# Hauntology K

## Notes

### Definitions

#### What is Hauntology?

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

Hauntology is used in this essay as both metaphor and pedagogical methodology for deconstructing the orthodoxies of academic history thinking and learning. As metaphor, hauntology evokes the figure of the ghost to trouble the hegemonic status of representational modes of knowledge in remembrance practices and to undermine their ontological frames and ideological histories. As pedagogical methodology, hauntology reframes histories of loss and absence and uses them as points of departure to acknowledge the complexities and contradictions that emerge from haunting. In other words, I invoke what Sande Cohen has coined as ‘‘historiospectography’’ — to describe Derrida’s advocacy of the unlimited ‘‘being-with specters’’ — and highlight the openings for renewed pedagogical engagements with notions of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in history education.

#### What are specters/ghosts?

Davis 5 – Royal Holloway, University of London (Colin, “Hauntology, spectres and phantoms,” <https://doi.org/10.1093/fs/kni143>, 7/1/05)//DD

“Spectrality does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its density and solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us.”

### General Explanations

The general thesis of the Futurism 1NC is that their linear understanding of history does not understand how past events continue to effect or “haunt” us today. The aff’s focus on creating a future of competitiveness, where the students are trained for the future is bad because it falls victim to this linear understanding of history. This results in poor ethics which are used to justified to create environmental destruction. The alternative is “teaching by the event” which is a deconstructive process where teachers would allow students to embrace the spectral nature of the world and criticize commonly held “truths” such as democracy.

The general idea of the Nuclearism 1NC is very similar to the Futurism 1NC. The main difference is that the link is more specific to nuclear war. The alternative is a deconstruction of history and education similar to the event alternative but focus more on interrogation than teacher/student interactions.

Email me at [dheemantrd@gmail.com](mailto:dheemantrd@gmail.com) for any questions or suggestions. Good Luck!

# Neg

## 1NC

### 1NC – Futurism

#### The education system is haunted by specters – the aff’s futurist reform precludes other possibilities and cements environmental destruction.

Kenway 8 – Professorial Fellow with the Australian Research Council, a Professor in the Education Faculty at Monash University and an elected Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, Australia (Jane, “The Ghosts of the School Curriculum: Past, Present and Future,” *The Australian Educational Researcher*, Volume 35, Number 2, August 2008)//DD

The Ghost of Christmas Yet To Be shows Scrooge his own lonely death. It does not show him what he desires to see. Scrooge wants reassurance that the decision he makes to change the present course of his life will change his future. Such reassurance cannot be given to him. The Scrooge state is obsessed with the future; with “future proofing”. Numerous curriculum policy and education system documents make proclamations about the ways the future will be and how schools must prepare students for it. As if living in the now is not enough. Such curriculum futurology is often focused, instrumentally, on the world of work and on the new sorts of worker that the global knowledge economy will require. Individualised workers are called upon to be more autonomous, self− monitoring, reflexive, enterprising and cross-cultural in order to make themselves employable. The recent OECD report on “The Definition and Selection of Key Competencies Project” (2005) is an example of such curriculum futurology. It has identified three key areas for personal, social and economic well being in the 21st century. These are: “interacting in socially heterogeneous groups; acting autonomously; and using tools interactively”. Further, the OECD has been the inspiration behind much “scenario building” and “futures thinking”. But what are the blind spots of Futures thinking? Why does it choose certain “trends” on which to build its “scenarios”?. Which trends does it leave out and why? More generally what blind spots does the Ghost of Curriculum Future alert us to? Scrooge’s experience suggests that there can be no guarantees, no certainties about the future. Further, Derrida’s notion of hauntology suggests that the narrow and linear view of history implied in much futures oriented thinking and curricula is problematic. Ghosts suggest that the present does not necessarily imply the future, just as the past is not necessarily replicated in the present. Futures curricula and futures thinking are guesswork based on the selection of certain trends and the diminishment of others; simply, they conjure up a future that may not happen, a future workplace that may not exist and a future worker that may not be called into being. They suggest certainty when only uncertainty is possible. I noted earlier, the “being there” of the spectre is highly ambiguous. The ghost is both present and absent; it is in the present but also in the past and the future. This casts into doubt what we think we know. The Ghost of Curriculum Future suggest that “futures curricula” are possibly only the “now” dressed up as the “yet to be”, today dressed up as tomorrow. Although the ghost of the future indicates that the future can only ever be uncertain, this does not absolve us from taking some responsibility for it, for as Lucy points out “we are prone to forgetfulness and need ghosts to remind us of our responsibility” (2004, p. 114). The question of course is how do we take responsibility; with regard to what, on what grounds and in whose interests? The Ghost of Curriculum Future invites curriculum policy to take responsibility for an ethical, not just an instrumental view of the future. Indeed, I suggest that the only grounds for taking responsibility for the future can be ethical. I offer two examples, work and climate. With regard to the world of work; ghosts of curriculum future ask: should the curriculum simply seek to instrumentally bring into being the “new” knowledge worker for the “new” global work order? Or does it have some responsibility to ask questions about the values and politics that are manifest or implied in this anticipated world of work – for instance industrial relations, casualisation, job insecurity, time poverty, work-life balance and more broadly, the end of the social contract between workers and employers? It is interesting in this context to note the role played by French school students in the recent industrial conflict in France. They took part in mass mobilisation to defeat the government’s new workplace law the CPE (First Employment Contract) which unfairly discriminated against them in employment. Taking ethical responsibility for the future means caring for nature, for the climate, for the weather and making this a top priority. This means acknowledging the severe and well documented high consequence risks for nature and humanity caused by consumption and excess, growth and greed and wanton waste in the over-developed nations of the world. It means the active pursuit of a more equitable relationship between economics and ecology. It even points to the importance of teaching students about what Singer (1993) calls the “paradox of hedonism”; the lack of connection between economic growth, happiness and well-being – including the well-being of all species. But, can an accountant’s and a cartographer’s view of the curriculum respond to such a ghostly call for responsibility and ethics? Is the moral philosophy of the Scrooge state sufficiently rich and robust? And is the Scrooge state too self interested to ask the curriculum to deal with genuine global, not just national or sub national problems?

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of teaching by the event – only a hauntological model of education can give possibility to the future.

Caputo 12 – Professor of Religion Emeritus at Syracuse University and the David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University (John D., “Teaching the Event: Deconstruction, Hauntology, and the Scene of Pedagogy,” Philosophy of Education, 2012, pgs. 25-28)//DD

It is the “event” that produces this spectral effect. Ghosts are neither entirely present, which is why we do not believe in them, nor entirely absent, which is why we do. So the ghost is a kind of “pres/absence,” there but then again not there, the source of a general disturbance in the present. So if we think of education on a hauntological model, as visibly present yet also visibly disturbed, it is because, on the premise of a hauntology, it is haunted by the event. The event is the ghost in the machine (computers, overhead projectors, buildings, offices, contracts, etc.), a machine for producing events, if that were possible. The spectral effect of the school is to leave students disturbed and provoked, believing in ghosts they never believed possible, never imagined were real. By the time we are done with them, they will never be the same. Their lives will be destabilized; they will have lost their equilibrium. They will see ghosts everywhere. Everywhere questions, suspicions, longings, doubts, dreams, wonders, puzzles where peace once reigned. Nothing will be simple anymore. They will never have any rest. We have come to bring the hauntological sword, not the peace of presence. So it is of central importance to clarify what I mean by the event and its spectral qualities. To be sure, in saying all this, I am not recommending we produce a pathological result. I mean to invoke the spookiness of the event as a way to disturb the settled tranquility of thinking we have nothing new to learn. The spirits that visit young children, who are still in the process of gaining a sense of self-confidence and security, should be cheery sprites. We mean to fill their heads with possibilities, not with fears in the night. By the time we see them in college, we expect students secure enough to question anything, knowing full well that it is the insecure who are afraid to question. Let us begin by saying that the event, like any ghost worthy of the name, is not what visibly happens but what is going on invisibly in what visibly happens.3 It is not what is palpably present, but a restlessness with the present, an uneasiness within the present. Something disturbs the present but we do not know what it is — that is the event. Something is “coming” (venire) to get us but we do not know what. What is that if not a ghost? The event is not what we desire but something haunting our desire.4 The event is not what we desire but what is being desired in what we desire, some deeper disturbance of our desire. When we desire this or that, we have the uneasy feeling that something else is getting itself desired in that desire, like a desire beyond desire. In this sense we can never say what we desire. We do not know what we desire. Still, this is not some fault or limitation in us, a failure on our part to know what we are doing. It is the very structure of the event, of temporality, of the openness of the future, of the ghost of the future. As you cannot see a ghost, the event is structurally unforeseeable, the coming of what we cannot see coming, not because we are shortsighted but because of spectral structure of the future, of temporality of the event. There is of course a future that we can see coming and provide for, the future of our children or our retirement, which Derrida calls the “future-present.” But the event concerns the “absolute” future, the future for which we cannot plan, a future beyond the future, that visits us like a thief in the night, that haunts us in the night. Faced with what we cannot “see coming” (voir venir) we do no more than to try to discern its indiscernible demands, as if we were Jacob wrestling through the night with an angel. Vis-à-vis an “absolute” future we are asked to take a risk, to say “Come — and let’s see what comes” (voir venir).5 Over and beyond our completely reasonable expectation of what is possible, over and beyond the sane, visible economies of the world, the event arrives like the possibility of the impossible, of the unforeseeable, of some invisible spirit in which we did not previously believe. The coming of the event is the coming of the impossible.6 When we are visited by the event it seems as if the impossible has just happened, as if the impossible were possible after all. Is this magic, a miracle? Is this place haunted? The present is made an unstable, uneasy place, shaken and disturbed by invisible forces, and this is because it contains something with which it cannot come to grips, something uncontainable. That is the event, which is contained in what happens but cannot be contained by what happens. The present contains what it cannot contain. The event is like a ghost whispering in our ear, making promises, like the visitation by some spirit that pretends to know the future. The event is not what happens but what is being promised in and by what happens, enticing us to live on promises. By the same token, if what is being promised belongs to an absolute and unforeseeable future, then this promise comes without guarantees and nothing protects the promise from the threat of the worst. Not every angel is good; not every spirit can be trusted. Every promise is a risk. But who or what is “making” this promise? If I knew that, Derrida says, I would know everything. He means he would be able to identify the ghost, make it entirely visible and present. The event is not something I do, or something we do, not anything that is being done by someone or something. Do not separate the doer from the deed, Friedrich Nietzsche says. There is no agent of the event, no active agency that brings it about, which means that the event is carried out in the middle voice. In virtue of some mysterious spectral operation, something is getting itself desired in and through and beyond our concrete and particular desires; something is getting itself promised in the particular promises that are all around us. If we could say who or what is making this promise, then the promise would not be the event, and it would not be a risk, for we would know someone real and substantive stands behind the promise, something backs it up. We would have driven out all the specters, exorcized one ghost too many. When Derrida says “give,” abruptly shifting from the aporia of the gift into the performative order, we ask, who is speaking here? Who calls for giving? Who has the authority to make such a call? This call, which is not a command or a direct order, has a certain force, but it is perforce a spectral force, a weak and unforced force, with no army to enforce it. It does not have the force of law but only the weakness of a plea for justice.7 Is this the voice of some spirit that somehow and invisibly manages to make itself felt? If we could identify the source, the call would cease to be a call. It would have the force of God or nature, of some super-presence instead of a spectral semi-presence, which we would be compelled to obey under penalty of disobeying God or defying nature. In order to protect the weak, fragile, and uncoercive character of the call, the origin of the call, s’il y en a, must be spooky, spectral, and indeterminate. “Es spükt,” it spooks, something spooks, something spooky is going on.8 All that we can say is that this call is made in the “middle voice,” without being able to identify an active agent calling. Something is getting itself said and called in a word like “gift” — and how many other words are there like that, words of an elementary but weak force? Some unknown spirit, something, je ne sais quoi, comes over us and asks something of us, asks for our faith, asks us to pledge our troth, without pretending to be a law of God or nature. Or perhaps precisely by “pretending” to be God or nature, but even so something is happening in this pretense. Like any ghost, holy or not, the event does not exist; it insists. The event is not an agent, nor an existing visible thing, neither a who nor a what to be thanked or blamed. It is not some identifiable person or object, not “God” or “Being” or “History,” not the “People” or the “Party” or the “Spirit,” not the “unconscious” or “economics” or the “will-to-power.” The event insists in and within what exists, prying open what exists in the name of something unnamable, unforeseeable, a promise/risk beyond our imagining. The event (événement) in the broadest possible sense is the specter of the future (avenir), meaning what is to-come (à venir).9 The event is the to-come itself, if there were such a thing, which there is not, since the event is not a visible palpable thing, not what happens, but what is going on invisibly in what happens. Deconstruction is situated at the point of exposure of the present to the to-come, precisely when the present feels the pressure of the “to come,” which is an infinite or infinitival pressure. The present is thereby pushed to its breaking point, where what happens bursts open under the pressure of what is coming. This burst, this deconstruction, this autodeconstruction is not destruction. To deconstruct is to unsettle and de-sediment, to disturb and haunt, but it is not to smash to smithereens. Quite the opposite, it restores to things the future from which they were blocked by the present. The event insinuates itself into and unsettles what seems settled, insists within what exists. But the force of the “to-come” is a “weak force,” like a spirit speaking in the middle voice. There is no identifiable agent behind it, no Big Other, as Slavoj Žižek would say. It has no police, no army to back it up. One of Derrida’s favorite examples of an event, which is not simply an example, but something close to its heart, is “democracy,” a spectral shape which never is what it is, is never what is present.10 At any given moment, no existing democracy can respond to what we call for when we call (for) “democracy,” even as we never adequately respond to what democracy calls for. Democracy is always and structurally coming, always to-come. Democracy is the event that is being promised in the word democracy, what insists in this word, what calls to us before we call for it, what addresses us, haunts us day and night. “Democracy” is a call, not a state of affairs, an infinitival weak imperative, not a sturdy noun or stable nominative. TEACHING THE EVENT How can we bring about the event? The very attempt to bring about the event would prevent the event. It breaks in upon us unforeseen, uninvited. Still, there is a certain conjuring of the event, a certain dark art of requesting an apparition. It is possible, Derrida says, to be inventive about the eventive, playing on the old sense of both the Latin “inventio” and the French “invention,” both to invent and to discover or come upon. We must be inventive in order to allow its in-coming (invenire). 11 That means getting over a fear of ghosts, being willing to live with strange noises in the night, being hospitable to spooks. It means conjuring the spirits that keep the system open to the event, that keep the system in play, embracing the spooky effects of a quasi-transcendental disequilibrium, living in an elusive state of instability, in a word, a magnificent word coined by James Joyce, “chaosmic,” meaning a state that is neither chaos nor cosmos. Either pure order or pure disorder would prevent the event. When Derrida calls this “deconstruction,” he invites the misunderstanding of radical chaos, implying that he is out to raze institutions instead of merely meaning to spook them. He is not recommending pure anarchy or a libertarian anti-institutionalism; he has in mind a positive idea of institutions as a scene of the event. Deconstruction is all about institutions — schools, hospitals, political bodies, courts, museums — and how to keep them in creative disequilibrium without tipping over, how to spook their complacency with the promise/risk of the future. What is truly destructive is the opposite of the event, which is the absolute exorcism of the event by the “program,” absolute foreseeability, deducibility, rulegoverned activity. When the “program” is in place, what happens is a function of the laws of the system, of a rigorous logic, not of the aphoristic, metaphoristic, grammatological energy of the event. The only possible program is to program the unprogrammable, the unforeseeable. Otherwise the ghost or spirit of the event will have fled the premises. All the aporias surrounding justice and democracy, education and the gift, are problems of the event. All the problems of teaching, of what Gert Biesta calls “subjectification,”12 are aporias of the event, of becoming a subject of the event, of responding to the call of the event — ever since Socrates tried to figure out a way to make students (the patients) the agent of their own instruction, to figure out how students could come to see for themselves, to be struck by the event, instead of simply being stung by Socrates; ever since Søren Kierkegaard tried to get existing individuals to assume responsibility for themselves, without being responsible to Kierkegaard. The teacher must somehow allow the event to happen without standing between the student and the event, without attempting to manipulate the event. The teacher must figure out how to be a weak force, how the middle voice works, how to be an agent without agency, a provocateur who is not an agent, how to engage the spooky dynamics of a haunting spirit. What is the spectral effect that takes place in teaching? According to the hauntological principle, we should say the event in education is not what happens but what is going on in what happens. What happens is teaching, the schools, but something is going on in what happens, something desired with a desire beyond desire, something unforeseeable, something impossible, uncontainable, something coming in and as an absolute future. When this or that is taught, that is what is happening, but the event is what is going in what happens, which we cannot get our hands on, cannot master or manipulate, cannot make happen, but only conjure up. The event is a matter of “indirect” communication, Kierkegaard would say; the teacher is only a midwife of the event, Socrates would say. Teaching does not directly handle the event. It deals directly with the various disciplines, the fields of study, more or less standard-form, academic operations. But all along, running quietly in the background, is the event. Teaching takes place under the impulse of the event, letting the event be in the teaching, letting it into the teaching, letting the event by which the teacher is touched touch the student, so that both the teacher and the student are touched by a common event. But the event belongs to an absolute future that no one sees coming, over which neither teacher nor student has disposal, what neither one knows or foresees or commands, where we do our best in an impossible situation to see what is possible, to “see what comes.” It is the invisible, unidentifiable, undetectable operations of the event that have assembled teacher and student together, placed them in the same room, both in the service of the event, me voici, in the accusative, in response to the event, in answer to the fetching call of some unknown spirit. Contrary to the received opinion, there are no masters in the school. The teacher then is variously the effect of the event, the caretaker of the event, its souffleur, its conjurer, but not its master. The student comes under the spell of the event, is spooked by its uncanny operations, is unaware that some spectral force is afoot in these halls. The school must be the space in which the event is possible, the scene in which every possible scenario of the event, of all the events, imaginable and unimaginable, might take place. To define teaching by the event is to situate the teacher at the point where the present is spooked by the future, trembles with the specter of the to-come. Teaching occupies the cracks and crevices in the present where the present is broken open by some coming spirit. The students are the future, the future we do not see, either because we never see them again, or because they are the future generations which outlive us, so that whatever gifts we have given are given to a future in which we will never be present, an absolutely spectral future in which we will be but shades. But if education is what happens, what is the event that is going on? If it is a spook, does the spook have a name? Which spook do I have in mind? Education is one of the openings of the event, one of its thresholds, one of the places the event take place. But what is the event of education (if there is one)? There is of course no one event, no event of all events, for that would lead to terror. Events disseminate, spread rhizomatically, by contamination, intimation, indirection, association, suggestion, by chance. Otherwise we would reinstate the old theology of sovereignty, the old top down onto-theological order, the metaphysics of the program, of mastery, of which the omnipotence of the good old God would be the paradigm — the old order of the king, of the father, of the master, to which the “school-master” belongs. Were we to allow a theology into this scene, it would not turn on the sovereignty of God but on the chance for grace, for the event of grace, for the grace of the event, for which the classroom attempts to provide the scene. Still, what is the distinctive call or address that takes place in the school, the spirit that haunts the halls of the school? To think the event that takes place in the schools — which is, I am proposing, to undertake what this association calls the “philosophy of education” — is to ask what is promising, what is being promised in the middle voice by the “school,” where the school joins the list of words of elementary promise, words that tremble with the quiet power of the promise, the quiet power of the possible. What is getting itself promised in “education,” the “university,” the “school?” What spirit is calling to us in what we call a “school,” a “university,” a “teacher,” a “professor?” Whoever enters the spectral space of the school is answering a call, responding to some spirit calling us together here in common cause. What calls? What does it call for? Who is being called upon? To what future does it call us forth? If I were throw all caution to the winds, to attempt in an act of sheer folly to condense the event of which the school provides the scene, to name this spook, I would say the school is the place where, in an effort to let the event happen, we reserve the right to ask any question. The school is mobilized by a spirit calling — give, ask, question, open up, risk — to put anything and everything in question, even and especially very sacrosanct things like “God” or “democracy,” or what we mean by “reason,”13 “knowledge,” “truth,” which are among our most intimidating, risky, and promising words. It may well be the case, for example, that what is being promised in the word “democracy” will come at the cost of the word democracy, which may finally prove itself to be an obstacle, a way to prevent the event. For after all, if the “democracy to come” is unforeseeable, how do we know it will still be a “democracy?” When he was once asked this very question, Derrida responded that, in the expression “the democracy to come,” the “to-come” is more important than the “democracy.”14 So then the school will be the place that puts democracy into question, in the very name of what democracy promises. The school is the assembly of those who answer the imperative or the call of the school — dare to ask, to question, to think, dare to know, dare to teach and dare to learn, dare to put what we think we know at risk, dare the event to happen. The right to ask any question does not mean that any question is a good question; this right includes the right put the question in question, to sort out good questions from bad. What I am saying at this point is conjuring up the old and venerable spirit that inspired the Enlightenment, sapere aude, dare to know, but I am saying it in the spirit of a new enlightenment, which is enlightened about any (capitalized) Enlightenment, which understands that there are many lights and that enlightenments come in many versions. This new enlightenment is not afraid of the dark; indeed it begins with the recognition that the absolute future is in the dark. This new enlightenment is not afraid of the ghosts that the old Enlightenment tried to exorcise. It understands that there are other things than light, that the event is not only a matter of light. So in saying “the right to ask any question” I am not proposing a one-sidedly cognitive ideal, emphasizing the light of the idea. The event is not only cognitive light and not primarily something cognitive. I have said the event is something that I desire with a desire beyond desire, so that the event has an erotic force; and I have said that it calls and solicits me, so that it has a “vocational” force, provoking me, evoking my response, transforming my life. The general effect of specters is to inspire, for better or for worse. The teacher has to play the delicate role of conjurer, of indirectly calling up an elusive spirit, of letting the event be, and that is because to learn is to be struck by the event. To teach is to teach by way of the event, to let the event touch the student. Teaching is haunting, subtly intimating that there are spectral forces afoot. That involves conceding the common exposure of the teacher and the student to the event, that there are unknown specters all around, and that we share a common situation of non-knowing and mortality and open-endedness. To teach is to ask a question to which one truly does not know the answer, because no one knows, and to make the answers we all think we know questionable. To teach is to expose our common exposure to the specter of the secret. To learn is to unlearn what we think we know and to expose ourselves to the unknowable. Teaching and learning alike are a matter of allowing ourselves to be spooked. The aporia of the school is to have administrators who do not produce administered institutions and to conduct “programs” that do not program the school, that do not bind and coerce the event. That means the program must be in-ventive, which means that it let something break in, so that in the end no one, neither the planners nor the implementers of the program, can know exactly where it will lead. It means no one is afraid of the risk. The program is not meant to program. It must be inventive in the double sense: as carefully planned as possible, but also designed to inject the system with chance, to allow entry to the aleatory spirits and the spooks that haunt the system, to “see what comes,” so that the “program” is “designed” to deal with a future that we cannot design. The school is a place of uncanny and unnerving instability, preserving a space of openness, a readiness for the future, pushing forward into an unknown future. All its ideas and ideals are all spooks, both shadowy specters of the past and faint images of an unforeseeable future. In the school, things are placed and displaced, posed and deposed, venerated but also innovated, respected but also subjected to the infinite, infinitival pressure of the tocome. Whatever has been constructed is deconstructible, and whatever is deconstructible is deconstructible in the name of what is not deconstructible, and what is not deconstructible is a spook, a specter, neither present nor absent, a promise, still to come, the to-come itself, the absolute future — of the school, of the teacher, of the student, of us all, of the earth. All of the aphoristic and even anarchic energies of deconstruction, all its impishness and seeming impudence, which seem mistakenly to some as sheer relativism, are like angels tending to the arrival of some unknown event while displacing the forces that would prevent the event. This does not pit deconstruction against systems, institutions, orders, in short, against economies of one kind or another, which are after all the only thing that exists. But we are here today because we are not satisfied with what exists and because we are haunted by what insists. Deconstruction is a style of displacement, a way of haunting these systems by inhabiting them from within, keeping all the inhabitants slightly off balance, in a state of optimal unease and disquiet, which lets events happen. The event is what allows invention, inventiveness, and reinventability, effecting a well-tempered dis/ order. The event is the resistance offered to a closed system, to a program, meaning everything run by rules so that nothing is unruly and there are no surprises. The love of order in the end is too powerful, too overwhelming, and it must be resisted by the order of love.

