# Impact Funding for Military Families

## Charles Horn Signature File: Wake 2017

## Notes

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### Key Terms

**Education Savings Accounts**: Essentially bank accounts that hold money that can only be spent on educational services. E.G. Private School, Tutors, Developmental Services

**Impact Aid Funding**: For the purpose of the aff, Impact Aid Funding is currently designated to school districts that contain families that don’t pay property taxes to the schools

### Explanations

**Land Forces:** In the present, military families are quitting the military because of concerns over their children’s education. This undermines readiness because of lack of human capital. The plan reverses this trend. The second internal link is recruiting. Military children are more likely to join the military, yet many cannot pass aptitude tests due to sub-par education. The plan enhances this which boosts human capital.

**Air Forces:** The air force advantage is slightly different. Currently, the air force faces a retention crisis due to many experienced officers (pilots and maintenance) leaving for private airlines. This undermines deterrence and long range strike capabilities.

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### Plan

#### The United States federal government should increase its regulation of primary and secondary education in the United States by making Impact Aid funding student-centered and portable in the form of Education Savings Accounts (ESAs).

###  Advantage 1 is Land Forces

#### Education quality on military bases is declining now and key to military readiness

**Cowen and Lingenfelter 2/27** (Jim Cowen and Marcus S. Lingenfelter, A former U.S. Navy officer, Cowen is executive director of the Collaborative for Student Success. Lingenfelter, who served in the U.S. Marine Corps, is senior vice president of state and federal programs at the National Math + Science Initiative., 2-27-2017, "The stealth factor in military readiness," TheHill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/education/321321-the-stealth-factor-in-military-readiness>) CH

The backbone of the armed forces, the men and women who wear the uniform, are at risk of voting with their feet if the education of their children suffers because of their choice to serve the nation. Military readiness, a measure of the ability of a military unit to accomplish its mission, is closely watched by leaders. Readiness typically is a function of length of deployments and the frequency of successive deployments, and it can be exacerbated by equipment problems or lack of training. But it is also impacted by issues on the home front, such as the quality of education for military-connected children. At the root is something all American parents contend with: education standards that are inconsistent from school district to school district or state to state and that don’t properly prepare a child for career or college. What sets military families apart is that they are highly nomadic – Department of Defense dependents attend as many as nine schools during their K-12 years. What that means is more than one million military-connected children, most of whom attend public schools, are exposed to the vagaries of U.S. education at a rate far exceeding that of their civilian counterparts. The education of military children can suffer as students are regularly put at a disadvantage of being either ahead of or behind their peers. That academic disadvantage is having an impact on military readiness. Military families now make choices about whether to accept a particular duty station or, worse, even depart the armed forces based in part on the quality of the surrounding schools. A recent survey by the Military Times, a leading publication widely read by active duty and former U.S. personnel, puts a finer point on the connection between the K-12 education of military-connected children and readiness. Over one-third of respondents, 35 percent, said that dissatisfaction with a child’s education was or is “a significant factor” in deciding whether to continue military service. At the same time, 40 percent of respondents said that they have either declined or would decline a career-advancing job at a different installation to remain at their current military facility because of high performing schools. While making regular moves around the country is a staple of military life, the findings suggest that neither the armed forces nor local communities have cracked the code on ensuring smooth transitions for the military-connected kids. A whopping 70 percent of respondents said that regularly moving between states added challenges to their children's education. The online survey of Military Times readers polled over 200 respondents, with representation from all U.S. military services; 78 percent of respondents have served 11 or more years in the armed forces, and nearly half – 48 percent—current serve on active duty. The survey took place from Jan. 12 – 24. U.S. military leaders recognize the readiness connection. Pentagon leaders last year unveiled a policy allowing personnel to remain longer at a particular duty station in exchange for extended service. The action was in response to complaints by military parents who are loathe to move if the next duty station has poorly performing schools. Similarly, the federal government recognizes that being in a mobile military family has the potential to pose significant threats to student achievement. The new K-12 federal education law, the Every Student Succeeds Act, created a newly-referenced demographic category -- military-student identifier. For the first time, federal law requires states to identify military connected students and track their test scores, attendance and graduation rates. For Melissa Helmick, an Army spouse, the mobility of military life added a major stress unfamiliar to most Americans. “We moved every two to three years to a different part of the country or another continent,” said Helmick, a member of the education group Military Families for High Standards. “The pace presented challenges as my children navigated new school systems while, we hoped, gathering sufficient knowledge and ability to succeed in college.” Hope has its place, but it is an insufficient plan for the thousands of military families with children in the K-12 years. That’s the reason why school districts near military installations are teaming up with non-profits to give military-connected children a better chance at a quality public school education. One of our organizations, the National Math and Science Initiative, recently provided a $400,000 DoD-sponsored grant to the Knob Noster School District in central Missouri to dramatically expand Advanced Placement (AP) math, science and English course offerings and provide the necessary supports to ensure student and teacher success. The school district serves 1,600 students, two-thirds of whom have parents assigned to nearby Whiteman Air Force Base. What precipitated the grant was a push by military personnel with children. “We heard an outcry from military families,” said Superintendent Jerrod Wheeler. “They wanted more academic rigor and challenges for their children. So the grant will allow us to establish seven new AP courses that will benefit military-connected students, as well as the entire student body.” This type of grant-making for districts that serve military children is essential. It highlights that simply setting high standards is not enough. Districts, especially those with large numbers of military-connected students, must redouble efforts to provide teacher training and evidence-based student supports – ensuring that students are able to meet and even exceed those standards. The goal is two-fold: to fully prepare students for life after high school and demonstrate to military parents that their children are not being shortchanged academically by their continued service. Military readiness is a multi-faceted challenge. And the education of military-connected children plays a vital role.

#### Scenario 1 is deterrence

#### Preserving human capital is the largest internal link to solving for military readiness, critical to sustain successful deterrence through adaptation and solve a litany of impacts, including preserving NATO readiness, and deterring North Korea

NCFA 16 (Commission On The Future Of The Army, 1-28-2016, "National Commission on the Future of the Army," <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/NCFA_Full%20Final%20Report_0.pdf>) CH

Based on its understanding of the future geopolitical and technological environment, the Commission concludes that the United States requires a flexible land component force capable of contributing to a wide range of future missions in a myriad of regions and circumstances. The optimum balance of Army capabilities differ for each specific threat, but all Army core capabilities are likely to be called upon in the future. Projected Russian doctrine and capabilities to threaten U.S. interests suggest the need for an Army with sufficient ability, as part of a joint and combined NATO or other multinational force, to quickly counter Russian armor, artillery, aviation, and proxy forces attacking European allies. Deterrence and assurance will be the primary mission for these forces. U.S. success in Europe depends on partners and adversaries believing that the U.S. military has the capability and capacity to win in combat. A substantial threat from manned aircraft, numerous unmanned aerial vehicles, and rockets presents the need for robust anti-air and rocket defense capabilities. The most efficient capabilities against these threats may differ greatly from current conceptions; for example, electronic warfare capabilities may be more effective at identifying and countering small drones than traditional kinetic air defense capabilities would. Events in the Middle East are likely to continue to demand Army counterterrorism and countering violent extremism operations. Trends suggest U.S. partners in both the Middle East and South Asia will continue to depend on U.S. weapons and training along with U.S. assistance during disasters. Army activities could include sustained land operations for a gray area, a counter-coercion campaign, or a mission to neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Increasing the Army’s expeditionary capability to quickly respond to threats in this region would improve the credibility of U.S. deterrence and expand response options during crises. In Asia, efforts to deter potential adversaries and assure partners, along with humanitarian response and disaster relief operations, likely would constitute the most frequent Army requirements. Successful deterrence and assurance requires strong strategic lift and improving U.S. and partner-nation anti-aircraft, anti-ship, and anti-missile capabilities to ensure freedom of movement. Army power projection from land into the air, sea, and cyber domains could provide Joint Commanders with the ability to deter, assure, and sustain land forces in the region despite enemy anti-access capabilities. Army leaders will likely also serve in an important military diplomacy role in support of the State Department because the armies of Asian nations generally hold more influence than their navy or air force counterparts. All the while, the U.S. Army must maintain trained and ready forces to deter an aggressive and unpredictable North Korea, which could collapse from within or launch an unprovoked attack on its neighbors. In either case, North Korea will present substantial WMD—chemical, biological, or nuclear—and humanitarian concerns, necessitating a large and long-term commitment of U.S. Army forces. As with the Middle East, South Asian threats indicate the Army should have the ability to proficiently conduct sustained counterterrorism and countering violent extremism operations, both independently and through partners. Security cooperation, civil affairs, counter-WMD, and information operations would be enduring regional requirements due to the many American interests at stake in the region, including the capacity of partners to contribute to counter-WMD and stability operations. However, large populations, frequency of national disasters, history of terrorism, traditions anti-Americanism, regional tensions, and growth of nuclear weapons complicate Army operations in the region. Expected Army missions in Africa and Latin America will focus on efforts to build partner capacity, counterterrorism missions, countering violent extremism activities, and countering transnational criminal organizations. These missions emphasize Army trainers, including Special Operations Forces, intelligence assets, logistics, engineers, and civil affairs. The most important mission remains developing the institutional capabilities of host nations, building upon previous U.S. assistance. Generally, the evidence suggests missions to provide disaster relief or stop infectious disease outbreaks will remain steady or grow. Despite all the threats abroad, the United States homeland will remain a chief concern for Army forces. Aside from girding against potential attacks from both state and non- or near-state actors, the nation must prepare to respond to terrorist attacks on a scale that ranges from small, localized incidents to regional events with numerous casualties and severe detrimental impact on infrastructure. Responding to natural and man-made disasters is part of the Army’s purview. Governors will continue to rely on their National Guard assets in the event of severe weather events, earthquakes, wildfires, and civil unrest, and Army Reserve and Regular Army forces will likewise be called upon to render defense support of civil authorities. Responding in the homeland remains a Total Force mission, both military and civilian. In all these missions, the most overarching mission requirement will be developing the Army’s human capital— creating flexible and adaptable personnel who can respond to adversary efforts to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and avoid U.S. strengths. Army leaders will need to adapt available capabilities and technology to unexpected missions. To retain a competitive advantage, the Army should emphasize the following: 1. Developing leaders who can adapt to enemy actions and new technology; 2. Improving cyber capabilities due to the Army’s increasing reliance on computer networks and the growth of cyber capabilities by state and non-state actors; 3. Expanding capabilities to operate in urban environments due to growing urbanization; 4. Enabling units to operate in a dispersed manner, with smaller and more flexible formations that better leverage partners and respond to hybrid challenges; 5. Improving air, rocket, and missile defenses against growing threats from air and ground artillery and missile systems; and 6. Investing in potentially game-changing technologies and preparing leaders to accept and exploit such new technologies to provide U.S. forces with the greatest advantage possible. Based on its survey of future requirements compared to average requirements in the past, the Commission did not find a reason to expect the use of U.S. Army forces to decline, either in the near or distant future. Rather, the current security environment could demand a greater need for U.S. Army units in missions that are more diverse and geographically dispersed than ever before.

#### The adaption of deterrence is key to solve Noko conflict, noko conflict goes nuclear

Hoehn 4/26

(Andrew Hoehn, 4-26-2017, "How Trump Can Deter Russia And All Of America’s Other Enemies," Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2017/04/26/donald-trump-russia/>) CH

Even the word “deterrence” sounds musty. A Cold War construct, deterrence was a complicated theory and then a collection of evolving policies that kept the U.S. and the Soviet Union from a nuclear Armageddon. It was largely mothballed during the post-Cold War era. But that was then. With a new set of threats playing out across the globe – in North Korea, Syria, the Baltic States, the South China Sea, and beyond – the Trump administration could benefit by relearning and reapplying the lessons of deterrence to this turbulent new era. Why does deterrence matter? First, because the American power to deter is critical to maintaining U.S. alliances, The Trump administration’s problem isn’t deterring other countries from attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Few would doubt the U.S. willingness or ability to obliterate any nation that launched a nuclear strike against it. But, as the Obama administration rediscovered when Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine, the U.S. does have a growing problem in deterring adversaries from using conventional weapons or even “little green men” to attack weak regional states. That’s destabilizing. The second reason why deterrence matters is that security threats to the U.S. and its allies are increasing. The wars of the last quarter century, especially since 9/11, have come at great cost to the U.S. The U.S. has wrestled with protracted wars in the Balkans, the collapse of Somalia, the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, and a growing crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but none of these threats were existential. Not yet. None threatened the survival of the American people, or large-scale destruction on U.S. territory. And, for the most part, none directly threatened key U.S. allies. The threats emerging over the next quarter century are likely to be much more consequential. China, Russia, and North Korea are rapidly modernizing their nuclear arsenals and upgrading their delivery systems. Moscow and Beijing are also vastly improving their conventional military capabilities, shifting the balance of power and introducing new uncertainties. Chemical and biological weapons are easier to get than ever, the threat from cyber attacks seems limitless, and international terrorism is not going away any time soon. How can the U.S. deter these threats? First, it must understand that there is no such thing as blanket deterrence. Rather, one must deter a specific adversary from taking a specific action. Deterrence means anticipating an adversary’s intentions, and influencing them. The U.S. cannot, for example, “deter Russia.” It could, however, plan to deter President Vladimir Putin from seizing Estonia in a lightning strike. Two years ago, RAND experts warned that such a scenario was quite possible. NATO and the U.S. have since taken steps to instill doubt in Russian leaders’ minds that such an attack could succeed. Similarly, the U.S. can deter North Korea from initiating a nuclear attack on the Republic of Korea or Japan, or initiating a large-scale conventional attack on the Republic of Korea. In both instances, the U.S. and its allies offer credible responses that would be both overwhelming and devastating. Yet, we don't think it is possible to deter North Korea from its pursuit of nuclear weapons — it is doing so out of a survival instinct — or its regular provocations of the south, which have brought it international attention and rewards over the decades. An end to the North Korean nuclear program would require a negotiated outcome that would likely necessitate that China be a guarantor for the regime. A holistic approach to these threats should include ramping up U.S. government capabilities to anticipate emerging threats, including events that are unlikely to happen but would be devastating if they did. The U.S. will never succeed at “predicting” the future, but it can foresee multiple possibilities and take appropriate action. Civilian and military planners should also develop specific policies and capabilities to deter those major threats that they can foresee. They should emphasize conventional means of deterrence more than nuclear means – America’s threats need to be credible – and prepare to deter across multiple domains, including space and cyberspace. And they should tailor deterrent capabilities and messages to influence different potential adversaries. What deters Vladimir Putin might not disturb Kim Jong Un. Finally, some threats will not be anticipated or deterred: pandemics, natural disasters, or sneak attacks, for example. Boosting national resilience could help the U.S. bounce back faster and stronger from any disasters or attacks that do occur. Disruption may be inevitable, but more anticipation, deterrence and resilience can help.

#### Lack of Nato assurances leads to Russian expansion- goes nuclear

Colby 15

(Elbridge Colby, Elbridge Andrew Colby has been selected for appointment to the Senior Executive Service and for assignment as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Force Development. Colby was most recently a Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, where he consulted extensively with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 11-11-2015, "Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy In Central Europe," Center for New American Security, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/countering-russian-nuclear-strategy-in-central-europe>) CH

In light of these starkly differing and in key respects opposed perspectives, it seems plausible that conflict involving Russia and one or some of these states, including those that are members of the Atlantic Alliance, could break out. Such a conflict might emerge from an escalation of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, disputes over the orientation of Moscow-affiliated states like Belarus, the handling of internal political reform in such countries, attempts by the Kremlin to engineer or capitalize upon unrest in NATO states among Russophone or Russophile populations, and even outright attempts by Russia to seize territory it regards as having been illegitimately severed from it with the collapse of the Soviet Union. These or comparable political disputes could lead to the involvement of Russian-aligned “hybrid” elements (such as the much-discussed “little green men”) and, if the conflict intensified, an assault by regular Russian forces.6 If the contest were to take place on NATO territory, this would presumably entail hostile contact between such Russian forces and those of NATO or at least some subset of NATO countries, as the alliance would need to respond forcefully and ultimately effectively to such an armed assault on the part of Moscow. A failure to reply in such a fashion would call into question the efficacy, credibility and, ultimately, the viability of the Atlantic Alliance, with dramatic potential repercussions. Should such a conflict break out between NATO and Russia, it would invariably unfold under the shadow of nuclear weapons, since Russia has a large and variegated nuclear arsenal, as does the United States and, albeit in smaller numbers, do the United Kingdom and France. Once a war broke out, no one could be sure that conflict would not escalate, and thus all parties would be acutely conscious of the potential for escalation and particularly escalation to the nuclear level. Indeed, such a conflict between NATO and Russia might “go nuclear” for a number of reasons. Such a war might spiral to higher levels of intensity even if neither side wanted it to, for instance through a failure to understand or observe each other’s respective red lines, inadvertent escalation stemming from the nature of how the sides implement their military plans, and even simple accident. But it is also possible that such a war might escalate to the nuclear level as the result of a deliberate choice by one of the combatants. Probably the most plausible-such escalation pathway would be through Moscow’s attempt to use its nuclear forces to intimidate NATO into backing down. Indeed, there is significant evidence that Russia plans to make such higher-order capabilities part of a war with NATO. In particular, Moscow appears to be refining a strategy of using nuclear and strategic conventional weapons (such as long-range, precision conventional munitions) in tailored and pointed ways with the idea of forcing Russia’s opponent to acquiesce or settle on terms favoring Moscow. Russian sources have occasionally described the objective of such nuclear employment as “de-escalation of aggression,” an approach sometimes termedan“escalate to de-escalate” strategy. An influential 2003 official document, for instance, described “[d]e-escalation of aggression” as the effort to “forc[e] the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity withrelianceonconventionaland(or)nuclearweapons.”9 Russiaappearstoseeboth nuclear weapons of tailored effect and non-nuclear but “strategic” conventional weapons as being of potential use in such scenarios. Nor is this doctrine merely a paper proposition. Rather, Russian procurement and posture appear to provide Moscow with at least some ability to put its enunciated doctrine into practice. Based on its variegated nuclear forces and the platforms to deliver them, Russia appears to have the fundamental hardware required to conduct limited nuclear strikes against both military and non-military targets of value to the Atlantic Alliance, both in Russia’s near abroad and deeper into Western Europe and even North America. Russia could use its large and diverse tactical nuclear arsenal as well as strategic-range nuclear and conventional weapons to conduct controlled strikes from a variety of aerial, maritime and ground platforms. It is also known that Russia has exercised its forces to conduct such limited strikes designed to force war termination on terms favorable to Moscow. Indeed, one expert claims that all of Russia’s large-scale military exercises since 2000 have included the conduct of limited nuclear strikes. Other reports have also indicated that Russia has frequently exercised such options. In a contest with NATO, then, Russia might threaten to use or actually employ its nuclear forces in selective, tailored strikes to demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to “go nuclear” and thereby shock the alliance, break its political cohesion, and ultimately compel it to back down and terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. The purpose of such strikes would not, presumably, be to defeat the alliance’s military or strategic forces outright, but rather to manipulate the risk of escalation in such a way that Moscow would come out of the contest of wills the victor. Russia would have a range of options as to how to mount such attacks. It could, for instance, strike at targets deep in western NATO, hoping to shatter the sense of security and sanctuary of populations in Western Europe and North America. Alternatively, given Russia’s large and diverse tactical nuclear arsenal, Moscow might use its nuclear weapons in relatively contained and controlled ways to exercise substantial influence on the course of the conventional fight, particularly since Moscow recognizes that it is conventionally inferior to NATO if NATO is able to bring the full brunt of its military power to bear. Implications The implications of this capability for the United States and NATO are significant and potentially grave. This is because, left uncountered, such a capability could provide Moscow with a formidable escalation advantage in the event of conflict with the Atlantic Alliance – or in calculations short of war about who would prevail in such a contest, which of course have significant strategic ramifications of their own. In concrete terms, an ability to use nuclear weapons flexibly and relatively controllably could allow Moscow to threaten to escalate to nuclear use in ways that would unfavorably shift the onus of escalation onto NATO and leave NATO “holding the bag.” Such use would do so not only by providing a breathtaking signifier of Russian resolve and ability to hurt the alliance, but might also involve gaining Russia a substantial advantage in a conventional fight over, for instance, the Baltics. Without a corresponding counterpunch to such Russian employment, NATO would be left with the choice of either not responding (or responding fecklessly) on the one hand or dramatically escalating in response. This choice would be especially urgent and difficult if Russian use had hobbled NATO’s ability to fight a conventional war, for instance by interrupting the flow of forces into the region from farther in the rear. The demerit of a feeble response would be that Russia would thereby be incentivized to “double down” on its tailored nuclear options, continuing to employ them to try to force NATO to back down. The downside of dramatic counterescalation, on the other hand, would lie in the reality it could well court a matching response from an adversary possessed of a nuclear arsenal roughly equal that of the United States in strategic forces and considerably outmatching NATO’s in theater-range systems. In brief, the challenge is not that Russia has any semblance of escalation dominance, but rather that it has capabilities to act at more and potentially more suitable echelons of the escalatory ladder. Given that neither side would want to continue mounting that ladder in the event of war, such advantages in flexibility and suitability could prove of great value and significance. Without an adequate NATO riposte, then, Russia might be able to ascend to a level of the escalation ladder that the alliance could or would not match, and then use the coercive leverage created by this advantage to compel the alliance to accede to Russian terms, with possibly calamitous consequences for the integrity of NATO and the security order it oversees. At the least, such a result would be likely to lead to a marked increase in Russian power over parts of Europe and to the serious weakening or even collapse of NATO, as well as to considerably greater security tensions and competition within and around Europe.

#### Scenario 2 is terrorism

#### Human Capital key to solve for ISIL

NCFA 16 (National Commission On The Future Of The Army, 1-28-2016, "National Commission on the Future of the Army," <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/NCFA_Full%20Final%20Report_0.pdf>) CH

Terrorism has emerged as the most visible threat to Americans and the nation’s allies. The organization currently receiving the most attention on the threat spectrum is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), operating in Iraq and Syria, but with devoted followers and affiliates willing to engage in acts of terrorism in nations around the globe, including the United States. The emergence of ISIL is an example of how non-state actors seize upon opportunities created by communal conflict and weak governance. ISIL’s willingness to use murder and other forms of brutality against innocents and its ability to mobilize people, money, and weapons have enabled the organization to seize territory and establish control of populations and resources. ISIL uses social media and cyberspace to prosecute a propaganda campaign while employing terrorist tactics to control populations and territory. The ISIL threat demonstrates the need for land forces to defeat determined enemies that operate among and control civilian populations. ISIL also highlights the need to extend efforts beyond physical battlegrounds to other contested spaces, such as public perception and political subversion. In addition to the threat of direct attacks, the activities of ISIL and other actors in the Middle East have created a massive movement of refugees, triggering a humanitarian crisis that raises concerns for future instability in Europe and other regions.

#### Unrestrained ISIS leads to nuclear terrorism and economic collapse

Cirincione 16 (Joe Cirincione, Joe Cirincione is the president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation. He is the author of "Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late," and "Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons." He serves on the secretary of state's International Security Advisory Board., 4-1-2016, "Opinion: Nuclear terrorism threat very real," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/nuclear-terrorism-threat-cirincione/index.html>) CH

Nuclear policy experts can seem like Cassandra, constantly prophesizing apocalyptic futures. In case you haven't noticed, we don't live in a Mad Max world devastated by nuclear war. Terrorists have not blown up New York with a makeshift nuclear bomb. We haven't bankrupted ourselves, despite the trillions of dollars spent on Cold War weapons. Cassandra's curse, however, was not that she was wrong, but that no one believed her. I don't know a single nuclear expert who thinks that the threat of nuclear terrorism is shrinking. I don't know a single one who thinks that the actions taken by world leaders at this week's Nuclear Security Summit are enough. We are fearful. And you should be, too. Chills went down a lot of experts' spines last month when we saw the news that the Brussels bombers, the ISIS terrorists who blew up the airport and attacked the metro, were secretly videotaping a Belgian nuclear official. This official worked at a facility that had radiological material that terrorists could use for a "dirty bomb." We do not know if they were filming him or his family, if there was a kidnap plot in motion, or what their exact plans were. But this is not some Hollywood fantasy. This is real. A nuclear terrorist event may be closer than you think. What are the risks? First, that terrorists could steal a complete nuclear weapon, like SPECTRE in the James Bond thriller, "Thunderball." This is hard, but not impossible. The key risk is that the outside terrorists get insider help: For example, a radical jihadist working at a Pakistan weapon storage site. Or the Belgian base just outside Brussels where we still stash a half-dozen nuclear weapons left over from Cold War deployments. Or the Incirlik air base in Turkey where we keep an estimated 50 weapons just 200 miles from the Syrian border. Second, terrorists could steal the "stuff" of a bomb, highly enriched uranium or plutonium. They cannot make this themselves -- that requires huge, high-tech facilities that only nations can construct. But if they could get 50 or 100 pounds of uranium -- about the size of a bag of sugar -- they could construct a crude Hiroshima-style bomb. ISIS, with its money, territory and global networks, poses the greatest threat to do this that we have ever seen. Such a bomb brought by truck or ship or FedEx to an urban target could kill hundreds of thousands, destroy a city and put the world's economy and politics into shock. Third, there is the possibility of a dirty bomb. Frankly, many of us are surprised this has not happened already. I spoke to Jon Stewart on his show 15 years ago about the danger. This is not a nuclear explosion unleashed by splitting atoms, but simply a conventional explosive, like dynamite, laced with radioactive material, like cesium or strontium. A 10-pound satchel of dynamite mixed with less than 2 ounces of cesium (about the size of a pencil eraser) could spew a radioactive cloud over tens of square blocks. No one would die, unless they were right next to the explosion. But the material would stick to the buildings. Inhaling just a speck would greatly increase your risk of getting cancer. You could go into the buildings, but no one would. There would be mass panic and evacuations, and the bomb would render a port, financial district, or government complex unusable and uninhabitable for years until scrubbed clean. Economic losses could be in the trillions. Fourth, terrorists could just attack a nuclear power reactor, fuel storage or other site to trigger a massive radioactive release that could contaminate hundreds or thousands of square miles, like Chernobyl or Fukushima. While nuclear reactors are hardened against outside attack, including by the intentional crash of a medium-sized jet plane, larger planes could destroy them. Or a series of suicide truck bombers. But it might not even take a physical explosion. This week, it was reported the United States and the United Kingdom are to simulate a cyberattack on a nuclear power plant. Can we prevent these attacks? Yes, by eliminating, reducing and securing all supplies of nuclear materials so that terrorists would find it too difficult to get them. And by reducing and better protecting nuclear reactors and spent nuclear fuel. Are we doing enough? No. "The capabilities of some terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State, have grown dramatically," says Harvard scholar and former Bush Administration official William Tobey, "In a net calculation, the risk of nuclear terrorism is higher than it was two years ago." The United States spends about $35 billion on nuclear weapons every year. This year, we will spend $1.8 billion on all our efforts to stop the spread these weapons and stop nuclear terrorism. You don't have to be a nuclear expert to know something is out of whack here. It is time we put our money where our threats are.

### Advantage two is Air Forces

#### Retention of Air Force personnel is low now, challenging air force readiness

Thornton 3-23 (David Thornton, 3-23-2017, "Air Force needs more manpower to improve readiness," FederalNewsRadio, <https://federalnewsradio.com/air-force/2017/03/air-force-needs-manpower-improve-readiness/>) CH

Three top Air Force generals told Congress that manpower issues were the greatest challenge to the organization’s readiness. While specific concerns varied between the USAF, the Reserves and the Air National Guard, each agreed that recruiting and retention is their top priority. “Assessing and retaining more airmen is the first step to improve our readiness,” Maj. Gen. Scott West, deputy chief of staff for Operations for the Air Force, told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness during a March 22 hearing. “Today we need congressional support for an FY17 appropriation and amendment that accelerates our readiness recovery. Repeal of the budget control act and predictable future funding are critical to rebuilding military readiness.” Lt. Gen. Maryanne Miller, chief of the Air Force Reserves, broke her manpower needs down a bit further. “With respect to our personnel readiness challenges, I am focused on three main areas: the first being the pilot shortage, the second the shortfalls in full-time support, and finally, critical skills manning,” Miller said. Sponsored content: Download our Executive Briefing to learn how agency and industry experts are using cloud for data and application strategy. She explained that critical skills are career fields that do not have enough people to support them based on the demand — namely pilots on the officer side, and cyber, intelligence and Remote Piloted Aircraft Sensor operators on the enlisted side. The Air Force has been losing pilots at a steady rate for quite some time. Gen. David Goldfein, Air Force chief of staff, said last year there were several reasons for that: The operational tempo for combat pilots has been extremely high for two decades, the commercial airline industry has a strong appetite for new hires at the moment, and the Air Force hasn’t received permission to increase its combat pilot retention bonuses since 1999. Currently, the Air Force is facing a shortfall of about 600 pilots. “We are currently 300 pilots short across the Air Force Reserve,” Miller said. “Our percentage of part-time pilots are around 92 percent. It’s the full-time piece we’re struggling with right now. We’re roughly 66 percent manned on the full-time side, and that is due to the pull from airlines. And the second part of that is being able to compete in the salary range of the technician force. So where could we use your assistance? In relocation, retention and bonuses.” Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Scott Rice, director of the Air National Guard, said he would like to grow his force from 106,000 to 110,000, with most of the increase devoted to maintenance. Know what to do with your Thrift Savings Plan the next time the stock market crashes? Senior Correspondent Mike Causey tells you how to avoid buying high and selling low. The Air Force told Congress in 2016 that it was short about 4,000 maintainers, airmen who care for military aircraft and their components. In February 2017, it said that shortage was down to 3,400 with plans to reach full staffing by 2020 or 2021, but hiring isn’t its only issue. The positions are filled by young, inexperienced workers, who need training before they can handle the responsibility of caring for complex weapons systems. That training takes years. And the lack of maintainers is connected to yet another issue affecting Air Force readiness: the status of its planes. Right now, West said, the Air Force has only 5,500 planes, down from 8,100. The average age of those planes is 27-years old. “Given that the age of the aircraft and parts obsolescence and that older aircraft tend to fail in newer ways, it’s more difficult to make them available for training, which affects our readiness,” West said. “Coupled with our shortage of maintainers to be able to generate sorties to improve our readiness and enable us to train for a full spectrum of operations, it exacerbates the issue with sustaining older fleets with less than the required manning in order to achieve the readiness levels that we need to.” Finally, West said that the Air Force is putting too much money into maintaining excess infrastructure, which currently stands at about 25 percent of the service’s total infrastructure. “If the Congress supported Air Force growth to 350,000, we would still have 24 percent excess infrastructure capacity,” West said. “Today we have a backlog of $25 billion in either MilCon or Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization. If we were to be able to apply $1 billion per year, it would just arrest the decline of what we have to do to keep facilities up to proper standards.” He said that money could be going to modernizing aircraft or increasing end strength instead. “Our total obligation authority is limited, so we have to make tough choices,” West said. He recommended another round of base realignment and closures to rid the service of some of its excess infrastructure. But Miller emphasized that the primary problem remains convincing airmen to stick around, rather than taking their skills elsewhere for more money after completing their training. “Recruiting is really not the issue,” she said. “We can get them in the door. On the active component time, they’re coming in to the Air Force, they’re coming into pilot training on the Reserve side. I fill all my quotas. It’s retaining them. It’s a retention issue.”

#### Increasing incentives is key to solve for loss of retention due to commercial airlines

Snow 1-19

(Shawn Snow, Editor and Reporter 1-19-2017, " Air Force readiness under stress," Air Force Times, <https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/air-force-readiness-under-stress>) CH

The readiness of the Air Force to achieve the country’s tactical and strategic goals is at risk and requires sustainable solutions, Gen. Dave Goldfein, the Air Force chief of staff, said Jan. 18 at an event hosted by American Enterprise Institute. The Air Force has had to contend with a growing slate of missions while providing support to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a growing list of low-level conflicts that have enveloped large areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, the service shoulders the majority of the nuclear command responsibility, controlling two legs of the nuclear triad: intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. It is heavily reliant on and invested in the space enterprise, and currently has roughly 35,000 airmen in cyber and intelligence fields, supporting combat operations and anti-terror missions Goldfein said. The challenge is that missions are expanding and “America thinks it still has the Air Force from the 90s,” Goldfein explained. During the first Gulf War the total size of the Air Force, including civilian personnel, was nearly a million. Today it is 660,000. In the 90s there were 134 fighter squadrons, today there are only 55. “Fifty-thousand airmen have left [the service], while missions grow,” Goldfein said. “Far too small for what the nation demands.” Sequestration, the series of automatic spending cuts enacted in 2013, and the continually evolving wars to combat violent extremist movements have sapped resources and impacted Air Force readiness, Goldfein said. “Am I ready to continue to fight violent extremism for the next decade? Yes,” Goldfein said, while describing the current state of Air Force readiness. However, as airmen maintain America’s nuclear deterrence and respond to threats from high-level competitors such as Russia and China, “we are at a high level of risk,” he warned. Tiered readiness is not the answer, Goldfein said. The Air Force must maintain total readiness to conduct America’s wars in low-level conflicts while maintaining the ability to respond to aggression from near-peer adversaries, and that requires sustainable solutions, he said. The Air Force is experiencing a fighter pilot shortage that is expected to grow to 1,000 pilots by 2022, and the head of Air Mobility Command says he is expecting the mobility pilot shortage to begin growing toward the end of the year. Calling it a national security issue, Goldfein said the Air Force will need to find a way to adjust the supply and demand of pilots between commercial and military needs. That could translate into finding new incentives for pilots to stay in the service or adjusting the 1,500 flight hours required of commercial airliners, he said.

#### Scenario 1 is Deterrence

#### Perceptually strong Air Force is necessary to deter China from invading Taiwan

Gons 10

(Eric Stephen Gons, Dissertation for Pardee RAND Graduate School, May 2010, “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific”, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf>) CH

The USAF would play a part in countering PLA information campaigns. Pursuing information superiority would also require a robust, survivable USAF ISR presence. Opening a naval blockade would be largely up to the USN, although the USAF would be needed to counter PLAAF and PLANAF air superiority pursuant to that blockade, as well as to cover USN assets from PLAAF and PLANAF attacks. Interdicting an invasion fleet and PLA resupply would be a cooperative Navy and USAF endeavor. - 51 - Opening an aerial blockade or a combined air/sea blockade, denying enemy air superiority, and pursuing our own air superiority would possibly be the most challenging operational goal to pursue. Pursuing these operational goals would require USAF air superiority fighters operating in sufficient numbers to deny PLA aircraft air superiority over Taiwan. PLA anti-access threats, especially its ballistic missile force, are most severe where USAF air superiority assets would be most optimally based – at Kadena AB and other airbases close to the area of operations. The actions listed above are just a sample of possible U.S. operational goals. Obviously, which goals are pursued would depend on the PRC course of action. If the PRC realized that the United States had the ability to achieve its operational goals, it would be much less likely to act. Robust U.S. capabilities would help alter China’s strategic calculus in favor of alternative, more peaceful courses of action. If the United States were not able to achieve the goals above, we would have to depend on some other form of deterrence. This could be difficult. If China were to pursue a hostile course of action, it would have already decided that the Taiwan issue was more important than the grave damage hostile action would inflict on the PRC economy and relations with other countries. The cost-benefit calculus implicit in such a decision, coupled with the asymmetry of interests between the United States and PRC, would make deterrence through threats of punishment or retaliation a very tricky matter.

#### Taiwan conflict goes nuclear

Glaser 11 [Daniel, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April]

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Scenario 2 is Long Range Strikes

#### Air-Force is transitioning to long range strikes now, preserving force readiness is key to preserve transition

Gallagher 15 (Sean Gallagher, Sean is Ars Technica's IT Editor. A former Navy officer, systems administrator, and network systems integrator with 20 years of IT journalism experience, he lives and works in Baltimore, Maryland., 10-28-2015, "Air Force picks Northrop Grumman to build Long Range Strike Bomber," Ars Technica, <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/air-force-picks-northrop-grumman-to-build-long-range-strike-bomber/>) CH

Yesterday afternoon, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III announced that Northrop Grumman had won its bid to be the builder of the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB), the Air Force's replacement for its aging B-52 and B-1 bomber fleets. The initial $21 billion contract could end up bringing Northrop $80 billion over the next decade. The LRSB is a key part of the Air Force's modernization plans—the B-52 fleet is made up of aircraft that are over 50 years old, and the B-1 aircraft are over 20 years old. "Building this bomber is a strategic investment in the next 50 years and represents our aggressive commitment to a strong and balanced force," Carter said, before turning the announcement over to the Air Force leaders (DOD video of the announcement is available here). "It demonstrates our commitment to our allies and our determination to potential adversaries, making it crystal clear that the United States will continue to retain the ability to project power throughout the globe long into the future."

#### LRS strike capabilities are necessary for preserving United States role as global power

Karen 15 (Maj Wade S. Karren, USAF, May-June 2015, “The Bedrock of Deterrence and America’s Strategic Advantage”, Air & Space Power Journal, <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-26_Issue-3/V-Karren.pdf>) CH

The fundamental value of wielding a credible, flexible, survivable, and visible demonstration of military power to realize national objectives has not changed. The strength of the American military is based on its ability to project long-range conventional and nuclear power across the globe at a time and place of its choosing. That prowess has remained a key component of our successful deterrent posture for more than 70 years. Many forms of global power exist (e.g., economic influence, diplomatic engagement, strategic communication), but only the United States currently maintains a legitimate capacity for persistent, precise, long-range global strike. Historically, however, great powers tend to believe that the sources of power will remain valid forever, even though they fail to make the requisite investments to maintain them. Without a concerted focus on LRS as a key component of the military instrument, our influence on global events will undoubtedly prove this axiom true. LRS gives America the military strategic advantage necessary to remain a preeminent global power. In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan confronted the same growing concerns (fiscal constraints and a declining military) as he challenged the American people to make the difficult choice to secure the country against a rising Soviet threat. President Reagan rightly said, “We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression. This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works.”19 History has proven him correct. As we balance complex rising threats while holding debates about the country’s fiscal future, we can say once again, “Now is a time for choosing.” As long as we retain our LRS capabilities and our strategic military advantage, we can remain a preeminent global power. To do otherwise would expose us to the same decline in influence experienced by the British as their naval power projection diminished during the economic hard times of the mid-twentieth century. 

