetermined end, and to be always working in close proximity beside “the very worst.” The indeterminacy required to be fully open to the possibility of meaningful ethical or social change also forces one to be open to the possibility of the arrival of its very opposites. For me, at least, the and yet of “Force of Law” is a reminder that part of Derrida’s legacy is to raise the stakes of conventional criticism, demanding that we hesitate before any action—not to refuse action by wallowing in indeterminacy, but rather to concede this dangerous indeterminacy even as we act**.** When we act, then, either as critics or caregivers, Derrida’s legacy reminds us that we must admit the possibility of something other, something that would be more just. It is to demand we recount, and take seriously, the power and risks inherent in the great ideas we casually toss about, with words such as freedom, equality, democracy, and, of course, justice. It demands we use such words carefully, understanding their close relationship to words like confinement, racism, fascism, and genocide. It is because we cannot fail to fall short of the demands of justice that we must anticipate, even encourage, the and yet to our every act or word. This lesson— this pedagogical aporia—is one that we must take not only from Derrida’s work, but also to it. To do less would be a disservice. Of course, there is a sense in which one could argue that every critic practices an “and yet, “in that critics often seek to clarify their own points by agreeing with someone else before offering their own critiques and revisions. What is important about his use of the and yet of his post-scriptum in “Force of Law,” however, is that Derrida does not simply agree with Benjamin before revising his work. Rather, the apparent indecision of this work speaks of a conscious willingness to remain in the moment of uncertainty. For Derrida, this moment of uncertainty, this location where agreement and hesitation collide, is not merely a middle to be acknowledged then left behind in the progress towards a larger point. It is, I would argue, not a means to an end at all, but rather, inasmuch as his search for justice stresses the importance of indeterminacy itself, the gesture of the and yet may be understood as expressing a desire to remain in the realm of indecision, a desire to suspend and defer the ends of the critical argument, moving toward something like a criticism of pure means. By pausing at the and yet, such a criticism refuses to condition, limit, and control its ends, remaining dangerously open to whatever may be to come. Let us continue to hope, as he did, that what is to-come may be justice.

### **Historicization**

#### **Vote negative to endorse a historicization of the West’s necropolitical underside – This is a destabilization of linear temporal narratives that attempt to impose coherence upon bodies and their affective potential – Entertain the unfolding archive of the present and its spectral excess**

Puar 7 Jasbir K. Puar, queer terrorist. “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times”. 2007. Pgs. Xvii – xx.

The tempo of always-becoming is in part what Achille Mbembe, writing about Africa as an anachronistic void, elucidates in his usage of ‘‘emerging time,’’ ‘‘time that is appearing,’’ ‘‘passing time,’’ and ‘‘the time of entanglement.’’ In his critique of telos, unilateral directionality, and the cyclical pattern of stability and rupture, Mbembe wants not only to claim time as nonlinear, an always already apropos move, but insufficient, he argues, given that nonlinearity has been embraced as chaos. Ultimately, he seeks to destabilize the opposition between stability and chaos, such that chaos is discharged from its semiotic resonance with violence, upheaval, anarchy. It is not to normativize chaos per se, nor to mark its production as aberrant, but to allow for what might issue forth from it, what it might produce, rather than to seek the antidote that would suppress it. It is also to disentangle political and social chaos from the terms of its conventional response, that of political urgency. This notion of political urgency, a temporality that problematically resuscitates state of exception discourses, suggests a particular relationship to temporality and change, inasmuch as it cuts across or runs against the grain of the ideal of laborious, ponderous, leisurely production of intellectual scholarship that can thrive only in the stable conﬁnes of a ‘‘room of one’s own’’ or a political climate that is not disruptive or tumultuous. No doubt this is, or was, a western concept of intellectual labor, mired in modernist yearnings for and fantasies about work, leisure, temporality, and spatiality. If we say that events are happening fast, what must we slow down in order to make such a pronouncement? If we delineate time as having a steady rhythm, what disjunctures must we smooth out or over in order to arrive at that conclusion? If we feel that things are calm, what must we forget in order to inhabit such a restful feeling? Terrorist Assemblages emerges as a story about various events that operate as both snapshots and ﬂashpoints: of September 11, torture at Abu Ghraib, the decriminalization of sodomy in the United States, the spate of racial backlash crimes against Muslims and Sikhs, the detention and deportation of suspected terrorists, and post-9/11 organizing. But both frames—snapshot, through its relation to history making and history vanishing, and ﬂashpoint, as a concretized movement from one incarnation of being to another—rely on the paradigms of past, present, and future**,** a before and an after, even if their inherent periodizations spill over, foreshadow and stalk each other, loop back recursively, return and relay, and scramble their attendant spatializing effects. As with all narratives of telos and periodization, such as those embedded in and endemic to modernity, to heterosexuality, to adulthood, temporal qualiﬁcations work to determine the intelligible sphere of scholarly legitimacy. How, then, to reassess the valuation of scholarly production emergent from apparent notions of stability, longevity, depth? Such a rethinking of the assumed shapes and temporalities of the labor of thinking and writing contributes to a broader global vision that does not erase profoundly uneven materialities of production in their manifold constellations. This is not to advocate a postmodern fetishization of anything quick, ﬂeeting, and superﬁcial, nor to deny that there is stillness in this writing. I have struggled to situate becoming-time as a collapsing of the binary frame of urgency, expediency, and politicality versus stability and calm, and move to a notion of becoming-time that allows for the force of the present in the ways of which Mbembe speaks, embracing the heteroglossia of public intellectual and intellectual activist modalities. The futures are much closer to us than any pasts we might want to return to or revisit. What does it mean to be examining, absorbing, feeling, reﬂecting on, and writing about the archive as it is being produced, rushing at us— literally, to entertain an unfolding archive? This question may lend an immediacy to the work, or it may emit a hollow ringing of the past that no longer feels pertinent; even more bizarrely, it may mean that the present is still unrecognizable to us. So while this is not a historical project, it is indeed a historicization of the contemporary moment, historicizing biopolitics of the now. This has meant in part less emphasis on historicization, or on the historicity of the biopolitical modes of surveillance, terror, war, securitization, torture, empire, and violence examined in this text, and a move toward collecting, shaping, and interrogating an archive that will be available for future historicization. This project is thus profoundly impelled by an anticipatory temporality, a modality that seeks to catch a small hold of many futures, to invite futurity even as it refuses to script it, distinct from an anticipatory **‘‘**paranoid temporality’’ that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick critiques. Sedgwick writes of paranoia, ‘‘No time could be too early for one’s having-already-known, for its having-already-been-inevitable, that something bad would happen. And no loss could be too far in the future to need to be preemptively discounted.’’ Paranoid temporality is thus embedded in a risk economy that attempts to ensure against future catastrophe. This is a temporality of negative exuberance—for we are never safe enough, never healthy enough, never prepared enough—driven by imitation (repetition of the same or in the service of maintaining the same) rather than innovation (openness to disruption of the same, calling out to the new). A paranoid temporality therefore produces a suppression of critical creative politics; in contrast, the anticipatory temporalities that I advocate more accurately reﬂect a Spivakian notion of ‘‘politics of the open end,’’≤∞ of positively enticing unknowable political futures into our wake, taking risks rather than guarding against them. In that sense it is also ensconced in an antedating temporality, an example of which is as follows: ‘‘The runner’s belief that he consciously heard the gun and then, immediately, exploded off the blocks is an illusion made possible . . . because the mind antedates the sound of the gun by almost half a second.’’≤≤ This book is an attempt at antedating the sound of the gun—that is, not only or primarily anticipating the future, but also recording the future that is already here, yet unknown but for a split second. Writing that ‘‘haunting is a constituent element of modern social life,’’ Avery Gordon asks us to contemplate ‘‘the paradox of tracking through time and across all those forces which makes its mark by being there and not being there at the same time, cajoling us to reconsider . . . the very distinctions between there and not there, past and present, force and shape.’’

### **Meme**

#### **The 1AC is a joke, at least the 1NC is a good one – Tear yourself from the shackles of history and meme the 1AC**

Hoffman 14 Christine Hoffmann, Pretend there’s a list of credentials here if it makes you feel comfortable. “Middling Through Somehow: Queer Temporality and the Disaster Meme”. Rhizomes, Issue 24, Fall 2014.

As inhabitants of a twittering, trolling, tumbling world, we might feel skeptical about any pedagogy that guarantees a complementary relationship between plenitude and order. Katherine Hayles writes shrewdly of the ways in which information (digital or otherwise) can be "equated with randomness as well as with pattern," the contraries "bound together in a complex dialectic that makes them not so much opposites as complements or supplements to one another" (25), but in the practice of everyday life, we may find ourselves too distracted by the noise to perform the necessary synthesis. As Time columnist Lev Grossman wrote in 2006, "[s]ome of the comments on YouTube make you weep for the future of humanity just for the spelling alone, never mind the obscenity and the naked hatred." Indeed, digital copia calls to mind not the solidarity of a common origin but the discordancy of a malfunctioning design. Even relatively inoffensive galleries of image macros suggest expansion unhinged from any complementary contraction. A tumblr page organized by hashtags has a structure to it, yes, but no real center. We tumble through a series of items organized in a sequence divorced from consequence. If tumblr could talk, it would stammer and stutter. If it could move, it would fall and keep falling. This is copia misused and mishandled, the kind of abundance that provokes not recognition of shared meaning but anxiety over unruly, outlying positions. Such injudicious expressions, Erasmus might say, ought to be disciplined back into consonance. Ideal readers, however, are not mortal ones. As Cave goes on to explain, to imagine time and texts as part of the same closed circle means that any artist interested in combining his own work with the discourse of ideal models is placed "outside the circle, in the postlapsarian space and time of his own composition. His project necessarily begins with a transgression: his desire to write challenges the ideal, presupposes the necessity of its replacement; his materials will be fragments of its dismembered corpse" (179). Mary Thomas Crane sounds similar warnings when she writes about humanist educators' failure "to imagine a safe way for texts to be assimilated into the mind and to transform it. If texts are only memorized, then their pedagogy remains superficial. If, however, they are more deeply absorbed and transformed, the imagination must come into play" (71). As I will argue, although memes are less rhetorically complex than the epic poetry celebrated in the early modern era, they position writers and readers in the same no-man's-land that Cave identifies for Renaissance humanists, and then inspire the same imaginative manipulation of closed models that Crane detects. Memes prepare us to contemplate our position outside a history that is divine or designed and inside an "unhistoricism" that is untimely and queerly accidental. Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon recently called for an "unhistoricism" within queer studies that would "violat[e] the notion that history is the discourse of answers" and present queerness as "resisting the strictures of knowability itself" (1609). The queerness of memes has its roots in the unknowingness that Goldberg and Madhavi wish to attach to queer projects. A resistance to knowability can first be spotted in the fact that the content of memes can be tracked, but not sequentially. That is, while their primary material may derive from an historical moment (a picture taken at a specific time, in a specific place), this material functions queerly, working "against the dominant arrangement of time and history" and instead "fold[ing] subjects into structures of belonging and duration that may be invisible to the historicist eye" (Freeman, Time Binds xi). Human beings turn time into history by accepting "the promise of sequence as the royal road to consequence" (Edelman in Dinshaw et al. 181), but the subjects of memes ignore this promise; they never come to know their history, never assimilate its fragments as part of a fixed system. Memes thus make room for a queer critique of the "teleological linearity" that means looking ahead to "revealed truth at the end of time or as the meaning of all time" (Dinshaw in Dinshaw et al. 186). Recognizing the queer time of memes is thus one way to violate traditional notions of history, to oppose theories of correspondence, and—as the last section of the essay will suggest—to discover a middle ground between ignorance and advancement. We can see queer time particularly well in a genre of image macros that I call Disaster memes: some looming threat or scene of catastrophe occupies the background of a disaster meme; the subject of the meme, meanwhile, might occupy the foreground or be dropped into the midst of the misfortune. [1] Disaster Girl, for example, became a meme after Dave Roth submitted to a contest a photo he took of his daughter Zoe "smiling devilishly" at the camera while a house burns to the ground behind her (Know Your Meme). As Disaster Girl, Zoe assumes sly responsibility for everything from the Titanic to the Hindenburg, from alien invasions to oil spills to the collapse of the housing market. Similarly flexible is Chubby Bubbles Girl, who we can see fleeing from dinosaurs, zombies, Hitler, Prince Charles, and much more. The subjects of disaster memes are both flexible and static—portable emblems to embellish any crowd shot or film still, always ready to be dropped into a scene, so that every disaster might be Disaster Girl's doing, and every threat imaginable might threaten Chubby Bubbles Girl. In their portability and repeatability, subjects of disaster memes relate to time queerly, for they refuse the "logic of time-as-productive" (Freeman, Time Binds 5). Elizabeth Freeman explains the "novelistic framework" demanded by normative historiography, where "having a life"—having meaning—"entails the ability to narrate it ... as event-centered, goal-oriented, intentional, and culminating in epiphanies or major transformations.... [T]he past seems useless unless it predicts and becomes material for a future" (Time Binds 5). While even disaster can be normatively productive when it fits inside a novelistic framework—for catastrophe culminates necessarily in the major transformation of an end (death, loss, extinction, apocalypse)—Disaster memes refuse to produce the future each one predicts. Or, to put things more precisely, they produce all their possible futures, so that each new meme is haunted by the end(s) of the memes that came before. If Bubbles Girl is doomed to anything, it is not to death by zombie or grope by John McCain, but to a narrative that denies normative temporal progress—one that haunts instead of hastens, echoes instead of ends. Indeed, each threat she faces is equally threatening. Help! Tornados! Ack! Cardinals! Yikes! Militarized Police! Disaster memes deal in the abject and deject rather than the object and subject. Consider the template or "paper doll" versions of Disaster Girl or Chubby Bubbles Girl. Always and already they are engrossed in a space of fluid catastrophe—a white background is enough to inspire the Bubbles Girl's flight. She is "affected by what does not yet appear to [her] as a thing" (Kristeva 10). This is the abject, "a wellspring of sign for a non-object" (Kristeva 11), so powerfully unstable that it produces the effect of the sign before the sign is constituted (the reaction to the disaster before the disaster appears). Like the sublime, the abject "is a something added that expands us, overstrains us, and causes us to be both here, as dejects, and there, as others..." (Kristeva 12, emphasis original). Something similar could be said about what it is that makes Disaster memes more instructive than other visual memes; they offer "a productive disbelief in the referential object, a disbelief strong enough to produce some kind of pseudo-encounter with it that isn't worried about the pseudo" (Freeman, Time Binds 14). Chubby Bubbles Girl encounters a string of annihilations—destruction of innocence, property, life, limb, even the whole world; she is a looping, loopy character, "on a journey without a telos" (Halberstam 81). But as we tumble our way through a Bubbles Girl gallery, we might see that, though she doesn't appear to be getting anywhere, she is nevertheless making her own way—a queer way, in fact. For as deject, Bubbles Girl strays into and out of time and history; with her in its midst, history itself seems astray—something that might be led, after all, in a different direction, something that might veer off after the right sort of bait, something as interested in pseudo-encounters as with legitimate ones. While the obvious purpose of many Disaster memes is to comically substitute verified history with an absurd version (No iceberg sunk the Titanic! It was a 7-year-old girl!), their more obscure and insurgent purpose has to do with history as the domain of answers. Comically but challengingly, Disaster memes paint history as fragmentary and unknowable when they suggest that anyone might have been there, in the midst of an event, her experience left unrecorded, or that anyone might stray into our textbook summaries of the past, (re)making them incomprehensible. More importantly, the incongruously placed meme deject not only invalidates the authentic history that the un-doctored visual serves to represent, but also floats the possibility that our histories invalidate themselves, that every element, in every history "lesson"—be it a photograph, news article, lecture, textbook chapter, etc.—might already be a rogue element, one that resists correspondence with the larger design into which it has been placed. Nothing impresses Maroney: not atom bombs or double rainbows or trips to the Oval Office. A deject always already rejecting the histories that enfold her, Maroney is the face of middleness, an exemplum for what it is to be in a middle that is not middle to anything. A stray leading history astray—like Donne's "shee," like all our meme dejects—she transforms her viewers into queer subjects, positioned to encounter copious amounts of cultural and historical moments as dispersed parts that do not add up to a whole. And Maroney is a perfect mascot for middleness precisely because she is so resolutely unimpressed; her apathy communicates something more deviant than Disaster Girl's cunning or Bubbles Girl's alarm. Maroney can stand in the middle of a crowd and not be a part of it. Her position is lonely, unenviable, and powerful, for to stand where Maroney does is to stand in an un-assimilable, nontemporal zone, not just out of place but out of touch with time. Out of sympathy with it. As Kate Thomas writes, "[i]f communication is about getting in touch, it is also very much about being pleasurably, desiringly out of touch," a position that, in turn, "form[s] a methodological bridge toward a ... quite different project, one about being out of time" (71). This is the kind of radical break with time and relationality that Lee Edelman endorses in his work on queerness, which he understands as excessive and irreconcilable to optimistic anticipations of any less insistently consonant future: we should expect it [queerness] to refuse not only the consolations of reproductive futurism but also the purposive, productive uses that would turn it into a "good." We're never at one with our queerness; neither its time nor its subject is ours. But to try to think that tension, to try to resist the refuge of the "good," to try to move ... into the space where "we" are not: that is a project whose time never comes and therefore is always now. (Edelman in Dinshaw et al. 189) Certainly Maroney seems to embody the paradoxical position Edelman outlines, in that every space she inhabits is a space where she is not. Unlike Edelmen, however, I do see purposive uses for Disaster memes and for Disaster Girls, uses that one more early modern example can elucidate.

### Necropedagogy

#### Necro-pedagogy requires a critique of schooling that promotes educational extinction – to recognize the sovereignty that produce apartheid schools that are sites of death

Bourassa 11 – (Gregory N., Assistant Professor @U Northern Iowa & Ph.D. @U Utah, “Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism”, OISEUT, PG 8-10, Published 1/12/11, SL)

From Illich to Agamben,” Lewis (2009b) offers a devastating critique of modern schooling. Similar to Giroux’s (2009) task of understanding a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability, Lewis (2009b) stresses the importance of understanding “a theory of ‘necropedagogy’ or a pedagogy that promotes a certain form of educational extinction or disqualification according to a sovereign ban” (p. 29). The power of Lewis’s theory of necropedagogy resides in his emphasis on the shift from cultivating students’ potentialities to the practice of engaging in forms of educational abandonment, in which students are pushed to the margins. Here, Lewis is able to illustrate the limitations of solely relying on a theory of disciplinary power, which is unable to account for forms of **educational exclusion and the persistence of a sovereign ban**. Working through a theory of biopower, Lewis reassesses the role of sovereignty in modern schooling, highlighting the ways in which it functions with neoliberal logics to determine whether or not particular populations are **worthy of educational** and social investment. By focusing on the logics of neoliberalism and biopower, Lewis is able to discern the death-function, or sovereign decision, that is embedded within the structure of modern schooling. According to Lewis (2009b), The sovereign decision is in other words a decision based on a cost-benefits analysis concerning long-term social payoffs of educating certain bodies over and against others. The economic calculus that functions within the biopower of the state acts as the sovereign determinate indicating which bodies have become socially superfluous. Thus, social abandonment lies at the very heart of the logic of social investment and a governmental logic of self-regulation. (p. 32) Here we can trace the similarities between Lewis’s theory of necroschooling and Giroux’s theory of a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability. Again, neoliberalism as an economic and political project meets biopolitics in the sphere of schooling, resulting in the sovereign determination of the educational life and death of populations. As Giroux (2009) illustrates, following Foucault’s lead, racism, and more specifically White supremacy, is foundational to the functioning of biopower and the sovereign decision over educational life. In contrast to Giroux, however, Lewis is compelled to confront the relation between the camp and the school. Borrowing from Agamben’s writing on camps, Lewis provocatively considers the educational space of schooling in relation to sovereign force. Using the camp as a metaphor for “apartheid schools” invites a productive line of questioning and positions **schools as sites of biopolitical struggle** where the production of forms of life and death unfold. For instance, we can ask how and why apartheid schools, which should be regarded as sites of great possibility and heralded as centers that nurture and cultivate bios, often come to resemble warehouses that produce forms of death, sites where youth are reduced to the status of zoe¯. Such questions help to highlight the dissonance between the proclaimed universal goals for schools and the reality that many youth of color experience in camplike apartheid schools. Important for consideration here is that Agamben’s theoretical construction of the camp as a paradigm is less concerned with the camp as a “historical fact,” or “anomaly belonging to the past,” and more interested in how the logics of the camp have become “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still living” (p. 166). In other words, considering schools as sites of educational encampment is not to suggest that the horrors of Auschwitz are replicated in public schools. Rather it is to locate the mechanisms of biopower and sovereign force that are embedded in the logics of modern schooling. Though many will likely resist Lewis’s consideration of schools as a space of educational encampment, his analysis should be taken absolutely seriously. For instance, as Paul Gilroy (2000) explains, “As it moves toward the totalitarian condition of permanent emergency, the camp is shaped by the terrifying sense that anything is possible” (p. 84). Schools, especially those serving students marginalized by race and class, are increasingly vulnerable to the logics of permanent crisis and a state of emergency. In such a context where the distinction between prison and school is collapsed, the extralegal abuse of authority is abundant. Consider Alexa Gonzalez, a 12-year-old student in New York City who was recently arrested and escorted out of school in handcuffs for doodling on her desk, “I love my friends Abby and Faith. Lex was here 2/1/10” (Chen, 2010). Lewis’s theory of necroschooling and educational encampment enables educators to better understand such an event, along with the imposition of zero-tolerance policies (Ayers, Dohrn, & Ayers, 2001), which impose a sovereign ban on the educational life of marginalized students. While only providing a partial outline of these three essays, the above hopefully offers a portrait of the vast thought that Lewis is able to offer through a biopolitical framework of schooling. Drawing off these ideas and those of Giroux, the following section will aim to make more apparent the implications of a biopolitical reading of curriculum and what it might entail.

### **Posthumanism**

#### **The alternative is an affirmation of the Posthuman – this disarticulation of the subject at the heart of modern politics is key to override majoritarian dominance, the systems of order and intelligibility that recreate modes of bodily coding, constricting subjects to isolated “dividuals”, gridlocked within the prototypical stasis of the liberal subject**

Hanafin 14 Patrick, Professor of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London, UK. He has been a visiting professor at the School of Law at the University of Porto, Portugal, and at the Law Faculty at the University of Pretoria in South Africa. He has held research fellowships at the European University Institute in Florence and at the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, *The Subject of Rosi Braidotti*, pp. 214-220

In this chapter I examine the potential of Rosi Braidotti’s work for a rethinking of the relationship between norm and life. In doing so, I proffer the possibility of a micropolitics of posthuman rights that subverts the majoritarian model of human rights, figured as a certain kind of thinking of the human (constructed as a white neoliberal male). Such a contestatory micropolitics of rights is one that is practiced by embodied beings who act to reshape their position in relation to both law and biopower. In Braidotti’s thought, the figuration of an active citizen can be seen in the multiple locations of the struggles of social movements from feminism to environmentalism. In locating her rethinking of subjectivity and ethics in actually existing political struggles, she engages in a conceptual move from the “what” that she would term the transcendental arrogance of the subject, to the “who” of the complex singularities of the transversal subject. As Braidotti observes: The kind of “self” that is “styled” in and through such a process is... an embedded and embodied set of interrelations, constituted in and by the immanence of his or her expressions, acts and interactions with others and held together by the powers of remembrance: by continuity in time. (Braidotti 2006, pp. 251-2) Braidotti, in other words, is engaged in a project of rethinking the political in a manner that gives body to each unique individual in order to undo the conceptual default setting of political subjectivity as the disembodied transcendent subject. In this conceptual remapping of the subject, we witness an active refusal of disembodiment. This is a politics and ethics of becoming something other than how we are defined by the biopolitical order. Braidotti’s thinking of a differential “we” rather than a possessive individualist “I” assists us in dismantling the imposed “what” of the masculine subject of rights. This hegemonic model is informed by a vision of social relations that valorizes male power and neoliberal capitalist social organization. Braidotti’s project presents us with a means of transforming the political order through the critical refusals of social movements and resistant individuals. This is an intriguing intervention in debates on biopolitics and allows us to think of a micropolitics of life as zoe (as material embodied singularity) that contests the ordering molarpolitics of Life as bios, (understood as transcendental and always already male). This micropolitical encounter with the law undoes the imposition of a biopolitical ordering on individuals and allows them, through their own continuous intervention in the domains of law and politics, to perform an active and contestatory form of citizenship, which leads to “a dispersed and active process of reordering—indeed, reconstituting—knowledge and society” (Jasanoff 2011, p. 290). From human rights to posthuman rights Braidotti’s work allows us to think human rights differently, this time as posthuman rights, a praxis of relations between singular embodied beings, engaged in a project of transforming communities from below. In her book Transpositions (2006g), Braidotti critiques Peter Singer’s utilitarian liberal model of animal rights. This critique allows us to open up a minoritarian thinking of rights as posthuman. In her argument, she notes that Singers model of animal rights is tantamount to a becoming-human of animals (Braidotti 2006g, p. 107). According to Braidotti, Singer’s model contains the same flaws as those of the traditional liberal model of rights as applied to humans, that is, it is a majoritarian model of rights informed by a notion of social relations that valorizes male power and capitalist social organization. In such a model, animals can hope to have rights only if they become human or almost human. This becoming human of animals fails to recognize the singularity of animals as such, just as the liberal rights model, more generally, fails to see the singularity and differential nature of human beings. Thus, in order to be included within the protective clothing of liberal rights protection, one must first divest oneself of one’s singularity and become human, where human is figured as the abstract and always already male subject. The alternative model proposed by Braidotti is premised on philosophical nomadism and holds that “no qualitative becoming can be generated by or at the center, or in a dominant position. Man is a dead static core of ego-indexed negativity” (Braidotti 2006g, p. 107). It is the becoming animal of the human, rather than the becoming human of animals that helps us to move beyond the trap of making rights discourse another form of subjection under the guise of emancipation. Braidotti’s model assists us in transforming the default setting of liberal rights discourse into a relational notion of rights that takes account of our relation to other citizens, animals, and the environment.

### Whatever-being

#### The alternative is an embrace of whatever-singularity – A politics of deviance from established modes of sovereignty that affirms the potential and value of that which is radically other

Robinson 11(Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Giorgio Agamben: Destroying Sovereignty”, January 21th, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-giorgio-agamben-destroying-sovereignty/, *wcp*)

This imperative leads Agamben to construct an alternative account of politics. Since sovereign power is based on the separation between bare life and politically recognised life, its destruction requires overcoming the division, constituting a form of bare (or biological) life which is also the site for its own form of political life, or which is wholly exhausted in bare life and does not require a supplementary political dimension. It must refuse any external decision, any logic which splits bare life from something else, and thereby take away the sovereign power to decide or ‘ban’. In other words, it requires that bare life be autonomous and self-validating**. Bare life must claim the ability to value itself directly**, without the mediation of sovereignty. The overlap of this view with Deleuzian network-based critiques of hierarchies, autonomist ideas of self-activity and self-valorisation, and anti-representationalist strands of anarchism such as Immediatism is extensive, and helps explain why Agamben’s concepts periodically pop up in insurrectionist texts. Agamben proposes ‘whatever-singularity’ as an alternative basis for political action, which escapes the logic of sovereignty. Taken from Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, a singularity is something which is unique and which can’t be reduced to a measurement or representation. Agamben likes it because it avoids his having to choose between universality and particularity. “Whatever” in English has unfortunate overtones of indifference (“whatever, talk to the hand”) which is not at all what Agamben means. Rather, **he is referring to something mattering whatever it is,** always mattering regardless of what it is – as opposed to the sovereign decision to divide life into things which matter and things which don’t. A “whatever-singularity” is neither reducible to its attributes nor expressible as an abstract generality such as universal humanity; rather, it is something which has general value as it is, with all of its attributes (and especially, as potentiality or possibility). It does not depend on any standard of conformity or subjectification or normality, or on belonging to the people or masses. It also denies that there is any particular essence which makes people human – instead, being human is a scattering of singularities. Whatever-singularity is also a kind of being which people are assumed to already have, which for instance motivates resistance to being normalised. In a sense, this is a radicalised version of human rights discourse, since anyone, whatever they are and whatever they do, is recognised as having a kind of autonomous ethical value. This is fundamentally an ethics of ‘letting be’ (with overtones of ‘being who you are’). It entails doing away with normativity as usually defined, with standards of good and evil which declare certain people to be valueless because of some particularly heinous deviant act they’ve committed (in contrast to the more common approach of either contracting normativity to cover a smaller range of acts, or altering it to focus on oppressive abuses). For instance, Agamben argues that ideas such as guilt and responsibility are derived from legal thought and hence from sovereignty. The ethical challenge Agamben poses is to still view every person – and, in line with the discussion in The Open, every animal – as fundamentally valuable in their own life, as having forms of life and particularity worthy of respect and autonomous existence, regardless of how ‘bad’ they are or what ‘crimes’ they commit. In effect, Agamben aims to take away, through choices in terms of language, ethics and philosophy, **the threat posed by others’ ethical judgements in constituting a person or being as vulnerable**. This does not remove human vulnerability per se, but does remove the particular risk of being made into homo sacer. It does, however, leave a particular ethical problem: are agents of sovereignty also to be treated as ‘whatever-singularities’, or as the negation of all such singularities? The ‘coming community’ corresponds on a collective level to ‘whatever-singularity’. It is related to the ‘people to come’, a concept Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Bergson, and to messianic ideas of a coming liberation. Agamben refers to the coming community as a form of social togetherness which is also a ‘non-state’ and is counterposed to the logic of sovereignty. The coming community is defined in Agamben as a kind of post-consumerist condition, emerging from a passage through current forms of life, such as **the indifference of mass media images and of commodities through which one can reshape one’s identity**. It passes through and beyond such forms of life by radicalising their challenge to normativity and sovereignty. It is not a hybrid space – hybridity is already actualised in homo sacer and the sovereign – but rather, a negation, the ‘un-man’. It is based on ‘whatever-singularities’ in their antagonism with the state and sovereignty (hence it cannot seek to seize state power). Agamben believes that whatever-singularities can form communities without affirming ‘representable conditions of belonging’ (such as laws, norms, etc). It also does not rest on categories of identity (even the identity of excluded or marginalised groups), which for Agamben, remain trapped within old forms of politics which reproduce sovereignty (mainly because the recognition of an identity is necessarily separate from the processes of life which constitute it). In conditions of sovereignty, **life has to separate itself from the orders of subjects and objects, to free itself from biopower and from hierarchical relations with living things,** to become whatever-singularity and to attain radical immanence. In Potentialities, Agamben argues for an almost Buddhist stance of contemplative separation which preserves instead of deciding. Agamben’s stance also has a revolutionary aspect. Rather than starting from identity, Agamben’s ethical theory starts from the standpoint of bare life. In Remnants of Auschwitz, **Agamben argues that the ethical standpoint from which one should start is provided by the experience of concentration camp inmates**. More precisely, it should start from the standpoint of the most abject sub-group of inmates, the so-called Musselmanner who were near death and had lost the will to live, who hence embodied directly the idea of bare life. This is because of a particular moment of inversion. The moment of catastrophe is taken also to contain the moment where salvation becomes possible, with passage through the low point of the current expansion of sovereignty acting as a transition to liberation. This is a rather strange argument, but based on a viable observation: that only when the logic of sovereignty is fully unfolded (only when we are faced with a giant tree instead of a sapling) does the nature of the problem – or the nature of what needs to be got rid of – become clear. **This also means that, in Agamben’s view, liberation is ambiguously tied to sovereignty, as its negation.** In a sense, therefore, Agamben remains within a Marxist model of historical becoming. Richard Day has expanded Agamben’s argument, claiming that social networks of marginalised groups are already ‘coming communities’, and also that the term should always be kept plural. He views the Marxist element in Agamben’s thought as unhelpful, arguing that post-consumers are not the most likely source of the coming communities. Another aspect of the coming community is that, on one level, it is a very small shift. Inspired by Jewish theology and authors such as Walter Benjamin, Agamben draws on messianic ideas of a total transformation of the existing world into a different world through a small gesture, the addition of an aura, or a new way of seeing. In a sense, everything stays as it is, and yet is rendered different by the removal of the transcendent moment of sovereignty.

## At:

### At: classroom/ debate good

#### Debate is not a site for fugitives – you don’t steal from debate, debate steals from you

(in soviet Russia, you don’t steal from the university, the university steals from you)

McKittrick, 2014 – Professor of Gender Studies @ Queen's University in Kingston Ontario. Peter Hudson interviewing Katherine McKittrick. (Katherine; “*The Geographies of Blackness and Anti-Blackness: An Interview with Katherine McKittrick*”; Online PDF; <http://www.katherinemckittrick.com/download/hudson_mckittrick.pdf>; DOA: 7/6/15 || NDW)

On twitter, you (depressingly, brilliantly) wrote, “I’ve never glimpsed safe teaching (and learning) space. It is a white fantasy that harms.” I’m wondering if you could expand on that as it pertains to the Black student in Canada? How does such a vexed space inform your own pedagogical practice?Yes. I wonder a lot about why the classroom should be safe. It isn’t safe. I am not sure what safe learning looks like because the kinds of questions that need to be (and are) asked, across a range of disciplines and interdisciplines, necessarily attend to violence and sadness and the struggle for life. How could teaching narratives of sadness ever, under any circumstances, be safe!? And doubled onto this: which black or other marginalized faculty is safe in the academy, ever? Who are these safe people? Where are they? But there is also, on top of this all, an underlying discourse, one that emerges out of feminism and other “identity” discourses that assumes that the classroom should be safe. This kind of “safe space” thinking sometimes includes statements on course outlines about respect for diversity and how the class (faculty? students?) will not tolerate inappropriate behavior: racism, homophobia, sexism, ableism. This kind of hate-prevention is a fantasy to me. It is a fantasy that replicates, rather than undoes, systems of injustice because it assumes, first, that teaching about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia can be safe (which is an injustice to those who have lived and live injustice!), second, that learning about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia is safe, easy, comfortable, and, third, that silencing and/or removing ‘bad’ and ‘intolerant’ students dismantles systems of injustice. Privileged students leave these safe spaces with transparently knowable oppressed identities safely tucked in their back pockets and a lesson on how to be aggressively and benevolently silent. The only people harmed in this process are students of colour**,** faculty of colour, and those who are the victims of potential yet unspoken intolerance. I call this a white fantasy because, at least for me, only someone with racial privilege would assume that the classroom could be a site of safety! This kind of privileged person sees the classroom as, a priori, safe, and a space that is tainted by dangerous subject matters (race) and unruly (intolerant) students. But the classroom is, as I see it, a colonial site that was, and always has been, engendered by and through violent exclusion! Remember Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy?! How wretched are those daffodils!?! I am not suggesting that the classroom be a location that welcomes violence and hatefulness and racism; I am suggesting that learning and teaching and classrooms are, already, sites of pain. We cannot protect or save ourselves or our students by demanding silence or shaming ignorance or ‘warning’ the class that difficult knowledge is around the corner (as with “trigger” moments—the moment when the course director or teaching assistant says: “look out, I need to acknowledge a trigger moment that will make you uncomfortable: we are going to talk about whiteness!”) All of this, too, also recalls the long history of silencing—subalterns not speaking and all of that. Why is silencing, now, something that protects or enables safety? Who does silence protect and who does silence make safe and who does silence erase? Who has the privilege to demand tolerance? In my teaching, although this is a day-to-day skirmish for me because the site where we begin to teach is already white supremacist, I try very hard to create classroom conversations that work out how knowledge is linked to an ongoing struggle to end violence and that, while racist or homophobic practices are certainly not encouraged or welcome, when they do emerge (because they always do!) we need to situate these practices within the wider context of colonialism and anti-blackness. This is a pedagogy wherein the brutalities of racial violence are not descriptively rehearsed, but always already demand practical activities of resistance, encounter, and anti-colonial thinking.

### At: Empirics/Falsifiability

#### Don’t do this to yourself

Mutz 8 (Diana, Department of Political Science and Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania, “Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 11: 521-538)

Falsifiability is probably the single most intransigent issue in getting normative theory and empirical research to speak to one another in the realm of deliberative theory. Several problems conspire to make deliberative theory elusive in this respect. For some theorists, deliberation is simply defined as intrinsically good. Obviously, such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant (see, e.g., Stokes 1998). But even without the assumption of intrinsic goodness, more complex problems hinder the interaction between empirical studies and political theory. It is difficult to envision an empirical test that might produce evidence construed by theorists and empiricists alike as disconfirming the claims of deliberative theory. This is because deliberation falls short on many of the standards deemed essential to good social science theory, at least as the theory is currently construed. Beyond the general issue of falsifiability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for productive social theory that are enumerated in virtually any textbook: 1. clearly defined concepts; 2. specification of logical relationships among concepts within the theory; 3. consistency between hypotheses and evidence accumulated to date. It is, of course, unfair to criticize a normative theory for lacking the characteristics required of productive social science theory. But criticism is not my main purpose. Instead, I want to take seriously the admonition that the two subfields should talk to one another. To make a dialogue possible, this normative theory must be translated into the terminology of empirical social science and must then be subjected to the standards of theory testing within the social science tradition. It is crucial to address these three problems in order to accumulate useful empirical evidence on the potential of deliberative democracy. Social scientists generally define “theory” as a set of interrelated statements intended to explain and/or make predictions about some aspect of social life. Toward those ends, a good theory is supposed to have well-defined constructs of general theoretical interest. It is supposed to describe logical associations among these constructs (which are most often causal associations), and it should allow for connections between the theoretical constructs and observable entities. When theories cannot meet these three criteria, they are generally unproductive in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of interest.2 What happens when empirical researchers attempt to translate deliberative theory into these terms? First, as Thompson points out, they discover a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. Moreover, the definitions offered by theorists frequently conflate causes (criteria defining deliberation) and effects (its beneficial consequences). Second, the tests of deliberative theory offered to date typically do not develop well-specified explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its many proposed benefits. Third, deliberative theory is inconsistent with much of what is already known about political discourse in group contexts. Many, though not all, of the hypotheses that flow from the deliberative framework are not well-grounded in either previous theory or empirical evidence.

### At: High theory bad

#### Every “high theory” bad argument links to the 1ac, which reads evidence from peer-reviewed journals behind a paywall. However, every attempt to put themselves above, or below, these theoretical positions is a reason to vote negative because our assemblage reserves those theories as tools in a toolbox, whereas their permutations crowd them out. Aversion to meta-narratives is itself a meta-narrative, and a potentially Maoist one at that.

Bowman 10. Paul Bowman, professor of cultural studies at Cardiff University, “Reading Rey Chow,” Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, pg. 248

Thus, Chow recasts the investments and orientations of cultural studies, poststructuralism, and other politicized ‘suffix-studies’ subjects in terms of the unacknowledged but constitutive ‘Chinese prejudice’, first identified by Spivak. According to Chow, ‘China’ has a multiple status in Western discourses, including cultural studies. As well as representing, for so long, the Other of capitalism, of freedom, of democracy, and so on, ‘China’ has also offered ‘radical thought’ in the West a promissory image of alterity, revolution, difference, alternativeness, and hence resistance as such. And, as Chow also observes, one of the most enduring metanarratives that has long organized cultural studies and cultural theory (plus much more besides) is the discourse of ‘resistance’. ‘If there is a metanarrative that continues to thrive in these times of metanarrative bashing’, argues Chow, ‘it is that of ‘‘resistance’’’: ‘Seldom do we attend a conference or turn to an article in an academic journal of the humanities or the social sciences without encountering some call for ‘‘resistance’’ to some such metanarrativized power as ‘‘global capitalism’’, ‘‘Western imperialism’’, ‘‘patriarchy’’, ‘‘compulsory heterosexuality’’, and so forth’.41 The discourses of cultural theory and cultural studies more widely do seem to be structured by keywords or (worse) buzzwords like ‘resistance’, ‘struggle’, ‘difference’, ‘hybridity’ and ‘multiculturalism’. And many have interpreted this as evidence that such putatively ‘radical’ work is, basically, nothing more than fashionable nonsense. But, rather than writing it off, Chow proposes that one of the key problems with the notion of resistance resides in the consequences of its rhetorical construction. She argues that the popular rhetoric of resistance is itself implicitly organized and underwritten by a subject/object divide in which ‘we’ speak against that which oppresses (capital, patriarchy, the West, etc.) and for (or ‘in the name of’) the oppressed other. Thus, ‘we’ rhetorically position ourselves as somehow ‘with’ the oppressed and ‘against’ the oppressors, even when ‘we’ are more often than not much more obviously at some distance from sites and scenes of oppression.42 Of course, the aim of ‘speaking out’ and publicizing the plight of the oppressed may be regarded as responsibility itself. It is certainly the case that a dominant interpretation of what academic-political responsibility is boils down to the idea that to be responsible we should speak out. Yet it is nevertheless equally the case that, unless the distances, relations, aporias and irrelations are acknowledged and interrogated, there is a strong possibility that ‘our’ discourse will become what Chow calls a version of Maoism. She explains: Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism – a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/ does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other’s deprivation – ‘having’ poverty or ‘having’ nothing – the Maoist’s strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.43 In other words, such rhetoric claims a ‘position of powerlessness’ in order to claim a particular form of ‘moral power’:44 a heady conceptual and rhetorical mix that can be seen to underpin an awful lot of academic work today. Derrida regularly referred to this position as ‘clear-consciencism’: namely, the belief that speaking out, speaking for, speaking against, etc. equals Being Responsible. However, quite apart from tub-thumping and mantra-reciting, Derrida believed in the promise of the ‘most classical of protocols’ of questioning and critical vigilance as ways to avoid the greater violence of essentialist fundamentalisms. Of course, Derrida’s attempts to draw such questions as how to interpret ‘responsibility’, how to establish who ‘we’ are, in what relations ‘we’ exist, and what our responsibilities might be, into the crisis of undecidability were equally regularly regarded as an advocation of theoretical obscurantism and irresponsibility. This charge was – and remains – the most typical type of ‘resistance’ to deconstruction. Despite the clarity and urgency of Derrida’s reasons for subjecting all presumed certainties to the harrowing ordeal of undecidability, the resistance to deconstruction surely boils down to a distaste for the complexity of Derrida’s ensuing close readings/rewritings of texts.45 Such resistance to deconstruction is familiar. It is often couched as a resistance to theory made in the name of a resistance to ‘disengagement’; a resistance to ‘theory’ for the sake of ‘keeping it real’. Such a rationale for the rejection of deconstruction (or indeed ‘Theory’ as such) is widespread. But when ‘keeping it real’ relies upon a refusal to interrogate the ethical and political implications of one’s own rhetorical and conceptual coordinates – one’s own ‘key terms’ – the price is too high. Chow points to some of the ways and places that this high price is paid, and reflects on the palpable consequences of it. For instance, in politicized contexts such as postcolonial cultural studies, there are times when ‘deconstruction’ and ‘theory’ are classified (reductively) as being ‘Western’, and therefore as being just another cog in the Western hegemonic (colonial, imperial) apparatus. As she puts it, in studies of non-Western cultural others, organized by postcolonial anti-imperialism, all things putatively ‘Western’ easily become suspect. Thus, ‘the general criticism of Western imperialism’ can lead to the rejection of ‘Western’ approaches, at the same time as ‘the study of non- Western cultures easily assumes a kind of moral superiority, since such cultures are often also those that have been colonized and ideologically dominated by the West’.46 In other words, ‘theory’ – ‘for all its fundamental questioning of Western logocentrism’ – is too hastily ‘lumped together with everything ‘‘Western’’ and facilely rejected as a non-necessity’.47 Unfortunately, therefore: In the name of studying the West’s ‘others’, then, the critique of cultural politics that is an inherent part of both poststructural theory and cultural studies is pushed aside, and ‘culture’ returns to a coherent, idealist essence that is outside language and outside mediation. Pursued in a morally complacent, antitheoretical mode, ‘culture’ now functions as a shield that hides the positivism, essentialism, and nativism – and with them the continual acts of hierarchization, subordination, and marginalization – that have persistently accompanied the pedagogical practices of area studies; ‘cultural studies’ now becomes a means of legitimizing continual conceptual and methodological irresponsibility in the name of cultural otherness.48 What is at stake here is the surely significant fact that even the honest and principled or declared aim of studying others can actually amount to a positive working for the very forces one avowedly opposes or seeks to resist. Chow clarifies this in terms of considering the uncanny proximity but absolute difference between cultural studies and area studies. For, area studies is a disciplinary field which ‘has long been producing ‘‘specialists’’ who report to North American political and civil arenas about ‘‘other’’ civilizations, ‘‘other’’ regimes, ‘‘other’’ ways of life, and so forth’.49 However, quite unlike cultural studies and postcolonial studies’ declared aims and affiliative interests in alterity and ‘other cultures’, within area studies ‘others’ (‘defined by way of particular geographical areas and nation states, such as South Asia, the Middle East, East Asia, Latin America, and countries of Africa’) are studied as if potential threats, challenges and – hence – ultimately ‘information target fields’.50 Thus, says Chow, there is ‘a major difference’ between cultural studies and area studies – and indeed between cultural studies and ‘normal’ academic disciplines per se.51 This difference boils down to a paradigmatic decision – itself an act or effort of resistance. This is the resistance to ‘proper’ disciplinarity; the resistance to becoming ‘normal’ or ‘normalized’, wherever it might equal allowing power inequalities, untranslatables and heterogeneities to evaporate in the production of universalistic ‘objective’ knowledge. This is why Chow’s attitude is always that: In the classroom [...] students should not be told simply to reject ‘metadiscourses’ in the belief that by turning to the ‘other’ cultures – by turning to ‘culture’ as the ‘other’ of metadiscourses – they would be able to overturn existing boundaries of knowledge production that, in fact, continue to define and dictate their own discourses. Questions of authority, and with them hegemony, representation, and right, can be dealt with adequately only if we insist on the careful analyses of texts, on responsibly engaged rather than facilely dismissive judgments, and on deconstructing the ideological assumptions in discourses of ‘opposition’ and ‘resistance’ as well as in discourses of mainstream power. Most of all, as a form of exercise in ‘cultural literacy’, we need to continue to train our students to read – to read arguments on their own terms rather than discarding them perfunctorily and prematurely – not in order to find out about authors’ original intent but in order to ask, ‘Under what circumstances would such an argument – no matter how preposterous – make sense? With what assumptions does it produce meanings? In what ways and to what extent does it legitimize certain kinds of cultures while subordinating or outlawing others?’ Such are the questions of power and domination as they relate, ever asymmetrically, to the dissemination of knowledge. Old-fashioned questions of pedagogy as they are, they nonetheless demand frequent reiteration in order for cultural studies to retain its critical and political impetus in the current intellectual climate.52

### At: Human = Biological

#### The human as a biological entity is defined in opposition to its incoherent outside – these racializing tactics continue an ever-present regime of categorization – this objectifies non-human bodies

**Weheliye 14** Alexander G. Weheliye, professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University where he teaches black literature and culture, critical theory, social technologies, and popular culture. “RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES, BIOPOLITICS, AND BLACK FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE HUMAN”.

Consequently, racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line—instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks—that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding anti-pathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality. Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity, their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter's day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly.” Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization. For Wynter, the promise of black studies—and the numerous other ruptures precipitated by the 1960s—lies in its liminality, which contains potential exit strategies from the world of Man. However, we must first devise new objects of knowledge that facilitate “the calling in question of our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore of what it is like to be, human.” We must do so because we cannot fully understand the present incarnation of the human from within the “biocentric and bourgeois” epistemic order that authorizes the biological selectedness of Man and, conversely, the creation of “dysgenic humans” (those who are evolutionarily dysselected), “a category comprised in the US of blacks, Latinos, Indians as well as the transracial group of the poor, the jobless, the homeless, the incarcerated,” the disabled, and the transgendered.— Within our current episteme, these groups are constituted as aberrations from the ethnoclass of Man by being subjected to racializing assemblages that establish “natural” differences between the selected and dysselected. In other words, black, Latino, poor, incarcerated, indigenous, and so forth populations become real objects via the conduit of evolutionarily justified discourses and institutions, which, as a consequence, authorizes Man to view himself as naturally ordained to inhabit the space of full humanity. Thus, even though racializing assemblages commonly rely on phenotypical differences, their primary function is to create and maintain distinctions between different members of the Homo sapiens species that lend a suprahuman explanatory ground (religious or biological, for example) to these hierarchies. As Wynter explains, “all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources.—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle.”44 Wynter's oeuvre facilitates the analysis of the relay between different forms of subjugation, because in it the human operates as a relational ontological totality. Therefore, the Man versus Human battle does not dialectically sublate the specificity of the other struggles but articulates them in this open totality so as to abolish Man and liberate all of humanity rather than specific groups.

#### **Biological delineations calcify into animacy hierarchies – this allows for the elimination of populations between rigid identity categories**

Chen 12 Mel Y Chen, Associate Professor of Gender & Women's Studies at U.C. Berkeley and an affiliate of the Center for Race and Gender, the Science and Technology Studies Center, and the Institute for Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences. “Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial mattering and Queer affect”. 2012. Pgs. 127 – 129.

Animacy hierarchies in Western ontologies are about kind: they assert that this group is affiliated with these properties (for instance, the assertion that “animals lack language”). In such a hierarchy’s conceptual life, kinds are equated with propensities; but in the maintenance of kinds, the hierarchy simultaneously assigns kinds a generativity, mapping and marking reproductive and nonreproductive bodies. Reproductivity in its signal bodily and material sites thus plays a key role in contentious debates about the borders between kinds. When carefully managed cross- animate realms change, so must the biopolitical stakes around their realignment. Continuing the previous chapter’s concern with queer animality, I turn here to take up questions of materiality, animality, and transness, demarcating the “proper boundaries” around both nonhuman animals and humans so that the drawn biopolitical relations among them can be made more palpable. If mattering turns irrevocably on gender—if, as Judith Butler writes, questions of gender are irretrievably interwoven with questions of materiality, and if human substantiation enduringly depends on the expulsion of animals—then it is imperative that we ask questions not only about how animals matter, but how they matter sexually.2 To examine the transness of animal figures in cultural productions or philosophical discourses (beyond their biology, queerness, or pure animality, for instance) is to also interrogate how humans’ analogic mapping to and from animals (within imagined, lived, or taxonomic intimacies) paradoxically survives the cancellation wrought by the operations of abjection, casting a trans light back on the human. By considering the simultaneous relevance of race, gender, sexuality, and geopolitics in animal studies, this chapter builds on recent work that treats animal spaces intersectionally. It makes use of the simultaneous mobility, stasis, and border violation shared among transgender spaces and other forms of trans-being: transnationality, transraciality, translation, transspecies. This is not to conflate these various, importantly distinct terms, but to instead try to think them together in new constellations. Making the astute observation that “biology has always meant the thing itself and knowledge of what it is, and equally notoriously, these two biologies have not always been identical,” Sarah Franklin dubs “transbiology” an intensified making of “new biologicals” via “the redesign of the biological in the context of contemporary bioscience, biomedicine and biotechnology.”4 She identifies what might be thought of as a significant shift in the specific depth of imaginative technologies in crafting matter, a shift in the participants of what Charis Thompson has called “ontological choreography.”5 Here, thinking less in terms of biotechnologies than attending to the role of visual representation and morphology in mattering, I turn directly to the “trans” in “transbiology,” redirecting it toward transsubstantiation. Changes in biology today are tweaking the delineation of kinds. Pharmaceuticals are composed of nonhuman biological material, cloning and stem cell technologies deploy blends of human- nonhuman animal material, and so on; this affects the “sex” of reproduction and fudges lines of lineal descent. Yet it is important to reiterate, for all the significance of today’s biotechnological chimeras, that human- animal mixings have already existed in the realm of discourse. In an unstable realm of animacy, relational exchanges between animals and humans can be coded at the level of ontological mediation, or alchemical transformation, one that goes beyond a vitalism that infuses given boundaries with lifeliness. I read these productions as participating in the animacy hierarchy by exercising a kind of substitutional, horizontal logic of species displacement (altering kind), intervening with the slower, largely lineal pace of the sexual reproduction of species (replacing kind with kind). In certain cases, I suggest it is by interactions of substance with human countervalences—(trans- ) substantiation— that animals may achieve their final form (for humans) or, more significantly, by interacting with animal countervalences that humans achieve their final form. This transsubstantiation has repercussions outside an intellected analogy. It extends beyond intimate coexistence in that it is not only substantive exchange, but exchange of substance, and thus cannot be understood in terms of pure ontological segregation. In some sense, the animate leakage within the strictest hierarchy is what paradoxically enables that hierarchy to become what it is imagined to be; biopolitical governance, conspiring with the “rehoming” assertions of those who traffic wrongly, steps in over and again to contain these leaky bounds.