### 1NC – Nuclearism

#### The 1AC is haunted by the specter of nuclear war – their images of nuclear destruction create the fantasy of total nuclear destruction, that leads to the capitalization of nuclear weapons and commodification of disaster.

Schwab 14 – PhD, a psychoanalyst, and Chancellor’s Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California at Irvine (Gabriele, “Haunting from the Future Psychic,” *The Undecidable Unconscious: A Journal of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis*, Volume 1, 2014, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/572072)//DD

The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? Dreaming of it, desiring it? —Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now” I have chosen Derrida’s provocative invocation of what I will call the “nuclear unconscious” as a stepping-stone toward a larger exploration of the legacies of the Manhattan Project and its impact on the formation of subjectivity. The nuclear age, and especially nuclear disasters like those of Chernobyl and Fukushima, continue to mark the cultural imaginary profoundly and nourish the fantasies and phantasms that structure subjectivity more generally. I will argue that “nuclear subjectivities” and the “nuclear unconscious” also challenge psychoanalysis to reconceptualize its notion of the subject and his or her environment. “Just as the unsuspected reality of the subatomic world contributed to changing science’s conception of itself, so the reality of environmental processes must lead psychoanalysis to change its own conception of itself as both scientific and therapeutic” (2000, 136), writes Alan Bass in his analysis of Hans Loewald’s “Psychoanalysis in Search of Nature.” Insisting that a psychoanalytic theory of unconscious processes needs to be grounded in a theory of nature, Loewald states: “Nature is no longer simply an object of observation and domination by a human conscious mind, a subject, but an all-embracing activity of which man, and the human mind in its unconscious and sometimes conscious aspects, is one element or configuration” (Bass 2000, 137). If Freud demonstrated that conscious mind is unable to perceive psychic reality directly, nuclear subjectivities compel us to extend this insight to material reality. The materiality of radioactivity is literally invisible, yet those affected by it, and especially those who are dying from it, experience it as a deadly material agency. In this respect, nuclear subjectivities assume an almost allegorical function in relation to the trans-individual subject-formation in today’s precarious ecologies. The material world, including nature as well as techno-scientific objects, can no longer be seen as an outside to this subject-formation. Rather, the boundaries between the subject and the material and immaterial forces that he or she encounters are continually renegotiated in processes of dynamic exchange. These processes also challenge conventional notions of objectivity in psychoanalysis. Seen from the perspective of Loewald’s theory and its elaboration by Bass, conventional assertions of objectivity appear as a defensive attempt to control the dynamic exchange between inner and outer nature by rendering it static (Bass 2000, 138). In this respect, the traditional objective sciences belong to the genealogy of the (Western) colonizing project of dominating and domesticating nature. According to Bass, the mind’s substitution of static objects for differentiating processes in order to create perceptual certainty is a form of fetishism. By contrast, Bass sees psychoanalysis offering a “powerful theory of the intersection of mind and nature.” As he points out, this ecology favors natura naturans (nature as active process) over natura naturata (nature as the assembly of created objective entities). In other words, a psychoanalytically informed ecological theory—in the larger sense of Gregory Bateson’s “ecology of mind”—belongs into the genealogy of postmodern fluid onto-epistemologies. Matter—or more specifically, material objects, including textual or artistic materialities—is endowed with an impersonal agency that becomes as formative of the ego and the unconscious as the fantasies and phantasms that emerge from the subject’s encounter with them. We know about nature and reality, argues Loewald, by “being open to their workings in us and the rest of nature as unconscious life” (Bass 2000, 140). According to Loewald, the traditional subject-object opposition as well as the rigid opposition of psychic and material reality belong to a pre-psychoanalytic conception of mind (2000, 140). The origin of individual psychic life is a trans-individual field that includes not only others but also “nature as unconscious life” more generally.1 Freud’s theory of “nature as unconscious life” rests heavily on his agonistic model of Eros and Thanatos. Nuclear subjectivities compel us to rethink the psychoanalytic theory of life and death in the context of today’s nuclear necropolitics.2 To the best of my knowledge, it was Jacques Derrida who first addressed the issue of a “nuclear unconscious.” In his rarely discussed early essay “No Apocalypse, Not Now” (published in 1984 in the special issue of Diacritics on nuclear criticism), he speaks about the possible future occurrence of nuclear war, asking the pointed question I used in my epigraph: “Who can swear that our unconscious in not expecting this? Dreaming of it? Desiring it?” (1984, 23). When I first read the essay, I stumbled over the almost shocking “Desiring it?” Could we truly harbor an unconscious desire for nuclear war? And wouldn’t such a desire be the ultimate manifestation of the death drive? Derrida emphasized that at this point in history the vision of a “remainderless destruction,” that is, a total nuclear war that would destroy our species, if not all life on Earth, cannot be anything but a fantasy, a phantasm. I am interested in exploring what role the nuclear imaginary plays in the formation of subjectivities and subjections after World War II and the inauguration of the so-called nuclear age with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “No single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today,” says Derrida, “by the cold war arms race”—Derrida calls it a “speed race”—“and by the nuclear imaginary that engenders it and is engendered by it” (1984, 20). Thirty years after Derrida made this strong assertion, we still live with the legacy of the Manhattan Project and the fantasies and phantasms of nuclear destruction. While the overt Cold War and the debates about the nuclear arms race have ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we now live in the shadow of the fallout of the so-called benign use of nuclear power and the nuclear disasters of Chernobyl and Fukushima. In what follows, I will revisit Derrida’s “No Apocalypse, Not Now” in order to raise a sequence of questions regarding the impact of the transgenerational legacies of the Manhattan Project and the ensuing nuclear necropolitics. The nuclear age is now marked by global nuclear power industries, the irresolvable problems and dangers of storing the obsolete weapons arsenal as well as the nuclear waste from power plants, and the specter of the production of nuclear arms by so-called rogue states or terrorist organizations. Thirty years ago, Derrida reminded us that the (phantasm of) the nuclear war triggers not only the “senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry” but also “the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, Bildung, schole, paideia” (1984, 23). Not much has changed in this respect, only that, except in the immediate aftermath of nuclear disasters, the discourses of nuclear war or nuclear catastrophes have largely moved underground. Have we managed, as Derrida feared, to domesticate the terror of the death machine? I want to return to these submerged legacies of the nuclear imaginary via the detour of testimonies by those for whom the nuclear threat has become a reality, namely, the survivors of Chernobyl. More specifically, I explore the fact that even those who have gone through the real horrors of nuclear destruction cannot escape the nuclear phantasms Derrida places at the center of his analysis. Looking at such phantasms, I will trace the impact of the nuclear imaginary on the formation of postnuclear subjectivities. The phantasms that aggregate around the nuclear imaginary range from apocalyptic to idyllic scenarios. The power of an apocalyptic imaginary is related to a haunting from the future that comes from the global destruction of sustainable ecologies. At the same time, however, it is necessary to disentangle the apocalyptic imaginary from notions of a haunting from the future. “No Apocalypse, Not Now” was written at the height of the nuclear arms race. Derrida insists that the massive stockpiling and capitalization of nuclear weaponry and the (apocalyptic) fantasies of a nuclear war are not two separate things. Calling the nuclear war “an event whose advent remains an invention” (1984, 24), Derrida invokes a haunting from the future that requires one to rethink the relationship between knowing and acting. Imagining nuclear war seems to become a precondition for (collective) actions that may be able to avert it. Yet the imagination of a remainderless destruction depends upon the performative and persuasive power of texts, discourse, and figurations. “The worldwide organization of the human socius today hangs by the thread of nuclear rhetoric. . . . The anticipation of nuclear war . . . installs humanity . . . in its rhetorical condition,” Derrida writes. He concludes that the imagined remainderless destruction would foreclose any cultural or symbolic “work of mourning, with memory, compensation, internalization, idealization, displacement, and so on” (28). Because of its apocalyptic undertones, however, nuclear rhetoric is immensely commodifiable. The uncanny attraction to the nuclear imaginary, including fantasies about a remainderless destruction, has generated its own rhetorical and figurative history. Thirty years after the catastrophic accident, Chernobyl, for example, has been commodified and exploited for astounding disaster tourism. Francesco Cataluccio (2012) calls his chapter on Chernobyl “The Disneyland of Radioactivity.” More than fifteen thousand people visit Chernobyl and Prypjat every year; the areas have become the site of films and novels whose apocalyptic imaginary draws on a “nuclear sublime” (see Masco 2006). The latter is marked by a fundamental ambivalence: on the one hand, there are the terrors and dread of life in a contaminated zone and the illnesses, deaths, and psychic toxicity that come with it; on the other hand, we find people with a pervasive sense of recasting the disaster zone as an idyll of freedom, a zone outside the law that generates a new conviviality with other species and a flourishing of new life philosophies. Cataluccio speaks of a “postnuclear optimism” expressed in assertions that around Chernobyl plant life seems to thrive, the fields are planted again, and people have moved back to the contaminated areas (see Cataluccio 2012, 132). This commodification of a nuclear aesthetic of ruins bears upon Derrida’s insistence on the “fabulously textual” nature of the problem of nuclear power and the question of how we are to get speech to circulate in the face of the nuclear issue. “Nuclear weaponry depends,” he writes, “more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding” (1984, 23). We may ask then how literary or artistic works or even oral histories and “ethnographies of the future” (Strathern 1992) relate to apocalyptic phantasms on the one hand and the foreclosed mourning of a remainderless destruction on the other. Derrida links the two through the “paradox of the referent” (1984, 28): Like nuclear war, literature is “constituted by the same structure of historical fictionality, producing and then harboring its own referent” (27). This is why, Derrida argues, literature and literary criticism must be obsessed by the nuclear issue, albeit not in a naively referential sense. “If, according to a structuring hypothesis, a fantasy or a phantasm, nuclear war is equivalent to the total destruction of the archive, if not of the human habitat, it becomes the absolute referent, the horizon and the condition of all the others” (28). While, according to Derrida, the symbolic work of culture and memory, their work of mourning, limit and soften the reality of individual death, the “only referent that is absolutely real is thus of the scope or dimension of an absolute nuclear catastrophe that would irreversibly destroy the entire archive and all symbolic capacity” (28). In the absence of but under the compulsion to imagine this catastrophe, literature then cannot but produce “concord fictions” (Kermode 1966), that is, fictions that convey the sense of such an ending in ever-new modes of indirection by inventing, as Derrida says, “strategies of speaking of other things, for putting off the encounter with the wholly other” (1984, 28). Because of this paradox of referentiality, Derrida believes, “the nuclear epoch is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in texts by Mallarme, of Kafka, or Joyce, for example, than in the present-daynovels that would offer direct and realistic descriptions of a ‘real’ nuclear catastrophe” (27).

#### Their images of nuclear conflict cement *unnoticed conventional war*, *panoptic surveillance*, and *drone strikes* as a way to prove American military superiority.

Taylor 3 – Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado – Boulder (Bryan “"Our Bruised Arms Hung Up as Monuments": Nuclear Iconography in Post-Cold War Culture” *Critical Studies in Media Communication*,<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0739318032000067065>, 2003)//DD

This final aesthetic involves the nuclear significance of iconography surrounding post-Cold War interventions by U.S. military forces. The events considered here include the 1990– 1991 Persian Gulf War between U.S.-led U.N. Coalition and Iraqi forces, and the 1999 Operation Allied Force conducted by NATO against Serbian forces in the former Yugoslavia. This discussion traces connections between images of these conflicts and a current debate concerning the viability of nuclear weapons for post-Cold War military strategy (and thus foreign policy). To contextualize this debate, it is necessary to recall that conventional and nuclear weapons have uneasily coexisted since the latter’s introduction on August 6, 1945. Indeed, the term “conventional” emerged only during the Cold War to signify the absence of nuclear weapons in a military conflict. The use of nuclear weapons against Japan climaxed and transformed the massive conventional conflict of World War II. Measured against the cumulative effects of “total war” in that conflict (such as incendiary bombing), some commentators have argued that the first nuclear weapons were not inherently more destructive (and thus not illegitimate). They were, nevertheless, more efficient at producing equivalent levels of destruction, unique in producing lethal radiation effects, and thus more threatening. Because, additionally, nuclear weapons could be delivered by bombers that would “always get through,” U.S. citizens quickly grasped that effective defense was impossible. Throughout the Cold War, as a result, actual and potential conflicts involving the superpowers have been haunted by the prospect of nuclear war. While the Bomb effectively deterred a direct conflict between the superpowers, it did not prevent their participation or their use of surrogate clients in conventional wars. In these conflicts, despite veiled threats by officials, nuclear weapons proved to be militarily useless, and a source of paradox. Their actual use, officials conceded, would be internationally condemned as disproportionate (and perhaps racist) and could trigger nuclear retaliation by opponents. Each time proposals were raised for “limited” nuclear war characterized by precision, incremental escalation, containment, and civil defense, they were rejected in deference to more likely (and frightening) prospects. These included spastic escalation and the impossibility of distinguishing – either in actual operations or in the scope of their created effects – between military and civilian targets (Freedman, 1981). This realization worked to stabilize the Cold War in a grudging acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability, and therefore deterrence. These premises of Cold War military strategy are currently in flux. One contributing force is technological innovation: the increasing power and precision of U.S. conventional weapons appears to challenge the need for a U.S. nuclear arsenal. Opposing this force, however, is the promotion by hawkish interests of low-yield nuclear weapons for missions such as penetrating and destroying hardened, buried targets. As discussed earlier, a recent U.S. government Nuclear Posture Review has reflected these changes by incorporating a mixture of elements. On the one hand, it proposes to reduce the size of the deployed strategic arsenal and incorporate remaining nuclear forces in a “new triad” along with nonnuclear, ballistic missile defense and other conventional forces. While this move potentially segregates and subordinates nuclear weapons, the Review also sustains the development of nuclear earth-penetrators. This proposal has generated opposition from several quarters, including: arms controllers, because it signals elimination of the traditional nuclear firebreak; health officials and scientists, because even low-yield weapons detonated underground generate significant fallout; and pacifists, because such forces encourage U.S. military intervention abroad and the escalation of weapons production among remaining and aspiring nuclear weapons states (Khatchadourian, 2002). In this way, the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons is undergoing significant rearticulation in post-Cold War culture. I am concerned here with the role played by images of military conflict in shaping public understanding of the evolving dialectic of nuclear and conventional weapons. By examining these images, we can understand how iconography alternately exorcises and reanimates the specter of nuclear weapons. Critics have extensively examined the iconography of these conflicts (see Best & Kellner, 2001, pp. 57–99). Generally, they agree that these events constitute a spectacular and unprecedented conflation of war-event and media-story. In its operations, virtual warfare has been conducted and represented in real-time. Its images – including those from missiles in flight carried on cable news networks – appear simultaneously on the screens of military “producers” and of their various “targeted” audiences (e.g., U.S. citizens, allies, and enemies). This fusion of “battle” and “programming” does not, of course, eliminate the materiality of destruction. It represents, however, a significant transformation in the rhetoric of war. This change has resulted from the growing overlap between military and entertainment interests in the ownership, design, and deployment of various media technologies. Increasingly, these technologies converge as a multi-functional apparatus devoted to surveillance, attack, and entertainment (Der Derian, 2001). Implicitly, these critiques establish several areas of continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War iconography, including: • Political and economic constraints exerted by the military-industrial (and now, entertainment) complex on media coverage of military conflicts; • Viewer and operator experience of disembodiment; • Panoptical surveillance; • Disorienting modes of hyper-reality and simulation; • Patriotic-populist orthodoxy; and • Relentless devastation caused by cyborg warriors using remotecontrolled, “smart” munitions. In media coverage, critics note, these elements have combined to produce images emphasizing brave and technically superior U.S. forces, surgical and relatively bloodless conflict, and the illegitimacy and irrelevance of antiwar activism.

#### The alternative is to embrace the specter – only a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete can prevent the obstruction of possibility.