#### Loss of US global power leads to power wars and the collapse of international institutions

Goure 13 (Daniel Goure, Dr. Daniel Goure is President of The Lexington Institute., 2013, "How U.S. Military Power Holds the World Together – Jewish Policy Center," Jewish Policy Center, <https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2013/05/31/us-military-power/>) CH

Nations, like nature, abhor a vacuum. It must be filled. How it is filled, by whom and with what are the challenging questions. Unlike nature, which seeks to fill a vacuum with whatever is handy and can be stuffed or sucked into the space available, nations rely on power, relationships and institutions to fill vacuums that arise in the international system. Political vacuums can readily be filled by raw power and the domination of the strong over the weak. Or they can be filled by the rule of law and a community of nations. Twice in the last 60-plus years the United States chose to fill the vacuum caused by the collapse of old institutions, relationships, and power centers. After World War II, along with key allies, the U.S. created an entirely new international order with a set of democratic institutions and international agreements that have endured to this day. America, again in concert with many allies, also built a security apparatus and military machine of global reach and power unlike any seen in peacetime. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States did not simply declare victory and go home. Rather, even while reducing the size of its military, America chose to remain in the world, forward deployed, and committed to maintaining and even expanding long-established alliances and security relationships. As a result, the world was able to weather difficult and dangerous transitions and create or maintain a viable international system. In both cases, nations, including America’s former adversaries, had the opportunity to become part of that system and to flourish. An Increased Role and Decreased Size Ironically, the role of the United States military in maintaining the global order increased with the end of the Cold War. From 1945 to the collapse of the Soviet Union there were between 40 and 50 significant instances of the use of U.S. armed forces abroad. From 1991 to the present, that number nearly tripled to between 100 and 135. These figures do not include several hundred humanitarian operations, support for civil authorities after natural disasters, or the myriad of routine deployments for training purposes or to build partnership capacity. Add these other actions to the total and the activity level for the U.S. military went up by a factor of four after 1991. At the same time, in the 1990s, the size of the U.S. military was reduced by half. With an activity level that increased four-fold and a force reduced by half, the resulting “use rate” or “stress level” on the military increased eight-fold. Two things saved the military from collapse in this period. The first was the overhang of military procurements that had taken place during the Reagan-Bush era. The military has lived off this investment for more than twenty years. The second was selective hollowing in which the services deliberately chose to reduce spending on maintenance and upgrades. For the Army alone this amounted to some $50 billion in the years prior to September 11, 2001. Now again, the prospect of a vacuum in the international order is emerging. Unlike the previous two, this one is not the result of a war or the collapse of erstwhile major powers. Rather, it is the consequence of a gradual diminution of the power and will of those that created the current international system to sustain it. Repeated economic crises, chronic slow growth at home, and the growing burden of social welfare programs have brought most Western counties to the point of military near-irrelevance. The last time U.S. allies “walked away” from the challenge of filling the global space, the United States took up the burden. Today, facing some of the same challenges at home as its allies and, simply put, being somewhat tired of carrying the burden, America is also considering a less central role in world affairs. It is not just that the U.S. defense budget is being reduced; it is being gutted. As every senior defense official and an endless parade of academics and experts has testified and written, the current plan to cut $1 trillion from defense spending over the next decade will be devastating to the U.S. military. Moreover, this is not the same military that existed at the end of the Cold War. It doesn’t have the legacy of the Reagan-Bush buildup on which to rely. It is emerging from a decade of conflict that has worn it out. There are new threats, such as the Russian sale of advanced air defense systems to Syria, which must be countered if the U.S. military is to have any future. It is also badly in need of modernization. The reason the United States requires a new strategic bomber to replace the fifty-year-old B-52 and F-22s and F-35s rather than F-15s and F-16s is because the threat is changing and it chooses not to send U.S. airmen into combat with less capable systems. The growing threat from ballistic missiles, including some armed with nuclear weapons, requires advanced missile defenses such as the Aegis BMDS and National Missile Defense system. It is also a power projection military, which must come from the homeland. This means airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, and a Navy with advanced nuclear attack submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface ships to ensure control of the oceans over which American forces must travel. The Call for Cuts The military also faces an internal cost problem. Overhead, administrative and personnel costs have grown to an unsustainable level. A full quarter of all defense spending is to cover administrative costs, a figure which no private enterprise would tolerate. Another 20 percent is a “tax” on all purchases due to government regulations and unique requirements. Given current budget projections, and recent growth rates for medical care, retirement and personnel, within a decade or so there will be no money left in the defense budget for new equipment. The defense of the United States is in danger of being crushed between the jaws of decreased budgets and increased indirect costs. An even greater challenge is political, or perhaps philosophical. The 65-year-old consensus on the role of this country’s military as the central pillar of security for Western civilization and a force for global stability is over. Elements on both ends of the political spectrum have been campaigning for years for a reduced vision of America’s role in the world and a correspondingly large retrenchment in our security commitments. A few years ago, former Congressmen Ron Paul and Barney Frank, two men who could not be more diametrically opposite politically, sponsored a study of American security that proposed in essence, that this country come home and in doing so, reduce its defense burden by nearly half. Now, what was once an extreme position has taken hold of the entire American political system. The desire to win on issues such as reducing the size of the federal government or increasing federal revenues has become so all-consuming that virtually no one is paying attention to the consequences of these absolute positions for the nation’s security. Congress as a whole has responded to warnings of the dire impacts of sequestration on the military with supreme indifference. Even centrists in both political parties are calling for America to reduce its overseas burden, stop acting as a “global cop,” and cut the size and cost of its military. The Centrality of U.S. Power There are three fundamental problems with the argument in favor of abandoning America’s security role in the world. The first problem is that the United States cannot withdraw without sucking the air out of the system. U.S. power and presence have been the central structural feature that holds the present international order together. It flavors the very air that fills the sphere that is the international system. Whether it is the size of the U.S. economy, its capacity for innovation, the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency or the contribution of U.S. military power to the stability and peace of the global commons, the present world order has “Made in the USA” written all over it. The international system is not a game of Jenga where the worst thing that can happen is that one’s tower collapses. Start taking away the fundamental building blocks of the international order, particularly American military power, and the results are all but certain to be major instability, increased conflict rates, rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons, economic dislocation and, ultimately, serious and growing threats to security at home. The second problem is the presumption that the country’s global security posture was created and maintained to serve others. In reality, the United States built a global security architecture and the world’s best military because it served our interests. Our network of security ties and treaties, most notably NATO, were instituted to serve a number of functions: prevent another war among the Western powers, deter the Soviet Union and its allies, and ensure that the major economic regions remain free and that global trade flowed. In the 1970s, based on the experience of the oil embargo, the U.S. focused more on the security of the Persian Gulf because of the growing importance of Middle East oil to the national economy and that of the entire industrialized world. While the Soviet Union is no more, the essential self-interestedness of America’s military role in the world remains. Any oil expert would say that even though the U.S. is less dependent than a decade ago on foreign oil, a cutoff of the flow from the Middle East would cause oil prices to go through the ceiling. A war across the Taiwan Straits or between the two Koreas will cost us hundreds of billions in lost trade and investment income, not to mention that it would cut off most of the world’s supply of computer chips and consumer electronics. The world’s economy and America’s well being depend on the independence of a relative handful of nations, most of whom are allies. The third problem with the case for abandoning America’s role as the security linchpin of a democratic world order and an international free trade system is simply this: while this country can run, it cannot hide. The U.S. is still the largest economy—at worst it will be number two behind China some day. America’s major companies are global, have hundreds of billions of dollars invested overseas, and millions of citizens working or traveling abroad. American culture permeates—foreign extremists would say pollutes—the world. To truly avoid international entanglements this nation would have to behave like a cloistered monk with vows of poverty and silence. Too Late to Hide Even if America runs, as the far left and right propose, it is too late to hide. Those who choose to be enemies can come after the United States. This is the lesson of 9-11. It also is the message that North Korea sent with its latest tests of a nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile. China, one of America’s largest trading partners and the holder of a trillion dollars in U.S. debt, is conducting a massive and continuous cyber assault on the nation’s private companies, infrastructure, and military facilities. To what mountaintop can America withdraw, how small must it become, and how meekly will it have to behave in order to ensure its security? The irony is that the cost of the U.S. military had for decades represented a small and declining percentage of both overall GDP and total federal spending. Today, defense spending is about 4 percent of GDP and less than 20 percent of federal spending. For this relatively small sum the U.S. had to deter major wars—including nuclear attacks on the homeland—contain innumerable local conflicts, create an environment in which a community of democratic nations emerged, grown, and flourished, and secured literally trillions of dollars of overseas investments, trade flows, and natural resources. It is a tragedy of epic proportions that all this should be put at risk.

#### This vacuum causes a global nuclear power war

Eide 16 – Espen Barth Eide, Higher Degree in Political Science, University of Oslo, Former Senior Researcher and Research Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Head of Geopolitical Affairs at the World Economic Forum, “Are We Sleepwalking Into Geopolitical Turmoil?”, World Economic Forum, 1-14, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/how-can-we-prevent-the-world-sleepwalking-into-geopolitical-turmoil/

Without a concerted effort to properly address current trends, the world is at risk of [heading] ~~sleepwalking~~ into a future of widening chaos with growing danger of interstate conflict. This is the conclusion of a year-long review of global risks, The Global Risks Report 2016, being presented today in London. Geopolitical risk is among the top concerns, but it is the convergence of drivers at different levels – national, regional and global – that threatens to overwhelm existing institutions, and should push us to engage a wider range of stakeholders. Economic and technological change is happening at a pace that leaves most political and regulatory systems unable to cope. This spurs dissatisfaction with leaders and increasing polarization in society, already weakened by a steep fall in social cohesion and trust. Trust is a fundamental element of social capital, and when it wanes, it negatively affects all aspects of society. Loss of trust results in part from a steady increase in inequality, undermining the feeling essential to the fabric of society of citizens being “in the same boat”. Downbeat perception of future economic opportunity aggravates grievances, now also in many of the economies that only recently were labelled as “emerging”. Polarization and growing populism forces leaders to take rather ill-advised, short term measures that may give the appearance of “doing something” without really tackling protracted crises at their roots. Individuals increasingly feel disengaged from traditional structures of power, but strongly engaged through new forms of participation and voice, but in ways that do not necessarily foster shared understanding in society. The conflicts in Syria and Iraq show how today’s wars are not confined to the battlefront itself. They are “glocal” in the sense that while most of the fighting takes place in a specific region, accompanying terrorist attacks can happen anywhere. Sophisticated recruitment campaigns and social media based information warfare has become genuinely global, with fighters from over 100 countries involved in Syria and Iraq. The allure of joining the battle, for ideological or personal reasons, is just a click away from a teenager’s computer somewhere in a European city. Intelligence services around the world are struggling to cope with a new reality, challenged by everything from well-organized, stealthy groups to self-radicalized “lone wolves”. Three years after the Snowden revelations, the debate on privacy vs. security has been slow to move on from recriminations to the search for practical solutions that command broad-based support. Cohesion and trust between countries and societies are also under threat. In its most extreme form, this trend may lead to successful calls for withdrawal from an integrated and interlinked world, creating the 21st Century equivalent of medieval “walled cities” that offer the few a sense of security and order, protecting them from the “sea of disorder” on the outside. For instance, the disjointed political debacle over how to manage the reality of people on the move, while not primarily a European phenomenon, has led to strong demands to undo some of Europe’s primary successes of integration, like the Schengen open borders agreement. A gradual dis-integration of Europe would not only be a regional drama, it would, if it happened, have severe implications for global norms and joint aspirations. This lack of trust and cohesion is also a factor in the development of “hybrid” war. Adversaries – be they states or non-state actors – exploit popular mistrust of government in the design of information operations deployed through conventional media channels as well as more sophisticated campaigns to influence individuals directly via social media. Asymmetric, ambiguous, grey zone, non-linear – these have become the default mode of conflict between major powers seeking to keep their rivalry below the threshold of what is legally defined as "war". With nuclear powers upgrading their delivery systems, confirming their continued emphasis on the ultimate tool of deterrence, such deniable or indirect ways to influence events, including the use of proxy forces, are gradually becoming the norm. The face of warfare itself is changing. Aversion to outright conflict is also a factor in the rise of geo-economics, or the use of economic relations, sanctions, trade regimes and potentially even means of payment for the purpose of geopolitical rivalry. The implications for the infrastructure of the global economy are highlighted by the fact that every conflict today is also a cyber-conflict. Cyberspace has become a domain of warfare, on pair with land, sea, air and space. In cyberspace, however, the attacker gets an advantage that he would not have in the physical world, as distance and early warning becomes largely irrelevant. Possibly, globalization has contributed to new modes of conflict that, if left unchecked, could bear the seeds of its destruction. For some time, the World Economic Forum has warned against globalization going into reverse. The sense of the first post-Cold War decades was that economy finally was becoming open and global, free of the geopolitical lid imposed by great powers. This assumption is again challenged. We see new institutions emerge, driven by new actors, at times complementing, at times challenging the established order. Only time will tell if this is a good or a bad development. We could see it as a trend towards a net of interlinked regional systems coalescing around regional hegemons, displacing a unified, global economic order, but still sustained by some form of overall agreement. But it could also be read as an early indication that we are transiting into a future global system not so much built on a shared set of values, but rather on tacit understanding of each other’s interests and consensus on the lowest common denominators. Last year's edition of the Global Risk Report featured the increase of fragility and disintegration on the one hand, and the return of strategic competition between strong and well-organized states on the other. Both trends strengthened in 2015, at times merging into a perfect storm like the one we are now observing in the Middle East: the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, to name a few, have local, regional and global dimensions. Regional players, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, compete over the future order of the region. Major global players are simultaneously competing and cooperating, at times engaged on opposing sides in the battle but also at times seeking to forge diplomatic compromises.

#### LRS capabilities structure the international model of deterrence, other countries use of it is inevitable, only a question of how the US interacts with it

Karen 15 (Maj Wade S. Karren, USAF, May-June 2015, “The Bedrock of Deterrence and America’s Strategic Advantage”, Air & Space Power Journal, <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-26_Issue-3/V-Karren.pdf>) CH

The basic concept behind LRS—using military power projection to influence the behavior of others—is as old as human conflict itself. Whether it took the form of naval expeditions by Athenian amphibious forays deep into Sparta, overwhelming ground attacks by Mongol light cavalry archers, or the massive aerial bombardment of the Combined Bomber Offensive of World War II, projecting power with speed across a wide span of the enemy’s territory and interests has made attacking or defending against such forces increasingly difficult. Napoleonic warfare, as described by Jomini and Clausewitz, led subsequent military planners to seek ways to identify and attack an enemy’s decisive points and centers of gravity.6 These concepts of power projection framed early ideas of how to break the bloody stalemate of World War I. Col Edgar S. Gorrell consolidated the innovative ideas of military theorists and aviators like William “Billy Mitchell, William Sherman, Sir Hugh Trenchard, and Giulio Douhet, leading to the development of a practice commonly called “strategical bombardment.” In his World War I publication The Final Report, Gorrell called for a strategy using the flexibility and reach of airpower to bypass the strength of the enemy’s military formations and defenses to attack vulnerable, war- infrastructure.7 Though never implemented because hostilities ended in 1918, this idea served as the intellectual bedrock for the strategic bombing concepts developed in World War II. During the 1930s, students at the Air Corps Tactical School studied the writings of Gorrell and Lord Tiverton to formulate the industrial web theory, which held that one could disrupt or destroy certain bottlenecks of production and thereby incapacitate an enemy’s ability to make war.8 Unfortunately, the early theorists overestimated the destructive and moral effects of bombing and underestimated the effectiveness of ground- and air-based defenses, as well as the resilience and regenerative capabilities of modern societies and their industrial complexes. Early bombers did not have the range, precision, or payload to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy’s heartland. By the time air forces had sufficiently established air superiority, which would allow truly long-range platforms to deliver atomic weapons, the war had come to a close. Despite the continuing debate concerning strategic bombing as an independent war winner, World War II demonstrated that ultimate victory came to the side that could project forcible power at a longer distance, preserving its own war capability while denying the same to its opponent. The proposed German strategy leading up to World War II offers an example of how a lack of LRS can affect a conflict. Agreeing with the LRS premise, Germany’s first chief of the General Staff, Gen Walther Wever, advocated a strategy of long-range strategic bombing. He based his strategy on bombing enemy bases, aircraft factories, warsustaining industries, and logistical networks in order to paralyze the enemy’s war-making capabilities.9 Fortunately for the Allies, General Wever’s untimely death in 1936 prevented his strategy from coming to fruition. His immediate successors and, ultimately, Hermann Göring, commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, fatefully steered the latter away from the long-range bombing strategy. Göring’s decision to develop shorter-range bombers such as the He-177 Griffon and the Ju-87 Stuka, emphasizing tactical close air support of ground forces, allowed aircraft-production facilities in England to survive the Battle of Britain. Despite the fact that Germany enjoyed a formidable tactical fighter force, its lack of strategic focus on LRS eventually conceded the strategic advantage to the Allies by allowing British Avro 683 Lancasters and US B-17s and B-24s to project airpower from longer range without fear of long-range counterstrikes.10 The Allies were victorious in large part because they could continue war production unhindered, while the Axis powers found their war-fighting prowess constantly degraded by a combination of short- and long-range attacks. One may debate the effects of LRS in Europe, but after the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II, the value of longrange power projection became readily apparent. The latent threat of further violence by LRS proved valuable to the United States and the allies because it contributed significantly to the end of the war. The value and capability of LRS had matured exponentially by the late 1950s with the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) armed with nuclear warheads. ICBMs enhanced the value of LRS by increasing standoff range and overcoming the lack of precision evident in World War II with nuclear yields. In the end, the ability of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to project power through LRS developed to the point where, for all practical purposes, each country could hold the entire planet at risk of instantaneous annihilation. LRS subsequently became the backbone of each country’s comprehensive deterrent strategies. As the concepts of massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction emerged to deal with the reality of the new strategic standoff, theorists such as Schelling, Brodie, and Lawrence Freedman came to grips with the implications of using LRS for deterrence in the nuclear age. By definition, deterrence is “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.”11 It depends solely on the adversary’s perception of what the opposition (United States) is willing and capable of doing. The first component of the equation—country’s will—ebbs and flows with the political climate. Yet without a credible capability to strike, the will to act becomes a paper tiger because a lack of capability would nullify the ability to act. Thus, capability is a prerequisite to any successful deterrent strategy. Compared to other instruments of military power, LRS platforms historically provide the best requisite capability to hold any target at risk, at any time, and therefore enable successful deterrence strategies. Assuming a nation’s will to act, the strategic foresight to develop, modernize, and adequately fund LRS has paid invaluable dividends by lending credibility to that country’s deterrent threats. Consequently, the value and importance of LRS with respect to national defense and security remain evident today and into the foreseeable future. Nearly every conflict since World War II has demonstrated the United States’ willingness and ability to use conventional LRS assets for limited objectives while retaining sufficient nuclear capability as a plausible deterrent. Despite the demonstrated capacity to destroy targets from long range at will—in Serbia, Iraq, Libya, or Afghanistan—air strikes alone cannot bring about desired political outcomes. Diplomatic engagement, effective strategic communications, economic embargoes, governance aid, and financial incentives for commercial investment are all part of resolving and recovering from wars. Yet without LRS, these forms of soft power possess less coercive power over the enemy. Even in today’s complex world, the power of LRS remains the essence of deterrence and a foundational element of America’s strategic advantage. However, as Mark Gunzinger points out, for the United States, “that advantage is dissipating.

### Solvency

#### Plan solves army retention

AUSA 15(Association of the United States Army, 7-30-2015, "Military children’s education standards affect Army retention," No Publication, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/military-children%E2%80%99s-education-standards-affect-army-retention>) CH

A new report says that inconsistent education standards of K-12 schools in and around military bases could pose a serious retention issue for the Army. "Soldiers expect family care as part of the overall package of compensation provided in exchange for their service and could perceive the value of their compensation as lower if the quality of their children’s educational experience is inconsistent," it concluded. "Soldiers facing moves to new school systems cannot be certain that the standards from one school will set their child up for success in a new school, in part because of gaps in education standards around the country," it said. More than 240,000 active duty soldiers have children, and some 300,000 school-age children (ages 5-18) of soldiers are affected by varying education standards. The report by the Washington, D.C.-based Stimson Center, a non-partisan think tank that focuses on national security and foreign policy-related issues, is titled, "The Army Goes to School – the Connection between K-12 education Standards and the Military Base Economy." K-12 education has caught the attention of Army leadership as a key retention issue because of the damaging impact that low or inconsistent standards are having on the families of servicemembers. So much so, in fact, that Gen. Ray Odierno, the outgoing Army chief of staff, has warned that the performance of local schools will be a major consideration of the service in the placement of Army units around the country.

#### ESA’s provide for school choice which solves for concerns over education quality

Burke 6/20 (Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education, 6-20-2017, "School Choice For Military Families: Educational Freedom For Those Who Secure Our Freedom," Heritage Foundation ) CH

Last month at a policy summit for the American Federation for Children, Education Secretary Betsy DeVos heralded the advent of “the most ambitious expansion of education choice in our nation’s history.” President Trump, she said, was committed to “empowering parents to make the best choices for their kids’ education.” One major step Congress could take to make this pledge a reality is to let “Impact Aid” — federal funds now sent to public schools near military bases — flow directly to the children of military families. If these funds were distributed to education savings accounts (ESAs), military families should then be able to spend it on the services, products and providers they determine are best suited to meet their children’s educational needs. There is constitutional warrant to justify this type of program. After all, the life and support of military families is a crucial part of our national defense — an enumerated power of the federal government. Providing school choice to military families strengthens us all. When military families are given high-quality education options, it benefits their children and the life and security of the nation as a whole. The quality of education available to children of those in uniform affects military readiness. Lack of access to good quality schools can be a determining factor in the decision of service members on whether they will accept a new assignment or even leave military service altogether. A recent survey conducted by Military Times found that 35 percent of respondents said dissatisfaction with their child’s education was a “significant factor” in their decision to remain in or leave military service. The Pentagon’s changes to policy in 2016 enabling families to remain at duty stations for longer time periods was a direct response “to complaints by military parents who are loathe to move if the next duty station has poorly performing schools.” Those complaints may stem from the fact that military-connected children are too often assigned to the public schools closest to military bases, regardless of whether those district schools are right for them. As a result, 80 percent of the 1.2 million military-connected school-aged children attend traditional public schools, and 4 percent attend Department of Defense schools located on base. More than half of children of active-duty military families live in states with no school choice options at all. Like their civilian-family counterparts, children of military families deserve a choice in where they attend school. One of the best ways to advance choice is through innovative Education Savings Accounts. ESAs are parent-controlled accounts funded with a portion (usually 90 percent) of what a given state would have spent on a child in the district school system. Across the U.S., five states have established ESA options: Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Mississippi and Nevada. In Arizona, funds are deposited quarterly into the ESA (going onto a debit card). Parents can then direct those funds to any education-related service, product or provider. They may be used to pay for private school tuition, online learning, special education services and therapies, private tutors, textbooks, curricula and any other education-related services of their choice. Parents are using the flexibility of ESAs to customize educational experiences for their children. Nearly one-third of parents in Arizona use their ESAs to craft a fully la carte educational program. To ensure that those who serve in the military are able to access education options that serve them in the best way possible, federal policymakers should work to empower them with education choice. Transitioning Impact Aid funding into parent-controlled education savings accounts would ensure that the federal program serves military families as well as they serve us.

#### Making Impact Aid funding portable is key

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

Of the approximately 1.2 million children of active-duty families, the total number of school age children is around 750,000. With roughly 13 percent of military-connected children in DODEA schools around the world and at home (DDESS schools) and roughly 7 percent homeschooled, the civilian public school system supports the education of the remaining 80 percent of that population. Data from the DOE show that 756,446 federally connected children (military-connected and tribal-lands-connected) were reported in the public school system in 2016. Despite federal taxpayers’ investment in military readiness and its significant investment in these children in the form of Impact Aid, no research on outcomes, performance, or parental satisfaction exists for the military-connected subgroup of students. The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), a rewrite of No Child Left Behind and the most recent reauthorization of the ESEA, addressed this issue by adding requirements for a military student identifier. The most critical policy reform needed to empower the parents of military-connected children is allowing for choice in education for service members and their children. The federal government should take steps to improve its support for military-connected children and children from tribal lands by making Impact Aid funding student-centered and portable in the form of Education Savings Accounts (ESAs).

# 2AC

## 2AC Case Extensions

### Extra Solvency Advocates

#### Congress is key, only the plan ensures quality education for active duty families

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

A strong national defense depends on a well-supported military. Members of the armed services and their families are the most important resource the U.S. has in terms of national defense. Individuals who have served deserve to be well-served through education opportunities for themselves and their children that enable the pursuit of life and career goals. All military members volunteer to deploy into harm’s way. For a service member preparing for deployment or already deployed far from home, the education options available to their children can be a point of great concern. The schooling options available to military-connected children can play a role in whether a family accepts an assignment, even factoring into decisions to leave military service altogether.1 Yet as important as education is to military parents, more than half of all active-duty military families live in states with no school choice options at all. In order to ensure that those who secure our nation are able to access education options that best serve them, policymakers should empower these families with education choice options through the federal Impact Aid program, which was designed largely with military-connected children in mind. Specifically, Congress should: Direct the federal Impact Aid program, which provides additional funding to districts with a military population, to military-connected children themselves, instead of to public school districts. Re-conceptualize the $1.3 billion Impact Aid program in a way that creates school choice for military families, empowering parents with the ability to choose what works for their children and ensuring that a service member’s decision to remain in the military does not hinge on outdated assignment-by-zip-code schooling policies. Transition Impact Aid funding into parent-controlled education savings accounts (ESAs) to provide children of active-duty military families with education choice, while ensuring the federal program serves military families so that they can serve the nation.

### Warming Add On

#### Heg decline causes nuclear transition wars and turns every impact, also key to solve warming

**Keck 14**

Zachary Keck (was formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues). “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?” The Diplomat. January 24th, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/

Still, China’s relative rise and the United States’ relative decline carries significant risks, for the rest of the world probably more so than for Americans. Odds are, the world will be worse off if China and especially others reach parity with the U.S. in the coming years. This isn’t to say America is necessarily as benign a hegemon as some in the U.S. claim it to be. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has undoubtedly at times disregarded international laws or international opinions it disagreed with. It has also used military force with a frequency that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War or a multipolar era. Often this has been for humanitarian reasons, but even in some of these instances military action didn’t help. Most egregiously, the U.S. overrode the rest of the world’s veto in invading Iraq, only for its prewar claims to be proven false. Compounding the matter, it showed complete and utter negligence in planning for Iraq’s future, which allowed chaos to engulf the nation. Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, **hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history.** This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, **America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows**. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan **acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests** against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through **multilateral cooperation**. Examples of this include **climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.

#### Climate change causes extinction and turns all scenarios for nuclear war

**Scheffran et al 16**

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Climate change and nuclear weapons represent two key threats of our time. Climate change endangers ecosystems and social systems all over the world. The degradation of natural resources, the decline of water and food supplies, forced migration, and more frequent and intense disasters will greatly affect population clusters, big and small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat multiplier” in already fragile regions. This could contribute to a decline of international stability and trigger hostility between people and nations. Meanwhile, the 15,500 nuclear weapons that remain in the arsenals of only a few states possess the destructive force to destroy life on Earth as we know multiple times over. With nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the risks of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or intent remain plentiful and imminent. Despite growing recognition that climate change and nuclear weapons pose critical security risks, the linkages between both threats are largely ignored. However, nuclear and climate risks interfere with each other in a mutually enforcing way. Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity, which, in turn, could enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used, could create more fertile breeding grounds for terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and could feed the ambitions among some states to acquire nuclear arms. Furthermore, as evidenced by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme weather events, environmental degradation and major seismic events can directly impact the safety and security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a nuclear war could lead to a rapid and prolonged drop in average global temperatures and significantly disrupt the global climate for years to come, which would have disastrous implications for agriculture, threatening the food supply for most of the world. Finally, climate change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy pose threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and nuclear power accidents and the lasting impacts on the climate, environment and public health by carbon emissions. 4 Nuclear energy is a critical issue in both climate change and nuclear weapons debates. Although sometimes offered as a solution to climate change, nuclear energy is neither required for nor capable of solving the climate crisis. Nuclear energy lacks the capacity potential to significantly replace the huge amounts of fossil energy, is not economically viable, and is not flexible to meet demand fluctuations by consumers. Furthermore, it stands in the way of increased renewable energy and enhanced energy efficiency. In addition, the nuclear ‘fuel chain’ contains a variety of problems and risks, including the release of radioactive materials at every stage of the cycle and long-term safety problems of nuclear waste disposal. Another serious problem is the possibility at various stages of the nuclear fuel chain to divert nuclear technologies and know-how toward nuclear weapons development. The recognition of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) further compounds this problem as it encourages states to develop nuclear industries, which can lead to high stakes confrontations and may trigger armed conflict. The discrepancy between long-term goals and concrete steps undermines the conditions for international cooperation in security and climate policy. Despite growing awareness of the urgency of tackling the climate and nuclear threat among policy-makers, academics and civil society, concrete action is lagging behind. Furthermore, there exist international legal obligations both with regard to curbing climate change and achieving universal nuclear disarmament. On both fronts, litigation has been used to ensure these obligations are implemented. Scientists and engineers invented the technologies to exploit fossil energy and nuclear power (both for civilian and military purposes) and so they have a special responsibility in abolishing both. Because of their expertise, they can make major contributions to abolishing nuclear arsenals and developing the technologies necessary for a sustainable energy transition. Preventing the dangers of climate change and nuclear war requires an integrated set of strategies that address the causes as well as the impacts on the natural and social environment. Institutions are needed to strengthen common, ecological and human security, build and reinforce conflict-resolution mechanisms, low-carbon energy alternatives and sustainable lifecycles that respect the capabilities of the living world and create the conditions for viable and sustainable peace.

#### Disease causes extinction – outweighs nuclear war

Guterl, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12

(Fred, “Armageddon 2.0,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied.Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military as commercial. They come from biology, energy production, and the information sciences -- and are the very technologies that have fueled our prodigious growth as a species. They are far more seductive than nuclear weapons, and more difficult to extricate ourselves from. The technologies we worry about today form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we're lucky. But it's more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because of rising prosperity and travel, the world has grown more conducive to a destructive flu virus in recent years, many public health officials believe. Most people probably remember 2009 as a time when health officials overreacted. But in truth, the 2009 virus came from nowhere, and by the time it reached the radar screens of health officials, it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G. Webster of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Before it became apparent that the virus was a mild one, health officials must have felt as if they were staring into the abyss. If the virus had been as deadly as, say, the 1918 flu virus or some more recent strains of bird flu, the result would have rivaled what the planners of the 1950s expected from a nuclear war. It would have been a "total disaster," Webster says. "You wouldn't get the gasoline for your car, you wouldn't get the electricity for your power, you wouldn't get the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart."

### India Pakistan Add On

#### US isolationism means Indo-Pak conflict goes nuclear

Yusef 16 (Moeed Yusuf, Moeed Yusuf is Associate Vice President for the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. He is the author of an upcoming book on South Asian nuclear crises, Brokering for Peace: Third Party Roles in Regional Nuclear Crises., 11-29-2016, "An India-Pakistan Crisis: Should We Care?," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/an-indian-pakistan-crisis-should-we-care/>) CH

The Donald Trump White House will have a fairly crowded foreign policy roster to deal with. From what has been said of the president-elect’s agenda for his initial months in office, Russia, the threat of ISIL and the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, tensions in the South China sea, and his promises to renegotiate or abandon certain international trade pacts are likely to be his top priorities. South Asia does not seem to have made this list. And yet, the region presents some of the gravest threats to global security. Islamist terrorists and the conflict in Afghanistan remain huge challenges. But even greater is the danger posed by the threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The world has recently been reminded of just how tenuous the India-Pakistan relationship remains. Bilateral tensions have been alarmingly high since a September 18 terrorist attack in Uri in the disputed territory of Kashmir killed 19 Indian soldiers. India blamed Pakistan, and responded by using military force inside Pakistan-controlled territory. Since that incident, both sides have continued to exchange fire across the Line of Control that divides Indian and Pakistani Kashmir, resulting in significant military and civilian casualties. The situation flared up significantly last week after India claimed that Pakistani commandos had killed three Indian soldiers. Days earlier, Pakistan reported that it had lost seven soldiers to Indian firing in one night. India and Pakistan are the only regional nuclear states in the world to be locked in an acutely crisis-prone relationship. Heightened crises offer terrorists the most realistic opportunities to breach Pakistani and Indian nuclear security protocols and gain access to their arsenals. Further, experts predict that an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange could “blot out the sun, starving much of the human race.”. It could be the end of the world as we know it. The dangers of an India-Pakistan crisis going nuclear have been repeatedly highlighted in simulations and scenario exercises sponsored by the U.S. government in recent years. These exercises concluded that a crisis can escalate to an active conflict with relative ease and that once underway, India and Pakistan do not know how to keep a war limited. A number of the simulations have ended with Indian and Pakistani nuclear strikes against each other. In the past, India and Pakistan have derived some of their confidence about limiting wars from their expectation of a U.S. role that would force their opponent to back down. They have tested this proposition at least three times since their May 1998 nuclear tests ushered in South Asia’s overt nuclear phase. A year after those tests, India and Pakistan were involved in the first limited war to have occurred between nuclear states since the 1969 Sino-Soviet Ussuri river clashes. Pakistan clandestine incursion into the Kargil region in Indian Kashmir led to a contained conflict. Unable to dislodge Pakistani troops in the initial weeks of the conflict, the Indian military reportedly came within minutes of launching air strikes inside Pakistani territory and the army had orders to prepare to cross the Line of Control at short notice. Either move could have led to swift escalation of the war. U.S. diplomacy proved critical in ensuring an end to the crisis. Alarmed by an Indian ultimatum to U.S. President Bill Clinton, Clinton threatened Pakistan with isolation and ultimately succeeded in getting the Pakistani prime minister to agree to pull out his troops in return for a promise that he would encourage resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue, including on Kashmir. A terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 triggered the next crisis. It brought a million Indian and Pakistani soldiers eyeball-to-eyeball on the international border for ten months. India was reportedly on the verge of punishing Pakistan militarily three weeks into the crisis. Influential voices in India urged action under the pretext that the United States would intervene to prevent Pakistan from escalating, and even physically prevent Pakistan from using nuclear weapons if came to that. American diplomatic engagement was crucial in disabusing Indian leaders of this notion. Washington consistently urged Indian restraint and put pressure on India by, for instance, issuing travel advisories that hurt it economically, while forcing Pakistan to acknowledge the presence of anti-India terrorists on its soil and acting against some of them. Lacking realistic military options and able to point to Pakistan’s unprecedented acknowledgment on terrorism as a success, India eventually de-mobilized. A promising bilateral peace process between India and Pakistan followed, but it eventually broke down in the wake of multiple terrorist attacks in the Indian metropolis of Mumbai in November 2008. The attacks, perpetrated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, brought the two countries “fleetingly close” to major war yet again even as India showed remarkable restraint and avoided any major military mobilization. The United States was again at the forefront, urging Indian restraint and managing to get just enough anti-terrorist action from Pakistan against those accused in the Mumbai attacks to let the tensest moments of the crisis pass. The Uri episode has transformed the South Asian crisis environment in at least one major way. By conducting targeted strikes inside Pakistani Kashmir in the wake of the attack, India has signaled a break from its long-held policy of strategic restraint. Previous Indian leaders threatened such retribution, but none ever executed it. By sending Indian troops into Pakistani territory to strike alleged terrorist targets, Prime Minister Modi has broken the taboo. His approach seeks to compel Pakistan to put a permanent end to cross border terrorism by actively raising its costs for allowing terrorists to operate from its soil. In the short run however, the combination of continuing terrorism and India’s assertiveness makes the prospects of full-blown India-Pakistan crises, and escalation, more likely. Specifically, the next significant cross-border terrorist attack in India could put New Delhi in a bind. Given that the Modi government struck a triumphant chord and declared victory in the wake of the post-Uri military action, another terrorist incident would confirm a failure of this approach to deter terrorism. Prime Minister Modi would likely face immense public pressure to do more to punish Pakistan. Pakistan absorbed the post-Uri Indian strike without overtly striking back, but in doing so, its leadership expended immense political capital. Pakistan would therefore find it extremely difficult to hold back next time round, especially if the quantum of Indian use of force is greater. A tit-for-tat escalatory dynamic could easily be unleashed in such a crisis scenario. There are other factors that promise to make these crises more dangerous than the previous ones. India and Pakistan continue to grow their nuclear arsenals at a fast pace. India has also actively worked to create limited war options against Pakistan under the nuclear overhang. New Delhi believes there is room to use force against Pakistan without breaching nuclear red lines. But Pakistan now possesses tactical nuclear weapons that could be used as battlefield weapons against Indian conventional forces. Pakistan’s nuclear threshold has always been ambiguous, and the danger of India inadvertently crossing it cannot be ruled out. Tactical nuclear weapons will likely lower Pakistan’s nuclear threshold further. These dynamics will reduce the time and space available to U.S. interlocutors of influence outcomes, making America’s ability to prevent an ongoing, fast-paced South Asian crisis from escalating far from certain. Further, U.S. leverage during a future crisis depends entirely on the faith India and Pakistan are willing to put in its crisis brokering. The previous crises saw the South Asian nuclear rivals ultimately defer to U.S. diplomacy in return for promises of U.S. support. However, these U.S. attempts, successful as they were, dented America’s credibility with both sides. The United States promised India that it would press Pakistan to ensure the absence of cross-border terrorism but failed to do so. Pakistan’s actions against terrorists during the 2001 2002 and 2008 crises proved to be temporary and were reversed after tensions subsided. India’s strategic elite have therefore openly questioned the merits of banking on U.S. diplomacy in crisis situations since the Mumbai episode. Pakistan felt disappointed as it never received meaningful U.S. support to get India to negotiate on their outstanding bilateral disputes. Pakistan’s fast-deteriorating relationship with the United States also makes it less likely to perceive Washington as a neutral broker in future crisis iterations. Many in Pakistan believe that the United States can no longer be relied upon. The context poses a serious dilemma for U.S. policy makers. As the global leader, the United States cannot afford to ignore a South Asian crisis that risks going nuclear. The region is home to one-fifth of humanity, including hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens and their immediate families. Close to 10,000 troops and many more private contractors are still stationed in Afghanistan, and any number of U.S. forward bases in the region’s vicinity will also be directly threatened by the fallout of any nuclear incident in South Asia. Washington’s policymakers must think outside the box. The current U.S. policy of engaging the India-Pakistan equation from crisis to crisis and merely firefighting at times of heightened tensions is unsustainable. Crises will continue to recur unless their deeper causes are addressed, and the growth of Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals will make them progressively more difficult to manage. A sustainable policy approach therefore requires the United States to go beyond mere crisis management and proactively facilitate crisis prevention by tackling these deeper causes. Two factors stand out as the principal enablers of conflict: terrorism and outstanding disputes between the two countries. A policy approach that combines the two has not been tried before but offers the best chance of success. The United States should take a firmer stand on any form of terrorism that can thrust India and Pakistan into crises. It must also make clear to Pakistan the reality that it will not be able to hold India back from using force in the wake of future cross-border attacks. Simultaneously, the United States must offer greater support to efforts aimed at resolving India-Pakistan disputes, like Kashmir, that underpin much of the motivation for cross-border terrorism. As a first step, the United States could encourage re-initiation of the India-Pakistan backchannel negotiations on Kashmir that brought the two sides close to an agreement before their bilateral peace process stalled in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. The many competing foreign policy demands for the next U.S. administration notwithstanding, the Trump White House must make a normalized India-Pakistan relationship a top foreign policy priority. No other issue risks causing as much damage to the world, and to America’s credibility as its effective leader, as the prospect of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange. On the other hand, normalization of their ties promises a more stable Pakistan less worried about Indian presence in Afghanistan and therefore more willing to support U.S. interests there. Normalization would also transform a jaundiced nuclear relationship that has held India back from becoming a truly global power.

### Military Suicide Add On

#### SQUO human capital shortages lead to increased military suicides

Ramsey and Padgett 2-2 (Brenton Ramsey &amp; Michael Padgett, Michael Padgett, Ph.D., &nbsp;is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with over 28 years of active service. He currently runs a consulting company focusing on federal government and contracts training. He and his wife reside in the mountains surrounding Sylva, North Carolina, Brenton Ramsey is a retired U. S. Navy Captain with 30 years combined active and reserve service., 2-2-2017, "What is the Appropriate Manpower Requirement of the U.S. Military?," No Publication, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/02/manpower_requirement_of_the_us_military_110730.html>) CH

Since the Cold War ended, military manpower declined by 685,000, a 34.5% reduction. In light of the current threat environment, have reductions put the U.S. at risk? The correct sizing of the U.S. military is once again a topic receiving a close examination by almost everyone. The Trump Administration wants to increase Army active duty end strength to 540,000 from the previously planned strength of 450,000. The Navy would increase from 274 combatant ships to 350 with manning increasing from 330,000 to 380,000. The Air Force would have 1,200 active tactical stealth fighter aircraft and add about 10,000 personnel. The Marine Corps would need to add approximately 12,000 to the infantry. Are these the right numbers for the U.S. to maintain its security and responsibilities worldwide? What are the repercussions if our active duty military is sized too small? Of course, the worst case is we are invaded by an adversary and lose our way of life. This is not likely, for many reasons, in the upcoming decades. Another possibility is a surprise attack with nuclear weapons via ballistic missiles. This is also viewed as unlikely from major adversaries based on the decades-old theory of MAD (mutually assured destruction) although a smaller attack from North Korea or Iran or radicals who get their hands on nuclear devices cannot altogether be ruled out. Therefore, regardless of the overall size of the military, it is absolutely essential for the country to acquire and maintain a robust ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) capability. Lesser interests, but interests that most consider vital, are to fulfill our treaty and other international agreements worldwide and to maintain the world’s oceans for freedom of navigation. International trade increases the U.S. GDP, which raises the standard of living for all Americans. Another reason for a strong military capability to project American strength worldwide is to prevent potential adversaries from taking actions against American interests. When countries are perceived weak, history has shown that adversaries are more likely to fill the void created by the perceived weakness. When the U.S. military is required to protect worldwide interests while being insufficient in manpower, the strain on the undermanned military becomes unbearable for military members and their families. Currently, the suicide rate of 25/100,000 is 25% higher than the civilian population and has more than doubled since 9/11. The military suicide rate in the 1980s was ~12/100,000. The suicide rate increase is one indicator of an overstretched military. One report not released to the public documents retention down across the Navy, even in the SEALs. The Air Force is short 700 pilots, and the figure is expected to grow to 1,000 as trained pilots are leaving the AF for the private sector in much higher numbers than desired.

#### Assisting the children of military families is an ethical act

Astor 11

Ron Avi Astor, Ron Avi Astor is a professor in the schools of social work and education at the University of Southern California, in Los Angeles. He is a project leader of Building Capacity in Military-Connected Schools, a partnership between USC and a consortium of eight public school districts., 6-7-2011, "The Need to Support Students From Military Families," No Publication, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/06/08/33astor\_ep.h30.html

It’s time for America to honor our brave warriors, who have sacrificed so much, by assuring them that we will provide their children with the best public education possible. For too long, military children in public schools have been overlooked, moving from school to school an average of nine times during their K-12 years and often facing a civilian education system that appears uncaring and uncompromising. Military students endure the strain of restarting relationships with friends and teachers, keeping up with work in each new school, and dealing with parental deployment. Certainly, some schools have created welcoming environments and academic supports for this group of students—but not enough. The Department of Defense Educational Activity, or DODEA, partnership program is providing leadership and resources to create these supportive public school environments. Most Americans are not aware that over 2 million students have had parents deployed since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As their parents fulfill their missions overseas, there are too many examples here at home of military students losing credit for courses already taken in another state after a family’s transfer or receiving unexcused absences for spending a day saying goodbye to a mom or dad leaving on deployment. Many students from military families fall behind in school following multiple moves because there is no funding for tutoring services, or they struggle emotionally because of the roller-coaster of deployments. New research from the Rand Corp. finds that long deployments—19 months or more—take an academic and emotional toll on military children. Army children whose parents were deployed have long scored lower on standardized tests than those whose parents had shorter tours of duty. Teachers and counselors also reported increased social and emotional challenges for children with a deployed parent, according to the study. With the heavy use of the military reserves and National Guard in these conflicts, many schools don’t even know if they are enrolling children from military families, let alone providing adequate supportive services. We are at a juncture where some of these problems can be rectified with bipartisan support. For the first time in this country, the needs of military children in schools are being highlighted from the very top.