### At:Liberalism good

#### They are ultimately all semantic redefinitions, saying “well, if we called liberalism something else, and that system was good, then liberalism is good” – our alternative is crucial to foment that transformation

**Beaulieu 10** [Alain Beaulieu, professor of philosophy at Laurentian University in Canada, “Towards a Liberal Utopia: The connection between Foucault’s reporting on the Iranian revolution and the ethical turn,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 801-818, sage]

As we know, the principle of calculation is constitutive of biopower which ‘gave itself the function of administering life [of the population]’.25 In a ‘post-biopolitical’ context (i.e. in a neo-liberal environment), this calculation paradigm remains effective. It finds its expression in various techniques of domination that administer virtual possibilities (not facts) considered to be dangerous. However, calculation is not the only component of the new liberal art of governing. Foucault states that in a socio-political environment where technologies of domination prevail over disciplines there is also room for a specific mode of counter-conduct associated with **the spiritualization of the self**. Foucault’s interest in **spiritual exercises** (**techniques of liberation**) is part of a larger topic he explores in his ethics. Therein, Foucault ‘commemorates’ the old traditions of the ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou) and the ‘art of living’ (techneˆ tou biou), which he now presents in terms of ‘aesthetics of existence’, ‘ethopoietic’ or ‘**art of existence’** to better designate the transformative process of the self in a world deprived of cosmic and divine orders. Are the spiritual transformations of the self merely irrational? It is perhaps this interesting question that opened the dialogue between the later Foucault and the Frankfurt School. The representatives of the Frankfurt School (at least those of the first generation) worked and thought on the opposition between power and freedom: the less capitalistic power is exercised over it, the higher level of freedom this consciousness will ideally attain. According to Foucault, this view is typical of the ‘**general intellectual’ who, in search of universalities, misses the subtleties of power**. For Foucault, **freedom cannot be dissociated from power, and escape from all forms of power relations is impossible**. Therefore, let us use forms of power intelligently, **to liberate ourselves**. In a neo-liberal environment, certain types of power over the self, namely spiritual exercises, can be useful for giving a specific sense of resistance and liberation. This is precisely what spiritual improvement is about. Foucault’s ‘**critical ontology of ourselves’** presented in the various versions of his text on Kant and the Enlightenment 26 constitutes an answer to the Frankfurt School’s ‘critical theory of society’. The critical ontology of ourselves states that **we are not merely theoretical observers**, but rather are directly, unceasingly and locally involved in practical process of transformation. Above all, critique for Foucault pursues ethical aims of self-transformation; for instance, those associated with the creation of innovative relations with the media, the creation of new duties for independent journalists, the formation of non-ideological views by individuals who put themselves in danger, etc. Foucault believes that the creative process of self-transformation eventually leads to the creation of **a ‘better’ or more tolerant society**. This self-fashioning has nothing to do with individualism. Indeed, Foucault vigorously denounced what he once called the ‘Californian cult of the self’,27 clearly pointing out that the veritable control of the self ‘can only be practiced within the group’28 and that it implies a ‘functional relation [lien de finalite´ ] between taking care of the self and taking care of others’.29 Therefore, for two reasons one must answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Are the spiritual exercises irrational?’ First, and as we mentioned earlier, Foucault’s spirituality has no religious finality. Therefore, any attempt to show that the later Foucault became some kind of enlightened Christian mystic is bound to fail. Second, secularized spiritual power developed through a series of rational exercises shows a sense of responsibility towards the improvement of the self and others. Thus, any attempt to show that ‘anything goes’ in Foucault’s ethics is also **predestined for failure**. Foucault’s conception of spirituality can perhaps be considered to be ‘irrational’ in a narrow sense in that spiritual exercises are not universal. In order to maximize improvement, some of those exercises have to be adapted and others have to be created knowing that, unlike Marx and his followers, emancipation is given in a series of singular and local processes which are never and will never be achieved once and for all. Towards the end of (or right after) his coverage of the Iranian events, it became obvious to Foucault that, although revolutionary, the introducing of a spiritual dimension into practical life, is not a universal driving force of history. In that sense, Foucault’s interest in multiple spiritual exercises developed within the western tradition can be understood as part of the self-critique of his journalistic experience in Iran. The Iranian Revolution gave Foucault the opportunity he needed to see **spirituality as a condition of revolutions to come**; after his condemnation of the Khomeini regime, however, it became obvious that society does not need to regress to an age of spiritual leaders or create a new, identical era. Therein lies the importance of reading Foucault’s texts on the Iranian Revolution and those on the Enlightenment in tandem. If there is hope of reorganizing society, this transformative impulse will come from **autonomous, yet singular**, subjects able to select spiritual exercises and **use these exercises to improve themselves**. This rational government of the self will lead to a different, and **likely better or more tolerant, government of others**. This freedom of selection of spiritual exercises has the highest chance of being fulfilled in a liberal environment. However, liberalism left without guidance tends to develop a **roughly hewn and materialistic vision of the world**. This is why we can see Foucault’s post-Iranian writings and meditations as an attempt to **spiritualize the liberal tradition**. Presenting Foucault’s ethics in terms of a ‘Khomeinization of the Shah’ may sound baroque. Nonetheless, this seems to be the case. By introducing a spiritual dimension into liberalism, the later Foucault’s ethics combine the best of the two worlds he saw in action during the Iranian uprising. In his dialogue with Iranian writer Baqir Parham, Foucault asserts that there have been two ‘painful experiences’ in the last two centuries of western culture. 30 The first was the ‘theory of the all-powerful state’ endorsed by the French and German intellectuals of the late 18th and early 19th centuries; Foucault is referring here to the Napoleonic Empire resulting from the French Revolution and the Prussian Empire legitimized by German idealists. The second was the Marxist socialist state. Foucault’s (unachieved) ‘political spirituality’ is **an alternative to those experiences**. Is it Utopian to think that the spiritualization of liberalism will neutralize the principle of calculation? Is it Utopian to think that the technologies of the self will help improve ourselves and resist the technologies of domination? Is it Utopian to think that the tradition of the care of the self can still play a concrete role in the reorganization of society? Is it Utopian to think that spiritual exercises are not other means to discipline bodies? The answer to all of these questions is Yes. But would not there be different types of Utopias? The search for a ‘liberal Utopia’ was one of the later Foucault’s preoccupations. Beaulieu 8118

#### Mills’ and other liberal apologists are so vague it’s meaningless – even if there is a theoretical philosophy of perfect liberalism that can exist, our links prove it’s not them

**Schmitt 12** [Richard, professor emeritus of philosophy at Brown University, “Comment on Charles Mills, "Occupy Liberalism!",” *Radical Philosophy Review*, Volume 15 number 2 (2012): 331-336]

Mills's argument begins with a distinction between Liberalism (capital "L") as theory and liberalism as practices and institution. The dominant liberalism that radicals are so critical of is not the core Liberal theory but a particular incarnation of that theory. Liberalism as theory is an "umbrella" that can be constitutive of the views of Rawls, as well as of Nozick. It can also be at the heart of both exclusionary liberalism—what Mills likes to call "Her- renvolk liberalism"—and the egalitarianism of genuine radicals. What is this protean Liberalism? It involves a commitment to universal equality, to individualism. But since these key terms—individualism, equality, universality—remain indeterminate in Liberalism as a theory, the sharp disagreements between radicals and liberals are, indeed, as Mills claims not disagreements about theory. The theory is so abstract and, frankly, vague that there is little to disagree about (unless, as a Fascist, one rejects equality altogether). And so long as we stick to airy generalities we can all agree that equality is very desirable. It is only when we begin to talk about what that means, that we will find radicals and liberals at each other's throats. If they accept Mills's distinction between Liberalism—indeterminate declarations about the great value of equality—and liberalism—the repugnant practice of praising equality while oppressing people who are not white men—radicals can do one of two things: they can follow Mills's recommendation and stick to Liberalism as theory and thus stick to extremely abstract declarations about equality, making very sure that they never explain what they mean by equality. (We might call this "Commencement Address Liberalism.") That might make them more acceptable to actually existing liberals but only at the price of giving up the fight for justice and equality as radicals understand it. Or they can confront their political enemies, e.g., contractarian liberals ("Herrenvolk liberals") and then they will have to draw sharp lines between themselves and the individualist, impoverished understanding of inequality that dominant liberalism uses to disguise the glaring injustices of our society. Then the cat is out of the bag: the commonalities between liberals and radicals are very tenuous. You cannot mouth the liberals' platitudes and fight against sexist, racist, and other group oppressions and hope that liberals will still agree with you. Once you talk about race and class they will discover what you are hiding under your liberal sheep's clothing. Mills supports his plea to radicals to employ the language of liberalism by claiming that, for instance, liberal denial of group oppression is not something their theory forces them to do but that it is "contingent." But it is not clear to me what that means. Liberals have denied, overlooked, looked away from group subjugation for 400 years at least, since the accusation of class oppression was first raised by the Diggers and Levellers in seventeenth-century England. That's simply what liberals do; they make the clearly false empirical claim that prince and pauper, cleaner and billionaire owner are fundamentally the same except that one is more successful than the other due to greater effort. Calling that "contingent" makes it no less predictable. There is no reason to think that liberals will not do that for a long time to come. Calling the denial of group oppression "contingent" suggests that liberals do not have to act as if we were all separate individuals endowed with more or less the same opportunities. Well, no, of course they don't have to do it but they have been doing it for centuries to the point where today they have managed to make "class struggle" a dirty word. Do we have any reason to think that they are going to stop distorting reality in the near future? Talking vaguely about equality will not make them change. If there is any hope of overcoming liberalism, it can only be through sharp confrontations of liberal distortions of the facts about equality and inequality in capitalist society. This is more or less what Charles's paper says, when read as an answer to the question: "what can we do to persuade liberals to take us radicals seriously?" But in the background, there is the esoteric message which answers a very different question: "What does it mean to be a radical today? What should we be thinking about and what should we be doing?" Here the question is not about how to change liberals. The question is about us, ourselves, and what it means to be a radical today. Charles's answer to that question goes more or less as follows: Radicals and liberals share some extremely abstract principles, such as a commitment to freedom and equality. Many Liberals tend to interpret those commitments in ways that are demonstrably inadequate.

### At: May

#### May is silly – there are no objective values one can struggle against – their card supports Hitler’s struggle to eradicate the Jews as much as it does the plan

Curmudgeon 11 [September 14, 2011, The Curmudgeon's Attic, Pseudonymn of anonymous philosopher, J.D., University of Texas School of Law, “The Thing As It Is A Reply to Todd May’s “The Meaningfulness of Lives” in the New York Times”]

Todd May, a professor of philosophy at Clemson University, wrote this article as part of a philosophy series, The Stone, in something called The Opinionater (online content only) in the New York Times. Because I’ve had lunch and need something meaningful to do with my life until my next meal (you’ll understand the reference if you read to the end of the post), allow me to parse Mr. May’s observations, in the process, hopefully providing some clarity: *Who among us has not asked whether his or her life is a meaningful one? Who has not wondered — on a sleepless night, during a long stretch of dull or taxing work, or when a troubled child seems a greater burden than one can bear — whether in the end it all adds up to anything? On this day, too, when many are steeped in painful reminders of personal loss, it is natural to wonder about the answers.* Indeed, I have wondered these very things myself. Does it all add up to anything? The fact of one’s existence is unalterable. Descartes told us we know we exist because we can think about whether or not we do. But what does it mean for the fact of one’s existence to add up to anything? Nothing that we do will be remembered for long after we’re gone. Even the extravagant pains Egyptian pharaohs took to preserve their existence only haltingly succeeded, and they go back only about four or five thousand years. So **if “adding up to anything” means that we will be eternally remembered by other humans,** then **no, our lives don’t add up to anything**. But if it instead means that we are a tiny link in an eternal chain of events in space-time, specks in a vast universe to be sure, but still, specks, then the fact that we exist or existed adds up to as much as it possibly can. *A meaningful life is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one.* I just love philosophers that offer platitudes like this without offering any supporting reasoning. How do we know a meaningful life is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one? Perhaps just because the words have different meanings? Can a happy life be meaningful? How about a morally good one? Is meaningfulness decided by others, or by the one who is actually living the life? Happiness, we know, is subjective. Hitler may have been happy, and his life had great meaning, if meaning is determined by the effect one’s life has on others, and several million German citizens apparently thought it to be a morally good one at some point or another. So is this philosophical exegesis pointing us to meaningful, happy and moral life modeled after Hitler’s? *The philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre thought that, without God, our lives are bereft of meaning. He tells us in his essay “Existentialism,” “if God does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of values, we have no excuse behind us, nor justification before us.” On this view, God gives our lives the values upon which meaning rests. And if God does not exist, as Sartre claims, our lives can have only the meaning we confer upon them.* For Sartre, meaningfulness is more or less completely subjective. God’s existence can not be proved or disproved. God is a matter of belief, which is, of course, subjective. So if meaningfulness is subjective and God is also, then God can provide meaningfulness to one’s life. *This seems wrong on two counts. First, why would the existence of God guarantee the meaningfulness of each of our lives? Is a life of unremitting drudgery or unrequited struggle really redeemed if there’s a larger plan, one to which we have no access, into which it fits? That would be small compensation for a life that would otherwise feel like a waste — a point not lost on thinkers like Karl Marx, who called religion the “opium of the people.” Moreover, does God actually ground the values by which we live? Do we not, as Plato recognized 2500 years ago, already have to think of those values as good in order to ascribe them to God?* This paragraph screams for some clarification as to what one means when discussing God. Is God a beneficent, if also irascible and churlish, old man, looking over us, concerned with our personal welfare, much as God is described in the Old Testament story of the Exodus? Or is it an omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent being not amenable to anthropomorphizing? Or, is God just generally, as Plato observed, a coalescence of our ideas of what is good as opposed to that which is evil? Without understanding the nature of the God referred to here, there is no way to know whether or not God’s existence matters. *Second, and more pointedly, must the meaningfulness of our lives depend on the existence of God? Must meaning rely upon articles of faith? Basing life’s meaningfulness on the existence of a deity not only leaves all atheists out of the picture; it leaves different believers out of one another’s picture. What seems called for is an approach to thinking about meaning that can draw us together, one that exists alongside or instead of religious views.* Again, we need to understand whether meaningfulness is subjectively determined by the individual, or is a quality decreed upon a life by others. If meaningfulness is subjectively determined, then belief in God is good enough to impart subjective meaningfulness (and possibly happiness, and maybe even allow one to live a morally good life). It doesn’t mean belief in God is necessary to achieve meaningfulness, it just means that it could be a path to meaningfulness. *A promising and more inclusive approach is offered by Susan Wolf in her recent and compelling book, “Meaning in Life and Why It Matters.” A meaningful life, she claims, is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one. In her view, “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.” A meaningful life must, in some sense then, feel worthwhile. The person living the life must be engaged by it. A life of commitment to causes that are generally defined as worthy — like feeding and clothing the poor or ministering to the ill — but that do not move the person participating in them will lack meaningfulness in this sense. However, for a life to be meaningful, it must also be worthwhile. Engagement in a life of tiddlywinks does not rise to the level of a meaningful life, no matter how gripped one might be by the game.* So Ms. Wolf apparently believes meaningfulness has an objective standard to which one seeking a meaningful life would be attracted. From whence does this objective standard arise? If tiddlywinks doesn’t cut the mustard, what about other games? Is being subjectively attracted to the game of football such that one spends one’s life engaged in it objectively attractive enough to qualify as meaningful? See what a mess to which all this pontificating resolves? *Often one defends an idea by giving reasons for it. However, sometimes the best defense is not to give reasons at the outset but instead to pursue the idea in order to see where it leads. Does it capture something important if we utilize it to understand ourselves? It’s this latter tack that I would like to try here. The pursuit of this core idea — that a meaningful life is both valued and valuable — allows us to understand several important aspects of our attitudes toward ourselves and others.* Valued by whom? Valuable on the basis of what metric? *In this pursuit, the first step we might take beyond what Wolf tells us is to recognize that lives unfold over time. A life is not an unrelated series of actions or projects or states of being. A life has, we might say, a trajectory. It is lived in a temporal thickness. Even if my life’s trajectory seems disjointed or to lack continuity, it is my life that is disconnected in its unfolding, not elements of several different lives. If a life has a trajectory, then it can be conceived narratively. A human life can be seen as a story, or as a series of stories that are more or less related. This does not mean that the person whose life it is must conceive it or live it narratively. I needn’t say to myself, “Here’s the story I want construct,” or, “This is the story so far.” What it means rather is that, if one reflected on one’s life, one could reasonably see it in terms of various story lines, whether parallel or intersecting or distinct. This idea can be traced back to Aristotle’s “Ethics,” but has made a reappearance with some recent narrative conceptions of what a self is. What makes a trajectory a meaningful one? If Wolf is right, it has to feel worthwhile and, beyond that, has to be engaged in projects that are objectively worthwhile. There is not much difficulty in knowing what feels worthwhile. Most of us are good at sensing when we’re onto something and when we’re not. Objective worthiness is more elusive. We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and, as we shall see, are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play.* Now I’m really confused. A meaningful life has a trajectory that feels worthwhile and is engaged in projects that are objectively worthwhile? Writing this blog feels worthwhile to me, but is it objectively worthwhile? By what metric might it be judged? I write because I like writing. I have found writing to be the only way for me to learn what I am really thinking; writing is subjectively valuable to me, as I place great value on understanding how I think and feel, if only because failing to do so is detrimental to my own welfare. Is it objectively valuable? My wife might say I waste far too much time at this that I could otherwise spend in fruitful endeavors, i.e., at things that make money. But that’s just her subjective opinion of my subjective view towards its value. Is there some other authority to consult that could determine whether this is objectively valuable? Society at large would probably agree with my wife, but what if they and my wife are wrong, even by their own valuation metrics? What if I one day become rich and famous as The Curmudgeon? Will it then have objective value? ***What is the point of understanding what makes lives meaningful? Why not just live them?*** Indeed. Mr. May could have started and ended his exegesis on meaningfulness there. *There are values we associate with a good narrative and its characters that are distinct from those we associate with good morals. A fictional character can be intense, adventurous, steadfast or subtle. Think here of the adventurousness of Ishmael in “Moby-Dick,” the quiet intensity of Kip in “The English Patient,” the steadfastness of Dilsey in “The Sound and the Fury” or the subtlety of Marco Polo in “Invisible Cities.” As with these fictional characters, so with our lives. When a life embodies one or more of these values (or others), and feels engaging to the one who lives it, it is to that extent meaningful. There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness. An intense life, for instance, can be lived with abandon. One might move from engagement to engagement, or stick with a single engagement, but always (well, often) by diving into it, holding nothing back. One throws oneself into swimming or poetry or community organizing or fundraising, or perhaps all of them at one time or another. Such a life is likely a meaningful one. And this is true even where it might not be an entirely moral one.* What in the world is a “narrative value”? Is it something that makes a story, or a life, interesting to others, or to the one who lives it? If so, I think rather highly of the narrative value of my life, as I suspect most others would feel of theirs. Like a microcosm of all lives lived in all times and all places, my life has been both tragedy and comedy, depending on whether feeling or thinking reigned paramount in my mind during the particular events comprising it. *We know of people like this, people whose intensity leads them to behavior that we might call morally compromised. Intense lovers can leave bodies in their wake when the embers of love begin to cool. Intense athletes may not be the best of teammates. Our attitudes toward people like this are conflicted. There is a sense in which we might admire them and another sense in which we don’t. This is because meaningful lives don’t always coincide with good ones. Meaningful lives can be morally compromised, just as morally good lives can feel meaningless to those who live them.* So meaningfulness must be grounded in subjectivity. Just because I might not admire someone who is famous just for being famous, or perhaps who is famous for doing others harm (instead of using the amorphous “morally bad”), they still might have led meaningful lives. I’m sure Britney Spears and Bernie Madoff believe their lives to be meaningful, no matter what is the opinion of others. For Britney, perhaps the essence of meaning in her life is that others have an opinion of her, whether good or bad. *We should not take this to imply that there is no relationship between meaningfulness and morality. They meet at certain moral limits. An evil life, no matter how intense or steadfast, is not one we would want to call meaningful. But within the parameters of those moral limits, the relationship between a meaningful life and a moral one is complicated. They do not map directly onto each other.* Who decides whether one’s life is evil? Going back to Hitler, who seems to be the essence of evil, imagine all the good that came of his life. Would Western Europe have enjoyed over a half century of unparalleled prosperity and freedom and peace had Hitler not coalesced and compelled the forces of freedom to defeat him? Would the nation state of Israel (regardless of whatever one thinks about the Israeli state at present) been revivified in Palestine had not the Holocaust happened? Good and evil are extraordinarily subjective matters. Germans thought victory over France, twenty years after the insult of the Treaty of Versailles, was good; the French, presumably, not so much. Meaningfulness is apparently, like good and evil, also a subjective matter. *Why might all this matter? What is the point of understanding what makes lives meaningful? Why not just live them? On one level, the answer is obvious. If we want to live meaningful lives, we might want to know something about what makes a life so. Otherwise, we’re just taking stabs in the dark. And in any event, for most of us it’s just part of who we are. It’s one of the causes of our lying awake at night.* I have never lain awake at night wondering whether life was meaningful in any overarching way. I have lain awake at night wondering whether the things I was doing were capable of meaningfully helping me achieve what I hoped to achieve. But **the hardest question in that regard is determining what is desired**, not whether actions taken to that end are meaningful or not.

#### May’s existential angst is caused by lots of Western privilege – let the world live and struggle

Curmudgeon 11 [September 14, 2011, The Curmudgeon's Attic, Pseudonymn of anonymous philosopher, J.D., University of Texas School of Law, “The Thing As It Is A Reply to Todd May’s “The Meaningfulness of Lives” in the New York Times”]

*There is another reason as well. This one is more bound to the time in which we live. In an earlier column for The Stone, I wrote that we are currently encouraged to think of ourselves either as consumers or as entrepreneurs. We are told to be shoppers for goods or investors for return. Neither of these types of lives, if they are the dominant character of those lives, strike me as particularly meaningful. This is because their narrative themes — buying, investing — are rarely the stuff of which a compelling life narrative is made. (I say “rarely” because there may be, for example, cases of intensely lived but morally compromised lives of investment that do not cross any moral limit to meaningfulness.) They usually lack what Wolf calls “objective attractiveness.” To be sure, we must buy things, and may even enjoy shopping. And we should not be entirely unconcerned with where we place our limited energies or monies. But are these the themes of a meaningful life? Are we likely to say of someone that he or she was a great networker or shopper, and so really knew how to live? In what I have called an age of economics, it is even more urgent to ask the question of a meaningful life: what it consists in, how we might live one. Philosophy cannot prescribe the particular character of meaning that each of us should embrace. It cannot tell each of us individually how we might trace the trajectory that is allotted to us. But it can, and ought to, reflect upon the framework within which we consider these questions, and in doing so perhaps offer a lucidity we might otherwise lack. This is as it should be. Philosophy can assist us in understanding how we might think about our lives, while remaining modest enough to leave the living of them to us.* Let me clear things up. Buying stuff does not impart meaning to one’s life, except as the stuff bought is necessary for life’s continuation in space and time. The purpose and meaning to every life, human or otherwise, is found in its struggle to survive and propagate. We only get confused about whether life is meaningful when survival and propagation is so easy that we have energy left to expend on considering whether there might be something we’re missing. When our human capacities are tasked to the limits of their design in securing the necessaries of life, there is no question that life is meaningful. The mothers of starving children in Somalia, and the children themselves, have no existential angst arising from questions about the meaningfulness of their lives. They would scoff at this silly discussion. For them, meaningfulness is found in the struggle to get food, and the other of life’s necessaries, enough to survive. It is because we in the West are so rich and comfortable and well fed that we suffer existential angst about whether our lives are meaningful. But easily achieving life’s necessaries does not mean that life’s meaningfulness can then be found elsewhere. It just means that we haven’t a clue what to do with all the extra time and energy industrialization has provided, which is the real question that Mr. May is trying reach: Once survival is more or less as assured as can be, what then? How can we find meaning in things we know aren’t as compellingly meaningful as the struggle to survive? We were designed for struggle, and as has become obvious over the last century or so, tend to fare quite poorly without it. But if there is any question that the essential meaningfulness of life is found in the struggle for survival, skip a few meals. After a time, depending on how fat decadent Western society has made you, the only meaningful activity in which you will wish to engage is the acquisition of food. Or as I like to say, **the meaning of life is lunch. A meaningful life is one spent struggling to attain it.**

### At: Subjectivity

#### The ontological drive to become structures the subject – radical experimentation within affective networks of relations undermines the liberal drive to purify the self or wallow in anxiety in favor of a joyous process of becoming

Braidotti 6[Rosi, Philosopher and Distinguished University Professor at Utrecht University as well as director of the Centre for the Humanities in Utrecht, “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin Boundas, Edinburgh University, Press: Edinburgh, 2006, p. 133-159] //khirn

So how does one know if one has reached the threshold of sustainability? This sort of intensive mapping requires experimentation. This is where the non-individualistic vision of the subject as embodied and hence affective, socially embedded and interrelational is of major consequence. Your body will thus tell you if and when you have reached a threshold or a limit. The warning can take the form of opposing resistance, falling ill, feeling nauseous or it can take other somatic manifestations, like fear, anxiety or a sense of insecurity. Whereas the semiotic-linguistic frame of psychoanalysis reduces these to symptoms awaiting interpretation, I see them as corporeal warning-signals or boundary-markers that express a clear message: " too much!". I think that one of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari are so interested in studying self-destructive or pathological modes of behavious, such as schizophrenia, masochism, anorexia, various forms of addiction and the black hole of murderous violence, is precisely in order to explore their function as markers of thresholds. This assumes a qualitative distinction between on the one hand the desire that propels the subject's expression of his/her conatus - which in a neo-Spinozist perspective is implicitly positive and on the other hand the constraints imposed by society. The specific, contextually-determined conditions are the forms in which the desire is 6 actualized or actually expressed. To find out about thresholds, you must experiment, which means always, necessarily, relationally or in encounters with others. We need new cognitive and sensorial mappings of the thresholds of sustainability for bodies-inprocesses-of-transformation. This is supported by Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. Another word for Spinoza’s conatus is self-preservation, not in the liberal individualistic sense of the term, but rather as the actualisation of one’s essence, that is to say of one’s ontological drive to become. This is not an automatic, nor an intrinsically harmonius process, in so far as it involves inter-connection with other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes. Violence, pain and a touch of cruelty are part of this process. Negotiations have to occur as stepping stones to sustainable flows of becoming. The bodily self’s interaction with his/her environment can either increase or descrease that body’s conatus or potentia. The mind as a sensor that prompts understanding can assist by helping to discern and choose those forces that increase its power of acting and its activity in both physical and mental terms. A higher form of self-knowledge by understanding the nature of one’s affectivity is the key to a Spinozist ethics of empowerment. It includes a more adequate understanding of the inter-connections between the self and a multitude of other forces, and it thus undermines the liberal individual understanding of the subject. It also implies, however, the body’s ability to comprehend and to physically sustain a greater number of complex inter-connections, and to deal with complexity witjout being over-burdened. Thus, only an appreciation of increasing degrees of complexity can guarantee the freedom of the mind in the awareness of its true, affective and dynamic nature. Sustainability thus defined is also about de-centering anthropocentrism in the new, complex compound that is nomadic subjectivity. The notion of sustainability brings together ethical, epistemological and political concerns under the cover of a nonunitary vision of the subject. ‘Life’ privileges assemblages of a heterogeneous kind: animals, insects, machines are as many fields of forces or territories of becoming. The life in me is not only, not even, human.

#### That nomadic potential can increases one’s powers to act by requiring awareness of one’s condition of interaction with others: ethically empowering modes of being create joyous passions capable of negotiating interpersonal relations

Braidotti 6[Rosi, Philosopher and Distinguished University Professor at Utrecht University as well as director of the Centre for the Humanities in Utrecht, “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin Boundas, Edinburgh University, Press: Edinburgh, 2006, p. 133-159] //khirn

What is, then, this sustainable subject? It is a slice of living, sensible matter: a self-sustaining system activated by a fundamental drive to life. It expresses potentia (rather than potestas), neither by the will of God, nor the secret encryption of the genetic code. This subject is physiologically embedded in the corporeal materiality of the self, but the enfleshed intensive or nomadic subject is an in-between: a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding-outwards of affects. A mobile entity, in space and time, and also an enfleshed kind of memory, this subject is in-process but is also capable of 4 lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining extra-ordinarily faithful to itself. This ‘faithfulness to oneself’ is not to be understood in the mode of the psychological or sentimental attachment to a personal ‘identity’ that often is little more than a social security number and a set of family photo albums. Nor is it the mark of authenticity of a self ("me, myself and I") that is a clearing house for narcissism and paranoia - the great pillars on which Western identity predicates itself. It is rather a faithfulness that is predicated upon mutual sets of inter-dependence and inter-connections, that is to say sets of relations and encounters. These compose a web of multiple relationships that encompass all levels of one's multi-layered subjectivity, binding the cognitive to the emotional, the intellectual to the affective and connecting them all to socially embedded forms of stratification. Thus, the faithfulness that is at stake in nomadic ethics coincides with the awareness of one's condition of interaction with others, that is to say one's capacity to affect and to be affected. Translated into a temporal scale, this is the faithfulness of duration, the expression of one’s continuing attachment to certain dynamic spatio-temporal co-ordinates and to endure. In a philosophy of temporally-inscribed radical immanence, subjects differ. But they differ along materially embedded co-ordinates: they come in different mileage, temperatures and beats. One can and does change gears and moves across these coordinates, but cannot claim all of them, all of the time. The latitudinal and longitudinal forces which structure the subject have limits which I express in terms of thresholds of sustainability. By latitudinal forces Deleuze means the affects a subject is capable of, following the degrees of intensity or potency: how intensely they run. By longitude is meant the span of extension: how far they can go. Sustainability is about how much of it a subject can take and ethics is accordingly redefined as the geometry of how much bodies are capable of. What is this threshold, then, and how does it get fixed? A radically immanent intensive body is an assemblage of forces, or flows, intensities and passions that solidify - in space - and consolidate - in time - within the singular configuration commonly known as an ‘individual’( or rather: di-vidual) self. This 5 intensive and dynamic entity does not coincide with the enumeration of inner rationalist laws, nor is it merely the unfolding of genetic data and information encrypted in the material structure of the embodied self. It is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough - spatio-temporally speaking - to sustain and to undergo constant fluxes of transformation. On all three scores, it is the body’s degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode, as I argued earlier. Positivity is in-built into this programme through the idea of thresholds of sustainability. Thus, an ethically empowering option increases one’s potentia and creates joyful energy in the process. The conditions which can encourage such a quest are not only historical, but also relational: they have to do with cultivating and facilitating productive encounters, which sustain processes of self-transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity. Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate these encounters and also their eventual conflicts.

### At: Suffering reps

#### Their representation of others suffering creates an affective distancing between spectator and spectacle – prevents authentic responses – this is especially true in the context of debate – we circulate suffering at high speeds and then demand that someone else acts – only the alt can redirect affect away from liberal economies of suffering

Adelman and Kozel 14 [Rebecca A., Assistant Professor in the Department of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Maryland, Wendy, Professor and Program Director of Comparative American Studies at Oberlin College, “Discordant Affects: Ambivalence, Banality, and the Ethics of Spectatorship,” *Theory & Event* 17:3, 2014]

According to Azoulay, citizenship and viewership are not only active but also somewhat automatic: When and where the subject of the photograph is a person who has suffered some form of injury, a viewing of the photograph that reconstructs the photographic situation and allows a reading of the injury inflicted on others becomes a civic skill, not an exercise in aesthetic appreciation. This skill is activated the moment one grasps that citizenship is not merely a status, a good, or a piece of private property possessed by the citizen, but rather a tool of struggle or an obligation to others to struggle against injuries inflicted on those others, citizen and noncitizen alike—others who are governed along with the spectator.”25 Atrocity images, like other images of trauma and suffering, dialogically engage viewers in often-discordant affective and ideological acts of spectatorship. In that regard, while affects are messy, incoherent, and intersubjective, as scholars today claim, they do not occur in some moment of pre-signification but rather within historically situated contexts, or within a “sensorium” that serves to shape, enable and/or constrain affective responses into identifiable, more politically manageable, emotions. In this instance, the surrounding news apparatus marked these photographs of soldiers posing cheerfully with body parts as significant and spectacular, much like B’Tselem’s circulation of the video of the IDF soldier pointing his gun at a Palestinian civilian marked that moment as eventful, rather than claiming its uneventfulness as the locus of its power. Priming by activists and news media to “feel” outrage in such moments indicates some of the ways in which affects, intertwined with modes of circulation and presentation, come to “move” the spectator.40 The affects that we feel or display when confronting an image of suffering often seem authentic, automatic, or unbidden, but these self-assessments themselves emerge from discursive conditions that encourage us to think of ourselves as sentient and responsive to the suffering of others, a self-concept that obligates those others, implicitly, to suffer visibly in a manner that provokes and justifies an intense response. In this context, our affective responses start to seem, in Lauren Berlant’s words, like “expressions of one’s true capacity for attachment to other humans rather than effects of pedagogy,”41 which is often delivered through a complex of political and ideological mechanisms. The lack of discussion in the media about military procedures for processing enemy corpses suggests that neither news commentators nor viewers found such policies, in and of themselves, troubling, much less “outrageous.” Debates centered on the apparent excesses of violence, not the routine visual practices of militarization, including the commonplace battlefield forensic act of processing corpses by scanning their irises and fingerprints. Such framings attempt to resignify the banality of violence within normative understandings of military conflict. Given the potential of prevailing forms of sentimentality to either overdetermine or delimit spectatorial responses to banal sights of suffering, what possibilities for ethical encounters with the suffering other, alive or dead, are afforded within mediated sites of publication and circulation of their images? And, moreover, given the lack of attention to Afghani corpses as political subjects (reporters made no attempts to identify and name these dead “insurgents”), are compassion or sadness even politically meaningful or ethically relevant in this instance? Berlant asks, “what happens to questions of managing alterity or difference … when feeling bad becomes evidence for a structural condition of injustice?” 42 This query suggests both that spectatorial discomfort is an untrustworthy indicator of another’s suffering (because its absence can be taken as a sign that there is no suffering after all) and a problematic response to it (because it begins to seem ethically sufficient in itself). In the case of the photos from Afghanistan, emotions like outrage gave Americans a roundabout way into domestic debates, allowing them to feel good about their presumed distance from, or opposition to, national policies and the unsavory corporeality of the visual work of war, while also demonstrating a kind of ‘civilized’ affective superiority to the Afghans who did not seem to care enough about what the pictures revealed.

### At: World improving

#### Neocolonial proxy wars have rendered state violence invisible – statistical analysis fails to measure the innumerable deaths suffered by the periphery

Gray 15 (John, former Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science and author. “John Gray: Steven Pinker is wrong about violence and war,” The Guardian. 3/13/2015. http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/13/john-gray-steven-pinker-wrong-violence-war-declining)//CB

The picture of declining violence presented by this new orthodoxy is not all it seems to be. As some critics, notably John Arquilla, have pointed out, it’s a mistake to focus too heavily on declining fatalities on the battlefield. If these deaths have been falling, one reason is the balance of terror: nuclear weapons have so far prevented industrial-style warfare between great powers. Pinker dismisses the role of nuclear weapons on the grounds that the use of other weapons of mass destruction such as poison gas has not prevented war in the past; but nuclear bombs are incomparably more destructive. No serious military historian doubts that fear of their use has been a major factor in preventing conflict between great powers. Moreover deaths of non-combatants have been steadily rising. Around a million of the 10 million deaths due to the first world war were of non‑combatants, whereas around half of the more than 50 million casualties of the second world war and over 90% of the millions who have perished in the violence that has wracked the Congo for decades belong in that category. If great powers have avoided direct armed conflict, they have fought one another in many proxy wars. Neocolonial warfare in south-east Asia, the Korean war and the Chinese invasion of Tibet, British counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Kenya, the abortive Franco-British invasion of Suez, the Angolan civil war, the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Vietnam war, the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf war, covert intervention in the Balkans and the Caucasus, the invasion of Iraq, the use of airpower in Libya, military aid to insurgents in Syria, Russian cyber-attacks in the Baltic states and the proxy war between the US and Russia that is being waged in Ukraine – these are only some of the contexts in which great powers have been involved in continuous warfare against each other while avoiding direct military conflict. While it is true that war has changed, it has not become less destructive. Rather than a contest between well-organised states that can at some point negotiate peace, it is now more often a many-sided conflict in fractured or collapsed states that no one has the power to end. The protagonists are armed irregulars, some of them killing and being killed for the sake of an idea or faith, others from fear or a desire for revenge and yet others from the world’s swelling armies of mercenaries, who fight for profit. For all of them, attacks on civilian populations have become normal. The ferocious conflict in Syria, in which methodical starvation and the systematic destruction of urban environments are deployed as strategies, is an example of this type of warfare. It may be true that the modern state’s monopoly of force has led, in some contexts, to declining rates of violent death. But it is also true that the power of the modern state has been used for purposes of mass killing, and one should not pass too quickly over victims of state terror. With increasing historical knowledge it has become clear that the “Holocaust-by-bullets” – the mass shootings of Jews, mostly in the Soviet Union, during the second world war – was perpetrated on an even larger scale than previously realised. Soviet agricultural collectivisation incurred millions of foreseeable deaths, mainly as a result of starvation, with deportation to uninhabitable regions, life-threatening conditions in the Gulag and military-style operations against recalcitrant villages also playing an important role. Peacetime deaths due to internal repression under the Mao regime have been estimated to be around 70 million. Along with fatalities caused by state terror were unnumbered millions whose lives were irreparably broken and shortened. How these casualties fit into the scheme of declining violence is unclear. Pinker goes so far as to suggest that the 20th-century Hemoclysm might have been a gigantic statistical fluke, and cautions that any history of the last century that represents it as having been especially violent may be “apt to exaggerate the narrative coherence of this history” (the italics are Pinker’s). However, there is an equal or greater risk in abandoning a coherent and truthful narrative of the violence of the last century for the sake of a spurious quantitative precision.

#### **Their world improving arguments rely on skewed data sets that obscure sovereign violence and continue necropolitical slaughter**

Mbembe 1 Achille Mbembe, Senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand. “On the postcolony”. 2001. Pgs. 34 - 36.

But—and herein lies one paradox—this form of sovereignty, made up of possessiveness, injustice, and cruelty, conceives itself as also carrying a burden, which yet is not a contract. In theory, the colonial potentate forms no bond with the object of commandement—that is, the native. In principle, there exists no mutual need between the parties. Nor is there hope of any eventual mutual beneﬁt. On the contrary, colonial sovereignty is deﬁned by the assurance of its omnipotence; its right to rule and command must in no case countenance any resistance on the part of the native. This form of government does not rest on a covenant since, in Hobbes’s words, covenants “are made of such things only as fall under our deliberation.” It does not compromise on its rights; on the contrary, it plunders its object and deprives it of what used to be its own. Yet the colonial potentate also portrays itself as a free gift, proposing to relieve its object of poverty and free it from debased condition by raising it to the level of a human being. That is what A. Sarraut called “the right of the stronger to aid the weaker.” Colonial conquest, he speciﬁed, “is not the right, but the fact of one who is stronger; the true right of the stronger is the generous right that he assumes to help, assist and protect the weaker, to be his guide and his guardian.” Raising the native to where he/she can contemplate the recovery of his/her rights requires moral education. The chief means of achieving this is kindness, and its main aim is labor. Kindness is supposed to soften command. As for labor, it is supposed to make possible the creation of utilities, and to produce value and wealth by putting an end to scarcity and poverty. In addition it is supposed to ensure the satisfaction of needs and the enhancement of enjoyments. The state that ﬂows from this sovereignty deﬁnes itself as protective. The native is its protégé. The strength of this state lies as much in the feeling that arises from the right to protect the weak as from the hard-headed quest for metropolitan proﬁt. Its strength is a strength for good and goodness. It is also a family state, and to that extent a “family and ﬁlial bond binds the colonies to the mother country.” Yet the protective state could in no way look kindly on any abdication of the family guardianship over its “protégé,” the native. The same is true of its sovereignty—its moral superiority, the force for good that it brings as a gift. As for the native, docilely caught up in the family guardianship, he or she can only think of his/her enfranchisement at his/her own risk and peril. For a native (or a protégé) cannot be a subject of law. Consigned unilaterally to a sort of minority without foreseeable end, he/she cannot be a subject of politics, a citizen. Since the notion of citizen overlaps that of nationality, the colonized, being excluded from the vote, is not being simply consigned to the fringes of the nation, but is virtually a stranger in his/her own home. The idea of political or civil equality— that is, of an equivalence among all inhabitants of the colony—is not the bond among those living in the colony. The ﬁgure of obedience and domination in the colony rests on the assertion that the state is under no social obligation to the colonized and this latter is owed nothing by the state but that which the state, in its inﬁnite goodness, has deigned to grant and reserves the right to revoke at any moment. As in the colonial regimes, in the African regimes whose crisis and decomposition are now being played out, respect for individuals as citizens with rights and freedom of initiative has not been the chief characteristic. The legal model of sovereignty is hard put to account for the relations of subjection as they functioned, even recently, in those states. To understand how these relations came into being, it is important to go beyond the fashionable slogans of traditional political science (big men, soft state, strong state, patrimonial state, etc.), and think about how the state sought to augment its value and manage utilities, in contexts both of scarcity and of abundance. Many hurried observers propose conceptualizing and describing these relations of subjection, and their overcoming, through uncritical use of such notions as “civil society” or “democracy.” We shall examine the former here, the latter in the next chapter. It will be remembered that, until the eighteenth century, the general image of society was inseparable from the conﬂicts dividing the various classes of men. These conﬂicts coalesced not simply around issues such as property (who had the exclusive and absolute right to use, enjoy, and dispose of what), successions (to whom should a deceased’s estate be transmitted), contracts (on what conditions are agreements between individuals valid), or civil status. They also touched on the forms that relations of subordination and violence assumed, and the privileges derived from particular usurpations (those called, at the time, feudal rights). The central issue was to invent means by which such conﬂicts of interest could be contained and arbitrated. Theories of civil law emerged and developed to resolve such conﬂicts. Initially, these chieﬂy concerned any acts of violence, of crime or murder, but they very quickly came to embrace other areas. Thus it can be said that at the origin of civil society is violence—or, at any event, the necessity of managing it to avoid situations where just anyone may be able to make war and raise taxes, arrogate to himself ownership of public authority, and exercise a relation of domination based on the pure law of arbitrariness.

### Becoming 1st

#### The drive to become structures the subject – radical experimentation within affective networks of relations undermines the liberal drive to purify the self or wallow in anxiety in favor of a joyous process of becoming

Braidotti 6[Rosi, Philosopher and Distinguished University Professor at Utrecht University as well as director of the Centre for the Humanities in Utrecht, “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin Boundas, Edinburgh University, Press: Edinburgh, 2006, p. 133-159] //khirn

So how does one know if one has reached the threshold of sustainability? This sort of intensive mapping requires experimentation. This is where the non-individualistic vision of the subject as embodied and hence affective, socially embedded and interrelational is of major consequence. Your body will thus tell you if and when you have reached a threshold or a limit. The warning can take the form of opposing resistance, falling ill, feeling nauseous or it can take other somatic manifestations, like fear, anxiety or a sense of insecurity. Whereas the semiotic-linguistic frame of psychoanalysis reduces these to symptoms awaiting interpretation, I see them as corporeal warning-signals or boundary-markers that express a clear message: " too much!". I think that one of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari are so interested in studying self-destructive or pathological modes of behavious, such as schizophrenia, masochism, anorexia, various forms of addiction and the black hole of murderous violence, is precisely in order to explore their function as markers of thresholds. This assumes a qualitative distinction between on the one hand the desire that propels the subject's expression of his/her conatus - which in a neo-Spinozist perspective is implicitly positive and on the other hand the constraints imposed by society. The specific, contextually-determined conditions are the forms in which the desire is 6 actualized or actually expressed. To find out about thresholds, you must experiment, which means always, necessarily, relationally or in encounters with others. We need new cognitive and sensorial mappings of the thresholds of sustainability for bodies-inprocesses-of-transformation. This is supported by Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. Another word for Spinoza’s conatus is self-preservation, not in the liberal individualistic sense of the term, but rather as the actualisation of one’s essence, that is to say of one’s ontological drive to become. This is not an automatic, nor an intrinsically harmonius process, in so far as it involves inter-connection with other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes. Violence, pain and a touch of cruelty are part of this process. Negotiations have to occur as stepping stones to sustainable flows of becoming. The bodily self’s interaction with his/her environment can either increase or descrease that body’s conatus or potentia. The mind as a sensor that prompts understanding can assist by helping to discern and choose those forces that increase its power of acting and its activity in both physical and mental terms. A higher form of self-knowledge by understanding the nature of one’s affectivity is the key to a Spinozist ethics of empowerment. It includes a more adequate understanding of the inter-connections between the self and a multitude of other forces, and it thus undermines the liberal individual understanding of the subject. It also implies, however, the body’s ability to comprehend and to physically sustain a greater number of complex inter-connections, and to deal with complexity witjout being over-burdened. Thus, only an appreciation of increasing degrees of complexity can guarantee the freedom of the mind in the awareness of its true, affective and dynamic nature. Sustainability thus defined is also about de-centering anthropocentrism in the new, complex compound that is nomadic subjectivity. The notion of sustainability brings together ethical, epistemological and political concerns under the cover of a nonunitary vision of the subject. ‘Life’ privileges assemblages of a heterogeneous kind: animals, insects, machines are as many fields of forces or territories of becoming. The life in me is not only, not even, human.

#### That nomadic potential can increases one’s powers to act by requiring awareness of one’s condition of interaction with others: ethically empowering modes of being create joyous passions capable of negotiating interpersonal relations

Braidotti 6[Rosi, Philosopher and Distinguished University Professor at Utrecht University as well as director of the Centre for the Humanities in Utrecht, “The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible,” *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin Boundas, Edinburgh University, Press: Edinburgh, 2006, p. 133-159] //khirn

What is, then, this sustainable subject? It is a slice of living, sensible matter: a self-sustaining system activated by a fundamental drive to life. It expresses potentia (rather than potestas), neither by the will of God, nor the secret encryption of the genetic code. This subject is physiologically embedded in the corporeal materiality of the self, but the enfleshed intensive or nomadic subject is an in-between: a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding-outwards of affects. A mobile entity, in space and time, and also an enfleshed kind of memory, this subject is in-process but is also capable of 4 lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining extra-ordinarily faithful to itself. This ‘faithfulness to oneself’ is not to be understood in the mode of the psychological or sentimental attachment to a personal ‘identity’ that often is little more than a social security number and a set of family photo albums. Nor is it the mark of authenticity of a self ("me, myself and I") that is a clearing house for narcissism and paranoia - the great pillars on which Western identity predicates itself. It is rather a faithfulness that is predicated upon mutual sets of inter-dependence and inter-connections, that is to say sets of relations and encounters. These compose a web of multiple relationships that encompass all levels of one's multi-layered subjectivity, binding the cognitive to the emotional, the intellectual to the affective and connecting them all to socially embedded forms of stratification. Thus, the faithfulness that is at stake in nomadic ethics coincides with the awareness of one's condition of interaction with others, that is to say one's capacity to affect and to be affected. Translated into a temporal scale, this is the faithfulness of duration, the expression of one’s continuing attachment to certain dynamic spatio-temporal co-ordinates and to endure. In a philosophy of temporally-inscribed radical immanence, subjects differ. But they differ along materially embedded co-ordinates: they come in different mileage, temperatures and beats. One can and does change gears and moves across these coordinates, but cannot claim all of them, all of the time. The latitudinal and longitudinal forces which structure the subject have limits which I express in terms of thresholds of sustainability. By latitudinal forces Deleuze means the affects a subject is capable of, following the degrees of intensity or potency: how intensely they run. By longitude is meant the span of extension: how far they can go. Sustainability is about how much of it a subject can take and ethics is accordingly redefined as the geometry of how much bodies are capable of. What is this threshold, then, and how does it get fixed? A radically immanent intensive body is an assemblage of forces, or flows, intensities and passions that solidify - in space - and consolidate - in time - within the singular configuration commonly known as an ‘individual’( or rather: di-vidual) self. This 5 intensive and dynamic entity does not coincide with the enumeration of inner rationalist laws, nor is it merely the unfolding of genetic data and information encrypted in the material structure of the embodied self. It is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough - spatio-temporally speaking - to sustain and to undergo constant fluxes of transformation. On all three scores, it is the body’s degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode, as I argued earlier. Positivity is in-built into this programme through the idea of thresholds of sustainability. Thus, an ethically empowering option increases one’s potentia and creates joyful energy in the process. The conditions which can encourage such a quest are not only historical, but also relational: they have to do with cultivating and facilitating productive encounters, which sustain processes of self-transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity. Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate these encounters and also their eventual conflicts.