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

One way of addressing the past and its representations is through the concept of the specter. In Specters of Marx, a book that initiates the perceived ‘‘ethical turn’’ in his work, Derrida argued that any rethinking of the past and any possibility of a just future depends on whether we can ‘‘learn to live with ghosts’’ (SM, xviii), the specters of the past, particularly the ghosts of victims of atrocities. The spectral is what haunts and returns in a society because the ghosts have unfinished business, something that needs to be corrected. However, the resolution of this unfinished business is not to abolish the specters — for example, through (uncritical) spectacle pedagogies — because, as Derrida warned, this would amount to eliminating the possibility of a different future.32 In addressing the issue of spectrality, Derrida introduced the term hauntology — a near homophone of ‘‘ontology’’ in French — to interrogate and replace the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost. Unlike ontology, which is fixed to the present and to what is representable (the traditional Western ontological and epistemological position), hauntology draws attention to specters that are neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.33 Hauntology, then, occupies a peculiar ‘‘in-between’’ space that ‘‘reclaims the unspoken and neglected.’’34 For Derrida, specters are both ‘‘revenants’’ and ‘‘arrivants’’ (SM, xix), that is, spirits that come back and spirits that are to come, respectively; both of these temporal dimensions, as Ross Benjamin and Heesok Chang observe, are essential to spectrality.35 ‘‘Spectrality,’’ Fredric Jameson explains in his reaction to Derrida’s book, does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its destiny and solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us.36 Spectrality denotes what is no longer or not yet living, which is not something present or absent, but something that is possibly everywhere, ‘‘bear[ing] traces of a lingering past and hover[ing] in suspense of an unforeseeable future.’’37 Being neither fully present nor fully absent, ghosts do not have an ontological status, but rather exceed all ontological oppositions between presence and absence, visible and invisible, living and dead.38 The concept of the spectral, then, has much to do with the concept of ‘‘trace’’ and thus time is always already spectral;39 in this sense, hauntology abolishes the concept of linear time as an ontological category of historical understanding. A society that has experienced disappearances — such as Argentina or Cyprus, for example — must come to terms with the specters of the disappeared, the traces left by them in the stories and images that are circulated, the societal habits of remembering and forgetting that are no longer noticed, and the public or private rituals that still take place to recognize the victims. The disappeared are ghosts whose stories and images reach from memory and absence; this is to say that ‘‘disappearance’’ as such — as a particular form of relationality between individuals within a society — reaches from a place and time that was and is no longer and records, recalls, and reinscribes remembrance in the aporetic of memory.40 A commonsense yet ideological response to the ghosts of the disappeared, as noted earlier, is a desire to remember and simultaneously a wish to ontologize the ghosts of the disappeared by categorizing them within what is representable — an action that aims at abolishing or reducing them to spectacles. Derrida argued, however, that a society can come to terms with specters without abolishing or reducing them to a spectacle, that is, to a kind of ontology. As he explained in a paragraph that concerns schools and educators in particular, The last one to whom a specter can appear, address itself, or pay attention is a spectator as such. At the theater or at school. The reasons for this are essential. As theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, and intellectuals, scholars believe that looking is sufficient. Therefore, they are not always in the most competent position to do what is necessary: speak to the specter. (SM, 11) To come to terms with the specters of the past, there needs to be an engagement with the past that is not reduced to its totalizing representation and that does not fall into the delusion of a timeless understanding that is ever present. Derrida called on us to speak and listen to the specter not because the specter will reveal some kind of a secret; rather, speaking with and listening to the specter may open us to the experience of unknowing that underlies a productive engagement and a turning away from that which is supposedly determined content to be uncovered by representational practices.41 The ghost of the disappeared, then, pushes at the boundaries of language, thought, and emotion to open new possibilities for the future, possibilities that do not reduce the ghost’s ethical injunction to an object of knowledge.42 The specter signifies, therefore, a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete; the specter reminds us that the past is incomplete because there are always elusive remnants that cannot be articulated in the languages available to us. This is why it is suggested, for example, that commemorative or justice projects that rely too heavily on epistemological accounts or seek merely redemption become too totalizing to be open to the view that specters can be anything other than obscure forms of representation. Finally, it is important to point out how Derrida linked the specter to the theme of justice and advocated a politics of memory and responsibility that is directed not only to the living, but also to the dead and to the not yet born: No justice ... seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. (SM, xix) Derrida chose, as noted earlier, to speak about ghosts in the name of justice because, he observed, ‘‘one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is just’ and even less ‘I am just,’ without immediately betraying justice.’’43 Since justice entails ‘‘an experience of the impossible’’ and thus is aporetic — because it is implicated with law, although it cannot be reduced to it44 — spectrality becomes valuable in determining how to address justice demands. It is in this spectral sense that justice is the ‘‘experience of absolute alterity,’’45 an openness toward a radical otherness, to ‘‘the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice’’ (SM, 28). The specter’s ethical injunction is that we remain open to the radical otherness of the arrivant as arrivant, what remains to come — for example, a ‘‘democracy to come,’’ ‘‘hospitality without reserve,’’ and ‘‘alterity that cannot be anticipated’’ (SM, 65–66). As Derrida pointed out, ‘‘without this experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on both justice and the event’’ (SM, 65) — that is, the event to come. The responsibility of the haunted is this, then: to be open to justice as unrepresentable, as always to come, as a trace of directionality rather than as a fixed destination.46 Hence justice for disappeared victims, for example, is not a calculable and distributive justice that ends with trials and punishments but an agonistic justice that contests legalistic settlements. In this sense, justice is a critical force that helps to articulate an alternative vision that is motivated by the infinite obligation to the other — in this case, the ghost of a disappeared victim who cannot be assessed by a finite set of qualities, representations, or legal arguments.

## Links

### Link – Generic Education

#### Specters are haunting the education system now – the aff’s fact-laden policy reform seeks to regulate people and prevent alternate forms of knowledge.

Kenway 8 – Professorial Fellow with the Australian Research Council, a Professor in the Education Faculty at Monash University and an elected Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, Australia (Jane, “The Ghosts of the School Curriculum: Past, Present and Future,” *The Australian Educational Researcher*, Volume 35, Number 2, August 2008)//DD

\*Note: the phrase “the ghosts of curriculum past” is an allusion to the ghost of Christmas past in Charles Dickens’ “A Christmas Carol” \*

The curriculum as graph and grid seeks to regulate people, knowledge and power. But it is haunted by the ghosts of curriculum past where school populations controlled themselves to a much greater extent. These particular curriculum ghosts arose in association with more decentralised approaches to knowledge, freedom and individuality. They arose in more generous and generative times. The Ghosts of Curriculum Past for the Scrooge state include, for example, school-based curriculum development, the negotiated curriculum, student-centred curriculum, democratic curriculum. And what of teachers? Currently, teacher education institutions are often expected by governments to train student teachers in compliance – student teachers are to be taught curriculum cartography and accountancy and of course this results in teachers thinking through maps and numbers and thus practicing parched pedagogy. In essence they become thin-thinking paraprofessionals. But the teachers who haunt curriculum accountants and cartographers are, for example, teacher researchers, teachers as critically reflexive practitioners or inquirers, indeed, teachers as relatively autonomous professionals who can be trusted to educate young people and who don’t need to be constantly measured and managed. Once, they were educated to become responsible professionals with expertise, judgement and creative capacity. Their employers respected their capacities. Once, they were educated to be practical intellectuals. Such Ghosts of Curriculum Past rattle the foundations of current curriculum policy. They cause unease in curriculum policy circles. They not only challenge state fantasies of control and compliant populations but also point to the undecidability of curriculum as it is practiced in schools. The logic of practice is that knowledge is not readily mapped, steered or measured from above. On the ground, in schools, curriculum is not straightforwardly about cause and effect, actions and consequences. Indeed, less regulated knowledges arise from below, through the intimacies of the immediate, the day-by-day. As Yates explains in her Inaugural Professorial Lecture at Melbourne University, curriculum theory: asks us to think about what is being set up to be taught and learned, what is actually being taught, what is actually being learned, why agendas are taken up or not taken up, who benefits and loses, whose voice is heard and whose is silenced… Curriculum is concerned with effectiveness, but also with expansiveness and voices, and who gets a say. (Yate, 2005, p. 3) The Ghosts of Curriculum Past do not allow curriculum accountants and cartographers to forget the leaky logics of practice and all that they imply. They point to the policy problems that arise through an obsession with counting and cartography. This obsession minimises the importance of what cannot be counted or mapped as David Boyle (2001) makes clear in his provocative book “The Tyranny of Numbers: Why Counting Can’t Make us Happy”.

#### Education is haunted by specters that echo in our relations between the public and private sphere.

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Thinking of education as a social practice that straddles the public and private sphere, and that, as Madeleine Grumet (1988) has expressed so eloquently, “mediates [the] passage between the specificity of intimate relations and the generalities of the public world” (p. 14), the ethical task is to find ways to assist students in navigating this passage well, attentive to the effects of their actions both in intimate relations and the public world. As students continuously move back and forth between private and public worlds, so do the ghosts; specters of past public worlds do not remain confined to the public world but echo in our intimate relations, and, similarly, the ghosts of intimate relations haunt the public world. “The memories we elude catch up to us, overtake us like a shadow. A truth appears suddenly in the middle of a thought, a hair on a lens” (Michaels, 1996, p. 213). Like a hair on a lens, the apparition of a ghost troubles our vision; it is too close to us to be seen sharply, but too close also to be ignored. Rather than brushing it away as an irritant, educational contexts are places where such spectral “hairs on a lens” can and should be examined: Whose is it? How did it come loose? When did it land on this lens? When, in biology, students learn about basic genetics, this is not only a matter of studying the eye colour of fruit flies, but also about attending to the specters of eugenics. When, in mathematics, students learn to measure and calculate, the specters of phrenology, craniometry, and statistics as political arithmetic haunt their studies. When, in physics, students learn the difference between mass and weight and the mechanics of a scale, the ghosts of weigh houses, where the fates of many women accused of witchcraft were sealed, circle the curriculum. When education is conceived as séance, such knowledge is not studied as something safely ensconced in the past, allowing for a sense of moral progress and superiority in the present. On the contrary, the knowledge is spectral precisely because it continues to haunt the present: eugenics rears its head again because new technologies allow for the abortion of fetuses with certain diseases or disabilities; the use of phrenology by the Belgian colonizers of Rwanda has a direct link with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and continued tensions between Hutus and Tutsis today; cultural assumptions about proper and improper weight and other statistical descriptions that have been turned into prescriptions are forcefully present today.

#### The ghosts are among us now – education is haunted by its relationship to the past – only by embracing the destabilizing effects of the ghosts can we change the system.

Kochhar-Lindgren 9 – Associate Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate Learning and Professor of Interdisciplinary Arts & Sciences at the University of Washington, Bothell (Gray, “The Haunting of the University Phantomenology and the House of Learning,” *Pedagogy: Critical Approaches to Teaching Literature, Language, Composition, and Culture*, Volume 9, Number 1, DOI: 10.1215/15314200-2008-014, 2009)//DD

The specters are among us, haunting the classrooms, the media centers, the laboratories, and the bright fluorescent corridors of the university. Since human beings have always lived on that shimmering borderland between the living and the dead, there have always been ghost stories, but these ancient fables are now, in our emerging telematic culture, taking on a new form marked by a discourse of phantoms, spectrality, haunting, and the uncanny. “The University is, increasingly, a ghostly institution,” Nicholas Royle (2003: 54) has claimed, “haunted not only by questions concerning the nature of teaching, but also by a sense of its relationship to itself and to its own past.” This is a very strange situation, as if a host of phantoms have come to trouble the Platonic dream and take up residence in the very heart of the project of rationality and its pedagogies. As the twenty-first-century university begins to shape itself, as if it were almost autotelic, its multiple pasts return as an experience of being haunted, but the presence of ghosts also opens up the future and its concomitant question of ethics: how shall we respond? As some of us within the university — mostly from out of the genealogies of psychoanalysis, literature, and deconstruction — attempt to “think the uncanny” along the lines of phantomenology, what experience will emerge for the academetron, that learning machine in which we all participate and that produces through the operations of reason so much useful and quantifiable knowledge? If there is anything to this being haunted within the university — and it may simply be the sleight of hand of a wild host of charlatans — it will show itself not only in the density of a philosophical discourse dispersed throughout a variety of departments, but also in our everyday habits of teaching, learning, reading, and writing. Indeed, one of the effects of haunting will be to destabilize the traditional modern site of teaching, the classroom, and its place in the so-called system of the university. Where do you, for example, teach? How would you, in detail, describe that space and its histories? How far does our teaching travel and at what speeds?

### Link – Economic Productivity

#### The aff’s focus on preparation for an economically productive life leads to the confrontation with the specters.

Ruitenberg 9 – Associate Professor, Philosophy of Education, in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia (Claudia, “Education as Séance: Specters, Spirits, and the Expansion of Memory,” Interchange, Vol. 40/3, DOI: 10.1007/s10780-009-9097-0, 2009)//DD

Curriculum, not only history curriculum but curriculum in many subject areas, offers opportunities for learning about the inherited knowledge to which our lives and actions and learning today are, always already, in response, and about the specters that haunt this inherited knowledge. This approach is at odds – or, as Derrida (1993/1994), following Hamlet, might say: “out of joint” (p. 21) – with the modernist orientation to progress which remains dominant in Western education today (e.g., Usher & Edwards, 1994). Education is widely assumed to be a form of preparation for an autonomous life, and preferably one that makes a measurable economic contribution. The presumed autonomy of the (adult) individual, however, has convincingly been called into question not only by Jacques Derrida but also by Emmanuel Levinas (with whose work Derrida’s ethics is closely entwined), and by Judith Butler. Conceiving of oneself as autonomous, independent of others, they contend, is a form of hubris that fails to take into account the fundamental dependence of each human being on the other; this other may be understood as the Other whose ethical demand calls me into subjectivity (Levinas), the other to whose discourse I am subjected to emerge as subject (Butler), or the other who bestows upon me an inheritance that I can never properly receive but to which I must respond (Derrida). Although the three conceptions of otherness are closely entwined, it is the notion of inheritance that I will pursue in more detail here. Derrida (1993/1994) writes, “One never inherits without coming to terms with [s’expliquer avec] some specter, and therefore with more than one specter” (p. 24). If one refuses or neglects to come to terms with, therefore, an inheritance has been bestowed but one cannot, properly speaking, be said to have inherited. I could not be said to have inherited the history of Hugo Grotius, no matter how familiar I was with the physical structure of Slot Loevestein, until I had come to terms with the multiple (religious, colonialist) specters of the history of the escape in the book chest. To understand what it is I have inherited simply by being born in The Netherlands, of parents, grandparents, and greatgrandparents who were all born in the Netherlands, I must come to terms with the specters of this ethnic identity, the traces left by the dead in the language I use, the ideas I call mine, the habits I no longer notice, the objects I recognize. And this ethical imperative “I must” becomes stronger even when I consider my Dutch identity as a home from which I venture out into the world to interact with others, and when I consider Derrida’s ethic of hospitality.

### Link – Environmental Apocalypticism

#### Their environmental apocalypticism is haunted by the specters of environmental destruction which allows elites to take over and mobilize solutions to sustain neoliberal capitalism.

Swyngedouw 13 – Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester (Erik, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2012.759252>, 2013)//DD

Despite significant differences, both catastrophic narratives share an uncanny similarity, particularly if viewed from the place of enunciation. While the ecological Armageddon points at a universal, potentially species-wide destruction, the economic catastrophe is a particular one related solely to the threatened reproduction of, basically, capitalist relations. Yet, the discursive mobilization of catastrophe follows broadly similar lines. Imaginaries of a dystopian future are nurtured, not in the least by various political and economic elites, to invoke the specter of the inevitable if NOTHING is done so that SOMETHING WILL be done. Their performative gesture is, of course, to turn the revealed (ecological or political-economic) ENDGAME into a manageable CRISIS. While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention by those entitled or assigned to do so. The notion of crisis also promises the possibility to contain the crisis such that the dystopian revelation is postponed or deflected. Thus, the embrace of catastrophic language serves primarily to turn nightmare into crisis management, to assure that the situation is serious but not catastrophic. Unless you are from the cynical Left\*‘‘don’t panic now, we told you that crisis would come’’\* or from the doomsday preachers who revel in the perverse pleasures offered by the announcement of the end\*the nurturing of fear, which is invariably followed by a set of techno-managerial fixes, serves precisely to de-politicize. Nurturing fear also serves to leave the action to those who promise salvation, to insist that the Big Other does exist, and to follow the leader who admits that the situation is grave, but insists that homeland security (ecological, economic, or otherwise) is in good hands (Swyngedouw 2010a). We can safely continue shopping! What we are witnessing is a strange reversal whereby the specter of economic and/or ecological catastrophe is mobilized primarily by the elites from the global North. Neither Prince Charles nor Al Gore can be accused of revolutionary zeal. For them, the ecological condition is\*correctly of course\*understood as potentially threatening to civilization as we know it. At the same time, their image of a dystopian future functions as a fantasy that sustains a practice of adjusting things today such that civilization as we know it (neoliberal capitalism) can continue for a bit longer, spurred on by the conviction that radical change can be achieved without changing radically the contours of capitalist eco-development. The imaginary of crisis and potential collapse produces an ecology of fear, danger, and uncertainty while reassuring ‘‘the people’’ (or, rather, the population) that the techno-scientific and socio-economic elites have the necessary tool-kit to readjust the machine such that things can stay basically as they are. What is of course radically disavowed in their pronouncements is the fact that many people in many places of the world already live in the socio-ecological catastrophe. The ecological Armageddon is already a reality. While the elites nurture an apocalyptic dystopia that can nonetheless be avoided (for them), the majority of the world already lives ‘‘within the collapse of civilization’’ (The Invisible Committee 2009). The Apocalypse is indeed a combined and uneven one, both in time and across space (see Calder Williams 2011). A flood of literature on the relationship between apocalyptic imaginaries, popular culture, and politics has excavated the uses and abuses of revelatory visions (Skrimshire 2010; Calder Williams 2011). Despite the important differences between the transcendental biblical use of the apocalypse and the thoroughly material and socio-physical ecological catastrophes-to-come, the latter, too, depoliticize matters. As Alain Badiou contends: [T]he rise of the ‘‘rights of Nature’’ is a contemporary form of the opium for the people. It is an only slightly camouflaged religion: the millenarian terror, concern for everything save the properly political destiny of peoples, new instruments for control of everyday life, the obsession with hygiene, the fear of death and catastrophes...It is a gigantic operation in the depoliticization of subjects. (Badiou 2008, 139) Environmental problems are indeed commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘‘ecologies of fear.’’ Much of the discursive matrix through which the presentation of the environmental condition we are in is quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the specter of ecological annihilation, or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. The nurturing of fear, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginations that serve to reinforce the seriousness of the situation (Katz 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water or at least with endemic water shortages; ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo-pluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of nuclear wastelands; the threat of peak-oil; the devastations raked by wildfires, tsunamis, spreading diseases like SARS, Avian Flu, Ebola, or HIV\*all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening, and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, recombining DNA, deforesting the earth, etc . . . In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured by millennialism fears sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger\*one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted.

### Link – Ethics

#### The affirmative’s notion of ethics is based on *linguistically structured truth claims* that reifies hegemonic violence.

Forte 7 – Ph.D. in Japanese Buddhism, ethics, and continental philosophy from Temple University, Philadelphia (Victor, “The Ethics of Attainment The meaning of the ethical in Dogen and Derrida,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD

Faced with the great breath of Derrida's written work, we shall attempt to focus on the ethical implications of his philosophy and evaluate important essays on this subject, including "The violence of metaphysics," an essay from the collection entitled Writing and Difference, and from essays included in the collection entitled The Gift of Death. We begin by briefly considering the ethical dimensions of his linguistic theory. Like Martin Heidegger and Friedrick Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida focused his philosophical efforts on uncovering the incongruence and inconsistencies of the Western philosophical canon. But unlike his predecessors, 12 he argues that the crux of these problems could be found in the assumption of decidability in linguistically structured truth claims. The finality of meaning suggested in philosophical assertions of truth invariably rests upon assumptions of presence, where an identifiable and singular truth somehow arises out of philosophical writings for all to witness. Truth claims are dependent, however, on a simultaneous marginalization or forgetfulness of other contradictory meanings that are nevertheless in relation with the preferred meaning. The marginalized supplements the preferred so that the supposed presence is, in actuality, left with traces of meaning that destabilize its centrality.' i Derrida's project is to bring out into the light, the other of language, which has been left in the shadows of the logocentric schemas of presence. In this sense, he shares with Levinas the concern for ethical possibility, in that he provides us with the opportunity for ~~hearing~~ [understanding] an otherwise ~~muted voice~~ [inexplicable concept] This possibility arises out of the "undecidability" of language in its differing/deferring functionality (differance), because it allows for a space to open up within assertions of truth. The meaning of any truth claim is therefore never closed off or terminated in a hegemonic fashion, but always remains open for the other to emerge.

#### We are winning the uniqueness debate – ethics are already corrupted – the alt is the only way to solve.

Magliola 7 – Ph.D., Princeton University; retired Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies from the (Interfaith) Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion at Abac Assumption University of Thailand; retired Distinguished Chair Professor at the Graduate School of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University (Robert, “Hongzhou Chan Buddhism, and Derrida Late and Early,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD

In my more radical reading of Derrida's intention here (and John Caputo and others share my view), because ethics is always already contaminated, any and every concrete case must entail some perversion, that is, the hurting of someone (or some people) unjustly. Caputo tends to identify the third party less with a third singularity and more exclusively with the "other others" or assembly of other singularities, thus—in my opinion—enabling the offender to excuse ~~himself/herself~~ [themselves] too easily,3 but no doubt Caputo's reading, like mine, takes injustice to the third party as inevitable, horrendous and inevitable: Isaac thus occupies the place of all others, of the ethical community, of the oikos and Sittlichkeit, of the bonds I have to everyone else whose needs I do not address when I respond to the singular other who claims me in this instant, every instant, day in and day out. If I help to feed and clothe this other, the one who is before me now, I abandon all the other others to their nakedness and starvation. If I attend to my children, I sacrifice the children of other parents. If I feed my cat, do I not sacrifice all the other cats in the world who die in hunger?4 (Caputo, 1997b, 204)

### Link – Fighting Against Evil

#### Their conception of fighting evil replicates the logic of war hawks – they use as positive image of the state as a way to justify “fighting evil” which turns the case and makes war inevitable.

Roy 7 – Besl Family Professor of Religion and Ethics at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. (David L., “Lacking Ethics,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD

How does the interdependence of good and evil, in particular, bedevil us? The problem is not only that we don't know what is good until we know what is evil; more troublesome is that we can't feel we are good unless we are fighting against that evil. We can rest comfortably and securely in our own goodness only by attacking and destroying the evil outside us. St. George needs that dragon in order to be St. George; his heroic identity requires it.1 Sad to say, this also points to one of the main attractions of war: it offers a collective version of the same projection. War cuts through the petty problems of daily life, by uniting us good guys here against the bad guys there. The meaning of our lives becomes simpler and clearer, once the source of our problems is understood to be outside us, over there. Unsurprisingly, then, there is something in us, or some part of us, that tends to love this struggle between good (us) and evil (them), because it is, in its own fashion, an easy, satisfying way of making sense of the world and reassuring ourselves of our role (the good guys) within it. For example, many Americans today are so deeply invested in such a positive image of the United States that no amount of contrary information—e.g., learning about the history of US foreign policy—can persuade them otherwise. What archi-ethical is revealed by such a Buddhist deconstruction of the ethical? To anticipate, ethical dualism for Buddhism is related to, indeed grounded in, the more fundamental dualism of self and other. To deconstruct subject-object non-duality exposes the non-dual ground of the archi-ethical: if "I" am not separate from others, the traditional ethical problem of how we should relate to each other is transformed. This is the context for understanding Buddhist emphasis on love—kangia, compassion; maitri, friendliness; mudita, sympathetic joy, etc.—which might be called the non-dual "archi-emotion" that manifests the wisdom of self/other non-duality. As Augustine put it: love, and do as you will. Hatred [vera] never ends through hatred. By non-hate [avera] alone does it end. This is an ancient truth. (Dhammapada, verse 5) Ethical guidelines are necessary mainly because we feel separate from others and need to reconcile our different interests. Understanding how that sense of separation is a delusion uncovers a different foundation for our relationships. We do not ask: why should I take care of my foot? This is not to deny alterity. Non-duality is not sameness but non-separation. Of course, my foot is not the same as my hand, or my head, but they are interdependent. Likewise, our interconnectedness does not make you the same as me, but inasmuch as the sense of self is a psychological construct that develops as part of our socialization, we are constructed and continue to be reconstructed by each other. The Buddhist doctrine of karma was revolutionary because its emphasis on cetand (motivation, volition) extended this insight ethically: if it is self-defeating to seek my own benefit at the price of yours, the ethical problem of how to relate to each other becomes transposed into a different issue, the delusive sense of self. Whether or not ethics is always contaminated by the non-ethical, Buddhist ethics originates in our dukkha. Does that mean the end of dukkha is also the end of ethics? If concern to overcome sense of self is at the root of our most troublesome dukkha, how is that delusion to be deconstructed?