### Extra Air Force Cards

#### There is a readiness and retention crisis now

Snow 1-19

(Shawn Snow, Editor and Reporter 1-19-2017, " Air Force readiness under stress," Air Force Times, <https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/air-force-readiness-under-stress>) CH

The readiness of the Air Force to achieve the country’s tactical and strategic goals is at risk and requires sustainable solutions, Gen. Dave Goldfein, the Air Force chief of staff, said Jan. 18 at an event hosted by American Enterprise Institute. The Air Force has had to contend with a growing slate of missions while providing support to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a growing list of low-level conflicts that have enveloped large areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, the service shoulders the majority of the nuclear command responsibility, controlling two legs of the nuclear triad: intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. It is heavily reliant on and invested in the space enterprise, and currently has roughly 35,000 airmen in cyber and intelligence fields, supporting combat operations and anti-terror missions Goldfein said. The challenge is that missions are expanding and “America thinks it still has the Air Force from the 90s,” Goldfein explained. During the first Gulf War the total size of the Air Force, including civilian personnel, was nearly a million. Today it is 660,000. In the 90s there were 134 fighter squadrons, today there are only 55. “Fifty-thousand airmen have left [the service], while missions grow,” Goldfein said. “Far too small for what the nation demands.” Sequestration, the series of automatic spending cuts enacted in 2013, and the continually evolving wars to combat violent extremist movements have sapped resources and impacted Air Force readiness, Goldfein said. “Am I ready to continue to fight violent extremism for the next decade? Yes,” Goldfein said, while describing the current state of Air Force readiness. However, as airmen maintain America’s nuclear deterrence and respond to threats from high-level competitors such as Russia and China, “we are at a high level of risk,” he warned. Tiered readiness is not the answer, Goldfein said. The Air Force must maintain total readiness to conduct America’s wars in low-level conflicts while maintaining the ability to respond to aggression from near-peer adversaries, and that requires sustainable solutions, he said. The Air Force is experiencing a fighter pilot shortage that is expected to grow to 1,000 pilots by 2022, and the head of Air Mobility Command says he is expecting the mobility pilot shortage to begin growing toward the end of the year. Calling it a national security issue, Goldfein said the Air Force will need to find a way to adjust the supply and demand of pilots between commercial and military needs. That could translate into finding new incentives for pilots to stay in the service or adjusting the 1,500 flight hours required of commercial airliners, he said.

#### Preserving maintenance staffing is key to readiness

Venable 6/14

(John Venable, John “JV” Venable, a 25-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force is a senior research fellow for defense policy at Heritage., 6-14-2017, "US Air Force is in Bad Shape," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/us-air-force-bad-shape>) CH

Nearly 25 years ago, Senator John McCain observed that “a force begins to go hollow the moment it loses its overall mix of combat capabilities in any one critical area.” Last week, Air Force Chief of Staff David Goldfein quoted those words when questioned about the posture of today’s USAF. No, General Goldfein didn’t say that the Air Force is now hollow. He did, however, flesh out McCain’s definition of what makes a hollow force: “When we talk about a hollow force holistically, we have to talk about all of those things that go into producing a ready force. And it’s training and it’s personnel and it’s equipment, and they all have to come together.” The Heritage Foundation published an independent assessment of Air Force readiness earlier this year that touched on several of those markers. That analysis was based on the testimony of senior Air Force leaders, historical readiness levels, current threats, funding levels, and operational insights gleaned from surveys and interviews with 46 active-duty Air Force fighter pilots. That assessment found that only four of 36 active-duty fighter squadrons are ready for conflict with a near peer competitor. It also found that fewer than half of active fighter squadrons could be deemed “ready” to prevail in even lower-threat wartime missions. That could mean as many as 17 squadrons are not ready to succeed in combat. The Air Force has determined that it needs 3,643 fighter pilots. At the end of 2016, it was 873 short. That might not be so worrisome if all the pilots on hand were at the top of their game. Unfortunately, they are not. Cuts in funding have resulted in lower standards of both flight-school training and what constitutes a “mission ready” pilot. From 1981 to 1990, the average graduation rate for candidates going through basic flight training was 75 percent. The highest single-year rate recorded over that time was 81 percent, logged in 1981. But after 1990, the rate exploded. From 1991 to 2015, the graduation rate averaged 91 percent; the lowest graduation rate was 1991’s 85 percent. At the height of the Cold War, the NATO standard for fighter-pilot flying time was 200 hours per year. Fighter squadrons would not take pilots who flew fewer than 150 hours a year into combat, as they were far less likely to survive their first missions and their lack of competence would put other pilots and the mission itself at risk. Today, the average U.S. fighter pilot receives 150 hours of flight time in training each year, and even that low average is inflated by units that deployed to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where threats in the air are rare, operational demands are low, and the ability to train for the real mission is non-existent. As for the fleet itself, it is old. The average fighter has been in service for well over 25 years, which means it’s much harder to maintain. Unfortunately, the maintenance-staffing shortfall is approaching 4,000, as the most experienced artisans within that realm leave for private life. The impact has been predictable. The sortie rates for Air Force aircraft are now at historic lows — well below those the Air Force endured during its previous nadir, during the Carter administration. When you take a hard look at the current status of training, personnel, and equipment, then, there is no question that the Air Force meets the definition of a hollow force. All service chiefs can only be so transparent when speaking about the readiness of their forces. Each works directly for the secretary of defense, and while piping up during closed-door sessions will most always be encouraged, speaking negatively about readiness in a public forum is rarely permitted. Telling the world a service is “hollow” may expose its weaknesses to an enemy who might otherwise be unaware of them. It could also have a negative effect on recruiting efforts and the morale of those currently serving. There certainly is a risk of exposing chinks in the armor to an enemy who may not be aware, and while it may make sense to some that people within the services “would know” how they are doing, the reality is somewhat different. The average soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman is not part of an operational unit and doesn’t have an innate grasp of combat readiness. While those in operational units should have a feel for their units’ readiness, they may not see the bigger picture unless a senior leader paints it for them. Nevertheless, the facts are indisputable. We cannot continue to ignore our military’s deteriorating state of readiness in hopes that a rogue nation won’t take advantage of it. Congress needs to make this discourse a public one and move immediately to rescind the sequestration-budget caps that hamstring our ability to stop this downward spiral.

#### Strong Air Force K2 freedom of the skies

Auslin 7-24(Michael Auslin, Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., 7-24-2014, "The Air Force’s Vital Role," National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/383556/air-forces-vital-role-michael-auslin>) CH

The tragic shootdown of the Malaysia Airlines plane over Ukraine last week proved that the world cannot take freedom of the skies for granted. This new face of war will require an American military transformed to meet new threats. Much of that burden will fall on the Air Force, whether to destroy ground-based threats, ensure the safety of threatened air lanes, or prevent American military forces from coming under attack from the sky. Yet also last week, the Senate joined the House in letting politics trump strategy, as it passed a budget preventing the Air Force from reforming itself for the 21st century. This failure will limit the country’s ability to continue playing a global security role in what are already more unstable times. After nearly two years of budget uncertainty, one trend is clear: The Air Force will actually purchase fewer aircraft over the next decade than the Navy. The service’s senior civilian officials and uniformed officers have opted to shrink the force in size but attempt to retain its technological edge, primarily by betting on the problem-plagued F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, whose job it will be to attack targets on the ground. While that large-scale, almost existential, choice may have been made, Congress and the Air Force have failed to deal with other, almost equally important choices about priorities that will determine the Air Force’s future structure and missions.

#### Freedom of the skies is key to globalization which enables growth

Husick 14 (Lawrence Husick, Lawrence Husick is an FPRI Senior Fellow, Co-Chair of FPRI’s Center for the Study of Terrorism, and Co-director of FPRI’s Wachman Center project on Teaching about Innovation, June 2014, FREEDOM OF THE SKIES: A TOOTHLESS DISTANT RELATIVE OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182803/husick_-_freedom_in_the_skies_0.pdf>) CH

The events surrounding the shoot down of Malaysian Air Flight 17 are well known: a Buk (SA-11) antiaircraft missile battery, stationed in eastern Ukraine, and either operated or advised by Russian military personnel took down a Boeing 777 cruising at 33,000ft (10,000m) on a well-known commercial air route. The missile system is an old Soviet type, but that does not matter to civilian aircraft, since it is able to track and target aircraft flying up to 25,000m (80,000ft) high, far beyond the capability of every commercial airliner. The dead number 298. Given the political situation on the ground, there is virtually no chance that Ukraine will ever be able to comply with its obligations under the Montreal Convention, and it is far from likely that Russia will, either. The other casualty here is Freedom of the Skies, which seemingly has no one to defend it. There are, of course, tremendous differences between defending sea lanes in international and coastal waters, and defending air corridors over nations and disputed regions in turmoil. The types of cover that can be given to civilian airliners is far less effective than that offered by the US Navy to civilian ships. It is unthinkable that the US Air Force would begin to patrol commercial air routes, using its weapons to preemptively strike at target-acquisition radar systems along the way. Even the battery that took down Flight 17 has vanished back across the Russian border, taking with it any record that implicates its operators and their political bosses. A greater danger than the MANPADS that can destroy planes during their most vulnerable ascents and descents must now become a factor in airline operations. Full surface-to-air threats mean that all operations are at risk. Free passage cannot be assumed in this environment, and political risk must now be a factor in flight planning. As may be seen from the July 22 FAA order to restrict US airlines’ operations at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, even threats in the vicinity of an airport will cause schedule disruption. Since 1944, the air transport industry has been a key factor in making the world a smaller and more integrated place. Globalization and growth have been facilitated by what the international community has assumed was safe and efficient air travel. Just in time inventory systems, from assembly lines that start in the Far East and end in Detroit, to overnight delivery of your made-to-order iPhone all depend on these assumptions. In many regions, however, assumptions of safety are no longer valid. How the US, in particular, responds to such threats, will determine the continued viability of international civil aviation. It is true that US voters have tired of playing the role of global policeman, but it may be just that role that is needed to ensure the future of international air transport.

#### Air-Power and LNS is the 21st century equivalent of naval power, the decline of which jeopardizes the US’s international standing

Karen 15 (Maj Wade S. Karren, USAF, May-June 2015, “The Bedrock of Deterrence and America’s Strategic Advantage”, Air & Space Power Journal, <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-26_Issue-3/V-Karren.pdf>) CH

Nations that can maintain freedom of action and the ability to threaten and apply violent force without retaliation will hold the ultimate strategic advantage. Failure to maintain credible LRS capabilities diminishes the effectiveness of the other instruments of national power. Although the US military has provided a dependable backdrop of international security for over 60 years, the size of that force has diminished recently even though the need for a strong force has not. In light of the present situation, one that closely resembles the slow demise of the British and Roman global powers, we would do well to heed Julian Corbett’s remarks about the intrinsic advantage of sea control during the waning years of Britain’s global preeminence: “Yet the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war have feared or valued British intervention . . . because they looked for its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. . . . Its operative action was that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly met.”13 Just as sea control and power projection proved critical for Britain, so is LRS valuable for today’s leading nations. Global actors such as China, Russia, and India recognize LRS’s strategic value, considering it imperative to a successful national security strategy. These rising global competitors, especially China and Russia, seek to obtain or develop their own LRS and to cultivate antiaccess and area denial capabilities to diminish the enduring strategic advantage of the United States. For example, China has fielded over 1,000 short- and mediumrange missiles, multiple double-digit Russian-made surface-to-air missile systems, and a dozen Russian Kilo-class submarines capable of launching the Sizzler cruise missile.14 China’s DF-21 ballistic missile, boasting a range of approximately 1,500 miles, can reach US bases in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand.15 The Chinese also developed the H-6K aircraft, having a 2,000-mile combat radius and carrying six CJ-10 cruise missiles, which can strike US installations in Guam, Wake Island, and Australia.16 China continues to add to its stockpiles each year, creating a lethal engagement zone for US fighter and bomber crews well outside the first island chain.17 Without an authentic LRS capability, the United States will become more reliant on other global basing options to project forcible power at shorter ranges. These basing options, however, will pose a substantial risk to US and allied forces.

#### Strong US federal signals are necessary to preserve Air Force, key to deter future conflicts

Auslin 13 (Michael Auslin, Michael Auslin is a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington., 8-13-2013, "Why America Needs The Air Force: Rebuttal To Prof. Farley," Breaking Defense, <http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/why-america-needs-the-air-force-rebuttal-to-prof-farley/> ) CH

As sequestration forces the Pentagon to consider truly transformative cuts to the U.S. military, the knives are coming out even more readily than usual in a town known for fierce infighting. Today’s budget environment has created an open season on traditional concepts of roles and missions. Service leaders have become far more vocal in warning about the potential of a 1970s-style hollowed out force, or the potential need to shed certain capabilities in order to protect core functions. In part, the services are working in a vacuum created by the lack of strategic direction coming from the White House. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was not strategic and failed to provide any practical guidance for responding to the key challenges facing U.S. core interests. As a result, a growing sense of ‘anything goes’ is pervading an increasingly hyperbolic defense discussion. An extreme example of that is a piece by Robert Farley, an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky. Entitling his piece “America Does Not Need the Air Force,” Farley asserts that the U.S. Air Force was unnecessarily separated from the Army in 1947, that its core functions can be handled by both the Navy and the Army, and that its existence is an example of the worst form of redundancy in U.S. defense organization. Instead, it should be disbanded and rolled back into the ground forces, while letting the Navy keep its air arm. This belief leads Farley to fundamentally misstate the core role of the Air Force. Farley sees it solely as a support force, providing reconnaissance, transport, and direct attack against enemy forces. He largely dismisses the role of strategic bombing, as well, which he believes the Air Force used to protect its bureaucratic existence in the 1950s and 1960s. Nor does Farley talk about the space, missile or ISR roles the Air Force plays. Yet it is in these realms that the Air Force provides indispensable capabilities that neither the Army nor the Navy can or will replicate, given their more limited core missions. To dismiss the particular demands of fighting in a new dimension (the sky and space) makes as little sense as to deny the importance of land and sea forces. Military innovation has always been about expanding capabilities. To argue that Army and Navy air arms performed well in World War II, and thus there is no need today for an independent Air Force is to ignore the vastly expanded global missions the U.S. military currently takes on. Indeed, only the Air Force provides a unique global capability for both steady-state and surge environments that makes possible the joint operations on which the Pentagon has become dependent. Which other service could or would embrace two-thirds of the nuclear mission (bombers and missiles), or operate the satellites that provide the intelligence and communications ability and the airlift assets upon which all elements of the U.S. Government depend? Moreover, for even ‘traditional’ missions, it is inconceivable that the Army would develop and maintain a conventional bomber force that would be used when ground forces were not deployed, since it would not see such a capability as part of its core roles. Nor would the Navy field a significant amount of close air support planes to protect ground troops, when its primary mission for naval air has been the protection of the fleet and initial strikes at enemy beachheads. It is only the Air Force that can, and does, exploit the full range of possibilities of operating from the aerial realm to ensure the fulfillment of defense objectives. Splitting up that capability will not make the U.S. military more effective, but rather less so. Farley argues that the airpower “works best in conjunction with the application of land or sea force.” Indeed it does, but that is descriptive, not prescriptive, and certainly not an argument that a dedicated, globally spanning air arm is unneeded. As he notes, both the Army and Navy have become more integrated over time, yet still distinct. Same with the Air Force, which, when properly used, can deliver strategic and operational effects across the spectrum of enemy capabilities, not to mention provide public goods to the other services that they would not have the ability to invest in, such as global mobility or space. Yet most importantly, Farley misses the two central reasons why the U.S. Air Force is not only needed, but is indispensable to American strength. The first is the precisely the idea of being a global power. The nature of ground forces means that they cannot act with speed, especially in the beginning stages of a conflict. Building up sufficient forces to undertake military operations can take months. Nor can the Navy have a ship in more than one place at one time. The Air Force is the only service that is globally positioned with a complete range of capabilities that can reach anywhere on earth in a matter of hours, with a mission set separate from mere support activities. Moreover, it can reach areas far inland where the Navy cannot go, and overseas in a way the Army is unable to. The Air Force has perfected the ability to bring relief supplies, peer into enemy territory, strike at key infrastructure, or control the skies anywhere in the world on command – all of which makes America the type of truly global power it is. Second, Farley misses the operational reality of today’s politics. The President’s Defense Strategic Guidance was a giant green light for increased airpower to uphold America’s global commitments and project power. Not for the foreseeable future will our country commit to sending tens of thousands of troops for extended land-based operations. The full range of airpower will increasingly be employed to shape the international environment, defuse crisis, and cap conflict. That cannot be done piecemeal; it can, however, be done flexibly and with the least loss of American life by the Air Force, in conjunction with the Navy and the support of the Army. Farley is right that it makes no sense simply to divide up the defense budget pie equally between the three main services. A better proportion would in fact give more money to the Air Force to expand its capabilities that underpin the operation of the joint force. The other services may indeed use their air arms to support their missions, but fulfilling the strategic objectives of the United States will depend ever more heavily on an independent Air Force that is able to exploit every advantage from the air domain, just as the Navy exploits every advantage from the sea. To expect global airpower without the Air Force is a fantasy, especially in today’s budget environment. If Mr. Farley wanted to be truly radical, he would have called for abolishing the Army and Navy’s air wings and folding them into the only airpower service that can make the full use of their ability.

### International Coalitions Add On

#### Nato assurances are the largest internal link to all US alliances, loss of assurances causes their collapse

**Santoro 14**

David Santoro (senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where he specializes in nonproliferation and nuclear security, disarmament, arms control, and deterrence issues, with a regional focus on the Asia-Pacific region and Europe). “America's Treaty Allies: Worth Going to War Over?” The National Interest. April 28th, 2014. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-treaty-allies-worth-going-war-over-10316>

\*\*Modified for ableist language

Logan raises a critical and timely question as Central and Eastern European NATO allies, particularly the Baltic states and Poland, are asking the United States to ramp up its defense efforts in case Vladimir Putin followed its invasion of Crimea by moving further into Ukraine and by hitting them next. His question also has important echoes in East Asia, where several U.S. allies concerned with China’s growing assertiveness over maritime and territorial disputes are pressing for stronger U.S. commitments to their defense. Echoes can even be found in the Middle East, where many U.S. allies are actively seeking reassurance from Washington because they see the possible conclusion of a historic agreement over Iran’s nuclear program as having the potential to fundamentally transform geopolitics and U.S. priorities in the region. However, Logan is wrong to argue that the United States should not fight to defend even allies of small strategic importance. More broadly, he is wrong to suggest that the U.S. alliance system is creating more problems than it is solving when it comes to matters of war. By fighting for allies such as the Baltic states, the United States would be standing up for more than just a “sheet of paper”: it would be standing up for a principle—i.e., **NATO’s credibility and, by extension, the credibility of the entire U.S. alliance system**. Logan insists that Washington should not worry about having to fight for its credibility, pointing to important scholarly work which suggests that a country’s credibility is assessed on the basis of power and interests at the time of a particular crisis and depending on the specific object of the dispute, not on the basis of its past reputation for acting decisively to honor all its commitments in a systematic fashion. But it is difficult to imagine a scenario where inaction by the United States and NATO over a Crimea-like invasion and occupation of the Baltic states by Russia would not have devastating consequences for the Alliance and **possibly even the whole U.S. alliance system**. Granted, failure to defend the Baltic states would not drive Putin to conclude that NATO is a paper tiger and that, if he so desired, he could freely continue his westward march all the way to the Atlantic coast. Nor would it lead China to believe, by extension, that it could get away with a much more adventurous policy in the East and South China Seas, including by engaging in “island grabbing.” In all probability, both Russia and China would remain very cautious about what they can afford to do short of triggering a U.S. response. Failure to stand up for the Baltic states, however, would almost undoubtedly create an immediate, acute crisis within NATO and among other, already unnerved U.S. allies outside Europe. All would raise major questions about the seriousness, perhaps even the usefulness, of U.S. alliance commitments. NATO’s break-up would be a real possibility. Some NATO and other allies could even decide to resort to self-help and develop independent nuclear-weapon capabilities—a development that the very existence of strong U.S. alliance arrangements has so far helped to prevent—as mainstream scholarship has long pointed out and recently reconfirmed. Plainly, all U.S. allies would feel directly affected and the entire U.S. alliance system would be plunged into a deep crisis of confidence, possibly leading to its partial eclipse. The fact that a Baltic debacle would affect U.S. credibility vis-à-vis its allies more than vis-à-vis its rivals should not come as a surprise. After all, it is always easier to maintain credibility vis-à-vis someone one promises to kill than vis-à-vis someone one promises to save. Former British defense minister Denis Healey captured this well when he famously stated during the Cold War that “it takes only 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians but 95 percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.” This suggests that the United States would in fact have an important interest in going to war to defend the Baltic states. But a broader and essential point is that the United States is unlikely to find itself in such a situation precisely because of the existence of NATO. While it will certainly not shy away from testing NATO’s boundaries, Moscow is simply unlikely to try and replicate the Crimea episode in the Baltic states because the latter are NATO allies and because Article 5 of the Alliance’s founding treaty clearly states that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all. Similarly, however concerning it may be, Beijing’s increasingly assertive policy vis-à-vis Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea is kept in check because the islands are covered by the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In other words, be it in Europe, Asia, or even in the Middle East, U.S. alliances act as effective checks against potential rivals, and as hedges against regional hegemons. **They are contributing to keeping the peace.**

### Inherency

#### Trump is aiming at cutting Impact-Aid in the squo

Crookston 3-16

(Paul Crookston, 3-16-2017, "Trump Proposes $9 Billion in Education Cuts but Increased Funding for School Choice," National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/445858/trump-education-proposal-cuts-funding-adds-school-choice-options>) CH

The White House released its federal budget proposal this morning, and, as Donald Trump promised, many departments are facing cuts, including a proposed 13.5 percent cut to Education. The budget proposal also holds to the president’s campaign promise to increase funding for school choice, by funding charter schools, permitting students’ funds to follow them to different public schools, and creating a voucher program to help families pay for private-school tuition. One can see Trump’s fingerprints on the proposal, particularly where it declares that various programs are lacking or failing, and requests their elimination. Indeed, four of the ten items in the proposal’s “Education” section begin with the word “eliminates.” In total the plan cuts $9.2 billion. On school choice, however, the proposal calls for “Increas[ing] investments in public and private school choice by $1.4 billion . . . ramping up to an annual total of $20 billion.” Exactly where those billions will go is not laid out, but the proposal includes a 2018 investment of “$250 million for a new private school choice program,” which would presumably entail vouchers. (A tax credit for donating to private-school scholarships is likely to appear in Republicans’ tax-reform bill.) National Alliance for Public Charter Schools president Nina Rees called the proposed $168 million for charters “critically needed funding” and said it would “[help] to expand high-quality public education options for all children.” The White House also requested additional funding for Title I — which provides billions for schools with more poor children — with the stipulation that funds would follow children to the public school of their choice. This is termed “portability” in education circles, and critics on the left argue that it spreads students (and their funds) around too much, since federal funding through Title I compounds based on concentration of poor children. This incentivizes keeping them in the same (often lackluster) schools. If funding portability does, in fact, stretch money for poor children thinly across school districts, then adding $1 billion to Title I could be Trump’s way of keeping schools in low-income areas from seeing their funding drop, while still injecting choice into the system. These moves could shift the ground in American education, but, alas, it is the cuts that are grabbing the most attention. American Federation of Teachers president Randi Weingarten said about the cuts, “They do what we feared would happen when Education Secretary Betsy DeVos was nominated: defund public schools with the aim of destabilizing and destroying them.” More measured commentators accused Trump of “slashing” Education, which from a purely budgetary standpoint is true enough, since Education Department funds usually rise year after year. Others have stated that this proves education is low on Trump’s list of priorities, which ignores the long-standing conservative critique that stopping some forms of federal meddling will ultimately strengthen education. The federal programs that Trump explicitly proposes eliminating are the Supporting Effective Instruction State Grants program, the 21st Century Community Learning Centers program, and the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant program. It also sets aside for reduction or elimination “over 20 categorical programs” which are deemed ineffective. Many of these are somewhat soft targets; Impact Aid Support Payments for Federal Property, for instance, is something that Obama also proposed ending. But eliminating the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants opens Trump up to criticism that he would be taking money from poor people who want to send their kids to college. (The White House proposed eliminating the grants on the grounds that Pell Grants are more effective.)

### AT: Recruiting Alt Cause

#### The plan creates a model for education that spills outward to bolster recruiting

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

A strong national defense depends on a well-supported military. Supporting the military includes making education options available to military-connected children. More than 1.3 million Americans made up the (active-duty) armed forces of the United States in 2015, with more than 87 percent of active-duty service members residing in the United States and the U.S. territories. The typical enlisted service member is 27 years old, with the average age for officers increasing to 34.5 years of age.3 The age of most military personnel means many have children school-aged and younger; these children are more than 1.2 million in number. Today, lack of adequate academic achievement, combined with a lack of physical fitness and in some cases, the presence of criminal records, means that more than 70 percent of Americans age 17 to 24 cannot qualify for military service. Moreover, 20 percent of high school graduates who hope to join the Army—which, at 36 percent of the overall armed forces personnel, comprises the largest portion of active-duty military members4 —cannot achieve an adequate score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test to do so. In Hawaii, Louisiana, Alabama, and South Carolina, this figure exceeds 30 percent.5 Children from military families are much more likely to serve in the military themselves. According to the 2016 Blue Star Family Military Family Lifestyle Survey, while only 0.5 percent of the general public is currently serving, 56 percent of their veteran and active-duty respondents reported multiple immediate family members who were veterans or currently serving.6 Because future recruitment depends in large part on military-connected youth, it is in the nation’s best interest to ensure that these children are adequately prepared not simply to pass a basic qualification test, but to excel during their service years afterward. The future success of our armed services depends on offering military-connected children an excellent education.

### XT- Military Manpower Key

#### Maintaining the human capital of the military comes first

NCFA 16

National Commission On The Future Of The Army, 1-28-2016, "National Commission on the Future of the Army," <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/NCFA_Full%20Final%20Report_0.pdf>) CH

The Army is an All-Volunteer Force. Conscription was used during the Civil War and World War I, and the first peacetime draft was adopted in 1940, with the specter of World War II causing concerns about the strength of the U.S. Army. The draft continued throughout the war and ended in March 1947. However, less than a year and a half later, in July 1948, with the Army failing to meet recruitment goals and the beginning of the Cold War raising fears of communist aggression, the Congress established the Selective Service System to provide the Army with manpower. The draft remained the primary source of personnel for the Army through most of the Vietnam War. The Gates Commission, established in 1969 to develop a plan to end the draft and return to an All-Volunteer Force, came to the unanimous conclusion that “the nation’s interest will be better served by an All-Volunteer Force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.” In 1972, at the request of President Richard Nixon, Congress passed Public Law 92-129, which extended the draft for just two more years and committed the country to transition to an All-Volunteer Force, which was fully implemented in 1973. The All-Volunteer Force has had a dramatic impact on the Army. The quality of the force, as measured by test scores and percent of high school graduates, has improved. The number of career personnel increased, leading to similar increases in proficiency and professionalism. Prior to the All-Volunteer Force, only 18 percent of the Army had more than four years of service; by 2006, that number stood at more than 51 percent. The increase in education and length of service has allowed the Army to develop into a true Profession of Arms. However, the clear benefits of the All-Volunteer Force come with a price. Recruiting, developing, and retaining qualified and talented personnel increases the costs of raising an army. The Army also must provide support for the families of the All-Volunteer Force who, more than any other group, share the burden of service with their soldiers and are vital in ensuring that soldiers continue to serve. The Army must maintain an All-Volunteer Force despite the pressures of economic cycles and social conditions. More than two-thirds of the current target population, ages 18–25, cannot meet current Army accession standards. They are ineligible because of physical issues, insufficient education, or violations of the law that are too serious or too frequent. The Army is a profession dedicated to the security and defense of the nation and the U.S. Constitution. Soldiers and Army civilians, bound by the Army’s professional ethic, develop and use their expertise in the service of their country. This ethic guides professional conduct and permits self-regulation, which forms the basis of the trust the American people place in the Army. The Profession of Arms includes uniformed soldiers, regardless of component. It is made up of volunteers who have trained to become experts in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority and entrusted with the defense of the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. However, in an environment of budget constraints, competing career choices, and a diminishing percentage of the American population qualified to serve in the Army, the Commission is concerned that the All-Volunteer Force is nearing a fragile state. So fundamental is an All-Volunteer Force to the governing principles of our nation, and so essential is an All-Volunteer Force in achieving the highest possible level of capabilities and readiness, the Commission considers sustaining the All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the nation. All budget and force management decisions must be made with this goal in mind.

#### Personnel prior question to budget concerns

Muñoz 1-22 (Carlo Muñoz, Carlo Muñoz is the military correspondent for The Washington Times focusing on U.S. defense and national security policy, programs and operations. 1-22-17, “Donald Trump’s hopes to rebuild military threatened by manpower shortage," Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/22/trumps-hopes-to-rebuild-military-threatened-by-man/>) CH

Manpower, not money, may prove a bigger challenge to President Trump’s hopes to rebuild what he calls a “hollowed-out” U.S. military. While much of the debate over how the administration will pay for its ambitious defense buildup, an equally large question mark looms over whether Mr. Trump and Defense Secretary James Mattis can find enough willing and able recruits to meet the demands for soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. On the campaign trail, Mr. Trump called for a restoration of force levels across the services to numbers before a series of “sequestration” cuts to defense spending, including a 540,000-member Army, backed by a 350-ship Navy and an Air Force of 1,200 fighter aircraft. The increases to the Navy and Air Force would likely result in a small uptick of 100,000 sailors and airmen combined, compared with the force levels sought in the Army and Marine Corps, Mark Cancian, senior international security adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told The Washington Times. Between the proposed expansions of the Army and Marine Corps, Mr. Trump’s plan would fall hardest on the Marines, Mr. Cancian said. Mr. Trump’s plan for the Army would put the service’s total force on par with troop levels at the height of the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the White House’s plan to boost the Marine Corps to 36 infantry battalions — more than 200,000 Marines — would put the service at force levels “not seen since Vietnam.” “That would be quite a struggle,” he said. One small sign of the challenge ahead came with the announcement this month that the Army was offering soldiers who have the option of leaving before October incentive bonuses of $10,000 or more to stay on for another 12 months. Those in high-demand fields also could be offered choice assignments or educational training if they stay. The Army Times noted that the service is scrambling to meet the mandate of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which says the active Army must have 476,000 soldiers in the next eight months — 16,000 more than the generals originally planned for. “Is it dire? No. But we need more soldiers,” Army Sgt. Maj., Dan Dailey told the newspaper this month. “We need to do this pretty rapidly.” Another challenge facing Mr. Trump’s plan is the lukewarm response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to an expedited surge in the ranks. Publicly and privately, the service chiefs have expressed wariness over the massive troop increases proposed in the Trump plan, Mr. Cancian said. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller have publicly stated that they would be willing to have a smaller troop increase and use the additional funds to repair aging weapon systems and procure newer ones for their arsenals, he said. Gen. Milley has expressed a desire for a 490,000- to 500,000-member force, and Gen. Neller said a total force of 184,000 Marines would be adequate. If the Trump administration seeks to push troop increases on the services too quickly, it risks a politically dangerous fight with the military brass, said Mr. Cancian. But retired Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr, director of the conservative Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, said Mr. Trump has an opportunity to address a readiness issue that has not received sufficient attention in recent years. Attracting and retaining capable recruits is among the “top one, two or three national security risks we are not talking about,” he said. While hardware and high-tech weapons are critical, “quantity has a quality all its own” in ensuring U.S. forces have the capability to address national security threats around the globe, Gen. Spoehr said. Dwindling pool? Only 1.4 million Americans, or less than one-half of 1 percent of the country’s total population, are serving as active-duty members of the U.S. military, according to Defense Department statistics. Only 17 percent of all military-age Americans would be deemed physically “qualified military available” for service, according to the most recent assessment of possible military manpower by the nonprofit Center for Naval Analyses. The pool of military recruits may be dwindling as the job market improves in the private tech and service sectors. Meshing those factors with the manpower goals required by the Trump administration’s defense buildup plan “is going to be a challenge,” said Mr. Spoehr. Money also will be an issue for the Pentagon. “You can’t do this on the cheap. You are going to have to grow into this thing,” he said. The Army in particular, he noted, can typically boost its force levels by an average of 10,000 troops per year. Go faster than that, Mr. Spoehr said, and “you are going to make some bad decisions” regarding the quality of soldiers who are brought into the service. These bad decisions came to the forefront during the troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mr. Cancian noted. “We just saw one of them be pardoned by the president,” he said, referring to Chelsea Manning, the transgender Army intelligence analyst convicted of leaking military secrets in 2010. President Obama commuted her sentence as one of his final official acts last week. Manning was part of the wave of recruits brought into the armed forces as part of the Pentagon’s effort to maintain troop “surge” levels in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s. To avoid those mistakes, the Trump team at the Pentagon must focus on bringing in “capable manpower,” not just swelling the ranks of the armed forces with fresh recruits, said David Johnson, a senior national security fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. “The issue will be how fast the [military] expansion will be” under Mr. Trump and Mr. Mattis, Mr. Johnson said. “The biggest challenge is we are not just looking for efficiency in the military, we are also looking for effectiveness in the military and the two are not necessary mutually exclusive.” One option to ensure that balance is struck is to slow down the schedule for retirements of more experienced service members, Mr. Johnson said, noting that retaining those officers and senior enlisted members would ease the pressure on fresh recruits. Mr. Spoehr agreed that slowing down the retirements of seasoned officers and senior enlisted service members could ease the manpower challenges: “That is a spigot you can turn on quite quickly,” he said. The Pentagon could look to its reserve and guard units to take a larger role, Mr. Mattis, a retired Marine general, has said. “It’s not just a strategic reserve anymore. It’s also an operational reserve,” he told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing this month. The Obama administration sought to offset reductions in American military might by leaning on global defense alliances and proxy forces to battle extremist groups in places such as Syria, Iraq and Libya. But that status quo of the Obama national security doctrine is in danger of buckling, as Washington faces renewed military threats from near-peer rivals such as Russia, China and Iran, Mr. Mattis told Congress. “That’s just a reality when we’ve shrunk our military to the point we have yet not reduced our strategic obligations,” he told the Senate defense panel.

### XT- Prolif Impact

#### Prolif causes extinction

**Kroenig 15**

Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, “THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM: DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?” <http://www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch3_Kroenig.pdf>

WHY **NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS A PROBLEM** The spread of **nuc**lear weapon**s** poses a number of **severe threats** to international peace and U.S. national security, including **nuclear war**, **nuclear terrorism**, **global and regional instability**, **constrained freedom of action**, **weakened alliances**, and **further nuclear proliferation.** This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is **nuclear war**. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in **human extinction**, and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in **millions of deaths** and casualties, billions of dollars of **economic devastation, environmental degradation**, and a parade of other horrors. 71 To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus year tradition of nuclear nonuse as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting in the late-1990s and the Great Recession of late-2000s.53 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a **transition period** in which they **lack a secure second-strike capability**. In this context, one or both states might believe that it **has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first**. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike 72 to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, **might feel “use ‘em or loose ‘em” pressures**. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the **reciprocal fear of surprise attack**.54 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that **war is inevitable** and that it would be **better to go first than to go second**. In a future Israel-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. **Even in** a world of **MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war.** Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews and who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. 73 One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As discussed previously, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest, and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: How can you credibly threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated earlier, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the **U**nited **S**tates was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) **as a way to de-escalate a crisis**. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. Finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. **Second**, as was also discussed earlier, leaders can **make a “threat that leaves something to chance**.”56 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can **increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down**. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. Scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.57 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

### XT- Russia

#### US readiness key to preserve Nato’s influence

Starr 1/20

(Terrell Jermaine Starr, Terrell Jermaine Starr is a senior reporter at Foxtrot Alph, 1-20-2017, "What Happens If The U.S. Doesn't Step Up To Defend NATO," Foxtrot Alpha, <http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/what-happens-if-the-u-s-doesnt-step-up-to-defend-nato-1791382160>) CH

President Donald Trump took the Oval Office today with the most anti-NATO outlook in recent memory. His previous statements suggest that he might not assist our allies if they came under attack, as required under Article 5 under the North Atlantic Treaty, which has been particularly troubling to America’s European allies. Ominously missing from his speech was Russia, which some critics credit with undermining the election itself. During his inauguration speech, President Trump said little about defense or engaging other countries other than committing to protecting “our borders from the ravages of other countries.” His “America First” philosophy is a major shift from America’s post-World War II mindset where the U.S. sought to be a kind of police force around the globe; President Trump seems to hint at his America taking on a more isolationist mindset. But with Russian President Vladimir Putin aggressively harassing Ukraine and the Baltics, one has to wonder who in Washington will defend Eastern Europe and NATO now. President Barack Obama was the most aggressive opponent of Moscow’s expansionism since the fall of the Soviet Union—particularly when you consider his response to the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine. His coordinated efforts with the European Union to sanction Russia over its annexation of Crimea taxed its economy so severely that it contracted 3.7 percent in 2015; last year its GDP was expected to further contract 1.2 percent. The sanctions have also prevented Russia from raising billions in needed western currency for its oil and gas exploration projects in the Arctic Circle, forcing Moscow to scramble for cash in Beijing, whose coffers aren’t as robust as those in European capitals. None of this warmed relations between the Kremlin and the White House, but that was inevitable—Eastern Europe is a zero-sum game for Putin and Obama refused to acquiesce its security. Putin, the former KGB officer, wants to expand beyond Crimea and into the rest of Ukraine and beyond, according to political analyst Alastair Newton. “Rising domestic socioeconomic stresses in Russia—caused by dwindling oil revenues and the impact of Western sanctions—will fuel President Putin’s anti-western rhetoric and increase the likelihood of him seeking foreign ‘distractions’,” Newton, told CNBC last year. “We therefore expect Russian provocations in its ‘near abroad’ to continue, including in NATO territory, short of an outright ‘land grab’.” Retired U.S. Army General Jack Keane warned that Putin has plans to invade the Baltics. “The Russians are (now) putting considerable pressure on the Baltic States, with the very real possibility of challenging NATO with a military hybrid occupation similar to eastern Ukraine, Keane told the Baltic Times. (Keane told the paper he declined an offer to be Trump’s Secretary of Defense.) But, so far, Russian troops have not advanced past eastern Ukraine. No matter what Obama’s detractors may have said, his coordinated sanctions with Brussels did in fact work. Russian troops may be in Ukraine, but they aren’t sipping vodka in the middle of Independence Square in Kiev—even though Russia could go much deeper into the country, if it desired to do so. Ukraine has roughly 200,000 service members; Russia has an estimated 766,000 active duty and 2.5 million on reserve. There is no comparison. Putin is not advancing any further because he expects a potential response from the west, even if it is not a military one. However, what is becoming dangerously clear with each overture Trump extends to Putin is that the security of Eastern Europe and the integrity of NATO is in dire jeopardy. In fact, Trump’s stated affections for Putin reveal that the new president may give in to his future Russian counterpart’s desire for NATO to stay outside of Moscow’s “sphere of influence” and allow him to run wild there—even though he has not outlined what getting along with Putin would actually look like. The fact that Russia absorbed much of eastern Ukraine, and little was asked of how Trump planned to prevent Putin from expanding further, have left us with few clues on how Trump would handle the ongoing crisis there. But we can highlight some key steps Trump should consider, if he wants his foreign policy to reflect his get-tough bluster. How To Handle The Russians For starters, Putin must know that if he even thinks about invading the Baltic republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, the move will leave a far more crippling wound on Moscow than NATO. Russia recently deployed Iskander tactical ballistic missiles to its Kaliningrad region, which borders Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia. These missiles have a range of at least 500 kilometers and are designed to destroy strategic targets. What’s more, they can carry nuclear warheads and have an error point of just 10 kilometers. Washington claims the move violates the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty that forbids such offensive weapons. Under Article 5 the United States is required to shore up military support for the Baltics in the event of an attack; the Baltics do not have the military strength to fend off a Russian offensive, according to a recent RAND report. The Baltics only have 11 battalions between them compared to Russia’s 46, which includes tanks, surface-to-surface missiles, Marines, and other heavily armed units and hardware. Another problem is that Russia shares a border with the Baltics and can easily deploy reinforcements into its territories. A high-ranking Department of Defense official told Congress in June that Russia could take the region’s capitals in less than 60 hours, and that more battalions are needed to prevent a complete overrun. Some 4,000 U.S. troops landed in Poland a few days ago as part of a show of force rotation Obama ordered more than a year ago. Other EU nations have also committed to sending more personnel to help bolster its military presence in Poland and the Baltics. All of these steps are highly unusual for a military during peacetime and are clear indications that NATO is preparing for a possible attack. It ought to. Putin clearly is. Encouraging America’s NATO allies to follow through on their deployment commitments should be one of Trump’s first priorities after entering office. Indeed, Trump spent much of the campaign suggesting he would not honor the NATO treaty but, in practice, he’ll soon learn that alienating the alliance will not work. If Putin pulls the same hybrid warfare in the Baltics as he did in Ukraine (remember the little green men?), Trump will be assailed as weak for allowing it to happen. Putin knows our incoming president will be less interventionist in Eastern Europe as Obama, which is why Baltic leaders have raised fears over Trump’s presidency. All Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania know is they aren’t getting a president who appreciates its security issues. The possibility of Putin invading the Baltics is real. Many traditional foreign policy observers didn’t believe Putin would invade Georgia in 2008, but he did. Few thought Putin would annex Crimea, but it happened. It is assumed that Putin would not attack a NATO country because of the military alliance. But given that Trump has been very hostile towards NATO, who is to say that Putin won’t invade when his past actions prove otherwise? If Putin does, in fact, wage an attack against the Baltics in 2017, it will signal to the world that Russia can crack the armor of the world’s most powerful military and that America’s Eastern European NATO allies’ security is tenable. Over the past two years, Obama fended off accusations of weakness regarding his response to Russian aggression, even though his sanctioning of key Russian economic institutions are actions President George W. Bush did not take when Moscow invaded Georgia in 2008. And those who said Obama should have done more to punish Putin over Ukraine, they never really articulated what more, exactly, looked like. The consequences of America not taking on Putin could be disastrous for several reasons. For one, fighting in eastern Ukraine is ongoing and has the potential to become a full-scale war again. That war can potentially spread over into the Baltics, which have large populations of Russians under the premise that Moscow is protecting its people; the Kremlin used the same logic in Ukraine. Latvia, for example, has expressed concern that its large Russian population could give Putin a reason to invade under a similar premise. And if Putin were to invade the Baltics, it would move his military sphere of influence squarely into Western territory. If Russian troops can enter Estonia or Poland, in theory, why not Germany as well? Of course, the first thought is to assume that it cannot happen. But given Trump’s distain for NATO, such a possibility is very real and America’s allies have expressed their concerns over his indifference to their security. In turn, those allies could refuse to assist the U.S. in future military operations. They could also refuse to host America’s many military bases around the world. That doesn’t make America strong. To the contrary, it weakens the U.S.’ strategic placement in the world. Disengaging NATO, in effect, weakens American security. And if Trump continues to ignore Putin’s expansionism, Russia will be America’s problem as well as Eastern Europe’s.