### Framing

#### Moving beyond the deliberative frames of liberal politics is the only radical use of the university – the alternative’s critique builds a new political vocabulary catalyzed by the energy of youth, which is the only solution to neoliberal militarism and carceral violence

**Evans and Pollard 14** [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Global Insecurities Center, the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, the University of Bristol, UK, and Tyler J., ABD Candidate in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, “Education, the Politics of Resilience, and the War on Youth: A Conversation with Brad Evans,” *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, 36:3: 193-213]

TP: We've talked at length over the past week about neoliberalism, the emergence of corporate forms of sovereignty, and the ways in which power, in particular at a global level, has been disconnected from politics. While politics has been rendered local, power has been elevated largely into global corporate and economic spheres, where it has, in many ways, become indifferent to the specificity and practices of local political realities—for instance, the kinds of struggles facing young people in places like Greece, Spain, across North Africa and the Middle East, as well as in the U.S. and elsewhere. In other words, politics no longer seems to exist in the spaces where we see power most visibly. Could you talk about this tenuous relationship between power and politics—the forces causing it, for instance—and about how this makes it particularly difficult, but, of course, more necessary than ever, to find ways of challenging the complex forms of neoliberal violence bearing down on young people today? I wonder, how can local, grassroots forms of political organization ever hope to speak to a power elite whose scope seems to have become transnational? BE: The idea that there has been a separation between power and politics resonates throughout the wonderful corpus of Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman (see, e.g., 1998) eloquently puts this thesis forward that neoliberal power is global, and yet, the recourse to thinking about the political remains entrenched in the model of the nation state—that is, ways of acting politically or the orthodox assumptions around what politics means remain at the national level. We have yet to conceive of a global political consciousness or imaginary or indeed a framework through which to really deal with the emerging political problems of our times. On the one hand, a number of people might point to global organizations such as the World Health Organization or the United Nations development project, and so on, which resemble an already existing architecture for global governments. I think that is partly right. However, much of what passes for a global political architecture is basically a hyperextension of the modern nation state—it's built on the shoulders of the modern nation state, and it serves, in many senses, to divorce from the logic that the modern nation state has now been reduced to a militarizing and policing function for the service of global neoliberalism and global capitalism. So the first question becomes: If there is this separation of power and politics, why is so much investment going into the idea of the modern nation state as if that can still be a site for political emancipation when the role and function of the modern nation state has been reduced to either (a) how can we better manage the crisis without fundamentally upsetting the cause of the crisis in the first place? or (b) a militarizing and policing function, not least the policing of ideas and what is an acceptable critique? The simple answer, if you look at those young people who are reimagining the meaning of the political, is that actually the nation state doesn't matter. While we can place demands on the nation state there is a real need to fundamentally reconceive not only what it means to be political as an idea, but the forms of organizations which are now required to transform the world for the better. Young people can point to a real clear structural violence in place to prevent those organizations from producing precisely those political architectures that are required to challenge the way power operates today. This violence can be understood very much in terms of the containment zones, the physically embodied containments of the local struggles, which prevent everyone from connecting globally. There is a very clear structural architecture and violence in place that openly operates to stop those connections from happening. And equally, of course, if we want to look at the state and the meaning and function of the state today we have to look at the militarization of responses to protest to see the way in which the state genuinely fears the protesting of youth—particularly, if that protest becomes “too political.” We can accept the protest of youth provided it's regulated such that it doesn't upset the political status quo. The moment that protest starts to really play into the politics of the everyday then it becomes overtly militarized and you see the reversion to law and order as a way to interject into the protest to disrupt any sense of the political. There is something else at stake that works out of this, and this is part of this emerging terrain about rethinking the very meaning of the political in the twenty-first century. The first question is what do we mean by the political? The political is certainly not taking place in an electoral process once every four or five years such that you elect someone. The term that gives it away is that it is “representative democracy.” It's not democracy; it's representative democracy. In other words, it's an illusion. We can call that regulatory politics. Rather, the political as I would understand it, is about the creation of new modes of subjectivity that are yet to exist. In this sense, it's a generational thing; it's a youthful project. The political, which is all about the creation of new modes of existence, requires a new language, a new political vocabulary, and new political registers and terms of engagement and organization. You understand this if you look at the ways youth are protesting and operating today. They are often lambasted for not having a recognizable political vocabulary, but that is precisely the point. They are emerging and constructing a new sense of what the political means, which we're still yet to formulate, we're still yet to make sense of. It's only really with the passage of time that political theorists will be able to make sense of and respond to that very existing empirical reality that youth are constructing. It's certainly not the case that a political thinker will put forth an intellectual book and hope youth will follow. Youth are constructing this new imaginary and it's up to political theorists to catch up to the new empirical reality of the world. The great joy that I see when you look at these movements, (and it's not a movement it's multiple movements), is how wonderfully affirmative, optimistic, and poetic they are. They don't resort to old dogmatic, positivist political vocabularies. Certainly there are those in the academy that will say these ways of thinking are immature, but this is the default setting of those that fear the power of youth. Others will say that this is a wonderful moment; that despite all the crises, these youths are actually willing to do something positive and affirmative and are not buying into the conceit that they have to accept the way things are. Also, if we accept the idea that youth are constructing new imaginaries, new political vocabularies, then they're not simply going to rest on their laurels and accept what was deemed to be emancipatory discourses over the past twenty or thirty years.

#### Analyzing the debate from within their proposed bounds cedes the framing of political possibilities to a fascistic liberal order that normalizes the racialized exclusion of difference

Evans 13 [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Global Insecurities Center, the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, the University of Bristol, UK, “Fascism and the bio-political,” Chapter 3, *Deleuze & fascism: security, war, aesthetics*, ed. Brad Evans & Julian Reid, 2013, Routledge: New York, NY]

Fascistic exposure Dangers require exposure to the fact. Manipulated desire also requires exposure to the fact in order to force the body to act upon the present in order to thwart certain possible outcomes. Invariably, the manner in which desires are to be mobilised in the face of certain dangers largely depends upon the political strategies recruiting insomuch as the nature of threat is always rationality- specific. Every threat occasions a rational underpinning which foregrounds its primary specificity in the collective political imaginary. Liberal regimes for their part operate in a particularly novel way. Unlike totalitarian systems which rely upon secrecy, liberalism brings everything into the open. It continually exposes us to that which threatens the fabric of the everyday. Even our own violent excesses are subject to the same treatment. Since the sources of our anxieties do not therefore rest upon the fear of the unknown, i.e. the advent of disappearance, fears are generated through a communicative assault which overloads the senses by heightening the stakes of all appearances. Indeed, since visual representations of threat so integral to future imaginaries have become globally networked – hence effectively rendering localised drama greater affective power than ordinarily afforded – the visualization of all dangerous encounters becomes the power of the image combined in its affects. Everything in this visually internalised world is connectable – our fears included. We are reminded by Paul Virilio's (2007) two regimes of fear. Mapping out the distinctions between totalitarian and liberal regimes, Virilio reveals some disturbing connections. While the former invokes paranoia by working in the shadows, the latter strikes at the same senses through overexposure. The former, in other words, stifles reality through repression and censorship, while the latter overloads the imaginary in a frenzied assault so that we are anxiously synchronised yet blinded to the attempted mastery of social space. The relationship to violence is particularly telling. While the embodiment of totalitarian regimes is pre-figured in the ‘disappeared’ – those missing lives who offer no empirical verification of the encounter – liberal violence is virtuously declared. It takes place as an ‘open event’. It actively shapes the world anew by ‘making the world safer’. Importantly, for Virilio, these affective relations are never simply articulated in a linear, top-down fashion. Like a networked system they endlessly feed back: ‘the synchronisation of sensations that are likely to affect our decisions’ (Virilio 2010: 6). While the problem of terror has therefore become connectable with all manner of everyday threats, liberalism produces a different regime of fear that replaces the neat tensions of sovereign (dis)order with the paradox of a bio-political potentiality in which life itself always registers to be greater than the sum of its epistemic parts. This will have a profound impact upon both the spatial and the subject account of living systems. Once notions of space are fully enclosed, nothing is epiphenomenal to the order of things. What terrifies actually emerges from within the afflicted com- munity. It is integral to the modalities which sustain life. It is therefore no coincidence to find that contemporary accounts of terror demand environmental frames of reference (Sloterdijk 2009). Within a global imaginary of threat, we fear what we actually produce. That is to say, since what endangers arises from within our living systems, what threatens is integral to that existence (Virilio 2010). Not only does this imply that terror is necessarily indiscriminate. It is also indiscriminable and indistinguishable from the general environment (Massumi 2009). It precludes any prior elimination of the fact on the basis that its sheer possibility inaugurates its simulated occurrence. No longer then a conventionally singular problem, contemporary terrors register in the multiple. Anything can become the material source of our physical undoing. With sequential notions of catastrophe as such firmly displaced by an unending continuum of endemic crises, selective auto-immunity is replaced by the demands for an auto-responsive logic that strategically connects all things liveable. Since this invariably lends itself to preemptive forms of governance in which all manner of threats blur into one strategic framework for counter-affection, the political is effectively overwritten as the normalisation of threat foregrounds an account of life already assumed to be settled. Faced with these conditions, geo-strategic tensions appear to be mere aberrations. Arcane remnants of an outdated past! Not only does this mean that our sense of political community transcends traditional state-centric demarcations, but enmity itself is radically transformed. As Michael Dillon and Julian Reid note, ‘Here, there is no Schmittean existential enemy defined, in advance or by what Schmitt calls the miracle of decision, by its radical otherness … instead, only a continuously open and changing field of formation and intervention: the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-in-formation; becoming-dangerous’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 44). This again is altogether Kantian. While Kant proposed a life of infinite potentiality, life in the process appeared infinitely problematic. The Kantian subject there- fore not only finds its proper expression in our complex, adaptive and emergent times, but the paradoxical nature of its potentiality has redefined the security terrain so that indisrimination becomes the default setting. This is perhaps what Deleuze had in mind when he previously argued that a ‘global agreement on security’ was ‘just as terrifying as war’, for when our very life processes become the source of our bio-political concerns, what Kenneth Galbreith once termed the ‘contented society’ is displaced by an Anxious Mass’ who fear the infinitely dangerous: All our petty fears will be organized in concert, all our petty anxieties will be harnessed to make micro-fascists of us; we will be called upon to stifle every little thing, every suspicious face, every dissonant voice.’ Whilst it is common to suggest that this dismantling of traditional sovereign allegiance has resulted in a crisis of subjectivity – to say that the subject is in crisis misses the point. Liberal subjectivity is made real on account of its ability to live through the ongoing emergency of its own emergence. Eschewing fixed modes of being, it is forever in the making. The liberal subject is therefore the subject of crises (Evans 2012). It lives and breathes through the continual disruption to its own static modes of recovery. None of this is incidental. It is central to paranoiac underpinnings of contemporary forms of fascism. While security has become the main criteria of political legitimacy (Agamben 2001), still we hold onto the belief that subjects of crises are desirable. Freed from the boundary-drawing constraints of the past, it is the riskembracing subject who is enriched beyond their forbear's wildest dreams. This reveals the fateful paradox of our times. Encoded with an altogether more powerful bodily trope, contemporary liberal subjectivity is assumed to be exponentially more powerful and dangerous because of it. It, too, registers the same dynamic, decentralised and recombinant presumptions which give risk societies their very meaning. If its allegiance, then, can no longer be taken for granted, neither can its actions be anticipated with absolute precision. It, too, operates beyond the epistemic pale. While planetary life is therefore seen to be the proper embodiment of liberated political existence, life's emergent globality renders it globally dangerous unto itself because of this potentiality. We must in short learn to embrace and yet fear what we have become. This brings us directly to the Foucauldian concept of the bio-political. Biopolitics refers to the strategisation of aggregated life for its own productive betterment. It links the ‘individual’ to the ‘population’ via a general economy of political rule. Deleuze appreciated the applicability of this concept long before it gained widespread academic currency. In his book Foucault, he paid considerable attention to those ‘diagrams of power’ in which modern systems of production, power and knowledge begin to take into account the ‘processes of life’, along with the possibility of modifying them: ‘administering and controlling life in a particular multiplicity, provided the multiplicity is large (a population) and spread out or open. It is here that “making something probable” takes on its meaning’ (Deleuze 1999: 61). This account of power is significant for two key reasons. First, since life becomes the principle referent for political struggles, life's politics either lives up to political expectations or puts the destiny of the entire species into question. As Deleuze says, ‘when power in this way takes life as its aim or object, then resistance to power already puts itself on the side of life, and turns life against power: “life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system so bent on controlling it”’ (Deleuze 1999: 76). What resistance therefore extracts is ‘the forces of life that is larger, more active, more affirmative and richer in possibilities’. Second, once power is broached bio-politically, it becomes increasingly clear why discourses of insecurity feature heavily in the mobilisation of ‘war machines’ for the securitisation/betterment of politically disqualified life. For when life becomes the principle object for political strategies, violence so often associated with historical fascism appears less pathological and more reasoned: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty … when it becomes the ‘bio-power’ or ‘bio-politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces the symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as a juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological’ danger. (Deleuze 1999: 76) A bio-political reading of fascism is crucial. Foregrounding notions of ‘life necessity’, the possibility that oppressive forms of politicisation can take place within legal frameworks becomes clearer. Fascism then is not necessarily a failure of the liberal imagination even if we understand liberalism to be simply a juridical commitment to rights. Neither is there any reason to believe that normative frameworks (especially those tied to universal moral proclamations) can prevent it from appearing within any social assemblage. To the contrary, normative judgements are in fact part of the problem. Essential to the play of power-politics, ‘norms’ normalise power over by limiting the political field of possibilities. They provide the necessary moral architecture so that a sophisticated assay of life can take place on the grounds of reasonable deliberation. They claim a monopoly over the terms security, rights, justice and peace, so that political judgements on the qualities of life become morally binding. Normative questions are not only therefore central to understanding what qualifies to be politically authentic; it properly disallows life so that its elimination can take place without any crime being committed. Less a problem of legal transgression, normative deliberations allow us positively to enforce what is necessary for a life to be lived well. While this entails the promotion of certain qualities so that ways of living thrive, it also entails fundamental decisions about what must be eliminated so that it is possible to overcome those related dangers to the secure sediment of political existence.

### At no change

#### Theoretical frameworks and theorization are key to change

CARLSON and KITTAY 09

LICIA, and EVA FEDER. "INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUMPTIONS IN LIGHT OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY."Metaphilosophy. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 18 Sept. 2009. Web. 06 July 2017. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01609.x/abstract>.

As the chapters on agency reveal, there is a close relationship between the theoretical frameworks within which we conceive of agency, and the ways in which we then articulate conceptions of the good, the necessity for care, and the demands of justice in relation to the individual with cognitive disabilities. Yet underlying these particular philosophical concerns is a deeper metaphilosophical issue that must be addressed: how and why we speak about cognitive disability at all. The chapters in the next group situate our philosophical discussions in a broader context in the following ways: by exposing the historical contingency and permeability of the categories themselves; by examining the ways academic and nonacademic voices can shape how cognitive disabilities are defined and experienced; by considering the presumptions and theoretical commitments that underlie our understanding of these conditions; and finally, by problematizing the positions that we, as philosophers, occupy when speaking about cognitive disability as an object of inquiry. While this task of contextualizing cognitive disability can be done in broad theoretical terms, the chapters collected here point to the importance of taking up these issues with greater specificity, and focus on two specific conditions: autism and ‘‘mental retardation.’’ Both of these categories have been and continue to be contested, though for different reasons and in distinct ways. Mental retardation as a category has gone through many incarnations, and with the advent of genetic research we find that it has become an increasingly fractured category (Carlson forthcoming). Moreover, vocal self-advocacy and the disability rights movement have challenged the very term ‘‘mental retardation,’’ and many professional groups have moved away from this terminology. Finally, as Stubblefield shows, the very concept of the ‘‘intellect’’ must be critically revisited

# Other 1ncs

## Chronopolitics

#### The strategic deployment of spectral violence is part and parcel of necropolitical governmentality – narratives of chaos are rhetorical tools used to legitimize pre-emptive violence against varying threats to order – this creates an affective attachment to death-making, guaranteeing their representations of geopolitics are used as a justification for invisibilized slaughter

Massumi 15 (Brian, Prof of Communications @ U of Montreal, *Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception*, ebook) \*\*\*Note 13 included in the text of this card, surrounded by brackets.

Time-Based Terra-Forming Signature management invariably involves linguistic signs, from pamphlets to proclamations to news conferences. For maximum performative effect, however, it must make frequent use of nonlinguistic signs. In the case of an invasion, these may involve, among many other things: displays of weaponry demonstrative of the capacity for further intervention; the removal of ﬂags, portraits, monuments, and other countersigns of the old regime; the striating of the territory with marked no-go zones, special function areas, and checkpoints regulating the ﬂow of the everyday; varying patterns of movement as troops, military police, military contract workers, and both civilian officials and military ofﬁcers selectively show themselves, deploying and redeploying in ways that may be frightening or comforting but always demand attention; and signals conveying a capacity for sudden, unmarked intervention, for example, through random stops and searches or intermittent rapid attacks liable to occur anywhere at any time, so as to render ever-present the threat of violence. Given the fraughtness of any war situation, even interventions carrying linguistic content will pack an illocutionary force of variable character and magnitude depending on the delivery. For example, a mass airdrop of pamphlets following an intensive bombing campaign, a tactic used early in the Iraq invasion, is a very different “proposition” than the same pamphlet hand delivered by occupying forces on patrol. The advantage of nonlinguistic sign action is that it performatively effects a kind of terra-forming. The interventions touch ground. When they do, they spatialize what is an essentially temporal form of power, the force- to-own-time, in what amounts to a processual phase-shift analogous to the transition from water to ice. The phase- shift enables military force to toggle to more classical tactics, such as occupation and zone-clearing, as needed. But the spatialization is never complete. It cannot be allowed to become frozen completely in place. Full- spectrum force implies a peculiar mode of occupation in which the territory is held without actually being occupied (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 352-354, 363-364, 368).13 [NOTE: 13. This has been the Israeli strategy in Gaza since its dismantling of Jewish settlements and withdrawal of ground forces in 2005. All ingress and egress, of goods and people, are controlled from the periphery and from the airspace above. Information is collected and controlled through the use of such means as satellite surveillance, informants, and Israeli control over the population registry and cell phone frequencies. This maintains in permanent readiness the conditions for a sudden shift to shock tactics and hard power, in the form of targeted assassinations, shelling, and ground incursions of various magnitudes. The occupation of Gaza never ended. It just changed modes.] Control of the territory depends much more on the ability to rapidly redeploy than on an implanted spatialized presence rigidiﬁed into a war of position. Time remains the overriding operational parameter. Military theory and strategic manuals become and remain speed-obsessed. Territorial control becomes less a traditional taking and holding of space than a time-effect. Time-based interventions take place more in the form of redrawable on-the-ground zonings and on-the-ﬂy spatial differentiations than enduring structurings of the territory. The lay of the conﬂictual land is the spatial form in which a time-based power process effectively appears, in much the same way that the color of an afterimage is the optical form in which a time-based visual process, in itself imperceptible, effectively manifests itself. Under pressure of a temporal power, the territory takes on characteristics of ﬂow. It becomes meltable and malleable, unsettlable and resettlable. The potentialized ﬂexibility of a capabilities-based approach coupled with rapid response submit the territory to repeated destructurings and adaptive restructurings. What is at stake is less a deﬁnitive striation of the terrain than a management of patterns of movement, in all of their operational, performative, and affective dimensions. All parties, friend and enemy, military and civilian, are swept up in overall ground conditions of ﬂux. The ground of war is a surfacing, on the macro-perceptual scale, of recurrent background conditionings occurring in the suspensive interval of the infra-instant. The territory is the surface form extruded by the life- priming of bare activity. It is the effective form of expression of what Deleuze and Guattari would call a cutting edge of deterritorialization (1987, 88 109, 587), understood as the processual suspension of prior griddings remitted to the formative commotion from which they emerged. The perception attack is the edge of that edge: the cut. The ground of war ﬂoats and tosses on a commotional abyss incised by the force-to-own-time. The territorial striations of the surface are the functional traces of generative fault lines racking the embodied potential of a population.” The fact that what the force-to-own-time most directly manipulates are signs does not make it pacific. Even at the far end of the spectrum, at the softest signature-managing degrees of soft power, its performative semiotic force does violence. In the arena of war, every sign emitted by an adversary is a sign of potential danger. It is a threat. Threats command attention. They rivet. They plug directly into the nervous system. They shock the body into infra- agitation. They tangibly stir the body, so as to intangibly modulate its life potential across a bracing interval of suspense. This is a bodily violence, committed immaterially, performatively, in a hit of perception. Soft power does not in the end, even at the extreme end of the spectrum, separate itself out from violence. It immaterializes violence.” It suspends the physical friction and ups the perceptual quotient. What varies across the full spectrum of power is the ratio in the equation of violence of frictional acting-out to perceptual in-action, of attrition to in-bracing. What seems to be a separating out at opposite ends of the spectrum, violence at one extreme, soft persuasion at the other, is nothing of the sort. The relation of violence to persuasion is not binary, on-off, zero-one. The spectrum is exactly that: a spectrum, a continuum. The two terms are imbricated, enfolded in each in mutual processual implication. What varies as the cutting edge of operational engagement cursors from one setting on the continuum to another is the ratio of their commixing. When the setting changes, qualitative variations occur across the spectrum. Persuasion slides between infra-perceptual conditioning on the one hand to macro-perceptual cognition and conscious reﬂection on the other. In its infra-perceptual exercise persuasion exerts nonconscious inﬂuence in the form of priming. As explained earlier, although often discussed in cognitive terms as an orienting of “implicit knowledge,” priming occurs at an emergent level where cognition is in the making. Its consequent nature is precisely what is at issue. Priming can be contained within psychology only if the embodied psychological dropout state of the bare-active offbeat of coming experience is conveniently bracketed. It is not “subliminal” if by that is meant an experience describable in the same cognitive terms as conscious experience but occurring below a threshold of manifest awareness. It differs qualitatively from conscious experience. The scale of violence, for its part, goes from the entropic materiality of attritional-frictional battle-force at one end to the immaterial violence of non-battle-force at the other. Because it stretches between the material and the immaterial, the continuum of violence radiates problems that can only be characterized as metaphysical.” The most basic of these is of course the very difference between the material and the immaterial, and the manner of their co-implication in each other across their difference. In the ﬁeld of war this question translates into the nagging question of how to assess and address the “intangibles” so intimately entangled in the constitution of every situation. In that guise, it infiltrates other issues. It is central to the question of force and persuasion, or the difference between and co-implication of war and peace. It extends to action and perception, perception-in-action and cognition, the body and its performatively stoked potential, time and its phase-shifting into spaces, the discreteness of the act and the continuity of the experiential spectrum, emergent order and the edge of chaos. All of these problematic knots rehearse the distinction between the tangible and the intangible, reformulating each its own way the question of the materiality and immateriality of conﬂict. These constant recapitulations carry metaphysical concerns into the very heart of the theory and practice of war. For all these reasons, “metaphysical” serves as a better qualiﬁer for contemporary conﬂict than “epistemological.” War Music As war doctrine underwent renovation and reorientation through the 1990s into the 2000s, a great deal of the ferment has focused precisely on this question of how militarily to address the “intangibles” of conﬂictual life occupying the “soft” end of the spectrum (Ullman and Wade 1996, 1, 3). The failure of the most high-proﬁle military campaigns to come out of this Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, is commonly attributed to their fumbling the intangibles. This has led to calls to retheorize contemporary war with renewed emphasis on what, quite wrongly, is being called the “human terrain.”17 The intangible terrain of war is anything but human. If everything comes to hinge on the infra-instant, that is where the intangibles most palpably reside. The fulcrum of war power is now at the level at which the emergence and reemergence of the human are modulated. War is no longer a power of the human but a power productive of it in novel conﬁgurations: an ontopower. Ontopowers of the human are themselves infra-human. Soft power and hard power are imbricated in the same continuum. They are spectrally co-involved. What holds them together is threat. The threat is of deadly force. The ever-presence, in the pragmatic field of potential, of the menace of lethal violence makes hard power operative, in some intangible way, at every setting. It is always at least bare-actively operative. It is always at least “insigned,” for in war signs of danger are liable to drop anywhere, all the time. Violence, although always insigned, cannot ever only be insigned. Force-against-force is a necessary complement and follow-up to hits of soft power. The use of physical violence is required to maintain territorial griddings within certain functional parameters between intervals of modulation, and to hold modulations within certain bandwidths of functional variation when they do occur. A checkpoint does not work as an exercise of movement-patterning soft power without a shoot-to-kill policy intermittently triggered into action in a ﬂash. It also does not always work to have checkpoints in continuous operation or set permanently in place. Similarly, as technology has developed attempts to control “diffuse” threats on the ground without actually occupying it have increasingly come to rely on ﬂash attacks and occasional in-and-out special-ops incursions, supplementing more continuous, softer power operations such as military advising, police and military training of indigenous proxy forces, surveillance and intelligence networking, and “nation-building” exercises such as school construction. Soft power needs hard power, to operate as its local spigot or voltage control. Hard power needs soft power, to give it span by stretching it across the whole spectrum of force. In each act of war, they co-occur as processual reciprocals, coactive in varying degrees of mixture producing a ratio of force-against-force to the force-to- own-time, frictional attrition to surplus-value war-process lubrication. In each act, one or the other will dominate. The dominant will give the act an overall felt quality leaning toward one end of the spectrum or the other. A soft power dominant can give hard power deniability (it’s “only” a threat). A hard power dominant can make soft power a relief. Toggled together, in varying mixtures and degrees, their coactivity expands the active scope of war. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have oil-spotted into a seeping expansion of the geographical, as well as operational, spectrum of active U.S. military intervention to previously unseen extents (between 2000 and 2014, U.S. military personnel are known to have been deployed for operations of varying natures not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Liberia, Chad, Mali, Uganda, Libya, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Bosnia, Georgia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Haiti; for a full count up to 2004, see Grimmett 2004). Signature management involves alternating the dominant from one act to the next, producing a complex rhythm of punctual macro-acts set against a continuously modulated background of ﬁeld potential. The rhythm has four compositional beats: the reconditioning interruption of shock; the prolongation of shock into a state of awe carrying the shock-effect to and through the next action; the actual execution of a next action; then a repeat shock, itself conditioned by the carryover awe, as it was modulated by the intervening action. The beats do not necessarily correspond to a chronological order. They may be reordered, remixed, or selectively skipped. There is a rhythmic composition to war involving a complex play between battle and nonbattle, the punctual and the continuous, the step-by-step of the line of action and its arc, which literally gives war a musical character. In the new art of war, according to Cebrowski and Garstka, combat at the operational level is reduced to a step function.. .. After the initial engagement, there is an operational pause, and the cycle repeats.. .. The step function becomes a smooth curve, and combat moves to a high-speed continuum.. .. Each element of the force has a unique operating rhythm.. .. The results that follow are the rapid foreclosure of enemy courses of action and the shock of closely coupled events. This disrupts the enemy’s strategy and, it is hoped, stops something before it starts. (1998) Stops something before it starts: the composition is as essentially preemptive as it is productive of a next pulse of reconditioned life (see chapter 1 on the productive nature of preemption). Military force rhythmically returns to the level at which actions emerge in order to stop what could have happened from happening as it otherwise would have, while priming the territory for other lines of emergent action (on the conditional as the signature mode of preemptive power, see chapters 1 and 7). The conduct of war overall consists in a preemptive modulation of action potential. What is “revolutionary” in contemporary military affairs is not only the operationalization of ontopower, the addressing by military force of powers of emergence, but also the priority of the perception attack, performed with a pronounced preemptive lilt. According to Donald Rumsfeld: The situation is this: We are going to address fixed targets as we find them. We are going to address emerging targets as we find them. Things will not be necessarily continuous. The fact that they are something other than perfectly continuous ought not to be characterized as a pause. There will be some things that people will see. There will be some things that people won’t see. And life goes on. (Rumsfeld 2001) Action alternates between macro-perceptual targets that are actually found on the ground, and emerging targets as yet only in potential. Things will therefore not be continuous. And yet they will be. There will be intervals, but the intervals will not be pauses. They will be nonbattles. They will be ﬁlled with action of an unseen nature. Not everything that happens will be perceptible. Perception is on the blink, and precisely because it is, it will be centrally at stake at every moment. Life, at any rate, will go on, marching to a staggered military beat of perceptibility and imperceptibility, on-the- ground step- functions and field-repotentializing interruptions, friction against things fixed and the insigning of a smooth abyssal curve of ﬂuctual refix.

#### **“The end comes first, so let us start at the end. And by the end, I mean The Future”. – As we find ourselves suspended within prognosis time, the question of politics is not one of anticipation or mourning, but instead, how can we create a joyful openness to those haunted futures beyond human calculation – They’ll bemoan the necessity of state action and the permutation, but who knows, they may already be too late.**

Cunningham 14 Kim Cunningham, Visiting Instructor, Department of Sociology, Wesleyan University. “Moving Through the Future: Affective Memory in Prognosis Time”. Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 2014, Vol. 14(5) 460 –470. Pgs. 463 – 468.

But what is this calm, this stopping of time, this suspension in vulnerability, this “waiting” while being “outside?” In The Future, we feel the characters are rushing to prevent something (climate change), or save something (Paw-Paw). Save the planet, save the cat, save life, save your marriage. And on the other hand, there is the possibility of being too late because of the suspension (climate change, Paw-Paw). Is it calm after the storm, of malaise or mourning, because it is already too late, the emergency is already in motion and we are just waiting for it to collapse, or the calm before the storm, which means we must anticipate, move, rush, prevent, preempt? The ground we are walking on itself may disappear if we stand still. We are outside on this building, we are vulnerable life. And we are waiting. Always waiting inside a risk that refuses to materialize, that taunts us with the thought of its immanence (Cooper, 2008, pp. 74-100). Clearly, on this building called The Future, an emergency is immanent. If The Future shows the affective conundrums that confound time, it also shows the post-human, vitalist (Bennett, 2010) time that the era of mass emergency brings. The sense of global doom, of having no future is co-constitutive with the de-centering of the human subject, as economic catastrophe, large-scale war, and ecological crises along with the calculation of risk create a sense of the bare elements of life become more salient, urgent. This calls forth a question of movement: If catastrophe seems to loom in the future, do you anticipate and act quickly to prevent it, or do you start to mourn your loss in the present as if the future had already come to pass? In your inability to take either position, you become suspended in between, waiting uncomfortably for that future to arrive. But if, as Jason says, it is too late, if such forces are already in motion—climactic, economic, political, affective—that means current action is a lost cause as the next catastrophe immanently snowballs toward eruption. So time could feel slow, inactive, as though we are waiting for the inevitable to take us over, and mourning our current lives as past. Or maybe it has not happened yet and we would better rush and imagine years collapsing on each other as we anticipate the next risk. The characters in the future seem to oscillate between these two temporal positions: It is too late/It has not happened yet. Is the catastrophic event in the past or the future? If only time could stop forever. So we could stop being inside risk, threat, and a traumatic event which we know not whether we should mourn or anticipate, whether it is in front of us or behind us and simply not visible just yet. But this sense of stopping can never be a safe haven either, for stopping, being inert, means time is still moving. It is clear that Sophie and Jason exist in a “crisis-oriented sociality” (Clough & Willse, 2011, p. 5). Crisis seems to be part of the environment they inhabit, a world in which nonhuman forces and survival itself decenter the human narrative and the ability to move through it in any effective way. What is haunting this environment? Speaking of this very environmentality of crisis, in his discussion of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath, Brian Massumi (2011) theorizes that our sense of the environment has merged with war, and become a composite “war-weather” environment in which crisis seems always on the brink of occurring. “Between irruptions, it blends in with the chaotic background, subsiding into its own pre-amplified incipience, already active, still imperceptible . . .. The figure of the environment shifts: from the harmony of a natural balance to a churning seedbed of crisis in the perceptual making” (p. 20). Arguably, in the post-9/11 world of preemptive governance, increasing climate catastrophe, and economic recession, our entire concept of the environment has changed, as governance moves toward a threat-based and preemptive conception of emergency. In this new conception of the environment, merging with the post-9/11 conception of terrorism as outbursts of violence and preemptive tactics of control, it seems, as Massumi argues that “threat is as ubiquitous as the wind, its source as imperceptible” (p. 23). Such threat is indiscriminate and so seems to appear everywhere, without a clear and definable object or event. Preemptive governance thus places subject in the awkward position of never knowing what to be afraid of, not having an object with which to form a relation, in the psychoanalytic sense. This object-less-ness is what causes a kind of nonlinear haunting. If anyone could be a terrorist, if the weather could be beautiful and yet the climate is doomed to disaster, if the threat could be anywhere, without a definite and definable source, then one cannot get away from it but must remain in a state of constant vigilance for a future. Is it in the future or the past? Should we run to prevent this catastrophe from happening, or resign ourselves to a coming loss, mourning before it happens? One thing is for sure—we are haunted by what has not yet happened. The time Jason, Sophie, and Paw-Paw exist in is a time in which catastrophic large-scale emergencies such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, war, climate change, global recession, speak the language of future catastrophic crisis through risk calculation. They present themselves through statistical measures of risk, as more and more objects enter into the realm of predictive speculation (Cooper, 2008). Climate change especially giving the sense of having harbored something that may now be out of control, too late to reverse, and yet, must still be anticipated in case it can in fact be reversed. July’s The Future makes palpable what Sarah Lochlann Jain (2007) calls “prognosis time” (p. 77). In her analysis of the temporality of cancer, waiting, and risk, Jain argues that “living in prognosis” is a time of in-between, as bodies modulated at every moment by calculations of risk and speculative forecast sense their own suspension in vulnerable time, ever partial, ever at risk, unsure whether the elements are too beyond control to worry about, or whether, by not worrying, they are leaving themselves vulnerable to the emergent threat. In the space of cancer prognosis, for example, one can neither mourn a certain death nor be comforted by high probabilities of survival, as the statistical calculation of risk keeps the body suspended in time between the two possibilities by ever-changing degrees. Jain writes, The prognosis activates terror—the shock of having harbored cancer, the fear of an unknown future seemingly presented through survival-rate numbers, the brush with a culture of death. But bizarrely, at the same moment, it dissolves that very terror in the act, its very function, of aggregation. The number itself imbricates one’s life into the inevitable and the universal; the number becomes the backdrop against which one can no longer locate the shape of one’s own life. The prognosis offers an abstract universal, moving through time at a level of abstraction that its human subjects cannot occupy, and in so doing it threatens to render us all (for we are all moving through the culture of cancer) inert. Simply a structure of and for our fantasies, the prognosis itself has no time for the human life and death drama. (p. 78) The prognosis suspends one between life and death chances, universalizing the molar body into a universal aggregate, a point of data. It is something out of step with the subject’s craving to take a position and locate the bounds of an event in time to take effective action. Jain writes, “Furthermore, prognostic time constantly anticipates a future. In this sense, it offers us a similar level of abstraction that is virtually impossible to grasp.” Stopping time makes sense. We are rendered “inert” in our ability to move through chronological narrative time because we exist in this time of prognosis, a time when neither mourning nor effective anticipation are possible, but exist in strange degrees which correspond to calculations beyond human control. As is clear in the film and Jain’s writing, this middling poses a challenge to the time of life, and remains quite unbearable for those living in it, concerned with their own survival. Indeed, The Future shows precisely this difficulty subjects face in adjusting to prognosis time, subjects who have to manage the suspension in the time of various prognoses, on the one hand, and on the other, try to simplify and make manageable life and action within prognosis through taking a position, reducing the suspension inherent in percentage (I have a 67% chance of surviving) to one pole (yes, I will die of this cancer) or (no, I will not die of this cancer), one position or the other. Prognosis time is confusing, for it suspends us between poles of certain events (having cancer or not, dying or not dying) even as it retains the uncertainty of either. We thus cycle between various combinations of mourning and anticipation, as we unconsciously remain suspended in these imagined possibilities, the chances of something horrible happening, hope and thus anticipation, potential loss and thus despair. Thus, Jain argues that prognosis is an affective device, an object for our fantasies of prediction and control. The “double action” of prognosis refers to the ability of the statistical marker to simultaneously act as “causing and evacuating the terror of a potential future.” Jain writes, “Once you enter the population, you will only die or not die; you will not 70 or 42, or 97 percent die” (p. 81). “On the one hand is chronological time and clear, definite boundaries of life and death” (“we either die or do not yet die, we don’t ‘70, or 42, 97 percent die’”; p. 81). The building will collapse or it will not collapse. Paw-Paw will die or will survive. Since we do not 70% die and neither does an emergency 70% happen, we oscillate between it already being too late, and it not having happened yet and rushing to prevent or preempt it. These two stances simplify the complexity of being in time for the subject. But complicating this attempt at “taking a position” to then take action, risk positions the body-as-population in a statistical middling between life and death, suspended in time by a numerical measure between these two poles, ever changing with new calculations. “Thus, if your five-year survival statistic is 5 percent, you are apparently worse off than if it were 80 percent, though you still do not know which side of the line you’ll be on in five years” (p. 81). Unable to anticipate or mourn, we are thus temporally suspended between these two affective positions, suspended, “waiting” (Jain, 2007, p. 83). This is what it means to try to live as a subject in prognosis time, a temporality which suspends one in time both before and after an event, a nonlinear time in which it becomes impossible either to anticipate a certain future or mourn a clearly delineated “past.” In prognosis, there is no “object” or clear “event” with a before or after—prognosis continually reworks temporal boundaries instead of cementing them. This suspension, for Jain, ironically drives an even greater power to seek and attach to the statistic as a kind of truth or certainty. “Offered in factual form, prognosis holds the counterfactual: life and death” (Jain, p. 90). Clearly, those in prognosis time are haunted by their own death, the end before the beginning of the story, what Jain calls “a pre-posterous viewpoint: one in which the end, or posterior, seems to precede the story” (p. 81). July’s The Future illustrates that this “end before the beginning” is not merely in cancer prognosis, but is something that feels like a characteristic of the universe itself as we picture apocalypse with every new traumatic event, every new calculation of doom. What Jason describes about the building about to collapse resonates with Jain’s writing on the “creepy” nature of cancer prognosis. Being diagnosed with cancer offsets one’s sense of time in the body. Cancer must have been there for a while, long before the signs became apparent to one’s inner sensation. Furthermore, after the treatments, how does one know if the cancer remains? The threat is ubiquitous. Is it over or not? The temporal boundaries are unclear. Where is it? The spatial boundaries are unclear. To simplify the threat, it would be nice to know the answers clearly. Instead, the prognosis enters, suspending us between them, holding us (comfortably and against our will) in time. While the cancer patient inhabits the time of prognosis as a single statistical variable, in The Future, we see that prognosis time is characteristic of our entire environment. Large-scale crises are objects of prediction too, making the entirety of our environment feel at risk, immersing us not merely in the prognosis of our individual lives, but the prognosis time for humans as a population. The Future shows how prognosis time has become not merely a temporality one enters into when one is deemed “at risk” but a more encompassing state of time itself, as now almost nothing is outside of the realm of risk calculation, including the entire planet and cosmos. The relations of temporality made so present in The Future are part of a larger assemblage of time in which we find ourselves, a form of governance that is preemptive, anticipatory. While Jain argues that we all live in some degree of prognosis, The Future shows that in the era of mass catastrophe, we are all living not in individual prognosis of life and death, risk factors and the neoliberalism of individual responsibility for managing this risk, but that we are constantly in prognosis as our basic assemblage of time. Mass emergencies and their acceleration place us in a constant state of universal prognosis. Jason and Sophie can thus be seen as attempting to reduce the ungraspable nature of living in a kind of cosmic prognosis. These positions are both indicative of being caught in a certain kind of time that comes with the era of mass emergency and its biopolitical management. If statistical management is beyond life and death to unlife, that is, beyond biopolitics and the preservation of life, then how do molar body-subjects, trying to live a life experience, adjust to, grapple with, and move in such a temporal arrangement? Indeed, prognosis time is part of a larger strategy of anticipation (Adams et al.) that includes prediction, prevention, and preemption. While prognosis is predictive, preemption acts before threat appears or can even emerge, prescribing that we should “intervene in the conditions of emergence of the future before it gets a chance to befall us” (Cooper, 2008, p. 91). Preemption, as a mode of governance, “has traveled far outside its original context and is increasingly at work in U.S. policy in environmental and health crises, ranging from global warming to infectious disease . . . and humanitarian intervention” (Cooper, 2008, p. 91). The objects of preemption are expanding, now present everywhere the model for governance of populations, from biomedical technologies to humanitarian interventions to war. This change is resonant with what Deleuze (1992) identifies as the formation of the “dividual”—the change in the modality of governance from disciplinary societies to societies of control (p. 4). In the era of the dividual, the human subject is not the fulcrum around which governance revolves. Instead, the statistical measure, a measure of life (Foucault, 2004/2007) and death (Mbembe, 2003) becomes the means of governance, and these statistical measures become means of speculative forecast (Adams, Murphy, & Clarke, 2009). These calculations makes life into fragments within databases, as life becomes information and back (Thacker, 2005). Eugene Thacker (2005) and Patricia Clough (2011) have both argued for the informational as bound into the statistical. “I want to rethink body parts . . . and outside the bounds of the organism” (Clough, 2011, p. 6). But the question becomes how the organism, reduced and modulated as informational bare life, then, as a subject, deal with this, or how this may fold back into subjectification. Thinking of this production of the individual as statistical, Patricia Clough writes, This sociologic comes to treat the individual itself as a population, complicating the individual in terms of his or her own propensities, his or her affective capacities, which are calculated by drawing on digitized databases from across institutional settings that carry the trace of the individuals’ institutional behaviors to be read as a statistical profile of the individual’s behavioral tendencies: What the individual has done and therefore can or cannot do in the future. The individual, like the population, has become “a sort of technical political object of management and government . . . dependent on a series of variables.” (Clough, 2011, pp. 9-10) These practices reflect the move toward “human security”—the blurring of the line between the establishment of physical securitization of national boundaries and the press toward securitizing human populations psychologically and affectively (Clough & Willse, 2011). But what becomes of the individual subject in such a modality of governance, which continually treats the human as bare life or informational snippets of matter, DNA, organs, and parts? To say that the body is divided into parts sounds like a spatial argument, and it is. But it can also be thought of as temporal. Indeed, Foucault argues that biopower is preemptive in its relation to time, as statistical measures of populations serve to preempt particular outcomes for that population. But recently, biopolitical thought has extended beyond the issue of life and death to matter itself, to unlife, that which has not yet emerged into actuality. What happens to memory’s ability “move” through linear time in the era of preemptive governance of populations? Following Clough’s “sociologic,” here is the logic of this preemption: To leave past trauma alone, or to address it without concern for the future, is to leave that society at risk. Like a landmine that will explode with each new stressor, the past itself is an unpredictable threat that must be staked out. To preempt a possible future repetition? Once again, it is too late, but it has not happened yet. It is too late (repetition)/we will make sure it has not happened yet (preemption). Irruption is always immanent. Preemptive action that sets out to preemptively stop a cycle of trauma, thus, ultimately seems to produce a cycle of its own: that of placing the subject, now dividualized as a data point, in a cycle of constant vigilance against their own psychic environment, positioned as risky and constantly on the brink of crisis, unable to be trusted. So the subject produced as “at risk” for traumatic memory too becomes suspended in prognosis time. At once, the dividualized subject is being asked to mourn and let go of traumatic events even as the possibility of an end point becomes suspended in continual risk, recycling over and over. The threat thus becomes not merely the traumatic event, but the neurological and affective state that precedes it. Memory has become “dividualized” as the forces of governance anticipate future memories. Anticipation is tricky. There isn’t some event anticipated that exists separate from the anticipations of it. In this regard, an anticipation is not a representation of a possible future. In contrast, when you anticipate, you do something. This doing is a movement, and a memory. Thus, risk calculation and the preemptive action that accompanies it, as a form of anticipation, is a doing. As Patricia Clough and Craig Willse (2011) have argued, the very measure of risk is an affective modality. It cuts into matter itself. It is not a representation but an alteration of affect. They write, “As a measure of risk, statistical analysis constitutes an actuarialism that is potentially productive rather than representational” (Clough & Willse, 2011, p. 5). In the same way, practices that seek to securitize memory as a potential threat, such as these emerging new practices and trends in humanitarian aid practices of psychotherapy, are not neutral, acting only on an anticipated future, but ironically in trying to preempt traumatic experience, they produce other ripples of traumatic contagion and new fears of what could be. Anticipation is a simulation, affecting the body. Fearing the future and preparing brings the feared future into the present. And this feared future is not a representation of what could be, but an action in the present, an action which produces its own memory, memory which is not witnessed or understood in this logic, but overlooked. This can be understood as the dividualization of memory, a memory that is made through the subject’s entrance into the universalizing pool of data and statistics. To position, for example, soldiers or refugees as “at risk” for becoming traumatized is not to protect their future but to affect their present and thus their memory, producing an affective response in the present. Preempting a memory is a memory. Thus, the production of trauma as risk is not independent from the circuit of trauma itself. Trauma as risk factor effectively builds the fear of trauma. The traumatized subject, now as part of a population that is threatening, faces a double trauma: the trauma itself and the trauma of being a subject at risk. One might call this a “violence on the violence.” Massumi argues that preemption produces a kind of simulation of the event imagined. We preempt the event we fear, and then this reaffirms our fear. Meanwhile the original threat, he says “always will have been”—we have no way of knowing what would have happened. We remained forever haunted by a will have been future (or future–past). We conclude after the fact that there was something to be afraid of, and in the process of supposedly producing security, we create all kinds of insecurity. Preemption can take the past as its object precisely because it is outside of the linear time of past–present and future. “It belong to the nonlinear circuit of the always will have been” (p. 56). Because it operates on an affective register and inhabits a nonlinear time operating recursively between the present and the future, preemptive logic is not subject to the same rules of noncontradiction as normative logic, which privileges a linear causality from the past to the present and is reluctant to attribute an effective reality to futurity. (p. 57) As such preemption is constantly “producing what it fights” (p. 57). In preemptive modalities, we enact a simulation of the fearsome, apocalyptic future we fear. “The security that preemption is explicitly meant to produce is predicated on it tacitly producing what it is meant to avoid: preemptive security is predicated on a production of insecurity to which it itself contributes” (p. 58). The insecurity produced by securitization is a type of memory, a type of memory in which a particular future may not be imagined, but rather, if the preemptive measures work, we have the “always will have been.” The threat always will have been, thus neglecting the supposedly protected subject-population to more fear. The “always will have been” is a kind of tense. Thus, the idea of protecting populations from future trauma via a variety of preemptive measures is producing a collection of “always will have beens” a sort of future-memory archive. A solider who is not traumatized, for example, after receiving the psychiatric drug propranolol or virtual reality training to preempt the possibility of traumatic memories, in being positioned as “at risk” thus always will have been traumatized, always will have developed PTSD. This future that always will have been remains without the possibility of testing it. Following Massumi, imagining that one might experience a traumatic incident in the future and preempting its possibility now places one, I argue, eternally in that traumatic future with no hope to empirically check on its truth. It remains, as Massumi (2011) writes, “in the nonlinear circuit of the always will have been” (p. 54). The always will have been remains in virtual memory, at each moment, in the body. We may feel we have warded off threat, but the sensation of threat, no longer subject to chronological time of a definite event which either occurs or does not occur, remains as a memory in the body. “Letting go” of fear relies on one’s ability to put that threat, to some degree, in the past, and so instead of a population securitized against trauma, the population remains threatened by what always will have been. It should be noted that to study memory within preemption means thinking of memory as beyond issues of life, extending to what Parisi and Goodman (2011, p. 174) call “unlife.” To remember within preemption, for these thinkers, is a form of control over a population at the level of simulation, but beyond biopolitics. Preemptive power exceeds the bio-logic of control. If preemption inserts a temporal dimension into power, then this dimension cannot be equated with the time of the living. The virtual should not be equated with the potentially lived but is rather a pure potential of which life potential is merely a subset . . .. It is in this sense that for us mnemonic control poses the problem of power beyond biopower, and opens memory to the plane of unlife. (Parisi & Goodman, 2011, p. 175) By unlife, Parisi and Goodman are referring to what has not yet emerged, and thus that which cannot easily fit into narrow issues of individual life and identity, that which has not been lived. In the case of preemptive practices of memory like those above, the individual need not to have actually experienced war or PTSD to be afraid of them, to be haunted by them, and thus, to in a sense remember them, according to Parisi and Goodman’s conception of memory.

## Dark Matter

#### **The 1AC’s generative capacity is only possible due to the proliferation of black death – The intelligibility of western politics are founded on a violent logic of death-making at the behest of the human – only a political strategy beginning with an analysis of the uneven distribution(s) of life can undermine the investments in violence that determine all forms of western polity**

Winant 15 Howard Winant, University of California. “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century”. 2015. Pgs. 313 – 317.

Race and racism may be termed the ‘dark matter’ of the modern epoch. ‘Dark matter’, as you know, makes up much of the universe. Invisible, it possesses mass and gravitational attraction (what gravity is, however, is still up for debate; that’s another story). This rhetorical device begins with a crude analogy, but it suggests a lot of detailed comparisons. Race was invented along with the modern era; this was a historic swing that itself took several centuries to accomplish. It involved the lift-off of capitalism, a big bang of sorts: primitive accumulation, worldwide European seaborne empire, the Westphalian state system, conquest and settlement, the African slave trade, and the advent of enlightenment culture. The invisibility of the dark matter then – the darker peoples of that time – was not complete: in fact they were not invisible at all as ‘matter’, as something that mattered. They were invisible as people. ‘The turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins’, as Marx (1967: 351) puts it. I won’t go much into the comparisons here. Empire, slavery, augmented state power, and the dialectic of enlightenment as well, can all be seen as racial dynamics, in which absolutism’s grasping and violent claws tore at the ‘others’, seeking to dominate their bodies and their lands. What absolutist rule did not destroy it attempted to use for its own purposes. Systems of rule and exploitation have advanced a great deal since the bad old days of maximum depredation that characterized the ‘way of death’ (Miller, 1988) in Africa or the ‘entombment of mines of the aboriginal populations’ (Marx again). That rapacity launched the modern world. Today, race and racism retain their predatory characteristics, their disregard for most of mankind. They continue from above as an ongoing war against the weak, the ‘dark matter’ of the world, who are still more ‘matter’ than people. An institutionalized forgetting of the provenance and meaning of race (‘colorblindness’) dismisses and disguises this war, this coercion and violence. Race and racism also work from below, as matters of resistance (racism continues as something to be resisted), and as frameworks for alternative identities and collectivities. Though there has been endless suffering, the subaltern social strata, the ‘dark matter’, has proved itself in resistance (in many ways, not all) to rule by the racial regime. The (partial) autonomy of people of color, combined with their sheer numbers and their continuing indispensability to the regime – as labor, citizens/denizens/migrants, as ‘multitude’, and even as ‘bare life’ – suggests that they can never be effectively ruled again as they were in the past. Still a significant degree of absolutism endures, much of it organized along racial lines. ‘Deathscapes’ anybody? ‘Bare life’? (Mbembe, 2003; Agamben, 1998). As Judith Butler (2007) notes: ‘We have become accustomed over recent years to the argument that modern constitutions retain a sovereign function and that a tacit totalitarianism functions as a limiting principle within constitutional democracies.’ To provide a credible theoretical account of race and racism is always a challenge. To do so in the 21st century, a period that is putatively ‘post-civil rights’, post-apartheid, and ‘colorblind’, is to run political and intellectual risks. My comments here are necessarily provisional, work-in-progress. In these few pages I cannot hope to offer anything definitive or comprehensive. Where race is concerned, we are in a notably contradictory age: the ‘post-civil rights’ period, the age of Obama, is also the age of neoliberalism, itself a political-economic phenomenon whose racial dimensions go largely unrecognized. Here I confine myself to situating the present in the longue durée of racial history that is, I believe, largely contiguous with the modern world-system’s history. ‘Deathscape’ is the term used by Achille Mbembe to describe the ‘postcolony’. We could also apply it to Gaza, to North Philadelphia (where I worked for many years), or to the Western Region Detention Facility at San Diego. The latter is one of an extensive archipelago of immigrant prisons where constitutional rights (and human rights) are below minimal. Circa 50,000 people are presently detained in the US on strictly immigration violations. The overall US prison population is now in the 2.7 million range. How should we understand the range of policing, carceral practices, and racial profiling involved in – or required for – the maintenance of the post-civil rights/post-imperial system? Some have argued that war is the appropriate framework and indeed I have used that term above. I would prefer to invoke a few other concepts, however. With the ‘cumulative’ idea I want to highlight the convergence of various racial projects that had earlier been distinct substantively or geographically. ‘Profiling’ is an instance of substantive convergence I want to stress. It was originally an aggressive racist style of policing; it now exceeds the criminological context in which it was first developed and extends to the racist gaze more generally. Race serves as a multi-use political technology for organizing and explaining any form of social conflict, both in social science and in everyday life/commonsense. John Solomos and Les Back point out that racism is ‘a scavenger ideology, which gains its power from its ability to pick out and utilize ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific socio-historical contexts’ (Solomos and Back, 1996: 18–19; see also Fredrickson, 2003: 8). This interpellative adaptability – to scavenge for ressentiment, xenophobia, religious dogma, or a host of other proclivities or projections – is a highly developed, indeed central, component of racism. In other words, the ready availability of race as an ‘explanation’ for deviance from some attributed norm becomes more intelligible when we recognize both the ease with which racial distinctions are made – their ‘ocularity’ – and when we simultaneously admit the breadth and depth of racial awareness in much of the modern world.