### Link – Foreign Languages

#### Diversity through language is key to *mobilize spectrality* – the aff attempts to integrate societies which only reifies neoliberal violence through globalization.

Lai 5 – Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature and the Director of the Foreign Language Center at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan with a Ph.D. in Critical Theory from the University of Nottingham, U.K (Chung-Hsiung, “Transgressive Flows: Theorizing a Hauntology of Anti-Globalization,” *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, 31.1 (January 2005)//DD

Another noticeable feature of the force of anti-globalization is that its specters speak in divergent languages. The protesters have different visions, ends and means for their anti-globalization movement. This accounts for the diversity and mobility of the haunting specters. The anti-globalization alliance has drawn together environmentalists, leftists, organized laborers, farmers, feminists, animal-rights supporters, third-world sympathizers, pacifists, local culture supporters, anarchists, the Black Bloc members, etc. Its diversity seems to weaken its political solidarity. One of the most-heard criticisms of anti-globalization activism is that it lacks coherent objectives, the views of different protesters being sometimes even contradictory. Moreover, there is no single organizing power behind the huge alliance of anti-globalization.7 Realizing the difficulties confronting many anti-globalizers, I nonetheless would point out that the lack of coherent goals and means could actually create the very strength of an antiglobalization movement, for it guarantees the diversity and mobility of spectrality, rendering the specters not so easily exorcised. To a certain extent, the incoherence of the anti-globalization movement manifests the uncontainable power of what Julia Kristeva calls the semiotic. In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva transforms Lacanís distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic orders into a distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic, the two phases of the signifying process in/of language. The symbolic is the logical, coherent syntax and rationality of the adult, while the semiotic, linked to the pre-Oedipal primary processes, is the endless flow of subversive impulses that undermine the symbolic order. Kristeva writes: We shall call symbolic the logical and syntactic function of language and everything which, in translinguistic practices, is assimilable to the system of language proper. The term semiotic, on the other hand, will be used to mean: [...] the return of these facilitations in the form of rhythms, intonations and lexical, syntactic and rhetorical transformation. (68) In terms of literary language and cultural praxis, Kristeva believes that this “feminine” poetic language brings the subversive openness of the semiotic into society’s closed symbolic order. Likewise, due to the incoherent diversity and “feminine” mobility of spectrality, anti-globalization can never be fully pinned down as a sign, either signifier or signified. With its constitutive diversity and undecidability, the force of anti-globalization provides a source, a kind of semiotic reservoir, for the symbolic process of globalization.

### Link – Foreigners

#### Foreigners are constructed as specters in the state who never have place but are always waiting at the margins.

Watson 13 – Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work at Texas Tech University (Matthew, “Derrida, Stengers, Latour, and Subalternist Cosmopolitics,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol 31(1), DOI: 10.1177/0263276413495283, 2013)//DD

Through the language of hospitality, Derrida takes the act of inviting an outsider to enter one’s home as the model for democratic practice (see also Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000). Derrida’s effort to grapple with the problem of hospitality is well-trod intellectual terrain (e.g. Barnett, 2005; Candea and da Col, 2012; Westmoreland, 2008). But exploring Derrida’s cosmopolitics requires us to dwell momentarily on the ontological status of this subject afforded the promise of hospitality. Derrida receives the subject of hospitality categorically as l’etranger, the stranger or the foreigner. L’etranger is not an absolute alterity, but rather a subject with the potential to become recognizable and visible to law and society: [A foreigner] is not only the man or woman who keeps abroad, on the outside of society, the family, the city. It is not the other, the completely other who is relegated to an absolute outside, savage, barbaric, precultural, and prejuridical, outside and prior to the family, the community, the city, the nation or the State. The relationship to the foreigner is regulated by law, by the becoming-law of justice. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 73) Derrida emphasizes that the foreigner is produced as such by the law and that one’s relation to a foreigner is not a breach between radically disparate sites of internality and externality. Since legal boundary practices produce the foreigner-as-such, the foreigner is preconstituted as a potential juridical and legal subject, and as a specter inhabiting the margins of the state. This necessary, legally constituted externality effaces the possibility of absolute justice and unconditional hospitality. It indexes the irresolvable contradiction of the state, how the state constantly reinstates itself through estrangement and autoimmunization (cf. Esposito, 2008, 2011).

### Link – Generosity/Gift-Giving

#### Their politics of generosity is an aporia that relies on the “economy of gift” which merely reifies a cycle of debt between them and the other and prevents action.

Berger 7 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Douglass L., “Deconstruction, Aporia, and Justice in Nagarjuna’s Empty Ethics,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge,2007)//DD

The to be ethics, responsibility or justice reveal themselves on a number of interrelated levels, those for instance of friendship, of goodness and on the political level, but always in the context of whether problems of what we normally conceive or not there is really anything ethically intelligible about the assumption of so-called "equality." With regard to friendship, for example, while it is talked of as loyalty and devotion to the "other" as friend, its quality is often judged on the basis of the quality of the partner's reciprocity and usefulness to oneself, which establishes "equity" among friends. But Derrida questions what the real ethical value of such an "equity" could possibly be if it demands that the virtue of the other be a precondition for my own commitment as a friend.8 The "give and take" of relationships, according to the "logic" or "economy of the gift" (cadeau), also demands, according to any existing "conscience" or "science of ethics," whether it be conceived under the name of virtue, deontological or utilitarian ethics, a systematic rule or condition of virtue that we both give with generosity and receive with gratitude, so that our relationships are perpetuated and stabilized through feeding on the cycle of care of others and indebtedness to others. However, Derrida warns, this introduces a crucial problem into the whole phenomenon of gift-giving, beneficience, generosity, because when a gift serves as a mere "bill of exchange," as it were, an investment in the economy of relational reciprocity, it ceases to be a gift as such, a gift in the most genuine sense of something offered purely for the offering, donation (le don). "For one might say that a gift that could be recognized as such in the light of day, a gift destined for recognition, would immediately annul itself."9 These charges of course go staight to the center of that most cherished assumption of liberal democracy, the assumption of "equality before the law," which conceives justice as the supposedly universalizable and calculable application of law to all citizen/subjects. Derrida reminds us that "Nietzschean geneology" has already uncovered the actual functioning intention behind such a socio-political prioritization of "equality," namely that of "the equivalence of right and vengence, of justice as principle of equivalence (right) and the law of eye for eye, an equivalence between the just, the equitable (gerecht), and the revenged (geracht)." What is so often self-righteously invoked as a moral principle of protection for "the people" unmasks itself as the power of the state to inflict punishment in exchange for disloyalty. All of these conceptions of justice as "reciprocity" and "calculable equity" that we have inscribed and encoded within our law harbor within them manifest injustice, for they miss the "singularity" of relationships which is opened by the "other," or which opens one to the other in a manner that confers upon the other not "equality" but priority. As Derrida puts it:" 'Good friendship' supposes disproportion. It demands a certain rupture in reciprocity or equality... 'Good friendship' is born of disproportion: when you esteem or respect (achtet) the other more than yourself."" In like manner, the "gift," if it is to be a true "gift" (le don), must be given as it were "in secret," hidden from the recipient so as not to evoke a sense of indebtedness from the recipient, and hidden from the giver too so as not to tempt the expectations of recognition and return in the giver. "On what condition," Derrida asks, "does goodness exist beyond all calculation? On the condition that goodness forget itself, that the movement be a movement of the gift that renounces itself, hence a movement of infinite love." 12 Love can achieve infinity, even between finite beings, when goodness, rather than demanding loyalty as the price of beneficence, offers itself to the other through the cancellation of "debt-consciousness," which is to say, "ethics" heretofore conceived. Responsibility as a meaningful act of intention is only exhibited by a giver who not only does not require a response, but who will not respond when asked why he offers his gift, in the manner of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in the biblical narrative. The demands of "infinite love" and "infinite gift" that the singularities, the unique and concrete events of our lives, enjoin upon us on behalf of the other also inspire that spirit of Marxism that deconstruction continues to embrace. That deconstructive spirit of Marxism Derrida invokes should continue to "haunt" Europe and the "New World Order" with the calls for social and global justice. Were we to treat goodness as a "transcendental objective," a duty that would lend itself to formulaic fulfillment, we would forfeit the actual call of social justice that always tugs at us through the singular other before our eyes, with this forfeit making available to us only a counterfeit "good conscience." The openness to the other and their future, precisely because it resists closure or fulfillment, is "undeconstructable," and is the "messianic" element in Marxism. "In the waiting or calling for what we have nicknamed here without knowing the messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as Justice\_ remains an ineffaceable mark...of Marx's legacy."13 Of course, all this drives a wedge, an ethically necessary and enabling one, between law and justice, ethics and goodness, responsibility and alterity, a wedge that Derrida not only acknowledges as presenting us with several facets of aporia, but also as preserving the "messianic" character, a universal, "undeconstructable" of justice. For one thing, while my ethical duty conventionally conceived makes "responsibility" incumbent on me an answerability for my deeds and a conscious knowledge of what I am doing, the goodness of truly giving in a relationship requires that I maintain a "secrecy," a hiding from myself of my giving in order to preserve it as giving, making "irresponsibility" just as necessary for me as responsibility!' Second, and certainly most poignantly, the calls to selfless and pure giving to the other that each singular event, each particular other, make to me render it impossible for me to see to justice for everyone. I must be selective, exclusive, and hence iniquitous, in my duties to others.15 But these painful and dreadful aporias of friendship, generosity, justice, and politics are thrown upon so as to be preserved, for what is preserved with them is the hope of the arrivant, the unexpected coming of the other, the call of justice itself. There is, beyond these issues, one of the fundamental aporias of justice, namely that while it demands a suspension of closure, an ever-vigilant and critical openness to the other and the other's future, the urgency of present circumstances also requires decision, a decision that would enforce a closure on matters at hand. That moment of decision that every event throws upon me preserves this mutually enabling tension between justice and law. Here is where the "other hand," as Critchley puts it, the genuinely deconstructive maneuver of Derridean thought, comes in.I6 "Determination," "closure," "ethical choices" have been rendered hopelessly problematic through a first-hit deconstructive critique of the role they actually play in traditional moral thought. But on the other hand, once the call to justice as gift, openness to the other, has through criticism rendered calculable decision-making intractably problematic, decisions must still be made in order for any justice to be done. But such decisions interrupt the possibility of justice that made their very consideration possible. In turn, these decisions, determinations to act, and the new calculations and economies of moral exchange they set in motion provoke another iteration of the tension between the indeterminate "perhaps" and the moral exigencies of decision. This is what Derrida refers to as "the aporia that all things must face."' There is a mutuality of a sort then in Derrida's representation of the relationship between justice and law, but their mutually enabling interaction is energized, prompted, provoked by their aporetic tension. The demand for justice, the call of responsibility to the other, is fueled by this tension, for the possibility of justice will always be "beyond right, calculation and commerce," for "thinking the gift to the other as gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come back and belong to the other" lifts justice out of the economy of right, reciprocity and law.18 Yet calculations are still to be made afresh, and laws are still to be made better. It is because justice and law are irreconcilable, because they cannot penetrate one another, that they provoke one another.

### Link – History Education

#### The aff reduces the histories of the disappeared to fact-laden information which promotes ideology and cultural redundancy and prevents effective praxis.

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

The transition from knowledge-based stories to spaces and moments of spectrality entails a number of dangers emanating from the ways stories and images — in this case, those about disappeared victims — come before us. The stories and images of the disappeared victims often come to us through mass-mediated culture and politics that ‘‘manufacture’’ particular desires — for example, the ideal of (re)conciliation or selective remembering/forgetting — and influence our choices with regard to remembrance practices and public rituals. Needless to say, not all stories and images are manufactured in the same manner. Yet, when individuals, groups, and institutions are encouraged to think about nonnarrative relations — for example, (re)conciliation — in a narrative manner, spectrality is reduced to forms of repetition and sensationalism, all of which promote ideology and cultural redundancy and block praxis.21 Drawing on what Charles Garoian and Yvonne Gaudelius term spectacle pedagogy, I wish to distinguish between a ubiquitous mode of representation and an invocation of a critical examination of representational forms and ideologies.22 Spectacle pedagogy, then, can be defined in two opposing ways, but for the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the former manifestation; that is, spectacle pedagogy is described here as the (public or school) pedagogy that transfixes the ghost of the disappeared into a spectacle. The ghost of the disappeared is a spectacle when it becomes an image or a story that is ‘‘ontologized’’ in certain ways that are fact-laden. The assumption is that the ghost cannot be talked about (rather than ‘‘talked to’’) or understood unless the question ‘‘ who/what is the ghost?’’ is answered. Consequently, (uncritical) spectacle pedagogy structures our attention to the stories and images of the disappeared in an identical manner, focusing on facts and information. Furthermore, ‘‘the spectacle,’’ writes Guy Debord, ‘‘is the acme of ideology for in its full flower it exposes and manifests the essence of all ideological systems: the impoverishment, enslavement and negation of real life.’’23 Given its mass appeal, the power of the spectacle is in its pedagogical functioning that arrests our attention through evocative stories and images and in doing so inscribes a selfvalidating ideology.24 For example, the construction of a memorial site in which all the names of disappeared victims are engraved facilitates the recollection of this traumatic event. This attempt is often linked to state ideological efforts that never cease to emphasize how this event should not happen again.25 At the same time, however, this attempt ‘‘to facilitate the recollection of facts in order to procure beneficial-redeeming results (expressly to inoculate us from repeating the past wrongs again) actually betrays a certain instrumentalization of memory.’’26 The instrumentalization of memory consists in its ideologization, that is, in how memory becomes an ideology grounded in the assumption that if you ‘‘know’’ the past (selectively), you can also control the future and therefore past wrongs will not be repeated. This assumption — that is, if you know the past, you can control the future — is deeply problematic because it is politically and epistemologically naive. First, the cognitive mastery of the past does not imply in any teleological manner that the future will be any better because how the scars from the past will eventually mark the future is unpredictable. In addition, the assumption that knowledge of the past controls the future is dangerous because it can lead to ethical cynicism. This assumption entails the danger of dismissing claims for justice made by relatives of disappeared victims since the wish that past wrongs should never happen again does not constitute securing justice for the disappeared or control of the future.27 This idea does not imply that justice does not involve preventing a recurrence of the past; the ethical manifestation implicit within this sense of justice, however, is to contest any foreclosure of justice merely for the sake of (re)conciliation, forgiveness, or any other instrumental purpose. Furthermore, two additional dangers result from making the naive assumption that if you know the past, you can also control the future; these dangers have important implications for the interpretation of spectrality in public and school spheres. First, by invoking mastery on the basis of knowledge, the spectral moment is collapsed into what is representable; the spectrality of the disappeared victim is rendered unrepresentable and therefore is discarded. Under such a spectacle pedagogy, there is a mode of attentiveness that contains the trauma within particular spaces and moments that exclude spectrality. The ghosts of the disappeared victims, for example, become spectacles, images, and stories that need to be contained within a certain epistemic frame; their otherness and radicality is gone.28 This sort of spectacle pedagogy invites a sensationalism that connects to the past only in terms of how a society can work through and eventually ‘‘overcome’’ its experience of disappearances; anything that retains the spectrality of the disappeared is viewed with skepticism or even hostility. Second, the dominance of a fact-laden mode of attentiveness reduces the past to its temporal dimensions and thus makes the ghost out of our time. The spectacle pedagogy emanating from this mode of attentiveness is a view of ghosts from a uniform standpoint, yet through a perception that reiterates the separation between our ‘‘entities’’ and the spectral others. These spectral others are ‘‘ontologized’’ on the basis of epistemic terms and thus are absorbed into the past; any notion of a ‘‘trace’’ through time that extends to the future is rejected because this trace points only to what is now gone. In this process what is ultimately lost is the ‘‘loss’’ of the disappeared victims because a spectacle pedagogy produces a narrowing of what counts as experience of the disappeared through time. The implication is that the elements and structures of relationality between us and the ghosts are narrowed. This relinquishment of the spectral moment to what is representable also depoliticizes the disappeared and in doing so the representable empties reality of its history and naturalizes its historical insignificance.29 Pierre Bourdieu explained that such an objectification of life ‘‘constitutes the social world as a spectacle offered to an observer who takes up a ‘point of view’ on the action and who, putting into the object the principles of his relation to the object, proceeds as if it were intended solely for knowledge and as if all the interactions within it were purely symbolic exchanges.’’30 Banishing spectrality, then, conforms to a spectacle pedagogy that establishes a practice by which individuals, groups, and institutions use only what is rendered representable to fuel the legitimation of ideological projects — for example, ideological projects that promote certain practices of remembering or forgetting, justice and (re)conciliation. However, a spectacle pedagogy needs to be critiqued in order to examine and expose the regressive ideology of historical selectivity, specifically as it relates to how a society chooses to remember or forget its disappeared victims. It is in this sense that fact-laden representations are deeply selective and mark a transpolitical maneuver carried out in the name of narrative stories or images.31 Thus a critique of the spectacle pedagogy is ethically and politically significant, as it enables the disclosure of representational forms and ideologies. If this problematic is not raised in the discussion of the disappeared, then the abolishment of spectrality will inevitably lead to a self-indulgent and voyeuristic imperative. Yet, the question remains as to how societies can learn to live with ghosts in ways that do not involve spectacle. To finally address this question, I will turn to Derrida’s reflections on spectrality as a productive way of engaging with unresolved histories of trauma such as the disappeared victims of war and dictatorship.

### Link – Humanities

#### Death to god, death to man, death to humanities – ghosts now drive the humanities as parts of the epistemic machine in need of justice.

Kochhar-Lindgren 9 – Associate Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate Learning and Professor of Interdisciplinary Arts & Sciences at the University of Washington, Bothell (Gray, “The Haunting of the University Phantomenology and the House of Learning,” *Pedagogy: Critical Approaches to Teaching Literature, Language, Composition, and Culture*, Volume 9, Number 1, DOI: 10.1215/15314200-2008-014, 2009)//DD

Within recent memory everything within the humanities has died and is now beginning to decompose. We are bored with this story, but here it is again: associated with the names of some of the most luminous of twentiethcentury professors — Heidegger, Altizer, Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, White, Fukuyama — there has been, in fairly rapid succession, the death of God, philosophy, literature, the author, print, meaning, the subject, and, indeed, history itself. It’s exhausting. Dispiriting. No wonder there are ghosts wandering restlessly through what used to be called libraries and disturbing the sleep of those of us who continue, as best we can, to practice an abysmally slow-paced practice of reading. Sprouting from all the dead bodies lying around campus (though this word, too, no longer means what it did) as if it’s the institutional version of Hamlet, a new cultural formation is emerging, in fits and starts, within the digitized machinery of the academetron. These phantoms are not outside the machine that invades the interior space of knowledge but instead are within the deepest self-organizations of the epistemic machine. Phantomenology gestures toward the fact that the logos of logic is haunted from its inceptions and that this logic is beginning to manifest itself throughout the domus of the university, and we know “how much our melancholy for the domus is relative to its loss” (Lyotard 1991: 195). The haunted house is always in ruins and in need of justice. There is crying from the basement and from the attic, from the bloodstained bed. But aren’t these far from the ordered spaces of the university?

### Link – Justice

#### Their focus on justice to right historical wrongs fails – only a perpetual re-questioning of injustice can free the other to achieve true justice.