#### Lack of European cohesion and western assurances leads to Russian expansionism

Fawaz 16 (Yassin Fawaz, Mr. Fawaz is CEO of the Raddington Group, a results driven strategic intelligence and political risk research firm., 9-19-2016, "What Is Russia's End Game? Escalation Of Tensions Between Moscow And Kiev," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/09/19/what-is-russias-end-game-escalation-of-tensions-between-moscow-and-kiev/#274eec0f5e6e>) CH

The Kremlin is also aware that showing NATO’s weakness can be highly influential in its proxy states’ geopolitical positioning, especially if it succeeds in blocking US missile defence programmes. A recent rapprochement with Turkey complements a strategy of complicating Western alliances both in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and thereby to show the West’s incapacity to defend some former Soviet Republics. Moscow is currently testing European unity as a way to deter more countries from joining a continental bloc that has spread to its borders. The argument for European disintegration is easy to grab for Putin, considering the recent Brexit vote in the UK and the series of crises -- including the threat of a new wave of refugees and terrorism – that have made the European political debate rather toxic. As EU leaders start planning for the future of the union following Brexit, the Kremlin will try to exploit any emerging opposition between them. Exploiting cracks between EU members can offer several benefits for Putindown the line, and Moscow counts on its increased aggression of Ukraine to deepen divisions between those that see Russia as an existential threat, and others for whom it is a secondary challenge. First, he can hope it will end sanctions that were imposed on Russia following the invasion of Crimea. In this sense, Brexit is also good news for the Russian leader – the UK was a leading supporter of sanctions -- as he tries to capitalize on the impact his counter-sanctions have had on several EU members’ economies – most notably on agricultural goods. Russian officials (including Mr Putin) have been keeping up constant lobbying efforts in European capitals – including a recent meeting between Latvian government ministers and Russia’s deputy PM, Arkady Dvorkovich. As a result, Italy, Greece and Hungary have openly questioned the extension of sanctions. While the effect of sanctions on the Russian economy are symbolical compared to the impact of low oil prices, Moscow also thinks that a European break-up would eventually get it to recover its waning influence in the former Soviet territory. This divide-and-conquer strategy also extends to a Kremlin infiltration in national politics, as the 2016-2017 season will be filled with crucial votes in leading European and Western democracies -- including in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. In France, the National Front -- an anti-EU party that is expected to reach the run-off stage in next year's presidential election -- received a loan in 2014 from a Russian bank with a link to the Kremlin. Moscow is also suspected to have gained influence in rightwing parties in the Netherlands -- and particularly with the Dutch far-right Freedom Party, which is currently leading the polls -- Italy, Greece, Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic. Whether Moscow’s lobbying is effective in influencing the EU’s future or not, the aggression and threat of invasion in Ukraine is also a test for the United States’ commitment to NATO, ahead of the presidential poll. Donald Trump – the Republican candidate -- has repeatedly praised Putin’s leadership and showed willingness to compromise with him on a set of issues that most directly involve a resolution of the Syrian conflict but also include the annexation of Crimea. Should Trump enter the White house, Putin would win a serious battle for influence in his region, as the American candidate’s foreign policy pledge – highly inspired by an increasingly pro-Russian faction within the Republican party – is to intervene as little as possible abroad and to step back from NATO. Overall, Moscow's current manipulation strategy of the Ukrainian conflict will remain one of its main tools to test Western democracies as it tries to come back to a geopolitical giant status. Therefore, Russia will remain a threat to its neighbour, while trying to remain the leading anti-American voice in international relations.

#### Economic decline leads to Russian nationalism and modernization

Petkova 1-1 (Mariya Petkova, Mariya Petkova is a Bulgarian journalist covering the Middle East, the Balkans and Eastern Europe., 1-1-2017, "Russia: Talking war in times of economic crisis," Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/12/russia-talking-war-times-economic-crisis-161225082642953.html>) CH

While the government has sought to alleviate social fears, it also has made it clear that defence is a priority and that it is dedicating a solid chunk of that budget to ensure the modernisation of the military. In the 2017 budget, it allocated $43bn, 4.7 percent of Russia's GDP, to the defence sector - what some analysts have called "record spending" for a country currently not at war. Vladimir Putin, himself, has spoken repeatedly on the importance of the military. In late December he warned that Russia is currently stronger than any "potential aggressor", but that it only takes a slip in "modernisation of the army and the fleet or in its preparation for this to change". This type of alarmist rhetoric is not only effective in justifying the defence budget to the general public but it is also distracting attention away from the economic crisis. Krasilnikova says that "the idea that Russia is a great country which has a lot of foes is quite popular" and has mitigated people's dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Such rhetoric has been consistently used on popular state TV channels such as Russia 1. "[Russia] possesses the military power to destroy the US [a] minimum 10 times. We are the only country that poses [an] existential threat to them," mused MP Vyacheslav Nikonov on one of the most popular political talk shows on Russia 1, Evening with Vladimir Solovyov. The host is known for his belligerent language and personal interviews with Vladimir Putin. Alleging US funding of liberal politicians in Russia, Nikonov also claimed that after the introduction of a law cracking down on "foreign agents", funding for such agents grew 10 times. News broadcasts also often carry similar rhetoric. Russia 1 news reports in mid-December about the situation in Aleppo extensively covered the successful operations of the Russian military, emphasising the absence of Western involvement or help and Western media's indifference or deliberate avoidance of reporting on Russian successes.

#### Russian nationalism leads to expansionism

Sharon 15 (Scott Sharon, Scott Sharon is an independent Foreign Policy Analyst currently interning at the Hudson Institute, assisting at the National Security Archive, 1-29-2015, "The Danger of Russian Nationalism," Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, <http://www.ypfp.org/the_danger_of_russian_nationalism>) CH

When Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014, President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings soared, Russia’s economy was strong, and it seemed like the big bear was back. Feeling he could do no wrong in the eyes of the Russian people, Putin then proceeded to fan the flames of a deadly insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. Russia pitted the Donbass region against Kiev, smuggled military hardware under the guise of humanitarian aid to separatists, and sent in its own troops cloaked in deceit as volunteers looking to assist proponents of Novorossiya, or “The New Russia.” Putin succeeded in convincing his population that they needed him to survive and that he was the only one who could return Russia to its glory of a bygone era. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine may loom large at the moment, but underneath the surface lurks something potentially more dangerous and even harder to contain: resurgent Russian nationalism. Throughout its history, Russia has prided itself on greatness. Moscow was once even referred to as “The Third Rome” as far back as the 1500s. In the 19th century, Emperor Nicholas I adopted the motto “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality” as official ideology, which provided the basis for guarding Slavic culture, and protecting it against what it viewed as the detrimental influences of Western Europe. The motto “Russia for Russians” dates back to the 1905 Russian Revolution and was a potent battle cry for emerging nationalist parties headed by powerful aristocrats. Pan-Slavism played an integral role in the start of World War 1, when Russia almost immediately backed Serbia against threats of conflict by Austria-Hungary and Germany. Though very different in ideology, the Soviet era saw an even bigger outpouring of patriotism, whether it was during the fight against Nazi Germany or the Cold War against the United States. The weight of Russian nationalism was perhaps best exemplified during Napoleon’s march toward Moscow in 1812 and Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, when Stalin’s order of “Not one step back” became a powerful symbol of Soviet resistance. Accordingly, in Russia these two conflicts are referred to as “The Patriotic War of 1812” and “The Great Patriotic War,” respectively. Both saw foreign invaders cut large swaths into Russian territory, and both were ultimately turned back at extremely high costs. These two wars help explain Russia’s fundamental sense of insecurity and its desire to maintain buffer zones to keep the West out. The subsequent Cold War then cemented this mindset for many Russians. But even after the Berlin Wall fell, the continued existence and expansion of NATO has provided cause enough for distrust of the West to persist. Within this larger context, the current crisis in Ukraine is viewed in Russia as started by a Western-backed, fascist coup overthrowing Moscow’s partner in Kiev. Moreover, Moscow fears this coup is just one part of a Western strategy to draw the remaining former Soviet republics out of its sphere of influence, leaving Russian soil vulnerable to Western (i.e., NATO) forces. This constant fear is what motivated Putin to jump on the nationalist bandwagon and declare that he has an obligation to protect all Russian-speaking peoples. He will not abate until it becomes clear that Ukraine will never join either NATO or the European Union. The first ceasefire, on September 5th, the Minsk Agreement, was doomed from the start as daily violations, which both sides blamed on each other, marred any chance for progress. Attempts to revive the agreement in December looked promising when Kiev and the separatists began swapping prisoners, but renewed fighting has plagued any hopes for a quick and decisive end to the conflict. With massive shelling in Donetsk, and the Ukrainian forces’ surrender of the airport, a highly symbolic target, it is fair to say that neither side is any closer to victory than they were a month ago. A December 2014 BBC article entitled, “The Russians Fighting a ‘Holy War’ in Ukraine,” describes the fanaticism of some of the separatists and their Russian allies. A term that has been widely used to describe the fighting spirit of Muslim extremists has now been adopted by the most fanatical of a new generation of Russian nationalists who “share the Kremlin’s distaste for Western liberal values.” One such nationalist and pro-Russian rebel interviewed in the article, Pavel Rasta, referred to Donetsk as Jerusalem and described a war for the Russian people, their future, their ideals, and their children. Pavel went on to blame the West for instigating the conflict in Ukraine, and spoke of his fear that if his side loses, the war will cross over into Russia (i.e., The West will really encroach on its borders). “To many outsiders this looks like paranoia. But the idea that Russia – and the wider Orthodox, Slav world – are surrounded by steadily encroaching enemies has been a powerful current in Russian thought for at least 200 years. And the tradition of volunteers travelling to defend it goes back a long way.” The problem with the nationalism Putin has tapped into is that it will likely be very difficult to tame, especially since that it is what drives support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine. At this juncture, the separatists will not stop until Kiev forces withdraw to the West of the country. But even if this conflict draws to a conclusion on favorable terms, Russian nationalist may urge Putin to do more, and this is where the danger lies. Even if oil prices sink to $20 a barrel, and Western sanctions pull the ruble even further down, will Putin be able to withstand the pressure when he is asked to stir up trouble in a neighboring Baltic State? He has tapped into the dark side of Russian nationalism, convinced his population that they need him to survive, and inspired the separatists in Eastern Ukraine to continue their fight against Kiev. But while Putin may accrue short-term benefits by drumming up national pride, he may very well reach a point where even he has no control over what he unleashed.

### XT- Military Readiness

#### The plan creates a net increase in funds available for military technology

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

Currently, the DOD operates or contracts with local educational agencies to operate 57 schools on 15 out of the 204 military installations in the contiguous United States.20 In 2014, a total of 25,911 students were enrolled in DDESS or DDESS special arrangements with local districts—a mere 4 percent of the total number of military-connected school age children in the contiguous United States.21 While all dependent children of DOD employees living on base are eligible to attend the DDESS schools tuition-free, eligibility varies for families who live off base, and many of these families send their children to the local schools.22 These DDESS schools are located only along the East Coast, with the highest concentrations in North Carolina around Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, and in Kentucky around Fort Knox and Fort Campbell.23 Section 2164 of Title 10 allows the Secretary of Defense to operate these types of schools based on two factors: Whether military-connected children are able to receive free public education from the local area, and How capable the local educational agency is of providing an appropriate education.24 In most cases, the local district schools in areas near bases with DDESS schools are not providing an adequate education and are struggling to keep up with national averages of academic performance. In these scenarios, DDESS schools are an important addition to life on base. DDESS schools perform at or substantially above national averages and their respective state public school averages on fourth-grade and eighth-grade National Assessment of Educational Progress tests, and military parents get to be heavily involved in school decision making.25 While DDESS schools provide a valuable option for military families on bases near struggling public schools, the DOD is actively considering whether it should continue to operate a domestic school system or if a better alternative exists to provide quality education in a more cost-effective way.26 This tiny school system is expensive to maintain. In 2015, the total operating budget was $9.3 million—one-third of the total budget for all Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) worldwide. In 2014, average per pupil expenditure at DDESS schools was $26,682.27 In 2013, the national average per pupil spending was $12,296.28 The DDESS average per pupil expenditure is more than twice that. As military and civilian communities continue to overlap and integrate, the DOD is evaluating whether it needs to provide the types of wraparound services necessitated by life on isolated military bases. If the DDESS system is adapted for modern times through adoption of an Education Savings Account program for DDESS families, military parents could choose high-quality education options for their children and the potential financial savings could be re-invested in core national defense priorities.

#### Military Readiness is key to preventing a great power war

Mansharamani 16

Vikram Mansharamani, Vikram Mansharamani is a lecturer in the Program on Ethics, Politics &amp; Economics at Yale University and a senior fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School., 11-4-2016, "Column: Is the military’s unpredictable budget leading to a readiness crisis?," PBS NewsHour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-militarys-unpredictable-budget-leading-readiness-crisis/

The United States spends more money on its military than any other country in the world. The American defense budget of almost $600 billion is more than four times that of China’s. In fact, the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes the U.S. spends almost as much as the next 14 countries — combined. But rather than simply leave the interpretation of this data to readers, the institute warns this large budget does not necessarily buy sustainable U.S. military superiority. In February of this year, John Chipman, director general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted that the proliferation of military-relevant technologies has large strategic consequences that appear to be undermining Western might. This point was driven home during a recent talk at the Harvard Kennedy School by former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy. She explicitly stated “our military technological edge … is no longer a given, because many of the technologies we rely on are becoming ubiquitous.” These concerns are being raised at a time when global instability appears to be accelerating. For much of the past 15 years, military efforts shifted to focus on fluid non-state actors, such as ISIS, al-Qaeda and al-Nusra, that emerged as the primary adversaries. “Our military technological edge … is no longer a given.” More recently, however, we’ve seen an acceleration of state-sponsored military activity. Consider three events that have happened in the past five years: Russia annexed Crimea, China built islands and military airfields in the South China Sea, and Iran has embarked on a plan to subdue parts of Arabia. Here’s another data point: Saudi Arabia now has the third largest defense budget in the world, behind the U.S. and China. And it’s not just the threat environment that has been uncertain. The Pentagon’s budget has also suffered from a lack of predictability. Flournoy’s advice to the next president was to “reach out to Congress and try to get a four-year budget deal as a national security issue.” She went on to note that “the Defense Department has not had a predictable budget top line for a long time … they’ve been living from continuing resolution to continuing resolution, the threat of sequestration hanging over their heads.” One impact of budgetary uncertainty is that current operations are regularly prioritized over maintenance and training. Charles Peña of the conservative Cato Institute notes that only 443 out of 1,040 Marine aircraft are ready to fly, half of the Navy’s F18s are out of circulation, and Army Aviation is only able to provide around 11.5 out of 14.5 required training hours per month to its soldiers. One impact of budgetary uncertainty is that current operations are regularly prioritized over maintenance and training. The result is a meaningful degradation of the U.S. military’s ability to fight a major overseas war. While the prospect of a major overseas war appeared remote a mere five years ago, recent Chinese and Russian activities make the possibility seem less distant today. And the focus on non-state actors has transformed the American military in ways that may make it less equipped to take on another country. The active-duty Army has fallen from around 780,000 soldiers in 1991 to 470,000 today — the lowest level since World War II. Similar dynamics are affecting the other services. In March, Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, asked Marine General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Do you agree that we have a significant readiness problem across the services, especially for the wide variety of contingencies that we’ve got to face?” General Dunford’s response was equally direct: “Chairman, I do, and I think those are accurate reflections of the force as a whole.” General David Petraeus, who retired from the Army after commanding coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, disagrees with this sentiment, penning an op-ed with Michael O’Hanlon, titled “The Myth of a US Military ‘Readiness’ Crisis.” They argue that today’s overall budget of around $600 billion exceeds the Cold War average budget of around $525 billion, that more than 90 percent of equipment is mission capable, that training for “full-spectrum” operations is resuming and that today’s military is battle-tested and experienced. They also note that “Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed $100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level.” The bottom line, Petraeus and O’Hanlon note, is that “while there are areas of concern, there is no crisis in military readiness.” “Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed $100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level.” Readiness crisis or not, most analysts and policymakers agree that the U.S. military is today the most capable armed force in the world. As General Dunford made clear: “It’s about the standards we’ve set for ourselves, which are incredibly high.” Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley assured lawmakers earlier this year that the military’s ability to fight against terrorist groups is not in question, noting “you can take it to the bank.” But he went on to emphasize the material risks emanating from a potential great-power war against Russia, China, Iran or North Korea. “We can collectively roll the dice and say those days will never come and that’s a course of action; that is not a course of action I would advise.” While General Milley’s comment may seem alarmist, it’s worth pondering the scenarios that may not be in our immediate field of consideration. We may not see a great-power conflict in the near future, but what might transpire if we did? Perhaps the U.S. military budget is too large today, but could it be too small for our future needs? Sure, force levels are shrinking, but could that be a strategic advantage? Yes, the Middle East seems particularly unstable, but might Saudi Arabia’s escalating military expenditures — despite its economic difficulties — point to even greater forthcoming instability? In a world of massive uncertainty, we need to think creatively about possible scenarios, because in the wise words of baseball legend Yogi Berra, “The future ain’t what it used to be.”

#### Military Readiness is key to fight new insurgencies as well as control geopolitical enemies

Donnelly and Zakeim 16

Thomas Donnelly, Roger Zakheim, Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow and director of&nbsp;the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Roger Zakheim is a former general counsel on the House Armed Services Committee and is a visiting fellow at AEI., 8-15-2016, "The Myth of the U.S. Military ‘Readiness Myth’," National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438982/us-military-readiness-david-petraeus-wrong-its-crisis

In a recent Wall Street Journal essay, “The Myth of a U.S. Military ‘Readiness’ Crisis” (August 9), General David Petraeus and Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon sadly perpetuate one of the most deeply held myths about the state of the U.S. military: that its “readiness” problems are a myth. The Petraeus-O’Hanlon piece is off the mark in a number of respects. To begin with, readiness shortfalls themselves aren’t a crisis, but they induce a kind of wasting disease that becomes a crisis in a surprising situation like the one that marked the beginning of the Korean War, when the Army’s “Task Force Smith” was overrun by North Korean tanks. The incremental but constantly accumulating challenges of too few people, aging equipment, and insufficient time to fully prepare large-scale units don’t show themselves in day-to-day operations but would be manifest in combat against tougher enemies. That said, we’re seeing manifestations of the disease even today. Having designed their straw man, Petraeus and O’Hanlon then begin with the most specious statistic, the size of the U.S. defense budget. The extent of Pentagon spending tells much — about the overall size of the American economy, for example, and that we try to pay the superb, but few, men and women in uniform an amount that at least approximates the value they give us — but very little about true readiness. It is even less enlightening to compare the dollars we spend to the formally announced spending of others, particularly Russia and China. That would be to compare true information with disinformation, for the purpose of misinformation. Second, Petraeus and O’Hanlon paint a far too rosy picture of weapons modernization; the idea that the post–Cold War “procurement holiday” is over is simply false. Many of the programs on the books in the 1990s have simply been terminated before anything new was acquired, or the programs were cut short. The list of casualties is long: The Army has failed six times to buy new ground combat vehicles and howitzers, and twice in attempts to field a new scout helicopter; the Air Force halted the F-22 fighter program at just 187 planes rather than the 750 originally planned, and the partnering F-35 has been hit with roughly a decade of delays while much-needed new refueling aircraft and long-range bombers have been likewise slowed; the Navy has cancelled submarine, destroyer, and cruiser projects and a medium-range stealthy strike plane for its carriers; the one ship it has managed to field, the small littoral combat ship, is now to be ended at about half the intended buy. While enjoying this holiday, the Pentagon has entertained itself with the idea that “skipping a generation” of weapons buys was actually a good thing. Donald Rumsfeld called it “military transformation”; Ashton Carter called it the “third offset” (the first being the Eisenhower nuclear “New Look,” the second being the introduction of “stealth” aircraft technologies), but then he created a “Defense Innovation Unit Experimental,” which has now been scrapped for “DIUx version 2.0.” Current U.S. military systems, the legacy of the Reagan buildup of the 1980s, no longer provide the technological edge they did when introduced. Skipping modernization has begun to have serious consequences in the real world. Current U.S. systems, the legacy of the Reagan buildup of the 1980s, no longer provide the technological edge they did when introduced. For example, F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s cannot penetrate modern air defenses of the sort fielded by the Russians, the Chinese, and, in short order, the Iranians, without extensive and expensive support from a variety of electronic warfare aircraft. In focusing on the “sequestration” provision of the 2011 Budget Control Act, Petraeus and O’Hanlon again miss the forest for the trees. It is true that sequestration has introduced both additional cuts and imbecilic turbulence to defense plans, but the more important wounds were inflicted by the baseline budgetary “caps” established by the law. Those caps go back into effect next year. Further, the BCA was inflicted on top of more than $300 billion in cuts during the early years of the Obama administration, and the increases of the Bush years were more than consumed by the costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Petraeus and O’Hanlon lampoon the worry that the U.S. military is “somehow not up to the next challenge.” The answer, of course, depends on what the next challenge is. We would simply note that the military has not been up to the challenges it has faced since 9/11: Despite the superb leadership shown by Petraeus and the tireless courage of the troops he led, America lacked the forces necessary to properly conduct campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time. This “two-war standard” has been the measure of strategic readiness for America’s armed forces since Representative Carl Vinson rammed the Two-Ocean Navy Act through Congress in 1940. Obama-administration doctrine notwithstanding, a global power cannot survive a one-war military. Given the world as it has become, with conflicts and crises in Europe, across the Middle East, and in the western Pacific, a three-war standard would be appropriate. Certainly, none of today’s service chiefs indulges in readiness happy talk. As he approached retirement as Army chief of staff in January 2015, Petraeus’s comrade-in-arms General Raymond Odierno told the Senate that service readiness “has been degraded to its lowest level in 20 years.” The current Army chief, General Mark Milley, confessed this spring that “if we got into a conflict with Russia then I think it would place our soldiers’ lives at risk.” If that conflict were over the Baltics, it’s also likely that the Russians would win, as several recent studies have revealed. In sum, the real readiness crisis is not measured in the fight against ISIS, or in Afghanistan, but in the capacity and capability needed in a more demanding contingency. As the House Armed Services Committee found in its version of this year’s defense bill, “the services are very good at counterinsurgency, but they are not prepared to endure a long fight against higher order threats from near-peer competitors.” Nor are they prepared to fight two advanced adversaries at once. Through the pose they strike, Petraeus and O’Hanlon not only mischaracterize the nature and extent of today’s problems. They also lead readers to underestimate the risks of a real crisis.

#### Military readiness low now

Walsh 6/12

Mary Walsh, 6-12-2017, "Defense Secretary Mattis "shocked" by poor state of U.S. combat readiness," No Publication, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/defense-secretary-jim-mattis-shocked-by-poor-state-of-us-combat-readiness/

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis declared Monday that he was "shocked" upon his return to the Pentagon by the poor state of the U.S. military's readiness for combat. He put most of the blame on Congress for its inability to approve budgets on time or repeal a law that strictly limits defense spending. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Mattis said Congress has "sidelined itself from its active constitutional oversight role" by failing to deliver a steady stream of funding to pay for new weapons and other critical gear. "It has blocked new programs, prevented service growth, stalled industry initiative and placed troops at greater risk," Mattis said as he urged the panel to do away with the Budget Control Act of 2011. If the budget caps mandated by the law are breached, automatic spending reductions known as sequestration are triggered. "For all the heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these wars, no enemy in the field has done more to harm the readiness of our military than sequestration," said Mattis, who retired from military service in 2013 as a four-star general. Mattis appeared before the committee along with Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to field questions from lawmakers on President Trump's proposed military budget for the 2018 fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1.

### XT – Nato

#### Trump refusal to acknowledge article 5 of NATO treaty means now is key to boost NATO assurances

Smith 5-26 (Alexander Smith, 5-26-2017, "Donald Trump's silence on NATO's Article 5 is a big deal. Here's why.," NBC News, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/trump-s-first-foreign-trip/donald-trump-nato-why-his-silence-article-5-big-deal-n765011>) CH

President Donald Trump has often shocked and confounded the world with his unique brand of rhetoric. But on Thursday it was what he did not say that caused a stir. The 45th president had been expected to promise that America would defend its NATO allies if they ever came under attack. That principle of collective defense is, in theory, cemented by Article 5 of the alliance's charter, NATO's core tenet. It means that "an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all." No other president since NATO was founded in 1949 has questioned that principle — until Trump. He's called the alliance "obsolete" and has repeatedly urged its members to pay more toward bolstering their own militaries. Many of these nations do not currently meet NATO's recommended spending targets, and Trump has threatened that, unless they up their game, the U.S. might not back them up in a fight. Asked in a New York Times interview last July whether he would protect smaller states from Russia, he said his support would be conditional on them paying up. "If they fulfill their obligations to us, the answer is yes," he said. “Once you start to undermine the alliance then the whole post-Cold War order breaks down” As he has for many of his policies, Trump has given mixed messages on NATO. In April, he backtracked on the "obsolete" comment and called NATO a "bulwark of international peace and security." But he has never explicitly endorsed Article 5. Many commentators expected that to change Thursday when Trump gave a speech at NATO's headquarters in Brussels. After all, he was speaking alongside a mangled girder from the World Trade Center, a shrine whose very name was "The 9/11 and Article 5 Memorial." The name refers to the attack on New York's twin towers, the only time Article 5 has actually been invoked. More than 1,000 military personnel from America's NATO allies have died in the subsequent U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Ahead of Thursday's speech, The New York Times quoted an administration official who was "briefed on the president's planned remarks" and said that Trump would make the promise. But his speech stopped short of doing so. Trump thanked other members for their support following 9/11 — "our NATO allies responded swiftly and decisively" — but was far from explicit on Article 5. The president's spokesman, Sean Spicer, told reporters afterward that Trump's mere attendance was a tacit acknowledgement of his commitment to the mutual-defense clause. "We all understand that by being part of NATO we have treaty obligations and commitments that we made as being part of NATO," Spicer said. "So to have to reaffirm something by the very nature of being here and speaking at a ceremony about it is almost laughable." Many experts disagree. Any sign that the U.S. might blink first could be taken as a signal by Russian President Vladimir Putin that cracks are appearing in NATO, according to many Western analysts. "Article 5 is the whole point of NATO," said James Nixey, head of the Russia and Eurasia program at London's Chatham House think tank. "Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all about talking. Article 5 is all about action — it's the only article that really means anything." Although talk of all-out-war between America and Russia may seem remote, the possibility that Moscow may try to extend its influence in Eastern Europe had increased in recent years, according to many Kremlin-watchers. Some of the countries that are now in NATO were formerly part of the Soviet Union, a communist bloc controlled by Moscow whose disintegration Putin has called "a major geopolitical disaster of the century." The Russian president enjoys sky-high domestic popularity — all built on his self-styled image as a man who can restore Russia to its former glory. He sees NATO as a Western encroachment on Russia's borders. In March, NBC News traveled to Latvia, one of the former Soviet countries now in NATO. Some people living there, around 20 miles from the Russian border, said they felt Trump's ambivalence toward NATO put them in danger of increased Russian influence. They feared a similar fate as Ukraine, which has been fighting rebels allegedly backed by Russia for the past three years. Trump is hardly the first president to press NATO allies to spend more. NATO recommends that each nation spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Only five of the 28 members currently do so — the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the U.K. and Poland. Trump railed against this shortfall Thursday, telling the audience in Brussels that it was "not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States." His words echoed those of President Barack Obama, who just last year accused NATO members of being "complacent" and told them to dig deeper into their wallets. What's different with Trump is that no other president has accompanied this plea with an ultimatum: Pay up or we won't protect you. Nixey, at Chatham House, agreed that "European states have to pay up more." But whatever the cost, NATO has always been a trade-off between the U.S. and its smaller allies. Washington protects them and in return gets stability and security along its allied border with Russia and beyond. "It depends whether you believe that America has a role to play in global security," Nixey said. "If you do, then NATO is critical." At its heart, the alliance is "all about values," he added. "Most NATO states are committed to democracy. Once you start to undermine the alliance then the whole post-Cold War order breaks down."

### XT-Nuclear Terrorism

#### Nuclear terrorism collapses US and international markets

SAGA Foundation 8

(Non Profit organization for Nuclear safety, July 2008, “Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaperSAGAMARK7282008.pdf)CH

Our principal conclusion is that the economic aftershocks flowing not only from a nuclear terrorist attack itself but from a predictable set of decisions a U.S. president could be expected to make in the wake of such an attack would inflict extraordinary economic damage on the nation stretching far beyond the point of attack. Beyond responding with aid to the scene of an attack, the first order of business for a president following a nuclear terrorist strike would be to determine if another strike was about to occur and to do everything possible to prevent it. Virtually all the important presidential decisions in the wake of the September 11 attacks – the suspension of all air travel; mandates to secure cockpit doors; the redesign of airport security; the dispatch of U.S. forces to Afghanistan; the institution of surveillance of terror suspects – were designed to prevent follow-on attacks. Punishing the aggressors was an important but secondary issue. In a nuclear attack scenario, presidential decisions revolving around this imperative would be taken regardless of whether another attack was planned or actually took place. Among the post-attack presidential decisions we deem highly likely: • Shutdown of freight commerce/border closures. The likelihood that a nuclear weapon would be clandestinely brought into our country would in all likelihood prompt a national initiative to seal the borders and freeze and search virtually all freight conveyances, whether trucks, ships or planes, delivering a major shock to the economy and bringing home to the entire populace the enormity of what has occurred, as stocks of basic supplies vanished almost overnight. 4 • Retaliation. The president would be under enormous pressure to respond swiftly and forcefully to such an attack, even if the geographic or geopolitical point of origin was uncertain. The science of ‘nuclear forensics,’ which can enable specialists to identify the source of nuclear material used in a bomb even post-explosion, would provide some key clues as to the source of the attack. As a consequence, there would be tremendous pressure to hold someone—terror groups and their state sponsors— responsible, engendering immediate and forceful retaliation. • Suspension of civil liberties. Extraordinary concern about further nuclear attacks following an initial attack would drive a series of decisions restricting freedom of movement and conferring extraordinary powers on government agencies charged with preventing another strike. The point cannot be emphasized enough: Not the attack itself but the fear of a follow-on attack and the response to that fear would drive a set of decisions that would almost certainly bring all freight traffic to a halt, shut down the nation’s ports, empty the nation’s grocery shelves, and bring most manufacturing to a virtual standstill. Even if this shut-down were temporary, our economic system of “just-in-time inventory” would mean that basic staples would very quickly become unavailable, delivering a psychological blow to the populace and a devastating shock to national and international financial markets. We live with the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack today, but the possibility of a future attack once the 5 first attack occurred would be deemed so much greater as to create an entirely new reality in terms of the political and economic functioning of the nation. Although preparation for disaster is an important part of any homeland security plan, we contend that the point of studying and understanding the full range of consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is to motivate the government and the people to ensure that such an attack never happens. We are not seeking a better civil defense plan or trying to revive a “duck and cover” strategy. We are trying to clearly lay out the consequences of failure so that the necessary steps are taken with the necessary energy and urgency.

### XT- China War

#### US heg bolsters Chinese co-operation which solves great power war

Ward 14 (Alex Ward, The Diplomat, Alex Ward works at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security on U.S. defense policy and strategy., 8-22-2014, "Only US Can Prevent Great Power War," Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/only-us-can-prevent-great-power-war/>) CH

As the World War I centennial is celebrated, repressed thoughts of great power war once again begin to surface. With today’s highly “interconnected global economy” underwritten by a liberal order leading to the “rise of the rest,” it appears unlikely that any state would want to disrupt the current system. And yet, the constant stream of somber news reignites fears of a calamitous global catastrophe. In times of international flux, where the worst seems possible, it is important to turn to those who can best interpret these eras. In the case of great power or “hegemonic” wars, there is hardly a greater authority than Robert Gilpin. In his seminal work on the subject, War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argues that three preconditions must be met for a hegemonic war to occur. First, Gilpin believes that the soon-to-be warring parties must feel there is a “‘closing in’ of space and opportunities.” Second, there must be a general “perception that a fundamental historical change is taking place.” Finally, events around the world start to “escape human control.” Notably, all three of these conditions currently exist in the world. Europe, where great power conflict took place for centuries, was heavily congested and contested. As powers like Britain, France, Germany and others rose, they fought for influence and geography at the expense of the others’ territory. Due to the close quarters, any desire for expansion on one country’s part would cause concern in the others. Today, some say, the world is different. The two powers that would compete in a war — the United States and China — are separated by a vast ocean, supposedly making it hard for each to antagonize the other. This, however, is not true. The map may show an expansive world, but new technologies — leading to hyperconnectivity and shorter travel times, especially for military equipment — have made the world “claustrophobic.” To wit, when China announced an “Air Defense Identification Zone” the United States quickly deployed two B-52 bombers to challenge its claim. And that was using old equipment. Both China and the United States are developing hypersonic missiles and vehicles. Humanity has already conquered physical space with commercial flight and fast ships. Now, it continues to shrink space even further for potentially decisive advantage. It is also hard to claim that China and the United States are far apart when they regularly bump up against each other as they have in the South China Sea. Perception Since the dawn of “Pax Americana” after World War II, belief in the United States as the undisputed global hegemon remained fairly stable. Until now. According to a recent Pew poll, Americans’ views of the United States as a global power have reached a 40-year low. Indeed, only 17 percent believe that America plays a “more important and powerful role than ten years ago.” Rightly or wrongly, this perception exists. Even though most people still find the United States preferable to China, regional powers can use the widespread belief that America is declining to make their cases for running the system. In fact they are already doing so to a degree. For example, China’s Global Times reports that 47 percent of people believe China has achieved “major power” status. Should both perceptions keep trending in the same direction — the United States is declining while China rises — then the feeling of an historic shift is almost inevitable. Human Control As current events prove, even the great powers cannot stop horrendous things from happening in the world. From Latin America and Africa to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, chaos and turmoil run rampant. While this is a particularly bad period for international affairs, it is naïve to think this may be an isolated epoch. In fact, there is reason to think the world might grow more unstable in the years ahead. Over the next 11 years, the world can expect another one billion people, reaching a total of around 8 billion by 2030. As technology becomes more powerful, it will do two things. First, it will empower the individual, or a group of individuals, to do great good or great harm. Second, it will allow individuals to be more aware of how the middle class lives. People around the world will demand similar things, causing stress on governments and brewing civil unrest and instability. Thus, as people are further empowered and further angered, the probability that these non-state actors — indeed, normal, everyday people — disrupt international affairs or geopolitics is high. Governments will continue to have less and less control of the citizenry, allowing the regular citizen to do with her newfound power what she wills. In essence, we will see, in a big way, the diffusion of power. Although the world currently satisfies Gilpin’s three preconditions, there need not be pessimism. For one, current relations between the United States and China are nowhere near the point where a potential great war between them is possible, and there is no other rivalry nearing that of Washington and Beijing. Second, some of the trends that can cause harm, like rapid technological progress, can also be used to help stabilize the global order. To be sure, technology could be used to curb the desolation brought on by expectedly low water, food, and energy levels. Finally, and most importantly, Gilpin’s guidance is certainly not comprehensive. There are more variables for which to account (i.e. the effect of nuclear weapons) that dictate whether or not a great power war may take place. That said, Gilpin’s framework serves as a good rubric by which to measure the current global climate. By all measures, this is certainly a dangerous time. But Gilpin’s preconditions shouldn’t be misconstrued as predictive or fatalistic. Indeed, the United States, as the hegemon, has the capability (and responsibility) to preserve the international order and lead the world out of this mess. By keeping good relations with partners and allies, deterring adversaries, reversing the perception of its decline, and leveraging technological capabilities for global good, there is a decent chance that the U.S. can make the great-power-war-incubation period fade away. Should the United States not seize this moment, and ensure that China is a responsible partner in the current global system alongside it, then the chance of a great power war cannot be dismissed, however remote.