#### Sustaining the coherence of the American political framework reproduces discourses of progress that result in the further accumulation of injured and murdered black bodies - black nihilism is the only metaphysical framework capable of addressing this antagonism and unraveling the political

**Warren 15** [Calvin K., Assistant Professor of American Studies at George Washington University, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” *CR: The New Centennial Review*, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015]

Perverse juxtapositions structure our relation to the Political. This becomes even more apparent and problematic when we consider the position of blacks within this structuring.1 On the one hand, our Declaration of Independence proclaims, “All men are created equal,” and yet black captives were fractioned in this political arithmetic as three-fifths of this “man.” The remainder, the two-fifths, gets lost within the arithmetic shuffle of commerce and mercenary prerogatives. We, of course, hoped that the Reconstruction Amendments would correct this arithmetical error and finally provide an ontological equation, or an existential variable, that would restore fractured and fractioned [End Page 215] black being. This did not happen. Black humanity became somewhat of an “imaginary number” in this equation, purely speculative and nice in theory but difficult to actualize or translate into something tangible. Poll taxes, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and extra-legal and legal violence made a mockery of the 14th Amendment, and the convict leasing system turned the 13th Amendment inside out for blacks. Yet, we approach this political perversity with a certain apodictic certainty and incontrovertible hope that things will (and do) get better. The Political, we are told, provides the material or substance of our hope; it is within the Political that we are to find, if we search with vigilance and work tirelessly, the “answer” to the ontological equation—hard work, suffering, and diligence will restore the fractioned three-fifths with its alienated two-fifths and, finally, create One that we can include in our declaration that “All men are created equal.” We are still awaiting this “event.” Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. placed great emphasis on the restoration of black being through suffering and diligence in his sermon “The American Dream” (1965): And I would like to say to you this morning what I’ve tried to say all over this nation, what I believe firmly: that in seeking to make the dream a reality we must use and adopt a proper method. I’m more convinced than ever before that violence is impractical and immoral…we need not hate; we need not use violence. We can stand up against our most violent opponent and say: we will match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will and we will still love you…we will go to in those jails and transform them from dungeons of shame to havens of freedom and human dignity. Send your hooded perpetrators of violence into our communities after night and drag us out on some wayside road and beat us and leave us half dead, and as difficult as it is, we will still love you. … [T]hreaten our children and bomb our churches, and as difficult as it is, we will still love you. But be assured that we will ride you down by our capacity to suffer. One day we will win our freedom, but we will not only win it for ourselves, we will so appeal to your hearts and conscience that we will win you in the process. And our victory will be double. The American dream, then, is realized through black suffering. It is the humiliated, incarcerated, mutilated, and terrorized black body that serves as the vestibule for the Democracy that is to come. In fact, it almost becomes impossible to think the Political without black suffering. According to this logic, corporeal fracture engenders ontological coherence, in a political arithmetic saturated with violence. Thus, nonviolence is a misnomer, or somewhat of a ruse. Black-sacrifice is necessary to achieve the American dream and its promise of coherence, progress, and equality. We find similar logic in the contemporary moment. Renisha McBride, Jordon Davis, Kody Ingham, Amadou Diallo, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Frederick Jermain Carter, Chavis Carter, Timothy Stansbury, Hadiya Pendleton, Oscar Grant, Sean Bell, Kendrec McDade, Trayvon Martin, and Mike Brown, among others, constitute a fatal rupture of the Political; these signifiers, stained in blood, refuse the closure that the Political promises. They haunt political discourses of progress, betterment, equality, citizenship, and justice—the metaphysical organization of social existence. We are witnessing a shocking accumulation of injured and mutilated black bodies, particularly young black bodies, which place what seems to be an unanswerable question mark in the political field: if we are truly progressing toward this “society-that-is-to-come (maybe),” why is black suffering increasing at such alarming rates? In response to this inquiry, we are told to keep struggling, keep “hope” alive, and keep the faith. After George Zimmerman was acquitted for murdering Trayvon Martin, President Obama addressed the nation and importuned us to keep fighting for change because “each successive generation seems to be making progress in changing attitudes toward race” and, if we work hard enough, we will move closer to “becoming a more perfect union.” Despite Martin’s corpse lingering in the minds of young people and Zimmerman’s smile of relief after the verdict, we are told that things are actually getting better. Supposedly, the generation that murdered Trayvon Martin and Renisha McBride is much better than the generation that murdered Emmett Till. Black suffering, here, is instrumentalized to accomplish pedagogical, cathartic, and redemptive objectives and, somehow, the growing number of dead black bodies in the twenty-first century is an indication of our progress toward “perfection.” Is perfection predicated on black death? How many more [End Page 217] black bodies must be lynched, mutilated, burned, castrated, raped, dismembered, shot, and disabled before we achieve this “more perfect union”? In many ways, black suffering and death become the premiere vehicles of political perfection and social maturation. This essay argues that the logic of the Political—linear temporality, bio-political futurity, perfection, betterment, and redress—sustains black suffering. Progress and perfection are worked through the pained black body and any recourse to the Political and its discourse of hope will ultimately reproduce the very metaphysical structures of violence that pulverize black being. This piece attempts to rescue black nihilism from discursive and intellectual obliteration; rather than thinking about black nihilism as a set of pathologies in need of treatment, this essay considers black nihilism a necessary philosophical posture capable of unraveling the Political and its devastating logic of political hope. Black nihilism resists emancipatory rhetoric that assumes it is possible to purge the Political of anti-black violence and advances political apostasy as the only “ethical” response to black suffering.

#### Voting negative is to adopt nihilism as the centerpiece to politics – this rupture in the terrain of liberalism’s will-to-action finds itself outside the struggle for political representation – In other words, to “hope for the end of political hope”.

**Warren 15** [Calvin K., Assistant Professor of American Studies at George Washington University, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” *CR: The New Centennial Review*, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015]

V. Conclusion Throughout this essay, I have argued that the Politics of hope preserve metaphysical structures that sustain black suffering. This preservation amounts to an exploitation of hope—when the Political colonizes the spiritual principle of hope and puts it in the service of extending the “will to power” of an anti-black organization of existence. The Politics of hope, then, is bound up with metaphysical violence, and this violence masquerades as a “solution” to the problem of anti-blackness. Temporal linearity, perfection, betterment, struggle, work, and utopian futurity are conceptual instruments of the Political that will never obviate black suffering or anti-black violence; these concepts only serve to reproduce the conditions that render existence unbearable for blacks. Political theologians and black optimists avoid the immediacy of black suffering, the horror of anti-black pulverization, and place relief in a “not-yet-but-is (maybe)-to-come-social order” that, itself, can do little more but admonish blacks to survive to keep struggling. Political hope becomes a vicious and abusive cycle of struggle—it mirrors the Lacanian drive, and we encircle an object (black freedom, justice, relief, redress, equality, etc.) that is inaccessible because it doesn’t really exist. The political theologian and black optimist, then, propose a collective Jouissance as an answer to black suffering—finding the joy in struggle, the victory in toil, and the satisfaction in inefficacious action. We continue to “struggle” and “work” as black youth are slaughtered daily, black bodies are incarcerated as forms of capital, black infant mortality rates are soaring, and hunger is disabling the bodies, minds, and spirits of desperate black youth. In short, these conditions are deep metaphysical problems—the sadistic pleasure of metaphysical domination—and “work” and “struggle” avoid the terrifying fact that the world depends on black death to sustain itself. Black nihilism attempts to break this “drive”—to stop it in its tracks, as it were—and to end the cycle of insanity that political hope perpetuates. The question that remains is a question often put to the black nihilist: what is the point? This compulsory geometrical structuring of thought—all knowledge must submit to, and is reducible to, a point—it is an epistemic flicker of certainty, determination, and, to put it bluntly, life. “The point” exists for life; it enlivens, enables, and sustains knowledge. Thought outside of this mandatory point is illegible and useless. To write outside of the “episteme of life” and its grammar will require a position outside of this point, a position somewhere in the infinite horizon of thought (perhaps this is what Heidegger wanted to do with his reconfiguration of thought). Writing in this way is inherently subversive and refuses the geometry of thought. Nevertheless, the [End Page 243] nihilist is forced to enunciate his refusal through a “point,” a point that is contradictory and paradoxical all at once. To say that the point of this essay is that “the point” is fraudulent—its promise of clarity and life are inadequate—will not satisfy the hunger of disciplining the nihilist and insisting that one undermine the very ground upon which one stands. Black nihilistic hermeneutics resists “the point” but is subjected to it to have one’s voice heard within the marketplace of ideas. The “point” of this essay is that political hope is pointless. Black suffering is an essential part of the world, and placing hope in the very structure that sustains metaphysical violence, the Political, will never resolve anything. This is why the black nihilist speaks of “exploited hope,” and the black nihilist attempts to wrest hope from the clutches of the Political. Can we think of hope outside the Political? Must “salvation” translate into a political grammar or a political program? The nihilist, then, hopes for the end of political hope and its metaphysical violence. Nihilism is not antithetical to hope; it does not extinguish hope but reconfigures it. Hope is the foundation of the black nihilistic hermeneutic. In “Blackness and Nothingness,” Fred Moten (2013) conceptualizes blackness as a “pathogen” to metaphysics, something that has the ability to unravel, to disable, and to destroy anti-blackness. If we read Vattimo through Moten’s brilliant analysis, we can suggest that blackness is the limit that Heidegger and Nietzsche were really after. It is a “blackened” world that will ultimately end metaphysics, but putting an end to metaphysics will also put an end to the world itself—this is the nihilism that the black nihilist must theorize through. This is a far cry from what we call “anarchy,” however. The black nihilist has as little faith in the metaphysical reorganization of society through anarchy than he does in traditional forms of political existence.The black nihilist offers political apostasy as the spiritual practice of denouncing metaphysical violence, black suffering, and the idol of anti-blackness. The act of renouncing will not change political structures or offer a political program; instead, it is the act of retrieving the spiritual concept of hope from the captivity of the Political. Ultimately, it is impossible to end metaphysics without ending blackness, and the black nihilist will never be able to withdraw from the Political completely without a certain death-drive or being-toward-death. This is the essence of black suffering: the lack of reprieve from metaphysics, the tormenting complicity in the reproduction of violence, and the lack of a coherent grammar to articulate these dilemmas. After contemplating these issues for some time in my office, I decided to take a train home. As I awaited my train in the station, an older black woman asked me about the train schedule and when I would expect the next train headed toward Dupont Circle. When I told her the trains were running slowly, she began to talk about the government shutdown. “They don’t care anything about us, you know,” she said. “We elect these people into office, we vote for them, and they watch black people suffer and have no intentions of doing anything about it.” I shook my head in agreement and listened intently. “I’m going to stop voting, and supporting this process; why should I keep doing this and our people continue to suffer,” she said. I looked at her and said, “I don’t know ma’am; I just don’t understand it myself.” She then laughed and thanked me for listening to her—as if our conversation were somewhat cathartic. “You know, people think you’re crazy when you say things like this,” she said giving me a wink. “Yes they do,” I said. “But I am a free woman,” she emphasized “and I won’t go back.” Shocked, I smiled at her, and she winked at me; at that moment I realized that her wisdom and courage penetrated my mind and demanded answers. I’ve thought about this conversation for some time, and it is for this reason I had to write this essay. To the brave woman at the train station, I must say you are not crazy at all but thinking outside of metaphysical time, space, and violence. Ultimately, we must hope for the end of political hope.

#### Reliance on legality as a metric of progress fuels a violent temporal narrative that materializes the permanency of whiteness – Western common law demands a series of affective attachments to the law, which ensures bodies come to desire the structure that produces violence against them – do you find yourself trapped within the auspices of hope, or do you desire to craft yourself otherwise, affirming the imperceptible politics of refusal

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The politics of hope, then, constitutes what Lauren Berlant would call “cruel optimism” for blacks (Berlant 2011). It bundles certain promises about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object that always lies beyond reach. The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal. Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude political hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an unknown future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives. The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.” “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the onto-existential horizon. The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution—every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself. The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,” a future tense unmoored from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence, the politics of hope cleverly shields its “solutions” from critiques of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense. The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” The field of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an anti-black world.

#### Even debate is a death that lives a human life – Corrupted by the values of enlightenment humanism, the 1AC cedes itself to a public sphere that relies on the liberal subject as its assumed participant, creation of the self within deliberative institutions traps us within a legal hall of mirrors – The space necessary to discuss western liberal rights is sustained on the basis of mass eastern death

Mbembe 3 Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15(1): pg.13

The aim of this essay is not to debate the singularity of the extermination of the Jews or to hold it up by way of example.6 I start from the idea that modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty—and therefore of the biopolitical. Disregarding this multiplicity, late-modern political criticism has unfortunately privileged normative theories of democracy and has made the concept of reason one of the most important elements of both the project of modernity and of the topos of sovereignty.7 From this perspective, the ultimate expression of sovereignty is the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made up of free and equal men and women. These men and women are posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation. Politics, therefore, is defined as twofold: a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition. This, we are told, is what differentiates it from war.8 In other words, it is on the basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the political, the community, the subject—or, more fundamentally, of what the good life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral agent. Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of the subject and politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere. The exercise of reason is tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for individual autonomy. The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing one’s own limits for oneself). The exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in society’s capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations.9 This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has been the object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here.10 My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death. Significant for such a project is Hegel’s discussion of the relation between death and the “becoming subject.” Hegel’s account of death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human’s effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the “animal” that constitutes the human subject’s natural being is defeated. In other words, the human being truly becomes a subject—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment.11 Politics is therefore death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one’s life.

## Death

#### The attempted securitization of life inculcates the drive for perfection of the western liberal subject in violent opposition to its incoherent outside – demanding the protection of life collapses into its destruction

Evans 10 Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to its lowest common denominator.

Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” *SubStance*, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)

Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

#### Politics of life affirmation deprives death of value - that destroys all value-making capacity and joy

McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, *Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 223-227)

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power. 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death *doesn't extinguish* but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In *Being and Time* Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are *not actually eliminating death* *itself*. They simply *privilege life over death* and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of *Verwerfung,* reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

#### Vote neg.

Brata Das 10 /Saitya, Assistant Professor, Centre for English Studies—School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, “(Dis)Figures of Death: Taking the Side of Derrida, Taking the Side of Death,” *Derrida Today*. Volume 3, Page 1-20 DOI 10.3366/drt.2010.0002, ISSN 1754-8500, Available Online May 2010/

In a proposition in his Ethics Spinoza claims: ‘A free man thinks nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life’ (Spinoza 1955, 232). We know is this wise man whose meditation is not of death but of life. It is none but the very figure of the philosopher. There is Socrates who, of all philosophers, is the very figure of ‘philosopher’, not in the sense that he is greater philosopher than others, but because his thinking in its purity, as Heidegger argues, did not need the draft of the written, and who says to Phaedo before drinking Hemlock these words: ‘Those who apply themselves to philosophy in the proper way are doing no more nor less than to prepare themselves for the moment of dying and the state of death’ (Plato 1972, 103). This moment of Socrates’ dying is not one moment among moments of the history of philosophical thinking; it is the very moment of the birth of ‘philosophy’, the moment when philosophy became for the first time self-conscious of its being as ‘philosophy’, the moment of philosophy’s opening itself to itself, the event of philosophy’s coming to presence to itself, the event of philosophy’s eruption into its own presence, as if at that very moment an abyss has opened up at the very heart of philosophy’s beginning, that is of death and a mourning that has henceforth haunted, like a specter, the whole history of philosophy against which Montaigne asserts his refusal to be sad, and Spinoza refuses to meditate on death. At the very birth of philosophy’s becoming there was a trembling and a cry, a seizure and an absence that has already opened up philosophy at that very moment of its coming to its abyss, and also, at that very moment of seizure there is felt – and Hegel6 dramatises this moment when he speaks of looking death in its face – the necessity to look death in its face, to tarry with it, and to discover at the very moment of its dismembering its truth (to salvage from the shipwreck of truth) the possibility of a decision and responsibility, of an ethics and an aesthetics of dying, and hence, there has to emerge, at that very moment, the necessity of a training – not just learning to die and to prepare oneself for the moment of dying – but a training to sacrifice oneself, and on the basis of this tragic-heroic pathos of the sacrificial to be able to constitute an ethics of responsibility and of decision. The moment of dismemberment also has to be – and this is the strange paradox – the moment of gathering, coinciding of self to self, self to the world, of self to the others and to the divine, as if, as in the classic interpretation of tragic drama, the atonement is here not so much of guilt, but of mourning, so that there be work, there be work at mourning for the sake of an ethics, of decision, of responsibility. The moment of the birth of philosophy, which has felt in its veins the seizure of death, is also the moment of the birth of an ethics of responsibility and of decision, which has henceforth decided in advance the whole destinal thinking of responsibility and of ethics as such. Therefore this ethics of responsibility is born with the confrontation with death, founded upon death, upon this impossibility, or ‘non-actuality’ called ‘death’; this ethics is born in this encounter with a gaze of an abyss which now, when being domesticated, speaks the language of responsibility and decision, of sacrifice for the other’s death, and for the sake of truth. The language of this ethics is this language of conversions, which also means preservation, elevation and negation, of nothing less than death than which, of all name is the name of the impossible. There, then, occurs as the very condition of a philosophical ethics a figure of death as an economic figure. One pays death, one gives oneself one’s death for greater gain, which is for Socrates ‘immortality’. The figure of the philosopher is the site of a sacrifice. This is the only consolation for the figure of the philosopher through which the figure of death speaks, that philosopher is nothing but this demonic, monstrous site – neither completely divine nor completely human – where truth occurs in its earnestness, and this truth takes away from death – to evoke Rosenzweig – its ‘poisonous sting’, its ‘pestilential breath’ (Rosenzweig 2005, 9). To be a philosopher, and to philosophise is to train oneself for this truth, to care for one’s own death for the sake of a care for truth, which is to open up the heart of existence of the philosopher, to open up this heart towards the abyss, and in this opening allowing truth to pass as truth, to welcome truth as the event of an arrival. Then there would be melancholy no more, for with that event a future is opened up, and death is mastered, at least domesticated, if death means nothing less and no more than the end of time and the end of future. It is in this anticipation of the futurity that has opened up from the very heart of death, from the very abyss of a dissolution, that Socrates asks the foolish women of Athens who are not wise because they have not yet learnt how to die, to go away when the philosopher dies, and in this anticipation of a futurity that Hegel’s asks the naive consciousness not to lament vain death, death that does not have future, death that could not be work, like ‘swallowing the mouthful of water’, useless death, vain death, imposture of death.7 The joy of life therefore – Hegel would perhaps have responded in this way to Spinoza – can not shrink from the thought of death, but to be joyous means to rescue a self from death, a life from death, converting death into life, another life, a resurrected life. Therefore there is life and life’s joyousness – if it has to be authentic, proper, and not merely immediate, vain sensuousness – only as uplifted (Aufheben) joy, a resurrected life, not life that is immediately given, but becoming otherwise than anything that is given as this life, another language of life, and another meaning of joy. What is the meaning of ‘ethical’ and ‘ethics’ if not this becoming different, this becoming other of oneself, to be able to give oneself another life and another death, and becoming responsible for this decisive becoming of becoming other? Does not Kierkegaard too says of ethics something of this sort in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and does not Rosenzweig (2005) speak of it when he discusses Gilgamesh’s confrontation with death?: that ethics is nothing less than this passing, traversing, confronting death as death; or better, ethics for this singular individual, or perhaps even for a community takes birth when it confronts death as death, when it feels at the very heart of existence, in its bones and marrow, in its veins the seizure and trembling of death. As if this truth, this event of ethics and decision, of responsibility and freedom is the very gift of death, which is not this or that gift, but the very gift-ness of the gift. The ethics of an individual self, and also a community is born precisely at that moment when, in its confrontation with death, the self feels the necessity to become otherwise than its mere immediate existence, and when this necessity demands simultaneously a series of training, or a series of practices, discursive or otherwise, and an ethical discourse on what is called, ‘care for death’. Let me come back to Derrida now after this long detour. When Derrida takes the side of death, is he speaking of ethics and responsibility with the same gesture, in relation to death, and above all, of gift as an infinite relation to the other who is yet to come; of a futurity in its messianic intensity; of a futurity whose thought is not stranger to the thought of death but that opens up from very heart of an abyss, which is death’s abyss? To take the side of death is to take the side of responsibility and of ethics; it is to be indebted, in mourning, for the gift given to ‘me’ even before this ‘I’ have asked for, given in a time immemorial and ancient, in a time before time. Therefore the thought of gift and responsibility always accompanies mourning, and is tied to the thought of death. Yet is this death that Derrida takes the side of the same figure of death that has haunted the very figure of the philosopher from Plato to Heidegger, death that in its very impossibility and abyss gifts the philosopher a self, the possibility of gathering unto itself, and also the possibility through death of becoming other than oneself, as an ethical self in its decisive sense, which assumes responsibility and decision at the very moment of dismemberment? If, as Heidegger says, decisions are always taken at the limit, that means, out of the undecidable, then in all decisive decisions a madness, even death watches over. Is this death that Derrida has taken the side of when he speaks of responsibility and of the gift, this gift of death to oneself, to give oneself death? Or is there an other figure or disfigure of death, and other thoughts of responsibility and gift? It is this question that I now turn.

#### Opening yourself to the potential moment of your death is a destabilization of the human as such – this is key to undermining the violent thought processes of modernity that render certain populations eligible for extermination – prior ethical question

Braidotti 13 (Rosi, holds Italian and Australian citizenship, was born in Italy and grew up in Australia, where she received degrees from the Australian National University in Canberra in 1977 and was awarded the University Medal in Philosophy and the University Tillyard prize. Braidotti then moved on to do her doctoral work at the Sorbonne, where she received her degree in philosophy in 1981. She has taught at the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands since 1988, when she was appointed as the founding professor in women's studies.[1] In 1995 she became the founding Director of the Netherlands research school of Women's Studies, a position she held till 2005. Braidotti is a pioneer in European Women's Studies: she founded the inter-university SOCRATES network NOISE and the Thematic Network for Women's Studies ATHENA, which she directed till 2005. She was a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor at Birkbeck College in 2005-6; a Jean Monnet professor at the European University Institute in Florence in 2002-3 and a fellow in the school of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 1994. Braidotti is currently Distinguished University Professor at Utrecht University and founding Director of the Centre for the Humanities, onored with a Royal Knighthood from Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands; in August 2006 she received the University Medal from the University of Lodz in Poland and she was awarded an Honorary Degree in Philosophy from Helsinki University in May 2007. In 2009, she was elected Honorary Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. Since 2009 she is a board member of Consortium of Humanities Centre and Institutes, The Posthuman Malden: polity, pg. 110-141)4

This chapter deals with the multi-layered issue of the inhuman by examining multiple modes of relation to death and dying. In an argument about life that constitutes the perfect counterpart of the idea of zoe as a posthuman continuum, I propose to look more closely at Thanatos, and to necro-politics, as a way of constructing an affirmative posthuman theory of death. I think that a conceptual shift towards 'matter-realist' vitalism, grounded in ontological monism, can assist us in this project of rethinking death and mortality in the contemporary bio-mediated context. Politically, we need to assess the advantages of the politics of vital affirmation. Ethically, we need to re-locate compassion and care of both human and non-human others in this new frame. We saw in the previous chapter that the posthuman predicament understood as the bio-political management of living matter is post-anthropocentric in character, raising the need for a Life/zoe-centred approach. Now I want to go a step further and argue that posthuman vital politics shifts the boundaries between life and death and consequently deals not only with the government of the living, but also with practices of dying. Most of these are linked to inhuman(e) social and political phenomena such as poverty, famine and homelessness, which Zillah Eisenstein aptly labelled as 'global obscenities' (1998). Vandana Shiva (1997) stresses the extent to which bio-power has already turned into a form of 'biopiracy', which calls for very grounded and concrete political analyses. Thus, the bodies of the empirical subjects who signify difference (woman/native/earth or natural others) have become the disposable bodies of the global economy. Contemporary capitalism is indeed 'bio-political' in that it aims at controlling all that lives, as Foucault argues, but because Life is not the prerogative of humans only, it opens up a zoe-political or post-anthropocentric dimension. If anxiety about extinction was common in the nuclear era, the posthuman condition, of the anthropocene, extends the death horizon to most species. Yet there is a very important difference, as Chakrabarty points out: 'A nuclear war would have been a conscious decision on the part of the powers that be. Climate change is an unintended consequence of human actions as a species' (2009: 221 ). This not only inaugurates a negative or reactive form of pan-human planetary bond, which recomposes humanity around a commonly shared bond of vulnerability, but also connects the human to the fate of other species, as I argued in the previous chapter. Death and destruction are the common denominators for this transversal alliance. Let me give you some examples of contemporary ways of dying to illustrate this political economy. The posthuman aspects of globalization encompass many phenomena that, while not being a priori inhumane, still trigger signiflcant destructive aspects. The postsecular condition, with the rise of religious extremism in a variety of forms, including Christian fundamentalism, entails a political regression of the rights of women, homosexuals and all sexual minorities. Significant signs of this regression arc the decline in reproductive rights and the rise of violence against women and GLBT people. The effect of global financial networks and unchecked hedge funds has been an increase in poverty, especially among youth and women, affected by the disparity in access to the new technologies. The status of children is a chapter apart; from forced labour, to the child-soldier phenomenon, childhood has been violently inserted in infernal cycles of exploitation. Bodily politics has shifted, with the simultaneous emergence of cyborgs on the one hand and renewed forms of vulnerability on the other. Thus, next to the proliferation of pandemics like SARS, Ebola, HIV, birdflu and others, more familiar epidemics have also returned, notably malaria and tuberculosis, so much so that health has become a public policy issue as well as a human rights concern. The point is that Life/zoe can be a threatening force, as well as a generative one. A great deal of health and environmental concerns as well as geo-political issues, simply blur the distinction between life and death. In the era of biogenetic capitalism and nature-culture continuum, zoe has become an infra-human force and all the attention is now drawn to the emergency of disappearing nature. For instance, the public discourse about environmental catastrophes or 'natural' disasters – the Fukushima nuclear plant and the Japanese tsunami, the Australian bushfires, hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, etc. – accomplishes a significant doublebind: it expresses a new ecological awareness, while re-inserting the distinction between nature and culture. As Protevi argues (2009), this results in the paradoxical re-naturalization of our bio-technologically mediated environment. The geo-political forces are simultaneously re-naturalized and subjected to the old hierarchical power relations determined by the dominant politics of the anthropomorphic subject. Public discourse has become simultaneously moralistic about the inhuman forces of the environment and quite hypocritical in perpetuating anthropocentric arrogance. This position results in the denial of the man-made structure of the catastrophes that we continue to attribute to forces beyond our collective control, like the earth, the cosmos or 'nature'. Our public morality is simply not up to the challenge of the scale an~ the complexity of damages engendered by our technological advances. This gives rise to a double ethical urgencv: firstly, how to turn anxiety and the tendency to mou~n tl~e los: of the natural order into effective social and political action, and secondly, how to ground such an action in the respo.nsib~l!ty for future generation, in the spirit of social sustamability that I have also explored elsewhere (Braidotti, 2006). Another significant case in point is the posthuman digital umverse that I analysed in the previous chapter and which engenders its own inhuman variables. They arc best manifested by the proliferation of viruses, both computer-based and organic, some of which transit from animals to humans an~ ?ack. Illness is clearly not only a prerogative of organic entitles, but includes a widespread practice of mutual contamination between organic matter – anthropomorphic or not – and electronic circuitry. A rather complex symbiotic relationship has emerged in our cyber universe: a sort of mutual dependence between the f1esh and the machine. This engenders some significant paradoxes, namely that the cor~ oreal site of subjectivity is simultaneously denied, in practices of human enhancement and in fantasies of escape via techno-transcendence, and it is also re-enforced as increased vulnerability. Balsamo ( 1996) argues that digital technology promotes dreams of immortality and control over life and death: 'And yet, such beliefs about the technological future "life" of the body are complemented by a palpable fear of death and annihilation from uncontrollable and spectacular body-threats: antibiotic-resistant viruses, random contamination, flesh-eating bacteria' (Balsamo, 1996: 1-2). The inhuman forces of technology have moved into the body, intensifying the spectral reminders of the corpse-to-come. Our social imaginary has taken a forensic turn. Popular culture and the infotainment industry are quick to pick up this contradictory trend that reflects the changing status of the demise of the human body, including illness, death and extinction. The corpse is not only a daily presence m global media and journalistic news, but also an object of entertainment in contemporary popular culture, notably in the successful genre of forensic detectives. Culture and the arts have been very sensitive in registering the rise in women who kill, as shown by the success of recent literary and stage renditions of classics like Hecuba and Medea. Not to mention, of course, the global appeal of sharp-shooting Lara Croft in the world of computer games. The evolution of gender roles towards a more egalitarian participation by both sexes in the business of killing is one of the most problematic aspects of contemporary gender politics. They can be summarized as the shift from the universal Human Rights stance of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, to the brutal interventionism of the Chechnya war widows, pregnant female suicide-bombers and the growing role of women in the military 'Humanism' of 'humanitarian' wars. Spiritual death is part of the picture as well, if we take into account contemporary embodied social practices that are often pathologized and never addressed fully, such as addictions, eating disorders and melancholia, burn-out and states of apathy and disaffection. I propose not to simply classify these practices as self-destructive, but rather to see them as normatively neutral manifestations of interaction with and resistance to the political economy of commodification of all that lives. They exemplify the shifting social relations between living and dying in the era of the politics of 'life itself'. The currency granted to both legal (Ritalin, Prozac) and illegal drugs in contemporary culture blurs the boundaries between self-destruction and fashionable behaviour and forces a reconsideration of what is the value of 'life itself'. Last but not least, assisted suicide and euthanasia practices are challenging the Law to rest on the tacit assumption of a self-evident value attributed to 'Life'. As is often the case, advanced capitalism functions by schizoid or internally contradictory moves. Thus, a socially enforced ideology of fitness, health and eternal youth goes hand in hand with increased social disparities in the provision of health care and in mortality rates among infants and youth. The obsession with being 'forever young' works in tandem with and forms the counterpart of social practices of euthanasia and assisted death. The moment one starts thinking about it, multiple ways of dying, of inflicting death and suffering losses are proliferating around us. And yet, when it comes to accounting for them, social theory tends to refer to this political economy as 'biopolitical. What does life (bios) have to do with it, though? Bio-political analyses since Foucault have transformed the field and introduced more precise understandings of what is involved in the management of the living. Why is not the same degree of analytical precision devoted to the analysis of the necro-political management of dying? Both the quantity and the scale of the changes that have taken place in social and personal practices of dying, in ways of killing and forms of extinction, as well as the creativity of mourning rituals and the necessity of bereavement, are such as to support the expansion of the socio-cultural agenda. This includes the emergence of a new discursive domain. 'Death Studies' has become a new and much needed addition to the academic landscape, growing out of the 1970s counter-culture into a serious interdisciplinary area that includes moral and religious discussions about mortality, but also research in social, policy and health issues as well as the very practical aspect of professional training.2 I shall return to this expansion of new 'studies' areas in chapter 4.

## Identity v2

#### Invocation of this space as a site of resistance to racialized violence traps it within a dialectical parliamentary politics ultimately relying on state models of deliberation as a metric of success – This allows for exponential proliferation of the deaths of those in-between rigid identitarian categories – we need a new mode of politics that rejects the parliament and creates new aesthetic dimensions

Preciado 13 [Interview between Ricky Tucker and Beatriz Preciado, professor of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, “Pharmacopornography: An Interview with Beatriz Preciado,” December 4, 2013, *The Paris Review*] //khirn

We don’t have to be afraid of questioning democracy, but I’m also very interested in disability, nonfunctional bodies, other forms of functionality and cognitive experiences. Democracy and the model of democracy is still too much about able bodies, masculine able bodies that have control over the body and the individual’s choices, and have dialogues and communications in a type of parliament. We have to imagine politics that go beyond the parliament, otherwise how are we going to imagine politics with nonhumans, or the planet? I am interested in the model of the body as subjectivity that is working within democracy, and then goes beyond that. Also, the global situation that we are in requires a revolution. There is no other option. We must manage to actually create some political alliance of minority bodies, to create a revolution together. Otherwise these necropolitical techniques will take the planet over. In this sense, I have a very utopian way of thinking, of rethinking new technologies of government and the body, creating new regimes of knowledge. The domain of politics has to be taken over by artists. Politics and philosophy both are our domains. The problem is that they have been expropriated and taken by other entities for the production of capital or just for the sake of power itself. That’s the definition of revolution, when the political domain becomes art. We desperately need it.

#### Their understanding of race is trapped within a dialectical identity politics that fails to analyze the multiplicity of ways race manifests itself, identity isn’t reducible solely to phenotype or culture, but a viscous entanglement of external stimuli

Saldanha 7 (Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” pg.194-196)

My disagreement is not with Fanon’s and Martín Alcoff’s insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant, that is, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari strongly distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis. First of all, for them, it isn’t consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect). That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism: If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.5 For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the outside.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—more or less. It would seem to me that to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our “post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

#### Don’t read poetry

Halberstam 11 J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 5

Illegibility, then, has been and remains, a reliable source for political autonomy. —James C. Scott, Perceiving Like a State Any book that begins with a quote from SpongeBob SquarePants and is motored by wisdom gleaned from Fantastic Mr. Fox, Chicken Run, and Find- ing Nemo, among other animated guides to life, runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Yet this is my goal. Being taken seriously means missing out on the chance to be frivolous, promiscuous, and irrelevant. The desire to be taken seriously is precisely what compels people to follow the tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours. Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts, for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for [exceptional] insights or flights of fancy. Training of any kind, in fact, is a way of refusing a kind of Benjaminian relation to knowing, a stroll down uncharted streets in the “wrong” direction (Benjamin 1996); it is precisely about staying in well-lit territories and about knowing exactly which way to go before you set out. Like many others before me, I propose that instead the goal is to lose one’s way, and indeed to be prepared to lose more than one’s way. Losing, we may agree with Elizabeth Bishop, is an art, and one “that is not too hard to master / Though it may look like a disaster” (2008: 166–167). In the sciences, particularly physics and mathematics, there are many examples of rogue intellectuals, not all of whom are reclusive Unabomber types (although more than a few are just that), who wander off into uncharted territories and refuse the academy because the publish-or-perish pressure of academic life keeps them tethered to conventional knowledge production and its well-traveled byways. Popular mathematics books, for example, revel in stories about unconventional loners who are self- schooled and who make their own way through the world of numbers. For some kooky minds, disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and ~~blind~~ [unscripted] fumbling might yield better results. In 2008, for example, The New Yorker featured a story about an oddball physicist who, like many ambitious physicists and mathematicians, was in hot pursuit of a grand theory, a “theory of everything.” This thinker, Garrett Lisi, had dropped out of academic physics because string theory dominated the field at that time and he thought the answers lay elsewhere. As an outsider to the discipline, writes Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Lisi “built his theory as an outsider might, relying on a grab bag of component parts: a hand-built mathematical structure, an unconventional way of describing gravity, and a mysterious mathematical entity known as E8.”1 In the end Lisi’s “theory of everything” fell short of expectations, but it nonetheless yielded a whole terrain of new questions and methods. Similarly the computer scientists who pioneered new programs to produce computer-generated imagery (CGI), as many accounts of the rise of Pixar have chronicled, were academic rejects or dropouts who created independent institutes in order to explore their dreams of animated worlds.2 These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside academia rather than within it, the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for alternatives precisely when the university cannot. This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred years ago to respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault de- scribed them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond either to real-world knowledge projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams (as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and conforming to the dictates of the discipline. This book, a stroll out of the confines of conventional knowledge and into the unregulated territories of failure, loss, and unbecoming, must make a long detour around disciplines and ordinary ways of thinking. Let me explain how universities (and by implication high schools) squash rather than promote quirky and original thought. Disciplinarity, as de- fined by Foucault (1995), is a technique of modern power: it depends upon and deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, and it produces experts and administrative forms of governance. The university structure that houses the disciplines and jealously guards their boundaries now stands at a crossroads, not of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, past and future, national and transnational; the crossroads at which the rapidly disintegrating bandwagon of disciplines, subfields, and interdisciplines has arrived offer a choice between the university as corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in thought and politics. A radical take on disciplinarity and the university that presumes both the breakdown of the disciplines and the closing of gaps between fields conventionally presumed to be separated can be found in a manifesto published by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in 2004 in Social Text titled “The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses.” Their essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical intellectual, the professional scholar and the “critical academic professionals.” For Moten and Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become “an ally of professional education.” Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the “subversive intellectuals,” a maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of “rigor,” “excellence,” and “productivity.” They tell us to “steal from the university,” to “steal the enlightenment for others” (112), and to act against “what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law refounds, society” (113). And what does the undercommons of the university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: “Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society” (113). Not the elimination of anything but the founding of a new society. And why not? Why not think in terms of a different kind of society than the one that first created and then abolished slavery? The social worlds we inhabit, after all, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not inevitable; they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to cite Fou- cault again, “disqualified.” A few visionary books, produced alongside disciplinary knowledge, show us the paths not taken. For example, in a book that itself began as a detour, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), James C. Scott details the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and undisciplined forms of knowledge in order to rationalize and simplify social, agricultural, and political practices that have profit as their primary motivation. In the process, says Scott, certain ways of [perceiving] the world are established as normal or natural, as obvious and necessary, even though they are often entirely counterintuitive and socially engineered. [Perceiving] Like a State began as a study of “why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of ‘people who move around,’” but quickly became a study of the demand by the state for legibility through the imposition of methods of standardization and uniformity (1). While Dean Spade (2008) and other queer scholars use Scott’s book to think about how we came to insist upon the documentation of gender identity on all govern- mental documentation, I want to use his monumental study to pick up some of the discarded local knowledges that are [eliminated] in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of other motivations for being and doing.

#### This creates a regime of coding bodily flows which freezes subjects into place and leaves them trapped within grids of intelligibility that allow for violence

Puar 7 Jasbir, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 214

Linked to this is what Massumi calls "ontogenetic difference" or "ontogenetic priority," a concept that rescripts temporality exterior to the sheer administrative units that are mobilized to capture the otherwise unruly processes of a body: To say that passage and indeterminancy "come first" or "are primary" is more a statement of ontological priority than the assertion of a time sequence. They have ontological privilege in the sense that they constitute the field of emergence, while positionings are what emerge. The trick is to express that priority in a way that respects the inseparability and contemporaneousness of the disjunct dimensions: their ontogenetic difference. And later: "The field of emergence is not pre-social. It is open-endedly social. ... One of the things that the dimension of change is ontogenetically 'prior to' is thus the very distinction between individual and the collective, as well as any given model of their interaction. That interaction is precisely what takes form."' The given models of interaction would be these bifurcated distinctions between the body and the social (its signification) such that the distinctions disappear. Massumi's move from ontology (being, becoming) to ontogenesis is also relevant to how he discusses affect and cognition and the processes of the body: "Feedback and feed forward, or recursivity, in addition to converting distance into intensity, folds the dimensions of time into each other. The field of emergence of experience has to be thought of as a space-time continuum, as an ontogenetic dimension prior to the separating-out of space and time. Linear time, like position- gridded space, would be emergent qualities of the event of the world's self- relating. " 2 7 This ontogenetic dimension that is "prior" but not "pre" claims its priorness not through temporality but through its ontological status as that which produces fields of emergence; the prior and the emergence are nevertheless "contemporaneous." "Ontological priority" is a temporality and a spatialization that has yet to be imagined, a property more than a bounded- ness by space and time. The ontogenetic dimension that articulates or occupies multiple temporalities of vectors and planes is also that which enables an emergent bifurcation of time and space. Identity is one of affect, a capture that proposes what one is by masking its retrospective ordering and thus its ontogenetic dimension- what one was- through the guise of an illusory futurity: what one is and will continue to be. However, this is anything but a relay between stasis and flux; position is but one derivative of systems in constant motion, lined with erratic trajectories and unruly projectiles. If the ontogenetic dimensions of affect render affect as prior to representation-prior to race, class, gender, sex, nation, even as these categories might be the most pertinent mapping of or reference back to affect itself-how might identity-as-retrospective-ordering amplify rather than inhibit praxes of political organizing? If we transfer our energy, our turbulence, our momentum from the defense of the integrity of identity and submit instead to this affective ideation of identity, what kinds of political strategies, of "politics of the open end,"" might we unabashedly stumble upon? Rather than rehashing the pros and cons of identity politics, can we think instead of affective politics? Displacing queerness as an identity or modality that is visibly, audibly, legibly, or tangibly evident-the seemingly queer body in a "cultural freeze-frame" of sorts-assemblages allow us to attune to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities. Intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information. Further, in the sway from disciplinary societies (where the panoptic "functioned primarily in terms of positions, fixed points, and identities") to control societies, the diagram of control, Michael Hardt writes, is "oriented toward mobility and anonymity. . . . The flexible and mobile performances of contingent identities, and thus its assemblages or institutions are elaborated primarily through repetition and the production of simulacra. "29 Assemblages are thus crucial conceptual tools that allow us to acknowledge and comprehend power beyond disciplinary regulatory models, where "particles, and not parts, recombine, where forces, and not categories, clash. "30 Most important, given the heightened death machine aspect of nationalism in our contemporary political terrain-a heightened sensorial and anatomical domination indispensable to Mbembe's necropolitics-assemblages work against narratives of U.S. exceptionalism that secure empire, challenging the fixity of racial and sexual taxonomies that inform practices of state surveillance and control and befuddling the "us versus them" of the war on terror. (On a more cynical note, the recent work of Eyal Weizman on the use of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Guy Debord by the Israeli Defense Forces demonstrates that we cannot afford to ignore concepts such as war machines and machinic assemblages, as they are already heavily cultivated as instructive tactics in military strategy.) For while intersectionality and its underpinnings- an unrelenting epistemological will to truth- presupposes identity and thus disavows futurity, or, perhaps more accurately, prematurely anticipates and thus fixes a permanence to forever, assemblage, in its debt to ontology and its espousal of what cannot be known, seen, or heard, or has yet to be known, seen, or heard, allows for becoming beyond or without being.32

#### Their politics interpret identity as a legible entity easily placed into specific positions on a grid – this locks identity into a freeze-frame – a static subjectivity that fails to acknowledge the viscous and unintelligible aspects of identity

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 211

There is no entity, no identity, no queer subject or subject to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, screaming its defiance, suggesting a move from intersectionality to assemblage, an affective conglomeration that recognizes other contingencies of belonging (melding, fusing, viscosity, bouncing) that might not fall so easily into what is sometimes denoted as reactive community formations-identity politics-by control theorists. The assemblage, a series of dispersed but mutually implicated and messy networks, draws together enunciation and dissolution, causality and effect, organic and nonorganic forces. For Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are collections of multiplicities: There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object, or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase as the multiplicity grows ).... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions.... There are only lines.21 As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, which presumes that components-race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion-are separable analytics and can thus be disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency.22 Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, relying on the logic of equivalence and analogy between various axes of identity and generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative aspects of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space. Furthermore, the study of intersectional identities often involves taking imbricated identities apart one by one to see how they influence each other, a process that betrays the founding impulse of intersectionality, that identities cannot so easily be cleaved. We can think of intersectionality as a hermeneutic of positionality that seeks to account for locality, specificity, placement, junctions. As a tool of diversity management and a mantra of liberal multiculturalism, intersectionality colludes with the disciplinary apparatus of the state-census, demography, racial profiling, surveillance-in that "difference" is encased within a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid, producing analogies in its wake and engendering what Massumi names "gridlock": a "box[ing] into its site on the culture map." He elaborates: The idea of positionality begins by subtracting movement from the picture. This catches the body in cultural freeze-frame. The point of explanatory departure is a pin-pointing, a zero point of stasis. When positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement comes a problematic second.... Of course, a body occupying one position on the grid might succeed in making a move to occupy another position.... But this doesn't change the fact that what defines the body is not the movement itself, only its beginnings and endpoints.... There is "displacement," but no transformation; it is as if the body simply leaps from one definition to the next. ... "The space of the crossing, the gaps between positions on the grid, falls into a theoretical [abyss] ~~no-man's land~~."B Many feminists, new social movement theorists, critical race theorists, and queer studies scholars have argued that social change can occur only through the precise accountability to and for position/ing. But identity is unearthed by Massumi as the complexity of process sacrificed for the "surety" of product. In the stillness of position, bodies actually lose their capacity for movement, for flow, for (social) change. Highlighting the "paradoxes of passage and position," Massumi makes the case for identity appearing as such only in retrospect: a "retrospective ordering" that can only be "working backwards from the movement's end." Again from Massumi: "Gender, race and sexual orientation also emerge and back-form their reality, ... Grids happen. So social and cultural determinations feed back into the process from which they arose. Indeterminacy and determination, change and freeze-framing, go together."24

#### Be the queer martyr – an explosion of self-sacrifice with a bomb, in favor of unsettling the violent definitions of subjectivity.

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage, "'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

#### **Voting negative is to interpret race and racism as molecular and constantly shifting – static identity constructions lead to violence against those on the margins – this is a refusal of subjectivity as such and instead conceptualizing identity as a series of events – this heterotopic model is key**

Saldanha 6 Arun, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, Environment, and Society, University of Minnesota and Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, “Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 2006, volume 24, pages 9-24, DOI:10.1068/d61j/

Every time phenotype makes another machinic connection, there is a stutter. Every time bodies are further entrenched in segregation, however brutal, there needs to be an affective investment of some sort. This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene. Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic. Many in American critical race theory also argue against a utopian transcendence of race, taking from W E B Du Bois and pragmatism a reflexive, sometimes strategically nationalist attitude towards racial embodiment (compare Outlaw, 1996; Shuford, 2001; Winant, 2004). What is needed is an affirmation of race's creativity and virtuality: what race can be. Race need not be about order and oppression, it can be wild, far-from-equilibrium, liberatory. It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian (or brown!), completely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism becomes strenuous as many populations start harbouring a similar economic, technological, cultural productivity as whites do now, linking all sorts of bodies with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life. That is, race exists in its true mode when it is no longer stifled by racism. ``The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race” (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 379). In ``A thousand tiny sexes'', Grosz (1994b) follows a well-known passage of Deleuze and Guattari to argue for non-Hegelian, indeed protohuman feminism that utilises lines of flight of the gender assemblage to combat heterosexist patriarchy. ``If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes'' (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 213). Similarly, the molecularisation of race would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races. It is from here that cosmopolitanism should start: the pleasure, curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of corporeal fragments outside of common-sense taxonomies. ``We walk the streets among hundreds of people whose patterns of lips, breasts, and genital organs we divine; they seem to us equivalent and interchangeable. Then something snares our attention: a dimple speckled with freckles on the cheek of a woman; a steel choker around the throat of a man in a business suit; a gold ring in the punctured nipple on the hard chest of a deliveryman; a big raw fist in the delicate hand of a schoolgirl; a live python coiled about the neck of a lean, lanky adolescent with coal-black skin. Signs of clandestine disorder in the uniformed and coded crowds'' (Lingis, 2000, page 142). Machinism against racism builds upon a gradual, fragmented, and shifting sense of corporeal difference, that of course extends far further than the street. Responsibility, activism, and antiracist policy will follow only from feeling and understanding the geographical differentials that exist between many different kinds of bodies: between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman in Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist. A machinic politics of race takes into account the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places; cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. It may seem that machinism is as utopian and open ended as Gilroy's transcendent antiracism. It is not, because it is empirical, immanent, and pragmatic. The machinic geography of phenotype shows that racism differs from place to place, and cannot be overcome in any simple way. It shows that white supremacy can subside only by changing the rules of education, or the financial sector, or the arms trade, or the pharmaceutical industry, or whatever. For machinic politics, the cultural studies preoccupations with apology, recognition, politically correct language and reconsiliation, or else cultural hybridity, pastiche, and ambivalence, threaten to stand in the way of really doing something about the global structures of racism. A thousand tiny races can be made only if it is acknowledged that racism is a material, inclusive series of events, a viscous geography which cannot be `signified away'. Miscegenation, openness to strangers, exoticism in art, and experimentations with whiteness can certainly help. But ultimately cosmpolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position. In a word, ethics encompasses politics, and politics starts with convincing people of race's materiality Close With racism enduring every well-meant attack (it's arbitrary! it's arbitrary!), it seems crucial for the humanities and social sciences to start engaging with the reality of phenotype phenotype itself, unmediated, in all of its connective glory. Following recent turns towards embodiment and materiality, the mediation model as endorsed by Butler and many in race and ethnic studies becomes inadequate to understand processes of racialisation. Race is not only a problem of how people think about skin colour. We need to know what race really is, that is, what it can be. Deontologising race, as Gilroy wishes to do, even if possible, seems a bad option if all the ontological questions are left to reductionist sociobiologists and far-right politicians to answer. As Haraway's writings attest, social scientists and cultural theorists cannot let multinationals and the sensationalist science press `do' all the biology. There is simply too much at stake to continue brushing aside the biological as `discursive practice'. Haraway's project, like Latour's, nonetheless remains too epistemological (science studies). With the profusion of popular science books and television programmes on `human nature', and this in conjunction with growing xenophobia, the public sphere is craving for critical social science interventions addressing these issues, not as mate- rial ^ semiotic constructions, but as debatable empirical, political and philosophical findings. Race is completely contingent, but not arbitrary: in hindsight, its differentiations and inequalities can be explained (Winant, 2004). A process such as race clearly cannot be studied with classical notions of identity, causality, cogito, representation, and reducibility. As a configuration made viscous by a whole host of processes, race requires genetics and ethnography and economics and literary theory to be understood. And a critical dialogue between the humanities and the physical sciences will be greatly facilitated by the nonmodern ontology of complexity theory. I discussed several entry points into such a pluralist ontological understanding of race. One is the phenomenology of race, provided it keeps the focus on embodied, social interaction, in which an ethics of responsibility follows from sensing the inten- sities between oneself and others, however distant. Another is the political appraisal of difference in corporeal feminism. Anthropology is a third entry point, at least if eased from the epistemological and imperialist straightjackets of modernity. Biology, as inaugurated by Darwin, is a contextuall and nuanced way of understanding the intrinsic vitality of matter. Deleuze's metaphysics of difference and repetition, finally, gives philosophical valence to the scientific project of understanding the emergence of race and the political project of striving for the freedom of more bodies. Race shows the openness of the body, the way organisms connect to their environment and establish uneven relationships amongst each other. The creativity of nature is not good in itself, but it can be made good. The molecular energies of race can be sensed, understood, and harnessed to crumble the systemic violence currently keeping bodies in place. Hoping for, striving for a thousand tiny races is not annihilating nature from culture, but on the contrary, immersing oneself in nature's lines of flight. This politics is also not mystical or anarchistic, it is pragmatic and includes state policy as well as what Deleuze and Guattari call micropolitics. It is first of all empirical: understand what race is, know its potentialities, try to sense them hidi.

## Lawfare

#### The simulacra of the law inculcates the perfection of the necropolitical state of total lawfare – imposition of control onto an unbounded space, maintaining the false distinction of law and disorder which the foundation of a liberal war on difference

Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, “Law and disorder in the postcolony,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144

Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier, the past, too, is being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) – is equally marked in postcolonies. As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, ‘Drive Out Trash’, which has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of ‘slum clearance’ – has recently taken this practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous ‘illegal structures’. Lawfare may be limited or it may reduce people to ‘bare life’; in Zimbabwe, it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count. But it always seeks to launder visceral power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital. Hence Benjamin’s (1978) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs. The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity: a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism – with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies of production and accumulation – has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, with growing heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage. Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between. Which, in turn, exacerbates the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state: cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities. Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes it unsurprising that a ‘culture of legality’ should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer ‘alternative citizenship’ to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, the counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties. We said a moment ago that communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing, in fact, that they become communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law. ‘Lawmaking’, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, ‘is power making.’ But ‘power is the principal of all lawmaking’. In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra.