Lai 3 – Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature and the Director of the Foreign Language Center at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan with a Ph.D. in Critical Theory from the University of Nottingham, U.K (Chung-Hsiung, “On Violence, Justice and Deconstruction,” *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, 29.1 (January 2003)//DD

As we have seen, in “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida does deal with some ethical issues but only in abstract ways to avoid, it is argued, falling into the structured mire of theory, method and philosophy or, in general, of the “limited economy.” Indeed, Derrida is often criticized for lacking positive and concrete socio-political aims and purposes. It seems that he has changed his privilege subjects—linguistic and philosophical thought over political and social thought6—although the spirit of deconstruction remains the same there for him. In most of his recent ethical-political articles and books, he clearly, directly and devotedly explores the political implications of deconstruction by joining the textual-linguistic différance to an ethico-political deconstructive messianism—justice (along with notions of democracy, laws, friendship and politics). “Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice” (Derrida 1992: 14-15). Justice, as the only thing he believes is undeconstructable, is a forever-coming messianic otherness—“the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice” (Derrida 1994b: 28). Justice, in the image of haunting specter, has directly lead deconstruction into ethical, social and political arenas and into, one may suggest, a post-deconstructive era. Deconstructive justice, however, can never be fully done in any tangible juridical form for it exists not merely for a historical wrong (which must be righted) or an epistemological violence (which must be repaired). Rather, it stands for the very possibility of justice as an imminence. In other words, just as history per se can never risk being reduced to historiographical records, files or representations, so can justice never be ontologized as juridical-moral rules within a hegemonic horizon. The logic of hauntology7 indicates this irreducible justice wholly external to the justice, a justice which is, and refers to, a justice of otherness separated irrevocably from juridical-moral justice and is always already antecedent to ontology and exterior to totality. Furthermore, this demand of justice to question is always imminent, uncompromising and unconditional. Only through a perpetual re-questioning injustice in an irremediable rupture, can the Other gain access to speak for itself and of itself in the name of justice. Responding to the imminent ethical demand of the Other for Derrida becomes “the art of politics” in our postmodern/postcolonialist context. Simon Critchely rightly states: The infinite ethical demand of deconstruction arises as a response to a singular context and calls forth the invention of a political decision. Politics itself can here be thought of as the art of response to the singular demand of the other, a demand that arises in a particular context— although the infinite demand cannot simply be reduced to its context—and calls for political invention, for creation. (1999: 276)

### Link – Law and Order

#### The law is not neutral – it is coded by the language of violence – the affirmative makes violence inevitable by using force to sustain the law which replicates the force that sustains violence.

Park 7 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion at American University, Washington DC (Jin Y., “Transgression and Ethics of Tension Wonhyo and Derrida on institutional authority,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD \*modified for gendered and ablest language\*

At the beginning of his essay, Derrida ponders the meaning of the English expression, "to enforce the law," and asks: if law is something that needs to be enforced, how is the force that is required to exercise law different from the use of the force that one commonly connects with violence? In other words, what makes one commonly hold the view that the kind of force in the law is different from the kind of force related to violence? One way of answering this question is to resort to the authority law embodies, which violence does not have. If so, that is, if law itself contains the power to justify its use of force distinguished from violence, where does this authority of law come from? Let us reiterate the question: how is the force of law different from the force of violence? The question leads us to several sub-questions: (1) If the force of law is different from the force in the use of violence, where does the authority and power of the law come from? (2) If the force of law is as violent as the force of violence, does that say that law is violence? (3) If law is violence, does it negate the legitimacy of the law? (4) If the force of law is violence—as in the case of the force of violence—and still the law is legitimate, what is the nature of justice and ethics that is proposed in this paradigm? The series of questions posed here regarding the relationship between the law, justice, violence, and authority is as relevant to the understanding of Wifinhyo's position on bodhisattva precepts as it is to Derrida's deconstruction of law and justice. By simply replacing "law" in the above questions with "precepts," one finds the similar nature of the issue in Wonhyo and Derrida. The question of whether the force of law can also be considered violence is a provocative one and could even be ~~seen~~ [perceived] as seditious, because the idea threatens the commonly held oppositional position between law and violence. The use of force that results in violence is also commonly defined as "illegal" as opposed to the legal "force of law," which protects one from such illegal use of force. If the commonsense logic distinguishing the law and violence is to be tenable, however, some factors need be identified to distinguish two forms of force—the force of law and the force of violence—other than the former being considered legal and the latter illegal. That is so because the fact that something is considered legal in a community does not attribute to that something an intrinsic authority. As we shall see shortly, the fact that something is violent does not necessarily make that violent force illegitimate or illegal, either. It is in this context that Derrida quotes from Pascal, who cites Montaigne without identifying the author: one ~~man~~ [human] says that the essence of justice is the authority of the legislator, another that it is the convenience of the king, another that it is current custom; and the latter is closest to the truth: simple reason tells us that nothing is just in itself; everything crumbles with time. Custom is the sole basis for equity, for the simple reason that it is received; it is the mystical foundation of its authority. Whoever traces it to its source annihilates it. (Pens& 293, quoted in Derrida, 1992a, 12) Immediately after this citation from the Pensees, Derrida adds Montaigne's passage: "And so laws keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because they are laws: that is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other.... Anyone who obeys them because they are just is not obeying them the way he ought to" (ibid). Even though Derrida borrowed the expression "mystical foundation of authority" from Montaigne, the meaning of this expression, in the way Derrida interprets it in his discussion of law and justice, is not clear at all in either Pascal's or Montaigne's passages. That is especially so because, in Derrida's view, the "mystical foundation of authority" does not simply imply the visible and intentional "abuse" of the force of law by those who have the power that one commonly associates with dictatorship. As Derrida notes, nor does "mystical foundation" of institutional authority relate itself to any kind of moral cynicism. Instead, it goes beyond a simple "conventionalist or utilitarian relativism, beyond a nihilism, old or new, that would make the law a 'masked power— (ibid., 13). That is the case because what is revealed through this idea of "mystical foundation" of authority is the "interpretative force" that emerges at the moment of the initiation of law and stays with it thereafter, so that law can function as a regulatory power. In this sense, like categorization itself, the "mystical foundation" of law is not an optional element in our exercise and maintenance of law: it is the law itself. Derrida thus states: The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an interpretative force... Its very moment of foundation or institution..., the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate. (Derrida, 1992a, 13) Locating the source of the legal authority in the interpretative force, and hence understanding it as inherently violent, is a natural consequence of a deconstructive mode of thinking. Derrida negates any possibility of the transcendental signifier to ground the legal authority, and in that sense, any authority. That is because foundation of an authoritative power cannot be generated, from a Derridean deconstructive perspective, without intentionally stopping the flow of meaning structure, which is based on a differential notion. Hence Derrida continues: "No justificatory discourse could or should insure the role of metalanguage in relation to the performativity of institutive language or to its dominant interpretation" (ibid.). To WOnhyo, precepts exist as accumulation of conditionalities, and thus no metalanguage for precepts and ethical codes should exist. The non-existence of metalanguage for precepts does not negate the existence of precepts, nor its validity as a regulatory force for practitioners. A salient point, however, is that if the practitioner takes the provisional authority of precepts as if they were permanent, endorsement of the temporary authority of precepts will result in the dreadful state of violating precepts by observing them. In other words, whereas the temporary authority is not negated completely, it is always to be understood in connection with the non-existence of this authority in the ultimate level; hence provisionally of precepts should always remain on the horizon of the practitioner's understanding and observation of them. This distinguishes Wonhyo's ethical stance from any kind of laissez-faire anarchism of ethics or even from the naiveté of a transgression-harmony paradigm. What WOnhyo might call the ultimate non-foundationalism of precepts is to Derrida the fundamental self-authorization of laws. Hence Derrida explains his more sophisticated way of dealing of violence as follows: the originary violence begins with articulation, it is not possible to escape the force of violence: it is already there. Articulation takes place in the web of signification, and signification is a product of categorization, division, and reification. Without categorization, and without, to some degree, reifying each defined category, signification cannot take place. Violence, then, is not a result of signification, but signification itself. The same can be said about law. Like the "originary violence of language," which makes signification possible, law and justice, that is, the practice of law (or the force of law), becomes possible through "the founding violence of law" because "Justice, as law, is never exercised without a decision that cuts, that divides" (Derrida, 1992a, 24, emphasis original). This passage might remind one of the well-known g°1Van (or encounter dialogue) in Chan Buddhist tradition, entitled "Nanquan cuts the cat in two" (Wumenguan #14; T 48.2005.294c). The physical violence involved in this gvneall reflects the violence involved in our meaning-giving act, which is understood as an act of ultimate decision-making. If we place side by side Derrida's view on violence, law, and justice with WOnhyo's view on precepts and the Brahma's net simile, we create a picture in which some elements are interestingly overlapping, and which, with some scrutiny, could be disturbing. Both bodhisattva precepts for the Buddhist community and laws in a nation-state are created in the process of institutionalization. Institutionalization becomes possible through appropriation and domestication, and, thus, reification of entities, which by nature to both Derrida and Wonhyo exist in terms of a differential notion, be it differance or conditionality. The violence is inevitable in institutionalization, which, however, amounts to the existence of the law or precepts. As much as the force of law is violence, so is the practice of precepts. Hence, as WOnhyo emphasizes, the observation of precepts contains the potential of turning out to be violation of them if the practitioner fails to see the fundamental violence involved in the act of creating them.

#### Their usage of the law as a form of justice conforms to a politics of collateral damages where actions are taken without regard to the damage it does to others.

Magliola 7 – Ph.D., Princeton University; retired Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies from the (Interfaith) Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion at Abac Assumption University of Thailand; retired Distinguished Chair Professor at the Graduate School of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University (Robert, “Hongzhou Chan Buddhism, and Derrida Late and Early,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD

Jacques Derrida, in his "Le mot d'acceuil" (1997b) and elsewhere, deconstructs the later Emmanuel Levinas, which is to say that Derrida claims to uncover how Levinasian thought actually works in the later writings, despite the surface-claims of Levinasian discourse. In the matter of ethics, what emerges from the Derridean deconstruction of Levinas is the following conclusion on Derrida's part, a conclusion alternative to and more conflicted than Levinas' own declared intention. Derrida concludes that there is "always already" the double-bind' of law (responsibility to the third party, the others not singularly facing us) and singularity (responsibility to the unique other who is facing us). Law/singularity constitute a double-bind, argues Derrida, because: [the bind] —justice to the third party necessarily violates justice to the singularity of the person-in-situation facing us (and vice versa); and yet [the double-bind]—one should not not-act but must make a decision, since indecision, indifference, etc., reject the call and demand of absolute responsibility. Thus, in Derrida's words, one must necessarily work this "non-path" (1990, 947): law/singularity are an aporia because they constitute a double-bind, a double-bind driven by an impossible justice. The "experience" of justice is impossible because experience is a holistic structure, i.e., it requires passage through to its own completion. But doing justice to/for someone inevitably hurts other(s) unjustly, and vice versa. Given this necessarily incomplete, thwarted structure, the most we can say, concludes Derrida, is that "Justice is an experience of the impossible" (ibid.). Aporia literally means "no-passage," i.e., the horns of the bind's dilemma block each other, and what makes the bind "double," i.e., that one still must choose, blocks the possibility of escape through opting out. For Derrida, one must (the it law) decide, choosing what seems to cause the least collateral damage. One must decide, though one can do so only in ~~blindness~~, trembling, tears, and hope.

### Link – Non-Violence/Peace

#### Their focus on peace is a messianic vision of a world without language – only by accepting the specters and using discourse to negate its violence can we affirm a world without violence.

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Derrida however questions Levinas’s non-violence oriented ethics, which privileges peace over war. He believes that were there a non-violent language, it would have to be one that goes without “verb,” without “predication,” without “to be.” “But since finite silence is also the medium of violence, language can only indefinitely tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it” (Derrida 1976: 117). Levinasian absolute peace, for Derrida, only exists in the domain of pure non-violence and of absolute silence, or, in an unreachable Promised Land, a homeland thither without language. Accordingly, in contrast to Levinas, Derrida calls for an “economy of violence”: “an economy irreducible to what Levinas envisions in the word. If light is the element of violence, one must combat light with a certain other light, in order to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse” (117). For Derrida, discourse can only do itself violence and negate itself in order to affirm itself. Philosophy, as the discourse of the Self, can only open itself to the question of violence within and by it. It is an economy: “violence against violence, light against light” (117). “One never escapes the economy of war” (148). In other words, if metaphysics is a violence of assimilation, one must fight against this violence with a certain other violence; a violence of revolutionary action against a violence of police action. It is this endless cycling, or the tertiary structure, of violence, which makes the economy of violence irreducible. Henceforth, to Derrida, Levinas’s notion of ethics as a critique of ontological violence is also presented in his discourse which presupposes the very ontological language that it claims it overcomes. That is, doesn’t Levinas’s critique of philosophy itself arguably use an assimilating language of philosophy as discourse of the Self? (Derrida 1976: 131). Accordingly, Derrida claims that every philosophy, including Levinas’s philosophy of ethics, “can only choose the lesser violence within an economy of violence” (313). Yet, Critchley and Bernasconi remind us that to see “Violence and Metaphysics” as a mere critique of Levinas is surely to misread Derrida’s deconstructive reading (Bernasconi and Critchley 1991: xii). “Violence and Metaphysics” aims much higher. It attempts to demonstrate by a double reading (a reading and a writing). That is, it “shows, on the one hand, the impossibility of escaping from logocentric conceptuality and, on the other hand, the necessity of such an escape arising from the impossibility of remaining wholly within the (Greek) logocentric tradition” (Critchley 1991: xii). Derrida’s deconstructive reading allows the two impossibilities to interlace and thus to suspend the critical moment of deciding between the two in the thought of Levinas.

### Link – STEM

#### The aff’s is running from a ghost – perception of STEM education as necessary for the economy is a form of value that seeks to maintain control over the “productive” citizens.

Kenway 8 – Professorial Fellow with the Australian Research Council, a Professor in the Education Faculty at Monash University and an elected Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, Australia (Jane, “The Ghosts of the School Curriculum: Past, Present and Future,” *The Australian Educational Researcher*, Volume 35, Number 2, August 2008)//DD

\*Note: the phrase “the Scrooge state” is an allusion to the character Scrooge in Charles Dickens’ “A Christmas Carol” \*

Unlike Scrooge, the Scrooge state does not value ignorance. It values knowledge; well, mainly certain sorts of knowledge; mathematical, scientific, technological, functional literacy and problem solving. This is also the sort of knowledge most valued by knowledge economy policies and which is assessed by PISA of the OECD. But, of course the Scrooge state also likes to “value-add” and it has added matters of identity and values to the curriculum in such a way as to give them quite a high priority. The Scrooge state has added values via such things as civics, citizenship and values education. The Scrooge state is concerned about social cohesion or, more accurately the lack of it and the possible flow-on effects of such a lack for its economic agenda. The Scrooge state is also concerned about national and sub-national identity and about how to ensure, in a world on the move, that its citizens, especially its most economically productive citizens remain loyal to the Homeland. Values, add value to the curriculum. So, in Australia for instance under the previous Liberal Commonwealth Government, schools were exhorted to promote in students the values associated with “care and compassion, doing your best, fair go, freedom, honesty and trustworthiness, integrity, respect, responsibility, understanding, tolerance and inclusion”. Indeed this list of values is on the poster “Values for Australian Schooling” distributed to all schools when Brendan Nelson was the Commonwealth Minister for Education. The Australian flag heads the poster and a ghostly image of Simpson and his Donkey provides the back-drop – almost foreshadowing the Liberal’s subsequent push for specifically Australian values. Clearly then the Scrooge state cannot be accused, like Scrooge himself, of ignoring “ignorance and want”. Nonetheless it is still haunted by the Ghost of Curriculum Present. This ghost is alert to a major aporia in contemporary curriculum policy on the matter of civics and values – a major failing of sight and insight. It is a fundamental curriculum insight that schools cannot be separated from society; that values are not just individual they are also social. Curriculum theorists around the world acknowledge this. They acknowledge that what goes on outside of schools has a strong bearing on what happens inside them. Schools are not self-contained units that can seal themselves off from the outside world and easily teach things that contradict that outside world. The history of socially critical curriculum and critical pedagogy in schools tells us how difficult it is to teach against the grain of society, how complicated it is for schools to produce new sorts of citizens and how sophisticated curriculum and pedagogy must be to do this.

### Link – Teacher Education

#### Teacher education programs are haunted by the phantoms of competitiveness – teachers are reduced to tools forced to serve the neoliberal agenda.

Clarke and Phelan 15 – Professor of Education & Theology at York St John University; and Professor of Curriculum and Pedagogy, University of British Columbia (Matthew and Anne, “The power of negative thinking in and for teacher education,” *Power and Education*, Vol. 7(3), DOI: 10.1177/1757743815607025, 2015)//DD

In the current policy climate, teacher education, as both a field of study or programmatic structure, has been severely impacted, as ‘governments around the world [are] intent on systemic reform of education to improve their country’s global competitiveness . . . [and] see the reform and progressive management of teacher education as a key component in that systemic reform process’ (Furlong, 2013: 46). In this section, we identify four particular ‘phantoms’ that have haunted teacher education in recent decades, each linked to this systemic reform process. These phantoms include: (a) the continual conjuring of crises that serve to stoke social anxiety about the effectiveness and efficiency of teacher education; (b) the imposition of a false consensus that deadens debate about the practice and purpose of teacher education; (c) the increasing standardization of curriculum and teaching that undermines the cultivation of teachers’ intellectual autonomy; and (d) the reduction of teaching to the application of policies and protocols tailored to producing predetermined ends, thereby sidelining teachers’ moral judgement and disavowing the ethico-political dimension of teaching. Below, we examine each of these four phantoms in greater detail. Teacher education has long been a site of social anxiety. In recent decades, wider economic anxieties about competitiveness (Connell, 2009), combined with, particularly in the post-9/11 world, political anxieties about the fabric of the nation and the perceived threat to its integrity from alien forces or ‘strangers’ lurking outside or within (Apple, 2011; Kostogriz, 2006), ‘have induced educators to embrace the language and business practices associated with neoliberalism’ (Taubman, 2009: 98), where the latter, while not a unified doctrine, is understood as ‘the pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics’ (Davies, 2014: 4). As a consequence of the neo-liberal embrace, it has be argued that ‘there has been a subordination of teacher education as intellectual, moral and ethical endeavor to the production of locally relevant job skills’ (Mayer et al., 2008: 80). Specifically, in the face of various forms of social anxiety and the resulting doubts as to whether teacher education is up to the challenges of the 21st century (e.g. Levine, 2006), policymakers and teacher educators alike have tended to reach out for what Deborah Britzman (2011) refers to as ‘a manual’. Such a manual can be seen as ‘signifying a profession’s unconscious wish for absolute knowledge, and as a defense against crisis. Demands for a manual seem to be one solution to a profession’s anxiety’ (Britzman, 2011: 81). How are the conjuring of crisis and the pervasive presence of social anxiety related to the proliferation of policy that seeks to manage teacher education? Conveniently, crises demand efficient management. The quest for efficiency begets standardization, ‘curbing variety so as to facilitate the generation of objective measures of performance’ (Hartley, 2000: 119). In teacher education policy and practice, stabilizing the social and operational meaning of both ‘teacher’ and ‘professional’ thus becomes desirable. As a result, and with the active involvement of professional bodies, teachers have consented to what amounts to impoverishments in practice, such as the elevation of the pseudo-scientificity of standards at the expense of subsequently devalued factors such as affect and intuition, as the price for purportedly accruing greater regard from politicians, policymakers, the media and society in terms of perceived improvements in standing and status. In this sense, increased teacher professionalization has been something of a Faustian pact, with teacher professionalism harnessed to government education reform agendas (Furlong, 2013), and with teachers being positioned ‘on the frontline of national economic defense and in the centre of educational reform, thus justifying the detailed mapping and scrutiny of their work’ (Clarke and Moore, 2013: 488). To this end, teaching standards are offered as descriptions of the kinds of knowledge, skills and attributes of any competent teacher. Masking their underlying political commitments (education as epiphenomenal to the economy), officially sanctioned representations of the teacher and teaching appear natural and irrefutable. Teachers are thus deprived of debate where they can make their voices heard, while teacher educators are simply left to the management of policy implications at the programmatic level – witness, for example, the arrival of the standards-driven portfolio as a prominent feature of assessment in teacher education (Sanford and Strong-Wilson, 2013) and the explicit linking of course syllabi to various teaching standards. Understandably, teacher candidates are keen to present themselves as ‘fitting’ with the standards, thereby adopting ‘a stable and positive identity obtained through identification with an existing socio-political order’ (Biesta, 2011: 145). There is little room for any reality other than the one established by the standards policy (Phelan and Vratulis, 2013). Consensus signifies the end of the political. How might teacher educators confront the contemporary depoliticizing policy consensus and advocate for a properly political view of education based on genuine alternatives? Reimagining teacher education as a site of dissensus is immensely challenging in light of discourses of standardized teacher identities. Strewn across the teacher’s lifespan, otherwise known as ‘the teacher development continuum’, professional learning is justified as a highly positive disposition for all teachers. Quality teachers want to achieve their ‘full potential through relentless and never-ending self-development, out of which [they] can self-regulate in the interests of students and colleagues’ (McWilliam, 2008: 33). Potential takes the form of a stylized identity, ever keen on developing itself as an excellent classroom manager, team builder, literacy instructor or emotionally intelligent leader. The proliferation of webinars, workshops, seminars and graduate programmes attests to this preoccupation, as lifelong learning becomes a life sentence for teachers (Falk, 1999). Much of this talk of professional learning, however, is less about expanding the subjectivity of the teacher and more about delimiting it (Falk, 1999). And even though there has been a growing interest in non-formal professional learning and sharing through social media outlets, much of this material remains tied to, rather than challenging, existing imaginaries of teaching as the implementation of ‘best practice’. As with more formal professional development, ‘teacher profiles’ as statements of teacher competencies and performance standards lurk beneath the surface (OECD, 2005: 10), including the usual array of subject matter knowledge and pedagogical skills, but, significantly, ‘the capacity to continue developing’ (OECD, 2005: 7). If the current understanding of teacher potential serves to restrict rather than enlarge the subjectivity of the teacher, what might a rearticulation of potential as ‘(im)potential’ offer teacher education? The turn to teaching standards and the articulation of a knowledge base for teaching constitutes a retreat, in our view, into a firmly modernist world view. This is a world in which knowledge is power, in which scientific research evidence is able to provide a basis for policy and practice, and in which experts hold out the promise, by submitting them to rational analysis, of rendering complex and semi-opaque processes like curriculum, teaching and learning visible and hence more controllable (e.g. Hattie, 2009). It is a world in which the intolerable and uncontrollable are redeemed by being made palatable and predictable, in order to provide ‘the specious clarity demanded and enforced by audit cultures’ (MacLure, 2010: 278); the cost of such assimilation is that we enter ‘the regime of the cliche ́ ’ (MacLure, 2010: 278). In such a world, it is all too easy for research to be positioned as an exact science, capable of making clear and unambivalent predictions about practice, ignoring the key notion ‘that in the design, enactment and justification of education we have to engage with normative questions’ (Biesta, 2015: 80). Such instrumentalism sidelines the teacher, disembeds knowledge from the idiosyncrasy of particular teaching situations and from the experience and knowledge of teachers, and ignores the moral complexities of teaching (Dunne and Pendlebury, 2002). What does it mean to cultivate ethical decision-making in and through teacher education in a climate that is hostile to uncertainty in, and the unpredictability of, practice? The issues and questions that we identify do not deny that important decisions about the nature and content of teachers’ knowledge, skills or dispositions must be made. To think solely in these terms, however, is to neglect teaching and teacher education as forms of praxis, where means and ends are always entangled (Biesta, 2015), where ethical action is the central concern, and where human relationships are particular and fragile. It is to limit ourselves to bloodless categories, narrow notions of the visible and the empirical, professional standards of indifference, institutional rules of distance and control, barely speakable fears of losing the footing that enables us to speak authoritatively and with greater value than anyone else who might. (Gordon, 2007: 21) Rather than accept such limitations, we seek ‘to represent the structure of feeling that is something akin to what it feels like to be the object of a social totality vexed by the phantoms of modernity’s violence’ (Gordon, 2007: 19). In short, we seek to engage in a complicated rather than a reductive conversation about teacher education; acknowledgement of such complication may require vocabularies heretofore disavowed in teacher education (Taubman, 2012).