### AT: Nationalism Bad

#### Nationalism K2 preventing the collapse of Western Civilization

Bucholz 16 (Todd G. Bucholz, Todd G. Buchholz is a former White House director of economic policy, managing director of the legendary Tiger hedge fund and winner of Harvard’s annual teaching prize in economics., 10-27-2016, "Column: Why do wealthy nations unravel? A lack of nationalism, says this economist," PBS NewsHour, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-wealthy-nations-unravel-lack-nationalism-says-economist/>) CH

While 64 percent of senior citizens say they are extremely proud to be an American, only 43 percent of young adults agree, and nearly half of Millennials say the “American dream” is dead. This book is not a long lament about patriotism and its enemies. Nor is it an attack on the modern economy. In fact, it turns on their head many traditional notions about patriotism and the stability of countries. It is a diagnosis, a history and a manifesto aimed at prosperous countries. Do not despair, for I will end on a note of optimism, with a road map that could help us avoid the shattering of nations. Theodore Roosevelt said, “We want to make our children feel . . . that the mere fact of being American citizens makes them better off. . . . This is not to blind us to our shortcomings; we ought steadily to try to correct them.” How many people agree only with Roosevelt’s statement about shortcomings? Contrast Roosevelt’s view with the University of North Carolina professor who teaches a course on “The Literature of 9/11” and calls the United States not just a superpower but a “necropower,” adding the Greek prefix that means “death or corpse.” The professor does not mean that the United States is dying; he means that it delivers death to others through torture and other military means. Virtually every advanced country from Japan to Italy faces similar economic and cultural land mines. This book is not solely aimed at Americans. As I write this, millions of refugees from Iraq and Syria stream across European borders, sneaking onto and even on top of trains and buses. Will they become Germans? Or Brits? Or Frenchmen? Or eternal refugees, the shrouded “Invisible Men” of the 21st century? Or worse? In 2014, the British Ministry of Defence reported that twice as many British Muslims traveled to Syria and Iraq to wage jihad than had joined the British military over the past three years. Among British Muslim students, 40 percent support introducing sharia law. We might think of France as a fairly unified state, but early in its history, France struggled to stop Normans, Bretons, Alsatians, Gascons, Savoyards, etc. from setting up their own countries. More recently, Charles de Gaulle wondered, “How can anyone govern a nation with 246 different kinds of cheese?” Like the France that de Gaulle bellyached about, the United States no longer coheres. We have a thousand television channels, 1 billion websites and 330 million citizens with no reason to listen to each other. Talking heads on MSNBC and Fox News shout as if they are attending UFC wrestling matches. It is hard to get a country to “rally around the flag” when everyone stomps off in his or her own direction. Though President Obama won a clear reelection victory in 2012, he gathered votes from fewer than 28 percent of the adults in the country. Our official “national tree” is the oak, but perhaps our national symbol should instead be a splinter. The splintering is even more profound in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other “advanced” nations. It is hard to get a country to “rally around the flag” when everyone stomps off in his or her own direction. Many commentators blame an obvious villain for polarizing civil society: new technologies, especially the internet, which offers infinite choices and distractions. The internet raises two separate threats: it can radicalize loners, and it can also fracture communities. An NYPD white paper proclaims that the “Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization” by luring weak-minded and strong-minded people into fringe groups. Former Obama official and Harvard Law professor Cass Sunstein warns that when “like-minded people get together, they tend to end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk.” At the same time, new technologies enable a splintering of society. Picture an old black-and-white photo from the 1930s, with grandparents, parents and children gathered around one RCA family radio in the living room listening to the revered voice of President Franklin Roosevelt. Even RCA’s mascot, a terrier named Nipper, perked up his ears to listen. Now look around a home today, with each individual tuned to a personal smartphone or iPad. We have all seen families gather together at restaurants, ostensibly to share a meal and conversation, but each holds in hand an electronic device that literally packs more computing power than Apollo 11. At the same time, community institutions have broken down, including thousands of city and village newspapers that have folded at a rate of about 150 per year. Throughout history prosperous nations have suffered from a powerful tendency to fissure, splinter and lose their unifying missions — even without the help of electrons zipping through wireless devices. Clearly, technology can play a role in unraveling communities. But to blame technology is too simple, convenient and recent of an explanation. I will show that throughout history prosperous nations have suffered from a powerful tendency to fissure, splinter and lose their unifying missions — even without the help of electrons zipping through wireless devices. This entropy explains why nations have collapsed, even when their economies looked relatively strong. In fact, this book will show that nations are just as likely to unravel after periods of prosperity as during periods of depression. I will uncover five key forces that tend to undermine nations after they have achieved economic success. Together these forces impose the price of prosperity. While Paul Kennedy’s classic “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” hit bestseller lists with tales of countries overextending their military, I make the case that the rot begins internally, not from armies storming across borders trying to conquer others. Recent bestsellers like Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” target inequality, while “Why Nations Fail” by James A. Robinson and Daron Acemoglu focuses on poor countries struggling to achieve prosperity. But we must also worry about “successful” countries that can no longer move forward or even stay in place. I will also argue that a splintering among the population matters: it induces people to cheat, swindle and focus more on the short term than on their long-term responsibilities, which ultimately undermines the economy and a cohesive civil society. The evidence jumps out from the headlines. A front-page story in the New York Times in 2008 reported that virtually every career employee of the Long Island Railroad applied for and received disability payments upon retirement. As a national spirit recedes, opportunism creeps in and shows up in everything from the housing market to school admissions to how congressmen handle national budgets. In the bubble years before the Great Recession of 2008, home buyers and brokers conspired to get subprime mortgages without putting any money down and without even showing tax returns to the bank. Bankers signed off anyway, since they were delighted to collect their hefty fees and pass the risk on to some faceless investor or taxpayer. Nobody had any skin in the game. As a national spirit recedes, opportunism creeps in and shows up in everything from the housing market to school admissions to how congressmen handle national budgets. It is a common and dangerous mistake to think that societies are less vulnerable when they are relatively prosperous. Most readers and even some social scientists assume, for example, that economic downturns spark crime. But faltering spirits and a lack of faith in the future kindle kidnapping, burglary and murder more than do falling incomes. During the 1930s, as families gathered around to listen to President Roosevelt’s reassuring voice, they felt a greater sense of cohesion and mutual support. In contrast, crime rates exploded in the 1960s, even as paychecks got fatter and jobs got easier to come by. To explain how even relatively prosperous societies have a tendency to come apart, we will scroll back the pages of history and look at the story of the splintering of such powers as the Ming dynasty in the 1600s, Venice in the 1700s, the Habsburg monarchs and Tokugawa shoguns in the 1800s and the Ottomans on the eve of World War I. In these examples, we will see how disintegrating national goals led to opportunistic behavior, an increase in cheating and theft and a decrease in saving and investment. We will see how the five forces of entropy threaten nations, putting a price tag on prosperity. These empires were powerful and reached extraordinary heights of economic wealth, yet they all collapsed from within. In this book, I have chosen examples that span cultural norms, from Confucian to Islamic to Catholic, geographic characteristics, from seafaring lowlands to mountainous highlands, and, of course, hundreds of years of history. The stories in this book will allow us to make inferences that are not anchored to one specific time, place, region or religion.

### AT: Nato Bad

#### NATO k2 preservation of US power internationally

Weinrod 16

(W. Bruce Weinrod, Bruce Weinrod, a Washington, DC attorney, served as an appointee of Secretary Dick Cheney as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy and as an appointee of Secretary Robert Gates as the Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO/Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe., 1-15-2016, "We Still Need NATO," American Interest, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/15/we-still-need-nato/>) CH

Not only does NATO remain relevant, but more importantly it continues to support and advance U.S. security interests—though again, often in ways that do not make headlines and that casual observers rarely appreciate in full. Most fundamentally, NATO provides a standing multilateral military capability that can deter or be deployed should a significant security threat arise. Because NATO has a military capability in place, the core elements for mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of substantial multilateral military forces already exist. The ongoing training, exercises, and regular communication among the national militaries of NATO members allows them to jump-start preparations and actions when needed without very lengthy preparatory work. This can allow the U.S. government to proceed in shaping and leading military coalitions more quickly, at less cost and with greater effectiveness, than if NATO did not exist and its functional equivalent had to be invented from scratch at a moment’s notice. While the U.S. government retains the capacity and the right to act unilaterally if and when necessary, it makes sense for it to act with others whenever possible, whether through NATO or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. A multilateral framework can provide both political cover and military resources, and the United States very much can benefit from both. The United States also benefits significantly from NATO’s logistics capabilities. Pontificating about grand strategies sounds impressive, but for military effectiveness and success, logistics capabilities are what really count. For example, while NATO did not formally participate in the 1991 Gulf War, NATO resources, supplies, bases, and other infrastructure provided crucial support prior to and during the U.S.-led coalition military action to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The coalition in effect borrowed NATO capacities already in existence, and benefitted greatly from equipment compatibility and common training and resources. Other coalitions of the willing assembled under U.S auspices and utilizing NATO resources can follow the same approach. In addition, the U.S. government has access to the numerous military facilities and resources that member nations make available to NATO. A good example is Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, now being used against ISIS in what is not a formal NATO operation. As importantly, working through NATO usually makes it relatively routine for host governments to agree to U.S. requests to use facilities within their territory for military-related purposes. Without NATO, in order to fulfill its security responsibilities, the U.S. government would need to develop and maintain a complex network of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and arrangements that would seek to maintain the kind of connectivity and flexibility that NATO already provides. Further, the U.S. government would need not only agreements to access such military facilities but also would likely need to obtain specific approval from the host nation for each use and perhaps even in some cases legislative approval. In general, it is much simpler, faster, and easier politically and otherwise for nations to grant the United States the use of their facilities within a NATO framework than it would be to have to grant permission to the United States on their own. Over recent decades NATO has, as noted above, developed a global security network that reflects formalized relationships with non-NATO nations. For the United States, this brings the advantage that it can work through NATO to develop or enhance security relationships with states that belong to the PFP, the MD, the ICI, and NATO bilateral security relationships. Working through NATO provides an extra dimension to U.S. efforts to enhance the military capacities of friends and allies in various regions who, with training and assistance, can provide supplementary support to NATO or U.S.-led operations. NATO also supports U.S. interests by providing a multilateral framework for a U.S. presence in nations where the U.S. government wishes to help train and also enhance its military contacts, but where unilateral U.S. military involvement might be politically contentious.

### AT: Deterrence Bad

#### Detterence leads to a net decrease in interventionism, solves endless wars

Record 4 (Jeffrey Record, Jeffrey Record is the author of Bounding the Global War on Terrorism and Dark Victory: America’s Second War against Iraq., 6-30-2004, "Back to Deterrence, Please!," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/back-deterrence-please>) CH

One by one, the rationales for the invasion and occupation of Iraq are falling away. Administration postulations of a grave and gathering Iraqi WMD threat and of a Saddam-Osama alliance dedicated to visiting a nuclear 9/11 on the United States have evaporated in the absence of discovered WMD. The same holds for an alleged collaborative relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda and Saddam’s complicity in 9/11. There is, indeed, no there there. The claims that regime change in Iraq would also deal a body blow to Islamic terrorism and set the stage for the Middle East’s transformation from autocracy to democracy are also belied by the facts. The Islamic terrorist threat has actually increased in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in large part because the Anglo-American occupation of an Arab heartland has not only stimulated recruitment of terrorists but also provided them with a new set of targets. As for democracy, the nature of future governance in Iraq remains far from clear (assuming the country does not collapse into civil war), and there are few signs that autocracy is on the run in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. OIF certainly has not cowed Iran and North Korea from pursuing their nuclear weapons programs; on the contrary, they have accelerated their programs since the invasion of Iraq as a means of deterring a U.S. attack. Our experience in Iraq has discredited the U.S. intelligence community and the neoconservatives’ fantasy assumptions about OIF’s strategic and political consequences. It has also underscored the perils of relying on preventive war as a substitute for traditional deterrence. Prewar administration statements dismissed the reliability of deterrence against fanatical terrorist organizations and rogue states, failing to distinguish critical differences between the two in character, aims, and vulnerability to U. S. military power. Administration spokesmen argued that Saddam Hussein, once in possession of nuclear weapons, would be undeterrable, that he would feel emboldened to run amok in the Persian Gulf and even attack the United States itself. The only way to eliminate this threat was to eliminate the regime itself, before it could acquire nuclear weapons. Because rogue states “see WMD not as means of last resort, but rather as weapons of choice…[as] tools of intimidation and military aggression,” announced President Bush in his 2002 “axis of evil” speech, “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” OIF can thus be viewed as the first war aimed at stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unlike deterrence, which focuses on thwarting the use of nuclear weapons, OIF sought to deny their acquisition. We know now, of course, that Saddam in 2003 had no nuclear weapons program worth the name. But in 2003 we also knew that neither Saddam Hussein’s Iraq nor any other rogue state had ever employed weapons of mass destruction against enemies capable of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage. Though Saddam had used chemical weapons against helpless Kurdish villages and Iranian infantry in the 1980s, he did not use them against U.S. or Israeli targets in the Gulf War of 1991. More to the point, even had Saddam Hussein managed to build a few atomic bombs, he would have been no more able to escape the reality of credible nuclear deterrence than the Soviet Union before him or North Korea today. As Condoleeza Rice declared in 2000, against rogue states, “the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence-if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” The administration rightly questions the utility of deterrence against fanatical terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. But rogue states, unlike terrorist organizations, have assets—territory, population centers, economic infrastructure and governments-that can be held hostage to devastating U.S. retaliation. Saddam Hussein always loved himself more than he hated the United States. And in 1991, when he had vast stocks of chemical weapons, he was deterred from using them against the Coalition and Israel by credible threats of obliteration.. The administration’s lumping together of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a common terrorist enemy was a strategic error of the first order because it ignored the effectiveness of deterrence against Iraq, and in so doing, encouraged an unnecessary preventive war based, as we now know, on a massive intelligence failure and a host of faulty assumptions about our ability to create stability and democracy in post-Saddam Iraq. In the final analysis, it is not rogue state possession of nuclear weapons that threatens the United States, but rather the prospect of their use. Accordingly, in dealing with the likes of Iran, North Korea, and other hostile nuclear wannabe states, the United States should return to its traditional-and successful-strategy of deterring their use. The alternative of preventive war to stop their acquisition simply invites repetition of what we have encountered in Iraq: diplomatic isolation, military dissipation, and an expanded terrorist threat. Creating and maintaining credible deterrence is not easy, but it’s a far less unattractive choice than starting unnecessary wars

#### Deterrence solves wars

Hanson 14 (Victor Davis Hanson, Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University,, 9-4-2014, "Only Deterrence Can Prevent War," National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/387006/only-deterrence-can-prevent-war-victor-davis-hanson>) CH

The world seems to be falling apart. Only lunatics from North Korea or Iran once mumbled about using nuclear weapons against their supposed enemies. Now Vladimir Putin, after gobbling up the Crimea, points to his nuclear arsenal and warns the West not to “mess” with Russia. The Middle East terrorist group the Islamic State keeps beheading its captives and threatening the West. Meanwhile Obama admits to the world that we “don’t have a strategy yet” for dealing with such barbaric terrorists. Not long ago he compared them to “jayvees.” Egypt is bombing Libya, which America once bombed and then left. Vice President Joe Biden once boasted that a quiet Iraq without U.S. troops could be “one of the great achievements” of the administration. Not now. China and Japan seem stuck in a 1930s time warp as they once again squabble over disputed territory. Why all the sudden wars? Conflicts rarely break out over needed scarce land — what Adolf Hitler once called “living space” — or even over natural resources. A vast, naturally rich Russia is under-populated and poorly run. It hardly needs more of the Crimea and Ukraine to screw up. The islands that Japan and China haggle over are mostly worthless real estate. Iran has enough oil and natural gas to meet its domestic and export needs without going to war over building a nuclear bomb. Often states fight about prestigious symbols that their own fears and sense of honor have inflated into existential issues. Hamas could turn its back on Israel and turn Gaza into Singapore — but not without feeling that it had backed down. Putin thinks that grabbing more of the old Soviet Republics will bring him the sort of prestige that his hero Stalin once enjoyed. The Islamic State wants to return to 7th-century Islam, when the Muslim world had more power and honor. The great Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges once summed up the Falklands War between his country and Britain as a fight “between two bald men over a comb.” In fact, Britain went to war over distant windswept rocks to uphold the hallowed tradition of the British Navy and the idea that British subjects everywhere were sacrosanct. The unpopular Argentine junta started a war to take Britain down a notch. But disputes over honor or from fear do not always lead to war. Something else is needed — an absence of deterrence. Most aggressors take stupid risks in starting wars only when they feel there is little likelihood they will be stopped. Hitler thought no one would care whether he gobbled up Poland, after he easily ingested Czechoslovakia and Austria. Saddam Hussein went into Kuwait believing the U.S. did not intervene in border disputes among Arab countries. Deterrence, alliances, and balances of power are not archaic concepts that “accidentally” triggered World War I, as we are sometimes told. They are the age-old tools of advising the more bellicose parties to calm down and get a grip. What ends wars? Not the League of Nations or the United Nations. Unfortunately, war is a sort of cruel laboratory experiment whose bloodletting determines which party, in fact, was the stronger all along. Once that fact is again recognized, peace usually follows. It took 50 million deaths to remind the appeased Axis that Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1941 were all along far weaker than the Allies of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Falklands War ended when Argentines recognized that boasting about beating the British was not the same as beating the British. Each time Hamas builds more tunnels and gets more rockets, it believes this time around it can beat Israel. Its wars end only when Hamas recognizes it can’t. War as a reminder of who is really strong and who weak is a savage way to run the world. Far better would be for peace-loving constitutional governments to remain strong. They should keep their defenses up, and warn Putin, the Islamic State, Iran, North Korea, and others like them that all a stupid war would accomplish would be to remind such aggressors that they would lose so much for nothing. Even nuclear powers need conventional deterrence. They or their interests are often attacked — as in the case of Britain by Argentina, the U.S. by al-Qaeda, or Israel by Hamas — by non-nuclear states on the likely assumption that nuclear weapons will not be used, and on the often erroneous assumption that the stronger power may not wish the trouble or have the ability to reply to the weaker. If deterrence and military readiness seem such a wise investment, why do democracies so often find themselves ill-prepared and bullied by aggressors who then are emboldened to start wars? It is hard for democratic voters to give up a bit of affluence in peace to ensure that they do not lose it all in war. It is even harder for sophisticated liberal thinkers to admit that after centuries of civilized life, we still have no better way of preventing Neanderthal wars than by reminding Neanderthals that we have the far bigger club — and will use it if provoked.

### AT: Assurance Better

#### Deterrence solves assurances

Mount 16 (Adam Mount, dam Mount is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 8-1-2016, "Deterrence is the best assurance," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/deterrence-best-assurance9819>) CH

As the Obama administration mulls over a list of potential steps to take on nuclear policy in its final months, discussion is sure to center on how these changes will affect US allies. Reports from Tokyo sand other capitals indicate that allies are already weighing in against one of the options, a declaration that the United States would not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. More and more, debates over US nuclear policy are not just about deterring adversaries but also about assuring allies of US security commitments. Over the course of the Obama administration, geopolitical events have not only made extended deterrence more difficult, but also, by extension, have made assurance of allies more difficult as well. It’s time to rethink how best to reassure allies of America’s security commitments, and refocus debate on deterrence of adversaries. The US alliance network extends across the globe, defending free people against war and helping to prevent dangerous regional arms races. The United States also extends nuclear deterrence to select allies, including Japan, South Korea, and members of NATO. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its continued provocation against NATO countries, China's expanding territorial claims in the South China Sea, and North Korean hostility have all set off alarms in the capitals of US allies. Drawing the line between threats that require a military response and those that can be addressed through other means can be difficult, both for the Pentagon and for any alliance of nations. If Washington is not willing to fight a war over a small cyberattack or South China Sea land reclamation projects, it can cause anxiety in allied capitals about the credibility of American commitments. If differences of opinion persist within an alliance, the US ally may decide to rely on it less for defense needs, and instead adopt policies that the United States considers ineffective, disadvantageous, or dangerous—ranging from more assertive military measures to appeasement of a powerful aggressor. Many officials believe, as US Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken said in June, that if allies lose confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, they could decide to develop nuclear weapons of their own. The Obama administration has devoted considerable time and attention to reassuring allies in Europe and Asia. In its 2017 budget, the Pentagon more than quadrupled its request for the European Reassurance Initiative. By the end of 2017, under this initiative, the US Army plans to have three Brigade Combat Teams continuously deployed in the region and equipment prepositioned for one more, plus provide allies with reinforcements in the form of aviation assets, special operations forces, and intelligence capabilities. In Asia, US defense officials have launched new dialogues on nuclear deterrence issues with Japan and South Korea. At periods of heightened tension, the Obama administration has repeatedly dispatched nuclear-capable bombers to fly over South Korea and other allies as a symbolic reminder of its nuclear guarantee. In both Europe and Asia, major joint exercises have helped teach allied militaries to work together to resist an attack and signal their ability to do so to potential adversaries. These joint exercises constitute a significant and under-recognized accomplishment, and will ensure that Obama’s successor inherits strong relationships. For all the attention it has received, though, assurance is not very well understood. In general, deterrence and assurance are two sides of the same coin. A mission designed to deter an adversary also has the effect of assuring an ally of its security. Ideally, the equation works the other way too: Steps that allies request for assurance also deter an adversary. Yet the two ideas are not conceptually or practically equivalent. Brad Roberts, who helped to manage nuclear alliances during his time in the Pentagon, writes eloquently in his recent book about the importance and difficulty of assuring allies today. He notes that in the years of the Cold War, “a conventional wisdom emerged that the standards for deterrence and assurance are very different.” In 1989, then-British Defense Minister Dennis Healey estimated that “it takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans”—because if the United States reneged on its alliance commitments, Europe stood to lose a great deal more than the Soviets stood to gain. Today, as extended deterrence takes on new importance and allies reach out for assurance, the concepts are again diverging. US officials now discuss the need to meet not only the deterrence requirements of allies but also their “assurance requirements.” The new moves under the European Reassurance Initiative, US officials have said, will help the US European Command “transition from reassurance to deterrence.” In principle, an ally should feel assured of its security when the partners act together to deter an adversary. Sometimes, however, US alliance partners ask for and receive new measures that appear to be only tangentially connected to deterrence. For example, most observers agree that US overflights of South Korea with nuclear-capable bombers do little to deter North Korea, and some believe they exacerbate crises unnecessarily. Similarly, the United States is pressing ahead with new missile defense sites in Romania and Poland, a decision for which Russia has promised to retaliate. Originally planned to hedge against a nuclear Iran, the sites ostensibly continue as a way of defending against Iran’s conventional missiles. Such actions may make US allies feel valued for a short time, but these kinds of assurance operations do not necessarily translate into an improved deterrence position. There are five reasons it can be problematic to focus on assurance. First, as deterrence becomes more difficult, it will simply not be possible to meet the Healey ratio. As his remark suggests, as deterrence requirements rise, assurance requirements will increase at a disproportionate rate. With force structure and posture increasingly constrained by budgetary politics in the United States and debates over the extent of nuclear modernization, it will not be sustainable to rely on new procurement and deployments to assure allies each time an adversary acts up. Second, new assurance missions can send inflammatory signals to adversaries without having a real deterrent effect. Allies tend to request visible or symbolic demonstrations of the US commitment, which can further alarm an adversary without providing new deterrent leverage, as with European missile defense and Korean overflights. If an adversary takes new steps to respond, it can lead to new assurance requests, and a downward spiral of insecurity—even if deterrence was in place all along. Third, some assurance relationships tend to privilege nuclear signals as more credible than conventional capabilities. However, US nuclear policy is a precise and highly constrained domain: Any new nuclear capability or deployment will have enormous ramifications for nonproliferation and stability, so US officials are limited in what they can do on this front. There will be limits to the Pentagon's ability to posture nuclear systems for assurance purposes. Fourth, assurance requirements can be used by parts of a bureaucracy to push their preferences about US force structure. In 2009, four Japanese diplomats apparently presented testimony to a US commission on nuclear policy asking the Pentagon to redeploy nuclear cruise missiles on its submarines, a system that had been withdrawn in 1990. Japan’s Foreign Minister later clarified that his government did not take official positions on specific US weapons systems, but rumors persisted in Washington that these missiles were “Japan’s weapon”—in part because some US officials wanted to retain the weapons. More recently, opponents of potential changes to US nuclear policy from within the US security establishment have claimed that allies disapprove of the moves under discussion, even in light of evidence to the contrary. Fifth, a focus on assurance can send perverse signals to allies. Blinken’s remark that failed assurance could lead South Korea or Japan to develop nuclear weapons is hardly uncommon; the idea has appeared in the Nuclear Posture Review and official remarks, and has recently been discussed in depth in the Bulletin. Often, such statements seem designed to justify support for the alliance to domestic audiences in America. However, they only encourage the groups in South Korea and Japan that do want to go nuclear. The next US president will have to devote considerable time and attention to establishing personal credibility with allies and carrying on the work of deterrence and assurance, especially after some reckless comments about allies made over the course of the 2016 presidential campaign. However, the next administration should also rethink how it conducts assurance in an age of increasingly complex asymmetric threats. The United States and its allies should focus directly on the difficult challenge of deterring adversaries and defending against aggression. US officials should not treat assurance requests as categorical, but rather as signals that they should work with allies to set deterrence requirements and then meet them. As force structure and posture face new constraints, communication and security cooperation will become more important for reassurance. Allies should avoid symbolic displays of solidarity that do not help prevent conflict, and resist the temptation to request and offer new assurance steps as a way of “sending a message” in response to new provocations. Both US and allied officials should work to gain a clearer sense of the interests of their counterparts, and refrain from using assurance arguments to settle domestic disputes. Allies should also not think of nuclear promises as inherently more credible than conventional-weapon assurances, or a signal of closer commitment, or a panacea for new challenges. Nuclear weapons are not well suited to deter or respond to grey-zone threats. The day-to-day joint missions of conventional forces to train, patrol, deter, and defend against provocations and war are not only a highly credible signal of America’s commitment to the security of its allies, they are also the most effective and important missions for the new generation of threats. Allies should value these routine but critical conventional operations and make new investments in areas like intelligence collection, readiness, special operations, and anti-submarine warfare. Both sides should work to prioritize the difficult work of conventional deterrence that can keep allies safe—and not the nuclear systems that are better suited to avenging an ally after tragedy strikes. This is the best assurance that the United States can offer.

### AT: Deterrence Causes Endless Wars

####  War breeds peace, a weak US hegemon would be compelled to intervene which would only make these wars last longer and be more devastating, turns the K

Luttwak 99 (Edward Luttwak, Edward N. Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author of several books on national security policy, July/August 1999,"Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance>) CH

An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is c. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, however, wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern. But a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends -- and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile -- again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords -- artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace. The Cold War provided compelling justification for such behavior by the two superpowers, which sometimes collaborated in coercing less-powerful belligerents to avoid being drawn into their conflicts and clashing directly. Although imposed cease-fires ultimately did increase the total quantity of warfare among the lesser powers, and armistices did perpetuate states of war, both outcomes were clearly lesser evils (from a global point of view) than the possibility of nuclear war. But today, neither Americans nor Russians are inclined to intervene competitively in the wars of lesser powers, so the unfortunate consequences of interrupting war persist while no greater danger is averted. It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves out. Today cease-fires and armistices are imposed on lesser powers by multilateral agreement -- not to avoid great-power competition but for essentially disinterested and indeed frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war. But this, perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps, with combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely. Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies. Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin. Peace takes hold only when war is truly over. A variety of multilateral organizations now make it their business to intervene in other peoples' wars. The defining characteristic of these entities is that they insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat. In the long run this only adds to the damage. If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war. But the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingents is to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanders therefore habitually appease the locally stronger force, accepting its dictates and tolerating its abuses. This appeasement is not strategically purposeful, as siding with the stronger power overall would be; rather, it merely reflects the determination of each U.N. unit to avoid confrontation. The final result is to prevent the emergence of a coherent outcome, which requires an imbalance of strength sufficient to end the fighting. Peacekeepers chary of violence are also unable to effectively protect civilians who are caught up in the fighting or deliberately attacked. At best, U.N. peacekeeping forces have been passive spectators to outrages and massacres, as in Bosnia and Rwanda; at worst, they collaborate with it, as Dutch U.N. troops did in the fall of Srebenica by helping the Bosnian Serbs separate the men of military age from the rest of the population. The very presence of U.N. forces, meanwhile, inhibits the normal remedy of endangered civilians, which is to escape from the combat zone. Deluded into thinking that they will be protected, civilians in danger remain in place until it is too late to flee. During the 1992-94 siege of Sarajevo, appeasement interacted with the pretense of protection in an especially perverse manner: U.N. personnel inspected outgoing flights to prevent the escape of Sarajevo civilians in obedience to a cease-fire agreement negotiated with the locally dominant Bosnian Serbs -- who habitually violated that deal. The more sensible, realistic response to a raging war would have been for the Muslims to either flee the city or drive the Serbs out. Institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe lack even the U.N.'s rudimentary command structure and personnel, yet they too now seek to intervene in warlike situations, with predictable consequences. Bereft of forces even theoretically capable of combat, they satisfy the interventionist urges of member states (or their own institutional ambitions) by sending unarmed or lightly armed "observer" missions, which have the same problems as U.N. peacekeeping missions, only more so. Military organizations such as NATO or the West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG, recently at work in Sierra Leone) are capable of stopping warfare. Their interventions still have the destructive consequence of prolonging the state of war, but they can at least protect civilians from its consequences. Even that often fails to happen, however, because multinational military commands engaged in disinterested interventions tend to avoid any risk of combat, thereby limiting their effectiveness. U.S. troops in Bosnia, for example, repeatedly failed to arrest known war criminals passing through their checkpoints lest this provoke confrontation. Multinational commands, moreover, find it difficult to control the quality and conduct of member states' troops, which can reduce the performance of all forces involved to the lowest common denominator. This was true of otherwise fine British troops in Bosnia and of the Nigerian marines in Sierra Leone. The phenomenon of troop degradation can rarely be detected by external observers, although its consequences are abundantly visible in the litter of dead, mutilated, raped, and tortured victims that attends such interventions. The true state of affairs is illuminated by the rare exception, such as the vigorous Danish tank battalion in Bosnia that replied to any attack on it by firing back in full force, quickly stopping the fighting. All prior examples of disinterested warfare and its crippling limitations, however, have been cast into shadow by NATO's current intervention against Serbia for the sake of Kosovo. The alliance has relied on airpower alone to minimize the risk of NATO casualties, bombing targets in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo for weeks without losing a single pilot. This seemingly miraculous immunity from Yugoslav anti-aircraft guns and missiles was achieved by multiple layers of precautions. First, for all the noise and imagery suggestive of a massive operation, very few strike sorties were actually flown during the first few weeks. That reduced the risks to pilots and aircraft but of course also limited the scope of the bombing to a mere fraction of NATO's potential. Second, the air campaign targeted air-defense systems first and foremost, minimizing present and future allied casualties, though at the price of very limited destruction and the loss of any shock effect. Third, NATO avoided most anti-aircraft weapons by releasing munitions not from optimal altitudes but from an ultra-safe 15,000 feet or more. Fourth, the alliance greatly restricted its operations in less-than-perfect weather conditions. NATO officials complained that dense clouds were impeding the bombing campaign, often limiting nightly operations to a few cruise-missile strikes against fixed targets of known location. In truth, what the cloud ceiling prohibited was not all bombing -- low-altitude attacks could easily have taken place -- but rather perfectly safe bombing. On the ground far beneath the high-flying planes, small groups of Serb soldiers and police in armored vehicles were terrorizing hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars. NATO has a panoply of aircraft designed for finding and destroying such vehicles. All its major powers have anti-tank helicopters, some equipped to operate without base support. But no country offered to send them into Kosovo when the ethnic cleansing began -- after all, they might have been shot down. When U.S. Apache helicopters based in Germany were finally ordered to Albania, in spite of the vast expenditure devoted to their instantaneous "readiness" over the years, they required more than three weeks of "predeployment preparations" to make the journey. Six weeks into the war, the Apaches had yet to fly their first mission, although two had already crashed during training. More than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging was responsible for this inordinate delay: the U.S. Army insisted that the Apaches could not operate on their own, but would need the support of heavy rocket barrages to suppress Serb anti-aircraft weapons. This created a much larger logistical load than the Apaches alone, and an additional, evidently welcome delay. Even before the Apache saga began, NATO already had aircraft deployed on Italian bases that could have done the job just as well: U.S. a-10 "Warthogs" built around their powerful 30 mm antitank guns and British Royal Air Force Harriers ideal for low-altitude bombing at close range. Neither was employed, again because it could not be done in perfect safety. In the calculus of the NATO democracies, the immediate possibility of saving thousands of Albanians from massacre and hundreds of thousands from deportation was obviously not worth the lives of a few pilots. That may reflect unavoidable political reality, but it demonstrates how even a large-scale disinterested intervention can fail to achieve its ostensibly humanitarian aim. It is worth wondering whether the Kosovars would have been better off had NATO simply done nothing.

(Luttwak Continues)

Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Unlike the ancient problem of war, however, the compounding of its evils by disinterested interventions is a new malpractice that could be curtailed. Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to intervene in other peoples' wars -- not because they are indifferent to human suffering but precisely because they care about it and want to facilitate the advent of peace. The United States should dissuade multilateral interventions instead of leading them. New rules should be established for U.N. refugee relief activities to ensure that immediate succor is swiftly followed by repatriation, local absorption, or emigration, ruling out the establishment of permanent refugee camps. And although it may not be possible to constrain interventionist NGOs, they should at least be neither officially encouraged nor funded. Underlying these seemingly perverse measures would be a true appreciation of war's paradoxical logic and a commitment to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace

#### Constant war is good for military experience which bolsters military capabilities

Babones 15

(Salvatore Babones, Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies., 6-11-2015, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=show>) CH

The massive federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers’ wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. By comparison, America’s current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that “if current policies remain in place, the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the implications of maintaining surpluses.” As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one financial crisis later, America’s budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America’s fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain’s was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America’s century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training. Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military. On the contrary, it may enhance it. America’s limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain’s bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922.

### AT: Deterrence Justifies Drone Strikes

#### Drone strikes are good and comparatively better than any alternative

Play 12

(Avery Play, [Avery Plaw](http://www.umassd.edu/cas/polisci/facultyandstaff/averyplaw/) is an associate professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, November 14, 2012, "Drone Strikes Save Lives, American and Other," New York TImes, <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/25/do-drone-attacks-do-more-harm-than-good/drone-strikes-save-lives-american-and-other>) CH

This is a tough call. Drone warfare has done a lot of good for the U.S., and could cause Americans a lot of harm. But my best judgment is that from the U.S. perspective, drone strikes have done more good than harm and should be continued, provided that the Obama administration can offer more clarity on what’s being done and can provide a sound legal justification for doing it. One point in favor of drone strikes is that they are weakening Al Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated groups, and hence protecting lives, American and other. Also, there don’t seem to be better means of doing so. Points against drone strikes are the cost in civilian lives, the alienation of parts of the Islamic world, potential harm to the authority of international law, and the possibility that drone use will spread around the world, generating more conflict and harming long-term U.S. interests. These are all valid points, and I respect that reasonable people could be convinced by either set. My own reasoning turns on four arguments. First, states have a primary responsibility for the protection of their own citizens. If drone strikes are the best way to remove an all-too-real threat to American lives, then that is an especially weighty consideration. Second, I doubt that ending drone strikes would substantially reduce anti-Americanism in the Islamic world or put a dent in radical recruitment. Third, the U.S can do a lot to moderate some harms caused by its use of drones. By being clearer about what it’s doing and offering detailed legal justification, the U.S. could mitigate damage to international law and the threat of uncontrolled proliferation. Finally, there is evidence that drone strikes are less harmful to civilians than other means of reaching Al Qaeda and affiliates in remote, lawless regions (for example, large-scale military operations). And that is what is required of states in armed conflict, legally and ethically: where civilian casualties cannot be avoided, they must be minimized.

### AT: IR Scholarship is America-Centric

#### American IR scholarship assists alternative views of IR theory to emerge

Mearsheimer 16 (John J. Mearsheimer, John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 3-2-2016, "Benign Hegemony," OUP Academic, <https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/isr/viv021>) CH

It is often said that the international relations (IR) scholarly community is too American-centric and needs to broaden its horizons. I disagree. In the mid-1970s, Stanley Hoffmann called IR an “American social science.” That label was appropriate then, and it is still appropriate today especially with regard to the all important ideas and theories that dominate discourse in our discipline. This situation is not likely to change significantly anytime soon and for entirely legitimate and defensible reasons. To be clear, the issue here is not about the makeup of the IR scholarly community as there is an abundance of scholars from outside the borders of the United States who study world politics. It is clear from just perusing the program for the International Studies Association’s annual conference that IR scholars live in a global village. This diversity—which is all for the good—is likely to grow with time as increasing numbers of young people from around the world go to college and study IR. In short, American scholars do not have great influence because of their numbers. Nor do Americans dominate the field because the subjects that concern them are privileged over the interests of scholars from other countries. In fact, the issues that concern IR students are the same almost everywhere. Nuclear proliferation, democracy promotion, and economic interdependence—to pick just three topics among many—hardly concern the United States alone or even just the great powers. Virtually every country cares about those subjects and countless others, although they might approach them in different ways. North Korea and the United States, for example, might think differently about the virtues of nuclear proliferation, but both care greatly about the issue. It is in the realm of methods, and especially theory, where US scholars dominate the study of IR. The analytical frameworks and causal stories that researchers from other countries employ in their work are associated in large part with American academia. For instance, the key names associated with the three most important bodies of IR theory—constructivism, liberalism, and realism—are closely tied to scholars at American universities. And the few influential IR theorists who do not teach at US universities are mostly British or are at least associated with British schools. Thus, one could argue that it is really Anglo-Saxon scholars who dominate the IR discourse. The importance of theory for studying international politics cannot be underestimated as there is no way we can make sense of the infinitely complicated world around us without theories. The fact that the United States is home to the world’s leading theorists is what allows its IR community to control the commanding heights of the field. The dominance of American-based scholars is reinforced by the fact that they have developed a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the international system. This means, however, there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories. To be sure, this is not to say that there is no room for new theories, especially when it comes to middle-range theories. Plus, there is always room to refine existing theories. Still, there are limited opportunities in 2015 for scholars outside the United States—as well inside it—to develop wholly new theories. If this were 1945, the situation would be markedly different. The extent to which American theories cast a giant shadow over the IR field is reflected in how undergraduate and graduate students outside of the United States talk and think about international politics. Wherever I speak abroad— regardless of the subject—the comments and questions from students are virtually the same ones I get when I talk on American campuses. Indeed, students inside and outside of the United States seem to read the same articles and books and for the most part employ the same concepts and arguments. I might add that as a realist, I feel intellectually more at home in Beijing than Washington because Chinese scholars and policymakers tend to be more sympathetic to realism than their American counterparts. So, when I speak in China— w here there is a deep fascination with American IR theories—I sometimes start my talks by saying, “It is good to be back among my people.” And I do not speak one word of Chinese, although I do speak the same language as my Chinese interlocutors when we talk about the basic realities of international politics. American dominance in IR is reinforced by the fact that many talented undergraduates from around the world come to the United States for graduate training, where they are taught that the theories and methods that dominate the intellectual landscape on American campuses are essential tools for being a first-rate scholar. Most of them go on to have successful careers—often not only in the United States but also in other countries—where they purvey the ideas they learned in graduate school. One sometimes hears the argument that there is a hegemonic discourse in IR and that the Americans who control it actively work to suppress new ideas generated by outsiders. In other words, there would be a richer and more diverse menu of IR theories were it not for American gatekeepers policing the discourse. This claim is wrong and easy to refute. For starters, just ask yourself: where are the ideas that are being suppressed? Where is the evidence that American academics have prevented others from pushing forward new ideas about international politics? In fact, there is none. And please remember that we live in the age of the Internet, where it is almost impossible to stop new ideas—particularly good ones—from reaching a wide audience. Beside, the scholarly world places a high premium on creating innovative arguments, especially if they challenge conventional wisdoms and even if they make prominent scholars angry. Finally, the American IR community is international and liberal at its core, which makes it hard to believe serious scholars in that world would be interested in protecting a hegemonic discourse, much less be capable of organizing to achieve that end. Even if a few scholars played politics and attempted to marginalize a novel idea they disliked, other scholars would intervene to promote and engage with it, particularly if it shed new light on an important problem. One might argue that focusing on culture, as an explanatory variable, would allow non-Americans to offer new theories and broaden horizons within IR. For example, a number of scholars and public intellectuals have claimed that China has a Confucian culture, which they maintain has had a profound influence on its past foreign policy and will continue to do so in the future. For example, this is a key element in Henry Kissinger’s 2011 book On China, and it is clearly a legitimate 2 Benign Hegemony argument. But cultural arguments of this sort have been swishing around in American academia for decades. During the Cold War, for instance, more than a few American scholars maintained that there was a Soviet strategic culture that mattered greatly for explaining Moscow’s behavior. All this is to say that cultural arguments do not offer a new way of broadening our intellectual vista in IR. American dominance of the IR discourse is likely to diminish somewhat in the decades ahead as scholars from other countries become increasingly engaged in trying to develop new theories and refine existing ones. After all, Americans do not have a special aptitude for doing theory, and the United States has not always ruled the theoretical roost. Britain and Germany dominated intellectual discourse in IR before World War II, and US preeminence did not emerge until after 1945. Moreover, when Americans got seriously involved in IR scholarship, their theories bore a remarkable resemblance to those developed in Europe. Just think of the profound influence of Immanuel Kant and Hans Morgenthau—both Germans— on IR theory in the United States. What this tells us is that those non-American IR scholars who become leading theorists at some future point will stand on the shoulders of American academics, much the way America’s leading lights have stood on the shoulders of their European predecessors. This is the way scholarship advances

## T

### Education

#### Education means formal schooling

Webster’s 10

Webster’S New World College Dictionary,, 2010, "Education definition and meaning," No Publication, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/education

1. the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., esp. by formal schooling; teaching; training 2. knowledge, ability, etc. thus developed 3. a. formal schooling at an institution of learning b. a stage of this a high-school education 4. systematic study of the methods and theories of teaching and learning

## CP

### States CP

#### CP can’t solve- only the federal government has the ability to regulate the military

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

Providing for national defense is an explicitly enumerated power of the federal government. Six of the 17 enumerated powers in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution pertain to the military and national defense. The Constitution outlines three key tenets of federal responsibility and purpose vis à vis national defense: National defense is the responsibility and first priority of the federal government (Article 1, Section 9); The federal government is mandated to provide for national defense (Article 4, Section 4); and National defense is exclusively the function of the federal government (Article 1, Section 10).11 The federal government’s exclusive responsibility and mandate to oversee national defense and the military extends to military-related issues that impact education. Whereas education is not an enumerated power of the federal government per the U.S. Constitution, national defense is clearly so, and the education of military-connected children has a special place as a Department of Education (DOE) program. Since it pertains to the U.S. military, Impact Aid is one of the few federal programs dealing with education that has constitutional warrant. Just as there is no question, constitutionally speaking, that the federal government has authority over the military, so also does the federal government have authority to implement or modify programs that provide federal funding to military families.