#### The presumed universality of the liberal legal subject is the nexus of violence. It indoctrinates a global drive towards peace in the protection of life itself and seeks to cleanse all the areas of political difference. War is the essential feature of the liberal encounter.

Evans 10 Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### Liberal subject construction breeds nihilism and continual violence against the periphery

**Evans and Reid 13** [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristole, and Julian, “Dangerously exposed: the life and death of the resilient subject,” *Resilience*, 2013, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 83-98]

Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to their enabling conditions. This renders them fully compliant to the logics of complexity with its concomitant adaptive and emergent qualities. Resistance here is transformed from being a political capacity aimed at the achievement of freedom from that which threatens and endangers to a purely reactionary impulse aimed at increasing the capacities of the subject to adapt to its dangers and simply reduce the degree to which it suffers. This conflation of resistance with resilience is not incidental but indicative of the nihilism of the underlying ontology of vulnerability at work in contemporary policies concerned with climate change and other supposedly catastrophic processes. What is nihilism, after all, if it is not a will to nothingness drawn from a willing reactive enslavement to forces deemed to be beyond our control as one merely lives out the catastrophic moment? It also alerts us to the fundamentally liberal nature of such policies and framings of the phenomenon of climate change defined, as liberalism has been since its origins, by a fundamental mistrust in the abilities of the human subject to secure itself in the world.10 Liberalism, as we have both explored extensively elsewhere, is a security project.11 From its outset, it has been concerned with seeking answers to the problem of how to secure itself as a regime of governance through the provision of security to the life of populations subject to it.12 It will, however, always be an incomplete project because its biopolitical foundations are flawed; life is not securable. It is a multiplicity of antagonisms and for some life to be made to live, some other life has to be made to die.13 That is a fundamental law of life which is biologically understood. This is the deep paradox that undercuts the entire liberal project while inciting it to govern ever more and ever better, becoming more inclusive and more assiduous at the provision of security to life, while learning how better to take life and make die that which falls outside and threatens the boundaries of its territories. Liberal regimes, in essence and from the outset, thrive on the insecurities of life which their capacity to provide security to provides the source of their legitimacy, becoming ever more adept at the taking of life which the provision of security to life requires.14 It is no accident that the most advanced liberal democracy in the world today, the United States of America, is also the most heavily armed state in the world. And not just the most heavily armed state today, but also the most heavily armed in human history. Liberal regimes do not and cannot accept the realities of this paradox. Which is why, far from being exhausted, the liberal project remains and has to be, in order for it to be true to its mission, distinctly transformative. Not only of the world in general and hence its endless resorts to war and violence to weed out those unruly lives that are the source of insecurity to the life that is the font of its security, but also, and yet more fundamentally, of the human subject itself; for this is a paradox which plays out, not just territorially, socially or between individuals, but within the diffuse and ultimately unknowable domain of human subjectivity itself. The liberal subject is divided and has to be in order to fulfil its mission, critically astute at discerning the distinctions within its own life between that which accords with the demands made of it in order to accord with liberal ways of living and those which do not comply with its biopolitical ambitions.15 Being divided means the liberal subject will always be incomplete, needing work, critical, insecure and mistrustful of itself for the purpose of its own self-improvement. The liberal subject is a project; one that renders life itself a project, subject to an endless task of critique and self-becoming, from cradle to grave. Sadly, many still find the concept of life appealing and even utopian. We are taught to think that we ought to choose life over emptiness or negation, Renton’s law.16 In fact, it is the source of the world’s greatest nihilisms. Liberalism too is and has always been a nihilism. Perhaps it is the greatest of all nihilisms. In giving us over to life, it gives us no ends to live for but the endless work on the self that contemporarily permeate our ways of living devoid of any meaning as such.

#### Be the queer suicide terrorist – an explosion of self-sacrifice with a bomb, in favor of unsettling the violent definitions of subjectivity

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage, "'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

#### Necropolitics makes impact calculation impossible – you should view impacts from the perspective of the non-human

Dillon and Reid 9(Michael, professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College and Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, “The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, pg 30-33, JS)

One way of expressing the core problematic that we pursue in this book is, therefore, in the form of a question posed back to Paine on account of that definitive claim. What happens to the liberal way of rule and its allied way of war when liberalism goes global in pursuit of the task of emancipating the species from war, by taking the biohuman as its referent object of both rule and war? What happens to war, we ask, when a new form of governmental regime emerges which attempts to make war in defence and promotion of the entire species as opposed to using war in service of the supposedly limited interests of sovereigns? For the liberal project of the removal of species life from the domain of human enmity never in practice **entailed an end to war**, **or to the persistence of threats requiring war.** Paine makes this clear in his original formulation. Under liberal regimes, Paine observes, war will still be defined by relations between the human and its enemies. The enemies of the human will simply no longer be ‘**its species’** (Paine 1995: 595). What that meant, in practice, was that the liberal way of rule had to decide what elements and what expressions of human life best served the promotion of the species. Those that did not were precisely those that most threatened it; those upon which it was called to wage war. Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, **even if it arises within the species itself.** Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composability of living systems and of living material. **The greatest source of threat to life becomes life.** It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely not that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modern discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death outwith the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern ‘political science.’ Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose very laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These, additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, or, indeed, pre-empt its expression by positively creating new nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated through the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic. The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devises remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which the very liveliness of life itself is now said to depend. Biohumanity—itself an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically—is therefore both threat and promise. The corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species **must be cast out from the species** as such. ‘Just war’ in the cause of humanity here—a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003)—takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itself; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian Homo lupus than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault’s analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account of the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of the life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, **any such war to end war becomes war without end;** thus turning Walzer’s arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 2000: 329-335). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and **unending process**. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is little particularly startling about this claim. Immanent in the biopoliticization of liberal rule, **it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression.** As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so the properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new king of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider, for example, Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master… he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. (Kant 2005; emphasis added) ‘Nowhere else but in the human species.’ Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism’s strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. **Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough**. In a massive, quite literally **terrifying, paradox**, however, since the biohuman **is the threat**, it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the ‘figure’ of Al-Qaeda, the very dispositive of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war—the biohuman—is no longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view to respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

## Specters of the law

#### The ghosts of legalism collude with biopolitical surveillance to produce omnipresent policing at the heart of global violence. These spectral remnants of other places and time call out to all of us, some haunting us with the suspicion that we ourselves may be criminal

Hutchings 14 Peter J. Hutchings, lecturer in Cultural Inquiry at the University of Western Sydney, Australia, The criminal specter in law, literature and aesthetics: incriminating subjects, Routledge 2014, pg. 20-21

[Police] power is formless, like its nowhere tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states. Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ (1920—l)52 Walter Benjamin’s relatively early essay on the problems of modern sover­eignty is a critique of doctrines of natural law through an exposition of the relation of violence to law and justice.53 It proceeds through an analysis of “the criterion established by positive law to assess the legality of violence” towards a critique of the value of violence, producing a distinction between “mythical” (lawmaking) and “divine” (law-destroying) violence which draws attention to the inescapably theological dimensions of sovereignty, and to a certain “rottenness” revealed at the heart of law.54 For Benjamin, that rot sets in with the Enlightenment reforms of law and punishment, crucially in the abolition of capital punishment (the aim of reform, if not its immediate outcome), as Derrida explicates: If the legal system fully manifests itself in the possibility of the death penalty, to abolish the death penalty is not to touch upon one dispositif among others, it is to disavow the very principle of law. And that is to confirm, says Benjamin, that there is something “rotten” at the heart of law. The death penalty bears witness, it must bear witness, to the fact that law is a violence contrary to nature. But what today bears witness in an even more “spectral” (gespenstiche) way in mixing the two forms of violence (conserving and founding) is the modern institution of the police. It is this mixture (Vermischung) that is spec­tral, as if one violence haunted the other (though Benjamin doesn’t put it this way in commenting on the double meaning of the word gespenstich). This absence of a frontier between the two types of violence, this contamination between foundation and conservation is ignoble, it is, he says, the ignominy [das Schmachvolle) of the police.55 In critiquing the post-Enlightenment realignment of sovereignty and law, Benjamin may as well be directly critiquing Bentham (he certainly appears here as Foucault’s surprise precursor). For what else is he describing but a panoptical installation of law brought about by a scheme for the ratio­nalized abolition of corporeal, capital punishment? And what else does Derrida describe in his exposition of Benjamin, but a society disciplined and surveilled by the ghosts of law? Let us return to the thing itself, to the ghost, for this text is a ghost story. We can no more avoid ghost and ruin than we can elude the question of the rhetorical status of this textual event. To what figures does it turn for its exposition, for its internal explosion or its implo­sion? All the exemplary figures of the violence of law are singular metonymies, namely, figures without limit, unfettered possibilities of transposition and figures without figures. Let us take the example of the police, this index of a phantom-like violence because it mixes foundation with conservation and becomes all the more violent for this. Well, the police that thus capitalize on violence aren’t simply the police. They do not simply consist of policeman in uniform, occa­sionally helmeted, armed and organized in a civil structure on a military model to whom the right to strike is refused, and so forth. By defi­nition, the police are present or represented everywhere that there is force of law. They are present, sometimes invisible but always effec­tive, wherever there is preservation of the social order. The police aren’t just the police (today more or less than ever), they are there, the faceless figure (figure sans figure) of a Dasein coextensive with the Dasein of the polis.56 As in the criminal contagion of vampirism, the spectrality of the criminal now affects the police. The police’s haunting, ghosting of law could be said to “harrow up the soul” and “freeze the blood” of the law’s subjects, scaring the life out of them, making them over in the spectral image of their guardians.57 This is the society of Schlemihls in reverse, first analysed by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire through the figure of Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon III, one-time policeman and strikebreaker, fake magi­cian, masked ghost. This is modernity. Most of this book is concerned with these issues as they develop in the nineteenth century, but it is not a period study in the strict sense: the point of the analysis of nineteenth-century developments is their influence on present-day concepts and practices. The spectrality of the criminal does not mean that there is no attempt to define or identify this new subject formation. On the contrary, one of this book’s themes is the variety of attempts to define the criminal subject. Medicine, psychiatry and law all work at definitions of the mentally compe­tent, or incompetent, criminal. Literature and the emergent discourses of penology, criminology, urban and criminal anthropology attempt to define the female criminal.58 The new art of photography and the developments in physiognomy, optics, statistics, anthropometry and fingerprinting attempt ever more precise identifications of the individual in general, and the criminal in particular. Aesthetic and eugenic discourses of genius and originality join with psychiatry in offering definitions of the highest form of criminal subjectivity, criminal genius. In a sense, each of these chapters marks the variety of attempts to catch the spectre, to arrest its evanescence. None of them really succeeds, but the effects of these attempts are felt nonetheless. We are all marked by the projects of criminal definition and control, just as we are haunted by the suspicion that we may ourselves be criminals, and as we are haunted by the spectres of law.

#### Independently, this debate is haunted by the spectral presence of nuclear war – catastrophic annihilation is a strictly textual event, it only exists in our discourses – the invocation of nuclear discourse betrays a larger commitment to a violent regime of techno-militarization that comes to determine all realms of political subjectivity

Derrida 84 Jacques Derrida, that Derrida. “No Apocalypse, Not Now Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives”. Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. Summer, 1984. pgs. 20-31.

Reason number one. Let us consider the form of the question itself is the war of (over, for) speed (with all that it entails) an irreducibly new phenomenon, an invention linked to a set of inventions of the so-called nuclear age, or is it rather the brutal acceleration of a movement that has always already been at work? This form of the question perhaps constitutes the most indispensable formal matrix, the keystone or, if you will, the nuclear question, for any problematics of the "nuclear criticism" type, in all its aspects. Naturally, I don't have time to demonstrate this. I am offering it, therefore, as a hasty conclusion, a precipitous assertion, a belief, an opinion-based argument, a doctrine or a dogmatic weapon. But I was determined to begin with it. I wanted to begin as quickly as possible with a warning in the form of a dissuasion: watch out, don't go too fast. There is perhaps no invention, no radically new predicate in the situation known as "the nuclear age." Of all the dimensions of such an "age” we may always say one thing: it is neither the first time nor the last. The historian's critical vigilance can always help us verify that repetitiveness; and that historian's patience, that lucidity of memory must always shed their light on"nuclear criticism," must oblige it to decelerate, dissuade it from rushing to a conclusion on the subject of speed itself. But this dissuasion and deceleration I am urging carry their own risks: the critical zeal that leads us to recognize precedents, continuities, and repetitions at every turn can make us look like suicidal sleepwalkers, blind and deaf alongside the unheard-of; it could make us stand blind and deaf alongside that which cuts through the assimilating resemblance of discourses (for example of the apocalyptic or bimillenarist type), through the analogy of techno-military situations, strategic arrangements, with all their wagers, their last resort calculations, on the "brink," their use of chance and risk factors, their mimetic resource to upping the ante, and so on- blind and deaf, then, alongside what would be absolutely unique; and it, this critical zeal, would seek in the stockpile of history (in short, in history itself, which in this case would have this blinding search as its function) the wherewithal to neutralize invention, to translate the unknown into a known, to metaphorize, allegorize, domesticate the terror, to circumvent (with the help of circumlocutions: turns of phrase, tropes and strophes) the inescapable catastrophe, the undeviating precipitation toward a remainderless cataclysm. The critical slowdown may thus be as critical as the critical acceleration. One may still die after having spent one's life recognizing, as a lucid historian, to what extent all that was not new, telling oneself that the inventors of the nuclear age or of nuclear criticism did not invent the wheel, or, as we say in French, "invent gunpowder." That's the way one always dies, moreover, and the death of what is still now and then called humanity might well not escape the rule. We are speaking of stakes that are apparently limitless for what is still now¶ and then called humanity. People find it easy to say that in nuclear war¶ "humanity" runs the risk of its self-destruction, with nothing left over, no¶ remainder. There is a lot that could be said about that rumor. But whatever¶ credence we give it, we have to recognize that these stakes appear in the experience¶ of a race, or more precisely of a competition, a rivalry between two rates of speed. It's what we call in French a course de vitesse, a speed race. Whether it¶ is the arms race or orders given to start a war that is itself dominated by that¶ economy of speed throughout all the zones of its technology, a gap of a few¶ seconds may decide, irreversibly, the fate of what is still now and then called¶ humanity- plus the fate of a few other species. As no doubt we all know, no¶ single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is¶ not marked today, directly or indirectly, by that speed race. And by the whole¶ strategic debate about "no use," "no first use," or "first use" of nuclear weaponry.¶ Is this new? Is it the first time "in history"? Is it an invention, and can we still say¶ "in history" in order to speak about it? The most classical wars were also speed¶ races, in their preparation and in the actual pursuit of the hostilities. Are we¶ having, today, another, a different experience of speed? Is our relation to time¶ and to motion qualitatively different? Or must we speak prudently of an extraordinary-¶ although qualitatively homogeneous - acceleration of the same experience?¶ And what temporality do we have in mind when we put the question that¶ way? Can we take the question seriously without re-elaborating all the problematics¶ of time and motion, from Aristotle to Heidegger by way of Augustine,¶ Kant, Husserl, Einstein, Bergson, and so on? So my first formulation of the question¶ of speed was simplistic. It opposed quantity and quality as if a quantitative¶ transformation-the crossing of certain thresholds of acceleration within the¶ general machinery of a culture, with all its techniques for handling, recording,¶ and storing information-could not induce qualitative mutations, as if every¶ invention were not the invention of a process of acceleration or, at the very¶ least, a new experience of speed. Or as if the concept of speed, linked to some¶ quantification of objective velocity, remained within a homogeneous relation to¶ every experience of time-for the human subject or for a mode of temporalization¶ that the human subject-as such-would have himself covered up.¶ Why have I slowed down my introduction this way by dragging in such a¶ naive question? Reason number two. What is the right speed, then? Given our inability to provide a¶ good answer for that question, we at least have to recognize gratefully that the nuclear age¶ allows us to think through this aporia of speed (i.e., the need to move both slowly and¶ quickly); it allows us to confront our predicament starting from the limit constituted by the¶ absolute acceleration in which the uniqueness of an ultimate event, of a final collision or collusion,¶ the temporalities called subjective and objective, phenomenological and intraworldly,¶ authentic and inauthentic, etc., would end up being merged into one another. But,¶ wishing to address these questions to the participants of a colloquium on "nuclear criticism,"¶ I am also wondering at what speed we have to deal with these aporias: with what rhetoric,¶ what strategy of implicit connection, what ruses of potentialization and of ellipsis, what¶ weapons of irony? The "nuclear age" makes for a certain type of colloquium, with its particular¶ technology of information, diffusion and storage, its rhythm of speech, its demonstration¶ procedures, and thus its arguments and its armaments, its modes of persuasion or¶ intimidation. In our techno-scientifico-militaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may consider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essential feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the frightof imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war,which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifyingrealityof the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Betterthan ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse- indeed, of the literature-on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. Forthe moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis- tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a¶ speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breakingof the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this?dreaming of it, desiring it?You will perhaps find it shock- ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about. Butwho can fail to recognize the massive "reality"of nuclear weaponry and of the terrifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are coming to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality"of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also becareful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, Bildung, schol, paideia. "Reality,"let's say the encompassing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at all),\* an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance.¶ Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy,¶ writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just¶ because we can do nothing but speak of it - and then as something that has never occurred.¶ It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it¶ only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion)- and the dividing line between doxa and¶ epistemb starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely¶ legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but¶ techno-militaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the¶ doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief."¶ One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the¶ decisive place of the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of¶ the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief¶ and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a¶ truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of¶ Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it,¶ but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies-which are also the¶ technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive,¶ emission, and transmission, like all techne-the extraordinary sophistication of these¶ technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and¶ the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most¶ vulgar psychology.

#### **Make no mistake, our subjectivities don’t exist in isolation – we are all inextricably haunted by the specter that is death – we offer this debate as a spectropoetic analysis of not only politics as whole, but particularly this space**

Ansell-Pearson 8 Keith Ansell Pearson, Specialist in Modern European Philosophy. I serve on the editorial boards of, among others, Cosmos and History, Deleuze Studies, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, and Nietzsche-Studien. “Spectropoiesis and Rhizomatics: Learning to Live with Death and Demons”. Pgs. 9-25.

Derrida points out that to construe a philosophy as a philosophy of life is an all too easy or simple affair simply because it is in danger of neglecting the other of life, namely death and the dead. So much so that for Derrida absolute life would be absolute evil, the life that is fully present (1994: 175). Learning to live life is not something that can be taught by oneself but only through the intermediation provided by the other, death, at the edge of life, at the internal or external border, speaking of a 'heterodidactics' that is situated between life and death, where this 'between' does not denote a simple genealogy requiring movement along a series of points from an arche to a telos (from birth to death). Nietzsche spoke enigmatically of justice as a 'panoramic power' which transcends this and that individual, as the highest representative of life, but a life that is fully implicated in death. Is it this kind of justice that Derrida is appealing to when he speaks of the life that lives beyond present life, its actual being-there?: 'not toward death but toward a living-on, namely, a trace of which life and death would themselves be but traces and traces of traces, a survival whose possibility in advance comes to disjoin or dis-adjust the identity to itself of the living present as well as of any effectivity. There is then some spirit. Spirits. And one must reckon with them' (Derrida 1994: xx). Repetition needs to be freed from the material or physical model of a merely 'brute repetition' that Deleuze holds it gets trapped in with Freud's positing of the death-drive and which posits a straightforward desire to regress, or involute, to an earlier, inorganic state of things. While the pleasure principle would be limited to a psychological principle that of the 'beyond' of the pleasure principle would be linked to a transcendental principle (not of life, but germinal life, the life and death that live on): 'If repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also frees us, testifying in both cases to its "demonic" power' (Deleuze1968: 30; 1994: 19). This move is not Freud's for whom the 'daemonic power' which assails and runs ahead of neurotics like a 'malignant fate' is always to be identified and stratified in terms of a recognisable fate, a fate that is 'for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences' (Freud 1991: 292). Psychoanalysis can only domesticate the demonic by placing it in the confines of regression therapy. There is something that haunts the present life, life as presence. For Deleuze this is repetition: not as regression but as originary difference, announcing not the return of the repressed (the past) but the evil spirits of the alien future; or rather, the time of Aion as opposed to the time of Chronos. This is the time of the Event (the time of eternal return). Events are not living presents but infinitives that involve a 'becoming' which in dividing itself infinitely in past and future eludes the grasp of the present. The time of events is the ghostly (virtual) time of 'incorporeal effects', effects which result from the actions and passions of bodies but which live in excess of them. The eternal return is not the time of individuals or persons but only of 'pure events' in 'which the instant, displaced over the line, goes on dividing into already past and yet to come' (Deleuze 1969: 206-7; 1990: 176). What makes the encounter with eternal return demonic is not the feeling of being subject to an evil fate beyond one's control or comprehension, becoming little more than the victim of the repressed; rather it is the fact that in its repetition the action is transformed into the event, in which the body is confronted with the chance to learn to communicate with ghosts and spectres of life. What is being willed in the willing of eternal repetition - in which repetition becomes the very object of willing (not mere self-destruction as in the death-drive) - is the field of forces and intensities that the self finds itself fortuitously implicated in. The eternal return turns the repetition of intensities and singularities (the mobile individuating factors which exceed the constraints of the self and live on or beyond) into the object of the highest affirmation. There is no genealogical origin or phallic birth since the only genesis is a hetero-genesis and the only production a spectropoiesis. An encounter with the demonic raises, of course, the question of what it means for philosophy to communicate with death. Freud refers to a work of anthropology by Kleinpaul in which the belief in spirits found in the remnants of civilized races is said to expose a fear of the dead among the living because the dead continue to enjoy the primeval lust for murder (the lust Freud affirms in working through the 'disillusionment of war' in his 1915 essay), seeking to drag the living onto their train. The dead are, in actuality, living dead who live death, they are vampyres conceived as 'evil spirits' who seek to rob the living of life (Freud 1990: 115). It is as if such an insight anticipates Freud's later preoccupation with the train of death that always leads to the same place, a regression to the inorganic that characterises the death-drive as precisely a drive towards death as a final entropic destination: 'the aim of all living is death'. But here we encounter the essential paradox: which life is it that the so-called evil spirits seek to deprive the living of? Could it be the absolute life, the life that thinks it can dispense with death and its filthy lessons (decomposition, degeneration)? Death no longer exists for we have buried the dead once and for all, the dead are without witnesses, no survivors remain to testify against the living. Derrida poses the question of the event precisely as a question of the ghost, seeking to comprehend the effectivity of that which is without body, as virtual and insubstantial as a simulacrum. Indeed, for Derrida a thinking of the spectral is one that takes into account 'an irreducible virtuality...virtual space, virtual object, synthetic image, spectral simulacrum, teletechnological differance, idealiterability, trace beyond presence and absence, and so forth...' (1994: 190). A state of affairs is haunted by the event (a ghost of time), which makes it possible to speak of a logic of haunting that is not simply larger than an ontology of Being but rather denotes that which implicates life in its other as the repetition of death. Whether this haunting entails, deconstructively, a renegotiation with genealogy (a genealogical deconstruction and a deconstruction of the genealogical schema) or, more destructively, a burning of the genealogical tree, will not be decided upon here (just as Nietzsche's own project of 'on' or 'towards' a genealogy of morals does not decide upon it once and for all but leaves the matter open for the future, and as the future). We simply need note that it is not only a question of our taking up of an inheritance which subjects genealogy to a heteronomous and heterogeneous determination; rather, the hereditary can be shown to enjoy an originary heterogeneity. This is what Deleuze means when he says that our only inheritance is the crack itself (the paradox of a transmission which transmits only itself). The event becomes what it is because it 'lives on'. It robs time of the present, indeed, of presence. There remains, however, a future for heredity simply because what is inherited in any passing on is the future. The 'germen' is the crack and nothing but the crack. In The Logic of Sense Deleuze develops a new conception of transcendental philosophy by approaching the transcendental as a topological field not inhabited by the 'I', the cogito or the synthetic unity of apperception, but populated by pre-individual singularities, what he calls a 'Dionysian sense-producing machine' (Deleuze 1969: 130-1; 1990: 107). It is this 'surface topology' made up of populations and preindividual singularities which constitutes the 'real transcendental field'. Singularities refer to 'ideal events' (ideal in the sense that they exist or endure beyond their specific individual manifestations and significations), such as bottlenecks, knots, points of fusion, processes of condensation, crystallisation, and boiling. The error of attempts to define the transcendental with consciousness is that they get constructed in the image of that which they are supposed to ground, running the risk of simply reduplicating the empirical (see ibid.: 128; 105). Deleuze makes a move in the direction of a non-human universe, giving primacy in the becomings of life to what he will later call with Guattari transversal modes of communication. In The Logic of Sense, for example the subject is transmuted into a free, anonymous, nomadic singularity which 'traverses' humans, plants, and animals by being dependent neither on the matter of the particular individuations nor on the forms of their personality. This transversality, says Deleuze, constitutes the universe of Nietzsche's 'overman'. In later work this tranversal field is identified as the plane of immanence, which, starting with Descartes and running from Kant to Husserl, gets treated as a field of consciousness: 'Immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject' (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 47-8; 1994: 46). For Deleuze, however, immanence is only immanent to itself, that is, to a plane populated by anonymous matter in continuous variation. Deleuze explores the existence of animal becomings that are said to both traverse human beings and affect both animals and humans alike. Animal becomings, it must be insisted upon, do not entail representation or imitation, simply because the becoming is situated on the molecular level of affect between particles of heterogeneous bodies, and not on the molar level of species and genus with its concentration on organs and their functions. It is for this reason that a becoming is said to produce only itself: 'What is real is...the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 291; 1988: 238, 'Memories of a Bergsonian'). These becomings cannot be said to be evolutions if evolution is taken to be synonymous with descent and filiation. Becomings involve the coming into play of an order different than filiation, such as novel alliances found in symbiotic complexes: 'If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation' (ibid.). Deleuze and Guattari adopt a model of 'creative involution' by disassociating involution from regression (the move towards less differentiation) and equating it with the establishment of nonlinear blocks of becoming. This is what they call 'neoevolutionism' in which animal becomings involve the movement of populations: '...the animal is defined not by characteristics (specific, generic, etc.) but by populations that vary from milieu to milieu or within the same milieu; movement occurs not only or not primarily, by filiative productions but also by transversal communications between heterogeneous populations' (ibid.: 292; 239). Every animal becoming partakes of the anomalous (Moby-Dick, Josephine the Mouse Singer, the Wolf-Man). The anomalous is a 'phenomenon of bordering' (1980: 299; 1988: 245), and it is within its terms of reference (a multiplicity, a population) that we can think in a novel manner the nature of demons and monsters.4 The anomalous resists schemas of classification, it has something of the 'unnameable' and the 'monstrous' about it - one could call it 'the Outsider', the 'nameless horror', or 'viroid life' (for further insight see Lovecraft 1993 & 1994). Conceived in its most important sense, biophilosophically, the anomalous cannot be said to be either an individual or a species. It has to do with the movement of a multiplicity and of populations, definable neither by their elements nor by their centres of unification, but solely and strictly in terms of the number of dimensions and variations they enjoy. The desire to be a demon is a desire not to be One but more than one, even less than one. No more One (see Derrida on an-other democracy beyond the One, 1997; compare Lawrence on Whitman and democracy, 1977, 171ff.: 'God save me, I feel like creeping down a rabbit-hole, to get away from all these automobiles rushing down the ONE IDENTITY track to the goal of ALLNESS'). Sorcerers occupy an anomalous position within their social field, dwelling at the edge of fields or woods, at the borderline between villages, and operating 'between' life and death. Their relation to the anomalous is not one of filiation but of alliance, establishing a pact with evil spirits: 'The sorcerer has a relation of alliance with the demon as the power of the anomalous' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 301; 1988: 246). The politics of this sorcery involve assemblages (couplings and copulations) that assume the form neither of the family nor those of the State and religion: 'Instead they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions...' (ibid.: 302; 247). If the animal becomings take the form of a great 'temptation', of monsters that are aroused in the imagination as a demonic influence, this is because 'it is accompanied...by a rupture with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established' (ibid.). Evil spirits ensure that nature overcomes itself by evolving contra itself through modes of involution, breaking out of the ossification and rigidification of organismic life, and heralding the germinal life of the nonorganic: 'it is not the mechanical which is opposed to the organic: it is the vital as potent pre-organic germinality (puissante germinalite pre-organique), common to the animate and the inanimate, to a matter which raises itself to the point of life, and to a life which spreads itself through all matter' (Deleuze 1983: 76; 1986: 51). Nonorganic life invokes a non-psychological life of the spirit, a life that does not simply 'belong' to either nature or to organic individuality since it is the ungrounding of both, the flowers of evil which adorn the crowned an-archy. Demons are demonic precisely because they exist without determinate function or fixed form. Where gods have fixed attributes, properties, functions, territories and codes, concerned to oversee and regulate boundaries, demons jump across intervals of space and time, and betray existing codes and territories. This is why Deleuze argues that it is a poor recipe for producing monsters merely to 'accumulate heteroclite determinations or to over-determine the animal'. Rather, the more successful and subversive task lies in raising up the ground and dissolving the form (Deleuze 1968: 44; 1994: 28-9). Of course, this involves betrayal, most notably, betraying the 'fixed powers which try to hold us back, the established powers of the earth' (Deleuze 1977: 53; 1987: 40). Deleuze and Guattari will go so far as to claim that the becomings of philosophy and science are unthinkable without recourse to an appreciation of the role played by demons in all thought-experimentation. The demon is to be construed not as a God-like figure, a trickster, who assumes the role of the total observer able to calculate the past and the future from a given state of affairs (in the manner of the demon invented by Laplace). The demon invoked here denotes not simply something that exceeds our reasoning capacities but rather a common kind of 'necessary intercessors' playing the role of inventive subjects of enunciation, such as the philosophical friend and rival, the idiot, the overman, etc. The demons of science - of Maxwell, of Heisenberg, and so on - function as 'partial observers' and play the role of a molecular perception and affection, in which knowledge becomes a perspectivism. This is not the perspectivism of a banal scientific relativism in which truth is said to be always relative to a subject. There is not a relativity of truth (the anthropocentric naivete par excellence), but only 'a truth of the relative'. It is worth quoting Deleuze and Guattari at some length on this point: ...the role of a partial observer is to perceive and to experience, although these perceptions and affections are not those of a man, in the currently accepted sense, but belong to the things studied. Man feels the effect of them nonetheless (what mathematician does not feel the experience the effect of a section, an ablation, or an addition), but he obtains this effect only from the ideal observer that he himself has installed like a golem in the system of reference. These partial observers belong to the neighborhood of the singularities of a curve, of a physical system, of a living organism. Even animism, when it multiplies little immanent souls in organs and functions, is not so far removed from biological science as it is said to be, on condition that these immanent souls are withdrawn from any active or efficient role so as to become solely sources of molecular perception and affection. In this way, bodies are populated by an infinity of little monads (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 124; 1994: 130). Critchley's recent book, which inevitably given the pedagogic task it undertakes to perform, gives due consideration to commonly accepted, if ultimately platitudinous, propositions regarding nihilism and modernity: 'To accept the diagnosis of modernity in terms of nihilism is to accept the ubiquity of the finite. That is, if God is bracketed out as the possible source of a response to the question of the meaning of life, then the response to that question must be sought within life, conceived as a finite temporal stretch between birth and death. So, under nihilistic conditions of modernity, the question of the meaning of life becomes a matter of finding meaning to human finitude' (1997: 24-5). But, we must ask: are life and death able to live and die when stratified within the confines of the 'ubiquity of the finite'? Certainly, the banal placement of life in terms of a 'temporal stretch between birth and death' reveals little insight into the phenomenon of repetition, in which life gets caught up in a spectropoiesis, whether this poiesis be the event of the over-life that lives beyond bodies and organisms, but also through them, as in Deleuze, or the spectres of life in Derrida such as automata, machines, ghosts, beasts, the nameless Thing. In both cases one is dealing with a germinal life that haunts finite organisms and bodies, and overturns dramatically the meaning of finitude, speaking of a machinic surplus value (which is how both Deleuze and Derrida read Marx on capital). Spirits do not simply leave nature; rather, they animate nonorganic and germinal life, inventing and reinventing themselves as evil spirits who burn nature in flames of metamorphosis, rediscovering the infinite in the spirit of evil. Even though he invokes spectres and speaks of the 'event of death' (in this analysis the event is too casually conflated with a 'state of affairs') - which means for him 'the event of our death' - Critchley is thus left with very little almost nothing, mourning the impossibility of a 'phenomenology of death' because, we are told, death is a 'state of affairs' about which we can find neither 'adequate intention' nor 'intuitive fulfilment', meaning that death is 'radically resistant to the order of respresentation' (ibid.). Hence the conclusion is reached that 'the ultimate meaning of human finitude is that we cannot find meaningful fulfilment for the finite. In this specific sense, death is meaningless and the work of mourning is infinite' (ibid.). The achievement of Very Little...Almost Nothing is to raise the stakes of a post-Nietzschean encounter with death, showing the need to cultivate atheism and skepticism in terms of a philosophical ethos. However, although Critchley desires to effect a movement beyond the phenomenology of death - the 'ungraspable facticity of dying' is said, with the aid of Blanchot and Levinas, to establish 'an opening onto a metaphenomenological alterity' that cannot be made reducible to the power of the will or Dasein (there can be no Subject of death) - for me this staging of the question of death remains caught within the confines of organismic life, the life of the 'I' and the self. For Critchley the 'recognition of meaninglessness' as something one can achieve leads to a 'deeper recognition of the profound limitedness of the human condition...' (ibid.: 27) He goes on to critique the illusions of suicide, locating in its alleged fantasy the 'virile leap into the void', and aiming to show the ridiculous character of a wanting to die, but one may want to ask about the phallic virility concealed in the idea of achieving and working towards one's very own recognition of meaninglessness (on the rational and courageous character of suicide see Hume's essay on the subject, 1965). The real difference between us, however, is over the question of affirmation. For him death cannot be laid hold of and be made to work as the basis for an affirmation of life since it belongs to an ungraspable finitude. But if death is ungraspable it is not because of human finitude and the limitedness of la condition humaine, but because it belongs to the event. In other words, it does not belong to me (Je or Moi), not even 'my' death. It is precisely because death does not belong (to the Subject) and cannot be owned (by the One) that it offers the basis for an affirmation. It is the 'event' of death which is not being thought in this instructive but inexcessive attempt to move beyond phenomenology.

#### Other specters haunting this very room are hidden by legal positivism’s hegemony, which sustains itself by violently foreclosing the ability to discover new concepts and interpretations. Our deconstruction of the temporal constraints undergirding law and debate is crucial to producing ethical lawmaking rooted in justice

Cornel 13[Drucilla Cornel, Professor of Political Science, Comparative Literature and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positivism: The Call for Judicial Responsibility,” HeinOnline, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 267, 3-25-2013, <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=yjlh>]

The traditional conception of time defines the past and the future as modifications or horizons of the "now." By time, I am not evoking chronology, but the privileging of the present as it is understood to be necessary to the establishment of a legal system. Without this present there would be no legal system that could be grasped as simply there for its participants, whether they be lawyers or judges. We find the deconstruction of the traditional conception of time worked through in Jacques Derrida's discussions of dilfrance. I will specifically focus on how the diachronic view of time implicit in the explanations of distrance undermines the very possibility of a positivist conception of law as Luhmann conceives of it. Legal positivism, when left unchallenged, creates a system, a kingdom which reigns over possibility and excludes the dream of a truly different future. Deconstruction, however, exposes the presumption of a determinant certitude of a present "justice" as defined by any current legal system, including legal positivism. But in so doing, deconstruction is hardly the nihilistic language exercise claimed by many critics. In the movement through the aporias of justice, deconstruction protects the divide between law and justice. This exposure of the aporias of justice is in and of itself ethical. The aporias, or more precisely, justice conceived as aporia, is an uncrossable limit which continually returns us to an inherent and ulti- mately irresolvable paradox. Justice so conceived resists its own collapse into law. As we will see, this ethical resistance to positivism is crucial for the development of an adequate conception of legal interpretation. First, it allows us to understand why legal interpretation always involves both "discovery" and "invention." Interpretation is not an activity separable from the other two. Indeed, deconstruction emphasizes precisely the necessity of "invention" in interpretation. But this process of invention and restatement of legal norms also entails a judge's "responsibility toward memory." This responsibility is not to an accurate repetition through the recollection of legal norms, but to a refutation of the belief that what has been can ever be conflated with justice. Invention is inescapable if legal norms cannot be discovered purely through their mere recollection. We cannot escape appeals to redemptive perspectives projected into the future as the "truth" of the past in justifying legal norms. The judge is responsible for his or her projection of the legal truth or appeal to the normative rightness of the past. I use the word "redemption" deliberately, even if it sounds foreign in the context of the secularized vocabulary of modern, liberal jurisprudence. I have chosen "redemption" because I wish to emphasize the inevitability of the projection of a "different" and "better" future, an inevitability which is essential to the justification of legal principles if such justifications are not to be reduced to a positivist appeal to convention. Moreover, it is a "projection," not simply a recovery of the past or the inevitable fulfillment of the telos of history. We can only maintain a critical resistance against the pull of the logic of recursivity through projections of the "future." It is the turn toward the future, once it is properly understood, that deconstruction demands of us. Is this simply a restatement of the Kantian insistence that justice is an ideal of political-historical reason, and as such is irreducible to the actual conventions of any existing legal system? In Kant's later writings the idea of justice or the totality of reasonable beings functions as the "as if" which is an ethical condition for the future that we must postulate if we are to preserve practical judgment from being a mere appeal to convention. Deconstruction does not, as it is often interpreted, reject out of hand the Kantian project. But deconstruction refuses to reduce the aporias of justice to a horizon. To analyze why, we will have to discuss how an ethical horizon has traditionally been conceived. The question of whether one can or should project a horizon of justice is itself addressed through the recognition that there is a historical specificity of types of horizons associated with the project of a horizon as an ideal. Do we idealize a 'totality' of multiple language games, as in Jean-Franois Lyotard's paganism, or the totality of reasonable beings in Kant's own Kingdom of ends? Would we instead project an ideal speech situation as does .Jiirgen Habermas? The questioning of the very concept of horizon as itself a reflection of historical specificity is just that-a questioning. The Kantian ethical suspicion of consensus as a "reality" which dresses up convention as truth is undoubtedly evidenced in deconstruction. Like Kantianism, deconstruction rejects the identification of the ethical with reality. This affinity does not, of course, mean that deconstruction does not challenge the metaphysical premises that underlie the Kantian split between the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. Deconstruction undermines this rigid dichotomy as it does all others. Deconstruction operates within the reality of the legal system by breaking it open and showing us that there can be no legal system that is just there. The Derridean deconstruction of the present also reminds us of the responsibility of judges, lawyers, and law professors for what the law "becomes." Moreover, this responsibility is connected with the very idea of judgment. Judgment is only judgment, and not mere calculation or recollection, if it is "fresh." 1 The judge is called upon to do just that, judge. As we will see, Derrida's remarkable insight into the limits of memory is connected to his deconstruction of the traditional conception of the modalities of time in which the present is privileged. The unique Derridean contribution to legal interpretation is to show us why the act of memory in judging involves the seemingly contradictory notion that the judge, in his or her decision, remembers the future. Deconstruction, in other words, helps us to correct recent misdescriptions of the process of legal interpretation which either appeal to the established conventions of the present or look back to the past. Even if that past is understood as a constructed "overlapping consensus," 2 and not just the simple recollection of norms, the process of reconstruction through the overlapping consensus is still directed to the past. The deconstruction of the traditional conception of time also provides us with an account of critique that can successfully answer the argument of Stanley Fish, who asserts that critique, in any strong sense, is impossible. For Fish, we are inevitably caught in the logic of recursivity, which enforces the hpparent adequation between the legal system and justice. It is this logic of recursivity that makes the following of the pregiven legal rules or norms, "Doing What Comes Naturally."' Judges and lawyers would, as a result, be caught in a mechanism of repetition from which they could not escape. Judgment, then, could not be separated from calculation. Memory would just be rote, a replication in consciousness of an objective reality. Decon- struction challenges the possibility that the lawyer or the judge can be identified with the mere instrument for replication of the system. The judge and the lawyer "act" when they remember precedent. The newest brand of legal positivism is offered by Niklas Luhmann and goes by the name autopoiesis. But if the name is new, the ultimate project of legal positivism, which is to solve the problem of the validity of legal propositions through an appeal to the mechanism of validation internally generated by an existing legal system, remains the same. In order to achieve a satisfactory solution to the post-modern problem of Grundlosigkeit- the loss of grounding of legal rules in foundationalist principles- the positivist, in any of his guises, must postulate a self-maintaining, even if evolving, cognitive system in which there is what Luhmann calls normative closure. At the very heart of the conception of law as autopoiesis is this idea of the self-maintenance of a normatively, if not cognitively, closed system.4 This conception of self-maintenance, and its corresponding notion of recursivity, implies an understanding of time. In terms of its definition within the framework of law understood as an autopoietic system, recursivity means that the normativity of law can only be established by reference to the legal norms already in place as they are authorized and, therefore, just~ied by the system. The legal system, in other words, grounds the validity of its own propositions by turning back on itself. Without recursivity there would be no operative, normative closure and, therefore, no system present to itself that could be considered self-maintaining. Luhmann explores the iterative use of temporal modalities (past presents, future presents, etc.) as they are relevant to his social theory and more specifically to his conception of law as autopoiesis. For Luhmann, following the tradition of Western metaphysics, any theory of modal forms must privilege the present. It is this privileging of the present that lies at the very heart of Luhmann's conception of social evolution as the only way to make sense of change in a legal system which nevertheless remains normatively closed. Validity is found only by circling within the system. Luhmann's well known anti-utopianism is inseparable from his view of time. Fortunately, as we have seen, there is also an effective challenge to legal positivism through the deconstruction of the traditional conception of time, which helps us solve the dilemma inherent in Fish's own work. There is no system present to itself which can fill the universe, and ourselves as containers for that universe, and by so doing "foreclose" the future or reduce it to the continuation of the present. This same time never is, will never have been and will never be present. . . .There is only the promise and memory, memory as promise, without any gathering possible in the form of the present. This disjunction is the law, the text of law and the law of the text.38 Deconstruction calls us to that promise and leaves us with that hope. The utopianism, if it can be called that, is in the reminder "that what took place humanly has never been able to remain closed up in its site."" But as we have seen, this reminder, at least within the legal system, also opens up the space for, indeed, demands utopian imagination. As suggested in the last section, this reminder is crucial for distinguishing between evolution and transformation. The impossible, Justice, is what makes the possible possible Given this, we must now re-think the significance of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's political theory and its implications for legal interpretation. Many claim Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau theoretically undermines the very possibility of political and ethical thought by showing that it must rely on an origin that does not exist. However, once we put Derrida's deconstruction within the understanding of time and temporization I have presented here, we can see why this is not the case. For Derrida, the Rousseauean community postulates an originary instant of coming together without a trace of what has gone before. This originary instant is the festival based on an unmediated unity in the face to face relations of the participants. As Derrida points up, Rousseau's vision privileges the living voice. Speech is the vehicle of co-equals who are literally present to one another as they co-determine their fate, as if they could start again from the absolute beginning, the origin. There is also a more profound point which has been completely missed and one which shows the significance of temporization for legal interpretation. Derrida shows us how the inevitable failure to find the origin as the full presence that Rousseau so desperately seeks opens up the space for the conditional mood. Derrida wants us to see that what masks itself as simple discovery is in fact discovery through a projection of the ought to be. Rousseau argues from the logic of discovery, as if we could just discover the origin in which oppositions of nature and spirit, man and woman, etc. did not exist so as to rend the soul apart. Rousseau seeks reconciliation in the past as if it were "there." But the power of his message actually lies in its eschatological anticipation, in Derrida's sense of the "not yet." If there is no simple origin that we can find our way back to in the future, then we cannot escape the conditional mood of political and ethical vision. We project forward the truth of the past of the never has been as the "ought to be." As Derrida reminds us again and again, when we remember the past to find the ethical truth of the origin, we are, in truth, remembering the future. But we do so within the rhetoric of memory, because the future only is as the anterior/posterior. Memory is the name of what is no longer only a mental "capacity" oriented toward one of the three modes of the present, the past present, which could be dissociated from the present present and the future present. Memory projects itself toward the future, and it constitutes the presence of the present. The "rhetoric of temporality" is the rhetoric of memory. 8 But this rhetoric is also a tension toward the future as the ought to be since memory can never exactly reconstitute what was. The memory we are considering here is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to "preserve" them, but traces of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come-come from the future, from the to come. Resurrection, which is always the formal element of "truth," a recurrent difference between a present and its presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it engages the future." In this sense, legal interpretation must be both discovery and invention because there can be no simple origin of legal meaning, whether we call it intent of the founders of the Constitution or some other name. We cannot escape the conditional mood of legal interpretation. In this sense, interpretation is always an act; moreover, an act from which we cannot escape responsibility.