### Link – Technology

#### The aff reaffirms the mindset of the specter that haunts educational technology and fuels the never-ending quest for the latest and greatest technology – this results in dominant, hegemonic discourses silencing others and reducing people to bare life.

Pinto 16 – Assistant Professor at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) (Laura Elizabeth, “Spectres of Educational Technology: Ghost-Busting as a Curricular Response,” <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/antistasis/article/viewFile/24501/28376>, 2016)//DD

The spectral is a restless presence that haunts and returns, both unfulfilled or unfinished from the past, and signaling the future (Peim, 2005). The spectre of educational technology is rooted in a long history of the never-ending quest for the latest solution to enduring educational problems. “Every major technology that became pervasive in the 20th century,” Kuehn (2010, p. 130) observes, “was going to revolutionize education. Film, radio, television – all were hyped as the silver bullet that would make education both more effective and more accessible.” The future, the spectre tells us in its present incarnation, is to be found in the yet-to-be found “Killer App”1. Yet, “much of what is written and discussed about educational technology is…more a matter of faith than it is a matter of fact” (Selwyn, 2011, p. 714) – where that faith largely amounts to ghostly beliefs about technology’s potential that haunt education discourse and practice. In this way, the spectre is a pattern of entanglement between subject (educator/education) and object (technology), not quite bodily nor immaterial, but an entity of “uncertain nature” (Zekani, 2014, p. 7). This spectre is conjured in educational discourse, curriculum and policy – haunted by ghosts that whisper “21st Century Learning” and “Digital Native.” In its uncertain, in-between state, the spectre of educational technology is paradoxical. When conjured, it is simultaneously admonished and promoted for the same purpose: the improvement of education. Current technological fascinations justified by this spectre include tablet use, BYOD programs, flipped classrooms, and massive open online courses (MOOCs) – none of which have delivered on their promises. On one hand, the spectre is the centre of a hegemonic “digital romance,” as Bigum (2012) characterizes it – unbridled enthusiasm for the ghostly presence of “the new” and “the latest” technologies constrain critique and debate, while educators struggle with “over-hyped, pre-configured digital products and practices that are being imported continually into university settings” (Selwyn, 2013, p. 3). Amidst the hype, the spectre obscures technology’s weak and blind spots, its contradictions, and its precarious nature. Yet, denial is precisely the reason for technology’s irrational pervasiveness as a problem posing as “solution” to education (Selwyn, 2013). As such, the spectre is cloaked in confusing smoke and mirrors: it attempts to deny that ghosts exist through its insistence that everything this “new,” but preserves its presence by conjuring away its own ambiguous history. Enlisting a medium: A hauntological curricular response Only by understanding and challenging what underpins the technological hegemony can we uncover the ghostly dimensions of the present, and the possible spirit(s) of the future. In its haunting, the spectre disavows critical conversations about education and technology: “dominant discourses of education and technology work primarily to silence dissent and reduce most people to shutting-up and putting-up” (Selwyn, 2013, p. 5). Critical perspectives are thus politely ignored or dismissed as “a ‘luddite’ or ‘technophobe’ embodying a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ attitude” (Selwyn, 2011, p. 713).

## Impacts

### Impact – Genocide

#### The rejection of these specters leads to nationalist and authoritarian violence – it justifies erasing all traces that disturb the self-enclosure of the present.

Papastephanou 11 – Associate Professor in the Department of Education at the University of Cyprus (Marianna, “Material Specters: International Conflicts, Disaster Management, and Educational Projects,” *Educational Theory*, Volume 61, Number 1, 2011, pgs. 113-114)//DD

It often appears that a prolonged conflict unsettles the present. Although this is psychologically true,44 politically it is mostly the other way round. According to Derrida, ‘‘every authoritarian regime wants to eternalize its present in order to rule out the possibility of its future disintegration and to erase the barbarity from which it sprang. Such regimes fear ghosts.’’45 Settlers — such as the Turkish settlers in the occupied part of Cyprus46 — have been used by their authorities as a means to an end (against Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative, of course): to effect and consolidate demographic alterations that will erase the past relation of space and rightful (co)habitation. Settlement as a crime against humanity according to international law and settlement as arrangement of situations for purposes of realpolitik create a new, modern space that is disconnected from the past and hostile to a just future. The new ontology of space is haunted only by the memory of those who are in a position to know how the landscape once appeared. If the ‘‘present is unsettled no less by the return of the past than by the imminence of the future,’’47 then educational theory must defend a qualified preservation of memories and a preparation for the revival of unsettling futurity. ‘‘The founders of Israel spoke of making ‘facts on the ground.’ This term refers to shaping material reality in ways that institutionalize and make solid that which is, in fact, a recent innovation’’ (CD, 159). As facts on the ground, authoritarian strategies settle the present and block the advent of a desirable future perhaps far more than the emotional effects of any direct, personal loss (raising barriers to reconciliation) could ever do. ‘‘To reassure and perpetuate themselves, [authoritarian regimes] efface any spectral traces that threaten to disturb the self-enclosure of the present.’’48 As Saltman writes, ‘‘Israel eradicated Palestinian towns, removing all traces, all physical markers from which public memory of the history of the place could be conjured, invoked or referenced’’ (CD, 159). Such material production of faits accomplis creates ‘‘institutional and public memory while also working to conceal that which was there before. The longer it takes to rebuild schools and communities in New Orleans, the more powerful that wreckage becomes as new facts on the ground’’ (CD, 160). In turn, ‘‘the longer [created realities] become facts on the ground, the harder it becomes to remember what was there before’’ (CD, 160). This gives a new meaning to the Greek-Cypriot educational slogan ‘‘I do not forget and I struggle’’ that Zembylas unequivocally disparages as nationalism, pure and simple (PTE, 7). The educational demand for memory and for struggle to reclaim the rights that have been denied cannot be sweepingly dismissed without significant loss of commitment to international justice.

## Alternative

### 2NC – Solves – Ethics

#### The alternative solves ethics.

Forte 7 – Ph.D. in Japanese Buddhism, ethics, and continental philosophy from Temple University, Philadelphia (Victor, “The Ethics of Attainment The meaning of the ethical in Dogen and Derrida,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD \*modified for ablest language”

The ethical, therefore, to truly function as the ethical, cannot be approached within an understood domain (a totality), but rather, the ethical functions viably only when its meaning is left open, when it is freed from, and not limited to, a final meaning, to a domain or a logos. The ethical is, in this sense, to question the ethical. By avoiding a claim that "the ethical is X," there is a mirroring of Platonic transcendence, in that there is a certain wisdom recognized in refuting knowledge of the ethical as such, and in this very recognition there is the possibility of "authorizing every ethical law in general." That is, the basis for an ethical authority that guides our actions is not found in assertion and certainty, but rather in questioning and doubt. So, we could say that deconstruction prefers the ethical meaning offered by transcendence, rather than immanence, avoiding the arrogance of attainment while, at the same time, rejecting a metaphysics that may lead one to hopelessness and powerlessness—ethical authority is human, but this authority is structured in non-attainment. Thirty years after the publication of "The violence of metaphysics," Derrida addressed the practical implications concerning the question of the ethical in his collection of essays entitled The Gift of Death. In the essay "Whom to give to (knowing not to know)," he examines Kierkegaard's reflections on the biblical story of Abraham and Issac. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard turns to this story to clarify the difference he finds between religion and ethics. Since we cannot reasonably conclude that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his own son is an ethical act, then it can only be understood as a religious act, which must be therefore distinct from the ethical. The basis for this distinction is that ethics, for Kierkegaard, is structured in the general, universal principles of conduct. But Abraham's relationship to God was not based upon a general principle, but a singular duty, and it is this singularity that distinguishes the religious from the generality of ethics. In this sense, Abraham's act to sacrifice his son is also a sacrifice of ethics, a dismissal of the general good in order to respond to the call of a singular God. However, in Derrida's examination of Kierkegaard's bifurcation of the general and the singular, of the ethical and the religious, he counters that one actually finds in every act of duty the same structure of singularity, and a similar sacrifice of ethics. As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the ~~gaze, look~~, request, love, command or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others. (Derrida, 1995b, 68) If this is the case, then Kierkegaard has failed to make a clear demarcation between the religious and the ethical. Just as Abraham's chosen duty to God was a sacrifice of the ethical principles of non-violence and family care, so every chosen act of duty, in its very specificity, must unavoidably sacrifice the ethical concern for the general good. In dedicating our efforts, for example, to care for the needs of a friend, we sacrifice our concern for the general good of "all the others." Because it is a human impossibility to care for all the others, in my responding to a friend (i.e., the other), I sacrifice the others. Derrida concludes that ethics therefore has an inherent aporia that is unavoidable. The aporia always provides the possibility that one can easily ~~blind~~ [deprive] oneself to the sacrifice of ethics in every ethical decision as one chooses to whom one shall be responsible. This inherent aporia must be ignored, in fact, in order for the everyday functioning of socio-political institutions. One must, in this sense, play a game of ~~blindness~~ if one wants the opportunity to play at all. As Derrida argues in the essay, "Every Other is wholly Other," those who recognize the game for what it is are simply dismissed as relativists.

### 2NC – Solves – History

#### The alternative solves history education – it serves both as ethical remembrance and critical learning – it does not forgo the possibility of history education – it just includes an emotionally uncomfortable and demanding relation to history.

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

These questions already imply that history education is not about any content, knowledge, and understanding brought by the ghosts to educators and learners. If the ‘‘unrepresentable’’ is transcribed into epistemological or legal narratives that offer an official representation of the ‘‘facts,’’ then it is more likely that closure will become inevitable. Needless to say, it is important to engage with various forms of knowledge that enable educators and learners to make sense of the remembered victims and foster an affective engagement with them in nonvoyeuristic terms.51 However, it is also important to clarify that the insistence on reiterating particular representations creates forms of engagement that may shut the door to spectrality and the critical learning it can offer. For example, learners should be given opportunities to critically examine how some forms of recognizing disappeared victims in public or school ceremonies — such as ceremonies that are strongly sensationalized and voyeuristic — are redemptive and perhaps seek to hide other parts of history about which a community may not be so proud. Opening the door to spectrality in history education implies that the specters will travel with educators and their students into territories that are likely to be emotionally uncomfortable and demanding. Pedagogies of hauntology, if they may be called such, invite educators and learners to consider how different forms of remembrance engender radical openness to the other — for example, the ghost of the disappeared victim — beyond a spectacle sensibility. In pedagogies of hauntology, the spectral is invoked as a means to interrogate epistemological, political, or legal narratives that offer closure; the spectral instead underscores the importance of the openings created by interrupting the rules of representation. To welcome the ghosts of the disappeared — and thus say ‘‘yes’’ to an admittedly difficult past — is to conjure a future by engaging in decisions and actions that are traced between personal narratives and collective memories, between what is representable and that which is unspeakable, between historical representation of disappearance and mourning as promise for a different future. For example, for a society to keep and hold memories of its disappeared victims, the ethical and political challenge is not merely a matter of spreading knowledge so that disappearances will not happen again. By inviting spectrality into public and school spheres, educators and learners seek understandings that are not reduced to instrumentalist perspectives of memory or self-redemptive accounts about justice. Pedagogies of hauntology call attention to the ambivalence of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation by harboring ‘‘the possibility of engaging the disjunctive force of the past as a resource that can allow us to pose new questions regarding our time and collective identity.’’52 Such questions include the following: What type of commemorative practices for the disappeared, both in schools and in the wider society, can instigate remembering without foreclosing both the demand of justice and the prospects of (re)conciliation? Which history learning practices would most effectively retain that which remains unsettled regarding the disappeared and resist being submerged into nationalist or self-righteous discourses? Invoking the past as a resource for posing provocative new questions might indeed constrain our efforts to be open to radical otherness insofar as we refuse to engage with the ghosts of the disappeared as ‘‘mediators’’ or ‘‘messengers’’ of a different relationality with the other. That is, if we do not (at least momentarily) expunge a totalizing and self-righteous version of the past, we might not even begin to contemplate a different future. For example, if we teach children that legal procedures (that is, trials and punishments) are the only mechanisms through which justice will be served in the case of disappearances, then we force them into a calculating box that strips the past of any irruptive forms of justice — such as the notion of justice as a gift or the possibility of some forgetting so that there can be some space left for peace, forgiveness, or (re)conciliation. If victims of genocidal crimes do not momentarily ‘‘disconnect’’ from a fixed understanding or version of the past, then any prospects for new connections with others — such as forgiving perpetrators — will never materialize. However, if ghosts, as boundary dwellers, find expression through experiences of traveling across the margins of different pasts, then educators and learners have an opportunity to appreciate the disruptive force of otherness brought by the many fragments of the past. Pedagogies of hauntology in history education, then, would include any form of pedagogical work that engages and sustains ‘‘encounters’’ with the ghosts of disappeared victims. One cannot calculate how to speak to the ghost beforehand because its appearance often comes as surprise, even if it is conjured.53 However, pedagogical practices that invite the spectral appreciate the disruptive force of otherness since therein lies the hope of openings to what is new and outside present delimitations.54 Educators and learners ‘‘speak’’ to the ghost of the disappeared when their knowing refuses to settle within an explanatory economy and instead prevents closure by turning away from any totalizing explanations — whether they are triumphalist or redemptive. As Di Paolantonio writes, the nuances, complexities and contradictions, often displacing and subverting any one literal and figural meaning ... help to prepare us to engage (rather than cover over) the elisions and gaps evoked by the traumatic past . . . [and] allow us to bring to the fore, to externalize, the ambivalences and affective resonances of memories that do not easily settle into any straightforward accounting or familiarity.55 Ambivalence does not imply that we should not thematize and explain, provide reasons and come to understandings, but whereas there can be reasons for disappearances under a dictatorship or in a war situation, there can be no reason for this individual’s disappearance nor any understanding of why that family who lost a loved one experiences rage and resentment over the process of (re)conciliation in the country.56 The demand for memory and the struggle for justice cannot be dismissed as being utterly nationalistic or self-righteous without diminishing the commitment to justice as aporetic. The danger here is ‘‘not because the state has failed to produce representations and validations (a history) of the past, but ironically, because the state (or anyone else for that matter) can cash in on these former representations by suggesting that the nation has already come to terms with its past.’’57 The struggle to balance different commemorative or justice projects in schools or public life through the help of the ghost does not imply in any sense that certain demands for justice or memory are simply relinquished. The figure of the ghost is invoked — politically, ethically, and pedagogically — to remind us that our thoughts, our representations, our emotions, and our lives would just be too limiting and superficial if they maintained ties only to a coherent-realist world. Living with the ghosts of disappeared victims of war and dictatorship implies that educators and learners learn to engage with the traumatic past — not by failing to address emotionally charged and controversial issues or by ‘‘forgetting’’ only those stories that are inconvenient to remember — but rather in a way that goes beyond evidentiary narratives and evokes new affective relationalities with others. These relationalities may be prompted, for instance, by the interrogative force of art, literature, and curricula that indeed welcome the ghosts of disappeared victims. The historical narrativization of disappearances will falter if it is limited to memorial desires for chronology, closure, and redemption or if it fails to acknowledge the complexities and ambivalences of competing (emotional) claims.58 All in all, pedagogies of hauntology foster a notion of history education that serves both ethical remembrance and critical learning precisely because these pedagogies do not aim to settle past injustices within familiar modes of historical lessons (for example, the collective identity of ‘‘we’’). Pedagogies of hauntology not only expose justice as aporetic (when there is a tendency to believe that ‘‘the past is over so ‘we’ just need to move on’’), but they also urge educators and learners to question their ahistorical attitudes as well as their ‘‘memorial desires for evidence, chronology, closure, identification and redemption.’’59 Such pedagogies include teaching and learning activities and curricula that enact new forms of relation to historical material (such as stories and images) and thus reclaim a sense of historicity. Yet this reclaimed sense of historicity is not evoked for purposes of continuity understood as a metahistorical concept, but rather it affirms that the responsibility of memory is aporetic justice.

### 2NC – Solves – Justice

#### Their focus on justice to right historical wrongs fails – only a perpetual re-questioning of injustice can free the other to achieve true justice.

Lai 3 – Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature and the Director of the Foreign Language Center at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan with a Ph.D. in Critical Theory from the University of Nottingham, U.K (Chung-Hsiung, “On Violence, Justice and Deconstruction,” *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, 29.1 (January 2003)//DD

As we have seen, in “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida does deal with some ethical issues but only in abstract ways to avoid, it is argued, falling into the structured mire of theory, method and philosophy or, in general, of the “limited economy.” Indeed, Derrida is often criticized for lacking positive and concrete socio-political aims and purposes. It seems that he has changed his privilege subjects—linguistic and philosophical thought over political and social thought6—although the spirit of deconstruction remains the same there for him. In most of his recent ethical-political articles and books, he clearly, directly and devotedly explores the political implications of deconstruction by joining the textual-linguistic différance to an ethico-political deconstructive messianism—justice (along with notions of democracy, laws, friendship and politics). “Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice” (Derrida 1992: 14-15). Justice, as the only thing he believes is undeconstructable, is a forever-coming messianic otherness—“the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice” (Derrida 1994b: 28). Justice, in the image of haunting specter, has directly lead deconstruction into ethical, social and political arenas and into, one may suggest, a post-deconstructive era. Deconstructive justice, however, can never be fully done in any tangible juridical form for it exists not merely for a historical wrong (which must be righted) or an epistemological violence (which must be repaired). Rather, it stands for the very possibility of justice as an imminence. In other words, just as history per se can never risk being reduced to historiographical records, files or representations, so can justice never be ontologized as juridical-moral rules within a hegemonic horizon. The logic of hauntology7 indicates this irreducible justice wholly external to the justice, a justice which is, and refers to, a justice of otherness separated irrevocably from juridical-moral justice and is always already antecedent to ontology and exterior to totality. Furthermore, this demand of justice to question is always imminent, uncompromising and unconditional. Only through a perpetual re-questioning injustice in an irremediable rupture, can the Other gain access to speak for itself and of itself in the name of justice. Responding to the imminent ethical demand of the Other for Derrida becomes “the art of politics” in our postmodern/postcolonialist context. Simon Critchely rightly states: The infinite ethical demand of deconstruction arises as a response to a singular context and calls forth the invention of a political decision. Politics itself can here be thought of as the art of response to the singular demand of the other, a demand that arises in a particular context— although the infinite demand cannot simply be reduced to its context—and calls for political invention, for creation. (1999: 276)

### AT: No Empirical Knowldge

#### Hauntology solves – it understands the specters without forgoing empirical knowledge.

Brøgger 14 – Associate Professor in education management, policy, and administration at the Department of Education Science in the Danish School of Education at Aarhus University (Katja, “The ghosts of higher education reform: on the organisational processes surrounding policy borrowing,” <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2014.901905>, *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 529–530, 2014)//DD

The philosophical concept of hauntology expresses a way of thinking that enables us to understand the ways in which the reform processes are haunted by what is seemingly absent. This analytical approach also relates to the manner in which the ethnographic method employed here allows us to gain access to what is not immediately visible: gaining access to what ‘is not there’. In this sense, ethnography becomes a kind of ‘ethnography of absence’: a tool to explore the constitutive effects of what is supposedly absent: As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten state, everything begins with the apparition of a specter. (Derrida 1994, 2) In Specters of Marx from 1994, Derrida starts developing his concept on ghosts by creating a neologism, the so-called ‘hauntology’: a ‘teaching on what is haunting’. Hauntology is a near homophone to ontology in French. Whereas ontology is the teaching on what exists, a teaching on the Da-sein, the being-there, hauntology is a teaching on what is not being-there (Derrida 1994, 202). In a way, hauntology is a supplement to ontology, and we have learned from Derrida’s work that the constitutive power tends to be imbedded in the supplement, ‘the rest’, the margins or what is seemingly ‘absent’. Ghosts are half-lives. They are an undetectable passage between loci and time, and are able to collapse past and present. According to Derrida, there is no Da-sein of the spectre. But neither is there Da-sein without the uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) of some spectre. In a way, ghosts are ‘absence’ with agency (Brøgger 2013; Brøgger and Staunæs 2012). What is absent will always ‘disturb’. It is beyond being but it appears and it haunts. The ghost is a revenant: it returns, ‘it ghosts’, it ‘specters’, as Derrida (1994, 10, 166) says: A question of repetition: a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and goings because it begins by coming back. (Derrida 1994, 11) Introducing the concept of hauntology in these studies allows us to present both a philosophical and an empirical point. The philosophical insight emphasises that ghosts first and foremost haunt Da-sein or ontology pure and simple: the idea that we can freeze ontological stands or centre on a single, hegemonic ontology. This insight connects with the empirical material; on the one hand, it appears as though the reform processes are haunted by what is seemingly absent; that the change in the organisation is propelled by something returning from absence (namely, as we shall see in this case, the old disciplinary groups). On the other hand, it is quite impossible to identify ‘the reality’ of the organisation; instead, various ‘reals’ seem to be evoked.