#### Permutation do both- only a rediverting of Federal funds can solve for the affs impacts

#### States don’t allow ESA’s in squo, the plan is less of a violation of federalism than the cp, since states would not have to change policies under the plan but would have to under the cp

Burke 7-4 (Lindsey Burke, 7-4-1776, "Educational Freedom for Our Warriors in the Land of the Free," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/educational-freedom-our-warriors-the-land-the-free>) CH

When our Founding Fathers drafted the Declaration of Independence and the Continental Congress adopted it on July 4th, 1776, they declared themselves a nation built on the principles of human freedom and limited, representative government. For years, they fought the British and gave their lives to confirm this independence. Now, 241 years later, our military families continue to give their lives to secure our freedom. As we celebrate this Independence Day and thank the men and women of our armed services, let’s also consider ways we can improve freedom and opportunity for our military families as they serve. All military members volunteer to deploy into harm’s way. For a service member preparing for deployment or already deployed far from home, the education options available to their children can be a point of great concern. The schooling options available to military-connected children can play a role in whether a family accepts an assignment, even factoring into decisions to leave military service altogether. According to a recent survey conducted and published by the Military Times, 35 percent of respondents said that dissatisfaction with their child’s education was a “significant factor” in their decision to remain in or leave military service. In fact, the Pentagon’s changes to policy in 2016 enabling families to remain at duty stations for longer time periods was a direct response “to complaints by military parents who are loathe to move if the next duty station has poorly performing schools.” These complaints may often stem from the fact that military-connected children are assigned to the district schools closest in proximity to military bases, regardless of whether those district schools are right for them. As important as education is to military parents, more than half of all active-duty military families live in states with no school choice options at all. What if, instead of assigning children of active duty military families to district schools closest to where they live, we offered military families a chance to access the federal dollars being spent on their children directly? The 1.3 billion dollar Impact Aid program supports the education of military-connected children by sending money to local district schools. Imagine if instead a military family could access a portion of those funds through an account with their name on it. Active duty military families would have access to a parent-controlled education savings account, populated with the federal funds that would have been spent on their child in the public system, which could be used for private school tuition, online learning, special education services and therapies, private tutors, textbooks, curricula, and any other education-related services of their choice. Educations savings accounts give valuable freedom to parents to choose the education that works best for their child. Across the U.S., six states have established educations savings account options: Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Mississippi, Nevada, and most recently, North Carolina. Like their civilian-family counterparts, children of military families deserve choices in education. Modernizing the Impact Aid program by transitioning funding into parent-controlled education savings accounts would provide children of active-duty military families with education choice, while ensuring the federal program serves military families as well as they serve us. When our Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, they made national defense a paramount responsibility of the new federal government. As we celebrate the birth of our great nation, let’s strengthen our national defense by supporting military families with educational freedom.

#### Uniform 50 state fiat is bad and a voting issue

#### Skills- the judge is a policy maker who shouldn’t have to interpret what other actors should be doing, teaches an irresponsible form of decision making that robs us of portable skills

####  Kills topic education- robs us of the core topic area which is regulation and funding and focuses debates on role of fed gov

#### Skews lit base- aff is disadvantaged since we cant access reliable offense

#### School choice may be a states issue, but the plan is uniquely a federal one

Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education, 7-14-2017, "‘S’ Is for ‘School Choice’ and ‘States’ — Washington Should Back Off," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/s-school-choice-and-states-washington-should-back

Allow states to continue to lead on school choice. The support for school choice expressed by the Trump administration and Education Secretary Betsy DeVos is more than welcome, but their efforts to advance choice through federal policy should be limited to a few key reforms where the federal government has clear authority. That includes advancing choice in the District of Columbia, which is under the jurisdiction of Congress; creating choice for children attending federally managed Bureau of Indian Affairs schools, and establishing school choice for military-connected children across the country.

### Extra CP Cards

#### State action isn’t enough to solve, need federal structuring

Pillow 4-20 (Travis Pillow, Travis Pillow is editor of redefinED, 4-20-2017, "Expanding school choice for military families," redefinED, <https://www.redefinedonline.org/2017/04/school-choice-military-tim-scott/>) CH

Sen. Tim Scott has seen how hard it can be for military families to find educational opportunities for their children as they move from one base to another. His older brother was a command sergeant major in the U.S. Army. His younger brother is a colonel in the Air Force. Their experiences trying to find schools for their children helped inspire the CHOICE Act. Scott’s legislation would create pilot scholarship programs on at least five military bases. “I know firsthand that a parent doesn’t choose the base they go to, and therefore, can only hope and pray that the education is good,” the South Carolina Republican tells Denisha Merriweather, a Florida tax credit scholarship alumna, in our latest podcast interview. April is the month of the military child, and several states are advancing proposals to create new educational options for military families — or help existing school choice programs better meet their needs. Georgia lawmakers approved a bill creating open enrollment for families on military bases, while Florida is advancing legislation that would allow military parents to apply for tax credit scholarships year-round. “Giving those folks more options, more tools in their arsenal, so to speak, so that their children can have a quality education while the service member is putting their life on the line to protect freedom and liberty is, I think, the right thing to do,” Scott says. Scott’s bill would also encourage states to create school choice programs for children with special needs, and expand the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, which provides vouchers to low-income students in the nation’s capital. Scott says there’s “turbulence” in Washington around more sweeping federal school choice legislation, but says Congress can help states see the wisdom of expanding educational options — especially for disadvantaged students. “The goal for us on the federal level is not to require states to have school choice programs, but to encourage the states to take a serious look at those trapped in poverty, and to look for ways to break that cycle of generational poverty. And education is a very important part of it,” he says to Merriweather. “If they see the light, I believe they will move in that direction, which is good news for kids like me and kids like you.”

### PGS CP

#### 1. Permutation do both

#### 2. SQUO human capital shortages lead to increased military suicides

Ramsey and Padgett 2-2 (Brenton Ramsey &amp; Michael Padgett, Michael Padgett, Ph.D., &nbsp;is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with over 28 years of active service. He currently runs a consulting company focusing on federal government and contracts training. He and his wife reside in the mountains surrounding Sylva, North Carolina, Brenton Ramsey is a retired U. S. Navy Captain with 30 years combined active and reserve service., 2-2-2017, "What is the Appropriate Manpower Requirement of the U.S. Military?," No Publication, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/02/manpower_requirement_of_the_us_military_110730.html>) CH

Since the Cold War ended, military manpower declined by 685,000, a 34.5% reduction. In light of the current threat environment, have reductions put the U.S. at risk? The correct sizing of the U.S. military is once again a topic receiving a close examination by almost everyone. The Trump Administration wants to increase Army active duty end strength to 540,000 from the previously planned strength of 450,000. The Navy would increase from 274 combatant ships to 350 with manning increasing from 330,000 to 380,000. The Air Force would have 1,200 active tactical stealth fighter aircraft and add about 10,000 personnel. The Marine Corps would need to add approximately 12,000 to the infantry. Are these the right numbers for the U.S. to maintain its security and responsibilities worldwide? What are the repercussions if our active duty military is sized too small? Of course, the worst case is we are invaded by an adversary and lose our way of life. This is not likely, for many reasons, in the upcoming decades. Another possibility is a surprise attack with nuclear weapons via ballistic missiles. This is also viewed as unlikely from major adversaries based on the decades-old theory of MAD (mutually assured destruction) although a smaller attack from North Korea or Iran or radicals who get their hands on nuclear devices cannot altogether be ruled out. Therefore, regardless of the overall size of the military, it is absolutely essential for the country to acquire and maintain a robust ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) capability. Lesser interests, but interests that most consider vital, are to fulfill our treaty and other international agreements worldwide and to maintain the world’s oceans for freedom of navigation. International trade increases the U.S. GDP, which raises the standard of living for all Americans. Another reason for a strong military capability to project American strength worldwide is to prevent potential adversaries from taking actions against American interests. When countries are perceived weak, history has shown that adversaries are more likely to fill the void created by the perceived weakness. When the U.S. military is required to protect worldwide interests while being insufficient in manpower, the strain on the undermanned military becomes unbearable for military members and their families. Currently, the suicide rate of 25/100,000 is 25% higher than the civilian population and has more than doubled since 9/11. The military suicide rate in the 1980s was ~12/100,000. The suicide rate increase is one indicator of an overstretched military. One report not released to the public documents retention down across the Navy, even in the SEALs. The Air Force is short 700 pilots, and the figure is expected to grow to 1,000 as trained pilots are leaving the AF for the private sector in much higher numbers than desired.

#### 3.**the risk of miscalc is high**

Woolf 2/3 - policy specialist in nuclear weapon policy (Amy, 2/3/17, Accessed 6/27/17, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues”, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>, p. 33-34, AD)

Some Members of Congress and many analysts outside government have focused much of their criticism of the PGS concept on the potential that other nations might detect the launch of a U.S. CPGS missile and conclude, mistakenly, that the United States had launched an attack with nuclear-armed missiles. Specifically, some have argued that, if the United States were to launch these missiles during a conflict, nations with minimal satellite capabilities and launch notification systems (such as China) or degraded launch notification systems (such as Russia) could conclude that they were under attack with nuclear missiles.96 Further, because many possible targets lie south of Russia and China, and the United States has historically planned to launch its ballistic missiles over the North Pole, a conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile might fly over these two nations to strike its targets. For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations. The potential for misunderstanding is compounded by the short time of flight of these missiles, giving these nations little time to evaluate the event, assess the threat, and respond with their own forces. Under such circumstances, critics claim that these nations may conclude they have no other option than to respond with their own nuclear weapons.

#### 4. PGS ensures retaliation – assumes their defense

Woolf 16 (Amy, policy specialist in nuclear weapon policy, 2/24/16, Accessed 7/1/17, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues”, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf>, p. 34-35, AD)

Taken together, these three types of measures might help reduce the risks of misunderstandings. But the accumulation of information during peacetime and frequent communications during crises may not be sufficient to address problems that could come up in an atmosphere of confusion and incomplete information during a conflict. Specifically, the argument in favor of using long-range ballistic missiles for the PGS mission assumes that the United States might have little warning before the start of a conflict and might need to launch its missiles promptly at that time. This scenario would allow little time for the United States to consult with, or even inform, other nations about its intentions. If other nations are caught by surprise and fear they might be under nuclear attack, they might also decide to respond promptly, before the United States had the opportunity to convince them that the missiles carried conventional warheads. 104 Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle, Submitted in response to Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force, February 24, 2004, p. 4. 105 Air Force Space Command, Common Aero Vehicle White Paper, p. 11. Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Congressional Research Service 35 Even though routine data exchanges and on-site inspections may provide confidence in the absence of nuclear warheads on the missiles on a day-to-day basis in peacetime, they cannot provide assurances that the warheads could not be changed in a relatively short period of time or that the warheads were not actually changed in the days or weeks since the last inspection. In addition, changing the basing patterns or launch patterns of missiles to draw a sharper distinction between conventional and nuclear-armed missiles assumes both that other nations can observe the differences and that they believe the different appearances indicate different warheads. Finally, these measures would do nothing to alleviate concerns among nations that did not participate in the cooperative programs. As a result, while the measures described above can reduce the possibility of misunderstandings, they probably cannot eliminate them. Moreover, they cannot address concerns, often expressed by officials in Russia and China, that the United States might use these weapons, along with other conventional strike systems and missile defenses, to acquire a the ability to attack strategic or nuclear targets in these nations without resorting to the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.

## DA’S

### Federalism DA

#### DA is terminally NUQ- and the plan doesn’t increase regulation over states, doesn’t result in a net increase in power over the states

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

Providing for national defense is an explicitly enumerated power of the federal government. Six of the 17 enumerated powers in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution pertain to the military and national defense. The Constitution outlines three key tenets of federal responsibility and purpose vis à vis national defense: National defense is the responsibility and first priority of the federal government (Article 1, Section 9); The federal government is mandated to provide for national defense (Article 4, Section 4); and National defense is exclusively the function of the federal government (Article 1, Section 10).11 The federal government’s exclusive responsibility and mandate to oversee national defense and the military extends to military-related issues that impact education. Whereas education is not an enumerated power of the federal government per the U.S. Constitution, national defense is clearly so, and the education of military-connected children has a special place as a Department of Education (DOE) program. Since it pertains to the U.S. military, Impact Aid is one of the few federal programs dealing with education that has constitutional warrant. Just as there is no question, constitutionally speaking, that the federal government has authority over the military, so also does the federal government have authority to implement or modify programs that provide federal funding to military families.

#### States don’t allow ESA’s in squo, the plan is less of a violation of federalism than the cp, since states would not have to change policies under the plan but would have to under the cp

Burke 7-4 (Lindsey Burke, 7-4-1776, "Educational Freedom for Our Warriors in the Land of the Free," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/educational-freedom-our-warriors-the-land-the-free>) CH

When our Founding Fathers drafted the Declaration of Independence and the Continental Congress adopted it on July 4th, 1776, they declared themselves a nation built on the principles of human freedom and limited, representative government. For years, they fought the British and gave their lives to confirm this independence. Now, 241 years later, our military families continue to give their lives to secure our freedom. As we celebrate this Independence Day and thank the men and women of our armed services, let’s also consider ways we can improve freedom and opportunity for our military families as they serve. All military members volunteer to deploy into harm’s way. For a service member preparing for deployment or already deployed far from home, the education options available to their children can be a point of great concern. The schooling options available to military-connected children can play a role in whether a family accepts an assignment, even factoring into decisions to leave military service altogether. According to a recent survey conducted and published by the Military Times, 35 percent of respondents said that dissatisfaction with their child’s education was a “significant factor” in their decision to remain in or leave military service. In fact, the Pentagon’s changes to policy in 2016 enabling families to remain at duty stations for longer time periods was a direct response “to complaints by military parents who are loathe to move if the next duty station has poorly performing schools.” These complaints may often stem from the fact that military-connected children are assigned to the district schools closest in proximity to military bases, regardless of whether those district schools are right for them. As important as education is to military parents, more than half of all active-duty military families live in states with no school choice options at all. What if, instead of assigning children of active duty military families to district schools closest to where they live, we offered military families a chance to access the federal dollars being spent on their children directly? The 1.3 billion dollar Impact Aid program supports the education of military-connected children by sending money to local district schools. Imagine if instead a military family could access a portion of those funds through an account with their name on it. Active duty military families would have access to a parent-controlled education savings account, populated with the federal funds that would have been spent on their child in the public system, which could be used for private school tuition, online learning, special education services and therapies, private tutors, textbooks, curricula, and any other education-related services of their choice. Educations savings accounts give valuable freedom to parents to choose the education that works best for their child. Across the U.S., six states have established educations savings account options: Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Mississippi, Nevada, and most recently, North Carolina. Like their civilian-family counterparts, children of military families deserve choices in education. Modernizing the Impact Aid program by transitioning funding into parent-controlled education savings accounts would provide children of active-duty military families with education choice, while ensuring the federal program serves military families as well as they serve us. When our Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, they made national defense a paramount responsibility of the new federal government. As we celebrate the birth of our great nation, let’s strengthen our national defense by supporting military families with educational freedom.

### PTX DA

#### Heritage already influences Trump administration, budget proves

Mufson 3/27 (Steven Mufson, Steven Mufson covers energy and other financial matters. Since joining The Post, he has covered the White House, China, economic policy and diplomacy., 3-27-2017, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/27/trumps-budget-owes-a-huge-debt-to-this-right-wing-washington-think-tank/?utm_term=.7a7baac13edb>) CH

Both documents lean on the same philosophical arguments for a greater role for states and private business, and for a federal government that seeks to get its money’s worth from spending — arguments that have appealed to ultra-conservative multimillion-dollar donors such as the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Richard and Helen De Vos Foundation, the Charles Koch Foundation and, more recently, the Mercer Family Foundation. Rebekah A. Mercer, who is close to Trump adviser Stephen K. Bannon, is a Heritage trustee. “I don’t think there’s any question. Heritage was the Number 1 source,” Stephen Moore, a senior economic policy expert at Heritage who advised the Trump campaign. “That was partly because there wasn’t a lot of time. They decided ‘we will get rid of this, and get rid of that.’ ” In May, when the administration maps out tax and spending in more detail, the group could again display its influence. Several Heritage analysts already have joined the administration, notes Romina Boccia, the lead author of this year’s Heritage budget blueprint. At the White House’s Domestic Policy Council, Paul Winfree, who oversaw last year’s budget blueprint at Heritage, is now deputy director and former Heritage researcher James Sherk is in charge of labor and employment policy. Justin Bogie, another Heritage analyst, was on the OMB landing team. Justin T. Johnson, a defense budgeting expert, was on the Pentagon landing team and may stay there, Boccia added. “They’re probably the senior outside group that’s been the most helpful on domestic issues and the budget of any group in Washington,” said Rick Hohlt, a longtime Republican consultant. The close relationship between Trump and Heritage was forged in the early days of the campaign - when the candidate was widely considered a long shot and spurned by many traditional Republicans. “When we were on the campaign, for Trump’s speeches we would pull stuff from Heritage budget documents and make the arguments that Heritage was making,” Moore said. “I think it’s very accurate to say that a lot of these ideas … even some of the arguments they make, some of the rhetoric is almost verbatim from Heritage.”

#### Trump has sent the signal that he is committed to military readiness, but more funding is needed

Spoehr 1/28 (Thomas W. Spoehr, Thomas W. Spoehr, a retired Army lieutenant general, is director of the Center for National Defense at The Heritage Foundation., 1-28-2017, "Trump Takes the First Step in Restoring the US Military," Daily Signal, <http://dailysignal.com/2017/01/28/trump-takes-the-first-step-in-restoring-the-u-s-military/>) CH

On Friday, President Donald Trump signed an exceptionally important executive order initiating both the beginning of the rebuilding of the U.S. armed forces and the fulfillment of a campaign promise. Because he signed this order on the same day he signed the order on immigration it hasn’t yet gotten the attention it deserves. That’s a shame. The order, titled “Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces,” has not yet been officially posted to the White House website. But a draft of the order, accompanied by news reports, gives us enough details to be able to assess it. The order directs Secretary of Defense James Mattis to conduct a 30-day review of the readiness of the armed forces to assess their ability to conduct the fight against the Islamic State, or ISIS, and other forms of radical Islamic terrorism, as well as near peer competitors and regional adversaries. This review is critically needed. The Heritage Foundation has been vocal in calling for such a review based on our independent assessment of the U.S. military. The Heritage 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength assessed our overall military capability as “marginal, trending towards weak” because of many years of budget cuts and overuse. Our assessment found that the U.S. Army today is the smallest it has been since the start of World War II; the Navy is the smallest it has been since World War I; and the Air Force suffers from crippling shortages of pilots and maintenance personnel. For example, the average age of the Air Force’s planes is 27 years old. For too long the nation, and the president, has neglected the state of military readiness in favor of other priorities. This 30-day review will allow the defense secretary and the president to establish the facts and determine the necessary priorities for the rebuilding of the military. The order also calls for a review to “reduce commitments not directly related to the highest priority operations to make resources available for training and maintenance.” This is also overdue. As described in the Heritage’s “Blueprint for Balance,” the Department of Defense spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year on programs not directly related to military readiness such as non-military-related medical research, sustainable energy programs, and junior ROTC programs. Although there won’t be enough resources identified just through cuts and efficiencies to fix the Pentagon’s readiness problems, every little bit helps. Perhaps most significantly, the order directs Mattis and the director of the Office of Budget and Management to develop both a new request for emergency funding for fiscal year 2017 and to revise the still-to-be-released budget request for 2018 to provide the increased funding needed to begin the rebuilding of the military. That direction aligns with recommendations from both Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas. McCain and Thornberry, the chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services committees, respectively, both have a clear-eyed view of the critical state of the U.S. military and have written persuasively on the need for additional defense funding. Obtaining additional funding for defense will require some difficult negotiations within Congress and with the White House, but the need is so critical that failure to succeed is not a viable option. Congress and the administration will need to establish concrete and measurable objectives for the rebuilding of our military so that the American taxpayer can be assured that every dollar applied to defense results in an improvement. Finally, the executive order calls for a new nuclear posture and missile defense reviews, two critical defense areas that have both suffered considerably under the Obama administration. Heritage has been consistent and vocal in pointing out the need for new reviews and increased investment of our nation’s nuclear and missile defense domains. Could all of these actions been undertaken without a presidential executive order? Certainly. But by signing this order, Trump has sent an unambiguous signal across his administration that the rebuilding of our military is one of his top priorities. Given the threats our nation faces today to its national interests, this sends exactly the right signal to both our allies and potential adversaries.

### Spending/ Econ DA

#### Plan results is net neutral for spending

**Burke and Ryland 6-2** (Lindsey Burke and Anne Ryland, Lindsey Burke, Director, Center for Education Policy and Will Skillman Fellow in Education in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, and Anne Ryland, Domestic Policy Studies Department at The Heritage Foundation , 6-2-2017, "A GI Bill for Children of Military Families: Transforming Impact Aid into Education Savings Accounts," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/gi-bill-children-military-families-transforming-impact-aid-education-savings>) CH

Congress is limited in the vehicles available to federal policymakers to advance education choice in a constitutionally appropriate manner while also limiting federal intervention in local school policy. The education of military-connected children is one such vehicle that is appropriate. In order to expand the education options available to the children of members of the armed services, federal policymakers should: Transition Impact Aid funding into ESAs. Instead of filtering the $1.3 billion in federal Impact Aid funding to district schools, and then assigning students to those schools based on where their parents are stationed, Impact Aid dollars should be directed to eligible students. All Impact Aid dollars for military-connected children should go directly into a parent-controlled education savings account, which the family could then use to pay for any education-related service, product, or provider that meets the specific needs of their child. Oversight and management of the repurposed Impact Aid program should be transitioned to the DODEA.35 Transition the DDESS system into a system of ESAs for military families. Rather than maintaining DDESS schools on military bases at great expense, the DOD should transition funding for DDESS schools into parent-controlled education savings accounts. Given the high average per pupil expenditure of $26,682 at DDESS schools—an amount that more than covers costs at most private schools—the DOD could transition part of its current spending into flexible, parent-controlled accounts and use the savings to direct funds back to national defense priorities.36

#### Nuclear terrorism collapses US and international markets

SAGA Foundation 8

(Non Profit organization for Nuclear safety, July 2008, “Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaperSAGAMARK7282008.pdf)CH

Our principal conclusion is that the economic aftershocks flowing not only from a nuclear terrorist attack itself but from a predictable set of decisions a U.S. president could be expected to make in the wake of such an attack would inflict extraordinary economic damage on the nation stretching far beyond the point of attack. Beyond responding with aid to the scene of an attack, the first order of business for a president following a nuclear terrorist strike would be to determine if another strike was about to occur and to do everything possible to prevent it. Virtually all the important presidential decisions in the wake of the September 11 attacks – the suspension of all air travel; mandates to secure cockpit doors; the redesign of airport security; the dispatch of U.S. forces to Afghanistan; the institution of surveillance of terror suspects – were designed to prevent follow-on attacks. Punishing the aggressors was an important but secondary issue. In a nuclear attack scenario, presidential decisions revolving around this imperative would be taken regardless of whether another attack was planned or actually took place. Among the post-attack presidential decisions we deem highly likely: • Shutdown of freight commerce/border closures. The likelihood that a nuclear weapon would be clandestinely brought into our country would in all likelihood prompt a national initiative to seal the borders and freeze and search virtually all freight conveyances, whether trucks, ships or planes, delivering a major shock to the economy and bringing home to the entire populace the enormity of what has occurred, as stocks of basic supplies vanished almost overnight. 4 • Retaliation. The president would be under enormous pressure to respond swiftly and forcefully to such an attack, even if the geographic or geopolitical point of origin was uncertain. The science of ‘nuclear forensics,’ which can enable specialists to identify the source of nuclear material used in a bomb even post-explosion, would provide some key clues as to the source of the attack. As a consequence, there would be tremendous pressure to hold someone—terror groups and their state sponsors— responsible, engendering immediate and forceful retaliation. • Suspension of civil liberties. Extraordinary concern about further nuclear attacks following an initial attack would drive a series of decisions restricting freedom of movement and conferring extraordinary powers on government agencies charged with preventing another strike. The point cannot be emphasized enough: Not the attack itself but the fear of a follow-on attack and the response to that fear would drive a set of decisions that would almost certainly bring all freight traffic to a halt, shut down the nation’s ports, empty the nation’s grocery shelves, and bring most manufacturing to a virtual standstill. Even if this shut-down were temporary, our economic system of “just-in-time inventory” would mean that basic staples would very quickly become unavailable, delivering a psychological blow to the populace and a devastating shock to national and international financial markets. We live with the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack today, but the possibility of a future attack once the 5 first attack occurred would be deemed so much greater as to create an entirely new reality in terms of the political and economic functioning of the nation. Although preparation for disaster is an important part of any homeland security plan, we contend that the point of studying and understanding the full range of consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is to motivate the government and the people to ensure that such an attack never happens. We are not seeking a better civil defense plan or trying to revive a “duck and cover” strategy. We are trying to clearly lay out the consequences of failure so that the necessary steps are taken with the necessary energy and urgency.

## K’s

### Colonialism

#### Shortages in Impact Aid funding exists now, especially affecting native schools

**Michelson 15**

(Preston Michelson, 3-20-2015, "Schools on Tax-Exempt Lands Suffer as Impact Aid Lags," US News &amp; World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/03/20/schools-on-tax-exempt-lands-suffer-as-impact-aid-lags>) CH

Money to schools on or near Indian reservations and military bases has stagnated in the last decade. Most school districts get about half of their funding from local property taxes. But schools on Indian reservations and military bases – which are tax-exempt – don’t have that traditional funding resource. Instead, they rely on federal Impact Aid to make up the difference. But since 2005, Impact Aid spending has grown by less than 5 percent. Adjusted for inflation, the government is currently giving out about the same amount of money as it did in 2001, even though Department of Education discretionary funding has grown since then. The Education Department “budget is a $3.6 billion increase over last year … however, not a penny to increase Impact Aid,” said Rep. Mike Simpson, R-Idaho, at a House appropriations subcommittee hearing earlier this month. More than 60 percent of Idaho’s land is federally owned. “It’s kind of frustrating to many Western states that tax-exempt federal property, military bases or Indian lands … because Impact Aid is the federal government’s obligation,” Simpson said. Nearly 60 percent of Impact Aid is given to schools near Indian reservations. And Education Secretary Arne Duncan said at the hearing that Native American communities have to receive “desperately needed support.” “[There is an] urgent need to do more in Native American communities,” Duncan said in front of the panel that deals with education spending. “We have included $53 million in our budget to improve college and career readiness for native youth. And we’ll work with the Department of Interior to expand the Bureau of Indian Education’s capacity.” Even though Duncan recognizes the need for support for Indian communities, the funding levels for Impact Aid remain flat. This also isn’t new. “Beginning in the ‘60s and ‘70s, we became underfunded and it was always a matter of trying to maintain an element of stability,” said John Forkenbrock, executive director of the National Association of Federally Impacted Schools. “…It’s always important that [school officials] keep Impact Aid on the front-burner of their member of Congress; that it’s important to their district in terms of turning the lights on and making sure teachers get paid.” In essence, Impact Aid is Washington paying its own tax bill on the lands the government owns. In this scenario, Forkenbrock says, “Uncle Sam is a delinquent.” Impact Aid is at only 56 percent of full funding – the amount needed to make up for all of the lost tax revenue. Instead, the government relies on an alternate formula to pay these school districts, with more money going to the locations with the highest need, based on their number of federally impacted students and reliance on the federal aid. Combined, that makes up what’s called a Learning Opportunity Threshold. Schools near Indian lands are more likely to be highly impacted than schools near military bases. There are about 300 Indian lands districts with 80 percent or 90 percent enrollment of students living on federal land, versus about 25 military districts. The goal is to pay school districts at 100 percent of this Learning Opportunity Threshold. From 1998 to 2010, there was enough money to go around. In 2002, because of the budget surplus, the federal government was actually paying out at 152 percent. In 2011, it fell to 99 percent, then 96 percent. In 2013, the government faced sequestration, a series of across-the-board spending cuts to lower annual deficits. The spending numbers from that year have not yet been finalized, but Forkenbrock anticipates a pay-out of about 88 percent of the threshold. At a level that low, schools started laying off staff and cutting programs. It could have been worse. “The fact that we have been in a recession, the per-pupil expenditures nationwide have really remained relatively stable, in fact they have even dropped a few dollars,” said Forkenbrock, who has been with the association for more than 25 years. The expectation is that the threshold will prove to have been funded in the mid-90 percent range for 2014. At that level, the extent of the repercussions for schools would be losing bus transportation for sports teams, reducing an art or music program, or putting off school improvements. It could also have long-term repercussions if a district has to dip into its reserve money. “We don't like to see the numbers that are getting into 30's and 40's in [class sizes], but we've had to do it because of reduced funding and not keeping up with inflation,” said Brent Gish, the executive director of the National Indian Impacted Schools Association, a part of Forkenbrock’s coalition. “I think it’s an oversight.” As the country comes out of its economic woes and Washington ramps up educational investments, per-pupil expenditures could rise. But if that anticipated growth doesn’t match up with a rise in Impact Aid spending, there will be problems. “Impact Aid is a lifeblood for our school districts,” said Gish, a member of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Tribes of Minnesota. “At a time which school reform is being implemented, school improvement, school restructuring — Impact Aid is a critical funding source to make this happen.”

### Capitalism

#### Improving capitalism is key to solve warming

Kellner 4-11 (Peter Kellner, Peter Kellner is founder and managing partner of Richmond Global Ventures L.L.C. and chairman and C.E.O. of the Richmond Global Compass Fund L.P., 4-11-2017, "To fight climate change, we need to improve capitalism, not get rid of it," America Magazine, <https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/04/11/fight-climate-change-we-need-improve-capitalism-not-get-rid-it>) CH

Pope Francis correctly points out the evil fruits of capitalism, including inequality. However, no other system has lifted billions of people out of poverty. It is an imperfect system, with many flavors, but it is our best form of imperfection. Now, more than ever, we must rely on—and change—its dynamics. We live in the Anthropocene, a period defined by the emergence of humans and our impact on the climate and environment. Before this period, there were five major mass extinctions: Ordovician, Devonian, Permian, Triassic and Cretaceous. Each time, a catastrophic event, or series of events, wiped out between 76 percent and 86 percent of all species. Should we be concerned about another mass extinction? The Industrial Revolution has dramatically affected the climate, causing the melting of the Arctic, rising sea levels and unbearable pollution in cities such as Beijing and Mumbai (and, at one time, Los Angeles). Yet the idea of climate change is still controversial. Is it hyperbole or undeniable reality? I contend it is the latter. We cannot ignore the signals from nature itself, akin to red alerts if one pays close attention. Scientists estimate that we are now losing species at 1,000 to 10,000 times the natural long-term rate. That means dozens of species are going extinct daily. In her book The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, Elizabeth Kolbert reports that a third of all reef-building corals, a third of all freshwater mollusks, a third of sharks and rays, a quarter of all mammals, a fifth of all reptiles and a sixth of all birds are headed toward extinction. The answer to this scourge is capitalism, but in a new form and magnitude. For decades, there has been a largely philanthropy-driven effort to promote socially conscious investing and grant-making. There has also been a substantial growth in socially responsible for-profit businesses of various kinds. But only recently has a focus on social and environmental responsibility started to gain traction among for-profit investors and financial markets. It takes the form of a new approach called E.S.G. (for “environmental, social and governance”) investing, and it is increasingly being used by endowments, pensions and family-controlled investment groups. E.S.G. investing has been mainstreamed through “impact investment” firms that seek both financial and social returns, as well as through philanthropy. In total, these efforts account for the hundreds of.billions of dollars invested in private markets annually. Evidence from leading business schools and experts suggest that E.S.G. investing can increase financial and social returns by lowering the cost of capital, reducing volatility, increasing returns (or the risk premium), improving governance (a proxy for management) and mitigating a variety of regulatory and other risks. Once an outlier, E.S.G. is now seen by the U.S. Department of Labor as valid in helping to determine the value of an investment. Here is the challenge, and it is enormous: The hundreds of billions invested annually from impact investing and philanthropy is critical but only a first step in addressing worldwide environmental change. Compared with the scale of global capital markets overall, it is a drop in the bucket. We must focus on the approximately $180 trillion invested annually in public global financial assets. E.S.G. investing barely touches this sector, but it is only this quantum of capital that is truly capable of shifting our global trajectory, through investments in a cleaner environment, improved governance and healthy communities. We have not yet seized the opportunity to drive powerful change through the allocation of global public capital. Reasons for this include the short-termism of financial reporting, managerial priorities and differences between investors in different geographic areas (for example, Europe is much more E.S.G.-focused than the United States is). We are nearly out of time. Most environmental scientists warn that if temperatures rise another two to four degrees Celsius (as I am sure they will without action), we will face irreversible change, including crop failure, flooding, diseases, wildfires, rising waters, extreme heat, and social and economic instability at a global level. An alternate course is possible if our greatest investors, and the trillions in assets behind them, recognize the gold mine waiting to be prospected: $180 trillion annually! The time is now for a course correction in capitalism, and its rewards are abundant. Everyone should preach this gospel.

#### Capitalism is key to resolve climate change, alternatives take too long, the belief that squo governments can solve only feeds into right wing criticisms of climate change

Chait 15 (Jonathan Chait, Jonathan Chait is an American liberal commentator and writer for New York magazine. He was previously a senior editor at The New Republic and an assistant editor of The American Prospect, 10-23-2015, "Is Naomi Klein Right That We Must Choose Between Capitalism and the Climate?," Daily Intelligencer, <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/10/must-we-choose-between-capitalism-and-climate.html>) CH

It is not the right but the center-left that provides the main target of Klein’s polemic. Mainstream liberalism, in keeping with classic economic analysis, has always seen pollution as a straightforward market failure. If an individual or a business is dumping a harmful by-product into the commons, economic logic dictates they be forced to internalize the cost. Creating a price for carbon emissions, so that greenhouse gasses cannot be emitted for free, will give the marketplace the correct financial incentive to reduce its emissions to the necessary level. Klein insists, on the contrary, that liberal remedies that leave in place the underlying structure of the market economy do not, and cannot, work. Klein portrays the 2010 failure of a cap-and-trade bill as a victory for true environmentalism against the corporate neoliberal sellouts that promoted it. “The fact that the U.S. Senate failed to pass climate legislation in 2009 should not be seen, as it often is, as the climate movement’s greatest defeat,” she writes, “but as a narrowly-dodged bullet.” Klein attacks the cap-and-trade bill for compromising with energy producers in order to neutralize their opposition. At one point, she mocks the bill as a giveaway to Big Energy (“a huge amount of wealth being transferred to their companies”). Two pages later, she mocks the bill for being opposed and defeated by those energy companies (who “made it abundantly clear that they had never stopped being its enemies”). Cap-and-trade is damned by evidence of energy companies supporting it, and it is also damned by evidence of energy companies opposing it. If her logic does not make sense to you, that is because you fail to grasp Klein’s moral code, which considered corporations an irredeemably evil force tainting anything with which they come into contact. Consider a passage in which she dismisses the Environmental Defense Fund, a moderate green outfit. EDF, she writes, “prided itself as putting ‘results’ above ideology, but Krupp’s EDF was highly ideological.” Its neoliberal ideology led it to advocate a cap-and-trade system in the 1980s to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide, which caused acid rain. “The new approach worked and it was popular among foundations and private donors, particularly on Wall Street,” she reports. If you’re a neoliberal sellout, you probably think the important part of that sentence is the beginning, where Klein concedes that the cap-and-trade system proposed by EDF “worked.” The successful results would seem to disprove Klein’s accusation that EDF is hyperideological and merely pretends to be results-driven. Indeed, she might even pause to consider the possibility that this program’s success demonstrates that it is possible to reduce pollution through market mechanisms. (Numerous other examples can be found.) Instead, Klein just blows right past the fact that EDF’s program worked right into associating it with Wall Street, a fact that tells her everything she needs to know. This is not the only time Klein comes face-to-face with evidence that falsifies her thesis and ignores it. In one passage, she castigates the World Trade Organization, an old bête noire, for blocking a Canadian law designed to protect a domestic solar manufacturer. This episode, she tells her readers, shows how free trade prevents the transition to a clean economy. Yet, in a footnote, she complains that China “flooded the market with cheap panels in recent years, contributing to a global oversupply that has outpaced demand.” Klein presents this as more evidence of the WTO’s nefarious impact. But, from the standpoint of the climate, aren’t cheap solar panels good? \*\*\* The most fascinating thing about This Changes Everything is how much factual refutation of Klein’s thesis is contained within the book itself. She faithfully reports huge amounts of damning facts, but confines them to subordinate clauses and footnotes. Klein’s major thesis, remember, is that the triumph of anti-corporate economics is the only way to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. In another brief but damning passage, she concedes that a number of governments with sufficiently progressive economic character have taken power in recent years, citing Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and Greece. Alas, she admits, “have so far been unable to come up with economic models that do not require extremely high levels of extraction of finite resources, often at tremendous ecological and human cost.” In other words, Klein’s proposed remedy of addressing climate change by electing a left-wing government has been tried repeatedly, and it has failed every single time. Even left-wing governments turn out to not be keen on shutting down their fossil-fuel industries and jacking up energy prices on their voters. Once again, though, Klein moves quickly past this deep record of unbroken failure. Her book and the documentary linger extensively on positive anecdotes she gathers from activists. “Large and growing social movements in all these countries,” she reports, “are pushing back against the idea that extraction-and-redistribution is the only route out of poverty and economic crisis.” Klein backs this up with lots of inspiring drum-circle footage. If Klein’s arguments do not pass any plausible evidentiary standard, it may be a result of her lack of interest in traditional standards of evidence. Klein’s narrative rests heavily on moral disgust with market-based mechanisms and the cold reasoning associated with them. She dismisses the “language of risk assessment,” a traditional economist way of measuring the dangers of climate change, and approvingly quotes a spiritual leader who tells her, “Water is holy.” Klein deems this analytic method superior to economic modelling of how to restrict pollution. “These truths,” she writes, “emerge not out of an abstract theory about ‘the commons’ but out of lived experience.” Klein’s fervently ideological, anti-empiricist style, and her deep skepticism of the mainstream liberals who believe emissions can be controlled without destroying capitalism, places her in odd agreement with the far right. Visiting a conference of climate-science deniers, Klein discovers the kind of absolutist ideological reasoning and suspicion of mushy technocracy to which she can relate. Climate-science deniers see the fight to restrain emissions as a pretext to expand government power over the economy. Since that is exactly how Klein sees climate change, she thinks they are on to something: “I think these hard-core ideologues understand the real significance of climate change better than most of the ‘warmists’ in the political center … ” she writes, “when it comes to the scope and depth of change required to avert catastrophe, they are right on the money.” Finally, somebody else who understands that the real choice is capitalism versus the climate. In the actual world outside this jointly inhabited ideological bubble, capitalism and climate science are discovering ways to co-exist. Klein dismisses the “past quarter century of international negotiations,” which she characterizes as “struggling, sputtering, failing utterly to achieve its goals.” In reality, American greenhouse-gas emissions peaked several years ago. European Union emissions peaked several decades ago. Chinese coal use has peaked, and its energy intensity has fallen. The world may not be decarbonizing as rapidly as it should, but it is moving rapidly. It may be slow by the standards of atmospheric conditions, but it is fast by the standards of global political cooperation. U.N. efforts to fight climate change have only been under way since 1988. Compare this with the notion of replacing capitalism with a radical egalitarian alternative, which has been around for a century and a half. The project does not seem to be moving forward. Waiting to limit the damage of greenhouse-gas emissions until the people can overthrow the yoke of unfettered capitalism may represent the most dangerous advice the left has come up with in a very long time.

# Neg

## CP

### School Districts

#### Text: School districts near military bases should allow military families to persue school choice

#### Happening in squo

Barksdale Air Force Base 7-13 (Staff Report,, 7-13-2017, "Bossier Schools to Offer Barskdale Families School of choice," Barksdale Air Force Base, <http://www.barksdale.af.mil/News/Article/1247256/bossier-schools-to-offer-barskdale-families-school-of-choice/>) CH

Barksdale Air Force Base is pleased to announce that school of choice for Barksdale resident students of all grade levels will become a reality in the 2017-18 academic year. School of choice empowers Barksdale residents to have more options when deciding which type of education best fits the needs of their children by enabling them to make the best possible choice. “On behalf of the men and women of Team Barksdale, thank you to Bossier Schools for being the education champion for our children,” said Col. Ty Neuman, 2nd Bomb Wing commander. “The support and education of our families is critical to our mission success, and we cannot provide that support without Bossier Schools and the greater Bossier/Shreveport community.” This paves the way for military families living on Barksdale to choose the school they wish for their children to attend, beginning in the 2017-18 year. Bossier Schools already grants dependents living on base high school of choice. By choosing to extend school of choice at all grade levels, the district continues to demonstrate its unwavering commitment to the military children and their families that are a part of the Bossier Schools family. “Bossier Schools has long worked side by side with Barksdale to identify and remedy hardships facing our military families,” said Bossier Schools Superintendent Scott Smith. “Not having the option of where they want to live and the choice of which schools their children attend is one of those challenges. It gives us great satisfaction to be able to extend this opportunity to the men and women who serve.”