#### Debate is always-already haunted by the ghosts created in the name of the necropolitical west - our illusion of community is haunted by the deaths of untold billions killed to make this space possible - This necropolitical violence is produced by the nostalgic and idyllic communicative ideals promoted by legal positivism

Culbert 9[John Culbert, Research Associate at the Critical Theory Institute, UC Irvine, “The Well and the Web: Phantoms of Community and the Mediatic Public Sphere,” *Postmodern Culture,* Volume 19, Number 2, January 2009]

Today we see in the Kathy Fiscus story the first rehearsal of now-familiar staples of television: prurient coverage of "human interest" topics, exploitative violence, permanent distraction from politics, and passive consumption. It is indeed tempting to see this media-event as the origin of our sensationalistic mediascape. Looking back this way, however, we may only repeat the Orphic turn that haunted viewers in 1949. When did media come to saturate the public sphere? How to heal the breach that makes the live moment always doubled by its alienating spectacle? How to rescue the singular life broadcast from San Marino across the world? The race against time, the struggle of life against death turned out to be unfortunately "too late" for Kathy Fiscus. But a more unsettling belatedness haunts this story. This belated horror resembles that described by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida as he pores over the photograph of a man condemned to death. Barthes is gripped by the convergence in the image of two disparate times: the man will die, and yet he has already died (96).1 Jacques Derrida refines this insight to claim that the poignancy of the photographic image lies in its status as impossible referent and evanescent presence. Speaking of Barthes's punctum and its haunting temporality, Derrida asks, "is not Time the ultimate resource for the substitution of one absolute instant by another, for the replacement of the irreplaceable, the replacement of this unique referent by another that is yet another instant, completely other and yet still the same? Is not time the punctual form and force of all metonymy – its instant recourse?" (Mourning 60).2 Every moment, even "live," Derrida suggests, is made spectral by this "resource" and "instant recourse": whatever appears appears "as" itself, yet masking the instant duplication that haunts the image. There is no source, in this light, that is not a re-source. The well in San Marino is such a haunted source; what the viewers saw as the "tragedy" of Kathy's death–thus fully narratable, if only by an abuse of genre–covers over the poignant and punctual re-source that always and already replaced her, as live television spectacle. As such, the Kathy Fiscus "story" is an allegory of television. Viewers were drawn into a spectacle that evoked primal fears and elementary struggles, but also the consolations of community reduced to the bare essentials of myth. Here at the well we seem to see the very source of community. The re-source of the well, however, escapes from view, making the viewer the haunted carrier of a visual secret, the poignant belatedness of the live image. The aim of this essay is to bring out ghosts that haunt community in such mediatic spectacles. In so doing, I articulate a notion of community that is expanded to a global scale. I explore the figure of the viral in tandem with that of the ghost to advance a theory of the ethics of spectatorship. The ghost, I argue, emerges as the figure of community's impossibility, indexing a confrontation with what it both banishes and aims to manage, contain, and lay to rest. The death of Kathy Fiscus is an instructive example here; it brought together a community of viewers in a spectacle of death, a redemptive, if painful, experience of common loss. As we will see, this scenario, including its haunted well, is compulsively repeated in narratives of mediatic communities. This would seem to echo René Girard's claim that social collectivities ground themselves in the sacrifice of one of their number. And yet behind the single victim of the spectacle there looms a vast number; it is worth noting that Kathy Fiscus was born August 21, 1945, a mere twelve days after the Nagasaki strike. The race to save the little girl's life is shadowed in this way by a global necropolitical force that relegates other people's lives to the category of collateral damage. It may seem ungenerous to ascribe such an anti-morality of survival to the well-meaning spectators of Kathy Fiscus's story. And yet a necropolitical logic binds together the spectators of the events in San Marino. To defend life at home is not merely to hold death at bay, but to enforce the distinction between valuable and disposable lives. Moreover, as Dina Al-Kassim argues, the figure of the innocent girl victim provides a frequent and reliable "link between social consensus and repressive force" (52), by means of which the "cultural production of innocence" both infantilizes the public sphere and legitimates the state's discriminatory policing of minorities (53). An illusion of community, a phantom public, is conjured in this blind act of necropolitical enforcement. This illusion of community is alternately a phantom public of mass mediatic spectacle, and the phantom of a global context, the untold millions who never amount to a story, but only haunt the edges of the scene as its ~~blindly~~ excluded. The TV reporter on the scene in San Marino, Stan Chambers, seems haunted by the events he covers. A young man at the time, this cheerful and popular reporter has never stopped paying his respects and giving credit to the little girl who made his name, indeed his "celebrity" (KTLA 31). His unfinished mourning indicates the burden of an unpaid debt. There is indeed an awkward, though fitting, irony in the fact that television would profitably extend its "news hole" into the night by continuing to cover the fatal story of a dark well. Sixty years later Chambers revisits the story in his autobiography. "The evolution of extended television news coverage happened overnight in that open field in San Marino," the veteran reporter says (23); one newspaper credited his coverage as "one of the greatest reporting jobs in the history of television" (28). Chambers quotes from a letter he received following his reporting of the story: Until that night, the television was no more a threat to serenity than any other bit of furniture in the living room. Now you have utterly destroyed this safety forever …you and the epic which you have been part of this weekend have made us know what television is for. You have made many of us know that we belong to the world. Through your own dignity and your recognition of the dignity of others, you have given us a flash of people at their best, as we remember them in the battle, or as I've seen them at Negev outposts in Israel. (27–8) This letter, the only one Chambers cites from his files, is oddly ambiguous, thanking the reporter precisely for destroying the viewer's safety and invading his home. Television, it would seem, is the gift of the Unheimlich. And while the letter proffers the lofty moral that "we belong to the world," it concludes, awkwardly, with an heroic evocation of Zionist war. A fleeting insight into shared precariousness--accidents happen, we are all mortal, like Kathy Fiscus--inflates into an "epic," and ultimately inverts into a valorization of armed conquest and colonization. The spectacle of community, of people gathered together around the well and around the TV set, morphs into that of a band of fighters facing a common enemy. While it was a common feature of the news of the time that the costs of the 1948 war went virtually unreported, what is less clear is how a book published in 2008 could skirt so casually over what many now understand to have been the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.3 We can only speculate that the author sees the Israeli context as somehow still "relevant" today--though surely not in the way he intends. A postwar necropolitics of American television news is sketched out here. Between the story of the girl in the well and the larger global scene there is a striking disparity in the valuing of human lives. In this, the news media support and broadcast the state's management of what Talal Asad calls "the distribution of pain" (508). One might add that it is local media--here, the provincial Los Angeles media--that best performs this unequal distribution in its focus on stories of local "human interest." But this local focus only exacerbates the contradiction opened up by the extended reach of television, its widening news hole, and the global scene. This other scene haunts the spectacle of the girl in the well, for while a common accord binds together the spectators in hoping to save the girl, the very definitions of the "local" and of "community" are implicitly thrown into crisis. What rises to the level of a television "story"? Who deserves saving? And can community cohere where the audience expands beyond the local? It would seem that only the figure of an innocent white girl can suspend these contradictions, if only for a moment.4 But in so doing, the televisual public sphere reveals itself, in Alexander Kluge's words, as a "universal provincialism," claiming to encompass all voices yet blind to its constitutive exclusions (Liebman 44). These exclusions are subtly perpetuated even in what seem the most humane expressions of cosmopolitan fraternity. As one editorial of the time has it, "A little girl falls down a well in California and the news sweeps across oceans, waking untold millions to eager, anxious sympathy" (Chambers 29). We may recognize here the postwar American discourse of "The Great Family of Man" ironized by Barthes's critique of media and consumer culture, Mythologies (100). Barthes shows how hypocritical sentimentality and gross abstractions of shared humanity serve to elide more concrete issues of history and politics. Barthes's diagnoses still resonate with a broad range of arguments, most notably those of Jürgen Habermas, that media, merchandising and ideology have corrupted the public sphere. As critics of Habermas have pointed out, however, the notion of the death of the public, or a "phantom public sphere," often grounds its critique in the nostalgic premise of an ideal state of communication that is questionable if not unfounded (Robbins viii). On the other hand, as these authors have argued, the idea of a "phantom public," to be taken seriously, may help account for the elusive promise and phantasmatic potential of public discourse as a field of subversion, emancipation and desire. Beyond the discourse of communicative norms and nostalgia for community, such a notion of a phantom public lays bare the contradictions and exclusions that sustain the public as a vital illusion. These two versions of the phantom public reflect the main schism in leftist cultural studies: the Adornian indictment of mass culture as thoroughly complicit in the economics of exploitation, and the search for dissident and emancipatory forces within the society of the spectacle. This argument is potentially endless, given that the two sides tend not toward a dialectical synthesis but to the stalemate of a liberal politics exemplified by the collection edited by Bruce Robbins, The Phantom Public Sphere. Other ghosts, however, haunt the phantom public, and the catastrophic legacy of the Kathy Fiscus story is carried on even by media's sharpest critics. Mary Ann Doane, for instance, argues that live TV coverage is intimately linked to the spectacle of catastrophe. "The lure of the real" sustains TV's claim to "urgency" and "liveness," but in so doing exposes its own failings as a medium devoted to "forgetting" and "decontextualization." As Doane says, "the ultimate drama of the instantaneous--catastrophe--constitutes the very limit of its discourse" ("Information," 222). Doane invokes Tom Brokaw's coverage of the Challenger disaster, a live report complete with unscripted moments that fall in the lineage of Stan Chambers's original broadcast.5 "It is not that we have a ghoulish curiosity," Brokaw lamely apologizes, as he reruns the disaster footage (232). Live TV, Doane argues, is drawn to events that defy representation, which in turn reinforces the medium's occlusion of deeper causes and political contexts that remain unrepresented. In this sense, then, the spectacle of catastrophe is a turning away from politics and the systemic causes of disaster. Doane thus contributes to an understanding of how capitalism exploits crisis as opportunity, indeed thrives on sheer catastrophe: a condition that has more recently been dubbed the "shock doctrine" (Klein). Interestingly, however, Doane's essay betrays a similar turning away, as if TV's fascinating "catastrophe machine" draws the critic into its own specular economy (234). "The Challenger coverage," Doane says, "demonstrates just how nationalistic the apprehension of catastrophe is--our own catastrophes are always more important, more eligible for extended reporting than those of other nations. But perhaps even more crucial here was the fact that television itself was on the scene--witness to the catastrophe" (231). For Doane, the crucial issue lies in TV's participation as mediatic witness of the disaster; live TV thus reveals its problematic entanglement in a general state of political-economic crisis it fails to account for. However, Doane's claim that the presence of cameras on the scene is "even more crucial" than the show's nationalistic bent is almost tautological, since it inadvertently reinforces the "always more important" choices critiqued in the foregoing sentence. Doane clearly does not condone those editorial choices, but she makes her own dubious decision as to what is most "important" in the scene, and in so doing, skirts the vital function of the spectacle in supporting the "distribution of pain." As a result, Doane enacts the very "slippage" she indexes in her definition of the catastrophic media event: "There is often a certain slippage between the notion that television covers important events in order to validate itself as a medium and the idea that because an event is covered by television--because it is, in effect, deemed televisual--it is important" (222). The slippage on the critic's part seems to follow the fateful lure of TV's supposedly self-reflexive nature, and demonstrates how media criticism can reinforce the closed loop of TV's self-interested perspective: "television," Doane says, "incessantly takes as its subject the documentation and revalidation of its own discursive problematic" (226). In contrast to Doane, we might assert that the catastrophic spectacle is not a postmodern exemplum of the media-event, but rather the symptom of a technological monopoly that turns eyes inward and away from the global scene. Further, that global scene is not an additional scene that cannot fit into the broadcast slot or the critic's commentary, but its haunting double, always present if only as lapses and asides. Doane's own lapse may seem minor, but it is symptomatic; it may be seen as well in her reference to economic crisis: "Catastrophe makes concrete and immediate, and therefore deflects attention from, the more abstract horror of potential economic crisis" (237). Her reference to a deflected "potential economic crisis" itself deflects from catastrophe on the other scene, where crisis is not "abstract," "intermittent," or "potential," but the actual realm of predatory capital; not the scene of the occasional NASA mishap, but the economic proving ground of the military-industrial complex. Doane goes so far as to say that "economic crisis does not appear to meet any of the criteria of the true catastrophe. It is not punctual but of some duration, it does not kill (at least not immediately)" (236). This last qualification is especially telling, as it betrays the limitations of the critic's temporal emphasis which, much as it critiques the sham liveness of TV coverage, envisions economic crisis either as one of long duration (and thus unspectacular) or as temporally deferred. We can, however, restate her formula instead in spatial terms: economic crisis, in other words, does not kill (at least not here). Indeed, we might say that space haunts the critic's analysis as its disavowed category; in this way, the argument subtly reinforces the presentness of the here even as it contests the liveness of the now. The space of the not-here, spectral and non-present, haunts both the critic and televisual catastrophe. This disparity in the coverage of disaster reflects Achille Mbembe's trenchant formula for necropolitics as the division between "those who must live and those who must die" (17). Mbembe's "necropolitics" draws on Foucault's theory of biopower as "that domain of life over which power has taken control" (12). Mbembe argues, however, that modern disciplinary power over subjects is always accompanied by its necropolitical other. This entails a challenge to the normative liberal theory of a public sphere grounded in freedom, reason, and autonomy, and expressing itself in the common exercise of sovereignty (13). Mbembe argues instead that this sovereign power is always also a force negating the life of others. The double injunction that some must live while others must die reflects the twin but disparate exercises of sovereign power over populations at home and populations abroad. Race provides the persistent rationale for this distribution of the power of life and death, whose history extends from early modernity into the present.6 Plantations, colonies, occupied territories and targets of neo-imperial wars are the sites of "death worlds" that relegate other populations to the status of "the living dead" (40). "If power still depends on tight control over bodies," Mbembe says, "the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the maximal economy now represented by the 'massacre'" (34). A sinister anti-morality results even for those who survive death, Mbembe says; survival becomes another means for the perpetuation of necropolitics. As Mbembe says, "in the logic of survival one's horror at the sight of death turns into satisfaction that it is someone else who is dead" (36). For Mbembe, the necropolitics of survival are realized in their most complete form in occupied Palestine, where the first world and an advance guard of settlers abut a population in enforced destitution. The invasion of Gaza in 2008–9 seems to confirm Mbembe's diagnoses by both ratcheting up the violence and underscoring the failed response of the media and the international community. Occupied Palestine, strangely invoked in the Kathy Fiscus story, reflects the logic of haunted community I pursue in what follows. In each case, community casts itself in the lurid terms of a battle of life against death. At the center of this struggle is the figure of the settler and the frontier, narrowing down to the figure of the frontier well. As we will see, the figure of the well supports a dubious mythology of autonomy and self-sufficiency. The autonomy of the frontier homestead allows the community to identify itself as similarly bounded, sovereign and independent. Gathered at the well as if in the forum of a town square, the community tries to save a threatened life, and thereby reaffirms its communal bonds. However, such scenes are haunted by a necropolitics they disavow; as a result, community takes shape as a phantasm haunted by ghosts of which it is only dimly aware.

## Necropolitics

#### The simulacra of the law inculcates the perfection of the necropolitical state of total lawfare – imposition of control onto an unbounded space, maintaining the false distinction of law and disorder which the foundation of a liberal war on difference

Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, “Law and disorder in the postcolony,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144

Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier, the past, too, is being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) – is equally marked in postcolonies. As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, ‘Drive Out Trash’, which has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of ‘slum clearance’ – has recently taken this practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous ‘illegal structures’. Lawfare may be limited or it may reduce people to ‘bare life’; in Zimbabwe, it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count. But it always seeks to launder visceral power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital. Hence Benjamin’s (1978) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs. The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity: a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism – with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies of production and accumulation – has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, with growing heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage. Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between. Which, in turn, exacerbates the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state: cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities. Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes it unsurprising that a ‘culture of legality’ should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer ‘alternative citizenship’ to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, the counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties. We said a moment ago that communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing, in fact, that they become communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law. ‘Lawmaking’, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, ‘is power making.’ But ‘power is the principal of all lawmaking’. In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra.

#### Necropolitics makes impact calculation impossible – you should view impacts from the perspective of the non-human

Dillon and Reid 9(Michael, professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College and Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, “The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, pg 30-33, JS)

One way of expressing the core problematic that we pursue in this book is, therefore, in the form of a question posed back to Paine on account of that definitive claim. What happens to the liberal way of rule and its allied way of war when liberalism goes global in pursuit of the task of emancipating the species from war, by taking the biohuman as its referent object of both rule and war? What happens to war, we ask, when a new form of governmental regime emerges which attempts to make war in defence and promotion of the entire species as opposed to using war in service of the supposedly limited interests of sovereigns? For the liberal project of the removal of species life from the domain of human enmity never in practice **entailed an end to war**, **or to the persistence of threats requiring war.** Paine makes this clear in his original formulation. Under liberal regimes, Paine observes, war will still be defined by relations between the human and its enemies. The enemies of the human will simply no longer be ‘**its species’** (Paine 1995: 595). What that meant, in practice, was that the liberal way of rule had to decide what elements and what expressions of human life best served the promotion of the species. Those that did not were precisely those that most threatened it; those upon which it was called to wage war. Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, **even if it arises within the species itself.** Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composability of living systems and of living material. **The greatest source of threat to life becomes life.** It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely not that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modern discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death outwith the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern ‘political science.’ Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose very laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These, additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, or, indeed, pre-empt its expression by positively creating new nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated through the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic. The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devises remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which the very liveliness of life itself is now said to depend. Biohumanity—itself an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically—is therefore both threat and promise. The corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species **must be cast out from the species** as such. ‘Just war’ in the cause of humanity here—a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003)—takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itself; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian Homo lupus than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault’s analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account of the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of the life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, **any such war to end war becomes war without end;** thus turning Walzer’s arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 2000: 329-335). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and **unending process**. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is little particularly startling about this claim. Immanent in the biopoliticization of liberal rule, **it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression.** As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so the properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new king of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider, for example, Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master… he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. (Kant 2005; emphasis added) ‘Nowhere else but in the human species.’ Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism’s strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. **Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough**. In a massive, quite literally **terrifying, paradox**, however, since the biohuman **is the threat**, it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the ‘figure’ of Al-Qaeda, the very dispositive of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war—the biohuman—is no longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view to respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

#### The presumed universality of the liberal legal subject is the nexus of violence. It indoctrinates a global drive towards peace in the protection of life itself and seeks to cleanse all the areas of political difference. War is the essential feature of the liberal encounter.

Evans 10 Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### The attempt to render the world coherent and legible is a disciplinary technique which paves over modernity’s foundational Conquest – the always-already ongoing war that determines what is and is not coherent, revealing and concealing ways of being in the world through the regime of sense. This is also the sum total of all other wars, all acts of violence which make the material convergence of this debate possible

Halberstam 11 J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 5

Illegibility, then, has been and remains, a reliable source for political autonomy. —James C. Scott, Perceiving Like a State Any book that begins with a quote from SpongeBob SquarePants and is motored by wisdom gleaned from Fantastic Mr. Fox, Chicken Run, and Find- ing Nemo, among other animated guides to life, runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Yet this is my goal. Being taken seriously means missing out on the chance to be frivolous, promiscuous, and irrelevant. The desire to be taken seriously is precisely what compels people to follow the tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours. Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts, for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for [exceptional] insights or flights of fancy. Training of any kind, in fact, is a way of refusing a kind of Benjaminian relation to knowing, a stroll down uncharted streets in the “wrong” direction (Benjamin 1996); it is precisely about staying in well-lit territories and about knowing exactly which way to go before you set out. Like many others before me, I propose that instead the goal is to lose one’s way, and indeed to be prepared to lose more than one’s way. Losing, we may agree with Elizabeth Bishop, is an art, and one “that is not too hard to master / Though it may look like a disaster” (2008: 166–167). In the sciences, particularly physics and mathematics, there are many examples of rogue intellectuals, not all of whom are reclusive Unabomber types (although more than a few are just that), who wander off into uncharted territories and refuse the academy because the publish-or-perish pressure of academic life keeps them tethered to conventional knowledge production and its well-traveled byways. Popular mathematics books, for example, revel in stories about unconventional loners who are self- schooled and who make their own way through the world of numbers. For some kooky minds, disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and ~~blind~~ [unscripted] fumbling might yield better results. In 2008, for example, The New Yorker featured a story about an oddball physicist who, like many ambitious physicists and mathematicians, was in hot pursuit of a grand theory, a “theory of everything.” This thinker, Garrett Lisi, had dropped out of academic physics because string theory dominated the field at that time and he thought the answers lay elsewhere. As an outsider to the discipline, writes Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Lisi “built his theory as an outsider might, relying on a grab bag of component parts: a hand-built mathematical structure, an unconventional way of describing gravity, and a mysterious mathematical entity known as E8.”1 In the end Lisi’s “theory of everything” fell short of expectations, but it nonetheless yielded a whole terrain of new questions and methods. Similarly the computer scientists who pioneered new programs to produce computer-generated imagery (CGI), as many accounts of the rise of Pixar have chronicled, were academic rejects or dropouts who created independent institutes in order to explore their dreams of animated worlds.2 These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside academia rather than within it, the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for alternatives precisely when the university cannot. This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred years ago to respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault de- scribed them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond either to real-world knowledge projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams (as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and conforming to the dictates of the discipline. This book, a stroll out of the confines of conventional knowledge and into the unregulated territories of failure, loss, and unbecoming, must make a long detour around disciplines and ordinary ways of thinking. Let me explain how universities (and by implication high schools) squash rather than promote quirky and original thought. Disciplinarity, as de- fined by Foucault (1995), is a technique of modern power: it depends upon and deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, and it produces experts and administrative forms of governance. The university structure that houses the disciplines and jealously guards their boundaries now stands at a crossroads, not of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, past and future, national and transnational; the crossroads at which the rapidly disintegrating bandwagon of disciplines, subfields, and interdisciplines has arrived offer a choice between the university as corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in thought and politics. A radical take on disciplinarity and the university that presumes both the breakdown of the disciplines and the closing of gaps between fields conventionally presumed to be separated can be found in a manifesto published by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in 2004 in Social Text titled “The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses.” Their essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical intellectual, the professional scholar and the “critical academic professionals.” For Moten and Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become “an ally of professional education.” Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the “subversive intellectuals,” a maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of “rigor,” “excellence,” and “productivity.” They tell us to “steal from the university,” to “steal the enlightenment for others” (112), and to act against “what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law refounds, society” (113). And what does the undercommons of the university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: “Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society” (113). Not the elimination of anything but the founding of a new society. And why not? Why not think in terms of a different kind of society than the one that first created and then abolished slavery? The social worlds we inhabit, after all, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not inevitable; they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to cite Fou- cault again, “disqualified.” A few visionary books, produced alongside disciplinary knowledge, show us the paths not taken. For example, in a book that itself began as a detour, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), James C. Scott details the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and undisciplined forms of knowledge in order to rationalize and simplify social, agricultural, and political practices that have profit as their primary motivation. In the process, says Scott, certain ways of [perceiving] the world are established as normal or natural, as obvious and necessary, even though they are often entirely counterintuitive and socially engineered. [Perceiving] Like a State began as a study of “why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of ‘people who move around,’” but quickly became a study of the demand by the state for legibility through the imposition of methods of standardization and uniformity (1). While Dean Spade (2008) and other queer scholars use Scott’s book to think about how we came to insist upon the documentation of gender identity on all govern- mental documentation, I want to use his monumental study to pick up some of the discarded local knowledges that are [eliminated] in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of other motivations for being and doing.

#### Liberal subject construction breeds nihilism and continual violence against the periphery

**Evans and Reid 13** [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristole, and Julian, “Dangerously exposed: the life and death of the resilient subject,” *Resilience*, 2013, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 83-98]

Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to their enabling conditions. This renders them fully compliant to the logics of complexity with its concomitant adaptive and emergent qualities. Resistance here is transformed from being a political capacity aimed at the achievement of freedom from that which threatens and endangers to a purely reactionary impulse aimed at increasing the capacities of the subject to adapt to its dangers and simply reduce the degree to which it suffers. This conflation of resistance with resilience is not incidental but indicative of the nihilism of the underlying ontology of vulnerability at work in contemporary policies concerned with climate change and other supposedly catastrophic processes. What is nihilism, after all, if it is not a will to nothingness drawn from a willing reactive enslavement to forces deemed to be beyond our control as one merely lives out the catastrophic moment? It also alerts us to the fundamentally liberal nature of such policies and framings of the phenomenon of climate change defined, as liberalism has been since its origins, by a fundamental mistrust in the abilities of the human subject to secure itself in the world.10 Liberalism, as we have both explored extensively elsewhere, is a security project.11 From its outset, it has been concerned with seeking answers to the problem of how to secure itself as a regime of governance through the provision of security to the life of populations subject to it.12 It will, however, always be an incomplete project because its biopolitical foundations are flawed; life is not securable. It is a multiplicity of antagonisms and for some life to be made to live, some other life has to be made to die.13 That is a fundamental law of life which is biologically understood. This is the deep paradox that undercuts the entire liberal project while inciting it to govern ever more and ever better, becoming more inclusive and more assiduous at the provision of security to life, while learning how better to take life and make die that which falls outside and threatens the boundaries of its territories. Liberal regimes, in essence and from the outset, thrive on the insecurities of life which their capacity to provide security to provides the source of their legitimacy, becoming ever more adept at the taking of life which the provision of security to life requires.14 It is no accident that the most advanced liberal democracy in the world today, the United States of America, is also the most heavily armed state in the world. And not just the most heavily armed state today, but also the most heavily armed in human history. Liberal regimes do not and cannot accept the realities of this paradox. Which is why, far from being exhausted, the liberal project remains and has to be, in order for it to be true to its mission, distinctly transformative. Not only of the world in general and hence its endless resorts to war and violence to weed out those unruly lives that are the source of insecurity to the life that is the font of its security, but also, and yet more fundamentally, of the human subject itself; for this is a paradox which plays out, not just territorially, socially or between individuals, but within the diffuse and ultimately unknowable domain of human subjectivity itself. The liberal subject is divided and has to be in order to fulfil its mission, critically astute at discerning the distinctions within its own life between that which accords with the demands made of it in order to accord with liberal ways of living and those which do not comply with its biopolitical ambitions.15 Being divided means the liberal subject will always be incomplete, needing work, critical, insecure and mistrustful of itself for the purpose of its own self-improvement. The liberal subject is a project; one that renders life itself a project, subject to an endless task of critique and self-becoming, from cradle to grave. Sadly, many still find the concept of life appealing and even utopian. We are taught to think that we ought to choose life over emptiness or negation, Renton’s law.16 In fact, it is the source of the world’s greatest nihilisms. Liberalism too is and has always been a nihilism. Perhaps it is the greatest of all nihilisms. In giving us over to life, it gives us no ends to live for but the endless work on the self that contemporarily permeate our ways of living devoid of any meaning as such.

#### Be the queer suicide terrorist – an explosion of self-sacrifice with a bomb, in favor of unsettling the violent definitions of subjectivity

Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination, indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage, "'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a "morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. "There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the "highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life." As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are "a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics," he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak," reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36 We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?) as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body. Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

## Specters V2

#### The 1AC finds itself within a legal hall of mirrors – The specters of legality overdetermine our being, making us desire the banal violence of lawfare – adherence to the state only legitimizes its ever-expanding sovereignty

Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean Comaroff, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies also at Harvard, “Law and disorder in the postcolony,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144

Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier, the past, too, is being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated territory from one African people to another, and so on.33 By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word. Also, to commit its own ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) – is equally marked in postcolonies. As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible when those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, ‘Drive Out Trash’, which has forced political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of ‘slum clearance’ – has recently taken this practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the law of the land to raze dangerous ‘illegal structures’. Lawfare may be limited or it may reduce people to ‘bare life’; in Zimbabwe, it has mutated into a necropolitics with a rising body count. But it always seeks to launder visceral power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital. Hence Benjamin’s (1978) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs. The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity: a nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of neoliberalism – with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies of production and accumulation – has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected from the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because, with growing heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage. Hence the flight into a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A well-recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of war, integral to the management of life itself. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most 21st century governments have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of actor, social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon of the weak, the strong and everyone in between. Which, in turn, exacerbates the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends. This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are ‘communities’ within the nation-state: cultural communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities. Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes it unsurprising that a ‘culture of legality’ should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer ‘alternative citizenship’ to their members.35 Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime. These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently, the counterfeiting of a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties. We said a moment ago that communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their affairs; it is often in the process of so doing, in fact, that they become communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law. ‘Lawmaking’, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet again, ‘is power making.’ But ‘power is the principal of all lawmaking’. In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra.

#### Independently, this debate is haunted by the spectral presence of nuclear war – catastrophic annihilation is a strictly textual event, it only exists in our writings – nuclear discourses betray a larger commitment to a violent regime of techno-militarization that comes to determine all realms of political subjectivity

Derrida 84 Jacques Derrida, that Derrida. “No Apocalypse, Not Now Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives”. Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. Summer, 1984. pgs. 20-31.

Reason number one. Let us consider the form of the question itself is the war of (over, for) speed (with all that it entails) an irreducibly new phenomenon, an invention linked to a set of inventions of the so-called nuclear age, or is it rather the brutal acceleration of a movement that has always already been at work? This form of the question perhaps constitutes the most indispensable formal matrix, the keystone or, if you will, the nuclear question, for any problematics of the "nuclear criticism" type, in all its aspects. Naturally, I don't have time to demonstrate this. I am offering it, therefore, as a hasty conclusion, a precipitous assertion, a belief, an opinion-based argument, a doctrine or a dogmatic weapon. But I was determined to begin with it. I wanted to begin as quickly as possible with a warning in the form of a dissuasion: watch out, don't go too fast. There is perhaps no invention, no radically new predicate in the situation known as "the nuclear age." Of all the dimensions of such an "age” we may always say one thing: it is neither the first time nor the last. The historian's critical vigilance can always help us verify that repetitiveness; and that historian's patience, that lucidity of memory must always shed their light on"nuclear criticism," must oblige it to decelerate, dissuade it from rushing to a conclusion on the subject of speed itself. But this dissuasion and deceleration I am urging carry their own risks: the critical zeal that leads us to recognize precedents, continuities, and repetitions at every turn can make us look like suicidal sleepwalkers, blind and deaf alongside the unheard-of; it could make us stand blind and deaf alongside that which cuts through the assimilating resemblance of discourses (for example of the apocalyptic or bimillenarist type), through the analogy of techno-military situations, strategic arrangements, with all their wagers, their last resort calculations, on the "brink," their use of chance and risk factors, their mimetic resource to upping the ante, and so on- blind and deaf, then, alongside what would be absolutely unique; and it, this critical zeal, would seek in the stockpile of history (in short, in history itself, which in this case would have this blinding search as its function) the wherewithal to neutralize invention, to translate the unknown into a known, to metaphorize, allegorize, domesticate the terror, to circumvent (with the help of circumlocutions: turns of phrase, tropes and strophes) the inescapable catastrophe, the undeviating precipitation toward a remainderless cataclysm. The critical slowdown may thus be as critical as the critical acceleration. One may still die after having spent one's life recognizing, as a lucid historian, to what extent all that was not new, telling oneself that the inventors of the nuclear age or of nuclear criticism did not invent the wheel, or, as we say in French, "invent gunpowder." That's the way one always dies, moreover, and the death of what is still now and then called humanity might well not escape the rule. We are speaking of stakes that are apparently limitless for what is still now¶ and then called humanity. People find it easy to say that in nuclear war¶ "humanity" runs the risk of its self-destruction, with nothing left over, no¶ remainder. There is a lot that could be said about that rumor. But whatever¶ credence we give it, we have to recognize that these stakes appear in the experience¶ of a race, or more precisely of a competition, a rivalry between two rates of speed. It's what we call in French a course de vitesse, a speed race. Whether it¶ is the arms race or orders given to start a war that is itself dominated by that¶ economy of speed throughout all the zones of its technology, a gap of a few¶ seconds may decide, irreversibly, the fate of what is still now and then called¶ humanity- plus the fate of a few other species. As no doubt we all know, no¶ single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is¶ not marked today, directly or indirectly, by that speed race. And by the whole¶ strategic debate about "no use," "no first use," or "first use" of nuclear weaponry.¶ Is this new? Is it the first time "in history"? Is it an invention, and can we still say¶ "in history" in order to speak about it? The most classical wars were also speed¶ races, in their preparation and in the actual pursuit of the hostilities. Are we¶ having, today, another, a different experience of speed? Is our relation to time¶ and to motion qualitatively different? Or must we speak prudently of an extraordinary-¶ although qualitatively homogeneous - acceleration of the same experience?¶ And what temporality do we have in mind when we put the question that¶ way? Can we take the question seriously without re-elaborating all the problematics¶ of time and motion, from Aristotle to Heidegger by way of Augustine,¶ Kant, Husserl, Einstein, Bergson, and so on? So my first formulation of the question¶ of speed was simplistic. It opposed quantity and quality as if a quantitative¶ transformation-the crossing of certain thresholds of acceleration within the¶ general machinery of a culture, with all its techniques for handling, recording,¶ and storing information-could not induce qualitative mutations, as if every¶ invention were not the invention of a process of acceleration or, at the very¶ least, a new experience of speed. Or as if the concept of speed, linked to some¶ quantification of objective velocity, remained within a homogeneous relation to¶ every experience of time-for the human subject or for a mode of temporalization¶ that the human subject-as such-would have himself covered up.¶ Why have I slowed down my introduction this way by dragging in such a¶ naive question? Reason number two. What is the right speed, then? Given our inability to provide a¶ good answer for that question, we at least have to recognize gratefully that the nuclear age¶ allows us to think through this aporia of speed (i.e., the need to move both slowly and¶ quickly); it allows us to confront our predicament starting from the limit constituted by the¶ absolute acceleration in which the uniqueness of an ultimate event, of a final collision or collusion,¶ the temporalities called subjective and objective, phenomenological and intraworldly,¶ authentic and inauthentic, etc., would end up being merged into one another. But,¶ wishing to address these questions to the participants of a colloquium on "nuclear criticism,"¶ I am also wondering at what speed we have to deal with these aporias: with what rhetoric,¶ what strategy of implicit connection, what ruses of potentialization and of ellipsis, what¶ weapons of irony? The "nuclear age" makes for a certain type of colloquium, with its particular¶ technology of information, diffusion and storage, its rhythm of speech, its demonstration¶ procedures, and thus its arguments and its armaments, its modes of persuasion or¶ intimidation. In our techno-scientifico-militaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may consider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essential feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the frightof imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war,which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifyingrealityof the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Betterthan ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse- indeed, of the literature-on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. Forthe moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis- tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a¶ speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breakingof the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this?dreaming of it, desiring it?You will perhaps find it shock- ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about. Butwho can fail to recognize the massive "reality"of nuclear weaponry and of the terrifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are coming to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality"of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also becareful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, Bildung, schol, paideia. "Reality,"let's say the encompassing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at all),\* an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance.¶ Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy,¶ writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just¶ because we can do nothing but speak of it - and then as something that has never occurred.¶ It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it¶ only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion)- and the dividing line between doxa and¶ epistemb starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely¶ legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but¶ techno-militaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the¶ doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief."¶ One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the¶ decisive place of the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of¶ the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief¶ and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a¶ truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of¶ Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it,¶ but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies-which are also the¶ technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive,¶ emission, and transmission, like all techne-the extraordinary sophistication of these¶ technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and¶ the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most¶ vulgar psychology.

#### **Framing this debate around macropolitical violence constrains our subjectivity to an ontology of war – we come to experience ourselves as instruments of technocratic warfare – outweighs**

Nordin and [Öberg](http://mil.sagepub.com/search?author1=Dan+%C3%96berg&sortspec=date&submit=Submit) 15-\*Lecturer in Politics, Philosophy, and Religion @ Lancaster University, \*\*Senior Lecturer in War studies at the Swedish National Defense College [Astrid, Dan, “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard,” Journal of International Studies, Vol. 43, no. 2, January 2015, DKP] modified for gendered and ablest language

In contemporary scholarship the phenomenon of ‘war’ appears in numerous guises: regular war, irregular war, high-intensity war, low-intensity war, civil war, guerrilla war, just war, virtual war, and so on. A significant proportion of these debates fall back on a notion of war as destructive and productive fighting. Commonly deployed illustrations of war include the wrestling match, the battle of wills, the game of chess, or the two armies clashing on the battlefield. As recent debates emerging from critical war studies have shown, these claims involve a reliance on an ontology of war which is rarely explicitly discussed and critically interrogated. This ontology has echoed in subsequent critical scholarship on war, and has recently been identified as well as proposed by Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton for a new ‘critical war studies’ discipline.5 It rests on an understanding of war as an antagonistic and generative process with the power to undo and order political life. As such, its idea of war falls back on two guiding principles: that it contains an antagonistic exchange and that it contains an inherent potential for differentiation, which gives it a generative character. These debates on the ontology of war draw directly on the work of Clausewitz, who places fighting at its centre. Clausewitz claims that fighting is as definitive for war as monetary exchange for economy.6 He explicitly defines war as fighting, a duel with violence as its means. War is an act of politics, where the dictation of the law by one side to the other gives rise to ‘a sort of reciprocal action’.7 War always consists of hostile bodies and each has the same object – to force the other to submit. Clausewitz’s ontology of war is explicitly used in contemporary military doctrines. For example, the United States Army and United States Marine Corps’ FM 3-24 doctrine on counterinsurgency states that ‘[w]arfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force’, and discusses war in terms of a ‘contest’ involving ‘will’.8 Similarly, the JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States explains war through quoting Clausewitz’s On War: Clausewitz believed that war is a subset of the larger theory of conflict. He defined war as a ‘duel on a larger scale,’ ‘an act of force to compel our enemy,’ and a ‘continuation of politics by other means.’ Distilled to its essence, war is a violent struggle between two (or more) hostile and independent wills, each trying to impose itself on the other…. These observations remain true today and place a burden on the commander to remain responsive, versatile, and adaptive in real time to create and seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities.9 The ontology of war that is under discussion in this article, then, is explicitly involved in important military doctrine and justifications of contemporary warfare. This ontology, and particularly Clausewitz’s notion of war as fundamentally reciprocal, also echoes in contemporary scholarship. Traditionally war studies tends to ignore the ontology which supports its common claim that war is fighting between states, or asymmetric fighting between counter-insurgents and insurgents.10 However, recent approaches look to war as directly related to ontology. What precisely constitutes the subjects or opponents that meet in war varies significantly between accounts. Deleuze and Guattari outline two irreducible forms – State and War machine – that perpetually interact.11 Hardt and Negri write that ‘all of the world’s current armed conflicts … should be considered imperial civil wars, even when states are involved’,12 thus alluding to war as being acted out within a framework of Empire and local combatants. Schmittean ideas of politics build on the idea that politics involves an ‘agon’, which may clash with others in war.13 To some, the exchange involved is primarily discursive and gives rise to war between cultural forms of identity.14 Yet others emphasise an antagonistic exchange between military regulatory regimes and forms of counter-subjectivity.15 The understanding of which type of formation, subject or agon constitutes the basis for the ontology of war thus varies. So does the understanding of which kind of violent meeting or exchange is involved. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement on the idea that war involves an implicit or explicit (re)production of opponents – subjects, discourses, spaces, agons – and an antagonistic exchange between them. Today, the idea of war as involving some form of exchange lives on in war studies, including the literatures that have begun to cluster around the name ‘critical war studies’.16 Barkawi and Brighton have discussed the possibility of a specific discipline under such a name, and have outlined what they think a discipline of war studies should be concerned with. Barkawi and Brighton’s discussion is strongly attached to the signifier war. In their suggestion of how to study ‘war’s fundamental properties’, Barkawi and Brighton build directly and explicitly on Clausewitz’s idea of war as fighting. To them, ‘[f]ighting is that which thematically unifies war in general and in particular – “war” with “wars” – and no ontology of war can exclude it’.17 However, what fighting actually is is not taken for granted by Barkawi and Brighton. To them ‘[c]learing the ground for a new ontology of war requires recognition that fighting understood instrumentally, as the Clausewitzean duel, the test of arms, as “kinetic exchange,” misses its wider application and importance’.18 Instead, they argue ‘[f]ighting marks the disruption of this wider order and the people and other entities which populate it, the unmaking and remaking of certainties, of meaning, of – potentially – the very coordinates of social and political life’.19 In Barkawi and Brighton’s account, as in a number of other accounts referred to above, conventional distinctions between agons of war – such as combatants and civilians – are thus destabilised. War and society are embroiled in mutually constitutive relations, thus there is an ‘excess’ or ‘capacity of organized violence to be more than kinetic exchange, to be constitutive and generative’.20 This excess at the core of their ontology of war gives war its status as an ontological event and a problematising framework, resulting in an ontology that avers to ‘hold on to the ontological primacy of fighting, but wrest it from the instrumentality its historicity demands’.21 This excess of war, claim Barkawi and Brighton, gives war a generative character. It means that war ‘shapes the social relations in which it is embedded’ and ‘is present beyond the war front and beyond wartime’.22 The key to understanding war as generative goes via the Foucauldian insight that the struggle of fighting is in itself a productive force.23 The notion of war as generative is also further developed by Brighton in a more recent article when he draws upon Foucault to discuss how the ‘brute economy of fighting’ and ‘war’s constitutive powers’ haunt political and social theory.24 A (renewed) emphasis on this morphogenetic aspect that arises from the turbulence of warfare and its associated differentiation is also evident in the work of others. Manuel De Landa, Antoine Bousquet, Julian Reid and others see war as a material force that gives rise to chaos and order, destruction and creation, which help social formations self-organise, aggregate, reproduce and make various orders emerge.25 To Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and Éric Alliez, war is constituted and challenged in a way that is generative in relation to social orders, something which in turn enables an asymmetric and violent exchange between Empire and attempts to challenge it.26 On this view war is not an aggregate for self-organisation but rather a result of an ‘ordering power’ through an imperial framework. Nonetheless, this understanding of war also falls back on the idea that antagonistic exchange is enabled through differentiation, which in turn leads to genesis. Whether this thinking was ever truly lacking in thought on war is debateable. What is clear is that this characteristic is emphasised in current critical war studies literatures, particularly in the argument that war and truth are mutually constitutive. What is more, Barkawi and Brighton argue that Clausewitz’s understanding of fighting and subsequent efforts to rethink it provide resources to think war and knowledge in this manner. On their reading, the Clausewitzian idea of fighting forms the basis of war’s ‘generative powers’ that stem from ‘uncertainty and contingency on the battle field’.27 The ‘nature of war itself’ is as ‘an unmaker of truths’.28 This in turn becomes generative of new and reorganised forms of knowledge.29 Thus, what has emerged in the discussions of a new critical war studies is a sense of agreement on the basic characteristics of an ontology of war. It spans thinking from Clausewitz to current military doctrine. Yet, it also invites us to critically question such ontological claims. Barkawi and Brighton have questioned what they take to be a common assumption that war is known. They take ‘war’ to possess ‘social power as a destroyer and maker of truths’.30 In what follows, we ask what ‘war’ as a signifier does to such ‘truth’, by way of its depiction as antagonistic and generative fighting. Could it be that the idea of war as ‘fighting’ evokes a ‘reality of warfare’ that makes us blind to other things in what we designate as ‘war’? Could other underlying principles be identified in contrast to those based on the supposition that war is about fighting and antagonistic exchange? In what follows we draw on Baudrillard’s notion of disappearance to outline an alternative understanding of war and illustrate this argument with regards to the processing of targets and the concept of warfare.It is possible, then, to identify a surprising level of agreement about the ontology of war. Despite this, we need to return to Judith Butler’s urging that we think of ontology as a normative injunction. Barkawi and Brighton discuss the ontology, or the nature of war in a way which risks making of it something unitary (they indeed at times lament the lack of ‘enabling coherence’ in the debate on war’s ontology).31 However, as Caroline Holmqvist points out there are critical ontologies of war. Holmqvist outlines how war’s ontology (if there is such a thing) might find resonance in debates on materialist ontologies, bodies and experience.32 We want to emphasise that our point here is not that Barkawi and Brighton write of war’s generative aspect as the ‘be all and end all’ of the ontology of war – they do not. We simply highlight here that we benefit from thinking war through the notion of plural ‘ontologies’ as it keeps open the question of what underlying principles relate to war and warfare. Emphasis on the particular ontology of war-as-fighting is a cause for concern, and there are indeed other ‘ontologies of war’. The most important alternative arguably stems from feminist theorists, such as Christine Sylvester who understands war as experience. For Sylvester, we need to view war through the way it is experienced by people, and she urges us to take this experience as a starting point for studying war.33 Drawing on the work of Butler and Elaine Scarry among others, she argues that war signs have ‘intensified rather than diminished social connections between friends and foes’34 and that war is best understood through focusing on injury.35 Along similar lines, the research on the relationship between the body and war is vast and points to important connections between how the body is represented and the way warfare is acted out.36 For example, Victoria Basham has noticed that wars have made possible (as well as require) gendered and racialised representations of bodies (by, for example, the military). The potential for representation in ‘war-bodies’ points to the important insight that war is being enacted and embodied by the military in various ways. 37 These accounts raise further questions regarding what kind of experience war is. Are there processes of warfare through which experiences of injury are made to appear distant and irrelevant, much like what happens through the often noted ‘sanitising’ language of war?38 If so, how do we make sense of these? Could warfare (and particularly military planning and conduct) be said to allocate, manage and manufacture such experience? What does the process of war do to human agency? Might the feminist emphasis on war as ‘intensified social relations’, like Clausewitz’s ‘exchange between subjects’, make it difficult to fathom a kind of war in which there strictly speaking is no ‘foe’? Where Sylvester, Basham and others indicate that we should take bodies as the contested entities and frameworks for an understanding of war,39 we ask if warfare may manage bodies and experiences in ways that reduce them to particular processes of war. Could such processes also be considered the framework and entities for experience? With these questions in mind we read Baudrillard below, in order to introduce an understanding of war based on disappearance caused by warfare. In Baudrillard’s notorious critique of the Gulf war he identifies traditional conceptions of war as involving the ontology we have seen in critical war studies and contemporary military doctrine: ‘war is born of an antagonistic, destructive but dual relation between two adversaries’.40 However, he argues, if this is war, then there is no war taking place in the Gulf. One important but hereto neglected reason for this argument is Baudrillard’s claim that war has disappeared into the processing of warfare. Baudrillard never fully developed this discussion, but he wrote extensively on the subject from a general perspective in his final works. Therein Baudrillard points to the way subjectivity disappears in operational processing as part of the attempt to fulfil and perfect potential.41 Baudrillard sees subjectivity becoming a subordinated part of technological media, ‘a perfectly operational molecule that is left to its own devices and doomed to … reproduce, self-identically, to infinity’.42 In his view, we are faced with a situation in which subjectivity, social relations and will are essentially liquidated by operational practices. They are not supplanted by a higher will or a higher purpose. Rather, they vanish into processing entirely devoid of symbolic meaning. This indicates that it is not physical disappearance Baudrillard discusses, but disappearance which strictly relates to the symbolic. Baudrillard on numerous occasions illustrated this idea through Alfred Jarry’s novel The Supermale, which tells a story of how automated processing dissolves limits between [wo]man and technology. The apex of the story is a 10,000-mile bicycle race – the perpetual motion race – which takes place between a five-man bicycle and an express train. In the race the cyclists function as a collaborative machine to challenge the train over long distance. The cyclists reach a speed that enables them to ride side by side with the locomotive – to become limitless automatons in the rhythm of the machine. This becoming comes at a price, since the cyclists gradually disappear as humans, as they reach the speed of the train. One of them disappears quite literally as he dies on his post. However, his decomposing corpse, strapped to the bicycle, pedals on. The corpse ~~stands~~ as [is] a symbolic marker for how the rest of the bodies also disappear by being absorbed into the process itself. In the end, the five-man machine rides alongside the train with the living and dead corpses riding at maximum speed in order to keep up. This theme, of transformation of man into machine, is also evident in the rest of the novel, which ends with its key figure dying while transforming into a machine.43 As Rex Butler points out, the novel helps to draw up the: [V]ision of a society in … which humans are unnecessary. We see this vision coming true in those self-enclosed and self-perpetuating systems of simulation that Baudrillard analyses, which have no outside and no need to be explained by an other, and whose best model would be the bicycle proposed by Alfred Jarry, which still continues to pedal long after its riders have passed away with fatigue.44 The image Jarry paints in the novel illustrates the symbolic disappearance of subjectivity by emphasising the repetitive and inherently meaningless relationship we have with various media that surround us. The attempt to reach a perfect speed and efficiency by way of the mechanic process works back on subjectivity. It is not far-fetched to see the recent conceptual inventions in military thought, such as the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), Comprehensive Approach (CA), or Network Centric Warfare (NCW), as part of the characteristic that Baudrillard is concerned with and Jarry’s novel illustrates. The common denominator of these concepts is the way they attempt to synchronise, coordinate, and make warfare more efficient through staff procedures. They are all based on the idea that perfect operationalisation generates a war in which all means and capabilities are interconnected in ways that aim to create a seamless economy of violence. This in turn indicates that the subject of warfare dissolves into operationalised repetition. Such an argument does not entail that militaries, insurgents, weapon-systems, logistical capacities and so forth are disappearing on a material level. Rather, as part of a symbolic disappearance through the fulfilments of technological processes, warfare strives towards perfection and symbolic aspects disappear through a model which is being operationalised as if it is war. This should not be taken to mean that there is an end to violence or suffering. There is of course bodily violence and death in military operations despite the attempt to fulfil wars’ every potential through repeated calls for ‘high-precision munition’ and ‘zero-death warfare’. However, processing and repetition also participate in making the representation of bodies and subjects disappear in operationalisation. The concern here is that focusing on the violence displayed in war-as-fighting might obscure a systemic violence which stems from the way in which war is operationalised. Baudrillard argues that the type of violence the military normally battles (such as terrorism) is far less lethal than the violence which replaces the subject with the will of an operational and technocratic structure.45 What we have, then, is a certain kind of disappearance which is obscured by (among other things) the focus on war as violent exchange between subjects. How do we go from the ontology of war as generative to an ontology of war as disappearance? To understand the transition it is helpful to return to the idea that war is considered generative as it exceeds social orders. Albeit helpful in order to understand war’s excess in terms of productivity it is also possible to understand excess differently, as a force of disappearance. Baudrillard argues that social reality disappears not because of a lack, but rather because of excess, arguing precisely that wars fought by the US tend to be ‘wars of excess’.46 One under-analysed aspect of the ontology of war is therefore the way in which the excess it gives rise to is not simply generative of appearances, but in turn forces disappearances. If we complement the generative notion of war’s excess with Baudrillard’s argument that excess is in and of itself a cause of disappearance, we can appreciate that the ontology of war might at times be generative, and at times erase the preconditions for appearance. On one hand it is correct that bodies, experience or materiality frame our understanding of war by generating narratives. On the other it is [also] important to acknowledge that subjectivity disappears through the excess of the processes themselves. Through such an acknowledgement we can see that warfare conditions the possibility of appearance as it ‘always, already’ works as a process of disappearance. Arguably targeting is a prime exampleof the latter.

#### **Voting negative is a strategy of wondering – an openness to encounter outside the rationalities of liberalism**

Lobo-Guerrero 13 Professor of History and Theory of International Relations @ the university of Groningen, Member of the advisory board of the Research Institute for the Study of Culture (ICOG), Member of the editorial boards of the journals Security Dialogue; Journal of Intervention and State Building; and Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses. Member of the international advisory board of Revista Pleyade (Chile) [Luis, “Wondering as research attitude,” *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies*, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 25-28]

Wondering is an attitude to approach research material on the grounds of its very existence. Its starting point is to encourage the researcher to pose questions on why something has been presented or analyzed in a particular way; what needs to be in place for a particular idea, which appears obvious or simple, to be possible, and indeed, thinkable; and what role do those ideas and thought play on the way the world is portrayed? It invites the researcher to focus on the details from which singularities in ways of thinking (Veyne 2010) can be analyzed. As Salter points out in the introduction to Part I, it also pays attention to the intertextuality of context; not the ready-made one, but that which renders the empirical intelligible. Wondering as a research attitude liberates itself from frameworks for analysis to make sense of the world (Neal. Chapter 6). It does not take the object of analysis for granted since encountering it is part of the process. It demands instead the sharpening of the researcher's senses to identify difference and ascribe meaning to that which appears to be without logic, as exceptional, miraculous, or magical. Wondering in this respect defies the very idea of research design since it entails a departure from carefully measured hypotheses and rationally focused "clean" questions. It leaves the researcher exposed to the surprise of thinking . . . in the wild. It becomes a pioneering endeavour since it assumes "the ordinary" as always exceptional (Nancy 2000; 10). When this attitude towards research is radically embraced, it tests the researcher's capacity to depict its newly crafted knowledge to the world in common language. In some cases new words and expressions will be required. Wondering requires courage to relate to the unexpected, resourcefulness to face the unrelated, and restlessness to persist with the adventure of opening up new paths of knowledge. Wondering, however, does not take place in the abstract. It is not speculative thinking for its own sake. It is instead a way of facilitating the possibility of doing critique, not "as a matter of saying that things are not right as they are", but of "pointing out on what kind of assumptions, what kind of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest... practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult" (Foucault 1988: 154-155, Guillaume, Chapter 3). In this respect, wondering precedes critique. It allows for the singularities of a practice or a discourse to stand out and for the researcher to make them explicit. Once this is done, following Veyne, the "arbitrary and limited nature [of phenomena presented as necessary] becomes apparent" (2010: 37). Wondering as a critical research attitude is necessary for the crafting of knowledge. It continuously challenges the orthodoxy upon which philosophies are built. This is always an important matter since, as Nietzsche observed, "as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself.. - it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise" (2000: 206) Wondering allows thought to be otherwise. My concern with wondering as a research attitude can be illustrated with the proce» ih.it led to the writing of the book insuring Har: Sovereign?. Security and Risk (21 > 12). The book explores a historical relationship between the marine insurance market of L undon and the capacity of the British state to wage war. drawing on experiences from the Napoleonic wars, the world wars, and the post-Cold War period. In documenting this relationship I began to rind historical cases that in principle defied a logic of security, or at least, of national security as we know it since the Second World War. For example. I found that in 1739. in the context of the War of Jenkins' Ear in which trade with Spain was forbidden. Spanish ships were legally insured at Lloyd's of London. It followed that losses inflicted by the Royal Navy and British privateers on Spanish ships were paid for at the London market Wondering how such a paradoxical mercantilist mentality (O'Brien 2002, Lipson 1934. Morgan 2W)2» could be reconciled with the idea of the security of the state (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, Clark 2' began researching Parliamentary debates from that decade which detailed the discussion for and against the insurance of enemy ships and labelled them as "King's enemy risks" Such a label attracted my attention and made me wonder further how a rationales of insurance, operating as a technology of risk (Ewald 1991), and u rationality of naiimul interest were related? 1 later found out that in 1793, during the American revolutionary unrest. in what can be considered to be a transition between a logic of mercantilism and an incipient liberal political economy. Parliament prohibited the insurance of King's enemy risks. Trying to make sense of that prohibition and while researching the British National Arcrmes in London, I was pleased to find a set of correspondence between the Committee of Lloyd's of London and the Board of Admiralty starting in 1794 and covering the totality of the Napoleonic Wars. I marvelled at the mere existence of that correspondence. In the process of idemiluni: some of the singularities of the relationship evident in the communications, 1 came across a phrase that helped me understand a crucial transformation in the political economy of the period. It also helped me make sense of the importance of the relationship between insurance and the national interest in the performance of sovereignty. In a letter sent by the Committee of Lloyd's to the Board of Admiralty in 1806, insurers made reference to Britain as "this Commercial Kingdom". Intrigued by the phrase. I began to research contextual source \* u» understand the nature of the relationship between these two entities I could then establish the extent to which the sovereignty of Britain relied on a partnership in risk with the 1.Unit's of London insurance market. At the start of the project all I had was a burning curiosity to know if there could be any relationship between the insurance of ships and the capacity of the British state to wage war. That curiosity was part of a wider concern to understand the emergence and development of technologies of security premised on a rationality of risk (such as insurance), in relation to the unfolding and development of liberal governance in the modern period. To the best of my knowledge, and to my surprise, a problem that 1 considered central to the understanding of International Relations and Security Studies had not been directK .uidre^ed by scholars in the discipline. The paradigms available offered, if any. minimal understanding of the i-\*ues it stake. Some knowledge could be rescued from Economic and Legal History, and the itory of I eas. Secondary literature on the subject was very limited. All 1 had at my disposal was an article by Clark describing some cases of the insurance of enemy ships in ie of war (2004) and three books on the history of Lloyd's of London with patch> references to the interaction between Lloyd's, the Admiralty, and the British government Wondering as research attitude 27 since the eighteenth century (Gibb 1957, Wright and Fayle 1928, Martin 1876). The question, then, had to remain vague and formulated in speculative terms. The objective was to wonder about any significant detail that would allow me to venture into what appeared to be uncharted territory. 1 resorted to exploring what archival material I could find on the matter, in the way I describe in my chapter on archives in this book (Chapter 19). Only after analyzing the correspondence in detail, that is. highlighting the singularities which signalled the particular features of the Lloyd's-Admiralty relationship at the lime, was I in the position to understand the problem at stake: the sovereignty of the British state as a partnership in risk management. This finding implied a change in the nature of the original question and led to an engagement with the political economy of the period, not from a disciplinary perspective but through archaeological and genealogical research (Bonditti, Chapter 16). I could then relate the understanding of the "Commercial Kingdom" to a wider problem of credit in time of war and a more complex and apparently obscure phenomenon of moral economy on which I cannot elaborate here, but that can be read about in the book. I then continued to interrogate the interaction between marine insurance and the state in time of war for the cases of the two world wars and the post-Cold War period. Allowing myself the possibility to wonder about an apparent relationship (apparent because at the start of the project 1 was yet to confirm its evidence), I was intrigued by an incredibly rich phenomenon for which I could only formulate a coherent and tightly defined research question in the concluding stages of the writing of the book. That question will now allow me to continue wondering about my wider intellectual concerns in future research. As is evident by now, wondering as a research attitude implies the need to react to surprises and capitalize on them. Surprises are here understood as unexpected disruptions in the order of knowing about phenomena. They constitute opportunities to challenge established truths by resorting to creative tactics to make sense of meaning that does not seem logical. These tactics inevitably lead to reading beyond disciplines, official narratives and authorized and authoritative texts. They demand from the researcher the capacity to weave networks of knowledge in the process of linking apparently disparate pieces of evidence into a coherent narrative for which an understanding is sought. My particular project focused on making sense of the logics and rationalities underlying the Lloyd's-Admiralty/British State relationship in time of war. This led me to explore several sites that involved a great deal of archival material as a way of developing a form of historical epistemology of this relationship. By exploring archival material (Chapter 19) I identified a set of singularities that provided clues to how to approach the problem at stake. Using those singularities as constitutive of events I could then approach secondary literatures to learn as much as possible about the contexts under which those events had taken place. This led me to formulate further questions that required further archival and bibliographic explorations as the basis for new questions. 1 soon realized that the narratives that I began to build through my questioning reflected a particular logic with a clear set of conditions of possibility and operability. In turn, they reflected a wider rationality of thought which was ultimately what I was interested in making explicit in the book. By carefully revealing the premises implicit in the logic of security articulating the insurance-war relationship I was in a position to highlight and analyze some of the principles and values supporting what I detail in the book as a rationality of risk management in time of war. Conclusion Wondering as a research attitude resembles the charting of waters without the help of a magnetic pole as a point of reference. It requires continuous strategic self-awareness to understand where the project is going to prevent falling into the depths of ever-seductive epiphenomena. Detailing the existence and development of a relationship demands both attention to the detail to reveal the rules of interaction, and attention to the context which helps understand the wider relations of power that define the interface. Balancing both detail and context was the biggest challenge of the project since it soon became clear that detail did not determine context and context did not contain the detail. Through wondering about the project I was constantly reminded that it was the surprise of the event that ultimately helped me characterize the relationship of insurantial sovereignty. Methodologically, the greatest challenge of wondering as a research attitude is that it does not provide the researcher with a telos. Surprises are always there if our attitude allows them to be. They operate not as a destination of the research enterprise but as a disruption of the rational effort that is usually undertaken as a method of discovery. The surprise as a disruption of the rational materializes in the researcher's capacity to perceive that excess that makes the very rational possible, that which does not fit, that which is left outside but whose very exclusion habilitates the rationality that made the technology, idea, or concept possible. The surprise, in this respect, is an opening into the possibility of challenging the rationality that made ideas and systems of thought possible in the first place, a window into an empirical space that is usually shaded by the apparatuses built upon it (Neal, Chapter 6). In this respect, then, wondering as a research attitude is more an ethos than a telos.