### AT: Pragmatism

#### Deconstruction is relevant for politics – it breaks down limits imposed by historical contexts.

Laclau 96 – Professor of Politics at the University of Essex(Ernesto “Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony,” in “Deconstruction and Pragmatism” by Chantal Mouffe, 1996)//DD

I will now successively explore the relevance for politics of these two dimensions of deconstruction—undecidability and decision. Undecidability first. I will broach the discussion by concentrating on the inner logic of three concepts central to contemporary political theory: representation, toleration and power. 1I have attempted elsewhere3 to deconstruct the logic of representation. Let me summarize here the main points of my argument. The condition of a good representation is, apparently, that there is perfect or transparent transmission, by the representative, of the will of those whom he represents. A good representation would be one in which the will moves in only one direction. This presupposes, of course, that at the point from which the relation of representation starts, there is a full identification of the represented with his will. The transparency of the relation of representation would be threatened if the will of the representative impinged upon the wills of those that he is supposed to represent. However, what this approach to the problem leaves aside is why the relation of representation needs to be established in the first place. The answer is, obviously, that it is because the represented are absent from the place in which the representation takes place, and that decisions affecting them are to be taken there. And these decisions—as any decision—involve negotiations whose result is indeterminate. But this amounts to saying that, if the represented need the relation of representation, it is because their identities are incomplete and have to be supplemented by the representative. This means that the role of the representative cannot be neutral, and that he will contribute something to the identities of those he represents. Ergo, the relation of representation will be, for essential logical reasons, constitutively impure: the movement from represented to representative will necessarily have to be supplemented by a movement in the opposite direction. Why is this important at all for the understanding of the political working of contemporary societies? The importance lies in that it allows us to understand—as possibilities that are internal to the logic of representation—many developments that had traditionally been considered as perversions or distortions of the representation process. For instance, it has usually been considered that the more democratic a process, the more transparent the transmission of the will of the represented by their representatives. Now, is this always the case? No doubt many examples could be quoted in which there has been manipulation of people’s will at the hands of their representatives. But there are other instances in which the privileging of the movement from representative to represented is the very condition of democratic participation. In many Third World countries, for example, unemployment and social marginalization leads to shattered social identities at the level of civil society and to situations in which the most difficult thing is how to constitute an interest, a will to be represented within the political system. In those situations, the task of the popular leaders consists, quite frequently, of providing the marginalized masses with a language out of which it becomes possible for them to reconstitute a political identity and a political will. The relation representative represented has to be privileged as the very condition of a democratic participation and mobilization. In the same way, even in advanced industrial societies, the fragmentation of identities around issue politics requires forms of political aggregation whose constitution involves that political representatives play an active role in the formation of collective wills and not just be the passive mirror of the pre-constituted interests at the level of civil society. Thus, these internal ambiguities of the relation of representation, the undecidability between the various movements that are possible within it, transform it into the hegemonic battlefield between a plurality of possible decisions. This does not mean that at any time everything that is logically possible becomes, automatically, an actual political possibility. There are inchoated possibilities which are going to be blocked, not because of any logical restriction, but as a result of the historical contexts in which the representative institutions operate. We should not forget, however, that there has been a general tendency to see the historical limitations resulting from those contexts as theoretical limits of the logic of representation as such. From there, there was only one step —which in most cases was unproblematically taken—to transform those limits into a canon and to consider any departure from it as perversion and distortion. All forms of ethnocentrism have developed in the wake of this operation. Deconstruction makes it possible to unknot this link between historical and logical limits and to reinscribe the apparently deviant cases in the very logical structure of the relation under analysis. The result can only be what I do not hesitate to call a widening of the transcendental horizon of politics (and by this I am not only speaking about a cognitive level —changes in performativity necessarily accompany all transcendental change).

## FW

### FW – Most Ethical

#### Our education is ethical – confronting the ghosts is key to disrupt the comfort of everyday assumption.

Ruitenberg 9 – Associate Professor, Philosophy of Education, in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia (Claudia, “Education as Séance: Specters, Spirits, and the Expansion of Memory,” Interchange, Vol. 40/3, DOI: 10.1007/s10780-009-9097-0, 2009)//DD

The perspective on remembrance and recollection offered by the work of Derrida is, first and foremost, ethical. Remembrance, for Derrida, is always interpretive and does not seek to re-collect a universal truth, but rather to come to terms with one’s intellectual heritage, the knowledge and values that have been passed down in explicit or implicit ways. This “coming to terms with” (s’expliquer avec) is an ethical act based on a recognition of indebtedness to whom and what came before, and responsibility for whom and what will come after. Derrida (1993/1994) turns the question of being into the question of inheritance, and lets the figure of the ghost (revenant) emerge as that which comes back from the inherited past to haunt a being in the present that, too often, forgets its indebtedness. Ontology thus becomes hauntology (p. 10). Based on this perspective, I add to the many metaphors that already exist for understanding and theorizing education, education as séance, a coming to (speaking) terms with ghosts. This metaphor is explicitly ethical, in the sense that I argue not merely that we can see education as séance, but that we ought to. My plea for attention to traces from the past is out of step with the modernist, anti-historical attitude of those narrowly focused on economic gain and technological progress. This attitude is exemplified in mottos such as “Don’t dwell on the past, look ahead to the future!” or “Life is for the living, not for the dead!” Life is indeed – obviously, tautologically – for the living, but an important and necessary trait of the dead is that they were once living, for what has not lived cannot be dead. The false dichotomy between past and future glosses over the fact that a human life does not consume itself, but spills over, exceeds itself, and its excess, its traces, both carry and disrupt the lives of the not-yet-dead. I conceive of education as a coming to terms with the ghosts and specters of the past that are, as Anne Michaels (1996) writes, “everywhere but the ground” (p. 8). They are in our dreams, our language, our ideas, our habits and rituals, our books and paintings. The knocking will not cease until we open the door; the ghosts will not settle down until we receive them. Before I go on to discuss the spectral traces of my childhood visits to an old castle, let me offer a point of clarification. Education can expand memory in many ways, and include pleasant as well as unpleasant recollections. In everyday language, however, we tend not to speak of ghosts and haunting in a positive way. The folk wisdom about ghosts is that only spirits who have unfinished business and cannot find peace will come back to haunt the living. Ghosts unsettle us, make us feel uncomfortable. That is the sense in which I will discuss ghosts: as those parts of our histories that we – or some of us – would rather not acknowledge and that, when we do, threaten to disrupt the comfort of our everyday assumptions and make our moral hair stand on end.

#### Hauntology is key to break down hegemonic knowledge production by focusing on inventing the future rather than fixing the past.

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

The purpose of this essay is to examine the possibilities for history education reconceived in terms of Derrida’s notion of hauntology (SM, 10), that is, as an ongoing conversation with the ghosts of disappeared victims of war and dictatorship through pedagogies that invent the future rather than fixing the past. Hauntology is used in this essay as both metaphor and pedagogical methodology for deconstructing the orthodoxies of academic history thinking and learning. As metaphor, hauntology evokes the figure of the ghost to trouble the hegemonic status of representational modes of knowledge in remembrance practices and to undermine their ontological frames and ideological histories. As pedagogical methodology, hauntology reframes histories of loss and absence and uses them as points of departure to acknowledge the complexities and contradictions that emerge from haunting. In other words, I invoke what Sande Cohen has coined as ‘‘historiospectography’’ — to describe Derrida’s advocacy of the unlimited ‘‘being-with specters’’ — and highlight the openings for renewed pedagogical engagements with notions of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in history education.

# Aff

## Link

### AT: Link – Common Core

#### Globalization is net worse and causes all of their impacts – it *cements neoliberal exploitation without social justice* which causes the rise of more unaddressed specters.

Lai 5 – Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature and the Director of the Foreign Language Center at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan with a Ph.D. in Critical Theory from the University of Nottingham, U.K (Chung-Hsiung, “Transgressive Flows: Theorizing a Hauntology of Anti-Globalization,” *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, 31.1 (January 2005)//DD

Specters, or more precisely the specters of the Other, are inexorably haunting globalization. Favoring free-market economy over social justice and environmental ecology,1 globalization as the most updated form of modernity is admittedly undergoing its severest test to date.2 In the wake of the 11 September 2001 tragedy, such a test yet takes on a new and even greater sense of urgency and severity. The transnational protests by the anti-globalization movement, demanding justice for diverse repressed others, have threatened the established systems of the new world order. Doubtlessly, globalization as an increasingly dynamic interplay of energy has created a novel and somewhat euphoric phenomenon of “time-space compression” or “deterritorialization”; it makes the world seem so far away yet so near, projecting its rosy future into the twenty-first century. Driven by neo-liberal capitalism and modern technologies, globalization at its best has been undertaken to promote the free and fair flow of a transnational economy and culture with a view to a better world to come. However, not to be ignored is the fact that the process of globalization is dominated by the wealthiest countries mainly for their own interest. The rosy promises of a global future shared by everyone on earth are criticized as pipe dreams. Indeed, globalization has conjured up diverse haunting specters, embodied in the numerous ethico-political protests concerned with environmental protection, third world poverty, marginal cultures, nuclear weapons, ethnic conflicts, linguistic colonization, etc. According to Derrida: “Hegemony still organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a haunting. Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (Specters 37). Where there is repression there is a resistance, frequently in the form of spectrality, of ethico-political haunting that brings in moments of rupture. The anti-globalization movement, I believe, introduces resistances in the form of dynamic and transgressive flows in an era of expanding transnational connections and global capital.

### AT: Link – Foreign Languages

#### Monolingualism is net worse and replicates the logic of the colonizer – the impact is racialized violence and otherization predicated on colonial modes of knowledge – only the aff solves by allowing students to access foreign language education.

Chow 8 – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Comparative Literature and Modern Culture and Media at Brown University (Rey, “Reading Derrida on Being Monolingual,” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20058066>, *New Literary History*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Reading, Writing, and Representation, Spring 2008)//DD

With these rhetorical turns, Derrida foregrounds the important question of the relationship among language, property ownership, and sense of belonging. His apparent logical or performative contradiction—always speaking and writing in French, while claiming that the language is not his and yet not foreign to him—may thus be seen as a way of confronting us with the problem of language as legacy: what does it mean to “have” a language—when we believe that a language belongs to us, that it is ours? Does “having” a language mean inheriting it like a bequest from authentic ancestors, and/or being able to control the language’s future by handing it down to the proper heirs? Is such possession through descent and/or posterity a privilege that is exclusive to native speakers? Not surprisingly, these eminently philosophical, yet also practical and mundane, questions lie at the core of a memoir about an author’s experience with colonialism during his most formative years.5 As is demonstrated in the arguments of well-known African writers such as Albert Memmi, Chinua Achebe, and Ngugi wa Thiong’o, the fundamentally alienating encounter with the colonizer’s demands often leave those who have lived through such an encounter feeling haunted for the rest of their lives.6 We may surmise that Derrida’s first-hand relationship with the legacy of French in colonial Algeria, too, must have left indelible imprints on his process of coming to terms with language, including his need to deconstruct it. As Hédi Abdel-Jaouad puts it: “Derrida invites us to read Monolingualism of the Other not only as yet another avatar of his autobiographical anamnesis, his nostalgeria, but also as a demonstration of deconstruction in the act, as a method of reading closely the intricate relationship between autobiography and language.” Derrida’s personal history in Algeria, Abdel-Jaouad Confessions from an "Absolute Habitat, in large part because of his mildly exhibitionistic and often self-flagellating sense of candor. Being introduced to French literature, for instance, is, he writes, an experience of alienation as well as of enjoyment: not only does it reinforce the haughtiness of the literary from non-literary culture; it also effectuated "a brutal severance . . . fostering a more acute partition: the one that separates French literature?its history, its works, its models, its cult of the dead, its modes of transmission and celebration, its 'posh districts,' its names of authors and editors?from the culture 'proper' to 'French Algerians'" (45).8 And although Derrida's French was undoubtedly of native fluency, he writes that he has not quite lost his "French Algerian" accent, adding, in a derisively self-revelatory tone, that "I would like to hope, I would very much prefer, that no publication permit my 'French Algerian' to appear," believing in the meantime that no one "can detect by reading that he is "French Algerian" (46; emphasis Derrida's)9?that is, that he can pass as authentic as long as his speech is seen and not heard. This pursuit of linguistic purity, gauged at the level of speech despite Derrida's famous critique of phonocentrism, a purity that must remain untarnished by any unseemly accents, leads to a ready intolerance of those who do not measure up, an intolerance that borders on (racial) discrimination.10 Again, it is through Derrida's unyielding honesty that we begin to grasp the depth of his anguish over this issue. Impure French accents tend to make him squirm, yet he also cannot forgive himself for feeling and reacting that way: these compulsive attitudes, judgments, and reactions, which he frankly acknowledges, imbue the following series of confessions with noticeable intensities: I am not proud of it, I make no doctrine of it, but so it is: an accent?any French accent, but above all a strong southern accent?seems incompatible to me with the intellectual dignity of public speech. (Inadmissible, isn't it? Well, I admit it.) Incompatible, a fortiori, with the vocation of a poetic speech. . . . Throughout the story I am relating, despite everything I sometimes appear to profess, I concede that I have contracted a shamefulbut intractable intolerance: at least in French, insofar as the language is concerned, I cannot bear or admire anything other than pure French ... I still do not dare admit this compulsive demand for a purity of language except within boundaries of which I can be sure. ... It simply exposes me to sufferingwhen someone, who can be myself, happens to fall short of it. I suffer even further when I catch myself or am caught "red-handed" in the act. (46; my emphases)11 Of course, the psychic burden exacted by the French language in Derrida's case could be understood simply as a typical consequence of colonialism, with something of the psychic burden exacted by whiteness that authors such as Memmi, Frantz Fanon, and W. E. B. Du Bois, among others, have described. The obsession with pure French—together with the sense of discomfort at detecting any improper accent, including one's own, and the concomitant sense of shame/guilt about such discomfort—is, in this respect, not unlike the black man's obsession with whiteness, replete with the tormenting feelings of hyper-self-conscious ness, self-revulsion, self-pity, and self-hatred that accompany such obsession, in what amounts to a vicious circle of ressentiment derived from skin color.12 "So goes the drama of the man who is a product and victim of colonization," writes Memmi of this situation. "He almost never succeeds in corresponding with himself."13 To this extent, the entangled feelings of submission, self-vigilance, and shame/guilt Derrida admits toward what he refers to as the "interdict" {l'interdite) instigated by French is one manner of explaining his phrase "monolingualism of the other"?which means, first and foremost, a monolingualism coerced and imposed by the other (39). "The other" in this instance is, quite straightforwardly, the colonizer who, operating on the foundation of a repressive sovereignty, demands that the colonized adhere to a single language, against which the colonized is, moreover, always found to be inferior. Hence Derrida's uneasy awareness that he probably still has an accent: "not everything in my 'French Algerian' accent is lost. Its intonation is more apparent in certain 'pragmatic' situations (anger or exclamation in familial or familiar sur roundings, more often in private than in public, which is a quite reliable criterion for the experience of this strange and precarious distinction) " (45) .14 In addition to inducing in the colonized an unfulfillable yearning for linguistic purity and hence a general sense of disability, this monolingualism of the other legitimates itself by getting rid of likely competitors, by making sure that native languages such as Arabic and Berber become increasingly marginalized and useless. During Derrida's youth, the study of Arabic, for instance, was restricted to the school, where it was presented as an alien language, an option like English, Spanish, or German, while Berber was never included. As a result, fewer and fewer students who gained access to the lycée, including those of Algerian origin, selected Arabic as a discipline, except when the language was deemed convenient for meeting technical and professional purposes (37-38). The monolingualism of the colonizer means that the development and refinement of the mind that come with literary, philosophical, and humanistic culture (in what may be called a liberal arts education) was allowed to take place, in Algeria's case, only in French. As Abdel Jaouad writes, this monolingualism is for Derrida "a living paradox, an aporia incarnated, . . . since whatever he rejects about French he must declare in French, the only language he has, but which he, nevertheless, cannot call his own."15

## Alt

### Can’t Solve in the Short Term

#### Deconstruction can’t solve the short term – only political deliberation and decision through *plain language* can create political change.

Rorty 96 – University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia (Richard, “Response to Simon Critchley,” in “Deconstruction and Pragmatism” by Chantal Mouffe, 1996)//DD

Still, Critchley is quite right in saying that I would not assign much political significance to either Proust or Derrida. I agree with Richard Bernstein that to understand Derrida’s motives one most see his work against a political background—and in particular against the background of the Holocaust. But I also agree with Thomas McCarthy that deconstruction is marginal to politics—that if you want to do some political work, deconstructing texts is not a very efficient way to set about it. Getting rid of phallogocentrism, metaphysics and all that is an admirable long-term cultural goal, but there is still a difference between such goals and the relatively short-term goals served by political deliberation and decision. In the United States there are, alas, a large number of admirers of Derrida who see writing in his manner as their contribution to the relief of human suffering and the enlargement of human freedom. This Derridean left acquired a bad reputation, because it was invidiously contrasted with the sort of left that organizes strikes, lobbies legislators, puts forward candidates for Congress, writes newspaper editorials, and the like. I have made a lot of such invidious contrasts myself.3 The main reason I make them is that I see politics, at least in democratic countries, as something to be conducted in as plain, blunt, public, easy-to-handle language as possible. I see the enemies of human happiness as just greed, sloth and hypocrisy, and I don’t see the need for philosophical depth charges in dealing with such surface enemies. Critchley is largely right in saying that I ‘refuse the rich critical potential of seeing writers like Nietzsche and Foucault as public ironists’. I think that cartoonists like Trudeau and Herblock in the US, and various contributors to Le Canard Enchaîné in France, have a lot more critical potential as public ironists—as purveyors of fruitful redescriptions of the behaviour of our leaders—than do philosophers. It is true that Foucault, unlike Nietzsche, did offer some sensible political advice: he explained what to watch out for when dealing with psychiatrists, social workers, professors of various social sciences, and the like. Nevertheless, when public irony is what is wanted, philosophers and social theorists (except for the occasional Veblen) are usually not the best people to turn to. A traditional difference between European and American intellectuals has been that the latter think that the moral and political decisions we face as individuals and as citizens are pretty clear, and that the vocabulary in which we typically formulate them does not need extensive revision. So they are slow to recognize the relevance of philosophy to politics, and inclined to think of philosophy as something you can take or leave alone—something which need not be approached in a spirit of moral seriousness. The Derridean left in the US has tried to make the Americans more European in this respect. I hope it fails in this attempt, because I think that in this respect at least, we Americans have bettered the instruction.