### States

#### Text: The 50 states and relevant territories of the United Stats should expand Education Savings Account access for all families

#### Solves national ESA’s

Burke and Bedrick 16 (Lindsey and Jason, Jason Bedrick is a Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom. Lindsey M. Burke is Will Skillman Fellow in Education Policy Studies, 12-12-2016, "Recalibrating Accountability: Education Savings Accounts as Vehicles of Choice and Innovation," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/recalibrating-accountability-education-savings-accounts-vehicles-choice-and>) CH

In order to foster a variety of innovative and high-quality education options for all students, universal access to education savings accounts (ESAs) should be the goal of policymakers in every state. ESAs are flexible spending accounts that parents can use to purchase a wide variety of educational goods and services, including private school tuition, tutors, textbooks, homeschool curricula, online courses, educational therapy, and more. Parents can also save unused funds for later educational expenses, such as college tuition. This Special Report explores how ESAs expand educational opportunity and hold education providers directly accountable to parents; it also explains several common types of regulations that can undermine the effectiveness of the program and how they can be avoided. The potential of ESAs to foster innovation and improved quality depends on a robust market in education. Increasing demand will require a critical mass of potential students, so ESAs should be made available to all families. A robust education market will also require education providers to have the freedom to innovate and parents to have the freedom to choose the providers that best meet their child’s needs. International research comparing different types of education systems has found that the most market-like, least regulated systems consistently outperformed more centralized and regulated ones. Policymakers therefore should avoid well-intentioned but misguided regulations such as open admissions requirements, price controls, state testing mandates, and excessive reporting requirements. Although intended to guarantee access and accountability, these regulations produce unintended consequences that can reduce the effectiveness of ESAs and even undermine their intended goals. The best way for policymakers in Texas and elsewhere to expand access to a high-quality education for all children is to provide all families with ESAs that give them the maximum possible freedom to choose the education providers that work best for their children.

#### School choice solves better and top down regulation fails

Burke and Bedrick 16 (Lindsey and Jason, Jason Bedrick is a Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom. Lindsey M. Burke is Will Skillman Fellow in Education Policy Studies, 12-12-2016, "Recalibrating Accountability: Education Savings Accounts as Vehicles of Choice and Innovation," Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/education/report/recalibrating-accountability-education-savings-accounts-vehicles-choice-and>) CH

ESAs expand access to a wide variety of educational options far beyond school vouchers. A voucher system might foster a variety of options among schools, but an ESA fosters a greater variety of educational options beyond the traditional classroom. In addition to, or even instead of, enrolling at a private school, ESA students might learn from tutors, take a course online or at a local college, procure services from a public school, study from a specialized curriculum, or use some combination of these. ESAs both empower parents to completely customize their child’s education and provide a platform for innovation. A distinctive feature of monopolies is lack of accountability. Because district schools are not held directly accountable to parents, some policymakers have attempted to impose accountability through top-down government regulations. Yet decades of attempts to regulate district schools into quality have had little effect. Unfortunately, too many policymakers have still come to see centralized government regulations as synonymous with “accountability” rather than an inferior alternative to direct accountability to parents, and have therefore sought to impose similar regulations on choice programs. However, regulations designed for a monopoly system are inappropriate for a market-based system. In a market-based system, producers are held directly accountable to consumers for results. The government sets certain rules against fraud or health and safety standards, but the consumers ultimately decide whether a product or service meets their needs. Likewise, the government could ensure that ESA funds are spent on qualifying educational products and services, but the accountability for results should lie with parents, who are in the best position to evaluate those results. Holding education providers directly accountable to parents creates a feedback loop that does not exist in more centralized, top-down systems like the district schools. As social scientist Yuval Levin has argued, this enables the system to “channel social knowledge from the bottom up rather than…impose technical knowledge from the top down.” This channeling is accomplished “through a process of experimentation, evaluation, and evolution.”

## K

### Heg Bad

#### US heg decline causes increased peace

Economist 12 (Economist Democracy in America, Analysis of American politics, in the spirit of Alexis de Tocqueville’s eponymous study of American society, "The stakes of American hegemony," Economist, <https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/world-order>) CH

There is much to quibble with here. It may be that the current global dispensation to some extent "reflects American principles and preferences". If it does, however, it's not because it "was built and preserved by American power", except in a rather trivial sense. The American model of political economy has proved in many ways to be the world's most successful. As the 20th century's main rivals to capitalist liberal democracy failed, polities worldwide looked to the example of Western Europe and North America, and this led to a glad flowering of democracy and prosperity. But America didn't cause the world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run. And America didn't compel aspiring first-worlders to try market economies and democratic governance. The nations of the world could see for themselves what was working and, in their own ways, have mostly followed suit. If American power does wither, it will be due to America's failure to maintain really first-rate institutions. The ensuing world order would indeed become, as Mr Kagan has it, one "reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers". But that's simply because the capitals of the world aren't full of blithering dopes who wouldn't know what to do if Brookings senior fellows didn't tell them. Smart countries will want to emulate those that remain or have become first-rate. And, as far as I can tell, people who become accustomed to wealth and freedom don't have to be bullied and cajoled into wanting to keep it. Because they have grown rich, they'll have the means to keep it. Which is why it's absurd to think that if America loses its lustre, the peoples of the world will inevitably suffer under the dark reign of Russian or Chinese bad guys. Other wealthy, liberal democracies can have huge navies, too, if we'd let them. Mr Ikenberry's alleged "pleasant illusion" looks pleasantly solid to me. Mr Kagan gives it his all arguing that the "rise of the rest" does not mean America's not still undisputed king of the hill. But Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown law professor, is right that the skyward trajectory of the BRICs does mean America's relative influence has waned, and that that's a happy development: [A]s Reagan recognized, a decline in relative American power is a good thing, not a bad thing — if we can turn rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone. The global public goods Mr Kagan rightly prizes—peace, stability, unimpeded trade routes—will be more, not less secure if the burden of their provision is more broadly distributed. And America is more likely to remain worth emulating were it to redirect some significant portion of the trillions spent maintaining its hegemony into more productive uses.

### Cap Link

#### The Aff’s endorsement of school choice endorses a commodification of neoliberalism that reduces education to profit margins and price gouging, leading to serial policy failure and the creation of society without any hope of communal practices

Blakely 4/17

(Jason Blakely, JASON BLAKELY is an assistant professor of political philosophy at Pepperdine University, 4-17-2017, "How School Choice Turns Education Into a Commodity," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/is-school-choice-really-a-form-of-freedom/523089/>) CH

Buoyed by Donald Trump’s championing of a voucher system—and cheered on by his education secretary Betsy DeVos—Arizona just passed one of the country's most thoroughgoing policies in favor of so-called “school of choice.” The legislation signed by Governor Doug Ducey allows students who withdraw from the public system to use their share of state funding for private school, homeschooling, or online education. Making educational funding “portable” is part of a much wider political movement that began in the 1970s—known to scholars as neoliberalism—which views the creation of markets as necessary for the existence of individual liberty. In the neoliberal view, if your public institutions and spaces don’t resemble markets, with a range of consumer options, then you aren’t really free. The goal of neoliberalism is thereby to rollback the state, privatize public services, or (as in the case of vouchers) engineer forms of consumer choice and market discipline in the public sector. DeVos is a fervent believer in neoliberalizing education—spending millions of dollars on and devoting herself to political activism for the spread of voucher-system schooling. In a speech on educational reform from 2015, DeVos expressed her long-held view that the public-school system needs to be reengineered by the government to mimic a market. The failure to do so, she warned, would be the stagnation of an education system run monopolistically by the government: “We are the beneficiaries of start-ups, ventures, and innovation in every other area of life, but we don’t have that in education because it’s a closed system, a closed industry, a closed market. It’s a monopoly, a dead end. And the best and brightest innovators and risk-takers steer way clear of it. As long as education remains a closed system, we will never see the education equivalents of Google, Facebook, Amazon, PayPal, Wikipedia, or Uber. We won’t see any real innovation that benefits more than a handful of students”. Many Americans now find DeVos’s neoliberal way of thinking commonsensical. After all, people have the daily experience of being able to choose competing consumer products on a market. Likewise, many Americans rightly admire entrepreneurial pluck. Shouldn’t the intelligence and creativity of Silicon Valley’s markets be allowed to cascade down over public education, washing the system clean of its encrusted bureaucracy? What much fewer people realize is that the argument over “school of choice” is only the latest chapter in a decades-long political struggle between two models of freedom—one based on market choice and the other based on democratic participation. Neoliberals like DeVos often assume that organizing public spaces like a market must lead to beneficial outcomes. But in doing so, advocates of school of choice ignore the political ramifications of the marketization of shared goods like the educational system. The first point to consider when weighing whether or not to marketize the public school system is that markets always have winners and losers. In the private sector, the role of competition is often positive. For example, Friendster, the early reigning king of social networks, failed to create a format that people found as useful and attractive as Facebook. The result was that it eventually vanished. When businesses like Friendster fail, no significant public damage is done. Indeed, it is arguably a salutary form of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction,” which is a feature of market innovation. But should all goods in a society be subjected to the forces of creative destruction? What happens to a community when its public schools are defunded or closed because they could not “compete” in a marketized environment? In Detroit (where DeVos played a big role in introducing school choice) two decades of this marketization has led to extreme defunding and closing of public schools; the funneling of taxpayer money toward for-profit charter ventures; economically disadvantaged parents with worse options than when the neoliberal social experiment began; and finally, no significant increase in student performance. Indeed, some zones of Detroit are now educational deserts where parents and children have to travel exorbitant miles and hours for their children to attend school. On the whole, neoliberalization is hardest on the poor. Market choice does, however, favor those who already have the education, wealth, and wherewithal to plan, coordinate, and execute moving their children to the optimal educational setting. This means the big beneficiaries of school of choice are often the rich. For instance, when Nevada recently passed an aggressive school-of-choice system the result was that the vast majority of those able to take advantage of it came from the richest areas of Reno and Las Vegas. As money is pulled from failing schools and funneled into succeeding ones, wealth can actually be redistributed by the state up the socioeconomic ladder. Education is not simply another commodity to buy and sell on a market. Market competition in the context of schools thus opens the possibility for a vicious cycle in which weak and low-performing communities are punished for their failings and wealthy communities receive greater and greater funding advantages. Americans should ask themselves a basic question of justice when it comes to the education system: Should it be organized around a model in which the more you win the more you get, and the more you lose the less you are given? Markets are by their nature non-egalitarian. For this reason, neoliberalization has been one of the biggest factors contributing to the growing inequalities and diminishment of the middle and lower classes. A common neoliberal response to this is simply to say that economic inequality is the cost paid for individual liberty and personal responsibility. But the problem is that this discourse of individualism followed to its logical conclusion eliminates any public goods whatsoever. For example, if student funds are portable based on consumption choices, why shouldn’t the growing number of childless taxpayers be able to move their funding outside the education system entirely toward goods they actually consume, like dog parks or public golf courses? This is the logical conclusion of Margaret Thatcher’s famous neoliberal pronouncement that “there is no such thing as society” but only “individual men and women.” The problem with this way of thinking is that education is not simply another commodity to buy and sell on a market. It is a shared good. Free societies need educated members to intelligently and critically deliberate over public life, select representatives, and help guide policy decisions. Market freedom is thus in tension with the freedom of democratic participation. Many people recognize this fact and for that reason favor coordinating action and sharing costs through the government when it comes to goods like education, defense, public parks, transportation, public health, and the environment. Yet forming a shared collective action through government or a labor organization is the one kind of individual freedom that neoliberal philosophy does not tolerate. As the preeminent historian of neoliberalism, David Harvey, puts it, “neoliberals have to put strong limits on democratic governance … while individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective institutions.” Neoliberalism is thereby fundamentally opposed to any democratic, individual choices that seek to constrain markets—be it teachers unions or simply majority decisions about how to fund and shape public schools. Indeed, historically speaking, neoliberal attempts to marketize public goods are often unpopular and so have required non-majoritarian institutions like the courts, the World Bank, or even strong men and authoritarians (like Chile’s Augusto Pinochet) to enact policies against the will of the majority. Authoritarianism and market freedoms can and often do go together. There is a basic tension between neoliberal market choice and democratic freedom to shape one’s community in ways that do not conform to market logic. Of course, thoughtful advocates of school choice might argue that while perhaps there are reasons to be skeptical of neoliberal theory, there are many schools of choice that in practice are phenomenal sites for educational innovation. Such advocates might point to cases of successful charter schools in poorer communities—for example, the Knowledge Is Power Program (or “KIPP”) charter schools across the country. Although KIPP is nonprofit, it is still engaged in the project of neoliberalizing public goods by introducing consumer choice as a form of subjecting the school system to a kind of market discipline. KIPP is not without its critics, but there is also undeniable merit in efforts to experiment with education on a more local level (some of these carried out by intelligent well-meaning teachers and administrators at charter schools). Rejecting neoliberal policies like school choice does not mean that people such as DeVos and charter-school employees who are attracted to experimentation and less centralization of curriculum don’t have a point. America’s public schools—like all institutions—are in constant need of reform, rejuvenation, and innovation. But debates about “freedom” and educational reform might be more constructive if participants center their questions around democratic freedoms—the freedom of every citizen to access education and the freedom of various communities to shape what that education looks like. Arguments over democratic freedom might contest how much of curriculum decision-making can be taken rightfully by the federal government versus devolution onto localities. Likewise, disagreements over democratic freedom could involve constructive debates over whether and how to fund private religious schools. Educational policy in democratic societies should be subject to spirited and even intense debate and disagreement. Yet attempts to reduce freedom to markets and consumer choice remains in serious tension with democratic liberties and ideals of self-government. Future debates might be no less vigorous while also seeking alternatives to a simplistic equivalency between markets and “choice.”

### Realism K

#### The AFF’s increase of military presence only replicates the failure of past liberal interventions, making their impacts inevitable, as well as distracting from solving for a rising China

Mearsheimer 16

(John J. Mearsheimer, John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago., 11-27-2016, "Donald Trump Should Embrace a Realist Foreign Policy," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-should-embrace-realist-foreign-policy-18502?page=show>) CH

There are many reasons to be deeply worried about a Donald Trump presidency. But if he makes the right choices, he could fundamentally alter U.S. foreign policy for the better. Trump campaigned against America’s powerful foreign policy community—what one of President Obama’s advisors derisively labeled “the Blob.” Its members include prominent Democrats and Republicans with similar views on foreign policy. He accused them of producing “one foreign policy disaster after another,” and promised to “develop a new foreign policy direction for our country.” This was precisely the message many voters wanted to hear, and the president-elect now has the opportunity to change how the United States deploys its power around the world. Over the past twenty-five years, American leaders have pursued a policy of liberal hegemony, which calls for the United States to dominate the entire globe. This strategy assumes every region of the world matters greatly for American security, and it calls for extending the U.S. security umbrella to nearly any country that wants protection as well as trying to spread democracy far and wide. In practice, this objective means toppling regimes and then doing nation building. Small wonder the United States has been at war for two out of every three years since the Cold War ended. Liberal hegemony is a bankrupt strategy. The United States has worked to topple regimes and promote democracy in six countries in the greater Middle East: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Each attempt has been an abject failure: wars are raging in every one of those countries except Egypt, which is once again a military dictatorship. This campaign has also made America’s terrorism problem worse: Al Qaeda has morphed and multiplied, and we are now at war with ISIS, which is largely a consequence of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. In Europe, the United States foolishly tried to integrate Georgia and Ukraine into the West, precipitating an unnecessary crisis with Russia that upset the peace in eastern Europe and made it harder for Moscow and Washington to cooperate on other matters, like ending the bloodletting in Syria. Spreading democracy, especially by force, almost always fails. It inevitably involves large-scale social engineering in societies that most Americans poorly understand. Dismantling and then replacing existing political institutions inevitably creates winners and losers, and the latter usually take up arms in opposition, which forces the U.S. military to wage costly counterinsurgency campaigns that are extremely difficult to win. The end result is precisely the sort of quagmire we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Trump administration should abandon liberal hegemony and adopt a realist foreign policy. Realism is chiefly concerned with America’s position in the global balance of power, and it shuns doing social engineering inside other countries. Instead, Washington would respect the sovereignty of other states even when it disagrees with their internal policies. Americans prize their own sovereignty, which is why they recoiled at the idea that Russia might be interfering in the recent presidential election. The United States should treat other countries according to the same standard and respect their sovereignty as well. Instead of trying to garrison the world and spread democracy, the Trump administration should concentrate on maintaining the balance of power in the three regions that are vital to U.S. security: Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf. East Asia and Europe are important because they are the key centers of wealth and have long been home to the world’s other great powers. The Persian Gulf is a core strategic interest, because it produces about 30 percent of the world’s oil, which is a critical resource for the functioning of the global economy. America’s main goal in each of these regions should be to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. The good news is that no country is strong enough to dominate Europe or the Gulf for the foreseeable future. Germany’s power will decline over time, mainly because of its shrinking population, while Russia has similar demographic problems and an economy that is too dependent on gas and oil revenues. Even if Russia modernizes its economy and its population grows in the years ahead—big ifs—it will still be unable to project significant military power beyond eastern Europe. And even then, the Europeans themselves can afford to build the military forces necessary to check Moscow’s ambitions. Thus, the Trump administration should encourage the Europeans to take responsibility for their own security, while gradually reducing the remaining U.S. troops there. Trump should also make a concerted effort to improve relations with Russia, which is not a serious threat to American interests. Indeed, the two countries should be allies, as they have a common interest in combatting terrorism, ending the Syrian conflict and keeping Iran (and other countries) from acquiring nuclear weapons. Most importantly, the United States needs Russia to help contain a rising China. Given the history of competition between Russia and China, and the long border they share, Moscow is likely to join in this effort once Washington abandons the misguided foreign policy that has driven it closer to Beijing. There is also no looming threat to dominate the Gulf, which means the new administration should move most of America’s military forces out of that region and station them over the horizon. The United States would monitor the regional balance of power from afar, but only reintroduce troops in the event a potential hegemon appeared on the scene. This policy of offshore balancing, coupled with quitting the regime-change business, would also ameliorate America’s terrorism problem, which is fueled in part by the U.S. military presence on Arab territory as well as the endless wars the United States has waged in the greater Middle East. The Trump administration should let local powers deal with ISIS and limit its efforts to providing intelligence, training and arms. ISIS is a serious threat to them but a minor problem for America, and the only long-term solution is building better local institutions, something the United States cannot provide. Regarding Syria, Washington should let Moscow take the lead in shutting down that conflict, which means helping the Assad government reestablish control over most of the country. A Syria run by Assad poses no threat to the United States; indeed, both Democratic and Republican presidents have long experience dealing with the Assad regime. If the civil war continues it will be largely Moscow’s problem. The new president should also work to improve relations with Iran. It is not in the U.S. interest for Iran to abandon, or not renew, the nuclear deal it recently struck and race to acquire a bomb. Tehran is more likely to take that step if it fears an American attack. After all, nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. Therefore, the United States should seek to mend fences with Iran to take away its main incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons. There is bad news, however, and it concerns East Asia. If China continues its impressive rise, it is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration must go to great lengths to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. Ideally, Washington would rely on countries in Asia to contain China, but that strategy will not work. Not only is China likely to be far more powerful than its neighbors, but also they are located far from each other, making it difficult for them to form an effective balancing coalition. The United States will have to coordinate these efforts and throw its considerable weight behind them. American leadership is indispensable for dealing with an increasingly powerful China. The fact that no country threatens to dominate either Europe or the Gulf is a blessing, as it not only allows Washington to concentrate its military forces in Asia, but also allows American policymakers to concentrate their strategic thinking on how to prevent China from becoming a peer competitor. That mission should be of paramount importance for the United States in the years ahead. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the Trump administration will be able to adopt the realist strategy described above. The foreign-policy community, which has deep roots and cuts across both of the major political parties, will go to enormous lengths to tame the new president and make sure he sticks with liberal hegemony. Should it prevail, there will be more terrorism, more failed attempts to spread democracy, more lost wars, and more death and destruction across the greater Middle East. And most importantly, it will be difficult for the United States to concentrate on containing China, mainly because liberal hegemony sets no priorities. It calls for the American military to be everywhere. Let us hope Trump is able to defeat the Blob once he is in the White House, as easily as he did in the campaign.

## DA’s

### Federalism

#### Federal regulation of ESA’s diminishes states’ rights and doesn’t solve

Malkus 4-25 (Nat Malkus Contributor, 4-25-2017, "Building an Education Marketplace," US News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2017-04-25/the-perils-and-promise-of-education-savings-accounts-for-school-choice>) CH

A key question is whether ESA funding can provide choice for all students. ESAs are state programs and thus only transfer the state's share of per-pupil public school funding to parents, but not funds from local or federal sources. For instance, Arizona's ESA provides the average student 90 percent of state funding, or about $4,500 per year. Low-income families receive 10 percent more funding, and students with disabilities receive supplemental funding based on the severity of their disability. If the base amount of an ESA is too low, or if supplements for low-income or disabled students are insufficient, ESAs could end up providing choice only to families with the means to supplement them. If such inequities materialize in Arizona, it could pose problems for the state's ESA program and, with its high profile as the only state-wide open-eligibility choice program, for the prospects of similar programs in other states. Another open question is whether ESA programs will be big enough to build a vibrant marketplace of education services. ESA's promise to create substantial demand for private educational services. However, many existing ESAs limit eligibility to specific subgroups of students. Even with statewide open eligibility, the enrollment caps like those that were part of the political compromise to pass Arizona's ESA may result in too few new customers, or spread them too thin, to spur new education service providers to launch. If increased demand only benefits existing private schools, which are most ready to serve new ESA participants in the short term, limited participation may not produce a diversity of market options.

### PTX Link

#### Plan unpopular in congress, they see Impact Aid as broader issue

Brown 6-2 (Emma Brown, Emma Brown writes about national education and about people with a stake in schools, including teachers, parents and kids., 6-2-2017, "As Trump pushes school choice, Heritage wants to let 800K military kids use public dollars for private education," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/06/02/as-trump-pushes-school-choice-heritage-wants-to-let-800k-military-kids-use-public-dollars-for-private-education/?utm_term=.ba1f04e92cf9>) CH

Whatever the administration’s position, it is not clear whether there is an appetite in Congress to create a new private-school choice program, particularly one that would come at the expense of local school districts. Congress created impact aid funds to compensate public schools for the cost of operating in areas with a lot of military or tribal property — which cannot be taxed, and therefore provide no revenue to schools. More than 1,200 districts receive some share of the money; some of them, particularly in tribal areas, rely heavily on impact aid funds to operate. Lawmakers have repeatedly denied requests from both the Obama and Trump administrations to reduce impact aid spending; senators and representatives from both sides of the aisle signed letters this spring calling the money “the very lifeblood” that allows some districts to operate.

## Case

### 1NC- No Readiness Crisis

#### Military readiness not low now

Patraeus and O’Hanlon 16 (General David Petraeus (Ret.) and Michael E. O'Hanlon, David Howell Petraeus AO is a retired American military officer and public official. He served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agenc, O’Hanlon is a Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence Director of Research - Foreign Policy, 9-30-2016, "America’s awesome military," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/americas-awesome-military/>) CH

The United States has the best military in the world today, by far. U.S. forces have few, if any, weaknesses, and in many areas—from naval warfare to precision-strike capabilities, to airpower, to intelligence and reconnaissance, to special operations—they play in a totally different league from the militaries of other countries. Nor is this situation likely to change anytime soon, as U.S. defense spending is three times as large as that of the United States’ closest competitor, China, and accounts for about one-third of all global military expenditures—with another third coming from U.S. allies and partners. Nevertheless, 15 years of war and five years of budget cuts and Washington dysfunction have taken their toll. The military is certainly neither broken nor unready for combat, but its size and resource levels are less than is advisable given the range of contemporary threats and the missions for which it has to prepare. No radical changes or major buildups are needed. But the trend of budget cuts should stop and indeed be modestly reversed, and defense appropriations should be handled more rationally and professionally than has been the case in recent years.

CONTINUED:

Those who worry about an American military supposedly in decline should relax. The current U.S. defense budget of just over $600 billion a year exceeds the Cold War average of about $525 billion (in 2016 dollars) and greatly exceeds the pre-9/11 defense budget of some $400 billion. It is true that defense spending from 2011 through 2020 has been cut by a cumulative total of about $1 trillion (not counting reductions in war-related costs). But there were legitimate reasons for most of those reductions, and the cuts were made to a budget at a historically very high level. We disagree with those who counsel further cuts, and we strongly resist a return to sequestration-level spending (as could still happen, since the chief villain and cause of sequestration, the 2011 Budget Control Act, remains the law of the land). There are good reasons why the United States needs to spend as much as it does on defense: because it has such a broad range of global responsibilities, because asymmetric foreign capabilities (such as Chinese precision-guided missiles and Russian advanced air defenses) can require large investments to counter convincingly, and, most important, because it should aim to deter conflicts rather than simply prevail in them. To be sure, many U.S. allies are wealthy enough to contribute substantially to their own defense and should certainly do more in that regard. But engaging in a game of chicken to try to persuade them to live up to their commitments would be a dangerous mistake. Having reached nearly five percent of GDP in the later Bush and early Obama years, U.S. defense spending is now down to about three percent. That is not an undue burden on the U.S. economy and is in fact a bargain given the peace, security, and international stability that it underwrites. There is no need to return to significantly higher levels, such as the four percent of GDP that some have proposed. But nor would it be prudent to drop below three percent. That translates into perhaps $625 billion to $650 billion a year in constant dollars over the next few years for the overall national defense budget, including war costs (assuming they remain at roughly current amounts). That level is sensible and affordable, and what the next president should work with Congress to provide. With that sort of support, there is every reason to believe that the country’s fortunate military position can be sustained for many years to come.

### 1NC- No Korean war

####  No Korean war

**Killalea 17**

Debra Killalea (contributing writer). “North Korea vs US: Will there be a war?” April 13th, 2017. <http://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/north-korea-vs-us-will-there-be-a-war/news-story/e106db167af907ef9ef1ce49db7f15ac>

THE drums of war are banging loudly as North Korea escalates its threats against the United States. US President Donald Trump has baited North Korea over Twitter warning it was looking for trouble while Pyongyang threatened to launch a nuclear attack on the US if provoked. The two nations, which are locked in a war of words, have sparked fears a war could be on the horizon. However, some argue the **fear of war breaking out may be unfounded.** Peter Hayes, an Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at Sydney University and a **leading expert on nuclear policy in the region**, told news.com.au he didn’t believe war would break out with North Korea. Prof Hayes said it was true North Korea had demonstrated nuclear weapons capabilities and had tested nuclear devices underground on five occasions, including twice last year. “Overall, I would say that the risk of war remains low but has increased due to the possibility of mistakes, loss of control of forces, and misunderstandings,” he said. “Given the immense stakes, a tiny increase in probability is of concern and when it is needless, of even greater concern.” The executive director of the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley told news.com.au North Korea may not have a deliverable warhead and may not have a reliable ballistic missile delivery system with a usable re-entry vehicle. “But it might, especially for short range missiles,” he said. “It certainly is testing missiles at a fast rate to try to get land based and sea based (submarine launched) intermediate range missiles that work well enough to threaten US and South Korea forces, and US bases in Japan with nuclear attack.” Speaking on Late Night Live last night, he also said there seemed to be a collective madness in the US regarding this issue but said he didn’t believe we were about to go to war with North Korea. “In reality we not about to go to war because it would require not only the assembly of one aircraft carrier, but a virtual armada of naval and ground forces,” he said. He also said the bigger concern was the US had moved from a policy of strategic patience under the Obama administration, which basically meant do nothing, to “doing s\*\*\*” and no one knew what Mr Trump’s strategy was yet. Brendan Thomas-Noone, a research fellow in the Alliance 21 Program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, said the pace of North Korea’s nuclear program has blindsided many analysts.

### 1NC- NATO Bad

#### Natos existence accelerates Russian aggression, turns case

Kinzer 16 (Stephen Kinzer, Stephen Kinzer is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, 7-5-2016, "Is NATO necessary?," BostonGlobe, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/07/04/nato-necessary/DwE0YzPb8qr70oIT9NVyAK/story.html>) CH

BRITAIN’S VOTE to quit the European Union was a rude jolt to the encrusted world order. Now that the EU has been shocked into reality, NATO should be next. When NATO leaders convene for a summit in Warsaw on Friday, they will insist that their alliance is still vital because Russian aggression threatens Europe. The opposite is true. NATO has become America’s instrument in escalating our dangerous conflict with Russia. We need less NATO, not more. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 as a way for American troops to protect a war-shattered Europe from Stalin’s Soviet Union. Today Europe is quite capable of shaping and paying for its own security, but NATO’s structure remains unchanged. The United States still pays nearly three-quarters of its budget. That no longer makes sense. The United States should remain politically close to European countries but stop telling them how to defend themselves. Left to their own devices, they might pull back from the snarling confrontation with Russia into which NATO is leading them. Russia threatens none of America’s vital interests. On the contrary, it shares our eagerness to fight global terror, control nuclear threats, and confront other urgent challenges to global security. Depending on one’s perspective, Russia may be seen as a destabilizing force in Europe or as simply defending its border regions. Either way, it is a challenge for Europeans, not for us. Yet the American generals who run NATO, desperate for a new mission, have fastened onto Russia as an enemy. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter preposterously places Russia first on his list of threats to the United States. Anti-Russia passion has seized Washington. This week’s NATO summit will be a festival of chest-thumping, with many warnings about the Russian “threat” and solemn vows to meet it with shows of military force. The United States plans to quadruple spending on NATO military projects on or near Russia’s borders. In recent weeks NATO has opened a new missile base in Romania, held the largest military maneuver in the modern history of Poland, and announced plans to deploy thousands more American troops at Baltic bases, some within artillery range of St. Petersburg. Russia, for its part, is building a new military base within artillery range of Ukraine and deploying 30,000 troops to border posts. Both sides are nuclear-armed. NATO views trouble between Russia and nearby countries as a military problem. That makes sense. NATO is a military alliance run by military officers who think in military terms. Our conflict with Russia, however, is essentially political, not military. It cries out for creative diplomacy. NATO is a blunt instrument unequipped for such a delicate task. If Europeans believe tit-for-tat escalation is the best way to deal with Russia, let them pursue it. But it should be their choice, not ours. NATO commanders and their political masters in Washington do not want to surrender control over European security. They fear Europeans would seek conciliation with Russia rather than follow the NATO model of in-your-face confrontation. That prospect is abhorrent to American generals, politicians, and defense contractors. By continuing to finance NATO, we buy the right to flash our swords on Russia’s borders. Some Europeans are unhappy with America’s use of NATO to intensify military pressure on Russia. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany called the recent maneuvers in Poland, in which 14,000 American troops participated, “saber-rattling and war cries.” In a clear rebuke to NATO, he added, “Whoever believes that a symbolic tank parade on the alliance’s eastern border will bring security is mistaken. We are well-advised to not create pretexts to renew an old confrontation.” NATO helped to keep peace in Europe during the Cold War. It is not suited to the 21st century. By stoking tension with Russia, it contributes to instability, not stability. Europe needs a new security system. Unlike NATO, it should be designed by Europeans to meet European needs, run and paid for by Europeans. That would allow the United States to step back from a long mission that may have been noble, but should not last forever.

### 1NC- No Russia War

#### Interdependence solves Russia escalation

Dreyfuss 14 (Bob Dreyfuss, Bob&nbsp;Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist specializing in politics and national security, 3-10-2014, "Capitalism Will Prevent a Cold War Over Ukraine," Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/capitalism-will-prevent-cold-war-over-ukraine/>) CH

﻿Plain, old-fashioned capitalism will prevent a new cold war between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and Russia’s gobbling up of the Crimean region. Capitalism, plus the fact that probably not one American in a thousand could locate Crimea on a map, and even the most hard-headed US political analysts have trouble coming up with a decent definition of what US interests in Ukraine might be. Helping to contain the crisis is the fact that Russia, Europe and to a lesser extent the United States are tied together in a powerful web of financial and economic ties that didn’t exist, say, during the real Cold War. Their influence runs counter to the many, many cries from hawks to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia, as if the giant Eurasian power were a small “rogue state.” The Washington Post, for instance, said in an editorial: Some argue that the West lacks the means to damage the Putin regime or that the United States cannot act without Europe, but neither claim is true. Banking sanctions—denying Russians and their banks access to the U.S. financial system—could deal a powerful blow. Mr. Obama must respond to Mr. Putin with measures that force the Russian ruler to rethink his options. But, as CNN reports: Russia is the European Union’s third-biggest trading partner after the United States and China, with goods and services worth more than $500 billion exchanged in 2012. About 75% of all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in EU member states, according to the European Commission. In addition, Russia is the single biggest supplier of energy to the European Union. British energy firm BP is the second-largest shareholder in Russia’s leading oil producer Rosneft, and some of the biggest energy companies in Germany, the Netherlands and France are invested in a joint venture with Russian gas giant Gazprom. And, in a lengthy interview in The American Interest, Zbigniew Brzezinski points with regret to the fact that British bankers, who have large deposits of Russian cash—particularly from Russian oligarchs—are resisting any sort of confrontation over Ukraine: The British seem inclined to argue, “Well, there’s a lot of Russian money in our banks.”… The bankers doubtless have a lot of influence, particularly in political systems in which money is increasingly the mechanism that oils the “democratic process.” Earlier, the BBC had reported that a document carried by a top British official read: “The U.K. should not support for now trade sanctions or close London’s financial center to Russians.” The New York Times, in a long March 7 piece analyzing US and European business interests in Russia and their effect on the politics of the situation, quoted several executives with Western firms who clearly want to cool the crisis talk: European businesses “have no interests in any deterioration of the current international situation linked to Ukraine,” Frank Schauff, the chief executive of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, said on Friday. “We call upon all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue, which will secure stability, welfare and economic growth on the European Continent.” Among American companies cited in the Times are Pepsi, Ford and John Deere. The Times quoted Ken Golden, director of global public relations for Deere, in its piece: While Russia represents less than 5 percent of Deere’s total equipment sales, the company recently cited Russia as being key to its future growth. “We urge political leaders to solve this issue without violence and in accord with international agreements,” Mr. Golden said. It even extends to the defense industry. According to Defense News, in a piece titled “Amid Ukraine Crisis, EU Plays It Safe,” various European arms manufacturers, including in Sweden, value current and potential sales to Russia. France is apparently insisting that it will continue to sell arms to Russia, including a $1.7 billion deal for two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Said one expert quoted in the piece: It looks like the Europeans are extremely keen to do everything except anything that hurts their commercial interests. There is zero appetite to hurt business interests, and arms sales fit into that category.

### 2NC- No ! to Russia

#### No escalation, EMPS de-escalate

Pry 5-15

Peter Pry, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is chief of staff of the Congressional EMP Commission. He served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA., 5-15-2017, "Is the US prepared for a nuclear EMP to shut down New York City?," TheHill, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/333377-is-the-us-prepared-for-a-nuclear-emp-to-shut-down-new-york-city

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack would be perfect for implementing Russia's strategy of "de-escalation," where a conflict with the U.S. and its allies would be won by limited nuclear use. It's their version of "shock and awe" to cow the U.S. into submission. The same kind of attack is viewed as an acceptable option by China and North Korea as well. An EMP attack would be the most militarily effective use of one or a few nuclear weapons, while also being the most acceptable nuclear option in world opinion, the option most likely to be construed in the U.S. and internationally as "restrained" and a "warning shot." Because EMP destroys electronics instead of blasting cities, even some analysts in Germany and Japan, among the most anti-nuclear nations, regard EMP attacks as an acceptable use of nuclear weapons. High-altitude EMP attack entails detonating a nuclear weapon at 30-400 kilometers altitude — above the atmosphere, in outer space, so high that no nuclear effects, not even the sound of the explosion, would be experienced on the ground, except EMP. An EMP attack will kill far more people than nuclear blasting a city through indirect effects — by blacking out electric grids and destroying life-sustaining critical infrastructures like communications, transportation, food and water — in the long run. But the millions of fatalities likely to eventually result from EMP will take months to develop, as slow as starvation. Thus, a nation hit with an EMP attack will have powerful incentives to cease hostilities, focus on repairing their critical infrastructures while there is still time and opportunity to recover, and avert national extinction. Indeed, an EMP attack or demonstration made to "de-escalate" a crisis or conflict is very likely to raise a chorus of voices in the West against nuclear escalation and send Western leaders in a panicked search for the first "off ramp." Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran in their military doctrines and training regard EMP attack as part of all-out cyber warfare, not necessarily as nuclear warfare. Our proximity to a nuclear war may be suggested by the simple fact that analysts can now imagine many more possible pathways to a nuclear conflict today than was the case during the Cold War, then dominated by a more or less stable relationship between two nuclear superpowers, the U.S. and USSR.

### 1NC- No Nuke Terror

#### No nuke terror

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(Leonard, “On fear and nuclear terrorism”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2015 vol. 71 no. 2 75-87, dml)

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008: Nuclear terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26) The three ways terrorists might get a nuke To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider the three possibilities for terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring. Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks (including so-called “permissive action links” that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn’t impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider. The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes. Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it’s also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event. Although these first two ways in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is no available data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a weapon, nor has there been any public information suggesting that any nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group), the probabilities cannot be said to be zero as long as nuclear weapons exist. Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan. But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,4 would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device. There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success. The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a “gun type” design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension. In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, stealing that much highly enriched material (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) is a major problem for any thief and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s5 and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it. Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, there is only one known case of a major theft of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves. Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons? A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

### 1NC- No Impact to Heg Decline

#### No great power wars

Nicholson 3/22

Brad Nicholson, Lt. Col. Jason (Brad) Nicholson is an Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program Fellow pursuing a PhD in political science at the University of Utah., 3-22-2017, "Balancing Force Modernization and the Most Likely Future Wars We’ll Be Fighting," No Publication, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/03/22/balancing\_force\_modernization\_and\_future\_wars\_111020.html

Today, military planners focus intensely on countering Russian revanchism in Europe and containing Chinese expansionism in Asia. After more than a decade and a half of fighting “small wars” In Iraq and Afghanistan and conducting counterterrorism strikes in many more countries, our national security focus and increasingly prevailing wisdom suggest the international system may be returning to an era of great power war. Except, it is not. Despite predictions to the contrary great power conflict will not dominate global security issues in the twenty-first century. Wars between great powers have steadily declined since WWII with the influence of nuclear weapons upon the international system, a trend that pre-dates American hegemony and argues against unipolarity as the sole causal factor. However, while great power war is unlikely to emerge in the near future, war itself will remain a constant feature of the international system. Instead of large-scale, inter-state conflicts, though, the prevalent form of conflict for the foreseeable future will be civil wars. Nationalism, or even fragmented and atomized derivative identities, will be the driving factor behind these conflicts, manifesting principally as insurgencies. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar balance of power thawed previously frozen conflicts. From the Balkans to the Caucasus, through the Middle East, to Africa and Southeast Asia, issues of ethnic and nationalist identity have driven political conflicts that have often become violent, and have frequently taken the form of insurgencies. Both contemporary scholarship and US military doctrine indicate insurgents often adopt identity-focused strategies based upon religion, language, or ethnicity. The slow unraveling of artificially constructed and imposed nation-states that has contributed to these post–Cold War insurgencies has far from run its course; the majority of these states and their boundaries remain, and the unraveling will continue throughout this century. The conflicts of the future are going to look more like the ongoing civil war in South Sudan than a great power war across the Taiwan Strait.

### 2NC- No Impact to Heg Decline

#### US is not a leader in the squo, NUQ their impacts

Bremmer 16 (Ian Bremmer, Bremmer is a foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME. He is the president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and a Global Research Professor at New York University, 12-19-2016, "The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over. Here's What Comes Next," Time, <http://time.com/4606071/american-global-leadership-is-over/>) CH

For at least the next four years, America's interactions with other nations will be guided not by the conviction that U.S. leadership is good for America and the world but by Trump's transactional approach. This will force friends and foes alike to question every assumption they've made about what Washington will and will not do. Add a more assertive China and Russia to the greater willingness of traditional U.S. allies to hedge their bets on American plans and it's clear that we've reached a turning point. Trump is not an isolationist, but he's certainly a unilateralist, and a proudly selfish one. Even if he wanted to engage the G-7 or G-8 or G-20 to get things done--and he doesn't--it has become unavoidably obvious that the transition toward a leaderless world is now complete. The G-zero era I first predicted nearly six years ago is now fully upon us. No matter how long Trump remains in the White House, a crucial line has been crossed. The fallout will outlive his presidency, because Trump has proved that tens of millions of Americans like this idea. Trump's "America first" approach fundamentally changes the U.S. role in the world. Trump agrees with leaders of both political parties that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, but he insists that the country can't remain exceptional if it keeps stumbling down the path that former Presidents, including Republicans and Democrats, have followed since the end of World War II. Washington's ambition to play the role of indispensable power allows both allies and rivals to treat U.S. taxpayers like chumps, he argues. Better to build a "What's in it for us?" approach to the rest of the world. This is a complete break with a foreign policy establishment that Trump has worked hard to delegitimize--and which he continues to ostracize by waving off charges of Russian interference in the election and by refusing the daily intelligence briefings offered to all Presidents-elect. American power, once a trump card, is now a wild card. Instead of a superpower that wants to impose stability and values on a fractious and valueless global order, the U.S. has become the single biggest source of international uncertainty. And don't expect lawmakers to provide the traditional set of checks and balances. It's not just that the Constitution gives the President great power to conduct foreign policy. It's also that Trump has succeeded politically where his party's establishment has continually failed, and as long as he remains popular with the party's voters, many junior Republican lawmakers will answer to their President rather than to their leaders on Capitol Hill. Expect Trump to use the bully pulpit with a vengeance, often at 140 characters or less, to try to set new rules and rally the faithful to follow his lead. As for special interests, Trump isn't much beholden to Wall Street, Silicon Valley or Big Business, since most didn't support him. Those in the tech class, in particular, are the most liberal of the U.S. business elite, and Trump's intense criticism of Apple for resisting FBI efforts to hack into the cell phones used by the attackers in San Bernardino, Calif., previews plenty of fights to come between the Trump White House and Silicon Valley. Trump has essentially charged Big Business with treason and threatens to punish--individually--those companies that ship jobs overseas. He hasn't yet taken the oath of office, but Trump (and Trumpism) have already begun to create turmoil abroad. In Europe, the new President's full embrace of Brexit sets teeth on edge in many capitals, and his friendly approach to Russia leaves European governments scrambling for security alternatives to NATO. Transatlantic relations have reached their lowest point since the 1930s. In Asia, his confrontational attitude toward China will bolster U.S. ties with allies like Japan and India that have long-term reasons to resist China's rise, but it has already made it that much harder to manage Washington's relations with Beijing, the most important relationship for the future of the global economy. It will also complicate any bid by the U.S. and China to work together, or at least in parallel, when North Korea finally becomes a red-alert-level emergency--which it almost certainly will.