# Aff answers

# Policy Aff Answers

### At: Affect

#### Affective politics turns inwards---never spills over at the expense of external action

Schrimshaw 12 – Will Schrimshaw, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Architecture at Newcastle University, is an artist and researcher from Wakefield based in Liverpool. January 28th, 2012, "Affective Politics and Exteriority"willschrimshaw.net/subtractions/affective-politics-and-exteriority/#

**The affective turn in recent politics thereby becomes auto-affective and in remaining bound to an individual’s feelings and emotions** undermines the possibility of its breaking out into collective action and mobilisation. Yet, referring back to Fisher’s article, it is where this affective orientation is inscribed into the social circuits of musical use and sonorous production that it perhaps begins to break out of the ideology of individualism through tapping into a transpersonal or `machinic’ dimension of affective signals that never find a voice yet remain expressive and hopefully inch towards efficacy. What is important to express here is that much of this affective content is inscribed in the use of music as much as its composition. As little of the Grime and Dancehall that Fisher and Dan Hancox catalogued towards a playlist of the riots and uprisings expresses in explicitly linguistic and lyrical content the sentiments of political activism, it is in the use of music and sound as a carrier of affects at the point of both playback and composition that its importance lies.2 Where music is deployed as a more affective than symbolic force in resistance, its significance becomes obscure and ambiguous from the perspective and expectations of symbolic coherence**. This noted lack of coherence and communicable message marks**, as Fisher points out, **a certain exhaustion of recognised channels of musical resistance: the protest song seems worn out, lacklustre, its own disempowerment, apparent obsolescence and displacement in pop culture a symptom compounding the apathy and estrangement that has characterised much of the still fairly recent discourse on youth and `political engagement’.**

#### Fear-driven anxiety is vital to affective agency

Susan McManus 11, Lecturer in Political Theory at Queen’s University, "Hope, Fear, and the Politics of Affective Agency", Volume 14, Issue 4, muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v014/14.4.mcmanus.html

Finally, if fear is a predominant affective formation in the political present, how can hope and fear be oriented together? Utopian-affect does not efface fear, but instead, inflects fear differently than hitherto. Restructuring or depathologizing fear-affects involves work on the sensory organization of all the different kinds of matter that affect agential capacity: affect circulates through various encounters of worldly matter and stuff through which subject finds itself manifest within. One way of restructuring fear-affect, then, is by intervening in the feedback loops through which fear is stabilized. This might involve turning the technologies that are central to the production of fear against themselves: when protesters use surveillance technologies against police, for instance, the feedback loops that those technologies sustain are interrupted, and the hegemonies they secure are disrupted, rendered capricious, variable, and open to intervention. Fear need not be ubiquitous, and visceral experimentation with our everyday sensorium can have effects upon the 'tone' of the age. Negri is, after all, right: hope is an 'an antidote to ... fear,' (Brown et al, 2002: 200); but only insofar as the antidote (hope) is made out of the same matter as the poison (fear). This illustrates the larger point that the future needs to be made out of matter that is available in the present, out of the same crises, but with different trajectories: it is from the matter of this world that the future is made. Utopian-affect, then, is made out of both hope and fear, and while fear might be restructured, it cannot be effaced, for the fear of utopian-affect also inheres in the encounter with the world itself, in the struggle, and in the uncertainty of the emergent. As Duggan puts it, 'there is fear attached to hope -- hope understood as a risky reaching out for something else that will fail,' (Duggan and Muñoz, 2009: 279). Fear and anxiety, rather than opposing utopian hope, are vital, necessary to its critical agency, as that agency works through immanent historical processes that remain open and undetermined.

#### **Affect = wrong**

Wetherell 12 – (2012, Margaret, PhD, Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Auckland, Emeritus Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Open University in the UK, former Director (2003-2009) of the Identities and Social Action Programme for the UK Economic and Social Research Council, “Affect and discourse – What’s the problem? From affect as excess to affective/discursive practice,” Subjectivity (2013) 6, 349–368)

One would expect that particularly for those engaged in empirically researching human affect, disenchantment would have given way by now, however, to some attempt at rapprochement and integration. The call for new emphases and for new ways of working does not in itself, of course, rule out a productive dialogue with research in discourse studies. Indeed, the turn to affect opens up crucial questions about meaning-making practices, the articulation of the somatic with these, and issues about how the speaking subject makes sense of and communicates affect. Above all, affect researchers emphasize assemblage, relationality, articulation and entanglement (see Latour, 2004; Thrift, 2008a; Blackman, 2012). An obvious entanglement for human social actors occurs routinely between embodied states and the semiotic. Why, then, is there still so little dialogue between affect scholars and discourse research? The explanation, in my view, seems to lie in one of the principal ways in which affect has been formulated within the turn. As a result, productive scepticism concerning the limits of discourse research and a push for new approaches seems to have turned into an impasse.

Affect and Discourse – The Emergence of an Impasse

For some leading affect theorists, such as Massumi (2002) and Thrift (2004, 2008a), the reaction against discourse studies is more far-reaching than a simple, strategic decision to hold discourse (semiotics, studies of talk and text) in abeyance while new methods are initiated and canvassed. Massumi and Thrift’s accounts of the relation between affect and discourse have been extraordinarily influential. They present a kind of mash-up from a range of mostly traditional social psychological and psychobiological sources such as EEG studies and social psychological research on automaticity, and in Thrift’s (2004, 2008a) case adding also elements of Damasio’s neuroscience and Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Affect is positioned as a kind of ‘non-representational’ domain (Thrift, 2004, 2008a) or excess (Massumi, 2002). As Blackman (2012, p. 11) describes, these approaches argue that: ‘power works “autonomically”, bypassing reason and criticality and seizing the body at the level of neural circuits, the nervous system, the endocrine system or other systems assumed to work independently of cognition’.

Massumi (2002), for instance, confidently claims that the world impinges (affects and has effects) on the body first. Affect is only subsequently, after a half-second time lag, picked up by the speaking, thinking, conscious, cognizing and representing subject (c.f. also Clough, 2007, p. 2). He maintains that affect is thus a kind of intensity, making a difference below the threshold of consciousness, thrusting the subject into particular kinds of relations with the material and social world. Consciousness is derivative and second-hand in this view, inadequate as a guide to the process of ‘being affected’. Similarly, musing on the short period in which the body is first activated, Thrift (2000, p. 34) describes it as ‘that small but vitally significant period of time in which the body makes the world intelligible by setting up a background of expectation’.

Massumi (2002, p. 219) argues that discourse works on a different track from affect – a ‘quality’ track as opposed to the ‘intensity’ track. The quality track leads to naming, and to the framing of affect in conventional discursive, linguistic and cultural terms. If affect is a kind of chaotic excess and an unprocessed push, then the moment of discursive representation is bureaucratic and organizational. For Massumi, it is the process by which potentially ‘wild’ affect is tamed, turned into something people can recognize, talk about to each other and communicate as ‘domesticated’ emotion. Needless to say, both Massumi and Thrift want to privilege the ‘wilder’ partner, what Thrift describes as the ‘roiling mass of nerve volleys’ (2008a, p. 7), ‘embodied dispositions (instincts if you like)’ (2000, p. 36), all seen as beyond the ‘threshold of contemplative cognition’ (McCormack, 2003, p. 488).

This dominant Massumi/Thrift analysis of affect and discourse is beginning to be extensively criticized (for example, Hemmings, 2005; Laurier and Philo, 2006; Gill and Pratt, 2008; Pile, 2010; Leys, 2011; Blackman, 2012; Wetherell, 2012, in press). Leys (2011), for instance, forensically takes apart the psychological studies on which Massumi’s argument is based and argues that the foundations are flimsy (see also Wetherell, 2012, Chapters 2 and 3). Interestingly, the direction of travel in those central ‘sciences of the unthinking’ – neuroscience and psychobiology – supports more integrated accounts. The claim that meaning-making and embodied affect separate chronologically (with affect first), dividing into different ‘tracks’, would be seen by many affective scientists as implausible.

Scherer (2005, p. 314), a leading emotion researcher in experimental psychology, for instance, works on the principle that a burst of affect involves the ‘synchronous recruitment of somatic and mental resources’. Damasio (1999), the neuroscientist perhaps most frequently drawn upon by social researchers, is contradictory in his emphases, but argues that everyday emotional experience is a functional continuum. This continuum, he maintains, is a ‘running polyphony’ (1999, p. 43) making up the fabric of body/mind. It consists of continuous cycles of bodily responses, changes in representations of body states, consciousness of feelings likely to trigger new embodied responses and so on. Experimental psychologists Barrett (2009) and Russell (2003) equally suggest a contingent, plastic and flexible, constructive feedback process, as core affects (core embodied, psycho-physiological states) are simultaneously perceived, organized, categorized, labelled and communicated becoming socially recognizable ‘emotions’. Any initial bodily hit, in other words, is always already occurring within an ongoing stream of meaning-making or semiosis. We cannot stop the clock, start it just from some constructed moment of initial impingement, and ignore the meaning-making contexts and histories that so decisively shape the encounters between bodies and events (Wetherell, in press).

Developments in experimental psychology and psychobiology aside (and I do not want to suggest accepting affective science uncritically), the problems with the assumption of a radical cut between affect and discourse come most sharply into view when we look at how researchers have tried to operationalize this cut in their empirical work. As the next section will try to show, as we come up against affect in practice, it becomes even clearer that the moment of ‘intensity’ is indissolubly linked to the history of ‘quality’ (in Massumi’s terminology). It becomes more and more difficult to sustain the chronology Massumi and Thrift propose, or the assumption that humans first encounter the world bodily and then secondarily discursively.

### At: Alt (Generic)

#### Abstract movements don’t lead to political results—pragmatic reform key

**Condit 15** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

#### Pragmatic approach is critical to productive change---alt fails

William J. Novak 8, Associate Professor of History at the University of Chicago and Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation, “The Myth of the “Weak” American State”, June, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/labor/speakers/documents/TheMythoftheWeakAmericanState.pdf

There is an alternative. In the early twentieth century, amid a first wave of nation- state and economic consolidation and assertiveness, American social science generated some fresh ways of looking at power in all its guises—social, economic, political, and legal. Overshadowed to some extent by exuberant bursts of American exceptionalism that greeted confrontations with totalitarianism and then terrorism, the pragmatic, critical, and realistic appraisal of American power is worth recovering. From Lester Frank Ward and John Dewey to Ernst Freund and John Commons to Morris Cohen and Robert Lee Hale, early American socioeconomic theorists developed a critique of a thin, private, and individualistic conception of American liberalism and interrogated the location, organization, and distribution of power in a modernizing United States. All understood the problem of power in America as complex and multifaceted, not simple or one-dimensional, especially as it concerned the relationship of state and civil society. Rather than spend endless time debating the proper definition of law or the correct empirical measure of the state, they concentrated instead on detailed investigations of power in action in the everyday practices and policies that constituted American public life. Rather than confine the examination of power to the abstract realm of political theory or the official political acts of elites, electorates, interest groups, or social movements, these analysts instead embraced a more capacious conception of governance as “an activity which is apt to appear whenever men are associated together.”35 More significantly, these political and legal realists never forgot, amid the rhetoric of law and the pious platitudes that routinely flow from American political life, the very real, concrete consequences of the deployment of legal and political power. They never forgot the brutal fact that Robert Cover would later state so provocatively at the start of his article “Violence and the Word” that legal and political interpretation take place “in a field of pain and death.” 36 The real consequences of American state power are all around us. In a democratic republic, where force should always be on the side of the governed, writing the history of that power has never been more urgent.

#### Legal norms don’t cause wars and the alt can’t effect liberalism

David Luban **10**, law prof at Georgetown, Beyond Traditional Concepts of Lawfare: Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 457

Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very foundation of Aristotle's conception of politics, which Schmitt completely ignores. Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the medium for organizing all human cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil institutions, and elemental tasks such as collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of course, peering into the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as the town mayor's office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position and patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as "banal forms of politics, . . . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues" and dismisses them contemptuously as "parasite- and caricature-like formations." n55 The fact is that Schmitt has nothing whatever to say about the constructive side of politics, and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community, political meetings debate issues as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic to another street. It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such disputes, and so, in Schmitt's view, they would not count as politics, but merely administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics.

Schmitt, I have said, uses the word "political" polemically--in his sense, politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word "political" to describe mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity Aristotelian and republican associations quite foreign to it. But the more basic point is that Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism as political and polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the critique of lawfare is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself.

What about the merits of Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism? His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and [\*471] apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is either too weak or too savage.

The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against "outlaws of humanity" would be the most horrible of all, it is hard not to salute him as a prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when Schmitt writes about the League of Nations' resolution to use "economic sanctions and severance of the food supply," n56 which he calls "imperialism based on pure economic power." n57 Schmitt is no warmonger--he calls the killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off an existential threat "sinister and crazy" n58 --nor is he indifferent to human suffering.

But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the same thing as wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so Schmitt's important moral warning against ultimate military self-righteousness does not really apply. n59 Nor does "bracketing" war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies who do not recognize duties of reciprocity. n60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being forced to put down their guns. Bracketing warfare is a decision--Schmitt might call it an existential decision--that rests in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien extrusions into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong, not weak. n61 We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that would be a political decision. It would simply be a bad one.

#### The alt fails---deriding all attempts at action is no way to deal with difficult political choices---we also control terminal uniqueness because they can’t convince others to abandon liberal subjectivity

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-62

A politics of radical democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice and 60 struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Susan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with postmodern (allegedly anti) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off of the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), poststructuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy. ¶ Connolly, Brown, and Butler reject explicit moral deliberation as a bad faith Nietzschean attempt at “ressentiment.” Instead, they celebrate the amoral, yet ethical strivings of a Machiavellian or Gramscian realist “war of position.”44 Sheldon Wolin, however, has written convincingly of how Machiavelli can be read as an ethical realist, a theorist of moral utilitarianism.45 Even a Machiavellian or Gramscian political “realist” must depend upon moral argument to justify the social utility of hard political choices. That is, if one reads both as ethical utilitarians who believe that, at times, one must “dirty” one’s hands in order to act ethically in politics, then they embrace a utilitarian, “just war” theory of ethical choice. According to this consequentialist moral logic, “bad means” are only justifiable if they are the only, unavoidable way to achieve a greater ethical good—and if the use of such “bad means” are absolutely minimized. Such “hard” political choices yield social policies and political outcomes that fix identities as well as transform them.¶ Not only in regard to epistemological questions has post-structuralist theory created a new political “metaphysics” which misconstrues the nature of democratic political practice; the post-structuralist analysis of “the death of man” and “the death of the subject” also radically preclude meaningful political agency. As with Michel Foucault, Butler conceives of “subjects” as “produced” by powerknowledge discourses. In Butler’s view, the modernist concept of an autonomous subject is a “fictive construct”; and the very act of adhering to a belief in autonomous human choice is to engage in “exclusion and differentiations, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy.”46 That is, the power of discourse, of language and the unconscious, “produces subjects.” If those “subjects” conceive of themselves as having the capacity for conscious choice, they are guilty of “repressing” the manner in which their own “subjectivity” is itself produced by discursive 61 exclusion: “if we agree that politics and a power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.”47 Susan Bickford pithily summarizes the post-structuralist rejection of the modernist subject: “power is not wielded by autonomous subjects; rather through power, subjectivity is crafted.”48 Bickford grants that post-structuralism provides some insight into how group and individual identity is “culturally constructed.” But Bickford goes on to contend that after post-structuralism exposes the “lie of the natural” (that there are no natural human identities), “socially constructed” modern individuals still wish to act in consort with others and to use human communication to influence others: “people generally understand themselves as culturally constituted and capable of agency.”49¶ For if there is no “doer behind the deed,” but only “performative” acts that constitute the subject, how can the theorist (or activist) assign agency or moral responsibility to actors who are “constituted by discursive practices.” (“Discursive practices” engaged in by whom, the observer may ask?) Butler insists that not only is the subject “socially constituted” by power/knowledge discourses, but so too is the “ontologically reflexive self” of the enlightenment. Now if this claim is simply that all social critics are socially-situated, then this view of agency is no more radical a claim than that made by Michael Walzer in his conception of the social critic (or agent). Walzer argues that even the most radical dissident must rely upon the critical resources embedded within his own culture (often in the almost-hidden interstices of that culture). Effective critical agency cannot depend on some abstract universal, external logic.50 Asserting that critical capacities are themselves socially constructed provides the reader with no means by which to judge whether forms of “resistance” are democratic and which are not. That is, no matter how hard one tries to substitute an aesthetic, “ironic,” “amoral ethical sensibility” for morality, the social critic and political activist cannot escape engaging in moral argument and justification with fellow citizens.¶ Butler astutely notes that “resistance” often mirrors the very powerknowledge discourses it rejects—resisting hegemonic norms without offering alternative conceptions of a common political life. But Butler seems to affirm the possibility (by whom?) of effective rejection of such “norming” by “performative resignification.” But the “resignification” of “performative” discursive constructions provides no criteria by which to judge whether a given “resignification” is emancipatory or repressive.51 And just who (if not a relatively coherent, choosing human subject) is “performing” the resignification. Furthermore, if all forms of identity and social meaning are predicated upon “exclusion,” then the democratic theorist needs to distinguish among those identities which “exclude” in a democratic way and those which exclude in an anti-humanist, racist, and sexist manner. Some social “identities” are democratic and pluralist, such as those created by voluntary affiliations. But other “identities,” such as structural, involuntary class differences and racial and sexual hierarchies, must be transformed, even eliminated, if democracy is to be furthered. And how we behave—or “perform”—can subvert (or reinforce) such undemocratic social structures. But if these social structures are immutably inscribed by62 “performative practices,” then there can be no democratic resistance. In her call for an ironic politics of “performative resistance,” Butler seems to imply that human beings have the capacity to choose which “performative practices” to engage in—and from which to abstain. If this is the case, then a modernist conception of agency and moral responsibility has covertly snuck its way back into Butler’s political strategy.52

### At: Alt -Suicide Bombing

#### Their ethics of suicide terrorism is *fatalist violence* – err on the side of an imperfect West

Derrida 3 (Jacques, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, p. 98—99

Borradori: Earlier you emphasized the essential role of international organizations and the need to cultivate a respect for international law. Do you think that the kind of terrorism linked to the al Qaeda organization and to bin Laden harbors international political ambitions? Derrida: What appears to me unacceptable in the "strategy" (in terms of weapons, practices, ideology, rhetoric, discourse, and so on) of the "bin Laden effect" is not only the cruelty, the disregard for human life, the disrespect for law, for women, the use of what is worst in technocapitalist modernity for the purposes of religious fanaticism. No, it is, above all, the fact that such actions and such discourse open onto no future and, in my view, have no future. If we are to put any faith in the perfectibility of public space and of the world juridico-political scene, of the "world" itself, then there is, it seems to me, nothing good to be hoped for from that quarter. What is being proposed, at least implicitly, is that all capitalist and modern techno scientific forces be put in the service of an interpretation, itself dogmatic, of the Islamic revelation of the One. Nothing of what has been so laboriously secularized in the forms of the "political," of "democracy," of "international law," and even in the nontheological form of sovereignty (assuming, again, that the value of sovereignty can be completely secularized or detheologized, a hypothesis about which I have my doubts), none of this seems to have any place whatsoever in the discourse "bin Laden." That is why, in this unleashing of violence without name, if I had to take one of the two sides and choose in a binary situation, well, I would. Despite my very strong reservations about the American, indeed European, political posture, about the "international antiterrorist" coalition, despite all the de facto betrayals, all the failures to live up to democracy, international law, and the very international institutions that the states of this "coalition" themselves founded and supported up to a certain point, I would take the side of the camp that, in principle, by right of law, leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the "political," democracy, international law, international institutions, and so on. Even if this "in the name of" is still merely an assertion and a purely verbal commitment. Even in its most cynical mode, such an assertion still lets resonate within it an invincible promise. I don't hear any such promise coming from "bin Laden," at least not one for this world.

### At: Comaroff

#### Zero link---this ev is about warfighting in postcolonial states. The aff says a particular policy is bad and gets rid of it.

#### Law not inherently violent—their analysis sustains a disciplinary elision in the anthropological imaginary. Focus instead on the day to day practices and the co-constituent nature of circumstance and law-making.

Andrew Catey, 2011, Ph. D. Candidate @ University of Florida,“THE CONSTITUTION OF SUBJECTS IN THE LONG REVOLUTION: RACE, THE POLICE POWER, AND THE EVERYDAY SHAPING OF THE ENSEMBLE STATE,” http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0043318/catey\_a.pdf

This approach to the operations of law and government is distinct in recent sociolegal scholarship, and unique in the anthropological literature. This uniqueness stems, in part, from the anthropological tendency vis-à-vis law to ignore legislatures and privilege jurisprudence (but see, e.g., Gershon 2008; Gershon 2011; Greenhouse 2005; In press; Lazarus-Black 2001; Moore 1984; Schneider 1998; see also Weatherford 1985 for an early exception which examines the US Congress). In political analyses this privileging takes shape as discussions of sovereignty; in legal analyses it takes shape as dispute resolution. More recent anthropological engagements with the concerns of jurisprudence have considered security (Eriksen, et al. 2010; Feldman 2005; Lakoff and Collier 2008), criminality (Clarke and Goodale 2010; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Schneider and Schneider 2008), and the rule of law (Mattei and Nader 2008). These are important studies, but they sustain the disciplinary elision of constitutions, legislatures, and legislation as analytical objects (although there are useful exceptions regarding constitutional analysis in Comaroff and Comaroff [2006]). 44 The distinctiveness of my approach is my divergence from the common assumption that law, properly, is the privileged prerogative of the state and of political elites. I also counter the familiar assumption that legislation is both suspect and beyond the ken of anthropologists. Attention to recent developments in Britain and Europe frustrate these notions, and productively so. Directing our focus to the everyday practices and consequences wrought through legislative and regulatory enactments can help to illuminate the intersubjective, interpersonal, and deeply humanized relations which characterize legislation and regulation, which I arrogate to the province of legisprudence, and which augurs the patriation of legislation to the anthropological imaginary. More precisely, my concern is with governing through difference in the present historical moment, and with the conjugation of the discourses and practices of legislation, the police power, and economy vis-à-vis the administration and management of forms of difference. I ask how civil government pursues its objectives, what rules are deemed necessary to the achievement of those objectives, and what agents are interleavened as necessary participants (cf. Tomlins 2006). That is, governors seek to achieve a particular public and social order, proper forms of behavior, and the ―general welfare‖; I argue that in Britain, these efforts are based largely on the (historical and contemporary) conceptual constructions of difference, including categories of race, ethnicity, multiculturalism and related forms of pluralism, as well as the other symbolic hierarchies, including gender, age, mental illness, heterosexism. My argument is contrary to the odd suggestion that Britain is ―known historically for its indifference to difference‖ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:17). This argument begins to 45 answer the question, How do the constitution, legislation, the police power, and government coalesce in the everyday administration of designated public, political, and social goals? This is less obvious than a superficial reading will appreciate. In the first place, this coalescence is not static or uniform. Rather, it is an achieved, hegemonic conjuncture of interests, means, and ends. This hegemony needs to be rendered in its full complexity, in order for us to apprehend ―the very important transformations in the state and state institutions that are now taking place‖ (Dezalay and Garth 2002:311). In the second place, the matrix of legislation, regulation, and government is not straightforward. It is not a matter of sovereignty and the coercive state of the Weberian imaginary; nor is it a matter of rule-promulgation and rule-obedience. Rather, it is a matter of continuously negotiated everyday practices that take shape from circumstances. This shape-taking is not an objective or functional process of legal practices reflecting extant real conditions, but one of ontology, of mutual constitution, in which knowledge, law-making, enactment, objectives, and circumstance comingle, immanently co-producing one another, the legal, political, and social equivalents of Heisenberg‘s atoms. In the third place, the coalescence I examine is not universal. Rather, the modalities of the exercise of police power differ between and within states and polities. Thus, Britain, by way of example, does not implement police projects necessarily similarly to France, the European Union, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, or the United States. Nor is Britain characterized by a particular relation of law and the police power, but by variegated sets of practices and regimes, so that governance from London differs from that at the level of regional administrations in Cardiff, Edinburgh, and Belfast. 46 These inter- and intra-state differences share historical linkages, such as imperialism, (post)colonialism, and globalization, but these do not produce, necessarily, identical understandings or enactments of projects of ordering and civility. Finally, the achievement of the coalescence and reactions to it are the result of struggle taking place in multiple sites, and at multiple political and social levels.

#### Can use lawfare to dismantle systems of authority

Craig A. Jones, 2015, MA candidate in Geography @ University of British Columbia, “Lawfare and the juridification of late modern war,” Progress in Human Geography (2015): 0309132515572270, SagePub;

V Toward a critical geography of lawfare? In the very same year that Charles Dunlap first began writing about lawfare, anthropologist John Comaroff proposed a competing – though seldom noted – definition. For Comaroff (2001: 306), lawfare signified ‘the effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the coercive use of legal means’. Comaroff’s definition directly challenges Dunlap’s vision of lawfare by placing the smoking gun – law as weapon – in the hands of the colonial state (and not in the hands of colonial subjects). Yet the lawfare debate teaches us that lawfare is characterized by a multiplicity of processes and is performed by manifold actors. Lawfare may have its antecedents in the colonial encounter, but Comaroff (2001: 306) also realized that it ‘had many theaters, many dramatis personae, many scripts’. What he meant was that lawfare is not uniform and unidirectional but has what he called a ‘counterinsurgent’ potential. Given this potential, and given the prominence of lawfare discourses today, does it make sense to only speak of lawfare as a colonial tool? Might it not also be a ‘post’-colonial tool, and could it not also be put to ‘insurgent’, counter-colonial use? In 2007, and writing with Jean Comaroff, John Comaroff returned to the topic of lawfare and offered a new definition not so dissimilar to that originally proposed by Dunlap. For them, lawfare had come to mean ‘the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007: 30). Yet their understanding of lawfare differs from Dunlap’s definition in two crucial respects. First, like the critical legal traditions, they are extremely attentive to questions of history, space and power. For them, lawfare did originate with colonialism, but this is not one and the same thing as saying that only colonial powers can wield it. As they go on to write, sometimes lawfare: is put to work, as it was in many colonial contexts, to make new sorts of human subjects; sometimes it is the vehicle by which oligarchs seize the sinews of state to further their economic ends; sometimes it is a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning the sanction of the court to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But ultimately, it is neither the weak nor the meek nor the marginal who predominate in such things. It is those equipped to play most potently inside the dialectic of law and disorder. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007: 31, emphasis added) Examining lawfare as a practice and something that is performed by social actors acting in a milieu of power relations is an important line of enquiry that is missing from mainstream 12 Progress in Human Geography Downloaded from phg.sagepub.com at BAYLOR LIBRARY on January 7, 2016 accounts of lawfare. This is somewhat surprising given that lawfare is supposed to have emerged as a result of asymmetric war as a way of redressing the imbalance of power between advanced militaries and smaller, less militarily powerful groups and nations. Beyond rhetoric from think tanks like TLP, there is little sense of how effective these groups and nations have actually been at harnessing lawfare and there have been very few studies that compare state lawfare alongside non-state lawfare. But these economies of power are important because they move us beyond thinking about lawfare as a political or social construction and encourage us to think about performances of lawfare and to ask what lawfare does and for whom.

### At: Liberalism Bad

#### Group their kritiks of liberal humanism—you should embrace a radical liberalism—liberal ideals are not monolithic, but instead leave room for inclusionary and radical projects

Mills 12 [2012, Charles W. Mills is John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, “Occupy Liberalism! Or, Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Retrieved for Radicalism (And Why They’re All Wrong)”, Radical Philosophy Review, Volume 15 number 2 (2012): 305–323]

Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray: Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society.... It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.2 What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be construed or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism (Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), different views of what count as desirable improvements, conflicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) socio-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of variants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants. Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is: Even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms? One kind of answer is the following (call this the internalist answer): Because there is an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it. Another kind of answer is the following (call this the externalist answer): It doesn’t. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual/normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity. Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, reflexively, as an obvious truth—the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States, and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers (vested group interests) and political barriers (organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism.

#### The rejection of all liberalism as equally pernicious strips political judgment of the evaluative categories necessary for progressive reform

Smith 8 [Nick, University of New Hampshire Department of Philosophy, Questions for a Reluctant Jurisprudence of Alterity, http://pubpages.unh.edu/~nicks/pdf/Levinas%20and%20Law%20Questions%20for%20a%20Reluctant%20Jurisprudence.pdf]

These are sobering questions for me. I find the challenges that Levinas and Adorno pose to modernity and the history of philosophy quite powerful, yet their resistance to practical philosophy is deeply frustrating. Surely not all philosophers must satisfy our desire to put philosophy to use, but Levinas and Adorno seem to have relinquished their ability to judge legal and political activity. This seems far from an apolitical, pre-political, or meta-political position. I cannot help but think that no politics is bad politics—politics stripped of evaluative thought. This worries Fraser as well because such a position is tantamount to surrendering any possibility of distinguishing emancipatory and oppressive identity claims, benign and pernicious differences. Thus, deconstructive antiessentialists evade political questions of the day: Which identity claims are rooted in the defense of social relations of inequality and domination? And which are rooted in a challenge to such relations? Which identity claims carry the potential to expand actually existing democracy? And which, in contrast, work against democratization? Which differences, finally, should a democratic society seek to foster, and which, on the contrary, should it aim to abolish?48 Although “we are not now in a position to envision a full-scale successor to socialism,” Fraser encourages us to “try nevertheless to conceive provisional alternatives to the present order that could supply a basis for a progressive politics.”49 There may be no leftist utopia, and all campaigns claiming otherwise should be treated with deep suspicion. We will not overcome identity thinking in grand political reformations, but we can fight it in the minutiae of each conflict, policy, and practice. Laws do identify and categorize, but they do not all do so with equal violence and disregard for particularity. Levinas and Adorno, however, deny us any means of drawing comfortable distinctions between the justifiable and unjustifiable. Given the current state of law and politics, the prospects of achieving reform through non-identity thinking seem quite grim. Even if we could—against Levinas and Adorno’s spirit—activate a coherent program of reform around theories of alterity, I doubt they could match the powers promoting their antithesis. Prevailing instrumental institutions gain momentum and crush or integrate theories of alterity, and the strategy of abstaining from political life in order to preserve the protest against instrumentality seems more desperate than ever. Our objective should not merely be to use thought to remember the nonidentical, but rather to safeguard the thought of the non-identical while acting to release it from blind domination. Without both a practical orientation toward transforming material conditions and a tolerance for the organizational categories necessary to implement such reform, deconstruction and critical theory seem severed from their radical traditions. Pretending that these critiques provide a form of resistance when they live harmlessly in their academic niche only reinforces the status quo. As Adorno and Marx recognized, reason struggles to navigate a course that gives it effect in the concrete world without sacrificing it to the instrumentalities of that world. I like to think that law is an ally in this project, but I now wonder if there is any practical upshot for a jurisprudence of alterity. Any attempt to discover legal praxis in Levinas and Adorno will traverse such heights that the reformer, if not forced to turn back, will ultimately find herself in air so theoretically rarified that one might doubt if any community could survive at its altitude. From this perspective, a jurisprudence of alterity seems most relevant as a regulative ideal for all legal activity. Yet for those of us inclined to seek guidance for law in Levinas or Adorno because we are moved by the threats of authoritarianism and consumerism, we find ourselves on strangely familiar ground as we stand on this summit. Though separated by miles of conceptual elevation, we arrive at the familiar practical values recognized by the traditions we seek to overcome: dignity, respect, difference, non-violence, dialogue, participation, etc. Did we find these practical principles at the height of Levinas and Adorno’s works, or did we bring them with us interpretive biases? It seems odd, for instance, to rely on a radical critique of Western metaphysics to support rather pedestrian arguments against racial profiling, capital punishment, violations of human rights, or the recent wars in Iraq. We can make such arguments with much less controversial premises, and hence I am suspicious of myself. Am I, as Adorno accused Lukács, “guilty of smuggl[ing] back the most pitiful clichés of the conformism to which the critique had once been directed?”50 Can law ever be more than such a cliché?

#### International Relations and Liberalism is key to solve human rights, environment, and poverty – constitutents provide a legitimate check.

Devitt ’11 – Masters in International Relations (Sept. 1, Rebecca, “Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?”, E-International Relations Students, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/)//DWB

Domestic interests have had a major impact on cooperation in International Relations, public reactions to the deaths of US soldiers in Somalia led to the Clinton administration pulling out of a peacekeeping mission to the war torn country whilst public demand for action on Climate Change has led to member states such as Australia to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol. [15]¶ This reflects the fact that domestic issues and policies have a major influence on how states cooperate with other states on an international stage. If a state was to go into agreement with another on trade relations, but that state had a bad record on human rights, the government might reconsider doing a deal if its constituents elected them on the basis of a strong human rights stance. This reflects the need for greater development of the liberal institutionalists argument in terms of domestic influences on decision making at an international level.¶ Furthermore whilst Liberal institutionalists have acknowledged the influence non-state actors in world affairs such as transnational organizations and non-governmental organizations play, they have failed to recognize the role that global political advocacy networks have had in international relations. Advocacy work on human rights, the environment and poverty has had major effects on the way states are viewed and global movements have challenged the notion that sovereignty is sacrosanct. Technological advances and telecommunication networks have allowed for swifter mobilization and organization of groups that can lobby governments and organizations about issues such as human rights and questioned the liberal institutionalists argument that states remain the key actors in world affairs. As R.B.J Walker has stated:

#### Liberalism is key to solve war. All other solutions lead to chaos.

Burchill ’05 – Researcher of International Relations at Deakin University (Scott, Theories of International Relations Third edition, Chapter 3 “Liberalism”, pp. 55-83)//DWB

For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs: in Kant’s words, peace¶ can be perpetual. The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation¶ between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial¶ contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human¶ nature. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the¶ human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and¶ the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain¶ confident that the stain of war can be removed from human experience¶ (Gardner 1990: 23–39; Hoffmann 1995: 159–77; Zacher and Matthew¶ 1995: 107–50).¶ A common thread, from Rousseau, Kant and Cobden, to Schumpeter¶ and Doyle, is that wars were created by militaristic and undemocratic¶ governments for their own vested interests. Wars were engineered by¶ a ‘warrior class’ bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest. According to Paine in The Rights of Man, the ‘war¶ system’ was contrived to preserve the power and the employment of¶ princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats and armaments manufacturers,¶ and to bind their tyranny ever more firmly upon the necks of the people’¶ (Howard 1978: 31). Wars provide governments with excuses to raise¶ taxes, expand their bureaucratic apparatus and increase their control over¶ their citizens. The people, on the other hand, were peace-loving by nature,¶ and plunged into conflict only by the whims of their unrepresentative¶ rulers.¶ War was a cancer on the body politic. But it was an ailment that¶ human beings, themselves, had the capacity to cure. The treatment which¶ liberals began prescribing in the eighteenth century had not changed: the¶ ‘disease’ of war could be successfully treated with the twin medicines of¶ democracy and free trade. Democratic processes and institutions would¶ break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence.¶ Free trade and commerce would overcome the artificial barriers between¶ individuals and unite them everywhere into one community.¶ For liberals such as Schumpeter, war was the product of the aggressive¶ instincts of unrepresentative elites. The warlike disposition of these rulers¶ drove the reluctant masses into violent conflicts which, while profitable¶ for the arms industries and the military aristocrats, were disastrous for¶ those who did the fighting. For Kant, the establishment of republican¶ forms of government in which rulers were accountable and individual¶ rights were respected would lead to peaceful international relations¶ because the ultimate consent for war would rest with the citizens of the¶ state (Kant 1970: 100). For both Kant and Schumpeter, war was the¶ outcome of minority rule, though Kant was no champion of democratic¶ government (MacMillan 1995). Liberal states, founded on individual¶ rights such as equality before the law, free speech and civil liberty,¶ respect for private property and representative government, would not¶ have the same appetite for conflict and war. Peace was fundamentally a¶ question of establishing legitimate domestic orders throughout the world.¶ ‘When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments,¶ wars become impossible’ (Doyle 1986: 1151).¶

#### Liberalism doesn’t cause exclusion of difference or violence—and the alt fails

Benno Gerhard Teschke 11, IR prof at the University of Sussex, “Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory”, International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's ‘spaceless universalism’. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993). But this **attempt to** read **the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins** seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’ world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as ‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the ‘liberal West’ coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is ‘blowback’. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – **it** also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal ‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-supervised ‘informal empire’, **which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways**. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

#### Shocks to the system are the ONLY propensity for conflict—liberal norms have eradicated warfare and structural violence—every field study proves

JOHN HORGAN 9 is Director of the Center for Science at Stevens Institute of Technology, former senior writer at Scientific American, B.A. from Columbia and an M.S. from Columbia “The End of the Age of War,” Dec 7, http://www.newsweek.com/id/225616/page/1

The economic crisis was supposed to increase violence around the world. The truth is that we are now living in one of the most peaceful periods since war first arose 10 or 12 millennia ago. The relative calm of our era, say scientists who study warfare in history and even prehistory, belies the popular, pessimistic notion that war is so deeply rooted in our nature that we can never abolish it. In fact, war seems to be a largely cultural phenomenon, which culture is now helping us eradicate. Some scholars now even cautiously speculate that the era of traditional war—fought by two uniformed, state-sponsored armies—might be drawing to a close. "War could be on the verge of ceasing to exist as a substantial phenomenon," says John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State University. That might sound crazy, but consider: if war is defined as a conflict between two or more nations resulting in at least 1,000 deaths in a year, there have been no wars since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and no wars between major industrialized powers since World War II. Civil wars have also declined from their peak in the early 1990s, when fighting tore apart Rwanda, the Balkans, and other regions. Most armed conflicts now consist of low-level guerrilla campaigns, insurgencies, and terrorism—what Mueller calls the "remnants of war." These facts would provide little comfort if war's remnants were nonetheless killing millions of people—but they're not. Recent studies reveal a clear downward trend. In 2008, 25,600 combatants and civilians were killed as a direct result of armed conflicts, according to the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden. Two thirds of these deaths took place in just three trouble spots: Sri Lanka (8,400), Afghanistan (4,600), and Iraq (4,000). Uppsala's figures exclude deaths from "one-sided conflict," in which combatants deliberately kill unarmed civilians, and "indirect" deaths from war-related disease and famine, but even when these casualties are included, annual war-related deaths from 2004 to 2007 are still low by historical standards. Acts of terrorism, like the 9/11 attacks or the 2004 bombing of Spanish trains, account for less than 1 percent of fatalities. In contrast, car accidents kill more than 1 million people a year. The contrast between our century and the previous one is striking. In the second half of the 20th century, war killed as many as 40 million people, both directly and indirectly, or 800,000 people a year, according to Milton Leitenberg of the University of Maryland. He estimates that 190 million people, or 3.8 million a year, died as a result of wars and state--sponsored genocides during the cataclysmic first half of the century. Considered as a percentage of population, the body count of the 20th century is comparable to that of blood-soaked earlier cultures, such as the Aztecs, the Romans, and the Greeks. By far the most warlike societies are those that preceded civilization. War killed as many as 25 percent of all pre-state people, a rate 10 times higher than that of the 20th century, estimates anthropologist Lawrence Keeley of the University of Illinois. Our ancestors were not always so bellicose, however: there is virtually no clear-cut evidence of lethal group aggression by humans prior to 12,000 years ago. Then, "warfare appeared in the evolutionary trajectory of an increasing number of societies around the world," says anthropologist Jonathan Haas of Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. He attributes the emergence of warfare to several factors: growing population density, environmental stresses that diminished food sources, and the separation of people into culturally distinct groups. "It is only after the cultural foundations have been laid for distinguishing 'us' from 'them,' " he says, "that raiding, killing, and burning appear as a complex response to the external stress of environmental problems." Early civilizations, such as those founded in Mesopotamia and Egypt 6,000 years ago, were extremely warlike. They assembled large armies and began inventing new techniques and technologies for killing, from horse-drawn chariots and catapults to bombs. But nation-states also developed laws and institutions for resolving disputes nonviolently, at least within their borders. These cultural innovations helped reduce the endless, tit-for-tat feuding that plagued pre-state societies. A host of other cultural factors may explain the more recent drop-off in international war and other forms of social violence. One is a surge in democratic rather than totalitarian governance. Over the past two centuries democracies such as the U.S. have rarely if ever fought each other. Democracy is also associated with low levels of violence within nations. Only 20 democratic nations existed at the end of World War II; the number has since more than quadrupled. Yale historian Bruce Russett contends that international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union also contribute to this "democratic peace" phenomenon by fostering economic interdependence. Advances in civil rights for women may also be making us more peaceful. As women's education and economic opportunities rise, birthrates fall, decreasing demands on governmental and medical services and depletion of natural resources, which can otherwise lead to social unrest. Better public health is another contributing factor. Over the past century, average life spans have almost doubled, which could make us less willing to risk our lives by engaging in war and other forms of violence, proposes Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker. At the same time, he points out, globalization and communications have made us increasingly interdependent on, and empathetic toward, others outside of our immediate "tribes." Of course, the world remains a dangerous place, vulnerable to disruptive, unpredictable events like terrorist attacks. Other looming threats to peace include climate change, which could produce droughts and endanger our food supplies; overpopulation; and the spread of violent religious extremism, as embodied by Al Qaeda. A global financial meltdown or ecological catastrophe could plunge us back into the kind of violent, Hobbesian chaos that plagued many pre--state societies thousands of years ago. "War is not intrinsic to human nature, but neither is peace," warns the political scientist Nils Petter Gleditsch of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. So far the trends are positive. If they continue, who knows? World peace—the dream of countless visionaries and -beauty--pageant -contestants—or something like it may finally come to pass.

#### Liberalism is not a strive for the perfect subject

Nussbaum 02 (Martha, U Chicago, “The Future of Feminist Liberalism”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 74, No. 2(Nov., 2000), pp. 47-79)

Such a conclusion should be reached with caution. Rawls's theory has often been wrongly criticized, because critics have not noticed that his model of the person in the Original Position is complex: his account of the person is not simply the account of the rationality of the parties, but that account combined with the account of the veil of ignorance, which is a complex way of modeling benevolence. Thus it is incorrect to say that he has not included concern for others in the conception of the person that forms the foundation of his theory - as he has noted, discussing Schopenhauer's similar critique of Kant.34 What this mistake shows us is that the contract doctrine has many ways of modeling the person; so we should not rule out the possibility that some device may be found through which a doctrine basically contractarian in spirit could model need and animality, just as it has modeled benevolence.35 There is, however, some reason to doubt that this can be done. For any such model would still involve a split of just the sort I've objected to, one that makes our rationality trustee, in effect, for our animality. And that, as I've argued, is inadequate for the kind of dignity and centrality we want to give to the problems of asymmetrical need.

Thus, while not denying that some determined contractarian might possibly solve this problem, I think it best to proceed as if it has not been solved. When we add to our worries the fact that Rawls's contract doctrine uses a political concept of the person at a number of different points, most of them not in association with the complex model of the original position, we have even more reason to want the political concept of the person to be one that does justice to temporality and need.

So I believe we need to adopt a political conception of the person that is more Aristotelian than Kantian,36 one that sees the person from the start as both capable and needy - "in need of a rich plurality of life activities," t o use Marx's phrase. whose availability will be the measure of well-being. Such a conception of the person, which builds growth and decline into the trajectory of human life, will put us on the road to thinking well about what society should design. We don't have to contract for what we need by producing; we have a claim to support in the dignity of our human need itself. Since this is not just an Aristotelian idea, but one that corresponds to human experience, there is good reason to think that it can command a political consensus in a pluralistic society. If we begin with this conception of the person and with a suitable list of the central capabilities as primary goods, we can begin designing institutions by asking what it would take to get citizens up to an acceptable level on all these capabilities.

In Women and Human Development I therefore propose that the idea of central human capabilities be used as the analogue of Rawlsian primary goods, and that the guiding political conception of the person should be an Aristotelian/Marxian conception of the human being as in need of a rich plurality of life-activities to be shaped by both practical reason and affiliation. I argue that these interlocking conceptions can form the core of a political conception that is a form of political liberalism, close to Rawls's in many ways. The core of the political conception is endorsed for political purposes only, giving citizens a great deal of space to pursue their own comprehensive conceptions of value, whether secular or religious. Yet more room for a reasonable pluralism in conceptions of the good is secured by insisting that the appropriate political goal is capability only: citizens should be given the option, in each area, of functioning in accordance with a given capability or not so functioning. To secure a capability to a citizen it is not enough to create a sphere of non-interference: the public conception must design the material and institutional environment so that it provides the requisite affirmative support for all the relevant capabilities.37 Thus care for physical and mental dependency needs will enter into the conception at many points, as part of what is required to secure to citizens one of the capabilities on the list.38

### Perm

#### Perm do both - engaging liberalism is essential to breaking down biopower, it promotes a form of rationality that limits state power

**Lacombe 96** [Danny, Criminology Simon Fraser U, “Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 2 Jstor]

The nature of the relation between the individual and the political order concerned Foucault in his studies of 'bio-power' and 'bio-politics'. In this work, he implicitly negates his earlier claims that rights in the West were unequivocally linked to the sovereign (1980b, 1988, 199 1). Foucault introduced the notion of 'bio-power' in his work on sexuality to designate the proliferation of a technology of power-knowledge primarily concerned with life. Bio-power was a mechanism that took charge of life by 'investing the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence' (Foucault 1980b: 14344, emphasis added). The notion of bio-power is useful for our understanding of the phenomenon of resistance because while it represents a totalizing or universal mechanism -one that interpellates the subject as a member of a population - it also contains the seed for a counter-power or a counter-politics because that mechanism individualizes the subject of a population. It is this aspect of bio-power, its simultaneous totalizing and individual-izing tendencies, that is of importance in understanding the strategies by which individual subjects can claim the right to self-determination. Foucault explains that against this [bio-]power that was still new in the nineteenth century, the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being. Since the last century, the great struggles that have challenged the general system of power were not guided by the belief in a return to former rights, or by the age-old dream of a cycle of time or a Golden Age. (. . .) [Wlhat was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plentitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerningrights. The 'right' tolife, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or 'alienations,' the 'right' to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this 'right' (. . .) was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty. (Foucault 1980b: 144-5) If life, understood here as 'man's concrete essence', is affirmed through rights claims, then, like Foucault we can no longer conceive law as necessarily linked to the sovereign. It must be linked to a different political rationality, one I believe, in which human rights are at the centre. While Foucault never specifically addressed the question of human rights, his lectures on 'bio-politics' (at the College de France between 1978 and 1979) suggest that struggles for life and for self-determination are to be understood in the context of liberalism. In his lectures, he explores the relation between bio-power -the mechanisms taking charge of life -and the emergence of bio-politics, by which he means the way in which a rationalization was attempted, dating from the eighteenth century, for the problems posed to governmental practice by the phenomena specific to an ensemble of living beings: health, hygiene, birthrate, longevity, races . . .(198 1 :353) Foucault's statement is significant because it suggests that we cannot dissociate the problems posed by the question of population (bio-power) from the political rationality within which they emerged, liberalism. Far from conceiving it as a political theory or a representation of society, Foucault understands liberalism as an 'art of government', that is, as a particular practice, activity and rationality used to administer, shape, and direct the conduct of people (1981 :358). As a rationality of government - a 'governmentality' -liberalism, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, breaks from reason of state (la raison d'e'tat) which since the sixteenth century had sought to 'justify the growing exercise of government' (Foucault 198 1 :354). What distinguishes liberalism from reason of state as an art of government is that for liberalism 'there is always too much government' (Foucault 1981: 354-5). In fact, far from being organized around the principle of a strong state, liberalism upholds the principle of maximal economy with minimal government (Foucault 1981: 354). The question of liberalism, that of 'too much governing,' regulates itself, according to Foucault, 'by means of a continuing reflection' (1 98 1: 354). The idea of reflexivity here is significant because it refers to a mechanism of self-critique, and self-limitation, inherent in liberalism. Foucault claims that Liberalism (. . .) constitutes - and this is the reason both for its polymorphous character and for its recurrences - an instrument for the criticism of reality. Liberalism criticizes an earlier functioning government from which one tries to escape; it examines an actual practice of government that one attempts to reform and to rationalize by a fundamental analysis; it criticizes a practice of government to which one is opposed and whose abuses one wishes to curb. As a result of this, one can discover liberalism under different but simultaneous forms, both as a schema for the regulation of governmental practice and as a theme for sometimes radical opposition to such practice. (Foucault 198 1 : 356) What allows liberalism to oppose state power, then, is not the principle of sovereignty or the idea of a natural right external to the state; rather it is a rationality, a governmentality of life that takes on 'the character of a challenge' (Foucault 1981 :353). People resist the conditions under which they live, they make claims for or against the state, because they have been submitted to government. In other words, the political technologies that seek to render us governable as a population (bio-power and bio-politics) simultaneously make possible the critique of these same technologies.'