### Deconstruction Utopian

#### Deconstruction is utopian and prevents effective action.

Rorty 96 – University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia (Richard, “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,” in “Deconstruction and Pragmatism” by Chantal Mouffe, 1996)//DD

This flurry of deconstructive activity seems to me to have added little to our understanding of literature and to have done little for leftist politics. On the contrary, by diverting attention from real politics, it has helped create a self-satisfied and insular academic left which—like the left of the 1960s—prides itself on not being co-opted by the system and thereby renders itself less able to improve the system. Irving Howe’s much-quoted jibe—‘These people don’t want to take over the government; they just want to take over the English Department’— seems to me to remain an important criticism of this academic left. I see no real connection between what Derrida is up to and the activity which is called ‘deconstruction’, and I wish that the latter word had never taken hold as a description of Derrida’s work. I have never found, or been able to invent, a satisfactory definition of that word. I often use it as shorthand for ‘the sort of thing Derrida does’, but I do so faute de mieux, and with a self-exculpatory shrug. In an article called ‘Deconstruction’ (published in volume 8 of The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism), I claim that there are deep differences between Derrida’s own motives and interests and those of Paul de Man, the founder of the school of literary criticism which was briefly (before the advent of ‘cultural studies’) dominant in the US. I argue that the de Manian way of reading texts—as testifying to ‘the presence of a nothingness’—is very different from Derrida’s approach to texts. So much for the opposed misreadings of Derrida which I mentioned at the outset. I turn now to the relation of the sort of thing that Derrida does to pragmatism. Pragmatism starts out from Darwinian naturalism—from a picture of human beings as chance products of evolution. This starting-point leads pragmatists to be as suspicious of the great binary oppositions of Western metaphysics as are Heidegger and Derrida. Darwinians share Nietzschean suspicions of Platonic other-worldliness, and the Nietzschean conviction that distinctions like mind-vs.-body and objective-vs.-subjective need to be reformulated in order to cleanse them of Platonic presuppositions and give them a firmly naturalistic sense. Naturalists, like Derrideans, have no use for what Derrida calls ‘a full presence which is beyond play’, and they distrust, as much as he does, the various God-surrogates which have been proposed for the role of such a full presence. Both kinds of philosophers see everything as constituted by its relations to other things, and as having no intrinsic, ineluctable nature. What it is depends on what it is being related to (or, if you like, what it differs from). When it comes to language, pragmatists see the later Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson as having got rid of the dualistic, Fregean ways of thinking which dominated the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and early analytic philosophy. They read Derrida on language as making pretty much the same criticisms of the Cartesian/Lockean/Husserlian view of ‘language as the expression of thought’ which Wittgenstein made in his Philosophical Investigations. They read both Derrida and Wittgenstein not as having discovered the essential nature of language, or of anything else, but simply as having helped get rid of a misleading, and useless, picture—the one which Quine called the myth of the museum: the image of there being an object, the meaning, and next to it its label, the word. What pragmatists find most foreign in Derrida is his suspicion of empiricism, and naturalism—his assumption that these are forms of metaphysics, rather than replacements for metaphysics. To put it another way: they cannot understand why Derrida wants to sound transcendental, why he persists in taking the project of finding conditions of possibility seriously. So when pragmatists are told by ‘deconstructionists’ that Derrida has ‘demonstrated’ that Y, the condition of the possibility of X, is also the condition of the impossibility of X, they feel that this is an unnecessarily high-faluting way of putting a point which could be put a lot more simply: viz., that you cannot use the word ‘A’ without being able to use the word ‘B’, and vice versa, even though nothing can be both an A and an B. In my own writing about Derrida I have urged that we see him as sharing Dewey’s utopian hopes, but not treat his work as contributing, in any clear or direct way, to the realization of those hopes. I divide philosophers, rather crudely, into those (like Mill, Dewey and Rawls) whose work fulfils primarily public purposes, and those whose work fulfils primarily private purposes. I think of the Nietzsche-HeideggerDerrida assault on metaphysics as producing private satisfactions to people who are deeply involved with philosophy (and therefore, necessarily, with metaphysics) but not as politically consequential, except in a very indirect and long-term way. So I think of Derrida as at his best in works like the ‘Envois’ section of La Carte postale—works in which his private relationships to his two grandfathers, Freud and Heidegger, are clearest.

### Deconstruction Fails

#### Deconstruction is ineffective and will only cause a remembrance of the past as everyone dies.

Blanuša 14 – Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Department for Croatian Studies at the University of Zagerb (Zrinka Božić, “What about the Politics of Deconstruction?” 2014)//DD

The question is, how to address these issues in relation to the deconstruction of community and rethinking of Europe? What do these two projects have in common? What do they tell us about the politics of deconstruction? How do the aforementioned complaints against Derrida’s politics affect the deconstructive preoccupation with questions of community and Europe? In his discussion on Nancy’s approach to the question of community, Bernasconi emphasizes the notion of nostalgia “as what constitutes its appeal”.97 Referring to Nancy’s insistence on Western nostalgia for a more archaic community, Bernasconi demonstrates, how in a certain way, deconstruction of nostalgia for community (as well as deconstruction of community) can be seen as another form of nostalgia. “Deconstruction of nostalgia for community is at the same time deconstruction of the future community for which one is required to sacrifice one’s life”, writes Bernasconi.98 In other words, when deconstruction takes place it is always for the sake of certain positive possibilities of tradition. Unlike Derrida, Nancy preserves the concept of community as a pure being-with (or the position of being). On the other hand, Gasché, following Derrida, argues for positive possibilities of the name Europe. What becomes evident in both cases is the attempt to add new meaning to old names in order to maintain past concepts for the future. Just as Gasché’s attempt to rethink the concept of Europe in order to preserve it, the discussion on community reveals how deconstruction keeps being “threatened by nostalgia for the so-called Western metaphysics, securing Western philosophy’s identity at the very moment that it questions it”.99 It seems that, in a violent and unpredictable encounter with the demand to think Europe and the community, deconstruction repeats traumatism without forgetting it completely and without letting itself be completely annihilated by it.

### AT: Specters

#### Their usage of specters as a deconstructive method fails – it forces contradictions that prevent rational and scientific knowledge.

Cilliers 5 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa (Paul, “Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, DOI: 10.1177/0263276405058052, 2005)//DD

A serious philosophical argument often brought against deconstruction, for example by Habermas (1987: 185–210), is that it is subject to the performative contradiction. Simply put, this mistake is made when there is a contradiction between what you say, and the way in which you say it. Thus Habermas claims that when Derrida argues against reason, he has to make use of rational means. ‘Anyone who argues against reason is necessarily caught up in a contradiction: she asserts at the locutionary level that reason does not exist, while demonstrating by way of her performance in argumentative processes that such reason does in fact exist’ (Fleming, 1996: 169). The claim made above – that we can never have complete knowledge of complex systems – falls into the same trap. It looks like an absolute statement about complex things but denies that such a statement can be made. Whether Habermas is correct in his assessment that Derrida argues against reason13 is of less importance now than it is to look at the ‘logic’ of the performative contradiction. The first thing one should notice is that most careful or modest claims will come under pressure from this test. The claim ‘no sentence has an exact meaning’ obviously fails the test, but the claim ‘perhaps some sentences are not perfectly clear’ is also in trouble. If it is correct, then the sentence itself is perfectly clear. If it is not correct, then perhaps all sentences are clear. This point can be made more explicit by examining what kind of statements would pass the test. The claim, ‘When I am rational I will always be right’ passes the test with flying colours! It may not be true, but there is no contradiction between what I say and how I am saying it. I am always right, and I am also right that I am always right, and I can make this claim in an assertive tone of voice. Surely a test that will pass most self-assertive, macho claims and that will fail most modest claims, cannot be all that useful when dealing with complex things. Some reasons for this can be supplied. The performative contradiction is predicated on the assumption that one can adequately distinguish between the performative and the locutionary levels, and, in the terms Habermas uses to criticize Derrida, between logic and rhetoric. However, in order to make this distinction clearly, one would need to take in a position that can characterize what is being said from an external vantage point. In the language of complexity, that would mean that one has access to a framework that is not the result of a strategic choice, i.e. some objective meta-framework. This is exactly what the view from complexity is sceptical about. The argument is that our frameworks are all compromised to some extent; dealing with complexity is a little messy. As Derrida (1988: 119) says: if things were simple, word would have gotten around.14 In a way, the view from complexity acknowledges that some form of performative tension is inevitable. We are playing in what Wood (1990: 150) calls the ‘theatre of difficulty’, and this requires a certain ‘performative reflexivity’ (1990: 132). We need to demonstrate the difficulties we are in; also in the way we talk about them. Our discourse should reflect the complexities. To talk about the complex world as if it can be understood clearly is a contradiction of another kind15 and this is a contradiction with ethical implications. Those who claim to have access to the truth are denying us our critical perspective and, therefore, keep us in a kind of false consciousness by not restoring the world to its original difficulty. It is only by acknowledging that we are in trouble that we can start grappling with the complexities around us. To be subject to the performative contradiction would seem, at least from the perspective of a certain kind of logical argumentation, to be a weak position. Such a position is seen as not being sufficiently rational and thus unscientific and irresponsible. The view from complexity argues to the contrary, that the conditions imposed by the test for performative contradiction feeds off a kind of intellectual arrogance that is in itself irresponsible. We only have limited access to a complex world and when we are dealing with the limits of our understanding, we are dealing with ethics. In Derrida’s (2000: 467) words: ‘There is ethics precisely where I am in performative powerlessness.’ The modest position is not weak; it is responsible.

### AT: Hauntology

#### Hauntology is too Right-wing and only causes a cycle that makes their impact inevitable.

Pankhurst 14 – had essays published in Evola: Thoughts & Perspectives, Volume One (2011), Crowley: Thoughts & Perspectives, Volume Two (2011), and Helios: Journal of Metaphysical & Occult Studies, Volume One (2011) and contributer to New Imperium magazine (Christopher, “Toward a Right-Wing Hauntology: Mark Fisher’s Ghosts of My Life,” <https://www.counter-currents.com/2014/06/toward-a-right-wing-hauntology/>, 2014)//DD

In fact, when you think about it, hauntology is already an implicitly Right-wing exercise in essence. Consider the notion of lost futures mentioned earlier. This sense that culture is drifting without any sense of progression, that the very notion of a possible future is receding, is exactly what you would expect to find at the end of a civilizational cycle. For Oswald Spengler, the declining years of a civilization give rise to what he termed the “second religiousness.” This is a phase where democratic, money values have become ubiquitous, and there is a general sense of cynicism and boredom, symptomatic of a yearning for more genuine, more numinous forms of expression. However, this is not a time when such forms of expression are readily available; instead there is a return to earlier forms that have the appearance of greater authenticity. Hence the plethora of new age movements and the importing of exotic spiritualities. At the time of the second religiousness, the inner life of the culture has already reached full maturity so it cannot continue to develop in any meaningful sense. Therefore the only available forms of spiritual expression are those forms which were once vital but which now are moribund. Spengler calls materialism shallow and honest, mock-religion shallow and dishonest. But he goes on to say that the very fact that there is even a longing for pseudo-religions foreshadows a more genuine seeking towards the numinous. And, in this respect, we can interpret the hauntologically-inflected artists under consideration here as seekers of the numinous who happen to be alive at the time of the second religiousness. Fisher locates the “current crisis of cultural temporality” (p. 14) as arising from Post-Fordist economic systems, seeing the simultaneous boredom and overactivity required by such systems as the motor for the lazy yet relentless recycling of retro forms. Such an observation is entirely in accord with Spengler’s view of the time of the second religiousness. The paradox of revolutionary, accelerationist technological developments delivering increasingly conventional and conservative content is simply the unwinding of the Faustian soul. The (digital) flesh is willing but the (numinous) spirit is weak. Whereas we perennialists might talk of the second religiousness, Marxist scholars will insist on “late capitalism.” They both refer to the same reality, but whereas the Marxists insist that this phase will inevitably be followed by revolutionary communism, Spenglerians recognie that capitalism and communism are both elements of the late phase of a civilization. Our view of history is based on reality rather than wishful thinking. Given that hauntology is predicated on the notion that the past will continue to intrude into the present, it seems to me to be a perfect mode of analysis for perennialists. The cyclic view of history recognizes that any particular culture must grow and develop according to certain principles, that there is a morphology of history, and also that history is cyclic. When this is realized, it will be seen that the Marxist view of history falls short because it posits a utopian endpoint. And, as Spengler observed, optimism is cowardice. In the perennialist view of history there is an inevitable unfolding, a flowering, but it will always lead to death (and then rebirth). So, just as for an individual, “the child is father to the man,” so for culture, “Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future And time future contained in time past.” Hauntology is right to suggest that Marx can be resurrected because the past can never be finally laid to rest. But it doesn’t go far enough. The communist phase does return, but it returns at the end of each cycle, again and again. There is no endpoint, just eternal unfolding.

## FW

### AT: Deconstruction is Ethical

#### Deconstruction replicates the logic of Holocaust denialism.

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Denials on the basis of rationalization, minimization, relativization or other deconstruction of meaning One of the first devices of deniers is to attempt to downgrade a significance of a genocide by minimizing the statistics of the number of dead (Charny, 1999). On the one hand, it is as if the numbers will be reduced to a level below some mythical mathematical quantity where they can no longer qualify as genocide; on the other hand, it is as if discrediting the conventional statistics will discredit the very essence of the genocide. Thus, when a scholar of the Holocaust of the stature of Yehuda Bauer revised downwards the number of Jews killed at Auschwitz, the denial industry immediately celebrated such further “evidence” for their corrupt revisionism. So too there are denials based on the often correct claims that not all members of a group were killed or were intended to be killed; hence, it is argued no true genocide was committed or even was attempted. Thus, as previously mentioned, an argument used by those who insist that only the Holocaust was a “true” genocide is that the Turks did not attempt to kill all the Armenians in Istanbul. In fact, it has been shown that there was an original roundup of Armenian political leaders and intelligentsia in Istanbul on April 24, 1915, which marked the onset of the Armenian Genocide, and that the Turks went on to murder thousands of additional Armenians in Istanbul later on, although they never reached the point of creating a total population transfer in that region. The fact is that neither were all Jews killed by the Nazis, not only because the Nazis did not get around to them all, but because there were various exceptions such as deals to allow some Jews to leave in return for trucks, and there are a variety of instances in which the ultimate annihilation of the Jews was postponed in various regions of Europe in response to the complex political interactions with local governments. Obviously, the definition of an obvious event of genocide of a large number of people should not be dependent on the degrees of efficiency and inefficiency or the timetables of the perpetrators for getting to victims. Another device used by deniers which borders on a return to the sloppy or flagrant forms of racism is to attempt to stigmatize the victim group as unlikable, or say as provocative, rebellious and disloyal to a host nation, as if to justify, at least psychologically, their deserving to be attacked. Over time the intellectual argumentation employed by deniers has become more and more sophisticated. The deniers attempt to employ various devices of rationalization and deconstruction of meaning that seek to avoid placing the deniers themselves in obviously bad lights as intellectual hooligans or bigots. Professor Bernard Lewis, for example, argued in formal written communications to the court in Paris—where he was successfully sued, convicted and fined for having been derelict of his responsibilities as a scholar—that he had revised his earlier writing about the holocaust of the Armenians based on new researches which he never cites even when challenged (Adalian, 1997; Charny, 1997, 2001). Similarly, historical “reinterpretations” of the Holocaust were advanced in Germany by Professor Ernst Nolte and others in a thinly veiled but unfortunately clever maneuver to devalue the Holocaust, arguing that there was nothing new in human history about collective mass murder. Nolte, moreover, accompanies the above subtle denial with manifest adulation of Hitler as a great German, as well as citations of full-fledged known revisionists, but then too with periodic statements of regret over the deaths of the Jews. The total effect is one of masterful sophisticated denial, in which the central argument that there have always been mass murders and therefore the Holocaust is not uniquely new in itself is literally correct. Yet the meta-meaning is to relativize and deconstruct the Holocaust, let alone as noted to engage in various forms of partial denial of central facts of the Holocaust (Nolte, 1966, 1994; Charny, 1997, 2001). What is common to all the labored redefinitions is that they seek to achieve the exclusion of some large number(s) of dead human bodies that have been murdered en masse from the universe of genocide. For a further discussion of “definitionalism” in the context of the legitimate and necessary functions of the process of definition in the workings of science, see Charny (1994) where a generic classification of genocide is presented which treats all cases of mass murder as genocide and then further defines specific different subcategories of genocides carefully according to their differential characteristics, so that differences between cases are not at all lost, but at the same time all cases of mass murder are honored as belonging to an overarching world of genocidal events

## Perm

### Perm do Both

#### Perm do both – Derrida’s critique does not include ways to change liberal democratic institutions.

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Derrida is similarly uninterested in the task of providing philosophical foundations for liberal democratic political concepts, preferring the pragmatic goal of seeking to ensure that they are as inclusive and as widely entrenched as possible. As we noted above, he has always insisted that deconstruction is pragmatic in the sense that it seeks to intervene in order to change things or at least to intensify transformations already underway (‘Force of Law’ 8–9). He and Rorty part company, it is true, over the role that philosophy can play in relation to these social and political trans- formations. While Derrida insists that the kinds of conceptual analysis he undertakes can play a positive role, Rorty prefers the efforts of artists, journalists and other sentimental educators towards changing the sensibilities of people, thereby awakening them to hitherto unnoticed or unappreciated harms, violations of right or limitations of democratic principles (Rorty, ‘Human Rights’ 180–5). Derrida’s aporetic analysis of democracy and his willingness to question fundamental presuppositions of its current forms undoubtedly serve to differentiate him from less critical and more complacent versions of liberalism. However, as he has admitted, there is a kind of formalism about his aporetic analysis which leaves it somewhat disengaged from both the immediate objects of political concern and the terms in which criticism can effectively engage with present institutions, policies and practices of government.8 For example, when he invokes the critical function of ‘democracy to come’ and suggests that it underwrites the criticism of ‘what remains inadequate to the democratic ideal’, he refers to the plight of those who suffer from ‘malnutrition, disease and humiliation’ and who are deprived not only of bread and water but also equality, freedom and ‘the rights of all’ (Rogues 86). In doing so, he appeals to certain determinate conceptions of equality, rights and entitlement, but does not spell out how these relate to what he has elsewhere characterised as the variable and paradoxical resources of the democratic tradition. What precisely is the content of the ‘democratic demand’ which is not met by the condition of those who suffer and how is it anchored in the democratic tradition? Given the historicity and variability of the concept, what in the present allows us to present it as a ‘demand’ of the democratic ideal? At this point, his argument would benefit from engagement with the rich and wide- ranging debate within contemporary liberal political theory over the basis of rights, the different kinds of equality and their relationship to the concept of democracy. Derrida’s aporetic analysis of democracy is also limited by its reliance on a rather simple and anachronistic concept of democracy. There is nothing extraordinary in the suggestion that the contemporary form and concept of democracy might be transformed in the future, as it has been in the past. The essential lack of essence and the resultant historicity of the concept already implies this possibility. The fact that unqualified democracy includes the principle that all principles of public reason, including this one, are open to criticism gives rise to the aporia implied in the logic of autoimmunity. It amounts to the potentially suicidal character of democracy. Derrida attributes this antinomy to the role of freedom in the concept of democracy, in particular as this was defined by Aristotle. He represents Aristotle’s definition in terms of two pairs of concepts: freedom and equality, and equality of number as opposed to equality of worth. Democracy is founded upon the freedom of individuals to think and act as they choose. This freedom extends to all, so that no individual’s choices are more worthy than another’s. In turn, this implies that the governing principle is equality of number: the decision of the majority is the final arbiter of justice. But this acceptance of equality of number rather than worth leads to the destruction of both equality and freedom, since it leaves open the possibility that an anti-democratic majority might attain the majority. In this manner, In the name of one couple, the couple made up of freedom and equality, one agrees to a law of numbers (equality according to number) that ends up destroying both couples; both the couple made up of the two equalities (equality according to worth and equality according to number) and the couple equality- freedom. (Derrida, Rogues 34) But this antinomy arguably exposes a limitation of Derrida’s discussion as much as it does of the concept of democracy. In order to formalise the aporia of autoimmunity, he relies on a very limited textual base and an anachronistic concept of democracy by contemporary standards. Had he taken into account more theorists of liberal democracy, he would have confronted a more complex axiomatic in which considerations of value do play an important role. First, the value of freedom is considered to set limits to the operation of the democratic principle of equality of number. The freedom of each is of such value that neither individuals nor the numerical majority are allowed to infringe upon it. This idea is embodied in Kant’s universal principle of public right, in Mill’s harm principle and in the first principle of Rawls’s theory of justice. In each case the freedom of each to live as he or she chooses does not extend to impinging on the freedom of others to do likewise. In effect, these philosophers add further axioms to those set down in Aristotle’s definition, thereby providing more complex concepts of democratic freedom and justice. They privilege equality of worth (the value of freedom for each member of the society) over equality of number (the value of majority decision). This kind of auto-limitation on the freedom enjoyed in democratic society serves to immunise liberal democracy against those forms of exercise of freedom which might undermine the freedom of others. However, it leaves open the question of permissible responses to breaches of this principle, some of which might undermine that very freedom. It would be helpful to show how the logic of autoimmunity can arise in these more complex axiomatisations of liberal democracy.9 These limitations show the importance of extending the textual base of Derrida’s arguments in order to bring his conceptual analyses to bear on a broader range of contemporary democratic theorists. At the same time, consideration of his work might open up new perspectives within contemporary liberal thought. Consider the manner in which he draws upon his earlier work to introduce into the discussion of cosmopolitan democracy elements of his critique of the autonomous subject or ‘ipseity’ and to relate this to the problem of sovereignty. By ‘ipseity’ he means the idea of a sovereign self that possesses the power to give itself ‘its own law, its force of law, its self-representation, the sovereign and reappropriating gathering of self in the simultaneity of an assemblage or assembly’ (Rogues 11). The present international order of sovereign states shows us that, so long as democracy incorporates this idea of sovereignty, it cannot but ensure that the reason of the strongest will prevail. Derrida concludes that it is imperative to dissociate democracy from the principle of sovereignty. He contrasts the unconditionality of sovereignty with the unconditionality of ‘democracy to come’ in order to argue for limits to sovereignty, for example by constitutional measures that might ensure that it is shared among different parties and that might regulate the manner in which it can be employed. A sovereignty that is no longer indivisible and uncon- ditional but divisible and subject to conditions in this way is no longer sovereign in the traditional sense of the term.