### 1NC- No ! to Prolif

#### Horizontal proliferation doesn’t exist

Pashakhanlou 15 (Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou is Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow in Politics &amp; International Relations at University of Bath., 7-14-2015, "Nuclear Proliferation Is a Myth," New Republic, <https://newrepublic.com/article/122301/nuclear-proliferation-myth>) CH

After nearly two years of incremental and painstaking negotiations, a full deal on Iran’s nuclear programme has at last been struck. In a feat of diplomacy and patience, Iran and the P5+1 – the US, the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China – have managed to construct a deal that limits Iran’s nuclear activity and the sanctions imposed on it. Early reactions deemed this a “new chapter of hope” in more ways than one; not just a victory for diplomacy, but a major victory in the efforts against nuclear weapons proliferation. This is misguided. In reality, even a nuclear-armed Iran would not have meant that a nuclear weapons proliferation among states was underway. Proliferation, after all, means rapid spread. And whereas nuclear weapons have proliferated “vertically”, with existing nuclear states adding to their existing nuclear arsenals, there has not been a “horizontal” nuclear weapons proliferation – that is, a fast spread of these weapons to new nations. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have spread slowly across the world, even though academics, politicians and the media frequently discuss horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation as if it was a matter of fact. Currently, there are only nine states in the world with nuclear weapons among the UN’s 193 members: the US (since 1945), Russia (since 1949), the UK (since 1952), France (since 1960), China (since 1964), Israel (since 1966, unofficial), India (since 1974), Pakistan (since 1998) and North Korea (since 2006). Other countries have dropped off the list. South Africa joined the nuclear club in the 1980s, but dismantled its weapons in the early 1990s. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union when they became independent states after the Cold War, but they transferred their nuclear arsenal to Russia in the 1990s. In other words, only a handful of countries in Europe, Asia and North America possess these weapons, while Africa, Australasia and Latin America are devoid of nuclear weapons states. In fact, the number of nuclear weapons states has actually decreased ever since the 1990s. And even though the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confirmed the existence of a global nuclear black market which purportedly provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to various countries, including Libya, no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place. Libya eventually voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan have also shelved their nuclear weapons programs. As of now, there are 31 countries with nuclear power plant units in operation; countries such as Australia, Canada, and Japan are widely believed to have the technological sophistication to become nuclear weapons states in relatively short amount of time should they want to – but they have not pursued that path. In other words, even though there have been opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation across a range of new states, such a development has not materialised. All of the available evidence thus unanimously suggests that no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place throughout the 70 years that these weapons have existed. Claims to the contrary lack basis, whether they are made for political or economic reasons, sheer ignorance, or for any other purposes. Horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a bogeyman that does not exist. If we are to devise sound strategies and policies regarding nuclear weapons we have to ground them in existing reality. Recognising that there is no horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a good place to start.

### 1NC- Prolif Good

#### Prolif is slow and deters war- their impacts are hype

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Obama’s declaration appeared momentous and it re-sparked debate on the issue of non-proliferation, but evidence suggests that rather than eliminating all nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation brings about more peace. After Obama's speech, non-proliferation organizations, such as The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, immediately launched a series of campaigns promoting nuclear disarmament. These groups played upon the irrational fears of the public to gain support for their goals and objectives. As a result of their rhetoric, segments of the American population are convinced that more nuclear weapons across the globe will certainly lead to nuclear annihilation. Nuclear proliferation will lead to the acquisition of this deadly technology by irrational and irresponsible states or worse yet, terrorists, who are less capable of self-control. Therefore, nuclear proliferation is not an option for a secure world. Unfortunately, while the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow. From 1945 to 1970, only six countries acquired nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession. Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club. Included on this list are such actors as: Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa. The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes. It is important to point out that while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21st century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War era. The fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states. In other words, states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare. Despite Obama’s commitment to a nuclear free world, he seems to understand the importance of possessing nuclear weapons. His recommended budget for nuclear weapons spending in 2011 calls for a full 10% increase in nuclear weapons spending.

#### New arsenals will be small- solves nuclear deterrence, miscalc, and de-escalates conflict

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Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, most analysts agree on the basic dynamics of deterrence, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive. As previously mentioned, most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal capable of warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, nuclear weapons socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism and, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly to provocation. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution despite the composition, goals, or desires of its leaders. In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade.

### 2NC- Prolif Good

#### Prolif uniquely deters conventional and CBW warfare- those are worse

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Conventional deterrence has been manifestly effective on occasion, but it also has an unfortunate 2,000-year record of periodically failing catastrophically: most recently, there were no nuclear weapons to deter war in 1914 and 1939. What followed were approximately 110 million casualties in fewer than 10 combined years of warfare. The subsequent 6-1/2 nuclear decades compare very favorably to that horrific prenuclear record. Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling makes the material point simply: “One might hope that major war could not happen in a world without nuclear weapons, but it always did.” 26 Indeed, we have already been to the “nuclear zero mountaintop.” Nuclear deterrence has helped to prevent a repeat of such horrors. In a comprehensive examination of the US–Soviet historical record, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein conclude: “The reality of nuclear deterrence had a restraining effect on both Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962 and on Brezhnev in 1973. When Superpower leaders believed that they were approaching the brink of war, fear of war pulled them back.” 27 And, “The history of the Cold War suggests that nuclear deterrence should be viewed as a powerful but very dangerous medicine . . . As with any medicine, the key to successful deterrence is to administer correctly the proper dosage.” 28 Yes, indeed. There is similar evidence from the post–Cold War era. In 2009, for example, former Indian army chief Gen Shankar Roychowdhury asked: “Do nuclear weapons deter?” He then answered his own question based on the empirical evidence, “Of course, they do. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deterred India from attacking that country after the Mumbai strikes. . . . It was due to Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons that India stopped short of a military retaliation following the attack on Parliament in 2001.” 29 Here we have India’s army chief explaining precisely what deterred India on two occasions—Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. The first Gulf War also offers evidence of the value of nuclear deterrence. It appears that the US nuclear deterrence strategy was key to deterring the Iraqi use of WMD in the war. In August 1995, the former Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, said that Iraq was deterred from using its WMD because the Iraqi leadership had interpreted Washington’s threats of grievous retaliation as meaning nuclear retaliation. 30 In January 1996, former head of Iraqi military intelligence Gen Wafic al Sammarai said: “Some of the Scud missiles were loaded with chemical warheads, but they were not used . . . the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms, and the price will be too dear and too high.” 31 Gen Hussein Kamal, Iraqi minister of military industry and Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, said in 1995: “During the Gulf War . . . there was no decision to use chemical weapons for fear of retaliation. They realized that if chemical weapons were used, retaliation would be nuclear.” 32 These few references do not close this case—historical studies rarely are settled definitively. Saddam Hussein himself once said that “Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened.” 33 This explanation is not necessarily inconsistent with the deterrence explanation, and discerning the truth in his various statements undoubtedly poses a challenge—during these same interrogations he also said that he invaded Kuwait because the Kuwaiti leader had told a crude joke about Iraqi women. 34 At this point, the most informed, unclassified analyses of the first Gulf War conclude that Saddam Hussein was indeed deterred from chemical and biological weapons (CBW) employment by his fear of US nuclear retaliation. For example, Charles Duelfer, executive deputy chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, has testified that “The Iraqis did not use these weapons even when they were losing, and I asked them why, and the long and the short of it was that Saddam thought that he would not survive. So the [deterrence] message worked. Saddam was deterred.” 35 Equally important, well-informed analyses also conclude that other possible nonnuclear deterrence threats, such as regime change, were not sufficiently credible to deter Saddam Hussein. In short, while conventional deterrence may well be adequate on some or many future occasions, there is sufficient historical evidence available to demonstrate that nuclear deterrence has helped to prevent conflict or escalation in the past. It also suggests that, in the absence of some significant transformation, the absence of credible nuclear threats would increase the risk of deterrence failure in some future cases. This deterrent value of nuclear threats may be of increasing importance as chemical and biological weapons become potentially more lethal and more easily acquired; the undeterred use of CBW could destroy the fabric of society, without nuclear use. This is why the elimination of nuclear weapons would not eliminate catastrophic threats to civilization, but would preclude nuclear deterrence from helping to counter such threats. The “mountaintop” vision of “nuclear zero” may well include the dark potential of leaving unprotected civilians more vulnerable to CBW attack.

#### Bioweapons cause extinction- their defense doesn’t assume new advancements

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Bioengineering can be a factor in GCR, both to increase and decrease the risk. In this and¶ other regards it is a dual-use technology, meaning that it can be used both for beneficial and harmful¶ purposes. Bioengineering has already led to breakthroughs in fields like agriculture and medicine.¶ However, bioengineering has also been used to produce weapons, such as the Soviet Union’s efforts¶ to engineer a highly virulent, antibiotic resistant form of anthrax.27 And as biotechnology improves,¶ its capacity to cause benefit or harm improves, too. Ongoing advances are making the technology¶ more accessible, more affordable, and more powerful than ever. All this raises the stakes for¶ bioengineering, including for bioengineering as a contributor to GCR.¶ A. Non-GCR Benefits of Bioengineering¶ Bioengineering has already led to an array of peaceful technologies that are pervasive in¶ many sectors of society. In agriculture, bioengineering has led to pest resistant crops that need fewer¶ pesticides, drought resistant crops have increased the amount of viable farming land, herbicide¶ resistant crops that helps eradicate weeds without killing crops, and virus tolerant crops.¶ Bioengineering has also resulted in increased crop yields, with a 2010 survey showing that¶ genetically engineered crops increased crop yield by 6 to 30 percent.28 Some crops can have¶ increased nutritional value, such as “golden rice” that can help remedy Vitamin A deficiency for¶ millions of children and pregnant women, although this particular food has been met with¶ opposition and is not yet widespread on the market. Finally, the net economic benefit is massive:¶ fueled by increased crop production, biotechnology boosted net income for famers by $65 billion¶ from 1996 through 2009 and $10.8 billion in 2009 alone.29¶ Bioengineering has also revolutionized many aspects of the medical field. First,¶ bioengineering has been used to create an array of medicines that were previously unavailable.¶ Insulin (formerly available only from sheep and cows), a Hepatitis B vaccine, and a HPV vaccine¶ are just a few of the examples. Bioengineering has also opened the door to medical treatments for¶ previously incurable diseases, such as through gene therapy techniques, which uses genes to treat¶ diseases. For example, one recent clinical trial successfully used gene therapy to attack the tumor cells of patients with recurrent B-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia, and three out of five patients¶ went into remission, with the two other patients being subject to unrelated complications.30¶ Finally, bioengineering shows great potential to promote environmental health. For example,¶ scientists are developing bioengineered algae that convert CO2 into an efficient fuel source for¶ motor vehicles. Scientists have also developed bioengineered microbes that are customized to¶ gobble up pollution, such as oil slicks or toxic waste, although these have not successfully entered¶ the marketplace. Bioengineered crops can also have a positive impact on the environment because¶ farmers can use less harmful tilling practices, fewer pesticides and herbicides, and can produce¶ more crops on the same amount of land.¶ On the other hand, these benefits of bioengineering may have unknown effects on human,¶ animal, and environmental health. For example, pesticide and drought resistant crops may spread¶ into unintended areas and be difficult to eradicate. Furthermore, the overall environmental effect of¶ GE crops is still unknown, and may not be known for decades, until the impact is irreversible.¶ Bioengineered microbes in the environment could also have vast unknown environmental¶ implications, potentially outcompeting their natural counterparts and transferring novel DNA to¶ other microbes,31 although these risks likely fall short of a GCR.¶ B. Bioengineering as a GCR¶ While bioengineering has many benefits, bioengineering can also increase GCR. There are¶ two general risks that arise from bioengineering: first, the risk of an accident involving a dangerous¶ bioengineered organism (a biosafety issue), and second, the risk of the purposeful release of a¶ dangerous bioengineered organism (a bioweapons issue). Biosafety is a major concern across the¶ globe. Biosafety lapses resulted in the apparent accidental release of Foot and Mouth Disease from¶ a leaky pipe in the UK in 2007 and several instances of SARS infections from laboratories in¶ 2003.32 Meanwhile, scientists are now able to use bioengineering techniques to create incredibly¶ deadly organisms, such as a genetically modified H5N1 virus (bird flu), which scientists engineered¶ to be airborne. The natural H5N1 virus killed an alarming 60 percent of reported infected¶ individuals,33 which is a higher fatality rate than the 1918 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu).34¶ Although the airborne H5N1 virus never escaped from the lab, its accidental release, or the¶ accidental release of a similarly dangerous virus, could cause a loss of life significant enough to qualify as a global catastrophe by its normal definition.¶ Bioweapons are also a growing threat. The technology to create dangerous bioengineered organisms is increasingly cheap and accessible. Custom DNA strands are available for shipment online for several thousand dollars, and consumers can even purchase DNA synthesis machines online, which can “print” customized strands of DNA.35 Individuals have also shown a willingness¶ to engage in attacks using biological agents, such as the postal anthrax attacks of 2001, which killed¶ 5 people in the United States. Furthermore, publicly available information on how to bioengineer¶ extremely deadly viruses can be used as an instruction manual for individuals, organizations, or governments to create extremely deadly bioweapons.36 So with bioengineering technologies¶ advancing, bioterrorists or other actors could create a biological weapon that is more deadly than anything existing in the natural world. Therefore, bioweapons that utilize bioengineered organisms¶ pose a GCR.¶ C. Bioengineering to Reduce other GCRs¶ In addition to itself being a GCR, bioengineering can also reduce the chances that other¶ GCRs will occur. One such GCR is climate change. Catastrophic climate change scenarios could¶ involve sea level rise of up to 10 meters, droughts, increased extreme weather events, loss of most¶ threatened and endangered species, and temperature increases of 6 degrees Celsius.37 Still worse than that would be outcomes in which large portions of the land surface on Earth become too warm¶ for mammals (including humans) to survive.38 And the worst scenario could involve climate¶ engineering backfiring to result in extremely rapid temperature increase.39¶ Despite the risks of climate change, the international community has struggled to¶ satisfactorily address the issue, for a variety of political, technological, and economical reasons.¶ Bioengineering may be able to help. An army of bioengineered algae that is specifically designed to¶ convert carbon dioxide into a “biocrude” fuel ready to be made into fuel for any vehicle type – a¶ technology that Craig Venter’s Synthetic Genomics, Inc. is developing with a $600 million¶ investment from ExxonMobil – could remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and provide a¶ plentiful, carbon-neutral fuel source that does not pose many of the downsides of today’s biofuel¶ options (although this technology has its own risks).40 Or, despite being a bizarre proposition,¶ humans could be genetically engineered to reduce our CO2 output, such as by engineering humans¶ to be intolerant to meat or to be smaller in size.41¶ Likewise, while a deadly bioengineered virus has the potential to escape from a laboratory¶ and cause a global catastrophe, such research may be necessary to create vaccines for viruses that¶ could cause worldwide pandemics. For example, the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 (the Spanish¶ flu) killed about 50 million people worldwide.42 Would modern bioengineering technology have¶ been able to avoid this global catastrophe? In fact, researchers justified the airborne H5N1 virus,¶ discussed above, as helping to prevent the spread of a similar strain that could mutate naturally.¶ Overall, there is a dynamic relationship between bioengineering and other GCRs that should be¶ assessed when considering how to respond to these risks.¶ IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION¶ International regulation of bioengineering is important for at least two reasons. First,¶ bioengineering can influence (increase or decrease) GCR, which is an inherently global issue. Thus¶ the entire world has a stake in ensuring that this technology is used safely. Second, bioengineering¶ research and development can be conducted anywhere in the world. With only scattered national or¶ regional regulation, harmful bioengineering could be conducted in unregulated areas. A deadly¶ virus could be bioengineered by terrorists in an unregulated area, but it would have an impact on the¶ entire planet. Thus international regulation has an important role to play in the overall management¶ of bioengineering, as with GCR in general.¶ Several international treaties already attempt to regulate various GCRs. The U.N.¶ Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol regulate climate change; the¶ U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) regulates biodiversity loss; the Treaty on the Non-¶ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regulates nuclear weapons; and the Biological Weapons¶ Convention (BWC) regulates biological weapons. However, there is no international treaty specifically for bioengineering.¶ Nonetheless, several other treaties regulate certain aspects of bioengineering, including the¶ CBD, the Cartagena Protocol, and the BWC. Still, the drafters of these treaties did not design them¶ with all the risks of modern dual-use bioengineering in mind. And so these treaties provide¶ imperfect regulations that fall well short of the comprehensive international scheme that would be¶ necessary to minimize the GCR arising from bioengineering.43¶ The existing treaties fall short in several ways. First, while the Convention on Biological¶ Diversity (CBD) requires parties to “regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use¶ and release of living modified organisms,” the treaty does not establish specific steps that countries¶ must take, such as requiring high-security laboratories or safety training for scientists handling¶ dangerous bioengineered pathogens (CBD, Article 8(g)). Second, the Cartagena Protocol on¶ Biosafety expands on the CBD, requiring parties to conduct risk assessment and risk management for living modified organisms that may adversely affect biological diversity. However, these¶ requirements only extend as far as a country’s self-determined protective goals,44 and the treaty is¶ overall too trade-focused to provide sufficient regulation of bioengineering. Third, the Biological¶ Weapons Convention takes measures to ensure that countries do not stockpile, acquire, or retain¶ dangerous microbial or biological agents, including dangerous bioengineered organisms, but there is¶ an exception for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” (BWC, Article 1), so while¶ the BWC may be useful in preventing acts of bioterrorism, the treaty does not sufficiently cover¶ biosafety issues. Overall, while these treaties regulate certain risks arising out of bioengineering,¶ they fail to provide a comprehensive regulatory regime that addresses all of the risks that arise from¶ dual-use bioengineering technologies.¶ A. International Legal Regime¶ There are a variety of options of how to create an international legal regime for¶ bioengineering. The first is to create a framework treaty that covers an assortment of emerging¶ technologies such as bioengineering, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and geoengineering.¶ Having one overarching governance scheme is perhaps ideal because of the fundamental similarities¶ amongst emerging technologies: they are all dual-use technologies; they all have risks that increase¶ with research and development; they call for similar forecasting techniques; and laboratory¶ transparency is central to their governance—just to name a few.45¶ Another approach to create a treaty is to begin by first creating “soft law.” Soft laws are¶ nonbinding laws, meaning that countries have discretion over whether to follow them.46 Hard laws,¶ on the other hand, are legally binding, such as treaties. This approach would involve creating soft¶ laws, either for bioengineering or emerging technologies in general, until there is the necessary¶ political will for a legally binding treaty, at which point the soft law could be integrated into the¶ treaty.47 Beginning with soft laws is a prudent approach when countries are unlikely to otherwise¶ agree to a legally binding treaty. However, soft laws do not provide the sort of robust protections¶ that may be necessary to prevent a GCR from bioengineering.¶ Finally, another option is to create a new international organization dedicated to mitigating¶ GCR and other risks from emerging technologies, including bioengineering. This international¶ organization could be established by an existing international body like the U.N. General Assembly,¶ the World Health Organization (WHO), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United¶ Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural¶ Organization (UNESCO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),¶ or the Strategic Approach for International Chemical Management (SAICM), for example. Perhaps¶ the best option is for several existing international organizations to jointly create and/or chair a new¶ body; for example, UNEP and the WHO co-chair SAICM. A new organization that covers¶ emerging technologies could attempt to quickly begin treaty negotiations or else create soft law that¶ is later embodied in an international treaty, as described above.¶ B. Universal Treaty¶ Finally, a treaty that regulates bioengineering (or several emerging technologies) should¶ have universal participation, meaning that every country is a party to the treaty. As Charney48¶ argues, global threats like environmental degradation, climate change, terrorism, and nuclear¶ weapons require treaties that are binding on all countries, or else the unregulated countries could¶ impede with the purpose of the treaty. For bioengineering, universal participation is important¶ because otherwise dangerous bioengineering technologies could be freely developed in the nonsignatory¶ countries, putting every other country in the world at risk. This type of situation¶ threatened to play out when physicist Richard Seed threatened to clone a human in Japan or Mexico if the technique was made illegal in the United States. If near-universal participation is achieved,¶ another option is to impose sanctions on countries that do not comply with the terms of the treaty,¶ much like the Security Council imposes sanctions on countries that violate certain provisions of the¶ NPT.¶ Another reason that a treaty on bioengineering should have universal participation is¶ because this would help prevent an arms race for dangerous biotechnologies. According to¶ Pinson,49 an arms race could be triggered by advanced nanotechnologies that assemble novel¶ biological or chemical compounds to be used as weapons. And Metzl50 argues that the genetic¶ manipulation of humans could spark an arms race to create populations that are smarter, physically¶ superior, and more advanced in other ways. A global treaty with universal participation may help¶ prevent similar arms races involving extremely dangerous and powerful bioengineering¶ technologies, because all countries would be subject to the same obligations and therefore would¶ not be threatened with comparative disadvantages.¶ Of course, achieving universal participation in a treaty is extremely difficult: Most of the¶ international community suffers from treaty fatigue, and developing countries have reservations¶ about diverting even more resources to implement treaties. Furthermore, an outright ban on¶ dangerous technologies does not always work, because this could hand over a monopoly to rogue¶ actors49 and because countries want make beneficial use of dual-use technologies, including as¶ defensive mechanisms against noncompliant countries.51 Despite these hurdles, forces such as the¶ threat of an imminent global catastrophe from bioengineering or massive public pressure could¶ create the requisite political will for countries to conclude a global treaty on bioengineering or all¶ emerging technologies.¶ C. Precautionary Principle¶ If the international community does decide to create an international treaty on¶ bioengineering or all emerging technologies, they should consider the precautionary principle (or¶ the “precautionary approach”) as a tool to reduce GCR.52 There are many interpretations of the¶ precautionary principle, but the crux of the meaning is that precautionary measures should be taken¶ in the face of scientific uncertainty, or, inversely, that scientific uncertainty should not be an excuse¶ for forgoing precautionary measures. Applied to bioengineering, this could require, for example,¶ that scientists develop dangerous bioengineered pathogens only once they can affirmatively¶ demonstrate that there is a satisfactorily small possibility that the pathogens will escape from the¶ laboratory. Similarly, a treaty could impose moratoriums on certain bioengineering applications,¶ such as the release of bioengineered microbes into the environment, until proponents of these¶ technologies can satisfactorily prove their safety or, at minimum, that they will not cause a global¶ catastrophe.¶ V. CONCLUSION¶ Advances in bioengineering significantly increase humanity’s capacity to affect itself and the world it lives in – for better or for worse. Bioengineering could revolutionize medicine and help¶ slash global greenhouse gas emissions, which would allow humans to live long, healthy lives on a¶ clean planet. Or, it could cause an unprecedented pandemic from a biosafety lapse or bioterrorist attack, which could devastate the global population and have other consequences like societal collapse. This paper develops GCR as a key consideration for dual-use bioengineering. According to¶ a range of consequentialist ethics views, reducing GCR should be the top priority for society today.¶ However, other ethics views do not consider GCR to be a priority. Indeed, some views even suggest increasing GCR. The question of how bioengineering should proceed is fundamentally an ethics¶ question, with the issue of GCR being a major factor.¶ Given the global nature of bioengineering and of GCR, regulating bioengineering should be¶ a global endeavor. Several existing international legal structures can help, including the CBD, the¶ Cartagena Protocol, and the BWC. However, these structures are insufficient to cover the entirety of¶ bioengineering GCR. New international laws could help with this, whether applied solely to¶ bioengineering or all emerging technologies, but creating them could be difficult. In the meantime,¶ other options include soft law and new international organizations, either of which could eventually¶ transition into a new international treaty.¶ Perhaps no formal governance structure could ever offer complete protection from¶ bioengineering-related GCRs. Only the most intrusive surveillance regime could hope to watch over¶ every decision made by every researcher; such a regime would itself pose many ethics issues and¶ could even lead to global catastrophe.53 In the absence of such a regime, it is incumbent that¶ everyone in the bioengineering community – researchers, institutional homes, funders, and others –¶ keep all the implications of bioengineering in mind, making preventing a GCR from bioengineering¶ their top priority. The survival of human civilization could well be at stake.

#### Anti-proliferation just shifts it underground- that’s worse

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At the same time that fewer actual weapons does no harm, and almost certainly is better in terms of safety and third-party effects, these results suggest the value of thinking more about the dangers of proliferation in terms of information, and uncertainty. Efforts to resist proliferation encourage countries bent on acquiring nuclear capabilities to do so secretly. Covert development programs in turn make it more difficult to establish the true nature and timing of a nation's nuclear status. The less that is known about what a country can do, the greater the likelihood that opponents will misperceive, underestimate, and fail to bargain effectively. We may be witnessing in the increase in dispute behavior among new nuclear nations a side-effect of efforts to prevent proliferation. The tradeoff between discouraging acquisition of nuclear capabilities and increasing, temporarily, the tendency to experience militarized disputes may be acceptable, but it is certainly worth considering as a tradeoff. There is no “free lunch” in counter-proliferation. Indeed, attempts to discourage proliferation make the most sense in terms of efforts to limit the ability of opponents to resist the will of the few existing nuclear powers. Nations with nuclear weapons are no more prone to fight than other nations, once their status as nuclear powers, and possibly increased expectations, are recognized and accommodated. As far as the effect of nuclear weapons on dispute behavior is concerned, information is more important than the actual weapons proliferation.

### 1NC- Families Hate the Plan

#### Military families hate the plan

Van Lare 6-5

Michelle Van Lare, 06-05-17, "Opinion," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-heritage-foundation-wants-to-hear-from-military-families-a-military-spouse-weighs-in/2017/06/05/6c3b87d8-4961-11e7-987c-42ab5745db2e\_story.html?utm\_term=.532f64bb2a77

In the June 3 Politics & the Nation article “School choice is pushed for military children,” Lindsey Burke from the Heritage Foundation explained that “it’s really important to hear from military families” about creating a voucher system for the 800,000 military-connected children in public schools. As a military spouse and the mother of two children who attended multiple schools, I reject Ms. Burke’s characterization of specific students “generating” federal tax dollars and her definition of public education as a whole. The schools receiving federal impact aid because they are near military installations are one part of the comprehensive public system of schools our country has built to serve all students. Although we each want the best for our individual children, we are also stewards of a viable public system that prioritizes access to education. And federal tax dollars, such as impact aid, are meant to keep those systems strong, not identify individual students as moneymakers for private institutions. Military families understand the importance of public services that aim to serve the needs of our entire country.

#### Plan is bad for federally impacted schools, and military families hate it

NAFIS 6-5 (The National Association of Federally Impacted Schools, June 5th 2017, “HERITAGE FOUNDATION PROPOSAL WOULD

DECIMATE IMPACT AID”, <http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/423d5a_97599e3f6a0445d39eb45bd90c5619f7.pdf>) CH

The National Association of Federally Impacted Schools (NAFIS) takes issue with a report from The Heritage Foundation published last week that calls for “re‐conceptualizing” the Impact Aid program into an Education Savings Account (ESA). The proposal, focused on military-connected students, would undermine the Impact Aid program, including for students on Indian lands. “Impact Aid works,” said NAFIS Executive Director Hilary Goldmann. “This misguided report would jeopardize the education of millions of students enrolled in federally impacted schools across the country and dismantle a program based on fairness to taxpayers.” Impact Aid funds are flexible and locally controlled, and the program has a proud history of bipartisan support. Impact Aid is a partnership between local communities and the Federal Government where there is significant non‐taxable property, such as military installations, Indian treaty or trust land, lowrent housing facilities, national parks and laboratories. Congress recognized in 1950 that the Federal Government had an obligation to help meet the local responsibility of financing public education in areas impacted by a Federal presence. That same obligation holds true today. Turning Impact Aid into an ESA reneges on the Federal Government’s responsibility to local taxpayers. “The proposals included in the Heritage Foundation report reflect a profound misunderstanding of the function of Impact Aid,” said National Military Family Association Executive Director Joyce Wessel Raezer. “Worse, they set unrealistic expectations among military families, who will be left holding the bag when the promised ESA’s aren’t enough to finance their children’s education. The Heritage Foundation proposals are a bad deal for military families – and a disaster for the local public school districts charged with educating our nation’s military children.” "While the Heritage Foundation is eager to find solutions to increase student performance, they continue to ignore the real, long‐term negative impacts of their policy proposals,” said National Indian Education Association Executive Director Ahniwake Rose. “Impact Aid is critical for schools and districts that cannot be funded by tax dollars. This funding is necessary to ensure schools have the ability to pay teachers, provide books, and keep the lights and heat on in their buildings. Removing Impact Aid from public schools decimates those schools and negatively impacts the students left behind who lack the means and resources to pursue other avenues for success. The only solutions that are effective in tribal schools are ones that are tribe and community led, this proposal is anything but. We must invest in our students, not make it harder for them to get a quality education. The only real solution is to invest in these schools so all students benefit. This report ignores fundamental facts in favor of a political agenda." Public schools that educate military connected children recognize the unique challenges facing these students, such as parental deployment and high mobility. As such, schools work hard to ensure appropriate staffing, programs, and services are in place to support these students. Additionally, the Military Children’s Interstate Compact Commission, adopted by all 50 states and DC, allows schools and families to work together on challenges associated with frequent moves, such as credit transfers and graduation requirements. This benefit only applies within the public school system. NAFIS opposes repurposing Impact Aid and other efforts to undermine the public school system through ESAs, private school vouchers, or portability. ESAs are as much of a concern as voucher programs in terms of their lack of accountability, transparency, and legal protections. Private schools are not required to abide by Federal civil rights and disability laws or comply with the accountability and reporting standards all public schools must meet. NAFIS looks forward to working with our partner organizations, the Administration, and Congress to ensure that public schools have adequate resources to ensure all military‐connected students, and other federally‐connected students, receive a high quality education.

### 1NC- Heritage Foundation Bad

#### Heritage Foundation has been proven to have a vested financial interest in advocating boosting of military readiness

Fang 15 (Lee Fang, 9-15-2015, "Emails Show Close Ties Between Heritage Foundation and Lockheed Martin," Intercept, <https://theintercept.com/2015/09/15/heritage-foundation/>) CH

When the Pentagon decided in 2009 to cut funding for Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor fighter jet — a weapons system with cost overruns in the billions of dollars that has rarely seen combat — the Heritage Foundation fought tooth and nail to restore taxpayer money for the planes. Heritage depicted its support for the F-22 as a matter of vital national security. But what the public didn’t know is that Lockheed Martin, a corporate donor to the conservative think tank, met with Heritage officials on nearly a monthly basis to discuss the F-22 and other defense industry priorities. Internal emails leaked online show at least 15 meetings in 2008 and 2009 between officials at Heritage and Lockheed Martin, including one with Bill Inglee, who at the time served as a senior lobbyist at Lockheed Martin. The emails also suggest that Heritage continued courting Lockheed Martin for donations, listing the company repeatedly in Excel spreadsheets used to collect pledges from past donors. Lockheed Martin gave $40,000 to Heritage in 2008, bringing its total contribution to $341,000, according to those documents. Heritage provides limited information about its donors to the public. But many were revealed in a cache of Heritage fundraising emails and attachments from 2008 and 2009 that somehow ended up getting posted online early last month. The documents detail how the group raises cash and builds relationships with its extensive donor network. Heritage carefully cultivated wealthy donors and corporate benefactors, maintaining extensive call sheets recording contributor demands and interests. The F-22, which is optimized for air-to-air combat, had long been criticized for its hefty price tag and for lacking combat use. The plane was projected to take nine years and $12 billion to develop — at a cost of $149 million per plane. But as the Los Angeles Times reported, it actually took 19 years to produce at a cost of $26.3 billion — with an average cost per plane of $412 million. The jet has also faced numerous safety problems, including two fatal crashes and a faulty oxygen supply system. In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates and then-Air Force Secretary Michael Donley forcefully requested that Congress end production of the F-22, capping the program at 187 planes, a shift designed to save the military $13 billion. Military officials called for F-22 money to be diverted to weapons that could be deployed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon request touched off a fierce, though ultimately fruitless, lobbying battle. Lockheed Martin directed its registered lobbyists to fight back against the cuts in Congress and took out full-page advertisements in D.C. publications. And the Heritage Foundation produced a flurry of reports and media outreach efforts to encourage Congress to overturn the Pentagon’s decision. Emails show that the Heritage Foundation’s fundraising staff worked closely with Mackenzie Eaglen, a researcher at the think tank who authored several reports calling for restoring F-22 funding. According to Heritage’s internal weekly calendar, Eaglen was scheduled to participate in “a Lockheed Martin think tank delegation to visit their fifth-generation fighter production facilities in Fort Worth, TX” in April 2009. “I had a very interesting 20 minute conversation this morning with Mackenzie Eaglen about the F-22 and defense spending in general. She gave me the sad update of defense spending on the hill, which provided good context for me to understand our activities during Protect America month,” wrote Jeffrey Trimbath, the assistant director of major gift planning at Heritage. Trimbath’s notes show that Eaglen said that Heritage had attempted to “convince the Congress to fund an Allied Variant of the F-22 so that the production lines stay open while retaining a critical aerospace industrial base,” but that the combined opposition of Secretary Gates and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., made the request difficult. James Jay Carafano, the vice president of Heritage’s Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, met several times with Lockheed Martin executives, even traveling to Marietta, Georgia, where the F-22 is produced, to participate in a “Lockheed Martin Tour of F-22 Programs.” Some of the meeting documents list their topics, including one titled “Lockheed Martin Briefing on the Saudi Eastern Fleet Modernization Program.” But the documents do not go into detail about what was discussed at the meetings. “We have no comment,” said Katherine Trinidad, Lockheed Martin’s director of worldwide media relations, when asked about the company’s relationship with Heritage. Officials at the Heritage Foundation did not respond to a request for comment. Eaglen, who now serves as a fellow with the American Enterprise Institute covering defense policy, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Heritage furiously opposed any effort to end production of the F-22. “The ability of America’s Air Force to dominate the skies is under attack from a different kind of enemy: a long-standing and widening fighter aircraft gap, which President Obama’s fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget fails to remedy,” claimed one Heritage report that called for restoring funding to the F-22. Another report from Heritage that year asked Congress to purchase 20 additional F-22 planes and to modify the planes for sale to Japan, Australia and “possibly South Korea.” “Obama Just Made Us More Vulnerable… Again,” said a headline from Heritage’s blog, citing the end of F-22 production — one of several posts that year arguing that the Pentagon decision would threaten national security. William Hartung, director of the Arms & Security Project at the Center for International Policy, said the documents provide “damning evidence of how hawkish think tanks do the bidding of powerful weapons contractors while posturing as objective national security analysts.” Trimbath’s fundraising notes mention Heritage’s Protect America Month, an initiative calling for increased defense spending. Fundraising documents show that Northrop Grumman, another major defense contractor, had pledged money to support the initiative. The fundraising documents list other programs at Heritage that got direct corporate support. IBM and Bayer both pledged money for Heritage’s Index of Freedom, an effort to rank the relative “freedom” of countries based solely on economic policy factors. Protection Life Corp, an Alabama-based insurance company, pledged $10,000 for Heritage’s Health Care Initiative. Press accounts suggest Google Inc.’s donations to Heritage began in 2010, but the fundraising documents show that the search engine company contributed money in 2009 as well. Heritage would eventually warn regulators not to press the Mountain View, California-based company on alleged antitrust violations. Corporations frequently donate to think tanks that share their policy agenda. Corinthian Colleges, a chronically underperforming for-profit college that relied on $1.4 billion in yearly loans backed by the federal government, funded Beltway think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute that helped oppose regulations on the company and other failing proprietary colleges. Alpha Natural Resources, a coal mining company, financed think tanks and political operatives working to counter the belief in man-made global warming. Donations from both companies were made public this year only after the firms declared bankruptcy. Defense contractors are no different, and have historically played an outsized role in shaping the national security debate through think tank funding. Lockheed Martin in particular funds an array of other policy institutes and think tanks. The nexus of defense contracting money and think tanks is poorly understood, however, largely because detailed think tank financial disclosures are voluntary. “Heritage and other think tanks that press for higher Pentagon budgets should come clean and give the full details of their contributions from weapons contractors,” said Hartung. “Otherwise their positions on what weapons to buy and what defense postures to adopt should be taken with a large grain of salt.”

### 1NC- AT: Taiwan

#### China won’t attack Taiwan, they know they lose

Grady 16(John Grady, John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army, 2-10-2016, "Atlantic Council Panel: China Likely Doesn’t Have the Ability to Invade Taiwan, Yet," USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2016/02/10/atlantic-council-panel-china-likely-doesnt-have-the-ability-to-invade-taiwan-yet>) CH

When viewed from the Chinese mainland, a hundred miles of water is a long way away and remains a big obstacle if Beijing intends to take military action anytime soon against Taiwan following the island’s election of a new president and a legislature controlled by pro-independence parties, an international security expert said Tuesday. Speaking Tuesday at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Thomas L. McNaugher, a professor at Georgetown University, said, an amphibious assault would be “an extremely dicey operation” for a military still dominated by its army and having no recent experience in that kind of warfare. “Right now, they’re capable of moving about two divisions at a time” over water, he said in answer to a question. “But they’re working on” overcoming those shortfalls. Roger Cliff, a fellow of the council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, said despite China’s 600 percent increase in real-term defense spending over the past 20 years “important weaknesses remain” in technology, logistics, training and organization. An example he used was maintaining equipment in the field. It “has to be sent back to the factory for maintenance and repair,” making sustained operations difficult. Cliff also cited shortfalls in underway replenishment and aerial refueling. While China has changed its military doctrine from “positional warfare” since 1995—when it launched missiles to intimidate Taiwan—to one based on surprise, deception and indirection used by the United States in Desert Storm, it still retains a centralized structure that does not “encourage risk-taking or creativity,” but “loyalty and obedience.” In response 20 years ago to China’s attempt to cow the island, which was holding its first presidential election, the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into those waters and were not detected by the Chinese. Taiwan is not a treaty partner with the United States. After recognizing the People’s Republic of China, the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which, in part, allows United States arms sales to the island. In a cross-straits conflict, however, Cliff said that China’s numerical superiority could “make up for organizational shortcomings.” “The question is still out there” for Beijing in whether to try to recover Taiwan, said Tiffany Ma, the center’s director of political and security affairs. One factor that could cause Chinese to move against Taiwan is that they “no longer see time is on their side” and/or “inattention” on the part of the United States. Inattention “is really the poison here.” Taiwan’s incoming administration, led by Tsai Ing-wen, has not ratcheted up the rhetoric with the mainland but intends to continue its defense buildup, she said. McNaugher added, based upon what is happening in Hong Kong since it reverted to Chinese control, “the Taiwanese do not want to go back to China.” Taiwan’s economy is booming. In fact, China’s “more assertive stance” in territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas may lead to more regional support for Taiwan, Ma said. McNaugher said that Taiwan needs to keep at improving its defenses and the United States should look at its basing strategy in the Pacific to include hardening air bases in Japan. Cliff said Taiwanese defense investments should look to better protecting itself against air and maritime blockade or invasion. In addition to corvettes, modern submarines and mines, Taiwan “needs more platforms, more modern platforms,” such as F-16s, and mobile air-defense systems. Taiwan earlier announced plans to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Those plans included spending $4 billion for eight diesel-powered submarines, but contracts have not yet been announced. If there were a blockade, Beijing needs to realize “two can play that game,” McNaugher said, referring to the American Navy’s strong presence in the Pacific. If there were an invasion, Ma said the Chinese “should not underestimate a people’s will to fight.”