#### Perm do both--Reformism is effective

Delgado 9 [Richard, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590 ]

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

### Reform Good

#### Reforms *key* – macro-level transformation is a *prerequisite* to solving necropolitics – *micropolitics* fails and *turns their impact*

Airewele 15 (Peyi, Professor of International Relations & Comparative Studies and Carnegie Fellow at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Covenant University, “THE END OF POLITICS? RECLAIMING HUMANITY IN AN AGE OF BIOPOWER AND NECROPOLITICS,” Covenant University Public Lecture Series, Vol. 4, No. 2, March 2015, p. 33—35, <http://covenantuniversity.edu.ng/content/download/35623/245151/file/40th+Public+Lecture.pdf>)

But what would emerge in its place? Still politics, but hopefully a reformed politics that can travel into the future. The word ‘reform’ sounds tame besides our preferred terms of revolution and transformation but I use it advisedly in the context of Foucault‘s caution against constructing utopias that degenerate into biopower. The dilemma with necropolitics is that even as we protest its putrid formations, we often lose sight of how much it has entwined itself around our lives, swamped and overwhelmed our vision, language, relationships, communities and lives. We ignore how deeply we are invested in and complicit with its norms and enticements. So perhaps seeking reform or transformation is a first step to recognizing, unlike the local party bosses of China, our own complicity in corruption and in systems of power and fear. Although the medical field utilizes surgical debridement to save lives threatened by necrotic trauma, the only assured mode the human species has of defeating death is ensuring that life is constantly birthed. So at various levels of the polity, we must continue to mobilize, debate and seek to elect ethical, visionary and responsive leaders; demand a national political structure rooted in true federalism; and hold leaders in all societal sectors accountable for their discourses and actions or lack thereof. However, at an individual and collective level, we must also be prepared to birth new modes of life. This is the ultimate challenge to necropolitics. In practical and basic terms, it translates to our genuine personal and sustained commitment to protect human dignity, to fulfill our personal determination to eradicate and alleviate poverty, provide just employment, support those who are marginalized and in need, respond to those rendered vulnerable in the mounting humanitarian crisis, protect the environment in trust, deal with honesty and integrity and generate progressive social relations rooted in the desire for justice, equity and peace. Despite our global and national context of violence, we are surrounded by numerous examples of those who deploy a politics of life to challenge systemic necrotic decay. To highlight one example, the Stephen‘s Children‘s Home in Abeokuta is an initiative birthed by a Nigerian committed to children who lost one or both parents in the various eruptions of religious violence in northern Nigeria. The residential center cares for over four hundred displaced children who all have heartbreaking narratives of trauma, rape and lossthey have experienced necropolitics in a manner that is irreversible, but the courageous determination of their Nigerian caregiving team and supporters challenges necropower in the lives of the children more effectively than some more popular modes of engagement that left them exposed and vulnerable to continued violence and suffering. This is not about mere acts of charity. It is about taking committed steps to self-transformation and actualization, breaking free of the ~~paralyzing~~ legacies of biopower and necropolitics, creating models and sustaining visions of the future, and re-establishing a national framework for lasting voice and change within the citizenry and political leadership. There is no simple set of rules for reforming the nation, but among other things we do need: 1. Acceptance of the fact that Biopower and Necropolitics will not vanish in the near future. 2. Readiness to be discomfited and challenged, to occasionally lose faith in the system and its promises, to find oneself intellectually and socio-politically afloat. 3. New visions and the capacity to live as practical visionaries, reimagining and reconstructing alternative and progressive spaces at every level. We must re-examine each space we inhabithome, work, community and nationand conceive of how to transform that space to enhance human dignity and equity, to establish microsystems that meet critical needs in a manner that is principled, collaborative, effective and sustained. 4. A focus on critical mass transformation that recognizes the limitations of one individual and the capacity of the state to coopt and constrain solo idealists. As democratic activists, human rights workers, environmentalists, socio-politicians and progressive institutions, we must seize on innovative ways to create collaborative networks that will achieve and sustain our struggles for socio-political change without being overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task 5. Ethical courage and integrity: Necropolitics generates decay throughout a system and the most difficult battle is the individual struggle to sustain personal integrity and voice in a framework that entices us to do otherwise.

#### Piecemeal reform is necessary and doesn’t endanger revolution – their critique is privileged

Delgado ‘9

Richard Delgado, 2009, Richard Delgado is a elf-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law,” p. 588-590

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#### Peace meal reforms to take down state psychiatric institutions solve the impact

Burstow 10 (Bonnie Bustow, PhD, faculty member at University of Toronto, an antipsychiatry activist, a feminist therapist Keynote address at PsychOUT Conference May 7-8, 2010, http://individual.utoronto.ca/psychout/papers/burstow\_keynote.html)

To spell out what some of those top priority actions, directions, or campaigns might be—and people familiar with the terrain will recognize most of these—particularly apropos and indeed, more central than they are currently, would be actions or campaigns which put the state on the defensive when it comes to psychiatry or weakens the state’s unilateral endorsement or funding of psychiatry. The reason why this direction is singularly important is the pivotal role of the state in psychiatric rule. Psychiatry has the power which it does only because it is an extension of the state, is part of the apparatus of the state, and as such, is additionally handsomely funded by the state. Loosen the tie-in with the state, eliminate all or a sizable part of the state’s sanction or support, and psychiatry’s size and power to harm begins to evaporate. Examples of actions or campaigns that might be taken up in this regard—and most of these have long figured in our community arsenal and indeed figure in this conference—include: directly suing the state for damages—and hats off to survivors and family members at this conference who are suing; suing hospitals for damages; challenging the constitutionality of laws which the state has enacted to empower psychiatry; appealing to a power outside the state, whether it be the U.N. or some other international body. And kudos here to work of people like my fellow keynote David Oaks. Other less foundational but also critically important measures on the same continuum include: • demanding moratoriums on new psychiatric hospital constructions • pressuring for the end to involuntary commitment • initiatives which support increased patients’ rights or the upholding of current rights • advocating cutbacks on funding for psychiatric services and increased funding for more benign services • waging campaigns to de-fund private psychotherapy delivered by doctors, or what I think might well serve us better, to fund equally psychotherapy delivered by others (psychiatry could not have the power which it has today without the state giving it a virtual monopoly).

### State Inev

#### Institutions are inevitable – policy focus solves better

Themba-Nixon 2k (Executive Director of The Praxis Project, Former California Staffer, Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000.Vol.3, Iss. 2; pg. 12)

In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are therules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right,stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevantthan this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### You can’t just wish away institutions

**McCormack 10**

(Tara, Leicester international politics lecturer, Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches, pg 58)

Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the world or social reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the contemporary critical theorists, theory can only ever be for someone and for some purpose. As this is so then quite logically critical theorists elevate their own values to be the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the fact/value distinction we see within the work of contemporary critical theorists a highly unreflective certainty about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all theory is normative, they offer in its place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the marginalised. The claims made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory theory today. Yet even good or critical theory has no agency, and only political action can lead to change. Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with contemporary power structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve problems, unlike problem-solving theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory makes claims to be able to explain why and how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the ‘given framework for action’. The critical theorist must therefore be able to differentiate between facts (or social reality) and values, this ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to the existing social world, go beyond the ‘given framework for action’. If we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox’s terms) and actually occurring social and political and historical processes and relationships, it is hard to see how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through abolishing this division we can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else, and thereby contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories. Contemporary critical theorists are like modern-day alchemists, believing that they can transform the base metal of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through their own words. For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a better world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just world order.

### State/Law Good

#### Our heuristic means we learn about the State without being it. It won’t entrench dominant norms *BUT WE ALSO* don’t’ invert the error and NEVER learn about them. Our framework teaches contingent, but engaged, middle grounds. No *State pessimism bias* or *optimism bias for extreme Alts*.

-we are defending a contingent state that does not exist now but we can bring it about

-Learning about the state good

-We don’t have to say the state is always good. Our model gives us another tool to combat pressing issues

Zanotti ‘14

Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and **contingent struggles** that are constituted **within** the scripts of **government**al **rationalities** and at the same time exceed and **transform them**. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Government**ality **as a heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also **foster** an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity **on the consequences** of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So **my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.**’’84

#### The kritiks characterization of the law is outdated and ignorant---legal reforms can protect subjects from state coercion

Smith 2k [Carole, Professor of Social Policy and Social Work at Univ of Manchester, “The sovereign state v Foucault: law and disciplinary power”, The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review, p. 291-2]

Foucault's analysis has much to offer in terms of his creative and radical thinking about the nature of power, the relationship between power and knowledge, the role of disciplinary power as it works to regulate the subject from without and to constrain the subject from within, and forms of modern government. The rise of liberal democracy, the thrust of welfare policy, government by administrative regulation and the enormous influence of expert knowledge and therapeutic intervention (Giddens. 1991; Rose. 1990; Miller and Rose. 1994) have all had an impact on law and operations of the juridical field. I would argue, however, that Foucault's characterisation of law, in the context of the modern liberal state, does not reflect our everyday experience of the means through which power and government are exercised. Similarly, the role played by expert knowledge and discursive power relations in Foucault's conceptualisation of modernity, such that law is fated to justify its operations by 'perpetual reference to something other than itself\* and to 'be redefined by knowledge' (Foucault, 1991: 22), does not accord with the world of mundane practice. In their sympathetic critique of his work. Hunt and Wickham (1998) point to the way in which Foucault's treatment of sovereignty and law must necessarily lead him to neglect two related possibilities. First, that law may effectively re-define forms of disciplinary power in its own terms and second, that law and legal rights may act to protect the subject from the coercive influence of such power. Reported judgments on sterilisation and caesarean interventions, without consent, show how law can achieve both of these reversals of power. They also demonstrate law's ability to turn the 'normalizing gaze\*, as the production of expert knowledge, back upon the normative behaviour of experts themselves.

**Simulation allows us to more effectively influence state policy AND is key to agency – studies prove (c/a)**

**Eijkman 12** [Henk, visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India, has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India, “The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice,” http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims\_in\_authentic\_learning\_report.pdf]

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the **unique combination of simulation with role-playing**. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create **possible futures** relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘**No other technique** allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. **The game element:** the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a **high level of proficiency** in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, **policy development simulations**—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below.

#### The law is problematic but it is a lived reality – there is nothing outside of it - the only effective method is redeploying institutional logic against contradictions.

Crenshaw 88 [Kimberle, University of California Los Angeles law professor, Harvard law review, “RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1341398.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>, JSTOR, p.1366-8, accessed 9-29-14, TAP]

The Critics' product is of limited utility to Blacks in its present form. The implications for Blacks of trashing liberal legal ideology are troubling, even though it may be proper to assail belief structures that obscure liberating possibilities. Trashing legal ideology seems to tell us repeatedly what has already been established -- that legal discourse is unstable and relatively indeterminate. Furthermore, trashing offers no idea of how to avoid the negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse or how to work around such consequences. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in terms of legal discourse, we must nevertheless exist in a present world where legal protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one. The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area.

The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their focus on delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of domination.

Unfortunately, no such strategy has yet been articulated, and it is difficult to imagine that racial minorities will ever be able to discover one. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [\*1367] excellent account of the civil rights movement, popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to that logic. 137 People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging. 138 Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic -- that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology -- will probably be ineffective . 139

The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140 Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The political consequences [\*1368] of maintaining the contradictions may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction.

This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement. Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology. Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice of absolute racial subordination. Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the “rights” that citizenship entailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, the potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation.

### necro/biopltx Defense

#### The thesis of biopolitics is wrong---it’s based on a faulty understanding of liberalism

**Selby 13** [Jan, Senior Lecturer of IR at the University of Sussex, "The myth of liberal peace-building", March 13, *Conflict, Security & Development*, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2013]

Most of the above features are shared right across the liberal peace-building debate and have been advanced from any number of theoretical perspectives. Thus it has been claimed from a constructivist perspective that contemporary peace-building is rooted in liberal ‘international norms’.36 Invoking Foucault, it has been argued that the liberal peace-building project is an exercise in global bio-politics or governmentality, which aims to govern and construct liberal populations and subjectivities.37 From a post-colonial perspective, liberal peace-building has been described as a colonial project, ‘cast in the mould of colonialism’, and aiming to restructure Southern societies in accordance with Northern metropolitan ideology.38And in neo-Gramscian terms, peace-building has been critiqued as part of a transnational neo-liberal project, ‘reﬂecting the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global politics’.39 Right across this variegated theoretical terrain, peace-building is represented as a liberal project, founded on liberal ideas, pushed forward by a decentralised plurality of institutions irrespective of the particularity of war-endings and peace agreements, in which global consensus is counterposed by local dissensus or disorder. Yet for all this trans-theoretical consensus, these shared emphases within liberal peace- building discourse constitute a questionable foundation for the analysis of contemporary peacemaking. Again, this is not to suggest that the liberal peace-building literature is without merit: the critical literature, in particular, provides much compelling evidence of the hubris of liberal internationalism, of the destruction wrought by World Bank-IMF policies and of the frequent complicity of peace-building projects in coercive processes of state-building, dispossession and subjugation. My contention is not that liberal peace- building research is without value, but that the above parameters are unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant interpretive errors. To advance this case, my focus in the remainder of this paper is on the relations between post-conflict peace-building on the one hand, and peace agreements and their negotiation on the other. What this will reveal is that peace-building is neither a discrete sphere of action, nor the dominant element within contemporary peace processes; that states, strategy and geopolitics continue, as ever, to be crucial determinants of these processes; and that the influence of liberalism, and the degree of global consensus over the liberal peace, are significantly overstated within liberal peace- building discourse. We start by considering one

#### No necropolitics impact

Rose 3 [(Paul Rabinow, Department of Anthropology, UC Berkeley; and Nikolas Rose, Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science) “THOUGHTS ON THE CONCEPT OF BIOPOWER TODAY”] AT

The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors take their concept and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower to Foucault’s remarks on sovereignty ñ as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its cha racteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain paroxysmal moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non-continuous. The totalization of sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial power sought to operationalize it, but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form. The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania under Hoxha, North KoreaÖ But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the extravagance displays of the sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master it. A cursory glance at the work of Jacques Le Goff ñ whose work Foucault knew well, or Ferdinand Braudel and the whole Annales project, or, for English readers, the writings of EP Thompson should be sufficient to dispel such recent mis- readings

#### The thesis of Necropolitics is wrong and re-trenches power

Angela Mitropoulos 5, a graduate of La Trobe University’s Department of Sociology and Anthropology. She currently writes on border policing. She has been published on several occasions – "Necropolitics" October 16, <http://archive.blogsome.com/2005/10/16/necropolitics-war/>

Mbembe concludes the essay by arguing that the concept of biopolitics might be better replaced with necropolitics, and he discusses suicide bombings at some length, in a pretty interesting way. But I am not sure I would follow him there with respect to the question of bios versus necros. They don’t seem to me distinguishable. The nexus between life and death politics is surely complicated not only by ‘the right to life’ (and the politics that attend it), but also by the reorganisation of so-called health and welfare policies, pharmacapitalism and its geopolitics, the proprietisation of genes, and so on.  But, maybe more than that, I would be inclined to think the following (the transition between the territorial state to a mobile war machine, as Mbembe puts it)through a more detailed discussion of the why and how of so-called ‘failed states’ in relation to their inability to give effect to the control over populations (and not simply resources). He talks about the ‘erosion’ of their ability to control, but there’s no discussion of what it was that eroded this. In that sense, it’s left open to characterise this erosion in terms not of people’s struggles but of processes that occur ‘above their heads’ as it were. Thereby reducing them to objects of the war machines’ movements, but not capable of movement themselves.

### necro/biopltx Good

#### Bio power in contemporary society is an expression of the enhancement of life, not the power to kill

Ojakangus 05 (Mika, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies , “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power” http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf]

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form o power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of biopower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio-political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.”112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio-political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio-political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present-day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio-political thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio-political paradigm of the West, has to be corrected.113 The bio-political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio-political society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge bio-political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In bio-political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio-political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because bio-power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of bio-power.

#### Biopower operates to sustain life, not kill it –rejecting it risks creating more atrocities

Ojakangas, 2005 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies at the University of Helsinki [Mika, “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://wlt-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf]

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of bio‐power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio‐ political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.”112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio‐political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio‐political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio‐political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present‐day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is **the very “right to kill”** that **has been called into question.** However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio‐political thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio‐political paradigm of the West, has to be corrected.113 The bio‐political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present‐day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio‐political society can be seen, for example, in the middle‐class Swedish social‐democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge bio‐political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In bio‐political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio‐political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because bio‐power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of bio‐power. Another important question is whether these bio‐political societies that started to take shape in the seventeenth century (but did not crystallize until the 1980s) are ideologically, especially at the level of practical politics, collapsing – to say nothing about the value of the would‐be collapse. One thing is clear, however. At the global level, there has not been, and likely will not be, a completely bio‐political society. And to the extent that globalization takes place **without** bio‐political considerations of health and happiness of individuals and populations, as it has done until now, it is possible that our entire existence will someday be reduced to bare life, as has already occurred, for instance, in Chechnya and Iraq. On that day, perhaps, when bio‐political care has ceased to exist, and we all live within the sovereign ban of Empire without significance, we can only save ourselves, as Agamben suggests, “in perpetual flight or a foreign land”116 – although there will hardly be either places to which to flee, or foreign lands.

### Util

#### Consequences come first

Issac 2 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, **but it suffers from** three fatal **flaws**: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real **violence** and injustice, **moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it is often a form of complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

Greene 2010 – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf))

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.

It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).

Missing the Deontological Point  
I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.  
In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.  
What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Util is a prerequisite for equality

Rakowski 93 Eric Rakowski [Taking and Saving Lives Author(s): Eric Rakowski Source: Columbia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 5, (Jun., 1993), pp. 1063-1156 Published by: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1122960>]

On one side, it presses toward the consequentialist view that individuals' status as moral equals requires that the number of people kept alive be maximized. Only in this way, the thought runs, can we give due weight to the fundamental equality of persons; to allow more deaths when we can ensure fewer is to treat some people as less valuable than others. Further, killing some to save others, or letting some die for that purpose, does not entail that those who are killed or left to their fate are being used merely as means to the well-being of others, as would be true if they were slain or left to drown merely to please people who would live anyway. They do, of course, in some cases serve as means. But they do not act merely as means. Those who die are no less ends than those who live. It is because they are also no more ends than others whose lives are in the balance that an impartial decision-maker must choose to save the more numerous group, even if she must kill to do so.

#### Prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### Prioritize human existence---we’re the only species that can protect the entire biosphere from inevitable asteroid strikes---their impacts are long term while the lives killed in short term matter

Matheny 09 (Jason Gaverick, research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment - particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, March 14, “Ought we worry about human extinction? [1]”, http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm)

At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time. Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with inefficient technologies that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised. This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 10^12 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 10^21 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years. The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. **To accept human extinction now would be like** committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch**.** If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

# K Aff Answers

### AB=Root Cause

**Libidinal Subjectivity Turn- We control the direction of impacts on a semiotic level. The middle passage is the founding extinction event of modernity that creates a unitary and coherent white subject on a libidinal drive toward the reproduction of black death. The forces of fungibility and original accumulation create binaristic registers of personhood where the subjectivity of the human gains coherence on the abject position of black flesh**

**Farley ’09** (Anthony Paul Farley, **“**Shattered: Afterword for Defining Race”, a joint symposium of the Albany Law Review and Albany Journal of Science and Technology pg. 1055-1057, [SG])

I will use the term original accumulation to discuss the traumatic moment that seems always to have occurred just before the curtains of history were raised, and I will use the term primal scene of accumulation to designate the always tentative nature of our attempts to reconstruct that time-beforetime. When a form of life is shattered the fragments come together in the form of the shattering force itself, not the form of life that was shattered. It is as if the fragments, each feeling in itself the lack of a former, albeit unrecognized, unity, are drawn to each other, but only in a way that preserves a certain lack. The lack is the shattering force itself. And the shattering is a certainty. The lack becomes the free-floating principle of reunification, and thus all attempts at reunification fail, in perpetuity. The lack about which I write is not a simple one. The lack is in fact the world-destroying force, the missing piece of all our reconstructions. The lack is the missing piece and world-destroying force that we are. It is always what we are becoming. Because we are that world-shattering force, the force of the original accumulation, whatever institutional film we wrap around that which we mistake for ourselves is doomed by the deadly contents that we ourselves are, both in ourselves and for ourselves, albeit without conscious awareness. Time, vanquished by the original accumulation, now reappears as a never-ending puzzle we feel compelled to complete. Our puzzle cannot be completed, for what it depicts is the end of the world that has already ended. The puzzle that we feel mysteriously compelled to put back together is not whatever was before the original accumulation, it is instead the world-shattering force of that original accumulation. If it ever seems as if we have found the final piece of the institutional puzzle that is the achievement of social, industrial and perpetual peace, and it often seems so, then we can be as sure as the original accumulation, as certain as the grave we are already in, that the seemingly final piece will shatter everything; and it will do so with all the eternity of the Middle Passage, the Black Atlantic, the undiscovered country, our source and final resting place, the navel of our contemplations. The repetitions are not repetitions of a form of life, they are repetitions of the force that opposed and shattered that form of life; they are repetitions of the original accumulation, of the total extinction event at the beginning of what is modern. The fragments come together in the form of the force that shattered the unity of their former life. That shattering force was the force of the original accumulation, and it shatters them again. Thus it is that we never cross the event-horizon of the original accumulation. The invisible hand of the market and the shattering force of race making genocide were and are one and the same. The market is the ghostly return of genocide. The world of the market, of capitalism, looks like life, “idyllic,” but it is not, not for the have-nots whose not having is the secret source of all capital accumulation. Capitalism is the repetition and intensification of the racial genocide of its origin. Repetition and intensification of the great death event of the world is not life; it is death, only death, and that continually. She comes in colors, like November. Today, 14 November 2008, we have charted, with great accuracy, several of the various terrains of the original accumulation’s repetition. We are the unfed.6 We are the executed.7 We are the banished.8 We are the unrepresented.9 We are the speculum10 in which the other rainbow appears11; the rainbow of the other scene12, the rainbow that promises nothing but the eternal duration of the death we are unable to acknowledge having died.13 We are the despised.14 The colorline, the border of the undiscovered country, runs through our bodies. We even chase each other, connecting the dots like children, if children had the unseeing eyes of corpses15, and we do this to ourselves, for them. We connect the stigmata, our stigmata, policing these bodies that are not ours, for them, for they know not what they do, and neither do we.16 The undiscovered country is the only one we can call ours. And it is a nation we must leave. There is a fear we dare not name, and so we misname it “race” and misunderstand its cruelties with ever more frenetic misnomers. Like so many scattered leaves, it means nothing, or so the scattering makes it seem. What is to be done? Repetition is a refusal of memory. Refused memories cannot be worked through, and without that working through we cannot leave the undiscovered country.

### A2: Necro Solves AB

#### There is an ontological difference between the gratuitous violence of racial slavery and the dehumanization present in international intervention – the attempt to draw a connection between black bodies and global subaltern positions invests in a violent chain of equivalence

Sexton ‘10 (Jared, ‘The Curtain of the Sky’: An Introduction, *Critical Sociology* 2010; 36; 11)

Yet, for Wilderson, **there is a qualitative difference**, an ontological one, **between the** inferiorization or **dehumanization of** the masses of **people ‘in Asia** ... in America and the islands of the sea’, including the colonization of their land and resources, the exploitation of their labor and even their extermination in whole or in part, **and the** singular commodification of human being pursued under racial slavery, that structure of gratuitous violence in which bodies are rendered as flesh to be accumulated and exchanged.7 On this score, we should note that ‘the absolute submission mandated by law was not simply that of slave to his or her owner, but the submission of the enslaved before all whites’ (Hartman 1997: 83). The latter group is perhaps better termed all non-blacks (or the unequally arrayed category of non-blackness), because it is racial blackness as a necessary condition for enslavement that matters most, rather than whiteness as a sufficient condition for freedom. The structural position of the Indian slaveholder – or, for that matter, the smattering of free black slaveholders in the USA or the slaveholding mulatto elite in the Caribbean – is a case in point (Blackburn 1997; Koger 2006; Miles and Holland 2006). Freedom from the rule of slave law requires only that one be considered non-black, whether that non-black racial designation be ‘white’ or ‘Indian’ or, in the rare case, ‘Oriental’ – this despite the fact that each of these groups have at one point or another labored in conditions similar to or contiguous with enslaved African-derived groups. In other words, it is not labor relations, but property relations that are constitutive of slavery.¶ To repeat: not all free persons are white (nor are they equal or equally free), but slaves are paradigmatically black. Because blackness serves as the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and legal culture, it permanently destabilizes the position of any nominally free black population. Stuart Hall might call this the articulation of elements of a discourse, the production of a ‘non-necessary correspondence’ between the signifiers of blackness and slavery (Hall 1996). But it is the historical materialization of the logic of a transnational political and legal culture such that the contingency of its articulation is generally lost to the infrastructure of the Atlantic world that provides Wilderson a basis for the concept of a political ontology of race that locates the color line vis-a-vis slavery: black/non-black rather than white/non-white. The USA provides the point of focus here, but the dynamics under examination are not restricted to its bounds. **Political ontology is not a metaphysical notion,** because **it is the explicit outcome of a politics and** thereby **available to historic challenge** through collective struggle. But it is not simply a description of a political status either, even an oppressed or subjugated political status, because it functions as if it were a metaphysical property across the longue durée of the pre-modern, modern and now postmodern eras. That is to say, borrowing a distinction from Jürgen Habermas, the application of the law of racial slavery is pervasive, regardless of variance or permutation in its operation across the better part of a millennium (Habermas 1985).8¶ In Wilderson’s terms, the libidinal economy of anti-blackness is pervasive, regardless of variance or permutation in its political economy.9 In fact, the application of slave law among the free (i.e. the disposition that ‘with respect to the African shows no internal recognition of the libidinal costs of turning human bodies into sentient flesh’) has outlived in the post-emancipation world a certain form of its prior operation – the property relations specific to the institution of chattel and the plantation-based agrarian economy in which it was sustained. As noted, Hartman describes this in her memoir as the afterlife of slavery: ‘a measure of man and a ranking of life and worth that has yet to be undone ... a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago’ (Hartman 2007: 6). On that score, it is not inappropriate to say that the continuing application of slave law facilitated the reconfiguration of its operation with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, rather than its abolition (on the conventional reading) or even its circumscription ‘as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted’ (on the progressive reading of contemporary critics of the prison- industrial complex). It is one of the great values of Wacquant’s work, especially in Wilderson’s hands, that it provides an historical schema for tracking such reconfigurations ‘from slavery to mass incarceration’ without losing track of the structural dimension.10 The challenge for all subsequent scholarship in the overlapping fields of the sociology of race and ethnic and racial studies is to orient itself within this theoretical horizon if it is to attain what is most essential.

### necro/biopltx Bad

#### Necropolitical theory operates on a plane of race-neutral objectivity which erases the affective and discursive implications of the Middle Passage. This distinctively conceals a point of emergence from which economies of fundability and accumulation took root.

Marshall 12 (Stephen H Marshall, Associate Professor of political theory in The Departments of American Studies and African and African Diaspora Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, 2012, “The Political Life of Fungibility,” *Theory & Event* Volume 15 Issue 3)

To make sense of black vulnerability as a transnational and postcolonial political crisis, Achille Mbembe employs the term necropolitics. A formation of terror, Mbembe explains, necropolitics constitutes the political spaces of postcoloniality as “repressed topographies of cruelty.”9 This is a topography founded upon racial slavery according to Mbembe, where slavery is an inaugural modern instance of “biopolitical experimentation” which founds and institutionalizes colonial sovereignty as a permanent state of exception. Principally concerned to pursue his thesis about the specificities of postcoloniality however, Mbembe averts his gaze from the juridical and libidinal economies of the middle passage and the plantation.10 In doing so he not only fails to clarify what is distinctive about the politics of Atlantic slavery he also severs the affective and discursive continuities between these two formations of terror—notwithstanding his very apt characterization of racial slavery as a form of biopolitical experimentation. Lingering with slavery as social and political formation, Saidiya Hartman explains that the juridical structure of slavery is founded not in the exploitation of slave labor but rather in the fungibility and ease of accumulation of the slave’s body as a commodity. As she notes, the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity makes the black body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others feelings, ideas, desires, and values, inaugurating a political and libidinal economy of black subjection and vulnerability.11 Carefully tracking the myriad ways in which the fungibility of black bodies augment slave masters’ wealth, enable abolitionist imaginaries, and facilitate the constitution of the Jim Crow regime, Hartman not only fleshes out politically Toni Morrison’s insights about the “figurative capacities” of the “Africanist presence in American literature,” she invites us conceive the fungibility of black bodies and hence black vulnerability as both a libidinal economy of enjoyment and a structure of political antagonism. Libidinal economy of enjoyment refers to Hartman’s account of the systemic circulation of the “desire to don, occupy, or possess [blackness] as a sentimental resource” and the “comfort, consolation, pleasure,… and ease” which accompany its “use and possession”. 12 By structure of political antagonism, I refer to fungibility as a system of political cleavage, one which persists and remains occluded if and precisely when we examine black vulnerability through the liberal conceptual lens of injustice, the Marxist lens of exploitation, and even the more expansive if generic lens of domination.13 For Hartman, relations of chattel slavery inaugurate a distinctive structure of violence and vulnerability and the task for political thought is to try to think with and from the subject position it engenders.

### Classroom Good

#### Their apirori rejection of the classroom as a liberating site erases the experiences of black resistance in favor of fatalism

**Gumbs ’10** (Alexis Pauline, queer black trouble-maker with a PhD in Philosophy from Duke University, “We Can Learn to Mother Ourselves: The Queer Survival of Black Feminism 1968-1996”, pgs. 36-43)

Barbara Smith’s diary entries during the Boston Murders are a key artifact in the 1979 redefinition of survival. In 1978 Barbara and Beverly Smith had introduced their collection of “letters from Black feminists” in the journal Conditions with the words “There is no guarantee that we or our movement will survive long enough to become safely historical. We must document ourselves now.”26 Months later as the new year opened with the wave of murders, Barbara Smith and Lorraine Bethel were both living in Boston and compiling the (dangerously) historical collection of writing that made up Conditions Five: The Black Women’s Issue and which eventually became Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology published by Kitchen Table Women of Color Press, an initiative envisioned and made real by Audre Lorde, Barbara Smith and other former participants in the Combahee River Collective Black Feminist Retreats in 1981. The Black women who witnessed the nation’s apathy towards blatant attacks on the lives of Black women who were believed to be deviant and expendable clearly believed that their survival, if possible, would happen in print. They printed copy after copy of the pamphlet “6 women. Why did they die?” as an organizing tool, crossing out and changing the number as more and more women turned up dead. But physical, gendered and economic violence also forced these women to think beyond their own threatened lifetimes. Like Black women in Britain who were also living in the midst of violence against women in Black and immigrant communities and unanswered acts of racial violence (such as the SouthHall Massacre) some Black women, and Black lesbian and bisexual anti-imperialist radical women in particular, decided to archive their existence and presence in print. Barbara Smith published an excerpt from her diary during the Boston Murders in Margo Culley’s edited volume, A Day at a Time: The Diary Literature of American Women from 1764 to the Present. Tellingly, her diary entry starts with a nightmare, not about facing murder in the street, but about the appropriation of Black women’s work by white feminists in the print movement, an act that Smith viewed as violence. Smith’s published diary meditations end with writing as well, when in the wake of her 24 hour a day response to the violence that was around her in Boston, Smith is able to go on a writers retreat, she wonders what it means for a Black woman to have time to think, write, or to live and breathe at all. (In “Chapter 5: Publishing and Survival,” I will provide a close examination of the demise of the Chrysalis collective and will elaborate on how Audre Lorde, June Jordan and Barbara Smith characterized the racism within the feminist publishing scene as racist violence, akin to police brutality and imperialism.) For Smith and other “mothers” of the Black feminist publishing movement, the climate of extreme violence that characterized 1979 (and the time before, and the time after) the threat that they could neither protect themselves, the children of their communities nor their words was often conflated. June Jordan accused Susan Griffin27 of being complicit with police brutality due to her disregard for her and Audre Lorde’s critique of the disrespect for poetry and Black women in the operations of Chrysalis a feminist literary magazine. After demanding that her name be removed from the contributing editors list of Chrysalis in the context of Lorde’s resignation and the police brutality that she experienced, Jordan writes a further letter elaborating that “Chyrsalis and its allies do not fail Black and Third World peoples by accident: It is a failure guaranteed by a concept of identity that excludes my own, in the broad sense of my own.”28 Jordan then goes on to describe her experience of listening to the radio on the way home to a newscast about “yet another white police murder of an unarmed, young Black man” and fearing that this time it was her son. Clarifying her stance against the underlying racism of Chrysalis she adds, “I am ready and working to defend my own right to life and the right to life of my son and the right to life of my people and the right to life of all Third World Peoples. Such a person as Susan Griffin who responds to me as she has, in this Third World context of non-theoretical urgencies persistently not addressed by Chrysalis as well as by S.G., I do regard as someone plainly prepared to let me, and my own, be destroyed.”29 How is it that violence against the words of Black feminist poets does constitute an attack on Black children and a stand against the survival of communities of color? This dissertation agrees with Jordan’s accusation, arguing that poetic practice, print and teaching are crucial elements of survival for oppressed communities, because they were never meant to survive. And survival is a function of meaning. Jordan’s analysis in this series of angry letters to and about the Chrysalis collective (in addition to her important essays on children’s literature and teaching) makes an explicit connection between the means of production for print publication and the biopolitical production or suppression of life in racialized communities. As I will discuss in “Chapter 1: Survival: An Intervention in Meaning,” Jordan had already advanced a definition of survival in her work on children’s literature that tied the production of literary possibility to the possibility of an intervention against the racist implications of capitalism, which she understood to be the literal and social deaths of Black children. This dissertation continues that quarrel. The phrase never meant to survive emphasizes the importance of meaning to survival. Survival, is the practice of asserting a meaning for criminalized forms of life in print and in the social world that contradicts a dominant narrative which insists that certain lives are expendable. The use of the means of print publication to spread an alternative meaning of Black life was a primary preoccupation of self-defined Black feminists. The 1977 Combahee River Collective Statement explicitly points out publication as a primary strategy of Black feminism, We feel that it is absolutely essential to demonstrate the reality of our politics to other Black women and believe that we can do this through writing and distributing our work. The fact that individual Black feminists are living in isolation all over the country, that our own numbers are small, and that we have some skills in writing, printing and publishing makes us want to carry out these kinds of projects as a means of organizing Black feminists as we continue to do political work in coalition with other groups.30 Life in print proved extremely important to Smith, who hustled to get the Combahee River Collective Statement published in as many venues as possible and who created the anthology Home Girls to ensure that Conditions Five, which sold more than four times as many copies as any other issue of the journal Conditions, would not go out of print. Indeed, during the lifetime of Kitchen Table Press, Home Girls and every other title they published remained in print whether or not copies were selling. While she describes the activism that she engaged in response to the Boston Murders as the “most nightmarish yet dramatically transforming political work” in her life, Smith describes Black Women’s Studies, the process of publishing and teaching that ensures that these stories survive over time, as her “legacy.”31 1979 was the beginning of the dissolution of Black feminist organizations including the Third World Women’s Alliance (formerly the Black Women’s Alliance), The National Black Feminist Organization, Black Women United for Action and the Combahee River Collective.32 But it was also the beginning of a period of sustained autonomous Black feminist publishing, marking an important transition in the manifestation of Black feminism. I argue that the violence of 1979 and the political and social conservatism that institutionalized this violence demanded a strategic shift on the part of radical anti-capitalist feminists. In some ways the Black feminist print movement was and is the afterlife of Black feminist organizing in the United States. Through radical publishing and teaching, Black feminists like Barbara Smith insisted on the relevance of their shifting present and projected their visions and lessons into the future. These queer visions and lessons about how the world could be would not be sustained by literary markets, or even academic departments. The radical world that these Black feminists believed in exists only in the words and lessons they left and in our contemporary relationship to them, when and if we find them. While some argue that Black feminism died or became tame or impotent when Black feminist theory moved out of the streets and into the academy, I would counter that the key theorists of a feminist anti-capitalist diasporic vision never accepted the amputation that would have made the academy or the mainstream literary market a homespace for them.33 While I concede that after 1979 some Black feminists agreed to market themselves within academic and literary markets and made sacrifices to so, the queerest of these, also retained an anti-capitalist approach. Alexis DeVeaux and Barbara Smith especially demonstrate a model of Black feminist survival in the way they straddled community organizing, autonomous publishing, commercial journalism and the academy in order to make queer spaces of critique, passing on traces despite the designs of institutions that would never endorse their survival. Barbara Smith, as the anchor for Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press was also supportive of a number of other autonomous literary ventures by women of color. As one of the organizers of the Third World Lesbian Writers Conference and the first financial and in-kind contributor to Between Ourselves a women of color created newspaper published for a short time out of Washington D.C., Smith also made sure that the Combahee River Collective Statement was present in number of special issues created by women of color intervening into predominantly white feminist publications and wrote letters of support for women of color controlled periodical ventures in England and Canada as well. Alexis DeVeaux’s is also an example of the critical production of experimental autonomous women of color led spaces for meaning making. Maintaining a critical stance towards the means of literary production, after publishing collections of poetry and children’s books with a number of mainstream publishers, DeVeaux published an experimental anti-imperialist folder of poems called Blue Heat with her self-invented Diva Publishing Enterprises which she dedicated “to self-publishing.”34 She also ran a workshop for women of the Black diaspora in her apartment in Brooklyn. This collective, called the Gaptooth Girlfriends, self-published 3 anthologies of their poetry. Along with her partner at the time, Black feminist artist Gwendolyn Hardwick, she founded a group called the Flamboyant Ladies who used the living room to hold Black feminist literary salons, craft radical performances, design t-shirts and even plan a day-long event on the impact of the nuclear crisis on the survival of Black communities. At the same time DeVeaux, with the partnership of her sister-comrade Cheryll Greene intervened in the pages of Essence Magazine a fashion and beauty magazine owned by Black men, to expose the largest reading audience of Black women in the United States to a Black diasporic political perspective before the term diaspora was in circulation. I argue that books, pamphlets, periodicals, classrooms and living rooms became strategic spaces of survival for Black anti-capitalist feminists under attack, allowing them to reach past the conservatism of the 1980’s towards an impossible future: this instant and this triumph. A queer diasporic relationship to time, self, community and survival. Quilted secrets, hidden inner pockets, nail scraped passageways, found.

### Saldahna Bad

#### saldanha’s invocation of deleuzian faciality overlooks an ontological gap between what is socially constructed and that which is beyond social construction – as such, he overlooks an *inherent* contradiction at the heart of any anti-racist politics; instead of pretending this contradiction can be dissolved, the alternative recognizes the inevitability of such trappings of race

Kobayashi 9 – prof of geography @ Queens University

(Audrey, Special Review Section on Arun Saldanha's *Psychedelic White*, Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 499-517)

Indeed, to do so implies that there is some material realm that exists beyond social construction, or, as many recent theorists would have it ‘beyond representation’ (see Thrift and Dewsbury 2000). This claim leads to my second point, that by invoking Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of faciality as a complex machine, Saldanha falls into a conceptual trap that also separates the body from the construction of meaning, albeit in the creation of a realm that is supposed to be material rather than ideal. Both are essentialisms. The concept of faciality is very attractive, and it works extremely well for much of the analysis, showing how bodies in Goa work to create difference. Faciality is an ‘abstract machine’ that ‘arranges bodies into relations of power’ through ‘imperialist racialization’ (p. 194). It is an intersubjective dialectic that goes beyond the Hegelian dialectic of recognition, transcending a simple binary of black and white. It is intricate, multidimensional, capable of thousands of expressions that give power to whiteness. Its capacity for transformation is also its capacity for power. By bringing bodies together, it is also geographically located or assembled in place. The machinic process, claims Saldanha following Guattari, is neither essentialist nor anti-essentialist, but rather non-essentialist: it originates in a complex set of human actions but emerges to gain a life of its own, or immanence (p. 189). He wants to counter the power of whiteness by addressing the immanent material quality of the white face, dissolving its power not only through the creation of new forms of faciality but in the proliferation of such forms to the point where the machine no longer has the capacity to reproduce itself. But it is the ontological gap between immanence and transcendence that is problematic here, and Saldanha never quite comes to terms with the gap. There is a break in the dialectic (and dialectics cannot, by deﬁnition, be broken) between what is socially constructed and what is beyond. He speaks of the need for better ways of organizing politically, but provides little basis for political action. If the power of race is, as he claims, beyond the capacity of social construction to create it, then it is also beyond the capacity of social construction to change it. His answer, instead, is to make that power, expressed in the lines of ﬂight through which faciality is transformed, less predictable, to place it outside the control, in other words, of ongoing social constructions (p. 207). And while we need to be mindful of the paradox, even the inherent contradiction, of believing that to freak conventional practices is to go beyond the conventional, is it not more effective to embrace the paradox than to believe that it can be dissolved? Is it not more important that we understand the direction of lines of ﬂight and the capacity of human actions to change those lines than simply to disrupt them? I have no quarrel with Saldanha’s political objectives, therefore, but I am concerned about the theoretical paths by which he achieves them. To pick up the paradox of the title, while the psychedelic lifestyle of Goa freaks did not overcome, but rather reinforced, the power of their whiteness, the concept of whiteness itself is psychedelic, a delusion of superiority worked out in embodiment-face-location that ends up ‘reproducing what it escapes’ (p. 211). The troubling ambiguity with which this book ends and his resistance to committing to a political course, emphasizes strongly the limitations upon, as the ﬁrst line of the ﬁrst chapter has it, ‘what a white body can do’ (p. 11). Thus the book ends by reproducing rather than escaping the contradictions and social challenges of race. On the last page, white freaks still dance around, not with, Indian beggars. While I may be unhappy with the lack of politics in the conclusion, there is one thing about which Saldanha and I are in complete agreement: that before whiteness can be changed its complexity must be understood. This volume does a great job of making sense of whiteness.

### A2: Puar Suicide Bomb Alt

#### The alt manifests itself in the figure of the suicide bomber which their theory posits in contrast with the supposed human agency of the female slave – this mystifies the way that black flesh is coded NOT as a human resistant subject but rather as an imperceptible singularity

Sexton 10’ (Jared Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery,” *Social Text*: 103. KLB)

The final object of contemplation in Mbembe’s rewriting of Agamben’s rewriting of Foucault’s biopolitics is the fin de siècle figure of resistance to the colonial occupation of Palestine: the (presumptively male) suicide bomber. The slave, “able to demonstrate the protean capabilities of the human bond through music and the very body that was supposedly possessed by another,” is thus contrasted subtly with the colonized native, whose “body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense”—a cultural politics in lieu of an armed struggle in which “to large extent, resistance and self-destruction are synonymous.”35 Resistance to slavery in this account is self-preservative and forged by way of a demonstration of the capabilities of the human bond, whereas resistance to colonial occupation is self-destructive and consists in a demonstration of the failure of the human bond, the limits of its protean capabilities. One could object, in an empiricist vein, that the slave too resists in ways that are quite nearly as self-destructive as an improvised explosive device and that the colonial subject too resists through the creation and performance of music and the stylization of the body, but that would be to miss the symptomatic value of Mbembe’s theorization. Mbembe describes suicide bombing as being organized by “two apparently irreconcilable logics,” “the logic of martyrdom and the logic of survival,” and it is the express purpose of the rubric of necropolitics to meditate upon this unlikely logical convergence.36 However, there is a discrepancy at the heart of the enterprise. Rightly so, the theorization of necropolitics as a friendly critique of Agamben’s notion of bare life involves an excursus on certain “repressed topographies of cruelty,” including, first of all, slavery, in which “the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom become blurred.”37 Yet, as noted, the logic of resistance-as-suicide-as-sacrifice-as-martyrdom is for Mbembe epitomized by the presumptively male suicide bomber at war with colonial occupation, “the most accomplished form of necropower” in the contemporary world, rather than Hartman’s resistant female slave, Celia, engaged in close-quarters combat with the sexual economy of slave society, “the emblematic and paradoxical figure of the state of exception.”38 Why the unannounced transposition? Because the restricted notion of homo sacer—alongside the related notions of bare life and the state of exception— is being used in confusion to account for the effects of the biopolitics of race too generally. The homo sacer, “divested of political status and reduced to bare life,” is distinguished not by her vulnerability to a specific form or degree of state-sanctioned violence but by her social proscription from the honor of sacrifice.39 The homo sacer is banned from the witness-bearing function of martyrdom (from the ancient Greek martys, “witness”). Her suffering is therefore imperceptible or illegible as a rule. It is against the law to recognize her sovereignty or self-possession.

### A2: Puar Assemblage K

#### Puar’s theory of assemblage can only disavow the bodily specificity of the black female

Martina 14 (Egbert Alejandro Martina, cultural critic, activist, and diasporic Afrorealist, 4-30-14, “more on puar and intersectionality,” <http://processedlives.tumblr.com/post/84342486940/more-on-puar-and-intersectionality>, strikethrough in original) gz

We could say here that Crenshaw anticipates Puar’s critique that intersectionality produces the enabling intellectual frameworks of state violence by insisting, to the contrary, that intersectionality is a reaction to the enabling frameworks of state violence and, further, demands for a new mode of analysis that undermines the enabling frameworks of state violence. This enabling intellectual framework is precisely the insistence that race and gender constitute discreet addends that are combined arithmetically to produce a sum—namely, the Black woman. Instead, the Black woman as a subject position is something different altogether, which is to say that race and gender are different things altogether than discreet markers of identity.

For Crenshaw, ‘the paradigmatic political and theoretical dilemma created by the intersection of race and gender’ is as follows: ‘Black women are caught between ideological and political currents that combine first to create and then to bury Black women’s experiences’ (1989: 160). That is, the Black woman, as a subject position, does not exist at a discreet point on a map (where ‘race’ and ‘gender’ meet), because the Black woman is produced in and as erasure. Black female subjectivity always only in a frustrated process of arriving, it is only ever the anticipation of its own arrival.

The Black female ~~subject~~ (a subject produced through its own erasure—to take a page from the work of Frank B. Wilderson, III [Red, White, and Black, p.xi]) as articulated by Crenshaw is precisely the disavowed Blackness that produces the queerness of Puar’s terrorist assemblages.

The question, then, is not, why can’t Puar see that intersectionality is not at all opposed to assemblage (but its very foundation), but why does Puar insist that intersectionality is opposed to assemblage?

### Language

#### Language has power over individuals and how society views them.

Paul Harpur, 12, Dr. Paul Harpur is a Senior Lecturer TC Beirne School of Law at University of QLD, specializing in disability rights, 04 Apr 2012., "From disability to ability: changing the phrasing of the debate,” Disability and Society, accessed June 35, 2017, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09687599.2012.654985>, BFMN

Language can influence how people think (Clark and Marsh 2002). Oliver has argued: ‘While it is undoubtedly true that communication is a function of language, it is not the only one. Language is also about politics, domination and control’ (1994, 4). Similarly Shakespeare explains that ‘prejudice is not just interpersonal, it is also implicit in cultural representation, in language and in socialization’ (1997, 234). Accordingly words can be extremely powerful tools in shaping public perceptions. Words and powerful phrases can be used to help shape public perceptions (Platteel 2003, 94; Werz and Sally 1998, 4). An important issue for disability advocates is how to use the power of language to influence public perceptions.

### Gender

#### Necro politics fail to engage gender by creating spaces and strategies that are gendered that target Black Women

Smith 16 – (Christen A., Associate Professor of Anthropology and African and African Diaspora Studies @UT & Ph.d – Cultural and Social Anthropology @Stanford, “Facing the Dragon: Black Mothering, Sequelae, and Gendered Necropolitics in the Americas”, Transforming Anthropology, Vol. 24, Number 1, PG 40-41, Published 4/19/16, SL)

Although necropolitics is a useful framework

for conceptualizing the state’s repressive apparatus

and its relationship with Blackness in the Americ-

as, feminist scholars note that Mbembe’s deﬁnition

of necropolitics fails to critically engage with the

question of gender (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade 2008;

Wright 2011; Puar 2007). “Gender...is central to

the violent dynamics linking the production of

states to the reproduction of their subjects”

(Wright 2011:710). Necropolitical subjugations of

life to death incorporate uniquely gendered strate-

gies of terror. Femicide in Ciudad Juarez and

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Indeed, in many ways, sovereign violence cannot

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necropolitics is a useful framework for conceptualizing the state’s repressive apparatus and its relationship with Blackness in the Americ- as, feminist scholars note that Mbembe’s deﬁnition of necropolitics fails to critically engage with the question of gender (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade 2008; Wright 2011; Puar 2007). “Gender. . .is central to the violent dynamics linking the production of states to the reproduction of their subjects” (Wright 2011:710). Necropolitical subjugations of life to death incorporate uniquely **gendered strate- gies of terror.** F emicide in Ciudad Juarez and honor killings in Turkey are two examples of such mechanisms (Ahmetbeyzade 2008; Wright 2011). Indeed, in many ways, sovereign violence cannot be decoupled from the politics of gender. Mbembe develops the theory of necropolitics in conversation with Agamben’s (1998) conceptu- alization of bare life. Bare life, as Agamben argues, is the stripping of political rights (polis), followed by the relegation of the political subject to the realm of zoe—bare life—wherein the sub- ject becomes killable by anyone without justiﬁca- tion. Yet, zoe was used in ancient Greece to also refer to the life in the zone of home (oikos, non- political life) (199812). The zone of zoe included women, children, the elderly and the mentally insane in opposition to politicized male life (poll's). In other words, the **zone of bare life is an inherently gendered space** that coincides with the absence of political subjectivity and the mark of violability. Moreover, “gender. . .is central to the violent dynamics linking the production of states to the reproduction of their subjects” (Wright 2011:710). Gender is one of the fundamental aspects that deﬁnes the body’s relationship with the nation-state and its killable status. Gender fundamentally deﬁnes the necropolitical economy of Black death. The stories of Black mothers’ experiences with police killings demonstrates this qualitatively. The theory of sequelae genders our reading of anti-Black necropolitics by focusing on the cumu- lative impact of violence on the family. Andreia Santos’s emphasis on the invisible after-effects of state violence evokes Frantz Fanon’s analysis of the relationship between colonial war and the fam- ily. In A Dying Colonialism (1965), Fanon notes that in the course of treating victims of the war in Algeria, he discovered that the family unit was an intended target of colonial devastation. Of colo- nialism’s targeting of the family, Fanon writes, “The tactic adopted by French colonialism since the beginning of the Revolution has had the result of separating the people from each other, of frag- menting them, with the sole objective of making any cohesion impossible” (1965:118). The strate- gies of the colonial state are to mobilize the repressive apparatus to quell colonized resistance, which includes undermining family structures (na- tive ideological apparatuses). This d-structuring of the family is, again, gendered, and is achieved through the production of sequelae, “No previous rhythm is to be found unaltered. Caught in the meshes of the barbed wires, the members of regrouped Algerian families neither eat nor sleep as they did before” (1965:117). Like Fanon, Santos’s medical treatment of those affected by state terror in Brazil leads her to conclude that sequelae are evidence of the state’s necropolitical strategy of targeting the Black fam- ily**.** This targeting is **gendered because of Black women’s role as primary caretakers** resigned to eternal wandering through state apparatuses. She continues, When people survive this level of violence, the majority of the time, they are resigned to a life of eternally wandering through hospitals, through the health system, through physio- therapy clinics, trying to reclaim their auton- omy and their health. And sometimes there is no other alternative. Sometimes the women must stop work to take care of their husbands, their sons, their brothers, and sometimes these people end up having their lives downgraded because their lives have become **a living death** [my emphasis] because of the sequelae they have suffered. The trauma of state violence is not unidirectional. It is also multifaceted, creating an intergenera- tional culture of fear among those who live in communities besieged by this terror and struc- turally upturning the community. This process undermines the economic structure of the family and also, ironically, weighs heavily on other state institutions—namely, hospitals and clinics—that absorb the impact of this loss. The concept of sequelae must be central in our qualitative analyses of anti-Black state vio- lence. It highlights the futility of relying solely on quantifying body count in order to demonstrate the consequences of processes like police killing. It also introduces the possibility that Black women are intended political targets of anti-Black state violence.